



April 29, 2013

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 12-764A
NSSL/WDC R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING
RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS TO A
LICENSEE CONTROLLED PROGRAM (TAC NO. ME9733)

By letter dated October 4, 2012, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). The proposed amendment would relocate certain technical specification (TS) surveillance frequencies to a licensee controlled program by adopting Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-425, Revision 3, "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control – RITSTF [Risk-Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative] 5b." The proposed change would also add a new program, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, in accordance with TSTF-425. In a letter dated December 18, 2012, the NRC transmitted a request for additional information (RAI) to DNC related to the LAR. DNC responded to the RAI, except for Question 3, in a letter dated January 4, 2013. The response to Question 3 was deferred until after an audit by the NRC of closed Findings and Observations. In a letter dated March 8, 2013, the NRC transmitted a second RAI to DNC related to the LAR. DNC responded to the RAI in a letter dated April 17, 2013.


Attachment 1 provides DNC's response to the NRC's RAI Question 3 from the NRC letter dated December 18, 2012.

Attachment 2 contains a marked-up TS Bases page that was inadvertently omitted from DNC's RAI response dated April 17, 2013. The marked-up TS bases page is being provided for information only. The changes to the affected bases page will be incorporated in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program upon approval of this amendment request.


ADD
NRC

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Wanda Craft at (804) 273-4687.

Sincerely,



Eugene S. Grecheck
Vice President – Nuclear Engineering and Development



COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA)

COUNTY OF HENRICO)

The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by Eugene S. Grecheck, who is Vice President – Nuclear Engineering and Development of Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. He has affirmed before me that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that company, and that the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Acknowledged before me this 29TH day of April, 2013.

My Commission Expires: MAY 31, 2014
Vicki L. Hull
Notary Public

Attachments:

1. Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program
2. Marked-Up TS Bases Page

Commitments made in this letter: None

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

ATTACHMENT 1

**RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING
RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
REQUIREMENTS TO A LICENSEE CONTROLLED PROGRAM**

**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3**

By letter dated October 4, 2012, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). The proposed amendment would relocate certain technical specification (TS) surveillance frequencies to a licensee controlled program by adopting Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-425, Revision 3, "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control – RITSTF [Risk-Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative] 5b." The proposed change would also add a new program, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP), in accordance with TSTF-425. In a letter dated December 18, 2012, the NRC transmitted a request for additional information (RAI) to DNC related to the LAR. DNC responded to the RAI, except for Question 3, in a letter dated January 4, 2013. In a letter dated March 8, 2013, the NRC transmitted a second RAI to DNC related to the LAR. DNC responded to the RAI in a letter dated April 17, 2013. This attachment provides DNC's response to Question 3 from the NRC's RAI dated December 18, 2012.

Question 3

The submittal provides the open gap items for the updated probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model (M310A). However, the staff also requests to review the closed findings and observations (F&Os) from the peer review, self assessment, and the focused peer review. Please provide the F&Os which have been closed and detailed descriptions of their dispositions from those reviews.

DNC Response

The relevant material associated with the closed findings and observations was made available to the NRC at the Dominion office in Washington, DC. The NRC review of the material was conducted on January 29 and 30, 2013.

Additional Item

Following submittal of DNC's RAI response dated April 17, 2013, it was discovered that a TS Bases page was inadvertently omitted from the letter. The change to the proposed markups for TS Bases 3/4.7.5, Ultimate Heat Sink, is being revised to align with the proposed changes to TS 3/4.7.5 submitted to the NRC in the April 17, 2013 letter. The TS Bases markup is provided in Attachment 2 for information only. The changes to the affected bases page will be incorporated in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program upon approval of this amendment request.

ATTACHMENT 2

Marked-Up TS Bases Page

For Information Only

**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3**

June 25, 2007

PLANT SYSTEMS

The surveillance frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

For the surveillance requirements, the UHS temperature is measured at the locations described in the LCO write-up provided in this section.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.5.a verifies that the UHS is capable of providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature. ~~The 24 hour frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.~~ This surveillance requirement verifies that the average water temperature of the UHS is less than or equal to 75°F.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.5.b requires that the UHS temperature be monitored on an increased frequency whenever the UHS temperature is greater than 70°F during the applicable MODES. The intent of this Surveillance Requirement is to increase the awareness of plant personnel regarding UHS temperature trends above 70°F. The frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.

3/4.7.6 DELETED3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMBACKGROUND

The control room emergency ventilation system provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. Additionally, the system provides temperature control for the control room envelope (CRE) during normal and post-accident operations.

The control room emergency ventilation system is comprised of the CRE emergency air filtration system and a temperature control system.

The control room emergency air filtration system consists of two redundant systems that recirculate and filter the air in the CRE and a CRE boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air. Each control room emergency air filtration system consists of a moisture separator, electric heater, prefilter, upstream high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, charcoal adsorber, downstream HEPA filter, and fan. Additionally, ductwork, valves or dampers, and instrumentation form part of the system.

The CRE is the area within the confines of the CRE boundary that contains the spaces that control room occupants inhabit to control the unit during normal and accident conditions. This area encompasses the control room, and other non-critical areas including adjacent support offices,