



Serial: NPD-NRC-2013-007
February 21, 2013

10CFR52.79

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

**LEVY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 52-029 AND 52-030
RESPONSE TO NRC RAI LETTER 111 RELATED TO SRP SECTION 13.3**

Reference: Letter from Jerry Hale (NRC) to Christopher Fallon (PEF), dated January 16, 2013,
"Request for Additional Information Letter No. 111 Related to SRP Section 13.3 for the
Levy County Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Combined License Application."

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Progress Energy Florida, Inc. (PEF) hereby submits a response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) request for additional information provided in the reference above.

A response to the NRC request is addressed in the enclosure. The enclosure also identifies changes that will be made in a future revision of the Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 application.

If you have any further questions, or need additional information, please contact Bob Kitchen at (704) 382-4046, or me at (704) 382-9248.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 21, 2013.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Christopher M. Fallon'.

Christopher M. Fallon
Vice President
Nuclear Development

Enclosure

cc : U.S. NRC Region II, Regional Administrator
Mr. Don Habib, U.S. NRC Project Manager

Progress Energy Florida, Inc.
P.O. Box 14042
St. Petersburg, FL 33733

DO94
NRO

Levy Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2
Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 111 Related to SRP
Section 13.3, Dated 1/16/2013

<u>NRC RAI #</u>	<u>Progress Energy RAI #</u>	<u>Progress Energy Response</u>
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NRC Letter No.: LNP-RAI-LTR-111

NRC Letter Date: January 16, 2013

NRC Review of Final Safety Analysis Report

NRC RAI NUMBER: 13.3-59

Text of NRC RAI:

By letter dated November 8, 2012, Progress Energy Florida (PEF), Inc. submitted to NRC Revision 5 of the Levy Nuclear Plant (LNP) Emergency Plan to address its compliance with the Final Rule on Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulation effective December 23, 2011. PEF's submittal included a proposed license condition for performance of an on-shift staffing analysis. NRC staff has the following requests for additional information:

Appendix E.IV.A.7. to 10 CFR 50 requires, in part, the licensee to identify and provide a description of the assistance expected from State, Local, and federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, including hostile action at the site. The applicant provided additional language in Section C, Emergency Response Support and Resources, of the LNP emergency plan that states support from State, local, and Federal agencies will include assistance for onsite activities in response to a hostile action event sufficient to cope with this event.

- a. Discuss whether the acknowledgement of a State, local and Federal response to a hostile action event has been incorporated into Section A, Assignment of Responsibility, of the LNP emergency plan, which describes the emergency responsibilities of various support organizations having an operational role within the Emergency Planning Zones, or provide justification for why this is not necessary.
- b. Discuss whether the letters of agreement proposed by Licensee Condition 11.B (cited below) in Part 10, Proposed License Conditions (including ITAAC), of the LNP combined license (COL) application includes consideration for response to a hostile action based event, or provide justification for why this is not necessary. License Condition 11.B – "Prior to the full-participation exercise to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, PEF will have available for NRC inspection Letters of Agreement with entities listed on Appendix 3 of the LNP COLA Part 5, Emergency Plan. These Letters of Agreement will detail each entity's specific emergency planning responsibilities and certify the entity's concurrence with their responsibilities."

Note: Any discussion or description of emergency planning responsibilities associated with a hostile action event contained in letters of agreement should not disclose safeguarded detail contained in the applicant's security contingency plan, but merely reference the location of that particular information.

- c. Discuss whether emergency plan implementing procedures will identify offsite response organizations available, including their integration into site activities, during an emergency event at LNP, including hostile action.

