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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
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6	TELECONFERENCE
7	+ + + +
8	In the Matter of:
9	PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
10	+ + + +
11	Thursday, April 11, 2013
12	
13	BEFORE:
14	JOSEPH G. GIITTER, Chairman
15	JOHN G. BILLERBECK
16	MERRILEE J. BANIC, Petition Coordinator
17	RICH V. GUZMAN, Petition Manager
18	EMILY L. MONTEITH
19	
20	PRESENT:
21	JOSEPH LYNCH, Licensing Manager, Pilgrim
22	Nuclear
23	Power Station
24	MICHAEL MULLIGAN, Petitioner
25	
26	NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(11:03 a.m.)

MR. GUZMAN: Good morning. My name is Rich Guzman. And I'm the Project Manager for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or NRR.

I'd like to thank everyone for attending this meeting. The purpose of today's teleconference is to allow the petitioner, Michael Mulligan, to address the Petition Review Board, or PRB, regarding his 2.206 petition dated March 7th, 2013, as supplemented with email correspondence dated March 20 and April 5th, 2013 regarding his concerns with safety relief valves at Pilgrim. I'm the petition manager for this petition. The PRB Chairman is Joe Gitter.

The teleconference is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by a court reporter. The transcript will become a supplement to the petition and will also be made publicly available.

Before I briefly go over today's agenda,

I would like to open the teleconference with

introductions. As we go around the room and bridge

line, please be sure to clearly state your name, your

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1 position, and your office or organization for the 2 record. I'll go ahead and start off. this 3 Again, is Rich Guzman, Project Manager in NRR. 5 MS. BANIC: Lee Banic, 2.206 Petition Coordinator, NRR. 6 BILLERBECK: John Billerbeck, 7 MR. PRB 8 member, mechanical engineer, NRR. 9 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Joe Giitter. I'm the 10 PRB Chairman, NRR. 11 MR. And completed GUZMAN: we've 12 introductions here at NRC headquarters. At this time, are there any NRC headquarter participants who 13 have dialed in on the phone? 14 15 (No response.) 16 MR. GUZMAN: Will the NRC participants from regional offices introduce themselves if you're 17 on the line? 18 19 (No response.) Okay. At this time, will 20 MR. GUZMAN: 21 the representatives for Entergy, the licensee for Pilgrim, introduce yourself? 22 23 MR. LYNCH: Good morning. This is Joseph I'm the Licensing Manager at Pilgrim Nuclear 24 Lynch. 25 Power Station.

1 MR. GUZMAN: And, Mr. Mulligan, would you 2 please introduce yourself for the record? Mulligan, 3 MULLIGAN: Michael whistleblower. I worked in the industry, worked at 5 Vermont Yankee, was a licensed operator for a while. 6 Thank you. 7 MR. GUZMAN: And, Emily, you are on the 8 line. Would you introduce yourself, please, Emily 9 Monteith? 10 (No response.) MR. GUZMAN: Okay. With that, are there 11 12 any others, such as members of the public, on the phone? 13 (No response.) 14 15 MR. GUZMAN: Okay. And, for our Court 16 Reporter, can you please restate your name? 17 THE REPORTER: Hi. I'm Matt Miller with Neal R. Gross Court Reporters. 18 19 MR. GUZMAN: Thanks, Matt. A brief overview of the agenda. 20 The teleconference is scheduled from 11:00 a.m. to 21 12:00 p.m. Eastern time. Following my introduction, 22 I will turn it over to the PRB Chairman, who will 23 provide opening remarks and briefly summarize the 24 25 scope of the petition under consideration. Mr.

And,

Mulligan will then give his presentation. finally, will 2 the PRB Chairman conclude the conference call with closing remarks. 3 I would like to emphasize that we each 5 need to speak up and speak clearly to ensure that the 6 Reporter can accurately transcribe 7 teleconference. Also, if you have something you 8 would like to say, please state your name first for 9 the record. For those dialing into teleconference, please remember to mute your phones 10 to minimize any background noise or distractions. 11 Ιf 12 you don't have a mute button, this can be done by pressing the keys *6 and then to unmute, press the *6 13 keys again. Thank you. 14 At this time, I will turn it over to PRB 15 16 Chairman Joe Giitter. 17 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Good morning, everybody. Welcome to this meeting regarding Mr. 18 19 Mulligan's 2.206 petition. First, I would like to start off to ask 20 the question, does anybody -- would anybody like some 21 background on this process or is everyone familiar 22 23 with it? I'm good. 24 MR. MULLIGAN: 25 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. If I don't --

MR. MULLIGAN: Mike Mulligan.

