



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

April 30, 2013

Mr. Dominique Grandemange
Site Manager
AREVA NP, Inc.
2101 Horn Rapids Road
Richland, WA 99354-0130

**SUBJECT: AREVA NP, INC. (RICHLAND) – U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 70-1257/2013-002**

Dear Mr. Grandemange:

This refers to the inspections completed during the first quarter of calendar year 2013, at the AREVA NP, Inc., facility in Richland, Washington. The purpose of the inspections was to determine whether activities authorized under the license were conducted safely and in accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) requirements. The enclosed report presents the results of these inspections. The findings were discussed with members of your staff at exit meetings held on February 14, March 21, and April 2, 2013.

During the inspections, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license as they related to public health and safety, to confirm compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Areas examined during the inspections are identified below. The inspections consisted of facility walkdowns; selective examinations of relevant procedures and records; interviews with plant personnel; and observations of plant activities. Throughout the inspections, observations were discussed with your staff.

The inspections covered areas pertaining to Maintenance and Surveillance of Safety Controls, Permanent Plant Modifications, and Radiation Protection. No significant findings were identified.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its Enclosure will be made available electronically

D. Grandemange

for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>.

If you have any questions, please call me at (404) 997-4629.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Marvin D. Sykes, Chief
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 3
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-1257
License No. SNM-1227

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/2013-002
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc: (See page 3)

D. Grandemange

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Distribution:
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ADAMS: ☒ Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: ML13121A097 ☒ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE ☒ FORM 665 ATTACHED

OFFICE	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI		
SIGNATURE	CAR3	RLR2	GDG1	MLT1	MDS1		
NAME	C. Rivera	R. Russell	G. Goff	M. Thomas	M. Sykes		
DATE	4/ 30 /2013	4/ 30 /2013	4/ 30 /2013	4/ 30 /2013	4/ 30 /2013		
E-MAIL COPY	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO		

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DFFI\REPORTS\DRAFT INSPECTION REPORT FOLDER\AREVA - RICHLAND\2013 REPORTS\IR 2013002 FEEDERS\AREVA 2013-002 QUARTERLY REPORT.DOCX

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II

Docket No: 70-1257

License No: SNM-1227

Report No: 70-1257/2013-002

Licensee: AREVA NP, Inc.

Facility: Richland, Washington

Dates: January 1, 2013 to March 31, 2013 (First Calendar Quarter)

Inspectors: M. Thomas, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector (Section B.2)
R. Russell, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section B.1)
C. Rivera, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section B.2)
G. Goff, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section A.1)

Approved by: M. Sykes, Chief
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 3
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AREVA NP, Inc.
NRC Inspection Report No. 70-1257/2013-002
January 1 – March 31, 2013

Inspections were conducted by regional inspectors during normal shifts in the areas of maintenance and surveillance of safety controls, permanent plant modifications, and radiation protection. The inspectors performed a selective examination of licensee activities that were accomplished by direct observation of safety-significant activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews, and discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of numerous licensee documents.

Radiation Protection

- The Radiation Protection program was implemented in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Paragraph A.1)

Maintenance and Surveillance of Safety Controls

- The maintenance and surveillance program was implemented in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Paragraph B.1)

Permanent Plant Modifications

- The permanent plant modification program was implemented in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Paragraph B.2)

Other Areas

- Unresolved Item 70-1257/2013-002-01 was opened. (Paragraph B.2)
- Violation 70-1257/2011-005-001 was closed. (Paragraph C.1.a)
- Violation 70-1257/2011-003-01 was closed. (Paragraph C.1.b)

Attachment

Key Points of Contact
List of Items Opened and Closed
Inspection Procedures Used
Documents Reviewed

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The AREVA Richland facility converts uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) into uranium dioxide for the fabrication of low-enriched fuel assemblies used in commercial nuclear power reactors. During the inspection period, normal production activities were ongoing.

A. Radiological Controls

1. Radiation Protection (Inspection Procedure (IP) 88030)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

Inspectors performed observations, interviews, and reviews of licensee documents to determine whether the selected radiation protection activities were being conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and to evaluate the adequacy of certain aspects of the licensee's radiation protection program.

