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**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:21 AM  
**To:** Decker, David; Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela; Dhir, Neha  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: House Approps Subcommittee on Energy and Water Transcript for Reveiw/Editing

Sorry – I should have also said that I'll bring up paper copies of these items in a few minutes.

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**From:** David Decker  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:17 AM  
**To:** Joshua Batkin; Angela Coggins; Neha Dhir  
**Cc:** Amy Powell; Rebecca Schmidt  
**Subject:** House Approps Subcommittee on Energy and Water Transcript for Reveiw/Editing

Josh, Angela and Neha,  
Attached above is the transcript from the 3/31/11 hearing with the House Approps Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. The subcommittee staff just sent it to us for review and minor editing, which they would like completed by 5/4/11.

Also attached are the "Questions for the Record" the subcommittee staff just sent as well. These will show up soon in the "Daily Reader", but I wanted to send them to you now as well.

David

House of Representatives  
Committee on Appropriations  
Washington, DC 20515

April 5, 2011

TO: Chairman Jaczko

As a convenience to you, the transcript of testimony of your hearing is provided for review only by your agency. Release of this transcript to any other agency or organization is strictly controlled by the Subcommittee. Because of the necessity for editing and printing the hearings at an **early date**, the attached **ORIGINAL** transcript should be returned to the Subcommittee Staff as early as you can, but not later than

May 4, 2011

Changes by the witnesses should be limited to:

1. Corrections (**in pencil only**) of grammatical, typographical, spelling, and other obvious errors such as run-on sentences; and
2. Additions of statements and information requested and approved by the Subcommittee. (Insertions to be typed on **one** side of a page only.)

**NOTE.**—Although no changes should be made in Members' remarks, if you observe any typographical or other obvious errors, we would appreciate pencil notes in the margin, or in an accompanying memo, calling them to our attention.

If you cannot prepare the required additional material within the time limitation, please return the transcript within such time with a notation as to when the additional material will be submitted.

Sincerely,

Energy and Water Subcommittee



1 | ANDERSON COURT REPORTING

2 | HAP090100

3 | ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012

4 | Thursday, March 31, 2011

5 | DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR REGULATORY

6 | COMMISSION, FY 2012 BUDGET

7 ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012

8 Thursday, March 31, 2011

9 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
10 COMMISSION, FY 2012 BUDGET

11 WITNESSES

12 DR. PETER LYONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR  
13 ENERGY

14 GREGORY JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

15           Mr. SIMPSON. Good morning, everyone. I would like to  
16 call this hearing to order. The Subcommittee on Energy and  
17 Water Development meets today to hear testimony on fiscal  
18 year 2012 budget requests for the Nuclear Regulatory  
19 Commission and for the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy  
20 Applied Research and Development programs.

21           We have before us Gregory Jaczko, the Chairman of the  
22 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Pete Lyons, the Acting  
23 Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy at the Department of  
24 Energy. I welcome both of you and look forward to your  
25 testimony.

26           The last three weeks have been devastating for the  
27 people of Japan. Our thoughts and prayers are obviously with  
28 them. In addition to this terrible loss of life in Japan,  
29 this Subcommittee has been paying close attention to events  
30 at the affected Japanese nuclear power plants given our  
31 jurisdiction over nuclear energy appropriations. Our hearing  
32 today is very simple. We look to two of our witnesses to  
33 inform us both on the events in Japan and on any implications  
34 for us here at home.

35           Average U.S. electricity prices have gone up 45 percent  
36 in just the last ten years. With growing global demand for  
37 energy sources, promising to pinch American wallets even  
38 further in the coming decades, a diverse and domestic mix of  
39 energy sources is essential to our prosperity now more than

40 | ever. Nuclear energy currently generates 20 percent of  
41 | America's electricity and powers much of our naval fleet.  
42 | There is little doubt that it will be a significant portion  
43 | of our energy mix moving forward. A new crop of new  
44 | generation reactors is on the cusp of moving forward and will  
45 | be an important part of that mix. And still we cannot charge  
46 | forward with new plans without ensuring the safety and  
47 | security of this and future generations to Americans. We  
48 | must learn all we can from what happened in Japan and make  
49 | certain that our reactors, whether existing or new, are safe.  
50 | Today we will consider programs of the Department of Energy  
51 | and Nuclear Regulatory Commission that work to ensure the  
52 | safety of our existing fleet of nuclear reactors. We will  
53 | also consider how activities proposed in the 2012 budget  
54 | request would develop new generations of nuclear power plants  
55 | with designs that incorporate the latest technological  
56 | advances for improved efficiency and safety. In all of these  
57 | areas, Dr. Lyons and Chairman Jaczko, we look forward--we  
58 | look to you to give us the facts and to explain a path  
59 | forward for learning from the events in Japan and building an  
60 | energy independent and prosperous America.

61 | Just as important, we will hold you both accountable to  
62 | explain how the administration's position to shutter the  
63 | Yucca Mountain Waste Depository, a position that throws away  
64 | billions of dollars of investment and with it a plan to

65 | dispose of spent fuel spread across the country, furthers our  
66 | energy interests and citizen safety. I ask that each of you  
67 | please ensure that the hearing record--that the questions for  
68 | the record and any supporting information requested by the  
69 | Subcommittee are delivered in final form to the Subcommittee  
70 | no later than four weeks from the time you receive them.  
71 | Members who have additional questions for the record will  
72 | have until the close of business tomorrow to provide them to  
73 | the Subcommittee office. At this point I will turn to Mr.  
74 | Pastor for any comments that he may have.

75 |       Mr. PASTOR. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for  
76 | taking the time today to discuss the NRC budget and  
77 | activities in Japan. Mr. Lyons, good morning. It is good to  
78 | see you again.

79 |       As the Chairman has said, this hearing is timely. With  
80 | the recent events in Japan, it is important to understand  
81 | what we know of the events in Japan and how it relates both  
82 | to the operating nuclear plants in the United States and  
83 | planned expansion. Of course, the implications for the U.S.  
84 | are not the primary concern at this point in time. The  
85 | safety of the Japanese people and their recovery is of utmost  
86 | importance in the short term. I would like to hear what we  
87 | are doing to support our ally, and if there are any funding  
88 | issues that must be addressed to ensure the United States is  
89 | doing all it can to support Japan.

90       As we move forward with a review of current safety  
91 requirements, the events in Japan have highlighted the  
92 importance of this position path for spent fuel. A number of  
93 U.S. plants are approaching three times the amount of spent  
94 fuel as originally planned. While the NRC has stated that  
95 spent fuel can be safely stored for longer than originally  
96 anticipated, it is still the critical issue. The  
97 administration's termination of Yucca has created a great  
98 deal of uncertainty when it comes to how the nation will  
99 dispose of its nuclear waste. Your organization, Mr. Lyons,  
100 would be responsible for executing the Department's  
101 responsibility under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and  
102 informing the Blue Ribbon Commission that we will be looking  
103 at alternatives for the backend of the nuclear fuel cycle.  
104 The Subcommittee continues to have questions regarding how  
105 your organization will support the termination process and  
106 the path forward. And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the  
107 time, and I yield back.

108       Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Lyons, welcome.

109       Mr. LYONS. Thank you. Mr. Simpson, Mr. Pastor, members  
110 of the Subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity  
111 to appear before you today to discuss the President's fiscal  
112 year 2012 budget request for the Office of Nuclear Energy at  
113 the Department of Energy.

114       As I testify here today and as you have noted in your

115 opening comments, we should all be mindful of the people in  
116 Japan who are still dealing with the effects of a devastating  
117 earthquake and a tsunami. The damaged reactors at Fukushima  
118 represent the largest nuclear crisis the world has seen in  
119 nearly a quarter century. Efforts are ongoing to contain the  
120 nuclear material and mitigate the effects of the crisis. But  
121 there is no doubt that for many years the nuclear community  
122 will be studying the combined effects of the earthquake and  
123 the tsunami on the Fukushima reactors to determine if further  
124 safety upgrades are required.

125       During the crisis, the Office of Nuclear Energy has  
126 provided continual staffing to the Department of Energy's  
127 Emergency Operations Center to help interpret technical and  
128 environmental data arriving from the field. Our principle  
129 laboratory, the Idaho National Laboratory, has activated a  
130 technical response team that is coordinating six national  
131 labs to supply any required expertise.

132       Turning to domestic matters, President Obama has  
133 declared that now is "'our generation's Sputnik moment'" and  
134 that we will make investments in clean energy technology and  
135 as he said, "'An investment that will strengthen our  
136 security, protect our planet, and create countless new jobs  
137 for our people.'" The President also called for a clean  
138 energy standard under which clean energy sources would  
139 provide the United States with 80 percent of its electricity

140 | by 2035. That is an ambitious goal and that will require all  
141 | the sources of clean energy, solar, wind, and other  
142 | renewables, as well as carbon capture and sequestration, and  
143 | nuclear power. Such a standard will provide additional  
144 | market pull to encourage private investment in new nuclear  
145 | reactors.

146 |       The President's FY12 budget request supports nuclear  
147 | power by requesting an additional \$36 billion in loan  
148 | guarantee authority for new nuclear plant construction. In  
149 | addition, the budget request includes a total of \$853 million  
150 | for the Office of Nuclear Energy and over half of that  
151 | budget, about \$447 million, is for research, development, and  
152 | demonstration.

153 |       One particular area that I would like to highlight now  
154 | from our FY12 request is our proposed Small Modular Reactor  
155 | or SMR program. I think that SMRs represent a tremendous  
156 | opportunity for the United States to regain leadership in one  
157 | potentially key area of the nuclear supply chain. They offer  
158 | many potential advantages, including their highly passive  
159 | safety systems. As other examples of advantages, building  
160 | reactors in a factory setting and shipping them to a plant  
161 | site could offer potential cost savings. If they can be air  
162 | cooled, they would lessen regulatory and siting challenges.  
163 | And if they can replace similarly sized fossil plant units,  
164 | some of the needed infrastructure could already be in place.



165 | There are many other potential advantages, too, that we may  
166 | explore with your questions.

167 |       To help accelerate the availability of SMRs, we have  
168 | proposed a near-term, multi-year program focused on cost  
169 | sharing for first-of-a-kind engineering associated with  
170 | design certification and licensing. If that request is  
171 | supported, we plan to promulgate a funding opportunity  
172 | announcement that would initiate a competition to select two  
173 | vendor utility teams. This, we believe, will spur innovation  
174 | and help American companies compete internationally.

175 |       The President also mentioned our nuclear energy hub in  
176 | the State of the Union address. Last May, we announced the  
177 | winning team for that hub, and this May we will have the  
178 | ribbon-cutting ceremony planned for the opening of the  
179 | one-roof collaboration site at Oak Ridge National Laboratory  
180 | as well as some first results from that hub, all available to  
181 | the public. We remain extremely excited about the prospects  
182 | of the hub for improving nuclear plant safety and efficiency  
183 | through advanced computing capabilities.

184 |       I am making no attempt to cover all our programs in  
185 | detail in this opening statement, and I will look forward to  
186 | your questions to explore them in greater detail. Thank you.

187 |       [The information follows:]

188 | \*\*\*\*\* INSERT 1 \*\*\*\*\*

189 Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, Dr. Lyons. Chairman Jaczko.