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Yes. Thank you. So if that is okay with you, Mr. Mulligan, I would like to go ahead and skip that background discussion.

So the purpose of today's teleconference is to give Mr. Mulligan, the petitioner, an opportunity to provide any additional details or explanation to support his petition before the PRB. And that is to -- prior to the PRB's initial consideration and ultimately recommendation.

This meeting is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for the petitioner to question or examine the PRB on the merits of the issues presented in the petition request. No decisions regarding the merits of this petition will be made during this teleconference. And following the teleconference, the PRB will conduct its internal deliberations. And the outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with the petitioner.

As everyone probably knows, the PRB typically consists of the Chairman, which is me in this case; usually a manager at the Senior Executive level. It also has a petition manager and a PRB coordinator. Other members of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the content of

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the information in the petition request. And today have John Billerbeck from the Component we Performance and Testing Branch within NRR; Muhammad Razzaque from the Reactor Systems Branch. Unfortunately, he's off sick today. We also have advice from Office of General Counsel. I understand Emily Montieth is being tied in from Region III. Emily, did you --

MS. MONTEITH: Yes.

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. So, as described in our process, the NRC staff clarifying questions in order to better understand Mr. Mulligan's presentation and to reach a reasoned decision once you accept or reject a petitioner's request for review under the 2.206 process. Additionally, the licensee may ask questions to clarify the issues raised by the petitioner.

So I would like to very briefly summarize the scope of the petition under consideration. March 7th, 2013, Mr. Mulligan submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding concerns with the safety relief Pilgrim Nuclear valves at In this petition request, Mr. Mulligan immediately shut requests the NRC down Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on the basis that the licensee

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is operating the plant in an unsafe condition with defective or inoperable safety relief valves.

The petitioner also indicates, in part, that Entergy is incapable of maintaining safety and quality at the plant. The petitioner also requests the NRC to not allow the Pilgrim plant to restart following shutdown until they understand pass/failure mechanisms of defective SRVs at Pilgrim.

Additionally, Mr. Mulligan is concerned that the repeated nature of the failure of the SRVs at Pilgrim demonstrates that Entergy does not understand the mechanisms of failure and that the defective or inoperable SRVs at a nuclear power plant resulted in unsafe condition.

Mr. Mulligan alleges that NRC allowing the plant to operate with unsafe SRVs until the next refueling outage and is covering up an unsafe condition at Pilgrim. Mr. Mulligan requests an investigation by the Office of the Inspector General for this concern.

In terms of NRC activities to date, the PRB met initially on March 18th to review the petitioner's request for immediate action. And based on that meeting, the PRB concluded there is no immediate safety issue to the plant or to the health

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and safety of the public to justify the petitioner's request for immediate action, which would be an emergency plant shutdown. Mr. Mulligan was informed of that decision on March 25th, 2013.

As a reminder, for the phone call participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks as this will help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript, which is being prepared by Mr. Miller. And that transcript will be made publicly available.

Mr. Mulligan, I will now turn it over to you to allow you to provide any information you believe the PRB should consider as part of this petition.

MR. MULLIGAN: Hi. I'm Mike Mulligan.

And, you know, so I'm just going to, you know, quote here. This is from Palisades February 22nd, 2010.

This is a 2.206. It failed again to do anything.

Don't you wish you had a button on your computer where it would give you a yellow, red, or green light? How are you doing now? How will the whole of Entergy do in a year, two years, or five years? Where will the NRC be stationed in the next decade? Is it going to boggle the mind, what the NRC discovers the next year or two at Palisades just like

the last two years? I say they are going to find bigger and more repetitive problems, not that this will present our nation's long-term interest making CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Mr. Mulligan, I'm sorry to cut you off, but I'd really like to stick to the issues at hand. And since we're talking about Pilgrim, I'm not sure what the relevance of Palisades is at this point. Well, the relevance of MR. MULLIGAN: Palisades is that it shows a pattern of problems at Palisades, at Arkansas, at Vermont Yankee, at Pilgrim, and stuff like that. And it lends to a pattern that Entergy is a roque company and they're out of control. And the NRC can't control them. CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. If you don't mind, could you get to the heart of the matter: your concern about the SRVs at Pilgrim? MR. MULLIGAN: Don't I have an ability to lend out what I want to say without --CHAIRMAN GIITTER: I just want to make sure that the focus -- because we only have an hour here. And I do have to leave for a public meeting in less than an hour. I just want to make sure that,