PGN RAI ID #: L-1020

PGN Response to NRC RAI:

- a. Section A of the LNP Emergency Plan describes the emergency responsibilities of various Federal, State and local support organizations having an operational role within the Emergency Planning Zones for any LNP emergency. Areas where support for a hostile action event could differ from other emergencies are medical assistance, fire fighting, and law enforcement. The Section A discussion on medical facilities (A.1.b.13 and 14) and local emergency medical services (A.1.b.15) does not explicitly mention support for a hostile action event but there are no limitations that would preclude the necessary support for such an event. Section A's discussion on local fire departments (A.1.b.16) includes response to a large area fire and thus addresses local support for a hostile action event. Section A's discussion on local law enforcement (A.1.b.17) does not explicitly mention hostile action but support in the event of such an action would be part of maintaining "area security and law enforcement within the 10-mile EPZ". This sub-section sets forth a list of "local law enforcement agencies," including a state agency (the Florida Department of Law Enforcement). Thus, local and state law enforcement agencies' response in the event of a hostile action are addressed. State, county, and local agencies providing the support for LNP have signed certification letters that are contained in Part 5 of the LNP COLA. Additionally, the State of Florida has statewide mutual aid plans that allow for immediate response of additional assets from around the State as a part of the following: Florida Sheriff's mutual aid agreement; Florida Fire Chiefs statewide mutual aid agreement and the State of Florida Emergency Response Plan. This supports the statement that sufficient resources are available to adequately support hostile action situations. Section A's discussion on the FBI (A.1.b.9) describes Federal support for security threats. Section A's discussion on DHS/FEMA (A.1.b.11) describes Federal support for security-related threats. Emergency Plan Section A, therefore, includes a sufficient discussion of the support to be provided by Federal, State, and local agencies to respond to a hostile action event at LNP. Accordingly, no additions to the LNP Emergency Plan are necessary in response to this question.
- b. The areas where off-site support for a hostile action event is needed are medical assistance, fire fighting, and law enforcement. Each of the entities listed on Appendix 3 of the LNP COLA Part 5, Emergency Plan provide support in at least one of these areas. License Condition 11B states "... PEF will have available for NRC inspection Letters of Agreement with entities listed on Appendix 3 of the LNP COLA Part 5, Emergency Plan. These Letters of Agreement will detail each entity's specific emergency planning responsibilities and certify the entity's concurrence with their responsibilities.", therefore, the agreement letters will include consideration for response to a hostile action based event. Any discussion or description of emergency planning responsibilities associated with a hostile action event contained in these letters of agreement will not disclose safeguarded detail contained in the LNP security contingency plan.
- c. LNP procedures will identify offsite response organizations available, including their integration into site activities, during an emergency event at LNP, including hostile action. This information may be in other types of procedures instead of or in addition to emergency plan implementing procedures.

Associated LNP COL Application Revisions:

None

Attachments/Enclosures:

None

NRC Letter No.: LNP-RAI-LTR-111

NRC Letter Date: January 16, 2013

NRC Review of Final Safety Analysis Report

NRC RAI NUMBER: 13.3-60

Text of NRC RAI:

Appendix E.IV.D.3 to 10 CFR 50 requires, in part, that the alert and notification system has a backup system capable of being used in the event the primary method for alerts and notification is unavailable during an emergency. Section E.5 of the LNP Emergency plan states, in part, that the primary means to alert the public consists of a system of sirens in the 10-mile EPZ with an alternate means of alerting the population using mobile sirens when fixed sirens are not suitable. The primary and backup alert systems consist of sirens, tone alert radios, NOAA weather radios or route alerting.

- a. Describe in the emergency plan where the description of the public alert and notification system provides reference to its design described in the LNP Emergency Plan, Appendix 7, "Public Alert and Notification System."
- b. Clarify in the emergency plan whether tone alert radios are the backup means for alerting the populace within the 10-mile EPZ should the primary method (i.e., fixed and mobile sirens) become unavailable.
- c. Clarify in the emergency plan the administrative means used by PEF to alert and notify the general public within the 10-mile EPZ.
- d. LNP Emergency Plan, Appendix 7 describes the use of mobile sirens as an alternate method for alerting the public in thinly populated areas within the 10-mile EPZ, "if cost effective." Since the emergency plan makes reference to mobile sirens as the primary means of alerting the public outside the 5 mile radius within the 10-mile EPZ, describe the primary means for notifying the populace within this area should mobile sirens not be cost-effective.
- e. Clarify in the emergency plan whether the 15 minute timeliness goal for notifying the populace outside of the 5 mile radius within the 10-miles EPZ is consistent with the use of mobile sirens. In addition, clarify in the emergency plan whether the 15-minute timeliness goal includes both alerting and notifying (e.g., delivery of alert signal and informational message) the public within the 10-mile EPZ of an emergency at LNP.