The inspectors reviewed internal and external audits to ensure that the radiation protection program was being reviewed, at least annually, to comply with 10 CFR 20.1101. Inspectors also reviewed nine recently revised radiological protection procedures and determined the changes were in compliance with the license application requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the current organizational structure and interviewed the radiation protection manager, the supervisor for health and safety technicians (HSTs), and two health physicists in order to assess whether radiation protection functions and responsibilities focused on worker safety and were not overly influenced by operational factors.

No calibrations of instrumentation/equipment were conducted during the inspection. The inspectors checked calibration records for selected survey instruments and exit monitors and determined that these radiation protection instruments and equipment were maintained in accordance with license application requirements and procedures.

Through interviews and reviews of recent internal and external exposure records (issued since November 2012), the inspectors verified that exposure records were maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2106. Total Effective Dose Equivalent, Lens Dose Equivalent, and Shallow Dose Equivalent results were within the AREVA-Richland site action levels and well below the regulatory limits of 5 rem/yr, 15 rem/yr, and 50 rem/yr, respectively. In addition, the inspectors also reviewed the bioassay program and the most recent results since the last inspection and noted no concerns.

The inspectors reviewed the respiratory protection program. Specifically, inspectors participated in respirator fit testing and a physical fitness examination as part of the respiratory protection program. The inspectors determined that the respiratory protection program adequately identified potential hazards and that users were properly trained, qualified, and re-qualified in the use of respiratory protection equipment. Inspectors physically examined respirators for use and found one to have minor damage. The licensee promptly removed the damaged respirator from service. The inspectors concluded that the program was in compliance with 10 CFR 20.1703, the license application, and applicable procedures.

The inspectors toured portions of the Dry Conversion Facility (DCF), UO₂ Building, Supercritical CO₂ Extraction facility (SCCO₂), Specialty Fuels Building, Uranyl Nitrate Building, Engineering Laboratory Operations, cylinder yard, laundry facility, and warehouses and verified that radiological signs and postings accurately reflected radiological conditions within the areas. These areas were posted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20. The inspectors verified that the Notice to Employees, NRC Form 3, was posted in high traffic areas (near employee entrances/exits) in accordance with 10 CFR 19.11.

The inspectors observed several stack sample filter and fixed air sampling monitor filter change outs, an area contamination survey, and many source/response checks on survey and dose meters. These activities were completed in accordance with procedures, and results demonstrated that the surveys adequately evaluated the magnitude and extent of radiation levels in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1501. During the observation of an HST performing source/response checks, four survey meters were found outside the acceptable range. The HST immediately removed the defective survey meters from service and replaced them with newly calibrated survey meters. The procedures utilized for the activities were current and adequately covered the tasks.

The inspectors reviewed radiation protection program-related condition reports/corrective actions issued since November 2012 and noted no significant issues with licensee actions.

The 2012 annual As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Report had not been published at the time of the inspection. Hence, this document could not be reviewed. The inspectors reviewed supporting ALARA program documents and determined these documents satisfied section 4.2 of license application.

b. Conclusion

No significant findings were identified.

B. Facility Support

1. Maintenance and Surveillance of Safety Controls (IP 88025)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors performed walkdowns of portions of the following areas: DCF, Ammonium Diuranate Process (ADU), SCCO₂, Fuel Rod Bundling, and the cylinder yard. During the walkdowns, inspectors observed selected items relied on for safety (IROFS) and safety controls receiving repairs, calibrations, or functional testing.

The inspectors interviewed several managers, supervisors, and engineers to evaluate maintenance and surveillance program activities. The inspectors verified that IROFS and other safety controls were adequate to assure that IROFS and safety controls were maintained available and reliable to perform their safety function when needed.

The inspectors verified that the licensee's work control program had provisions to ensure adequate pre-job planning and preparation of work packages to support maintenance and

surveillance activities. The inspector reviewed preventative maintenance (PM), and instrument repetitive maintenance (IRM), and surveillance work packages for accuracy and to ensure the test packages challenged and verified operability of IROFS and safety controls.

The inspector observed maintenance work activities on selected systems and processes to determine if work activities were conducted in accordance with licensee requirements and approved procedures and to determine if corrective actions were taken when a safety control failed or was degraded. The inspector reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution program to verify that performance issues relating to the maintenance and surveillance of IROFS and safety controls were entered into the corrective action program.

b. Conclusion

No significant findings were identified.