you know, we give you ample time to discuss your

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1	issue on Pilgrim.
2	MR. MULLIGAN: Well, you know, I'm
3	probably one of the most skilled guys that are doing
4	these failing on these 2.206s. And if you have
5	any knowledge of me and stuff like that, I generally
6	wrap it up in the right time frame and stuff like
7	that.
8	CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. All right. Go
9	ahead.
10	MR. MULLIGAN: I've done this over and
11	over again and to say that, you know, I'm keyed like,
12	you know, I'm going to go rogue, you know.
13	CHAIRMAN GIITTER: No. I just want to
14	make sure that you have ample time to focus to
15	provide us with the information on the Pilgrim SRVs.
16	Go ahead. I'm sorry to interrupt.
17	MR. MULLIGAN: Do you get what I'm
18	saying? I'm saying that
19	CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Yes. I understand. I
20	understand what you're saying. Go ahead.
21	MR. MULLIGAN: History teaches us
22	unimaginable things are going to go on behind the
23	security fence of Palisades. And the NRC misses the
24	really important stuff, better than the NRC doesn't
25	have the power to make Entergy meet the greater aims

of us all.

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And so, you know, I was trying to get the NRC to -- you know, to engage with Entergy and behavior. You know, the problems seems to jump into one plant, then jump into another, then jump into another. They must send a lot of personnel or expertise over the troubled plant and then another plant gets ignored and that type of thing, which I'm worried about. And so here, you know -- you know, I'm trying to lay that out. Give me a second here.

Let's talk about the timeline. January 1st, well-known electric shortage was developed in our New England grid; April, May 2011, New SRV valves installed. December 26th, 2011, Pilgrim plant had It was shut down for a three-day its first leak. November 27th, 2012, November 27th -- I've shutdown. got that mixed up, but, anyway, moving on ISO, sir, the grid crisis over natural gas has begun. We have shortage of electricity. January 20th, second week, requires plant shutdown and then another three-day outage. January 21st, 2001, going on ISO search grid emergency, mandatory rolling blackouts and really cold weather. January 24th, 2013, New says natural gas shortage began England ISO earnest with 300 megawatts of electricity. January

of --

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Excuse me, Mr. Mulligan. We have the timeline in front of us, which we can read. Is there something you would like to elaborate on the timeline?

MR. MULLIGAN: Well, on the timeline, it basically says, you know, you look at this thing and the NRC has the inability to control Entergy and the Pilgrim plant and Arkansas Nuclear Plant and stuff like that. And then you see that the New England grid itself, New England ISO, is mired in some sort of political game and may have the inability to anticipate problems and set the grid up to be reliable.

You know, this whole thing should have been taken care of a couple of years ago, seen, and they should have manipulated their components and system around and so there was never ever a threat of a shortage of electricity. And then you see this. You've got a blizzard coming up and stuff like that. And then you see that the plant trips during the blizzard and that type of thing. And it's just mind-boggling that we don't have a reliable grid system. And that's what this New England business --
CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. I'm trying to

understand how that relates to the SRV concern.

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MR. MULLIGAN: How does it relate? Because everything is connected. You know. everything is connected. Whether it's the grid is reliable and that asks us, you know, if the grid isn't reliable, will we have an issue where we won't be able to provide electricity in an emergency to a plant like Pilgrim plant and that type of thing?

Then next you've got -- you go down that timeline and stuff like that. It's mind-boggling why we would even have a plant trip in places like that when you really get down to think about it. You know, you have the grid lines were fluctuating in and out and all that sort of stuff. And I'll talk about they had many plant trips in so-called severe weather and all that sort of stuff. It's a repetitive pattern of not having the grid prepared for the climate.

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. We have the timeline. Do you have any additional comments on the timeline?