PGN RAI ID #: L-1021

PGN Response to NRC RAI:

- a. The body of the LNP Emergency Plan does not provide reference to Appendix 7 other than in the Table of Contents. The LNP Emergency Plan will be revised such that Appendix 7 will be referenced in Section E.5 of the LNP Emergency Plan.
- b. Tone alert radios are not the backup means for alerting the populace within the 10-mile EPZ should the primary method become unavailable. They are an alternative that is available but

not credited as the primary or backup means for alerting. Section E.5 of the LNP Emergency plan will be revised to clarify that route alerting is the backup means for alerting the public and tone alert radios will be deleted.

- c. The primary alert system consists of fixed sirens and the backup is via route alerting. The primary notification system is the EAS and the backup is route alerting. Section E.5 of the LNP Emergency Plan will be revised to include the primary and backup means to alert and notify the general public within the 10-mile EPZ.
- d. Mobile sirens are no longer considered to be an alternative to fixed sirens as the primary means of alerting the general public within the 10-mile EPZ. "Mobile sirens" and "an alternative to mobile sirens if not cost effective" will be deleted from the text of LNP Emergency Plan Section E.5 and Appendix 7 as a primary means of alerting the general public.
- e. Mobile sirens are no longer considered to be an alternative to fixed sirens as the primary means of alerting the general public within the 10-mile EPZ. Mobile sirens will be deleted from the text of LNP Emergency Plan Section E.5 and Appendix 7 as a primary means of alerting the general public. The second sentence in the "Coverage" paragraph of Appendix 7 will be revised from "5 miles" to "10 miles". The first sentence in the "Coverage" paragraph discusses the 15 minute alert capability, therefore; the capability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ of an emergency at LNP will be clarified by this change. It is appropriate to include this information on alert capability in the LNP Emergency Plan since the siren system will be developed and maintained by PEF for activation by the associated county emergency management personnel. However, the primary notification system, the EAS, is not developed or maintained by PEF. EAS information and capabilities are contained in the county emergency plans for the LNP site. It is not considered appropriate to include details on public notification timeliness capabilities in the LNP Emergency Plan.

A future revision of the LNP COLA will reflect the changes discussed in this response.

Associated LNP COL Application Revisions:

1. COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan Section E.5 first two paragraphs, will be revised from:

The primary method of alerting the public is by sounding the Alert and Notification System. The Alert and Notification System consists of a system of sirens that alert the public in the 10-mile EPZ of the recommendation to initiate protective actions. An alternate means of alerting the population may be used for areas that are not suitable for fixed siren emplacement. An alternate means includes the use of mobile sirens in areas beyond 5 miles from the site to alert the public in sparsely populated areas. Upon hearing the warning sirens, the public is instructed to tune their radios or televisions to emergency channels for further instructions. Local and state actions are then instituted in accordance with the State Plan to ensure the implementation of appropriate protective measures.

In the event of the failure of the primary means, back-up methods that may be implemented by the responsible offsite authorities with the administrative and physical means for alerting and providing prompt notification to the public exist. The primary and backup alert systems consist of sirens, tone alert radios, NOAA weather radios or route alerting. The notification systems consist of a combination of EAS, NOAA weather radios or route alerting.

To read:

The primary method of alerting the public is by sounding the Alert and Notification System. The Alert and Notification System consists of a system of sirens that alert the public in the 10-mile EPZ of the recommendation to initiate protective actions. A description of the design of the Alert and Notification System is provided in Appendix 7, Public Alert and Notification System. Upon hearing the warning sirens, the public is instructed to tune their radios or televisions to emergency channels for further instructions. Local and state actions are then instituted in accordance with the State Plan to ensure the implementation of appropriate protective measures.

In the event of the failure of the primary means, back-up methods that may be implemented by the responsible offsite authorities with the administrative and physical means for alerting and providing prompt notification to the public exist. The primary alert system consists of fixed sirens and the backup is via route alerting. The primary notification system is the EAS and the backup is route alerting.

2. COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan Appendix 7 page A7-2, will be revised from:

Capability beyond fixed sirens: Alternate alert equipment such as mobile sirens may be used in thinly populated areas if cost effective. Alternate methods for alerting and notifying institutional facilities are provided, as needed.

CRITERIA

Alerting criteria are delineated in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (Appendix 3) which also references Civil Preparedness Guide 1-17 (CPG 1-17). Additional guidance is provided in FEMA-REP-10. The following performance criteria are used to consider the system functional:

Reliability: The system is designed to allow activation by at least two separate (redundant) methods and will be available 24 hours per day. Backup power supplies are provided for the activation system. Fixed siren design is sufficient to withstand the environmental conditions expected at the emplacement (e.g., wind loading, precipitation).

Signal Parameters: The siren signal is a 3 to 5 minute steady signal capable of repetition. The strength of the signal is at least 10 db above average ambient noise level but not more than 123 db at the receptor.

Coverage: The siren system alerts the population on an area-wide basis within the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ within 15 minutes. The system provides direct coverage of essentially 100% of the population within 5 miles of the site. Alternative methods, such as mobile sirens, may be employed outside the inner 5 mile radius if needed to assure coverage of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Backup means to alert the population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ in a reasonable time are provided in the event of a partial or complete failure of the primary method.

2.2 METHODOLOGY

A detailed sound engineering study, including acoustic surveys, is used to determine optimum siren site locations. Site selection is also based on population density, ambient noise levels, topography, electric power availability, and existing/interfaced siren locations. Siren site selection is subject to obtaining necessary rights of way.

Alternate means of alerting the population may be used for areas that are not suitable for fixed siren emplacement. These include the use of mobile sirens in areas beyond 5 miles from the site to alert the public in sparsely populated areas.

Public information is provided to transient populations within the EPZ to advise them on actions to be taken if the sirens are sounded.

To read:

Capability beyond fixed sirens: In the event of a partial or complete failure of the fixed sirens, the backup means for public alerting and notification is route alerting. Additional methods for alerting and notifying institutional facilities may be provided.

CRITERIA

Alerting criteria are delineated in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (Appendix 3) which also references Civil Preparedness Guide 1-17 (CPG 1-17). Additional guidance is provided in FEMA-REP-10. The following performance criteria are used to consider the system functional:

Reliability: The system is designed to allow activation by at least two separate (redundant) methods and will be available 24 hours per day. Backup power supplies are provided for the activation system. Fixed siren design is sufficient to withstand the environmental conditions expected at the emplacement (e.g., wind loading, precipitation).

Signal Parameters: The siren signal is a 3 to 5 minute steady signal capable of repetition. The strength of the signal is at least 10 db above average ambient noise level but not more than 123 db at the receptor.

Coverage: The siren system alerts the population on an area-wide basis within the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ within 15 minutes. The system provides direct coverage of essentially 100% of the population within 10 miles of the site. Backup means to alert the population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ in a reasonable time are provided in the event of a partial or complete failure of the primary method.

2.2 METHODOLOGY

A detailed sound engineering study, including acoustic surveys, is used to determine optimum siren site locations. Site selection is also based on population density, ambient noise levels, topography, electric power availability, and existing/interfaced siren locations. Siren site selection is subject to obtaining necessary rights of way.

Public information is provided to transient populations within the EPZ to advise them on actions to be taken if the sirens are sounded.

Attachments/Enclosures:

None

NRC Letter No.: LNP-RAI-LTR-111

NRC Letter Date: January 16, 2013

NRC Review of Final Safety Analysis Report

NRC RAI NUMBER: 13.3-61

Text of NRC RAI:

The LNP emergency plan (sub-section H.2.1.a.2) provides reference to the Emergency Operations Facility as being established consistent with NUREG-0696, "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities." In addition, regulatory guidance provided in NUREG-0696, Subsection 4.3, "Staffing and Training," as enhanced by NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, states in part that prior to initial operation of a consolidated EOF and in at least one drill or exercise per exercise cycle thereafter, the EOF staff will demonstrate the ability to perform the additional consolidated EOF functions described in the emergency plan and revised guidance.