2. Permanent Plant Modifications (IP 88070)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors interviewed managers, supervisors, and operators to verify that the licensee had established an effective configuration management system to evaluate, implement, and track permanent plant modifications (PPMs) to the site which could affect safety.

The inspectors verified that the licensee's work control program had provisions to ensure the adequate pre-job planning and preparation of PPM design packages. The configuration management system had adequate provisions to ensure that PPMs did not degrade the performance capabilities of IROFS or other safety controls that are part of the safety design basis.

The inspectors reviewed six modification design packages since the last PPM inspection and walked down these PPMs to verify that the "as-built" drawings agreed with the field configuration as applicable. The inspectors verified that the licensee had management measures in place to ensure that the IROFS affected by facility changes remained capable of performing their intended safety function before approving the modification for operation. The inspectors verified that applicable post maintenance installation and testing requirements were adequately identified and performed prior to implementation of modification design packages.

The inspectors verified that the licensee addressed the impacts of PPMs to the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and other safety program information developed in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) to verify that unanticipated and nonconforming issues relating to the preparation and installation of modifications were entered into the CAP and adequately addressed.

The inspectors reviewed several engineering change notices (ECNs) that involved modifications to criticality drains. While reviewing these ECNs, the inspectors identified two examples in which the licensee had IROFS in a degraded condition and did not complete a justification for continued operations (JCO) under compensatory safety measures as

required by procedure E12-01-007, "Justification for Continued Operations Under Compensatory Safety Measures," Version 4.

The first example was identified by the licensee on November 17, 2011, and involved Criticality Drain C120DR01 (IROFS 3514). Criticality Drain C120DR01, located in the bottom of Scrubber S-906, provides protection against transfers of UN solution into Scrubber S-906. During an ongoing re-evaluation of the capability of the criticality drains used at the facility, the engineer performing the study found that IROFS 3514 would not drain the potential maximum input into Tank 906. This could result in an accumulation of liquid and UOx particulate in Scrubber S-906, which is an unfavorable geometry.

The second example was identified by the licensee during a maintenance activity on February 20, 2012, and involved Criticality Drain C120DR03 (IROFS 3529). Criticality Drain C120DR03, located in the UNH storage tank process off gas (POG) header, prevents liquid flow to Scrubber S-906 by directing overflow to the room floor. This could result in an accumulation of liquid and UOx particulate in Scrubber S-906, which is an unfavorable geometry. Procedure E12-01-007 requires the licensee to develop a JCO if, after evaluating the condition, the system cannot be restarted prior to the IROFS function being re-established.

In both examples, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to develop a JCO in accordance with procedure E12-01-007 as required. However, additional review is needed to further evaluate if the licensee was in compliance with the performance requirements during the time both IROFS 3514 and 3529 were in a degraded condition. An unresolved item (URI) was identified to further evaluate whether the licensee was in compliance with the performance requirements during the time both IROFS were in a degraded condition. (URI 70-01257-2013-002-01)

During a tour of the site, the inspectors noted that Criticality Drain C100DR13 in the South Tank Gallery of Room 102A in the UO2 Building was installed nearly flush with the floor. Maintenance work was ongoing in the area and the floor was wet and partially covered in debris when the drain was discovered. Following discovery, the floor was cleaned and approximately two inches was cut off the end of the drain to prevent backflow of UN solution into POG Scrubber S-184. The figures below show the drain before (on the left) and after corrective action was taken (on the right).



The inspectors reviewed evaluation E04-NCSA-186, "Supercritical Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) Extractor System," Version 6.0, to determine whether the as-found condition of the drain degraded its safety function. The inspectors determined that the drain, IROFS 6964, prevents overflow of process tanks into an unfavorable geometry POG scrubber S-184. The inspectors examined accident sequences relying on IROFS 6964 and determined that, in all cases, there were sufficient redundant criticality drains to ensure the performance requirements were met. The safety function of drain C100DR13 requires it to be capable of handling a flowrate of 10.5 gallons per minute (gpm). Based on the diameter and static fluid head in the pipe above the drain, the drain was calculated as having a drainage capacity of 27 gpm. The inspector determined that if the air gap between the drain and the floor was conservatively estimated as 1/8 inch, the flowrate could be reduced by approximately 50%. Due to the safety margin designed into the system, the drain would still be able to handle the required flowrate.