MR. MULLIGAN: So we had a plant trip, right? When we had a plant trip, we had a loop, one of the most consequential accidents you can have at a plant without a meltdown. This really threatens

everybody. They actually had two loops. And then according to the New England ISO and all that sort of stuff, during all of this SRV business and stuff like that, the grid itself was threatened repeatedly with of electricity and high shortages spiking It's mind-boggling that you set up a electricity. grid like this that is supposed to support a nuclear power plant and emergency. And then all of these things intertwine together where you end up in pretty serious trouble. And then you have SRVs numerous incidences indicate leakage and that type of stuff.

And just everybody Ι want understand this, the system behind this. just a broken relief valve. It's a broken set of regulators that creates this situation. And, instead of seeing it in a rules-based type of situation that's primitive at best, it's better to think of this as holistically. You know, how does political system control doing an ISO, stable grid? And how does the NRC control? How does the NRC control the reliability of the Pilgrim station?

Just give me a second here.

(Pause.)

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MR. MULLIGAN: So facts about doing the grid, you know, a different -- the loops. The plant was without electricity for a couple of days more or less I think like that and talks about a tap on the main transformer that is causing the short and stuff. And now my computer is not working. I can't pull up this LER. And there is another LER in 2008 that essentially has the same issue. Well, it's on a start-up transformer.

And Entergy basically promises that ice was falling off the main transformer and another resister or something like that. You know, the lines weren't qualified for the grid or qualified for the weather and stuff like that. And they promised to look into that thoroughly. And then the same thing happens during a plant trip with the SRVs and stuff like that.

And then we find out that, you know, they really didn't -- you know, the 2,000 LER promises that they were going to make the grid more -- their transmission system -- their switchyard system more reliable. And they were going to look into all of these ice-falling things and causing shorts and stuff like that. And, of course, then we have the loop over an ice that shouldered the thing.

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So we have issues with the SRV. We have inappropriate operation of the plant when the blizzard was approaching and causing surges in the line from the plant. I am surprised. I don't even know if Entergy had any kind of meeting before the blizzard and talking about all the other past events where they had severe weather and it caused a plant to trip.

In this LER, 2008 with the ice trip, they identify 4 or 5 other severe weather trips and stuff.

And in this thing, it talks about severe weather, severe weather, severe weather, severe weather, severe winter blizzard. And then you start looking up the weather report, and it was just a regular snowstorm.

So, you know, honesty and ethics. How does Entergy get away with mischaracterizing the weather conditions in their interests, you know, like the severe blizzard, out of our ability to control and stuff like that?

Again, this blizzard, this Nemo business and stuff like that, that was only the fifth worst blizzard we ever had. So that questions, you know. Is the grid reliable enough to support the plant? Why is the Pilgrim plant having all of these plant trips in severe weather? How come? You know, it

shouldn't have happened in 2008 if they did what they said they were going to do and repair and inspect the plant and never trip that plant again.

And especially it wasn't just the plant trip. It was a plant trip that then caused another loop. You had two loops there and stuff like that; again, one of the most riskful events a plant can have. It really drives the plant and a risky behavior and stuff.

And so, like I said, that snowstorm was really a minor snowstorm and stuff like that. But they put it on the LERs severe storms, severe winter blizzard. So it questions the truthfulness as far as being able to -- and it questions whether Entergy can keep that -- figure out how to keep that plant from shifting during blizzards, especially during the reliability of that plant, whether it's weather-related, either blizzards, other storms, and stuff like that.

How come you can't -- it's easy engineering to keep that plant reliable. How come they can't do that? How come they have a repetitive pattern of not keeping that plant in the condition whether the normal weather or maybe a moderate or a minor blizzard -- how come they can't keep that plant

reliable?

You know, if Pilgrim is unreliable and stuff like that, it gives everybody an excuse to jack up electric rates and stuff like that. And everybody plays around and, you know, as I said, I think the New England ISO was a corrupt organization. I think right there where the Enron and the California debacle as far as our electric prices and this here we've got a miracle of natural gas fracting, dragging the prices down, across the board, throughout the country.

And here we've got -- you know, they've got us in a bottleneck with natural gas. And their regulatory people can't between themselves figure out what is best for the United States and what is best for New England and that type of thing. And so that's what I -- you know, so it all fits together, you know, a plant in trouble and --

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: All right. I appreciate your comments, Mr. Mulligan.

MR. MULLIGAN: You know, this is -you're throwing me off. This is what really is
happening here. You throw me off.

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: I thought you were done.

