

# ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

## REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Advises that util decided to provide Seismic Catetory 1  
 source of makeup water to CCW surge tanks.

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July 30, 1990

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362  
Component Cooling Water System  
TAC Nos. 71194 and 71195  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station  
Units 2 and 3

Reference: Letter from F.R. Nandy (SCE) to Document Control Desk (NRC) dated  
January 4, 1990; Same Subject

This letter is to inform you that Southern California Edison (SCE) has decided to provide a Seismic Category I source of makeup water to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) surge tanks. Additionally, SCE has concluded that installation of block valves to improve the maintainability of the CCW non-critical loop isolation valves is not warranted.

In the referenced January 4, 1990 letter, SCE committed to:

1. Implement specific modifications to minimize the potential for system voiding,
2. Enhance the capability to monitor system leakage,
3. Optimize the location of the hook-up connection for the firewater tankers, and
4. Install block valves between the critical and non-critical CCW loops to provide for maintenance on the isolation valves to minimize cross-train leakage.

The modifications to minimize the potential for system voiding and enhancing the capability to monitor system leakage, items 1 and 2 above, are proceeding and are currently scheduled for completion by the end of the Cycle 6 refueling outage for each unit. However, with respect to items 3 and 4, SCE has decided

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to implement alternative courses of action as described in the following paragraphs:

### Fire Water Tankers

After further engineering evaluations, in lieu of provisions for a permanent fire hose connection for makeup to the CCW surge tanks by the fire tanker trucks (item 3 above), a dedicated Seismic Category I source of emergency makeup water will be provided by the end of the Cycle 7 refueling outage for each unit. This has been determined to be a better alternative in that it minimizes procedural and operator action to add emergency make-up water to the CCW system.

### CCW Block Valves

SCE previously committed to install block valves to isolate the critical and non-critical CCW loops to allow for CCW train isolation valve maintenance. Based on past valve performance, maintenance of the CCW train isolation valves is only anticipated to be necessary at 10-year intervals. Therefore, an alternate approach to installing block valves has been developed.

To perform maintenance on the CCW train isolation valves without installing block valves the following conditions must be satisfied:

- a. One train of CCW must be isolated and taken out of service,
- b. The non-critical CCW loop, which provides normal cooling to the spent fuel pool, must be taken out of service, and
- c. Alternate cooling must be provided for the spent fuel pool.

The SDC system, when available, currently provides backup cooling for the spent fuel pool cooling system during complete core offloads by using an existing spectacle blind flange. Since each SDC train is cooled by a corresponding CCW train, using the SDC system to cool the spent fuel pool will allow a) one train of CCW to be isolated (the train not providing cooling to the SDC System) and b) the non-critical loop to be taken out of service. This would therefore permit maintenance to be performed on the CCW train isolation valves. Accordingly, SCE will prepare a License Amendment request to allow the SDC system to be the source of cooling to the spent fuel pool during maintenance of the CCW train isolation valves.

These CCW plant betterment items will be reflected in Schedule C of the next Integrated Implementation Schedule.

If you have any questions regarding this information, please let me know.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. B. Martin". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

cc: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V  
C. Caldwell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2, and 3