190 Mr. JACZKO. Mr. Chairman and members of the  
191 Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before  
192 you today to discuss the fiscal year 2012 budget request for  
193 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But before I speak  
194 about broader agency or budget matters, I would like to take  
195 just a few moments to address the tragic events in Japan. I  
196 would like to reiterate my condolences to all those who have  
197 been affected by the earthquake, tsunami, and the resulting  
198 nuclear emergency in Japan. Our hearts go out to all those  
199 who have been dealing with the aftermath of these natural  
200 disasters. The NRC has been working since the event started  
201 to support the U.S. Embassy in Japan as well as our  
202 colleagues in Japan with requests for information and  
203 analysis to help support their efforts to deal with this  
204 situation. In spite of the evolving situation, the long  
205 hours, and the intensity of the efforts, the NRC staff has  
206 approached their responsibilities with dedication,  
207 determination, and professionalism. And at the same time, we  
208 have still remained focused on our essential safety and  
209 security mission here with the reactors and other materials  
210 we regulate in the United States. I am very proud of the  
211 work that they have done.

212 On Monday, March 21, my fellow commissioners and I  
213 established a senior-level task force to conduct a

214 comprehensive review of our processes and regulations to  
215 determine whether the agency should make improvements to our  
216 regulatory system. This review will be conducted in a  
217 short-term and a longer term timeframe, and we anticipate the  
218 first short-term review to be completed within approximately  
219 90 days. And that review will involve meetings with the  
220 Commission at 30 and 60 days as well. The longer term review  
221 is scheduled to be completed in approximately six months from  
222 the beginning of its evaluation.

223 I would now like to turn back to a general description  
224 of our budget request for fiscal year 2012. As you know, the  
225 NRC currently licenses, inspects, and assesses the  
226 performance of 104 operating nuclear power plants as well as  
227 many fuel-cycle facilities and research and test reactors.  
228 Furthermore, we regulate nuclear materials that are in use at  
229 thousands of hospitals, universities, and other locations  
230 around the country. The safety and security of these  
231 facilities and materials is and always will be our number one  
232 priority. In light of the prevailing budgetary climate, the  
233 NRC is taking steps to improve our strategic planning and  
234 annual performance plans, the implementation of our  
235 contracting initiatives, and the efficiency and cost  
236 effectiveness of our corporate support functions. These  
237 initiatives allow us to fully meet our safety and security  
238 responsibilities while also reviewing new reactor

239 applications and applications to construct and operate  
240 fuel-cycle facilities.

241 With these efforts as a backdrop, the agency has  
242 formulated its 2012 budget to support the NRC safety and  
243 security strategic goals and objectives.

244 Now I will just give you a few highlights overall of  
245 what the budget covers. Our proposed budget for the fiscal  
246 year 2012 is \$1 billion, \$28 million. That is a decrease of  
247 approximately \$28 million from the fiscal year 2010 enacted  
248 level. Approximately 90 percent of that budget is recovered  
249 from fees on licensees, and this results in a net budget  
250 authority of approximately \$128 million for fiscal year 2012,  
251 and this is a decrease of approximately \$26 million from  
252 fiscal year 2010.

253 Of the \$1 billion, \$28 million requested, approximately  
254 \$800 million of that goes to the Reactor Safety program, and  
255 this is a decrease of approximately \$8 million from the  
256 fiscal year 2010 enacted level. Those decreases largely  
257 reflect fact-of-life changes in programs that are completing  
258 activity in our research area as well as just the natural  
259 changes in cycles with our License Renewal program. Our  
260 Materials and Waste Safety program budget decreases by  
261 approximately \$20.7 million from the fiscal year 2010 level,  
262 and that is largely a reflection of the closeout of the  
263 high-level waste activities.

264        So with that broad overview, I will end my testimony and  
265        be happy to answer any questions you may have about specific  
266        programs for our fiscal year 2012 budget.

267        [The information follows:]

268        \*\*\*\*\* INSERT 2 \*\*\*\*\*

269 Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, and thank you both again for  
270 being here today. Let me begin by--everybody has mentioned  
271 the tragedy that has gone on in Japan with the earthquake and  
272 the tsunami and the resulting nuclear crisis, if you want to  
273 call it that. Could you give us, the Committee, a brief  
274 overview of what has happened, what the current situation is  
275 as you understand it, and what the implications are, early as  
276 they may be, for the nuclear industry in the United States?

277 Mr. LYONS. Want me to start?

278 Mr. SIMPSON. Start.

279 Mr. LYONS. Well, as you are well aware, the earthquake  
280 and the resulting tsunami has devastated the Fukushima  
281 Daiichi Plant. At the time of the earthquake, there were  
282 three reactors operating. Those, to the best of our  
283 knowledge, they--those three--shut down successfully, but the  
284 resulting tsunami, again, based on what information we have,  
285 damaged the emergency diesel generators. We have been  
286 following the resulting sequence now for a large number of  
287 days. The situation remains where they need to restore  
288 cooling for those plants as well as the seven spent-fuel  
289 pools at the site. And within the Department of Energy, we  
290 have been providing whatever assistance we can both to  
291 understand--first to understand--the situation and then to  
292 offer assistance. There are substantial numbers of  
293 personnel, about 40, large amounts of equipment, which are

294 onsite in Japan assisting now. The situation remains serious  
295 until long-term cooling can be reestablished. Between us we  
296 can go into far more detail if you wish.

297 Mr. SIMPSON. Is there any--in your view, what is the  
298 implication for the nuclear industry in this country? Have  
299 you been able to assess that yet, what you think it might be?

300 Mr. LYONS. I believe the President was completely  
301 correct in asking the NRC to undertake a very careful  
302 evaluation of any lessens learned or implications from the  
303 situation in Japan as they might apply to U.S. plants. Until  
304 that review is completed by the NRC, I am certainly not aware  
305 of changes that are required at any of the U.S. plants, but  
306 again, Greg can speak more directly to that.

307 Mr. SIMPSON. But let me follow that up first. The NRC  
308 announced a review of all commercial nuclear power plants per  
309 the President's orders. Is the DOE doing the same type of  
310 thing and, specifically, is DOE taking similar steps such as  
311 seismic analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor in Idaho?

312 Mr. LYONS. Yes, sir, very much so. I will start by  
313 saying we believe the Advanced Test Reactor at Idaho, which  
314 is a workhorse for us and for naval reactors, is operating  
315 safely. However, the Department of Energy, in a prudent  
316 step, is asking each of the operators of any similar  
317 facilities within the Department of Energy to undertake  
318 similar evaluations such as the NRC is undertaking for the

319 commercial plants, and that process is ongoing.

320 Mr. SIMPSON. Okay. Chairman Jaczko?

321 Mr. JACZKO. Well, I would just add a little bit to what  
322 Dr. Lyons said about the event. Largely the challenges we  
323 believe for the long term have resulted because of the lack  
324 of electric power to the site. And that is a situation we  
325 refer to as a station blackout event, namely you lose all of  
326 the electric power and the backup electric power systems.  
327 That is known to be based on our understanding of reactors to  
328 be a significant event, and we are seeing obviously the  
329 consequences of that in Japan. So that is something we will  
330 be looking at as part of our review. And as I mentioned in  
331 my opening remarks, that review is essentially a two-step  
332 process. We will begin with a 90 day, what we are calling a  
333 quick look review, which is really to get an assessment of  
334 whether there are any immediate actions that we would need to  
335 take with reactors in this country. The longer term review  
336 will begin when we have more detailed information about what  
337 really were the causes of the challenges in Japan. As Dr.  
338 Lyons indicated, right now we know that there was an  
339 earthquake followed by a tsunami which appears to have been  
340 an important contributor to the event. But until the  
341 situation has really stabilized, we will not really know  
342 exactly what were the most important factors as we go  
343 forward. So the review we are doing will take a look at the



344 | best available information we have right now and really do a  
345 | quick look and make sure that there are not any immediate  
346 | actions we need to take to ensure the continued safety of  
347 | reactors in this country.

348 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Your budget was prepared and submitted  
349 | before this event in Japan. Will the reviews that you are  
350 | both undertaking require additional resources from the  
351 | budget? Will there be a supplemental request or an amended  
352 | budget that is submitted to address the increased workload  
353 | that is going to occur because of this?

354 |       Mr. LYONS. I cannot speak to whether a supplemental  
355 | will be requested or not. We have been asked by our Chief  
356 | Financial Officer to catalog expenses or costs that we are  
357 | incurring specifically in response to the crisis in Japan,  
358 | and those costs are certainly mounting. As to whether there  
359 | will be a need for a supplemental or whether there will be a  
360 | direct impact on our budgets in FY12, I do not foresee that  
361 | now, but it is very much an evolving situation.

362 |       Mr. JACZKO. I think it is a similar situation for us.  
363 | In the short term for the current fiscal year, we would  
364 | anticipate being able to recover the costs or cover the costs  
365 | for our activities likely through a reprogramming request  
366 | once we have a final fiscal year 2011 budget. For fiscal  
367 | year 2012 and beyond, at this point we do not anticipate a  
368 | significant additional need. We would likely incorporate the

369 | longer term activities into our normal safety review process  
370 | and into our normal safety activities. Of course, these may  
371 | get a higher level priority and displace some other lower  
372 | priority work, but at this point we do not anticipate a  
373 | significant need for additional resources in 2012.

374 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Let me ask--on a different subject in a  
375 | different direction--Dr. Lyons, you mentioned in your  
376 | testimony SMRs. I have been in Congress now--this is my  
377 | thirteenth year. I think I have had three Presidents, four,  
378 | maybe five--at least four--Secretaries of Energy. I do not  
379 | know how many Under Secretaries since we made it an Under  
380 | Secretary position and so forth. We have gone through--I  
381 | cannot remember what it was in 1998 when I first came and we  
382 | went through the GNEP phase; then we went through the NGNP  
383 | phase; now we are going to the Small Modular Reactor phase.  
384 | What phase are we going to move into next? And this gets  
385 | back to my question of how do we create a sustainable program  
386 | that we know what we are going to fund and why we are doing  
387 | it without changing every time we have a new Secretary? I am  
388 | kind of between a rock and hard spot here in that I want a  
389 | new Secretary and an administration to be able to put their  
390 | footprint down of what they would like to do. But we are  
391 | talking about programs that are sometimes 10-, 20-, 30-year  
392 | programs and this Committee is--we have put in NGNP I think  
393 | \$526 billion total so far, something like that, or \$1

394 million, I cannot remember exactly how much. But it is--now  
395 we are substantially reducing the funding for NGNP and we are  
396 moving to a different phase of the Small Modular Reactor,  
397 again a cost-share program, moving from one cost-share  
398 program to another cost-share program. Could you give me the  
399 logic of what we are doing, why we are doing it, why will  
400 this cost-share program be successful when the other  
401 cost-share program apparently has not been, and what are the  
402 problems we are running into moving NGNP along the road that  
403 I think we all thought it was going to go down?

404 Mr. LYONS. Mr. Simpson--

405 Mr. SIMPSON. Pretty broad question.

406 Mr. LYONS. No, that is a rather broad question. Let me  
407 at least take a few cracks at some of those key points. As  
408 far as trying to achieve stability and achieve a long-term  
409 vision, I am very proud of the Research and Development  
410 Roadmap that we have pulled together within the Office of  
411 Nuclear Energy, certainly with participation from national  
412 laboratories, industry, many different sources. Certainly,  
413 my view and my very earnest hope is that the R&D Roadmap can  
414 lay out or has successfully laid out a long-term path in the  
415 directions that are appropriate for the nation to undertake  
416 from a research, development, and deployment standpoint, on  
417 the broad area of nuclear power. I would also point to the  
418 Blue Ribbon Commission. I think that is an extremely

419 | important group, which has been constituted by the Secretary  
420 | with a very, very broad charter to try to look at all that  
421 | has been learned in decades now, since the Nuclear Waste  
422 | Policy Act, and provide suggestions certainly within the  
423 | government and I hope they will be reviewed within Congress  
424 | on appropriate approaches for management of used fuel. I am  
425 | very, very optimistic that the BRC, the Blue Ribbon  
426 | Commission, will provide some very, very important guidance  
427 | to the country as we look into the future and hopefully reach  
428 | I guess what I might term as a sustainable approach to  
429 | management of used fuel. At least in my mind, we certainly  
430 | have not demonstrated that we have a sustainable approach at  
431 | this point, and I am looking to the BRC to help create it.