MR. MULLIGAN: No. Wait. Wait. Listen to me. Would you listen to me? I have been doing this over and over again. And they let me usually say my piece and stuff like that. And this is different. What is going on here is different than it ever has been going on in the past. Now, if you would have called me and explained to me how you are going to be different, I would --

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: I thought you were done talking. I apologize.

MR. MULLIGAN: Well, if you knew anything about how I -- if you knew anything how I interacted in the past over numerous times and stuff like that and talked to your buddies, you would have understood. We have a pattern here. We have always had a pattern of you let me talk and you don't disrupt me.

And, actually, I think this is part of the coverup. The NRC is trying to disrupt me and not let me get my say out of here and stuff like that and unnerve me.

And it's radically different than how the NRC during a 2.206 ever treated me in the past in the last five years. So I don't know what's going on as far as what all this disruption, interruption, and

all this sort of stuff are you've done. Nobody has ever done that to me in the past. So this is radically different than it's ever -- how the NRC has ever treated me.

So, anyway, you know, a problem. So, you know, that you had -- you had two shutdowns, right, then just before the Nemo snowstorm? The plant had been restricted to 80 percent power. Then you went into the Nemo snowstorm, and the plant tripped. You started back up after -- I don't know -- a week or so like that. Within another couple of weeks, another leak developed. Within another couple -- so you restricted to 90 percent power. Then after another week like that, another -- until recently, I think March 30th and stuff like that, you went down to 84 percent power.

And there's been no discussion of why those are leaking, what was leaking post-Nemo. There's been no LER on the second shutdown and stuff like that. So this is all a coverup. This is all a coverup to get the plant into an outage to get the plant out of the severe grid crisis with not having a lot of electricity, enough electricity to support the New England and stuff like that.

So, you know, how come the plant is so

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unreliable? How come the plant has one of the largest grid crises we've had in recent memory? How come this SRV business that has been churning out here with the plant shutdowns and then there are certain secret leaks with SRV?

How come this behavior of harassing me when I'm in the 2.206 process and stuff like that? How come we can't get to the root of this? How come people can't discuss things honestly and talk about it and lay out what they think is the problem going on here? And why does the NRC have to be so militaristic with me as far as disrupting me and all that sort of stuff? You know, this is just a pattern of a coverup.

And, like I have been saying, whether the NRC was listening to me since -- as I was discussing back in Palisades time and Vermont Yankee and stuff, we wouldn't have had this problem. If you would have been listening to me, we wouldn't have had this problem with a death at Arkansas 1 and stuff. You won't have had -- you won't have lost two plants. They're struggling to get another plant up and stuff. You don't know what the nature of the damage with the turbine building of the scatter that fell off a crane and that type of stuff. And so it seems like

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I'm just trying to have a nice -- here for -- what is it? -- the moments, the minutes that I had if I wasn't -- been disrupted so much, militaristically disruptive.

And, like I said, you know, as far as the NRC talking with me in the last -- about -- I called up the revenue inspector. I called up the NRC inspector, I mean, the PR guy. And, you know, you think that the -- you know, you guys would want to talk to somebody like me, who has a little bit of experience, and we could talk about the issues and why this is happening and all that sort of stuff. But you just -- you know, you threw up a security shield on me more or less.

What is that nature of all the secrecy with the NRC? Do you have issues with one of the local groups and the NRC -- they caught the NRC with the use fuel pattern, pattern stuff, and the NRC was disruptive. They immediately admit that this pattern was being constructed. What is the secrecy?

Why does everybody use rules to create secrecy instead of using rules to, you know, communicate and talk? How come you guys can't talk in a manner that brings confidence to the public at large and a lot of the people around the nuclear

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this militaristic type of stuff with the NRC 2 3 attacking people and that type of stuff? Is it where you don't want to get the story out that, you know, 5 the natural gas thing and a lot of plants are threatened. 6 And there's a lot of noise underneath it 7 8 that's screaming out to the NRC that we're in trouble 9 and you have to put a floor on some of this poor performance of a lot of these plants and stuff like 10 11 that and that type of thing? Is that what's going on 12 here is that the NRC wants to not get the story out of what is really going on? And I'm concerned about 13 that. 14 15 I'm just checking. Are you still on the 16 line? 17 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Yes. Mr. Mulligan? MR. MULLIGAN: Yes. I was just checking 18 19 to make sure you are still on the line. Oh, yes. 20 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: We're here. I didn't want to unintentionally interrupt you. 21 Well, I was wondering if 22 MR. MULLIGAN: Can I go on? Can I finish a little bit? 23 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Yes, sir. 24 25 MR. MULLIGAN: So we know that safety

plants? How come you can't -- what is going on with

relief valves are behind three feet of concrete, one of the most dangerous components of a plant. They're behind many feet of concrete. And there is a huge radiation field for you. You really don't -- you know, they are permanently instrumented up and the like and stuff. So you really -- it's just deafening.