- a. Clarify in the emergency plan whether the reference to NUREG-0696 in sub-section H.2.1.a.2 is the same reference listed as reference "W" in Appendix 2, "References," to the emergency plan.
- b. Describe in the emergency plan whether the EOF staff will demonstrate its ability to perform their consolidated EOF functions established in the emergency plan and regulatory guidance in at least one drill or exercise per exercise cycle thereafter.

PGN RAI ID #: L-1022

PGN Response to NRC RAI:

- a. The reference to NUREG-0696 in sub-section H.2.1.a.2 is intended to refer to reference "W" in Appendix 2. LNP Emergency Plan sub-section H.2.1.a.2 will be revised to clarify NUREG-0696 is reference "W".
- b. The LNP Emergency Plan will be revised to add a requirement in Section N.2 to demonstrate the ability to perform consolidated EOF functions established in this plan and regulatory guidance in at least one drill or exercise per LNP exercise cycle.

A future revision of the LNP COLA will reflect the changes discussed in this response.

Associated LNP COL Application Revisions:

1. COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan sub-section H.2.1.a.2, will be revised from:

The Emergency Operations Facility has been established consistent with NUREG-0696 guidelines.

To read:

The Emergency Operations Facility has been established consistent with NUREG-0696 (Reference W) guidelines.

2. COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan sub-section N.2 second paragraph, will be revised from:

During these drills, activation of all of the emergency response facilities may not be necessary. Progress Energy may use the drills to consider accident management strategies, provide supervised instruction, allow the operating staff to resolve problems and focus on internal training objectives. Progress Energy may include one or more drills as portions of an exercise.

To read:

During these drills, activation of all of the emergency response facilities may not be necessary. Progress Energy may use the drills to consider accident management strategies, provide supervised instruction, allow the operating staff to resolve problems and focus on internal training objectives. Progress Energy may include one or more drills as portions of an exercise. In at least one drill or exercise per LNP exercise cycle, the LNP and CR3 EOF staff will demonstrate the ability to perform consolidated EOF functions established in this plan and regulatory guidance.

Attachments/Enclosures:

None

NRC Letter No.: LNP-RAI-LTR-111

NRC Letter Date: January 16, 2013

NRC Review of Final Safety Analysis Report

NRC RAI NUMBER: 13.3-62

Text of NRC RAI:

10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.E.8.d requires, in part, the emergency plan include the identification of an alternative facility (or facilities) that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of ERO staff during hostile action to minimize delays in emergency response and provide for a swift coordinated augmented response.

- a. Section H.2.3, "Alternate Emergency Response Facility," of the LNP emergency plan states, in part, that the alternate facility is intended to be staffed short term during the period when the onsite facilities are not accessible and will contain minimal equipment necessary for operation. Clarify in the emergency plan whether the alternate facility is capable of being staffed for an extended period of time should a hazard to emergency responders exist at the site with adequate equipment necessary for supporting its operation.
- b. Clarify in the emergency plan whether the purpose of the alternate facility is to stage ERO personnel in a manner that supports rapid response to the LNP site to limit or mitigate site damage or the potential for a radiological release.
- c. Section H.2.3, "Alternate Emergency Response Facility," of the LNP emergency plan bullet 3 states, in part, that the alternate facility will have the capability for engineering and damage control teams to begin planning mitigating actions (e.g., general drawings and system information). Clarify in the emergency plan whether general drawings and system information will be used to support engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation.

PGN RAI ID #: L-1023

PGN Response to NRC RAI:

- a. Section H.2.3 of the LNP Emergency Plan will be revised to state that the alternate facility is capable of being staffed for an extended period of time should a hazard to emergency responders exist at the site, with adequate equipment necessary for supporting its operation.
- b. Section H.2.3 of the LNP Emergency Plan will be revised to state that the purpose of the alternate facility is to stage ERO personnel in a manner that supports rapid response to the LNP site to limit or mitigate site damage or the potential for a radiological release.
- c. Section H.2.3 of the LNP Emergency Plan will be revised to state that general drawings and system information will be accessible for use in engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation.

A future revision of the LNP COLA will reflect the changes discussed in this response.