The inspectors also reviewed the ECN to replace the Dry Conversion Reactors for Lines 1 and 3. The ECN package was accurate with respect to the items being replaced and the affected IROFS, but it was noted that the package did not take into account the weight difference of the reactors. The replacement reactors each weigh approximately 346 kilograms more than the current reactors. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2013-858 and engaged the services of a structural engineering firm to analyze the floor. The analysis of record for the affected floor of the DCF rated the floor at 50 pounds per square foot live load with a transient load of 500 pounds per square foot. The engineering firm determined that the two narrow panels of the affected floor did not adequately support the load of the two reactors currently installed on those panels as two of the support legs on the affected reactors were at the edges of the panels and not capable of distributing the load in all directions. The engineering firm recommended

that the additional live load rating of the affected floor panels be reduced to 11 pounds per square foot and marked accordingly. The licensee followed this recommendation and wrote a Justification for Continued Operation to restrict the use of the one-ton crane, and to inspect the floor for additional live loads once per day. The existing floor will support the existing and new reactors.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the PM activities for the one-ton crane that will be used to move the reactors to ensure that the crane would be capable of handling the load of the reactors and associated peripherals.

b. Conclusion

Design and installation of plant modifications were adequately evaluated for safe operations. The licensee implemented adequate management measures to ensure all safety-related modifications would be maintained. An unresolved item was identified to further evaluate whether the licensee is in compliance with the performance requirements during the time they had both IROFS in the degraded condition.

C. Other Areas

1. Follow-up on Previously Identified Issues (IP 92702)

- a. (Closed) Violation (VIO) 70-1257/2011005-01: Failure to implement management measures to ensure that IROFS 6914 was available and reliable to perform its function when needed.

IROFS 6914 is Criticality Drain C186DR14 in the HEPA filter cabinet of the Supercritical Carbon Dioxide Extraction system. The licensee performed a complete walkdown to investigate all the HEPA filter cabinets that have a criticality drain to determine if a similar design deficiency exists as described in CR 2011-7773. No other HEPA filter cabinets having criticality drains were identified to have a design deficiency as described in CR 2011-7773 or potential for plugging due to debris. The affected HEPA filter cabinet was repaired to prevent blockage of Criticality Drain C186DR14. The licensee's plan was to modify the piping drains to allow for flow tests or boroscope inspections of the drain piping. These modifications were completed in November 2012 and the annual preventative maintenance (PM) for inspecting the criticality drains was completed in March 2013.

During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the annual PM for this drain and determined that the licensee implemented the corrective actions for this issue. The updated PM incorporated the use of flow tests or boroscope inspections of the complete drain piping to give licensee assurance that the drains will remain unobstructed and free flowing. This item is closed.

- b. (Closed) VIO 70-1257/2011-003-01: The failure of three operators to complete initial qualification, including written exams and skills demonstrations, prior to independently working in the 45 gallon to 55 gallon transfer and storage workstation.

After having transferred to a different production area, the licensee failed to confirm that three workers possessed current qualifications and training to perform a specific task. After reviewing the corrective actions and updated training records for these three individuals, inspectors determined the licensee's response to be adequate. This item is closed.

2. Event Follow-up

None.

D. Exit Meeting

The inspection scope and results were presented to members of the licensee's staff at various meetings throughout the inspection period and were summarized at exit meetings on February 14, March 21, and April 2, 2013, to D. Grandemange and staff. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. No violations of NRC requirements were identified. An unresolved item was identified to further evaluate whether the licensee is in compliance with the performance requirements during the time they had both IROFS in the degraded condition. Proprietary information was discussed, but not included, in the report.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title/Area</u>
R. Burklin	Health Physicist
S. Cline	Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
W. Doane	Criticality Safety Engineer
D. Durham	Supervisor, Health, and Safety Technicians
G. Grandemange	Site Manager
P. Lee	Preventative Maintenance Administrator
M. Leonard	Project Engineer
B. Lewis	Project Engineer
B. Link	Environmental, Health, Safety, and Licensing Manager
C. Manning	Criticality Safety Manager
L. Maas	Manager, Licensing and Compliance
K. Olsen	Reliability Engineer
Y. Sakach	Health Physicist
T. Tate	Safety, Security, and Emergency Preparedness
H. Welker	Calibrations

2. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

70-01257/2013-002-01	URI	Further evaluate whether the licensee is in compliance the performance requirements during the time they had both IROFS in the degraded condition.
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Closed

07001257/2011005-01	VIO	Failure to implement management measures to ensure that IROFS 6914 was available and reliable to perform its function when needed. (Paragraph C.1.a)
07001257/2011003-01	VIO	The failure of three operators to complete initial qualification, including written exams and skills demonstrations, prior to independently working in the 45 gallon to 55 gallon transfer and storage workstation. (Paragraph C.1.b)

3. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

88025 Maintenance and Surveillance of Safety Controls
88030 Radiation Protection
88070 Permanent Plant Modifications

4. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Records:

C100P001-Overflow/Vents 12MO PF

C120P001-UNH Overflow/Vents/Door 6 MO PF

C186P002-SC CO2 Enclosure 12MO PF

C210P003-Tank Drain SYS ELO 12 MO PF

LOTO Permit: Line 1 V1-203 and V1-303 Reactors, February 4, 2013

Numerous IRM Records, PM Records, Test Records, 2012-2013

WO: 13146864, C810I001-0002, IROFS Transmitter Pressure CYL/HDR PT2-1012, dated October 27, 2012

WO: 13160874, PG000131-0002, Calciner Off Gas Piping, dated March 31, 2013

WO: 13160871, PG000129-0003, DC Reactor Inspection L2A, March 31, 2013

WO: 13160865, PG000129-0004, DC Reactor Inspection L2B, March 19, 2013

Calibration records: US175-87, US17521-70, US17522-88, US17550-36, US17521-52, US17521-51, US 17522-02, US17522-81, US17550-47, US17570-10, US17550-66, US17550-68, US17570-07, US17510-18, US17510-22, US17522-73, US17522-86, US17550-49, US17550-53, US17510-84, US17522-71, US17522-75, US17522-76

Procedures:

ADM-00006, Administrative Procedure for Documentation DCM Documents, Version 21

AID-10066, Reference 066 Ludlum Model 37512 Digital Area Monitor, Version 2.2

AID-10061, Model 12 Ratemeters, and Eberline E-140 Ratemeters Using Geiger-Mueller (GM) Probes, Version 2.2

AID-10110, Reference 166 Ludlum Model 2241 with "GM" or Alpha Scintillation Probe, Version 2.2

AID-10067, Reference 069 Eberline Model R0-1, R0-3C and R0-3D, Dose Rate Meter Ion Chamber, Version 2.2

AID-10198, Reference 307 Canberra NetCAM Alpha Continuous Area Monitor Models AS1700R, Version 4.0

AID-10064, Reference 063 Portable High Volume Air Samplers, Version 2.2

AID-10419, Reference 1087 Ludlum Survey Meter, Model 3 with Model 44-6 Probe, Version 2.2

AID-10397, Reference 1068 Canberra, Model ADM606M Using Three Model GSP-100 Gamma Scintillation (NaI) Probes with ROI's Set at 166-206 keV, Version 2.2

AID-10409, Reference 1083 Canberra Argos-4AB & 5AB, Personnel Contamination Monitors, Version 4.1

AID 10408, Reference 1082 Canberra Sirius-2AB, Hand, Cuff and Foot Contamination Monitor, Version 3.2

AID 10092, Reference 073 Eberline Geiger Counter Model E-520 W/HP 270 Prober, Version 2.2

AID 10105, Reference 155 Alpha Air Sample Counters, Version 2.2

AID 10065, Reference 065 Ludlum Model 1000 and 2000, Counter With Models 43-1 or HP-210T Probes, Version 2.2

AID 10106, Reference 160 Ludlum Model 177-61, 177-45, 177-3, 28A, 21S, and Model 12 Ratemeters with Alpha Air Proportional or Alpha Scintillation Probes, Version 2.2

Calibration 156 and 163

E12-01-007, Justification for Continued Operation under Compensatory Safety Measures, Version 4.0