And a plant like Entergy usually -- you know, they get in their direction that benefits them. They don't necessarily get in a way that shows the public the safety. And Davis-Besse, two of the worst accidents in the United States came out of safety relief valves or pilot-operated relief valves.

Davis-Besse had a ghost leak essentially, a leak of a pressure-operated relief valve. It was going into the tank, and it was leaking. The plant was leaking for years in a host of other areas and stuff like that. And then it was leaking into this tank. And they did a whole bunch of stuff.

Actually, they finally got the leak stopped, but when Davis-Besse, the leaks began, a so-called ghost leak appeared. In other words, they kept saying -- using the rationale that "Oh, it might be that, a pilot-operated relief valve leaking again. We have a history of that valve leaking in the

containment. And that is what is causing our problem" and stuff. But it wasn't leaking. And they kept using that excuse, too, you know. They shut down. And somebody stumbled across the broken relief valve.

In Davis-Besse, they had, again -- TMI. Sorry. TMI they had issues with maintenance of the relief valves and poor operation. They had a caution tag not to operate it, operate the valves. And then the event happened and they got confused. The tag was -- they got confused on the indication. They had support springs and stuff like that.

And this relief was implicated in the reason, among other things, why the plant melted down. But, yet, two accidents essentially revolved around a lot of the relief valves, these relief valves and BWRs.

And, of course, they're implicated in all of our bad accidents, really. They really didn't cause a meltdown. There are a lot of other things involved in it, but it created the justification to not take the safe way out and just shut the plant down and fix the problems and all that sort of stuff.

I'm just laying out the case that safety relief valves are nothing to be playing around about,

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nothing to be playing with. They should be -- if they show indications of it being -- indications of leakage, they should have to burden that they have that valve in a condition where no leaks are tolerated during operation and stuff. It should be reliable valves.

Here they are new valves, brand new valves and stuff. And, of course, the first LER, the only LER in the LER update, basically says, "We find no problems with the SRV valve." They had the Southern Company. They have Entergy. And what is the other company? Who was the other? They had a host of people looking over this valve, over the new SRV valve, saying that, "Nothing is wrong with your leak of the new SRVs."

And then they had, like I said, another shutdown. Then they had another big leak. They shut down. Within a week or two, they set it up. Some other valve leaked. You know, then you had the down to 80 percent -- I mean, to 90 percent. And then it went down to restriction of 80 percent. And so you sit here and say, "Why? Who chose these unreliable valves? How did these valves become so unreliable?" And, like I'm saying with the Arkansas Nuclear, you know, all their troubles, 700, that 600 data was

1 rolled in that over there at first. The record 2 weighed 400 tons. And this guy weighed something like 600 tons. 3 And let me tell you the Arkansas plant 5 there, the two facilities, it looks like a NASCAR crash as far as incidents and stuff like that. 6 unbelievable 7 Palisades, set of operational problems. 8 And also they list human 9 health when they're fiddling around with an up in D.C. circuit, you know, and stuff like that without 10 the proper safeguards and stuff like that. 11 So 12 Entergy has a pattern of being careless over employee safety and stuff. You would think this would --13 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Mr. Mulligan? 14 15 MR. MULLIGAN: Yeah. CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Yeah. I didn't want 16 to interrupt again, but did you have any additional 17 18 comments? 19 MR. MULLIGAN: How many more minutes have I got? 20 21 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Excuse me? MR. MULLIGAN: Do you know how many more 22 minutes I have? 23 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: No, I don't, but we do 24 need to wind up here fairly quickly because we did 25

reserve an hour. I just wanted to make sure because you had paused again. I didn't want to interrupt you if you had more to offer.

MR. MULLIGAN: I've got some notes. I'm just looking quickly through it.