Associated LNP COL Application Revisions:

COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan Section H.2.3, will be revised from:

The Alternate Emergency Response Facility is located away from the plant site in the EOF/ENC Facility. The Facility will serve as a location for ERO members to assemble and activate in the event that access to the plant's onsite and alternate "onsite" Emergency Response Facilities (TSC and OSC) location is not possible due to a severe weather event, hostile-action or any other reason. The Facility is intended to be staffed short term during the period when the onsite facilities are not accessible and will contain minimal equipment necessary for operation. The facility will have at a minimum:

- Communication links with the EOF, control room and security
- Capability to notify offsite response organizations if the emergency operations facility staff is not performing the action
- Capability for engineering and damage control teams to begin planning mitigating actions (e.g., general drawings and system information)
- Computer links to the site to access plant data

Specific setup criteria for the Alternate Emergency Response Facility are contained in the EPIP, Activation and Operation of the Alternate Emergency Response Facility.

To read:

The Alternate Emergency Response Facility is located away from the plant site in the EOF/ENC Facility and its purpose is to stage ERO personnel in a manner that supports rapid response to the LNP site to limit or mitigate site damage or the potential for a radiological release. The Facility will serve as a location for ERO members to assemble and activate in the event that access to the plant's onsite and alternate "onsite" Emergency Response Facilities (TSC and OSC) location is not possible due to a severe weather event, hostile-action or any other reason. The Facility is expected to be staffed short term when the onsite facilities are not accessible; but, it is capable of being staffed for an extended period of time should a hazard to emergency responders exist at the site, and it will contain adequate equipment necessary for supporting its operation.

The facility will have at a minimum:

- Communication links with the EOF, control room and security
- Capability to notify offsite response organizations if the emergency operations facility staff is not performing the action
- Capability for engineering assessment activities including, damage control team planning and preparation (items such as general drawings and system information will be accessible to support this capability)
- Computer links to the site to access plant data

Specific setup criteria for the Alternate Emergency Response Facility are contained in the EPIP, Activation and Operation of the Alternate Emergency Response Facility.

Attachments/Enclosures:

None

NRC Letter No.: LNP-RAI-LTR-111

NRC Letter Date: January 16, 2013

NRC Review of Final Safety Analysis Report

NRC RAI NUMBER: 13.3-63

Text of NRC RAI:

10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.I requires, in part, that the emergency plan include a range of protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile action and ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the reactor and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan. Section J, "Protective Response," of the LNP emergency plan states that the Radiation Protection Program (RPP) at LNP assures that protective measures are provided for the purpose of safeguarding the health of all personnel working on-site and of the public outside the boundaries of the facility that may be radiologically threatened during an emergency. Clarify in the emergency plan how the RPP interacts with the emergency preparedness programs, to assure the health and safety of on-site personnel and the general public in the event of an emergency at LNP.

PGN RAI ID #: L-1024

PGN Response to NRC RAI:

The first paragraph in Section J will be revised to clarify that this section contains information on protective measures taken to protect onsite personnel during a hostile action event in addition to protective measures taken to limit radiation exposure during an emergency. Also, the information in sub-section 6 with a description of hostile action event protective measures and inclusion in emergency plan implementing procedures will be moved to the end of sub-section J.6 such that it is not intermixed with radiological protective actions. The RPP is not responsible for assuring non-radiological protective measures are taken for a hostile action event.

The information provided in Section K describes how the RPP interacts with the emergency preparedness programs, to assure the health and safety of on-site personnel and the general public in the event of an emergency at LNP. Therefore, the clarification requested can be provided by referencing Section K for additional information on the RPP in Section J at the location of the text quoted in the RAI. Section K.2 in the LNP Emergency plan has additional information on the Radiation Protection Program (RPP) and references some other sub-sections of Section K for additional information. The key elements of the RPP that relate to emergency preparedness are listed in Section K.2 and are dose limits for normal operating and emergency conditions, access control, personnel monitoring, and contamination control. Emergency exposure limits are discussed in K.1. Access control, personnel monitoring, and contamination control are discussed in K.6.

A future revision of the LNP COLA will reflect the changes discussed in this response.

Associated LNP COL Application Revisions:

1. COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan Section J first and second paragraphs, will be revised from:

This section describes the protective actions that have been developed to limit radiation exposure of site personnel and the public following an accident at the Site.

