

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8801250555 DOC. DATE: 88/01/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-361 San Onofre Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Southern California 05000361
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 MORGAN, H. E. Southern California Edison Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-031-00: on 871217, main feedwater isolation valve failed closed, causing main feedwater pumps to trip on high discharge pressure. Caused by failure of inadequate maint procedure. Procedure will be revised. W/880118 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 7
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL		RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD5 LA	1 1		PD5 PD	1 1
	ROOD, H	1 1			
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1		ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1		AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2		AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	ARM/DCTS/DAB	1 1		DEDRO	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0		NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1		NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1		NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1		NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1		NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1		NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1		NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2
	NRR/DRIS/SIB	1 1		NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1		RES TELFORD, J	1 1
	RES/DE/EIB	1 1		RES/DRPS DIR	1 1
	RGN5 FILE 01	1 1			
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5		FORD BLDG HOY, A	1 1
	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1		LPDR	1 1
	NRC PDR	1 1		NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1
	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1			

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 6		
TITLE (4) MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE FAILING CLOSED																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
1 2	1 7	8 7	8 7	0 3 1	0 0	0 1	1 8	8 8					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
1		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 7 5				20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
H. E. MORGAN, STATION MANAGER										7 1 4 3 6 8 - 6 2 4 1						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs						
D	S J	IS O L	M O 9 0	Y												
B	J I	IP C IV	C 6 0 0	Y												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												X NO				

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0831 on 12/17/87, with Unit 2 at 75% power, one of two Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV) failed closed, causing both Main Feedwater Pumps to trip on high discharge pressure. Unit 2 was manually tripped in accordance with operating practice to minimize the effects of the loss of feedwater. Concurrent with the automatic initiation of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System for Steam Generator #2 (EFAS 2) as a result of low level in Steam Generator #2, EFAS 1 (for SG #1) and EFAS 2 were manually actuated. Plant conditions were stabilized, and recovery proceeded normally. This event had no effect on the health and safety of plant personnel or the public since all safety systems operated as designed.

The threaded conduit connection to the affected MFIV solenoid was found loose, and the cable penetration area into the conduit connector was not sealed. By one or both of these paths, water and foreign material entered the solenoid housing and caused corrosion of the power leads and terminal block. This resulted in failure of the power lead to the MFIV solenoid and closure of the MFIV. The Maintenance procedure for reassembly of the solenoid did not provide sufficient guidance regarding the reinstallation of the conduit and sealing of the cable penetration to ensure their water tightness.

The terminal block and power leads to the affected MFIV solenoid, as well as the solenoid coil and plunger, were replaced. The threaded conduit connection to the solenoid valve and the cable penetration area into the conduit connector were properly sealed. The Maintenance procedure which describes the overhaul of the MFIVs will be revised to adequately address properly sealing the conduit connections.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)
Unit: 2
Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering
Event Date: 12/17/87
Time: 0831

A. PLANT CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT:

Mode: 1, Power Operation (75% power)

B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

1. Main Feedwater Isolation Valves

The Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV) (EIIS Component Code ISV) function to isolate the Feedwater System (EIIS System Code SJ) from the Steam Generators (SG) (EIIS Component Code SG) upon receipt of a manual or automatic signal. Each MFIV is held in the open position by a hydraulic system which exerts pressure on the bottom of a piston actuator. For each valve to shut and perform its safety function, redundant actuation solenoid valves (EIIS Component Code ISV), whose solenoids (EIIS Component Code SOL) are powered from separate Class 1E power sources (EIIS System Code EJ), open and dump hydraulic oil from the bottom of the piston actuator through two separate lines, allowing nitrogen pressure on the top of the piston actuator to close the valve.

2. Steam Bypass Control System

The Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) (EIIS System Code JI) contains four valves (EIIS Component Code PCV) which open following a turbine/reactor trip and dissipate excess energy from the steam generators directly to the main condenser (EIIS Component Code COND). This minimizes the increase in SG pressure following the trip, thereby alleviating the need for the Main Steam Safety Valves (EIIS Component Code RV) to open.

C. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

1. Event:

At 0831 on 12/17/87, one of two Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV) failed closed, causing both Main Feed Pumps (MFP) to trip on high discharge pressure. Unit 2 was manually tripped in accordance with operating practice to minimize the effects of the loss of feedwater. Concurrent with the automatic initiation of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System for SG #2 (EFAS 2) (EIIS System Code BA) as a result of low level in SG #2, both EFAS 1 (for SG #1) and EFAS 2 were manually actuated. It was noted that one SBCS valve failed to open beyond 10% during the event. Plant conditions were stabilized, and recovery proceeded normally.

2. Inoperable Structures, Systems or Components that Contributed to the Event:

None

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3. Sequence of Events:

TIME	ACTION
0831 (12/17)	Both Main Feed Pumps tripped on high discharge pressure when Main Feedwater Isolation Valve 2HV-4048 failed closed. Operators manually tripped the reactor. One Steam Bypass Control Valve failed to open beyond 10%.
0845	Commenced plant recovery
1322 (12/18)	Completed repairs to 2HV-4048
1613	Returned Unit 2 to Power Operation

4. Method of Discovery:

Control Room alarms and indications alerted the operators of the MFIV failure and the MFP trips.