Oh, you know, in this storm here, Millstone had more snow than Pilgrim did. So how come they operated through a storm? I don't know what their record of plant shutdowns is in severe weather, blizzards, and stuff like that, but how come Millstone was able to operate through the storm? How come Pilgrim wasn't when they had a lot less storm and stuff? So that's the thing.

We know that in 2003, LER -- excuse me.

In a 2003 storm, one of the worst -- Pilgrim didn't

fit. So what causes -- why is it tripping? Is it

old and obsolete equipment? What is the nature of

it?

Another thing I'm going to say is I was talking to the Mass. Attorney General office. And they said the problem with them is that they have no agreement, really, to talk with -- or no mandate for Entergy or Pilgrim to disclose issues at the plant. I mean, a lot of it is voluntary, but there is no hard-core agreement.

And I just want you to know that up in Vermont, there was a requirement that -- and stuff like that in a very detailed manner reported from Vermont Yankee to the state agency in charge of nuclear power and stuff like that. So how come? it's just interesting that Massachusetts basically -- the Attorney General office basically said, you know, "We don't have any strict requirement or agreement for Pilgrim to report to us. voluntary" and hit or miss as far as who to notify and all that sort of stuff and it's not a point person like a state nuclear engineer, the report to the DPS or the report to the Attorney General's office and stuff like that. So that's a pattern of Massachusetts not setting the ground rules concrete and defining what Pilgrim is going to report to the state.

And, you know, that gives the politicians a plausible deniability, "Oh, well. You know, Pilgrim never reported that problem to us. So you can't blame us" and stuff. So a lot of times, a situation like this when reportability state is not required and stuff like that, this is to protect the politicians and the people in the other offices at DPS and whatever you call it and the Attorney General

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31 -- you know, they don't -- you know, you can't Pilgrim could be a problem, you know, down the line here. And behind -- you know, because of this setup, the state could say, "Oh, we never knew how bad Pilgrim was" and stuff. And that's a big problem. We had that with Vermont Yankee. took care of that problem by creating a situation where we created a statewide debate on, you know, a memorandum of understanding, operate the memorandum of understanding, as far as, you know,

So most of the stuff Vermont Yankee just reported to the state engineer. 13

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And so, you know, I'm just saying the Attorney General office told me that it's not the case with Pilgrim. It's hit or miss. There's no requirement or no direct mandatory requirement that the report -- or, you know, most things going on at the plant, especially --

what can be said, what can be disclosed and stuff.

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: I'm Mr. Mulligan?

MR. MULLIGAN: Yes?

CHAIRMAN GIITTER: We're going to have to wind down here because I have to provide an opening a public meeting that starts in about for ten

1	minutes. So what I'd like to do is see if the staff
2	here at headquarters has any additional questions for
3	you if
4	MR. MULLIGAN: They don't have any
5	questions for me.
6	CHAIRMAN GIITTER: I have to ask them
7	anyway. So does anybody have any questions for Mr.
8	Mulligan?
9	(Whereupon, there was a chorus of "No.")
10	CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. Before I
11	conclude the meeting, I would also ask if there are
12	any members of the public that may provide comments
13	regarding the petition or ask questions about the
14	2.206 petition process. I don't think we had any on
15	the phone, but I'll ask the question in case somebody
16	has joined.
17	(No response.)
18	CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. It sounds like
19	we don't have anybody.
20	MR. MULLIGAN: And I just want to get one
21	more thing.
22	CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Yes?
23	MR. MULLIGAN: I think that in the
24	beginning, you were the NRC. I won't get
25	personal, but the NRC was really rude to me and

1 disruptive because they didn't know all the other This was off normal as far as how it was 2 ones went. -- you disrupted me and got me off my thought train 3 and stuff. And I interpreted it as being rude and 5 disrespectful and part of a coverup. Thank you. CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. Well, thank you 6 7 for that feedback. 8 Mr. Mulligan, I'd like to thank you for 9 taking the time to provide the NRC staff with the clarifying information on the petition you have 10 submitted. Before we close, does the Court Reporter 11 12 need any additional information for the meeting transcripts? 13 THE REPORTER: I'm all set. Thanks. 14 15 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Okay. Thanks. With that, the meeting is concluded. And we will 16 terminate the phone connection here. 17 18 MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you. 19 CHAIRMAN GIITTER: Thank you, Mr. 20 Mulligan. 21 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter was concluded at 11:50 a.m.) 22 23 24