432 |       As far as NGNP, that remains an important program for  
433 | us. I continue to be very confident that there is a strong  
434 | future, a strong need in the country for reactors that  
435 | operate at very high temperatures. This is very much a  
436 | transition year--well, this year and FY12 are very much a  
437 | transition year for the NGNP program. Just a couple of the  
438 | events that are ongoing now: Our Nuclear Energy Advisory  
439 | Committee is, as we speak, reviewing the NGNP program. They  
440 | will provide a report to us. That will be the basis of a  
441 | recommendation for a Secretarial determination later in FY11  
442 | as to whether we move ahead with construction of NGNP. I  
443 | believe that a key element in that decision will be decisions

444 by industry for effective cost sharing. You asked or at  
445 least I think part of your question was why are we having  
446 difficulty with the cost sharing in general. Again a  
447 complicated issue, but I think at least part of the  
448 answer--and I do not think it is specific to nuclear power; I  
449 think it is specific to almost any of the various clean  
450 energy sources--is that we have a very low cost of natural  
451 gas at least at this instant in the country. We do not have  
452 a value on carbon. For utilities looking at short-term  
453 solutions to energy needs, natural gas is an extremely  
454 inviting target. If one looks at a longer term view, the  
455 importance of diversity, I hope that there will be interest  
456 from utilities in moving towards a number of clean energy  
457 sources. And programs such as we have within our office,  
458 such as the Loan Guarantee program within another office, I  
459 hope can help to move us in that direction.

460 I think I completed the story on NGNP, but the reason  
461 for the reduction--I did not talk about that--the reason for  
462 the reduction in FY12 is that no matter which way the  
463 Secretarial determination goes late in FY11, either to  
464 transition to a more research-focused program or to move  
465 ahead with a construction program, we view FY12 as being a  
466 year of transition into that program. The funding that we  
467 have requested in FY12 is sufficient to maintain the R&D  
468 emphases within the high-temperature gas reactor program that

469 | is the backbone of the NGNP. And then depending on that  
470 | Secretarial decision will determine where we move in FY13 and  
471 | beyond. That is a long answer, sir, but that was a  
472 | complicated question.

473 |       Mr. SIMPSON. If I could I just want to follow up on  
474 | just one question. If the Department was to accept the  
475 | proposed cost share by industry, what would that do to the  
476 | Department's Research and Development budget in terms of  
477 | nuclear energy?

478 |       Mr. LYONS. It would basically consume it. The industry  
479 | proposal such as I have seen--and, of course, that may evolve  
480 | as we move further into this process--would require such a  
481 | large fraction of the budget, assuming the current levels of  
482 | budget within my office, it would be extraordinarily  
483 | difficult for us to pursue any of the other essential  
484 | activities that are required within my office.

485 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you. Mr. Pastor?

486 |       Mr. PASTOR. As I recall, building this reactor is going  
487 | to be at what cost, dollar wise?

488 |       Mr. LYONS. Well, those estimates are still being  
489 | developed, but it is probably going to be--

490 |       Mr. PASTOR. Well, give me a ballpark?

491 |       Mr. LYONS. \$3 to \$4 billion range.

492 |       Mr. PASTOR. \$3 to \$4 billion, and so I think--as my  
493 | conversations with the group have been that probably 2011 at

494 | the latest is either we are going to do it or we are not  
495 | using the money effectively. I think that we are pretty much  
496 | at the cusp of having to make that decision. If the money is  
497 | not there, and this is probably this year, then we are going  
498 | to have to let this program go because of the cost share and  
499 | the unwillingness for industry to step up and bring forth  
500 | that kind of money. Do you not agree?

501 |       Mr. LYONS. Well again, sir, the plan is late 2011 for  
502 | the Secretarial determination. That Secretarial  
503 | determination will certainly include evaluation of industry's  
504 | interest and willingness for a cost share. If that is not  
505 | forthcoming, my anticipation is that we will move to a  
506 | research focus, which I believe should continue on  
507 | high-temperature reactors in general.

508 |       Mr. PASTOR. Well, I would tell you that the probability  
509 | that it is going to go forward with completing the reactor  
510 | is--the chances are pretty minimal. I mean, but I was wrong  
511 | in the brackets, so I guess I could be wrong on this one.  
512 | But I have to tell you that after seeing this program now for  
513 | a number of years and the willingness, I think, right now of  
514 | the industry for a consortium to come up with that kind of  
515 | money is not there for various reasons.

516 |       The other question I had was dealing with safety. I  
517 | know that you are going to start the review shortly and it is  
518 | going to be a 30- to 60-day review as I heard your testimony.

519 Now you have been looking at monitoring these nuclear plants  
520 all along so you know or should know the status, the safety  
521 status of these nuclear reactors at current times I would  
522 think.

523 Mr. JACZKO. We believe right now we have a very strong  
524 regulatory program in place that ensures the safety and  
525 security of the fleet of operating reactors. Of course, when  
526 you see an event like what happened in Japan, we always want  
527 to take information from that and use that to improve our  
528 process, to improve our regulations if there are areas that  
529 need to be adjusted. And that is really what--the focus of  
530 this short term review, which will be a 90-day review, will  
531 really be on the short-term look.

532 Are there some things, actions we need to take  
533 immediately just to continue to ensure the safety?

534 But again we believe we have a strong regulatory program  
535 in place right now that involves multiple layers of  
536 redundancy in defense in depth so that if we were to have an  
537 event, like a natural disaster comparable to something like  
538 that in Japan, we have some confidence now that these  
539 multiple layers of defense in depth would ensure ultimately  
540 that the public is protected and that there is not exposures  
541 to the public of radiation that would be harmful.

542 Mr. PASTOR. Well, I always made the assumption that your  
543 safety regiment today would currently look at models to say



544 | if you are up in San Francisco, there is a high probability  
545 | that you are going to have an earthquake that possibly is of  
546 | this magnitude so therefore the reactor, because of how it is  
547 | constructed and, you know, where it is at, this is a  
548 | probability that would have this failure or not have the  
549 | failure. I mean, I would think you are making those  
550 | assessments, or have made those assessments, all along.

551 |       Mr. JACZKO. We have. We look for all types of natural  
552 | disasters or natural phenomenon like hurricanes, earthquakes,  
553 | tsunamis. We look at the historical record, and all of our  
554 | plants are designed to make sure that they can deal with what  
555 | we think are the maximum historical natural disasters that  
556 | have occurred in any area. So, for instance if it is a power  
557 | plant on the West Coast, we look at earthquakes that would be  
558 | within about a 200-mile radius of that plant, and we require  
559 | the plants to be able to be designed to deal with an  
560 | earthquake that is the largest earthquake we have seen for  
561 | that area. And then we add a little bit of kind of margin to  
562 | that just to make sure that we have captured some of the  
563 | uncertainty about what may have happened historically.

564 |       And then if you look beyond that, we also have a program  
565 | where we require the plants to--or the plants have looked at  
566 | these kinds of severe accidents and they have procedures that  
567 | they have developed so that if something were to happen that  
568 | we never envisioned or could not imagine, that we know the

569 | plants will be able to cope with that situation.

570 |       And I think the last real significant piece that we have  
571 | right now that gives us strong assurances right now that we  
572 | have a safe program is following September 11th we put in  
573 | place requirements for all of the plants to have procedures  
574 | and equipment already developed again to deal with a very  
575 | catastrophic event at a nuclear power plant.

576 |       Our thinking at that time was more events that were  
577 | terrorist related, but the end result is ultimately the same,  
578 | that if you have a damaged condition at the plant or  
579 | significant damage to the plant, all of our plants are  
580 | required to be able to mitigate that and ultimately do the  
581 | important things, like keep cooling in the reactor core and  
582 | keep cooling water in the spent fuel pool. So, we think we  
583 | have a very strong system, but we are a learning  
584 | organization, and we do not want to miss an opportunity to  
585 | improve our regulations, improve our understanding of safety  
586 | to continue to make sure that we provide the best program for  
587 | the American people.

588 |       Mr. PASTOR. Since you have had this ongoing safety  
589 | regiment all along, because that is your responsibility, what  
590 | is your assessment right now of our nuclear plants in the  
591 | United States and the ability to assure the American public  
592 | that right now the plants are--the construction, the  
593 | operation is safe enough that you are not losing sleep at

594 | night?

595 |       Mr. JACZKO. Well, the program, as I said, we have in  
596 | place we think is a very strong program that provides safety  
597 | for the existing fleet of reactors. It is something we worry  
598 | about and we think about every day. That is what the 4,000  
599 | men and women who work at the NRC come to work every day  
600 | doing--is to make sure that the facilities and materials we  
601 | regulate are safe and secure. And that is--more  
602 | specifically, at each of our reactor sites, for instance, we  
603 | have two or more inspectors who are there pretty much full  
604 | time to continue to oversee and inspect the facilities and  
605 | identify problems where they see them and ensure that those  
606 | problems get addressed. So, it is a very active program. It  
607 | is continuously monitoring the plants and their performance,  
608 | and where we find challenges, and there always are areas  
609 | where the plants can do a little bit better, we make sure  
610 | that those are addressed, identified, and then corrected. .

611 |       Mr. PASTOR. Getting all those data, having those safety  
612 | inspectors being briefed every day, and all the reactors we  
613 | have, do you feel very good that our reactors are safe? Do  
614 | you feel somewhat good that our reactors are safe? Or are  
615 | you worried that our reactors are not in very good safety  
616 | condition? What is your assessment--and that is all I am  
617 | asking? I know you are doing all the--how do you feel about  
618 | it? Are you--

619 Mr. JACZKO. I feel very good that we have a strong  
620 safety program.

621 Mr. PASTOR. No, how are the reactors? You have a great  
622 program, but how do you assess the--you know, I know that  
623 you--I agree you, okay? I will agree you. You have a great  
624 safety program.

625 Mr. JACZKO. We--

626 Mr. PASTOR. What is your assessment right now of our  
627 nuclear reactors in terms of are they safe enough or do you  
628 problems in some of them?

629 Mr. JACZKO. Right now we have very good performance  
630 from the actual reactors. We have generally a system of  
631 review that we have for each of the reactors. And right now  
632 there are approximately six plants that are in one of the  
633 areas of more intensive review from a safety perspective, and  
634 those are the plants that we right now are most concerned  
635 about. But again we have a very conservative system, so we  
636 like to identify problems early and ensure that that they can  
637 get addressed early. But with the exception of those six  
638 plants, the remaining plants really in this country are  
639 operating well within our safety requirements and we believe  
640 are operating safely. And, again, all of the plants right  
641 now are meeting our safety requirements and we believe are  
642 operating safely.

643 Mr. PASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

644 Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Rehberg?

645 Mr. REHBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

646 One of the natural phenomena of catastrophe is initially  
647 an overreaction. So, I guess my question is on the  
648 short-term effects of the disaster on America's construction.

