



# **NRC Public Webinar**

## **Basis for NRC Requirements on Pressurized Thermal Shock**

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# Welcome

Cynthia Pederson  
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NRC Region III

# Introductions

- **Cynthia Pederson**  
*Deputy Regional Administrator, Region-III*
- **Jack Giessner**  
*Chief, Project Branch 4*
- **Mark Kirk**  
*Senior Materials Engineer, Office of Nuclear  
Regulatory Research*
- **Mel Holmberg**  
*Senior Reactor Inspector, Region III*

# Agenda

- Properties of metals
- Nuclear reactors: designed against embrittlement
- Pressurized thermal shock (PTS)
  - What is it?
  - How is safety ensured?
  - Specifics of Regulations
- Status at Palisades

# Purpose

- Provide a perspective on vessel embrittlement and PTS, as regulated by the NRC
- Discuss the vessel at the Palisades plant
- Answer questions from the public

# Ductility & Embrittlement

## Definitions



**Ductile** metals bend (absorb energy) when pulled upon

**Embrittlement**

**Embrittlement** (a loss of ductility) reduces how much a metal can bend before it breaks

**NRC Regulations limit embrittlement to ensure safety**



# Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPV)

## Designed Against Embrittlement

- The reactor coolant system produces forces on the RPV
  - Pressure
  - Thermal
- RPV designed to resist these forces, even after embrittlement
  - RPV steel has adequate toughness
  - Toughness measures ductility
- NRC limit on embrittlement keeps the probability of fracture extremely low





**RPV:**  
**Pressurized  
Cylinder**

# Toughness vs. Force

## Toughness Always Greater

Before reactor operation  
***force < toughness***


After operation (& embrittlement)  
***force (still) < toughness***





# Embrittlement is Measured

NRC Requires: 10 CFR 50 Appendix H



Embrittlement monitored by  
surveillance programs & limited  
by regulations




Photo courtesy  
of J. May, AREVA NP GmbH

# **Brittle (or Embrittled) Materials**

## **Used Safely**

### **Nuclear RPVs**


- Steel embrittles over time
- Embrittlement is
  - Understood
  - Measured
  - Limited
- NRC limits transition temperature shift so that toughness always exceeds force
  - Ensures safety

### **Non-Nuclear Example**

- Aircraft landing gear
- Very high strength steels needed to resist landing forces
- High strength steels have lower toughness
  - Less ductile
  - More brittle
- Nuclear RPV toughness exceeds landing gear toughness (even after embrittlement)

# Pressurized Thermal Shock PTS

- **A rare event**
  - Designed against
  - Regulated for safety
- **More force applied to RPV during PTS**
  - Injection of cold water
  - Rapid cooling



# NRC PTS Rules

## 10 CFR 50.61 (1984)

- Significant conservatisms restrict operations with no safety benefit
- Conservatisms include
  - Over-estimated force
  - Under-estimated toughness
- Conservatisms evidenced by
  - Additional toughness data
  - More realistic & thorough analyses
  - Scale model experiments that validate predictions

## 10 CFR 50.61a (2010)

- Considerations
  - Conservatisms in 50.61 limits will cause many plant-specific submittals
  - All submittals would address the same fundamental issues
- Alternative approaches
  - Many plant-specific assessments reviewed individually
  - **Comprehensive re-assessment of PTS risk performed proactively & with thorough review by technical experts**



# Alternative PTS Rule

## Rigorous Development Process

- Joint effort of NRC, national labs, universities, and industry (providing data & operating experience)
- Approximately 10 year project duration
- Many opportunities for public involvement
- Extensive expert technical reviews
  - Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards
  - Independent expert panel
- Full documentation available on NRC website

# Alternative PTS Rule

## Technical Approach & Insights

- Three analyses performed

Analysis		Purpose
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Assessment	Establish events that cause rapid cooling. Assess human factors.
TH	Thermal Hydraulics	Quantify force produced by rapid cooling
PFM	Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics	Quantify resistance to rapid cooling, accounting for embrittlement.

- Detailed assessments of three plants (Palisades, Beaver Valley, Oconee)
- Results generalized to all plants in USA
  - Only the most severe forces produce any risk
    - Similar across the fleet
  - Rapid cooldown to 200 °F below operating temperature needed to produce any risk
    - Operational controls limit the likelihood of such cooldowns occurring

# Comparison of PTS Rules

## 10 CFR 50.61 & 10 CFR 50.61a

Aspect of Rule	10 CFR 50.61 <b>REQUIRED</b>	10 CFR 50.61a <b>VOLUNTARY</b>
Embrittlement Limits	More restrictive	Less restrictive
Plant-specific surveillance data check	Required: 1 test	Required: 3 tests
Plant specific inspection for flaws	Not required	Required

- 10 CFR 50.61a embrittlement limits are less restrictive than 10 CFR 50.61
  - Justification: More thorough, consistent, & realistic assessment
- Limits can only be used once screening criteria are met
- Screening criteria ensure that key features of the 50.61a model apply to the plant being assessed
  - a. The embrittlement of specific RPV materials
  - b. The flaws in a specific RPV

# Current Status at Palisades

## Relative to PTS Limits

### 10 CFR 50.61

- One of the most embrittled plants in USA
- Palisades operates in compliance
- Embrittlement limits will be exceeded in 2017
- Palisades must
  - Address limit exceedence in 2014 (2017 minus 3 years), or
  - Shut down in 2017
- Options for operation beyond 2017
  - Annealing to reverse embrittlement,
  - Analysis to provide a plant specific safety justification, or
  - Use 10 CFR 50.61a

### 10 CFR 50.61a

- One option Palisades has to continue operation after 2017
- Would need to
  - Analyze data
  - Check embrittlement
  - Check flaws
- Generic analysis of US fleet in NUREG-1874 suggests this is a viable option for Palisades



# Palisades Summary

- The vessel at Palisades is one of the most embrittled in the USA
- Palisades continues to operate as long as it demonstrates compliance with NRC regulations
- Palisades continues to operate safely
- There are several options by which continued safe operation of the Palisades vessel after 2017 could be demonstrated
  - The licensee decides what option to take

# Questions

# Meeting Closure

Cynthia Pederson  
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# Meeting Contacts

- Followup Questions - Contact the NRC Region III Office of Public Affairs
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