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SUBJECT: Forwards RCE-91-025, "MSIV 2HV8204 Rail/Skirt Failure,"  
 safety engineering root cause rept.

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November 6, 1991

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362  
Root Cause Evaluation of Main Steam Isolation Valves  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Gentlemen:

As indicated in SCE's letter dated September 24, 1991, during an inspection of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) on San Onofre Unit 2, damage was identified in MSIV 2HV8204. The damage was observed in an internal cam assembly which is not part of the valve pressure boundary. This letter provides our evaluation of the root cause of that damage in the enclosed report, "MSIV 2HV8204 RAIL/SKIRT FAILURE, ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION RCE-91-025, NOVEMBER 5, 1991."

As indicated in the enclosed report, it is concluded that the root cause of the observed damage to 2HV8204 was a poor design choice for the material used on the contact surfaces of the guide rail and shoe of the cam assembly. The material problem was compounded by a previous valve modification which resulted in line contact between the surfaces of these components and therefore increased the contact stresses between the components.

In order to eliminate the possibility of damage, both of the Unit 2 MSIVs have been modified during the current outage by hardfacing the components and revising the ramp angle between the contact surfaces. The Unit 3 MSIVs will be similarly modified during the next refueling outage, presently scheduled for January 1992. Until the Unit 3 refueling outage, it is concluded that the Unit 3 MSIVs remain capable of performing their safety function as discussed in the operability assessment forwarded by our September 24, 1991, letter.

Finally, SCE will perform a review of the design of all WKM valves used in safety related applications and determine if they are subject to similar failure modes. It is expected that this review will be completed by November 1, 1992. Appropriate corrective action will be taken if required by the outcome of this review.

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If you have any questions regarding the enclosed report, please call me.

Sincerely,

*RM Roser*

cc: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V  
C. W. Caldwell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre  
Units 1, 2 & 3