649 You had mentioned there is going to be an ongoing review of  
650 the construction. How many plants are currently being  
651 constructed? Is it two or four or--

652 Mr. JACZKO. We have--right now we have limited  
653 construction activities ongoing at two facilities.

654 Mr. REHBERG. Where are those?

655 Mr. JACZKO. One is in Georgia; one is Texas. And then,  
656 again, there is site preparation work and other types of site  
657 work going on at a third reactor right now.

658 Mr. REHBERG. Do you anticipate any delay in review and  
659 approval of various phases in the Georgia and Texas  
660 facilities?

661 Mr. JACZKO. Our plans right now are to continue doing  
662 our reviews at the pace that we were before the Japanese  
663 event. We certainly will--if there are lessons from any of  
664 these reviews that we are doing, we certainly will  
665 incorporate them into the review. But at this time we are  
666 continuing with the resources we have to move forward.

667 Mr. REHBERG. Okay. I have kind of mucked around France  
668 looking at their process. I have been to Chernobyl. Are

669 | there any similarities between Three Mile Island and  
670 | Chernobyl and this that are glaring; they just kind of poke  
671 | you in the head?

672 |       Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think--again, it is very early to  
673 | speculate on what happened in Japan and what the real  
674 | contributing factors will be. It will take some time before  
675 | we really know.

676 |       Mr. REHBERG. Well, you know, you always seem to hear  
677 | cooling, cooling, cooling, cooling. And you would think that  
678 | maybe you would have a cooling process in place. I mean,  
679 | does that seem to be a similarity among all three?

680 |       Mr. JACZKO. The events at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island,  
681 | and the events in Japan are all very different in terms of  
682 | what happened and the causes of each of those, although the  
683 | one common factor that appears certainly in Three Mile Island  
684 | and Chernobyl is the impact of human error and people making  
685 | wrong decisions. So, that is always something that we look  
686 | at, and following Three Mile Island we had a very strong  
687 | program put in place to enhance the training and the  
688 | qualification requirements for operators at nuclear power  
689 | plants to ensure that they would better deal with these kinds  
690 | of emergency situations that may develop. So, there is very  
691 | extensive training. They now spend a lot of time on  
692 | simulators to ensure that they can handle an abnormal type of  
693 | occurrence. But it continues to be an issue that we focus on

694 and want to really make sure is working appropriately,  
695 because it is certainly a factor.

696 Mr. LYONS. Just to add a little bit, Mr. Rehberg, as  
697 you are probably well aware, Chernobyl was a very different  
698 type of reactor and quite distinct in its operating  
699 characteristics from either TMI or the reactors in Japan.  
700 Now, there are similarities, at least in the sense that they  
701 are light water cooled, between TMI and the Fukushima  
702 reactors. However, at TMI there was very little release,  
703 certainly not health significant releases off site, and there  
704 were no--there were basically no injuries from TMI. It is  
705 clear already that the Fukushima situation is substantially  
706 worse than TMI.

707 Mr. REHBERG. Oh, let me ask about Japan and Three Mile  
708 Island. Do they--I mean Yucca. Do they have anything--do  
709 they store their spent fuel on site in Japan, or do they have  
710 a central repository for waste?

711 Mr. LYONS. Oh, well, Japan has several different  
712 approaches. However, at Fukushima there were a total of  
713 seven spent fuel pools. There is one for each of the six  
714 reactors at Fukushima Daiichi. In addition, there is a very  
715 large central spent fuel pool at that site, and they also  
716 used dry cask storage.

717 Mr. REHBERG. So, is there is similarity, though, among  
718 the nuclear industry in Japan to --

719 Mr. REHBERG. All of our plants--

720 Mr. LYONS. Yeah, something comparable to Yucca.

721 Mr. REHBERG. Yes, all--again, comparable to Yucca.

722 Mr. LYONS. We are looking--

723 Mr. REHBERG. Yeah, all of our plants have spent fuel  
724 pools. The majority of our plants are now utilizing dry cask  
725 storage. Japan has also reprocessed some of their used fuel,  
726 not--well, very little of it Japan at this in time. There  
727 has been some reprocessed in France and some in the U.K. I  
728 am less sure on their progress towards a long-term  
729 repository. I know they have some programs, but I do not  
730 know the details at all.

731 Mr. LYONS. Does this change your attitude at all about  
732 Yucca with storage on site and all the facilities that we  
733 have in America and maybe--I know you cannot get too far out  
734 on a limb on this.

735 Mr. REHBERG. Well, I would start from the perspective  
736 that based on the NRC regulations, I believe--well, they  
737 believe--I believe, and I believed when I was on the NRC,  
738 that both spent fuel and dry cask storage.

739 Mr. LYONS. It does not change the fact that we  
740 eventually need to work towards--I used the word  
741 ''sustainable'' before. A sustainable national policy on the  
742 back end of the fuel cycle. I am looking with the great  
743 anticipation towards the report of the Blue Ribbon



744 Commission. That interim report will be available in July,  
745 and I believe that report will provide very important  
746 guidance as we look towards a range of options which could  
747 involve a once-through cycle, like we have had, leading  
748 directly towards a repository. Could involve work towards a  
749 re-processing type of economy in the future. And the  
750 research programs within my office span the gamut of the  
751 different options that could be used for used fuel. And  
752 those programs may be refined after we have the BRC report.

753 Mr. REHBERG. Okay. I am just going to want to go back  
754 to one point that the chairman made. And as far as a  
755 supplemental on additional money being required or necessary.

756 You probably do not want to prioritize, but if you were  
757 to prioritize your expenditures in your budget for fiscal  
758 '12, is it the 60--the 90-day and the 6-month review? Or the  
759 ongoing licensure of the two plus the partial third  
760 construction?

761 Mr. JACZKO. Well, those would happen in very different  
762 parts of the organization. So in a sense those would both  
763 have, I think, equal priorities as we go forward.

764 Mr. REHBERG. And you have enough money for the ongoing  
765 concern? Again, I cannot help but think of my neighbor to  
766 the left here in Louisiana with the, you know, the  
767 overreaction as they started this whole conversation. The  
768 overreaction of the disaster down in the Gulf by the

769 administration pulling back and making it very difficult to  
770 permit. And I just do not want to see that happen. This is  
771 too important to our comprehensive energy policy to see any  
772 kind of a delay in any of the new construction as a reaction  
773 to something that occurred somewhere else, especially if the  
774 processes are different. The safety is different. Then, you  
775 have a protocol for safety in place.

776 I just want to be assured that you have got the money  
777 necessary to continue the ongoing permitting process of the  
778 new construction. And in your reaction to go out and take a  
779 look at all the others and spend the 90 days and the 6 months  
780 is not going to affect our energy policy in this country.

781 Mr. JACZKO. Well, I would say right now we have the  
782 resources to continue with the licensing activities and the  
783 licensing reviews that we are doing. We are budgeted in 2012  
784 to begin the possibility of construction inspection and  
785 construction activities for some of those reactors if they  
786 are successfully licensed.

787 But I do not want to prejudge the outcome of any of the  
788 reviews that we are doing and say right now that there may  
789 not be impacts. It is certainly possible that there will be.

790 We will have to wait and see what the information tells us.  
791 But right now, we are continuing to move forward on the  
792 licensing activities that we have. And right now, there is  
793 not really an impingement on our budget as a result of that.

794 Mr. REHBERG. Okay, thank you.

795 Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Fattah?

796 Mr. FATTAH. Thank you. And let me thank both of you  
797 for your testimony. You know, obviously for the last 30  
798 years--oh, well, since the Regan administration forward--we  
799 have not built any nuclear power facilities in our country.  
800 So, I know that this administration wishes that moving ahead.  
801 We will take into account any of the safety concerns that  
802 need to be taken care of. Take it into account as we move  
803 forward, and I supported the President's call for a safety  
804 review.

805 So I think that, you know, we should move forward. But  
806 obviously we have to be able to take into account that there  
807 has been a tremendous calamity that is, you know, both from  
808 earthquake and the tsunami. But at the heart of the problem  
809 in Japan is the spent fuel in these pools. Now, we have  
810 something, you know, slightly more than 60,000 metric tons of  
811 spent fuel here in the United States. And you said that it  
812 is in dry casks. Is that the term you used?

813 Mr. LYONS. Dry casks or spent fuel pools.

814 Mr. FATTAH. Right. And so, this is a challenge that we  
815 have to think through and I think the Blue Ribbon Panel and  
816 its review will help inform us on this point. But first and  
817 foremost, I think the administration should be commended.  
818 Because it is inexcusable over the last 30 years that we have

819 | done nothing on this, you know. And through many, many  
820 | administrations we know that nuclear has to play a part of  
821 | our energy mix going forward.

822 |       So, the fact that you are moving forward in at least a  
823 | couple of instances--and I know that the NRC is reviewing a  
824 | number of other proposals and your decision package will help  
825 | us kind of figure out the total deal flow in terms of the  
826 | number of units. But it will be somewhere in the four or  
827 | five.

828 |       The Secretary of Energy has come out--and I guess I will  
829 | start with you, Dr. Lyons--over the last 72 hours very  
830 | strongly related to the small modular reactor program that  
831 | you referenced in your testimony. And now this is going to  
832 | be the focus, this is going to be based at Oak Ridge. Is  
833 | that correct?

834 |       Mr. LYONS. Once we have a budget, we would look towards  
835 | a competitive process to identify two locations for  
836 | demonstration projects. Oak Ridge has certainly discussed  
837 | their interest in this, but they would go through the  
838 | competitive process.

839 |       Mr. FATTAH. I understand. And the idea here, just so  
840 | we can talk about it in English, is that you will be able to  
841 | make--the idea here is to develop these small, modular  
842 | reactors that can be made in factory, and then deliver it to  
843 | site and, therefore, cut the cost. There is tremendous costs

844 | in building a new, new plant.

845 |       There is this other idea that Bill Gates has been  
846 | pursuing in terms of terra power. And in your research  
847 | budget, is this one of the items that you will be looking at  
848 | in terms of new designs perhaps going forward?

849 |       Mr. LYONS. Our program in small modular reactors has  
850 | two components, at least the requested program. There is the  
851 | 67 million that we are requesting for the licensing  
852 | demonstration and another roughly 30 million for review of  
853 | advanced concepts.

854 |       The Gates concept is similar to several other ideas that  
855 | are also being considered around the country. And yes, I  
856 | anticipate that those kind of ideas would be explored within  
857 | the advanced component of our SMR program.

858 |       I am trying to distinguish between reactors that we  
859 | think can be deployed quite soon of the small modular reactor  
860 | type--

861 |       Mr. FATTAH. That is a different--yes. I am separating  
862 | it, too, also.

863 |       Mr. LYONS. As opposed to two more advanced. And the  
864 | ideas proposed by Mr. Gates certainly are in the more  
865 | advanced, extremely interesting, but definitely the more  
866 | advanced and longer term.

867 |       Mr. FATTAH. Let me try to break these apart. So on the  
868 | first level, the administration is proceeding forward with

869 some number of what we might refer to as more traditionally  
870 designed nuclear reactors, both in Georgia, Texas, and  
871 whatever other decisions that the NRC may make about permits  
872 that would be offered under the loan guarantee program  
873 through traditional financing. And then separate from that,  
874 the Department plans to move forward. That is number one.  
875 The Department plans to move forward in terms of the small  
876 modular reactor at least in two locations in which there  
877 would be competitively determined.