E-18-01-001, External Reporting of Safety, Environmental, MC&A, and Security Related Events or Conditions, Version 7
 MCP-30025, Lock and Tag Procedure, Version 9.0
 MCP-30036, Respiratory Protection Program, Version 12.0
 MCP-30166, Welder Operator Certification, Version 2.3
 MCP 30379 C, Management Control Procedure: Construction or Modification Change Control, Version 1.0
 SOP-40000, Quality Control of Portable Alpha Survey Instruments, Version 4
 SOP-40003, Ludlum Model 12, Version 3.1
 SOP-40005, Portable Count Rate Meters with Pancake Type G-M Probes, Version 4
 SOP-40011, Ludlum Counters, Version 4
 SOP-40020, In-Plant Air Sampling, Version 12.0
 SOP-40025, Routine Facility Radiation Level Surveys, Version 5.0
 SOP-40032, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Sampling, Version 10.0
 SOP-40046, Area/Facility Removable Contamination Control, Version 7.0
 SOP-40789, Work Order Instructions, Version 10.0
 SOP-40791, Maintenance Work Permit (MWP) and Pre-Job Briefing (PJB), Version 8.0
 SOP-40820, Quality Control of Beta/Gamma Survey Instruments, Version 5.0
 SOP-40839, Instrument Repetitive Maintenance (IRM), Version 5.0
 SOP-40841, Preventive Maintenance (PM), Version 6.0
 SOP-40954, Quality Control of Portable Dose Rate Instruments, Version 1.0
 SOP-41036, UNB Warehouse & Associated Truck Bay, Version 1.0

Condition Reports Written as a Result of the Inspection:

CR-2013-1542, Documented Comments Identified by NRC during IP 88070 inspection, dated February 20, 2013

Condition Reports:

CR 2011-8550
 CR 2011-7773
 CR 2012-1262
 CR 2012-1383
 CR 2012-2062-FA ESH&L
 CR 2012-2207
 CR 2012-2988-FA EHS&L
 CR 2012-4596
 CR 2012-5462
 CR 2012-5603-FA ESH&L
 CR 2012-7456
 CR 2012-7725
 CR 2012-8349
 CR 2012-8425-FA EHS&L
 CR 2012-8774
 CR 2012-8827
 CR 2012-9307
 CR 2012-9342
 CR 2013-382-FA EHS&L
 CR 2013-715
 CR 2013-1542

Other Documents:

Engineering Change Notice(s) (ECNs): 8428, 8549, 8591, 8624, 8627, 8628
 ALARA Committee Meeting s - January 2012, February 2012, March 2012, June 2012, October 2012, January 2013, February 2013
 E11-01-001, Radiation Protection Standard, Version 8
 EHS&L Organization Chart
 2012 Annual Radiation Protection Program Audit (HP-4), February 19, 2013
 Records Audit (HP-2), March 5, 2013
 Contamination/Radiation Survey Audit / HP-8, February 8, 2013
 Environmental Audit (HP-7), December 11, 2012
 Airborne Audit (HP-6), December 5, 2012
 Dose Tracking System Audit/ HP-18, October 25, 2012
 Contamination/Radiation Survey Audit / HP-8, October 10, 2012
 Posting Audit (HP-9), October 3, 2012
 Bioassay Records (November 1 – Present)
 External Dose Records (2012)
 Monthly Surveillance (HP-1) – October 2012, December 2012, January 2013
 Radiological Safety Culture (June 15, 2012, and January 16, 2012)
 Bioassay/ HP-10, October 31, 2012
 S186P002, NDE Vessel Inspection PM, Revision 1
 ISA Summary, E15-01-2.10, Dry Conversion Facility, Version 9.1
 ISA Summary, E15-01-2.9B, UO2 Building, Version 8.0
 2013 Outage Work Schedule

Monthly Activities Reports – 3/13, 2/13, 11/12, 10/12, 9/12, 8/12, 7/12, 6/12, 5/12, 4/12, 3/12, 2/12, 1/12

Radiation Job Permits: 216 and 217

Maintenance Work Permits: S1927-00, 3501, 58510-00, 35520-01, 52408-00, 40500-00, 8530, 35581, 56333-01, 52663-00, US52507-00, 589-78-01, US43403-00, 52493-01, 14589-00, 58973-00, 53463-00, 52493-01, 31405-00, and 56025-08