The Radiation Protection Program at LNP assures that protective measures are provided for the purpose of safeguarding the health of all personnel working on-site and of the public outside the boundaries of the facility that may be radiologically threatened during an emergency. The responsibility for the implementation of these protective measures is shared between Progress Energy and the State of Florida. Progress Energy is responsible for the implementation of these protective measures on-site; the state is responsible for implementation off-site. As appropriate, Progress Energy recommends off-site protective actions to the local and state authorities.

To read:

This section describes the protective actions that have been developed to limit radiation exposure of site personnel and the public following an accident at the Site. In addition, protective actions developed to protect onsite personnel during a hostile action event are discussed in this section.

The Radiation Protection Program at LNP assures that protective measures are provided for the purpose of safeguarding the health of all personnel working on-site and of the public outside the boundaries of the facility that may be radiologically threatened during an emergency. Additional information on the Radiation Protection Program is provided in Section K. The responsibility for the implementation of these protective measures is shared between Progress Energy and the State of Florida. Progress Energy is responsible for the implementation of these protective measures on-site; the state is responsible for implementation off-site. As appropriate, Progress Energy recommends off-site protective actions to the local and state authorities.

2. COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan sub-section J.6 will be revised to move the paragraph after J.6.a.3 on hostile action protective measures to the end of sub-section J.6.

Attachments/Enclosures:

None

NRC Letter No.: LNP-RAI-LTR-111

NRC Letter Date: January 16, 2013

NRC Review of Final Safety Analysis Report

NRC RAI NUMBER: 13.3-64

Text of NRC RAI:

10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.F.2 requires, in part, that exercises test emergency equipment, communication networks, and the public alert and notification system. Section N.1, "Exercises," of the LNP Emergency Plan states, in part, that exercises shall be designed to test the public notification system. Clarify in the LNP Emergency Plan whether exercises will be designed to test the public alert and notification system.

PGN RAI ID #: L-1025

PGN Response to NRC RAI:

Section N.1, bullet 2 of the LNP Emergency Plan will be revised to state that exercises will be designed to test the public alert and notification system.

A future revision of the LNP COLA will reflect the changes discussed in this response.

Associated LNP COL Application Revisions:

COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan Section N.1 bullet 2, will be revised from:

- Test emergency equipment, communication networks, and the public notification system, and

To read:

- Test emergency equipment, communication networks, and the public alert and notification system, and

Attachments/Enclosures:

None

NRC Letter No.: LNP-RAI-LTR-111

NRC Letter Date: January 16, 2013

NRC Review of Final Safety Analysis Report

NRC RAI NUMBER: 13.3-65

Text of NRC RAI:

10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) requires that emergency responsibilities of supporting organizations have been specifically established and procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations. Section 5.2., "Off-site Emergency Response Organization," of the LNP emergency plan states that outside organizations that support LNP in an emergency include CR3 and other organizations as described in Section A, "Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)." Clarify in the LNP Emergency Plan the emergency planning responsibilities of CR3 as a supporting organization for LNP, including provisions for notification of CR3 during a declared emergency event at LNP.

PGN RAI ID #: L-1026

PGN Response to NRC RAI:

To clarify the required outside organization support for LNP in an emergency, CR3 will be deleted from the referenced sentence in the LNP Emergency Plan Section B.5.2. CR3 is a nearby nuclear station within the same company and is not listed in Section A. Any CR3 support would fall under the description of Progress Energy corporate support provided to LNP which is described in Section B.7. Corporate personnel supporting the LNP ERO are notified of an emergency at LNP in accordance with LNP emergency plan implementing procedures as stated in sub-section E.1.1.

A future revision of the LNP COLA will reflect the changes discussed in this response.

Associated LNP COL Application Revisions:

COLA Part 5 LNP Emergency Plan Section B.5.2 last paragraph, will be revised from:

Outside organizations that support LNP in an emergency include CR3 and other organizations as described in Section A, Assignment of Responsibility (Organizational Control).

To read:

Outside organizations that support LNP in an emergency are described in Section A, Assignment of Responsibility (Organizational Control).

Attachments/Enclosures:

None