878 Mr. LYONS. Yes, sir.

879 Mr. FATTAH. That is number two. And then looking into  
880 the future, you are looking at newer designs that can  
881 alleviate a number of the challenges going forward. One of  
882 those could be, for instance, or similar to the Bill Gates  
883 approach related to terra power, which are reactors that in  
884 some ways get around some of the questions around spent fuel.  
885 Is that correct?

886 Mr. LYONS. Yes, in general that is correct. The Bill  
887 Gates approach would be one very interesting approach on  
888 unused fuel management. It could certainly contribute.

889 Mr. FATTAH. And this is something that would be a part  
890 of some of the research that you are asking for in the FY  
891 '12?

892 Mr. LYONS. Yes, sir, very much. It would be research  
893 on advanced concepts, which will include the types of--we

894 | call them fast reactors that would be involved in the  
895 | proposal that Mr. Gates is proposing.

896 |       Mr. FATTAH. But you have a bifurcated approach moving  
897 | forward on, you know, kind of a number of different levels.  
898 | And what I am suggesting is that that is in face of 30 years  
899 | of us doing 0. And I think that is an admirable position for  
900 | the administration, and should be noted by the public.

901 |       Thank you.

902 |       Mr. LYONS. Thank you, sir.

903 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Nunnelee?

904 |       Mr. NUNNELEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to  
905 | follow up really on some of the questions from a couple of my  
906 | predecessors.

907 |       You put together a budget, submitted it, and then we had  
908 | this tragedy in Japan that none of us could have anticipated.

909 |       And appropriately, you are reacting in the United States to  
910 | ensure the safety of our citizens. But that could not have  
911 | been anticipated in your budget request that you put  
912 | together. And so I just want you to reassure me that the  
913 | process of reviewing pending applications for licenses is  
914 | going to continue to move forward in the same manner that it  
915 | was before the tragedy in Japan.

916 |       Mr. JACZKO. As I said, right now the work of the  
917 | oversight and the safety of the existing fleet of reactors is  
918 | a very separate budget item from the new reactor licensing

919 reviews that we are doing. So right now we will continue to  
920 move forward on the pace we would have prior to the events in  
921 Japan with the new reactor licensing activities. But, again,  
922 we are doing reviews to see if there is not some information  
923 that we need to accommodate or incorporate into our  
924 understanding of safety for the existing fleet and possibly  
925 for the new reactors.

926         So, I do not want to prejudge what comes out of those  
927 reviews, but right now certainly from a budget standpoint we  
928 have the resources we need in order to move forward with our  
929 plan schedules for new reactor licensing in the U.S.

930         Mr. NUNNELEE. And certainly that should be your  
931 position. You should not prejudge. But I want to make sure  
932 you have got the resources you need to adequately make those  
933 reviews. And there is not going to be any inordinate delays  
934 because you do not have the resources you need.

935         Mr. JACZKO. Right. Right now, we do not see a resource  
936 challenge. Although I will be clear that in fiscal year 2011  
937 we have some amount of carry over funds from previous fiscal  
938 years that we would reprogram when we finally get a fiscal  
939 year appropriation. And we would reprogram those funds to  
940 help cover the costs of our ongoing incident response  
941 activities with the Japan events.

942         So if we were not successful with that reprogramming,  
943 then we would have some challenges dealing with resources in



944 | fiscal year 2011.

945 |       Mr. NUNNELEE. I guess 2011, if we do not get things  
946 | worked out we are all going to have some challenges after  
947 | Friday.

948 |       Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

949 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Olver?

950 |       Mr. FATTAH. He will be right with you.

951 |       Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I  
952 | actually am going to pass on this round, if I may, because I  
953 | have just come in and I wanted to get a sense of what has  
954 | been missed. I apologize for not being in here earlier, but  
955 | I had something rather important.

956 |       Mr. SIMPSON. No problem. We will get back to you.

957 |       Let me ask Dr. Lyons about--we talked a little bit about  
958 | SMRs. Give me what you see as the advantages of SMRs, the  
959 | challenges of SMRs, the economics of SMRs versus the Gen III+  
960 | reactors that--how do the economies of scale work here? Tell  
961 | me why this, I guess, new soup du jour is small modular  
962 | reactors.

963 |       Mr. LYONS. Mr. Simpson, let me start from several  
964 | perspectives. As far as some of the advantages, these much  
965 | smaller units allow the developers to take advantage of  
966 | highly passive features in the plant. By ''passive'' we mean  
967 | in virtually any accident scenario one can imagine that there  
968 | is very few or no operator actions required, that there is

969 not a dependence on AC power. One does not need emergency  
970 diesel generators. One can rely on natural forces, gravity  
971 and convection, to adequately cool the reactors. So, that is  
972 in terms of one key advantage, the passive safety.

973 Another key advantage, again, the smaller size. Any of  
974 the vendors that I have heard of at this point are looking at  
975 underground sighting. The underground sighting may offer  
976 some very important advantages from the standpoint of  
977 security. Probably also will offer advantages from the  
978 standpoint of seismic, in the sense that you do not have a  
979 large structure, if you will, up wiggling in the breeze. So,  
980 those may all be advantages.

981 Now on the economics, I think those need to be proven.  
982 We and a number of vendors have done studies which suggest  
983 that the fact that these can be built in a factory setting  
984 and transported largely completed to a site leads to rather  
985 dramatic savings in the construction costs. A number that is  
986 derived from the nuclear submarine business, which I have  
987 heard from a number of different sources, is that as the  
988 nuclear submarine program has moved from essentially building  
989 each sub intact as one unit and has moved towards so-called  
990 modular construction where large modules are built in a  
991 factory setting, that the time and cost savings has been  
992 about a factor of eight.

993 Now, it remains to be proved that that can be

994 demonstrated effectively for the small modular reactors. And  
995 that they can come in at the cost targets that the vendors  
996 are proposing. If they can do that, then it would appear  
997 that they will be another very interesting option compared to  
998 the large plants, such as the ones being built in Georgia,  
999 South Carolina, that are also passively safe but offer--the  
1000 large plants lead to substantial challenges from the  
1001 standpoint of financing. For the large plants, one is  
1002 talking about costs of the order of 5 billion or more in  
1003 overnight costs, and typically these sites are 2 plants, so  
1004 double that. Or two units, I should say.

1005       If you compare that to the size, the capitalization of  
1006 many of our utilities, building one of the large plants is  
1007 getting close to a bet the company proposition. That still  
1008 may be very appropriate for some companies, and the  
1009 administration remains very supportive of the large plants  
1010 being constructed and that is demonstrated by the loan  
1011 guarantee at the Vogel site.

1012       But the small modulars may present another paradigm  
1013 which may offer different opportunities for other utilities.  
1014 Ones that cannot look towards the \$10 billion investment and  
1015 are far more interested in, if you will, much more bite-sized  
1016 chunks of both power and economic costs.

1017       Mr. SIMPSON. What is the cost of an SMR, roughly? Any  
1018 idea?

1019 Mr. LYONS. The targets for cost from the various  
1020 vendors range in the 4,000 to 5,000 or so per kilowatt  
1021 number. That is the same general range for overnight costs  
1022 for the large plants. In other words, a 100 megawatt plant  
1023 of the order of 500 million as opposed to the \$10 billion  
1024 number. Again, those are projections--

1025 Mr. FATTAH. Gentlemen, we all know these would be 700  
1026 megawatts at the max, though?

1027 Mr. LYONS. The small modulars--we are using--what we  
1028 have been using as a definition, 300 megawatts. But I think  
1029 an even better definition is simply that they are amenable to  
1030 factory construction and transport to the site. We have used  
1031 300 megawatts as the upper limit, though. And the IAEA has  
1032 suggestions of the 300 megawatt level as well.

1033 Mr. SIMPSON. Any challenges in licensing SMRs relative  
1034 to your staff, your budget, et cetera?

1035 Mr. JACZKO. For fiscal year 2012, we are budgeted to be  
1036 able to support the applications for the SMR designs that  
1037 would get Department of Energy support. So we are  
1038 anticipating right now at least one design review in 2012,  
1039 and one actual license application in 2012 for a site with  
1040 the Tennessee Valley Authority. And I think, as Dr. Lyons  
1041 has indicated, there is multiple activities then. We are  
1042 doing research and licensing framework development for the NG  
1043 and P project, which is also kind of combined in that

1044 | advanced reactor area that we are working on.

1045 |       So right now we think we have the resources and we need  
1046 | to do what we think is anticipated in 2012.

1047 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Okay. Dr. Lyons, your budget request  
1048 | provides \$97 million for a new program, nuclear  
1049 | energy-enabling technologies. Some of that funding is for  
1050 | existing modeling and simulation hub and some of it is for  
1051 | the Idaho User Facility, but almost 60 million appears to be  
1052 | for new programs. Your request says the programs are for  
1053 | crosscutting and transformative research, but I would like a  
1054 | better idea what that is and what we expect to get out of it  
1055 | and what do we expect next year when you come back for the  
1056 | next budget?

1057 |       Mr. LYONS. In the crosscutting area, we are identifying  
1058 | a number of areas of technology that do not fit neatly within  
1059 | either our reactor or fuel cycle programs. These would be  
1060 | areas like advanced manufacturing, advanced instrumentation,  
1061 | nonproliferation. Where they--well, we have used the word  
1062 | ''crosscutting'' because I think that is the best  
1063 | explanation.

1064 |       Just to take proliferation for an example, we need to  
1065 | evaluate the proliferation potentials on whether we are  
1066 | talking from the reactor perspective or the fuel cycle  
1067 | perspective. And we see that the crosscutting place is a  
1068 | very good--is the best opportunity to do that.

1069       Advanced materials is another area for emphasis within  
1070 the crosscut. And again, the material challenges that are  
1071 faced on the reactor side will share many similarities with  
1072 material challenges that will be shared on the fuel cycle  
1073 side. So, we are viewing this as an efficient way of better  
1074 organizing programs, some of which are ongoing under either  
1075 the reactor or fuel cycle area.

1076       And the transformative area, I would describe that as  
1077 ensuring that blue sky ideas have an opportunity to come to  
1078 the forefront, to be evaluated, and if interesting and  
1079 promising, to be funded to the point where we can understand  
1080 whether they, again, would fit more logically into one of the  
1081 larger programmatic areas.

1082       Mr. SIMPSON. Your 2012 request in your budget overall  
1083 goes down \$30 million. At the same time, you propose to  
1084 increase program direction by \$20 million. Explain what you  
1085 plan to do with \$20 million additional in program direction.

1086       Mr. LYONS. The largest source of the need in the  
1087 program direction is that we have taken over within my office  
1088 the remaining functions of the Office of Radioactive Waste  
1089 Management. And we have added a number of staff from the Las  
1090 Vegas office into our program, based on those new  
1091 responsibilities.

1092       Mr. SIMPSON. Okay. I am going to go through again and  
1093 then we are going to get back to a subject that is near and

1094 | dear to everyone's heart. Mr. Pastor?

1095 |       Mr. PASTOR. On the last point, is your offices where  
1096 | the technical papers from Yucca Mountain have been deposited?

1097 |       I know we are trying to salvage as much as we could in  
1098 | terms of the technical knowledge, the paperwork, et cetera,  
1099 | and some personnel.

1100 |       Mr. LYONS. The personnel and certainly their knowledge  
1101 | is resident in my office. The records management, the  
1102 | reports that you indicated, that is being handled through the  
1103 | Legacy Management Office at the Department of Energy. And in  
1104 | fact, there is a number of different offices across the  
1105 | Department that have different responsibilities in different  
1106 | aspects of the closed office.