5. Personnel Actions and Analysis of Actions:

In accordance with operating practice, the operators manually tripped the reactor upon receipt of indication that both MFPs had tripped. The operators manually initiated EFAS 1 and EFAS 2 to assist in the mitigation of the loss of feedwater to the steam generators.

When one SBCS valve failed to open beyond 10%, the operators took manual control of the other SBCS valves to enhance system response in maintaining SG pressure within the desired band. SG pressure never reached the Main Steam Safety Valve setpoint.

The operators stabilized plant conditions utilizing the Standard Post Trip Actions and the Reactor Trip Recovery procedures. Proper operation of all EFAS components was verified.

6. Safety System Responses:

The Reactor Protection System was actuated manually and operated in accordance with design.

EFAS 2 automatically actuated on low level in SG #2. EFAS 1 and EFAS 2 were concurrently manually actuated. All EFAS components operated properly.

D. CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

1. Immediate Cause:

The immediate cause of the event is the failure of a power lead to the train B solenoid valve for MFIV 2HV-4048, causing the hydraulic oil to be dumped from the bottom of the MFIV piston actuator and resulting in closure of the MFIV.

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2. Intermediate Cause:

The threaded conduit connection to the affected MFIV solenoid was found loose, and the cable penetration area into the conduit connector was not sealed. By one or both of these paths, water and foreign material entered the solenoid housing and caused corrosion of the power leads and terminal block.

3. Root Cause:

The Maintenance procedure for reassembly of the solenoid housing did not provide sufficient guidance regarding the reinstallation of the conduit and cable penetration to ensure their water tightness.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. Corrective Actions Taken:

The terminal block and power leads to the train B solenoid valve of MFIV 2HV-4048, as well as the solenoid coil and plunger, were replaced. The threaded conduit connection to the solenoid valve and the cable penetration area into the conduit connector were properly sealed.

The terminal blocks and power leads to the other Unit 2 MFIV solenoids (and Main Feedwater Block Valves (MFBV) solenoids, which have a similar design) were inspected for corrosion and other problems. The leads into the terminal block for the train A solenoid valve for 2HV-4048 were found to be discolored and were replaced. No other problems were noted for the other solenoid valve power leads and terminal blocks.

2. Planned Corrective Actions:

The Maintenance procedure which describes the overhaul of the MFIVs and MFBVs will be revised to adequately address properly sealing the conduit connections.

The terminal blocks and power leads for the Unit 3 MFIV and MFBV solenoid valves will be inspected during the next outage of sufficient duration.

As a result of this event and a recent Unit 1 DC Bus ground which was caused by water intrusion into a Turbine Plant Cooling Water valve solenoid housing (See LER 87-018, Docket No. 50-206), the Trip Reduction Task Force is evaluating this event and will initiate actions as necessary to address concerns regarding the protection of electrical components from water intrusion.

This event will be discussed in the Maintenance Professional Development Program.

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F. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT:

This event had no effect on the health and safety of plant personnel or the public since all safety systems operated as designed. There are no reasonable or credible alternative conditions which could have increased the severity of this event.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

1. Component Failure Information:

The MFIVs are 20" gate valves manufactured by WKM (Cooper Industries). The valves utilize an electro-hydraulic actuator.

The solenoid (pilot) valve assembly which was affected by water intrusion in this event is a 1.5" valve manufactured by Marotta Scientific Controls, Inc., model no. MV233C and MV238C.

The SBCS valves are 12" inlet, 18" outlet, combined shutoff/pressure reducing angle valves manufactured by Control Components, Inc., model no. B36A-12-12BW-18BW-31NB42.

2. Previous LERs on Similar Events:

None

3. Results of NPRDS Search:

The NPRDS search resulted in four WKM valve failures in which there is a strong possibility that the cause of the failures was water intrusion into the solenoid circuitry.

The search resulted in no additional corrective actions beyond those already mentioned. (Refer to section E.)

4. Other information

a. MFIV Design

Each MFIV is designed to perform its safety function (i.e., close) assuming a single active component failure. The MFIV will also close if a single failure occurs in either one of the redundant solenoids. An upgraded design will replace and reconfigure the solenoid valves to prevent a single failure from causing a spurious MFIV closure which could result in a unit trip. This change is planned to be implemented during the Cycle V outages for Units 2 and 3.

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b. SBCS Valve Failure

The failure of SBCS valve 2HV-8425 in this event was consistent with previous SBCS valve performance over the past two years. Modifications which will improve the reliability and performance of these valves are in progress and are approximately 50% complete on the total population of eight valves (Units 2 and 3). These modifications are continuing on a "one valve at a time" basis while the unit is in operation. Approximately six months is required to complete the modifications to each valve with completion of all eight valves expected by December 1989.



Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P. O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

H. E. MORGAN
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE
(714) 368-6241

January 18, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 87-031
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the manual actuation of the Reactor Protective System and the manual and automatic actuations of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

HE Morgan

Enclosure: LER No. 87-031

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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