1107 |       Mr. PASTOR. How many personnel have been moved here, to  
1108 | your site from Yucca Mountain?

1109 |       Mr. LYONS. We had between 20 and 25 people were added  
1110 | into my office in an area that we have labeled as used fuel  
1111 | disposition within our fuel cycle program.

1112 |       Mr. PASTOR. In the, I think it was the 2010 budget  
1113 | which was adopted--it was money--I think it was 12.5 million  
1114 | for the startup of the hub, the nuclear hub? The modeling  
1115 | and the simulation?

1116 |       Mr. LYONS. I think it was a number like that, at least.  
1117 | Yes.

1118 |       Mr. PASTOR. How much was it? Oh, 22 million.

1119 Mr. LYONS. Okay, that is more what I was remembering.  
1120 That is--yes.

1121 Mr. PASTOR. And we are now, what, we have been at it  
1122 for a year. What is the status of it? I know you--could you  
1123 go to more detail on other than we are going to have an  
1124 announcement here soon? Twenty-two million in a year, what  
1125 have we gotten from it or for it?

1126 Mr. LYONS. I have tremendous optimism for the modeling  
1127 and simulation hub. It is an attempt to bring modern  
1128 computational tools to the nuclear power industry.

1129 Mr. PASTOR. The question is, you have had a year and 22  
1130 million. And your optimism, that is good. But what has it  
1131 brought us to date? What is the status of it?

1132 Mr. LYONS. They are releasing--this month, they will  
1133 release the first version of their virtual reactor simulation  
1134 code. And that code, which they will continue to develop  
1135 throughout the five years of this process, is focused on a  
1136 software or a computational rendition of an operating  
1137 reactor. Our goal is to use that code and modern computing  
1138 to try to better understand safety and efficiency aspects of  
1139 operating reactors, and, frankly, to bring the nuclear power  
1140 industry into the regime of modern computing, which they have  
1141 not been in. Again, I can go into more detail, but.

1142 Mr. PASTOR. I would like for you to go more detail  
1143 because, you know, we have spent 22 million and we have had a



1144 year. And I am just curious how that money has been spent  
1145 and what we--as a result, we have a code, so.

1146 Mr. LYONS. This is a modeling and simulation center, so  
1147 the result is a code.

1148 Mr. PASTOR. No, I understand. What is that?

1149 Mr. LYONS. The result of this now and in the future  
1150 will be codes and simulations that will help the nuclear  
1151 industry better understand particular details that have not  
1152 been amenable to the existing codes.

1153 Just as some examples: When a utility considers  
1154 upgrading the power of an existing reactor, they utilize the  
1155 tools that they have available in working with the NRC to  
1156 develop a case as to whether that the power of that reactor  
1157 can be safely upgraded. With these new tools, I think we can  
1158 do a far better job of defining the safety margins and  
1159 helping the utility and, hopefully, helping the NRC better  
1160 understand the safety case for that upgrade.

1161 It may be possible, using this code, to increase the  
1162 already impressive capacity factors, which are around 90  
1163 percent in this country. It may be possible to better  
1164 understand some of the problems that still plague our  
1165 industry with problems in fuel pins. Occasionally, some of  
1166 our sites will have a leaking fuel pin. And there's  
1167 tremendous efforts that go into trying to minimize those  
1168 leakers, because that requires, in many cases, shutting down

1169 the reactor, finding the leaking pin before they can move  
1170 ahead.

1171 It may be possible to better understand the development  
1172 of the different sources of degradation of those pins and  
1173 avoid those leakers. That could be very important to the  
1174 industry.

1175 Those are all examples of the vision that we have for  
1176 applying high-performance computing tools to operating  
1177 reactors. And of course, if this continues into the future,  
1178 we would expect to expand this to advanced reactors in new  
1179 systems. But we thought the most important first step was to  
1180 literally move the nuclear power industry into the regime of  
1181 high performance computing.

1182 Mr. PASTOR. I have the same--I do not know what--I  
1183 would describe it as I've been with Mike here in this  
1184 Committee, Subcommittee for a number of years. And two years  
1185 ago, maybe it was three years ago, the hydrogen fuel cell was  
1186 the silver bullet. And now with this administration it is  
1187 the hubs, and we have supported them, as you know. And that  
1188 is why I was asking the question, because there is still--and  
1189 in all honesty, what the makeup of the hubs, the money that  
1190 is invested, and what will be the result? And so in the Bill  
1191 2010, when this hub was created as well as the other one, we  
1192 asked for transparency and also for reporting, so that the  
1193 Subcommittee would have the knowledge to ensure that it had

1194 | the information, so as we went forward, that we knew that the  
1195 | money that is increasingly becoming more scarce was a good  
1196 | investment.

1197 |       And even today, yesterday we had a hearing with the  
1198 | Office of Science. No, it was Efficiency. And still, you  
1199 | know, you have the hubs, you have the frontiers, you have  
1200 | ARPA-E, and sometimes the connections are not that easy to  
1201 | define or see. But the hubs seem to be a way of addressing  
1202 | some of the needs that we have in our country as it deals  
1203 | with energy.

1204 |       So we just are asking that you keep the Subcommittee  
1205 | informed, because when you have greater transparency and more  
1206 | information, then the decisions that we make hear about the  
1207 | funding, I think make it easier in terms of understanding  
1208 | what you are doing and what the objective is in the future.

1209 |       Mr. LYONS. That is correct. If you or your staff or  
1210 | any of you would like a briefing on exactly what has been  
1211 | going on with the hubs--with our hub--I would be very happy  
1212 | to provide that. I view it as a great success story already,  
1213 | and I think over the five years it will be an even more  
1214 | dramatic success story.

1215 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Fattah?

1216 |       Mr. FATTAH. Thank you. Well, I just have one question  
1217 | because I know we have a nuclear scientist who wants to ask  
1218 | some questions here. So I just want to go back because I did

1219 not probe this particularly as well. We have about 63,000  
1220 metric tons of spent fuel, some of it in pools, some of it in  
1221 dry casks.

1222 As part of your review, you, I assume--and I guess just  
1223 to put on the record, you are going to review the entirety of  
1224 the circumstances relative to the safety of the spent fuel  
1225 that exists here at our hundred plus nuclear facilities,  
1226 right?

1227 Mr. JACZKO. Yeah, that is certainly a part of what we  
1228 will look at, but again to reiterate, we believe right now  
1229 fuel is stored safely in spent fuel pools and safely in dry  
1230 cask storage.

1231 Mr. FATTAH. I believe it s fuel that is stored safely,  
1232 too, but I have no actual knowledge bout it. So the nuclear  
1233 regulatory--you are going to look at it again in each and  
1234 every instance in terms of what type of facility, how robust  
1235 the facilities, what redundancies are built in. Because in  
1236 Japan what you have was a set of calamities, you know, that  
1237 did, I guess, you know, caused the problem. And most of the  
1238 problem, if I am correct, relates to the spent fuel being in  
1239 these pools.

1240 Now, we have some of it in pools here, and we have some  
1241 of it in this more in this dry cask, right?

1242 Mr. JACZKO. That is correct. And again--

1243 Mr. FATTAH. And again, can we quantify which is which,

1244 | bow much of the metric tons are in pools and how much are in  
1245 | dry cask?

1246 |       Mr. JACZKO. We can get you that number, but right now  
1247 | the majority of the fuel is in pools.

1248 |       Mr. FATTAH. But is one safer than the other?

1249 |       Mr. JACZKO. We think that both--

1250 |       Mr. FATTAH. I know you think both are safe.

1251 |       Mr. JACZKO. --are safe.

1252 |       Mr. FATTAH. I am asking in a relative sense is one  
1253 | safer?

1254 |       Mr. JACZKO. It is not clear at this point. They both  
1255 | provide a very, very high degree of safety. And when you get  
1256 | into the level of safety that we are talking about, yeah, the  
1257 | likelihood of anything happening is so small in a spent fuel  
1258 | pool, and it is so small in a dry cask storage that it is  
1259 | hard at those very, very small levels to really say one is  
1260 | more or less safe because it is just a very, very low  
1261 | likelihood of any concern.

1262 |       And I would just add that we are constantly reviewing  
1263 | and monitoring the safety of the spent fuel pools of the dry  
1264 | cask storage. So the review we are doing is not a review  
1265 | to--

1266 |       Mr. FATTAH. I am not trying to cast any suggestions to  
1267 | the contrary, and I do not think that it would be right to do  
1268 | so. I am I mean, we should I am pronuclear.

1269 Mr. JACZKO. Mm-hmm.

1270 Mr. FATTAH. Part of this process is spent fuel. Now,  
1271 we have lot more of it than, for instance, than the French  
1272 do. They have a different process altogether, right, in  
1273 terms of reusing this.

1274 But, Dr. Lyon, would you care to offer to the Committee  
1275 whether one process is better, the dry cask versus the pool?  
1276 You have a degree from Cal Tech in astrophysics, would you  
1277 like we are just politicians, so.

1278 Mr. LYONS. I would give you the same answer that Dr.  
1279 Jaczko did: They are both carefully evaluated; they are both  
1280 safe.

1281 Mr. FATTAH. So you take the spare fuel, you put it in  
1282 water and you put it in some kind of building, right?

1283 Mr. LYONS. Yes.

1284 Mr. FATTAH. Versus you create some kind of more solid  
1285 dry casking of it. And both of them provide the same level  
1286 of safety?

1287 Mr. LYONS. Both, I believe, are safe.

1288 Mr. FATTAH. Because in a more commonsense circumstance,  
1289 right, just, you know, someone who did not have a lot of this  
1290 information from a scientific basis, one suggests it is a  
1291 little more safe than the other?

1292 Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, if I could add, they perform  
1293 different functions. The fuel when it comes out of the

1294 reactor is very hot. It needs at that point to go into a  
1295 pool in order to dissipate.

1296 Mr. FATTAH. To cool, right. So you suggest that it  
1297 should be in the pool for five to seven years. We have spent  
1298 fuel that has been in pools for a lot longer than that, all  
1299 right?

1300 Mr. JACZKO. Mm-hmm.

1301 Mr. FATTAH. So I am just trying to figure out whether  
1302 it should be in dry casks or not, and I do not have the  
1303 scientific basis to know, which is why I am asking you.

1304 Mr. JACZKO. And what we know and what we have looked at  
1305 is as the fuel gets cooler, so as it is in the pools for a  
1306 longer period of time, it presents a much lower risk. So the  
1307 fuel that needs to go into the pools is the hotter fuel, and  
1308 that cannot go immediately into dry cask storage.

1309 So the challenge is that you have what the fuel is to be  
1310 when it is hotter and when it is more recently out of the  
1311 reactor. That can only go into the spent fuel pools.

1312 Mr. FATTAH. I got you, Chairman, but follow me for a  
1313 minute. You are the NRC you recommend, as I would understand  
1314 your regs, that it should be in the pool for five to seven  
1315 years.

1316 Mr. JACZKO. We actually, as part of our regulations, we  
1317 require that it be in there for at least a year. We have  
1318 approved fuel being removed from a pool within three years,

1319 but generally it is kept in the pools for about five years.

1320 That is kind of the minimum assumption.

1321 Mr. FATTAH. But we have fuel that is in pools beyond  
1322 the suggested realm.

1323 Mr. JACZKO. Again there--

1324 Mr. FATTAH. In our country.

1325 Mr. JACZKO. There is no the five years is not a maximum  
1326 time.

1327 Mr. FATTAH. That is not my question.

1328 Mr. JACZKO. Right, so we have fuel that is in the  
1329 pools that has been there longer than five years.

1330 Mr. FATTAH. Okay, but is that safer, that fuel safer  
1331 than if it was in dry casks?

1332 Mr. JACZKO. As I said, we do not have technical  
1333 information right now that says that it is safer in dry casks  
1334 versus in the pools. It is both at a if I could, it is like  
1335 winning the Powerball versus winning, you know, the or  
1336 another lottery that happens. It is very, very unlikely that  
1337 either you are going to win either one of those.

1338 I think other than I think Congressman Sensenbrenner  
1339 does fairly well with lotteries, but it is hard to say when  
1340 you are getting at that low level of numbers. It is the  
1341 difference perhaps between a one and a million times a  
1342 million versus five in a million times a million. Those  
1343 numbers at that level do not really tell you--



1344 Mr. FATTAH. I understand. But you understand the odds  
1345 of a tsunami and an earthquake at the same point that you got  
1346 these spent fuel rods in Reactor 3 and I think it is 4 in  
1347 Japan. So there was a set of dynamics that happened. At the  
1348 end result, the danger relates to this spent fuel being in  
1349 the pool.

1350 So then we come to America. We got spent fuel in pools.

1351 I am just trying to figure out if it should not be there  
1352 past five years, whether we should be doing something else  
1353 with it.

1354 I know the Chairman wants to get to a broader range  
1355 discussion of that, so I am going to leave it alone.

1356 Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, we do not right now think that  
1357 that is the case.

1358 Mr. FATTAH. I got you. You think it is safe no matter  
1359 whether it is in a dry cask or not

1360 Mr. JACZKO. Right.

1361 Mr. FATTAH. whether it has been there five years or  
1362 not, and you do not think there is any relative difference in  
1363 the level of safety--

1364 Mr. JACZKO. Right.

1365 Mr. FATTAH. --notwithstanding.

1366 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

1367 Mr. FATTAH. Thank you. All right, thank you.

1368 Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Olver?

1369 Mr. OLVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to just ask  
1370 a couple of questions about the deep burn fuel research  
1371 program. I understand it is to you are hoping to extract a  
1372 lot more energy out of the fuel that is put in and/or improve  
1373 the fuel. I am sort of curious on what does it mean to  
1374 improve the fuel, and, well, for a simple one, in the normal  
1375 fission procedures, what is the burn level?

1376 Mr. LYONS. I you mean the utilization of the original  
1377 uranium in a once-through cycle, it is 0.6 percent of the  
1378 actual uranium is actually used in the energy reduction  
1379 production.

1380 Mr. OLVER. Only 16/100ths of a percent?

1381 Mr. LYONS. 0.6 percent, so.

1382 Mr. OLVER. Six-tenths of a percent.

1383 Mr. LYONS. Six-tenths of a percent.

1384 Mr. OLVER. Six-tenths of a percent.

1385 Mr. LYONS. That is starting from the original mined  
1386 uranium all the way through the process. It is very low.

1387 Mr. OLVER. Oh, but, well, what percent of what actually  
1388 goes into the plant as the fuel rods? That must be higher  
1389 than six-tenths of a percent.

1390 Mr. LYONS. Oh, it is far higher than that, but you have  
1391 thrown away a tremendous amount in the process in the  
1392 enrichment process. Typically, fuel would be enriched into  
1393 the roughly 4 percent range as it goes into the as it is

1394 loaded into a reactor and would come out when it is slightly  
1395 below 1 percent uranium.

1396 Mr. OLVER. Really?

1397 Mr. LYONS. U-235, yeah.

1398 Mr. OLVER. Oh, so you are actually using three-quarters  
1399 of the uranium?

1400 Mr. LYONS. Of the U-235 that was loaded into the fuel,  
1401 which is very different than what was mined. That is I was  
1402 trying to I started from the mining. Maybe that was  
1403 confusing, sir.

1404 Mr. OLVER. Well, I am interested in what happens with  
1405 the rods. The rods are what percent of U-235? That has  
1406 been enriched in the first place; the U-235 has been brought  
1407 considerably above its isotopic abundance.

1408 Mr. LYONS. Yes, sir, that is the roughly 4 percent,  
1409 depending on the details. It can be some variation around  
1410 that, depending on the reactor.

1411 Mr. OLVER. So it is roughly 4 percent. But then are  
1412 you saying, then, that three-quarters of the U-235 has been  
1413 used?

1414 Mr. LYONS. Yes.

1415 Mr. OLVER. In that process of whatever is going through  
1416 what is it, a year and a half or so before you have to  
1417 replace rods?

1418 Mr. LYONS. The rods are typically in longer than that,

1419 but there are multiples. The simple answer is, typically,  
1420 they are in for 3 cycles of 18 months.

1421 Mr. OLVER. Okay. So that deep burn is trying to make  
1422 certain that you have to be using three-quarters of the  
1423 uranium by some other processing procedure, I take it. Maybe  
1424 you need to explain to me what you mean by "deep burn." To  
1425 me, I thought the word "burn" meant what percentage of the  
1426 available fuel was being used up, which would be the  
1427 percentage of the U-235 that is being used up in the first  
1428 burn. And I have gotten--

1429 Mr. LYONS. Okay. There is a number of different  
1430 approaches that go under the general rubric of deep burn.  
1431 They all look towards increased utilization of the uranium  
1432 resource and/or the actinides that are produced in the--

1433 Mr. OLVER. But you are still only able to get energy  
1434 out of the reaction of the U-235. So three-quarters of it  
1435 has been used in the--

1436 Mr. LYONS. No, sir. In the process of the reaction,  
1437 you start with U-235, yes. But you build up plutonium, you  
1438 build up other actinides, and those also contribute to the  
1439 fission process. And, in fact, by the time the fuel comes  
1440 out of the reactor, you have the order of, say, slightly less  
1441 than 1 percent is now plutonium. So you start with U-235,  
1442 yes, but in the process you are building up other materials,  
1443 other isotopes that also fission.

1444 But deep burn is a way of making better utilization  
1445 and/or further destruction of the actinides. It is a process  
1446 that is of considerable interest. That is why we have funded  
1447 it rather well within our fuel cycle.

1448 Mr. OLVER. Well, then you are going to repeat. You are  
1449 going to do some concentration, reconcentration, or  
1450 reformulation of the fuel, I take it, for additional burns,  
1451 for going deeper than the original burn.

1452 Mr. LYONS. Most of the deep burn ideas would involve  
1453 some degree of reprocessing and reformulating the fuel.

1454 Mr. OLVER. Then you are not going to be using in those  
1455 fuels, you are not using the much more than the plutonium and  
1456 the uranium in the second and sequential operation. You  
1457 could include a number of the higher actinides, which are  
1458 some of the troublesome isotopes from a repository  
1459 performance standpoint, and at least some of the ideas of  
1460 deep burn would involve destruction of transuranics and other  
1461 actinides.

1462 Mr. LYONS. Well, okay. Clearly I am in over my head.  
1463 The gentleman who just--to my left who has just left  
1464 notwithstanding.

1465 Let me ask a little bit different question. On the  
1466 modeling hub, the hub, the simulation and modeling hub, was  
1467 that competed?

1468 Mr. OLVER. Yes, sir.

1469 Mr. LYONS. How many competitors were there?

1470 Mr. OLVER. I am remembering three. I think I am  
1471 correct.

1472 Mr. LYONS. At least three?

1473 Mr. OLVER. Yes, I--

1474 Mr. LYONS. Were they all energy labs? Were they  
1475 all--because you ended up choosing Oak Ridge--

1476 Mr. OLVER. We chose--

1477 Mr. LYONS. --one of our--

1478 Mr. OLVER. Oak Ridge was the winner. The other two  
1479 that at least I am remembering, and I could be forgetting  
1480 one, one was led by Argon, one was led by--it was either Utah  
1481 or Utah State. I am not sure which one.

1482 Mr. LYONS. But each of them has--cooperation,  
1483 collaboration, it was--was it not drawing on resources  
1484 outside the Argon or the Oak Ridge--

1485 Mr. OLVER. You are absolutely correct.

1486 Mr. LYONS. --hub?

1487 Mr. OLVER. Yes. They involve--

1488 Mr. LYONS. How many of those--in the case--when was the  
1489 actual hub chosen? When was it contracted? When was  
1490 that--the award was made, but then there must be some sort of  
1491 a process of contract being written as to who is going to do  
1492 what as the products that you are going to get out of it?

1493 Mr. OLVER. I could certainly get you the precise dates,

1494 but my memory is that May of 2010 was the selection of Oak  
1495 Ridge and their very large team. You are right, it is a very  
1496 large team.

1497 Mr. LYONS. How many of that team is now at Oak Ridge?  
1498 It is not new buildings or anything like that that you are  
1499 building. Is it not using more spaces that are not being  
1500 used for other things?

1501 Mr. OLVER. It--they are certainly taking advantage of  
1502 virtual connections among the industry, other national labs,  
1503 and universities. There was a facility being constructed at  
1504 Oak Ridge for their advanced computing facility and the  
1505 hub--the center of the hub will be housed in that.

1506 That building was not constructed by the hub, it was  
1507 being built as part--

1508 Mr. LYONS. So, are people from these other--what did  
1509 you call--you used the term they are--

1510 Mr. OLVER. Well, virtual.

1511 Mr. LYONS. Virtual, from those places that are in the  
1512 virtual sphere, are some of those people going to be actually  
1513 housed at Oak Ridge?

1514 Mr. OLVER. Some will.

1515 Mr. LYONS. Brought to it and housed at Oak Ridge?

1516 Mr. OLVER. Some will, but the majority of the  
1517 interaction will take advantage of the virtual  
1518 interconnections.

1519 Mr. LYONS. We are far too early to have any sense of  
1520 what your success might be on that, are we?

1521 Mr. OLVER. Well, as I indicated, this month the first  
1522 release of the reactor simulation code will be coming out or  
1523 is coming out. In fact, I think it is today or tomorrow.  
1524 However, the intent is to build on that and to have a far  
1525 more capable product over the five-year tenure that this is  
1526 planned for.

1527 Mr. LYONS. I am sure we would all like to examine that  
1528 action code. I quit.

1529 Mr. SIMPSON. You usually yield back, you do not quit.

1530 Mr. LYONS. I quit.

1531 Mr. SIMPSON. Turn off your mic then.

1532 I would like to welcome member of the Appropriations  
1533 Committee, Ms. Lowey, who, I understand, has requested  
1534 permission to join the hearing today. I understand that a  
1535 motion for Ms. Lowey to join will require unanimous consent  
1536 from the subcommittee members present. Do any members  
1537 object?

1538 Hearing none, welcome to the committee, Ms. Lowey, and  
1539 you are next in line.

1540 Ms. LOWEY. Well, you are very kind and I would like to  
1541 thank my friend Chairman Simpson, Ranking Member Pastor,  
1542 Chairman Frelinghuysen, we all wish him good health. I am  
1543 grateful--it is all right, I will talk loud--I am grateful



1544 for the opportunity--I am grateful for the opportunity to  
1545 discuss a discussion issue of critical importance, the safety  
1546 and security of those who live near--such good help in this  
1547 committee, thank you so much--thank you, again--Indian Point  
1548 Nuclear Power Plant in Westchester County, as you know, is  
1549 located within 30 miles of New York City. Approximately 20  
1550 million people live in the 50-mile radius surrounding the  
1551 plant. My grave concern is that a terror attack, natural  
1552 disaster, or other unexpected event could put Indian Point at  
1553 risk and cause it to lose power, limit its ability to cool  
1554 reactors, and cause a leak of radiation or radioactive  
1555 material.

1556       The government has recently recommended a 50-mile  
1557 evacuation zone in Japan. If a 50-mile evacuation were  
1558 ordered for Indian Point, millions of families from the lower  
1559 Hudson Valley to New York City to parts of Long Island and  
1560 New Jersey would need to be evacuated, however there is  
1561 currently no plan and insufficient infrastructure to ensure  
1562 an orderly evacuation in that event.

1563       We simply cannot accept such risk yet the NRC, which  
1564 oversees safety and security operations at the nation's 104  
1565 commercial reactors, has neglected terrorism and evacuations  
1566 in relicensing decisions.

1567       Despite the risk, factors such as population, security,  
1568 insufficient evacuation routes, seismic and scientific data

1569 are not taken into account when determining the relicensing  
1570 of nuclear facilities. Many of our commercial power plants  
1571 are aging and are now or will soon be in the relicensing  
1572 process. I hope to work with you in ensuring that the  
1573 criteria used for relicensing protects the safety and  
1574 security of our citizens.

1575 I would like to read you a quote. Concerns regarding  
1576 nuclear facilities within high population areas are not new.  
1577 In fact, in 1979 the NRC's own director of the Office of  
1578 State Programs, Robert Ryan, stated that, "I think it is  
1579 insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in  
1580 Westchester County," 40 miles from Times Square, 20 miles  
1581 from the Bronx, and if you describe that 50-mile circle, as I  
1582 said before, you have got 21 million people and that is  
1583 crazy. I am sorry, I just do not think that is the right  
1584 place to put a nuclear facility. Do you agree with this  
1585 assessment?

1586 Mr. JACZKO. No. I think right now we think that for  
1587 Indian Point the plant is safe, it meets our strong safety  
1588 requirements, and that in the very, very unlikely event of  
1589 some type of accident that would possibly release radiation,  
1590 that the right kinds of emergency protective actions would be  
1591 taken to protect the population in and around the plant.

1592 Ms. LOWEY. Well, I was very pleased also to hear  
1593 Secretary Chu's statement on March 21, 2011 in which he

1594 | stated that nuclear power plants in high-population areas  
1595 | with inadequate evacuation plans should receive further study  
1596 | and that officials should determine if these plans should  
1597 | remain in light of these risks.

1598 |         Dr. Lyons, do you agree with that statement?

1599 |         Mr. LYONS. I believe Dr. Chu was referring to the  
1600 | planned review that the NRC is undertaking and it will  
1601 | certainly be--well, as we have been discussing quite a bit  
1602 | today, that review will be taking into account the lessons  
1603 | learned from the Fukushima disaster in making sure that  
1604 | plants here are appropriately regulated to meet that concern.

1605 |         Ms. LOWEY. Well, I think I just heard Chairman Jaczko  
1606 | make a statement that it was all safe and it is going through  
1607 | a relicensing process in 2013, so I would like to ask Dr.  
1608 | Lyons what steps will the Department of Energy take to  
1609 | evaluate whether these plants, and especially Indian Point,  
1610 | as Secretary Chu noted, should remain, and what  
1611 | factors--perhaps I should let you answer that. What steps  
1612 | are you going to take?

1613 |         Mr. LYONS. Well, there is a clear differentiation  
1614 | between the responsibility of the Department of Energy and  
1615 | the responsibilities of the NRC. The review in question here  
1616 | is a responsibility of the NRC and I think Congress, I would  
1617 | say in a great deal of wisdom, separated the promotional  
1618 | aspects of nuclear power within the Department of Energy,

1619 from the regulatory aspects within the NRC.

1620       So, we are not a part of a specific review of the safety  
1621 of any specific unit within the country. We have many  
1622 programs that impact or are oriented towards the research of  
1623 safety of all systems, but we do not focus on a particular  
1624 reactor from a licensing standpoint which is NRC's purview.

1625       Ms.. LOWEY. Well, then let me ask Dr. Jaczko, what  
1626 factors should the NRC take into account in relicensing and  
1627 why should the NRC not take into account high-population  
1628 areas and the effectiveness of a propose evacuation in  
1629 relicensing determinations?

1630       Mr. JACZKO. Well, the factors that you are talking  
1631 about, these are issues that we look at on an ongoing basis  
1632 with nuclear reactors. The availability of evacuation plans  
1633 to be effective is assessed, I believe, on a biannual basis.  
1634 So, this is not something we wait until the relicensing  
1635 process--

1636       Ms. LOWEY. Are you still looking at a 10-mile  
1637 evacuation plan rather than a 50-mile that has been  
1638 recommended in Japan?

1639       Mr. JACZKO. The current program for emergency  
1640 preparedness is basically built on two thresholds. The first  
1641 threshold are those types of events that could happen in a  
1642 very short period of time and would require pre-prepared and  
1643 pre-planned evacuation plans and that gets you to the 10-mile

1644 emergency planning zone that we often refer to.

1645       Beyond that, we have a 50-mile planning area that is,  
1646 again, for events that are happening more quickly, is  
1647 intended to provide a mechanism to ensure that food supplies  
1648 and other kinds of contamination-related events could be  
1649 controlled and dealt with, but in any situation, it is up to  
1650 the state and local governments to provide the ability to  
1651 take appropriate protective actions and that could extend  
1652 beyond 10 miles, certainly if the events warranted that.

1653       So, it is the preplanning that is what goes into the 10  
1654 miles that we have right now. And, again, we will be looking  
1655 at a short-term, 90-day review of information coming out of  
1656 Japan and then a longer review of information coming out of  
1657 Japan, and I suspect that this is an issue that we will look  
1658 at and see if there are changes we need to make with our  
1659 understanding and concepts for emergency planning and  
1660 emergency preparedness.

1661       Ms. LOWEY. Well, thank you, Chairman Jaczko, thank you  
1662 Chairman Simpson. I would just assume, and I encourage you  
1663 to review this carefully, if the United States is  
1664 recommending a 50-mile zone in Japan, I do not know why it  
1665 would not be as good for the United States of America, and I  
1666 appreciate your willingness to come tour the plant and meet  
1667 with constituents. There is a great deal of concern and as I  
1668 understand, the news today, unfortunately, there is such a

1669 catastrophe there and I met with the ambassador yesterday  
1670 from Japan who is so grateful for our help and assistance,  
1671 and I guess the news today is they are planning to bury the  
1672 reactors and just evacuate all the people.

1673       So, I just thank you and thank you for allowing me to be  
1674 here and I just hope there is a real thorough evaluation  
1675 given the latest statistics and numbers and not just a  
1676 routine stamp.

1677       Thank you so much and I look forward to welcoming you to  
1678 Westchester County.

1679       Mr. JACZKO. Thank you.

1680       Ms. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

1681       Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Lowey.

1682       Let us turn to a subject that--you know, any hearing  
1683 with the NRC and NE would be incomplete without a thorough  
1684 re-discussion of Yucca Mountain. Probably the foremost  
1685 expensive electoral votes ever cast in this country were the  
1686 four Nevada votes in 2008. They cost us approximately \$12  
1687 billion in shutting down Yucca Mountain or the attempt to  
1688 shut down Yucca Mountain.

1689       There seems to be a difference of opinion between  
1690 Congress, past Congresses, past Administrations, and this  
1691 Administration, about what the Nuclear Waste Policy Act does.

1692       It seems clear on reading it, to me, that Congress and the  
1693 Administration, through law, enacted legislation which

1694 created Yucca Mountain as the nation's nuclear waste  
1695 repository.

1696 This Administration has a different point of view. I  
1697 respect that. Disagree with it, but I respect it. It would  
1698 seem to me that if we are going to close down Yucca Mountain  
1699 as the Administration wants to do, the Administration needs  
1700 to come to Congress and modify the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

1701 Is the Administration going to propose legislation to  
1702 amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act?

1703 Mr. LYONS. Mr. Simpson, I am not a lawyer. Our general  
1704 counsel has thoroughly reviewed the actions that have been  
1705 taken, thoroughly endorsed the actions that have been taken  
1706 as being within the--within the legal framework available to  
1707 the Department. And I might note that I accepted this job  
1708 with the clear understanding that we were--that Yucca  
1709 Mountain was viewed as an unworkable solution, an opinion  
1710 which I agree with, and--

1711 Mr. SIMPSON. Unworkable in what way? Scientifically  
1712 unworkable?

1713 Mr. LYONS. The Secretary has made it clear that to be  
1714 workable requires both a technical--from a technical  
1715 perspective and a local support perspective. Technical  
1716 perspective, I do not think I am prepared to comment on.  
1717 That has not been determined. From a local support  
1718 perspective, it has certainly not enjoyed that support.

1719 Mr. SIMPSON. It depends on how local you want to get.

1720 Mr. LYONS. It does, and as someone who grew up in

1721 Nevada--

1722 Mr. SIMPSON. There are counties very close to Yucca

1723 Mountain that support it.

1724 Mr. LYONS. I saw that up close and personal.

1725 Mr. SIMPSON. There are counties very close to Yucca

1726 Mountain that do support Yucca Mountain.

1727 It was interesting when we had this discussion with

1728 Secretary Chu. I mean, we all know what this is. It was a

1729 political decision. We all know that and we all know why it

1730 was done. I am not even criticizing that. I have kind of

1731 gotten to the point where I do not really care about Yucca

1732 Mountain anymore because it has become such a political issue

1733 that it is taking away from our, I think, drive to actually

1734 solve the problem. What bothers me is the law and I think

1735 this Administration's clear refusal to accept what Congress

1736 enacted and was signed by a President.

1737 Now, I do not like throwing \$12 billion away. I think

1738 it was a stupid decision, but that is my opinion. I think

1739 the attorneys that are interpreting that are looking

1740 beyond--I mean, they are--attorneys can interpret something

1741 to say pretty much anything that they would like their

1742 employer to say.

1743 I notice that the NRC's review board said, no, you



1744 cannot withdraw it. The decision is still before the NRC.  
1745 The decision has been voted on by the NRC of whether to  
1746 accept that decision or not.

1747 Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman, the--our voting process  
1748 is an involved process--

1749 Mr. SIMPSON. It has been voted on.

1750 Mr. JACZKO. We have not, in our formal process, made a  
1751 final decision on that. Voting at the NRC is not much as you  
1752 do voting here. It is not the final action. In fact, the  
1753 final action would be commission agreement on an order  
1754 responding to the particular issue in question. That has not  
1755 happened at the commission yet. There are ongoing  
1756 discussions in regard to that.

1757 I know that term voting gets used, but it is not in  
1758 fact--our votes are often not even in a traditional form of a  
1759 yes or no decision, they are often just opinions and  
1760 commentary about a particular action, so--

1761 Mr. SIMPSON. The other commissioners do not agree with  
1762 you. They do not agree that they are just opinions. They  
1763 believe that they are--that they are made well informed  
1764 judgments and that they take a vote and that they are not  
1765 just discussion points to be discussed until we have a  
1766 majority opinion.

1767 Mr. JACZKO. I am not familiar with any position of the  
1768 commission that is contrary to what I have stated. The

1769 commission's procedures are well established. It is true for  
1770 every action that we take. Voting begins and is not actually  
1771 the final decision. The final decision on non-adjudicatory  
1772 matters is actually something we call staff requirements--

1773 Mr. SIMPSON. Well, let me tell you in response to an  
1774 inquiry by Senator Inhoff, "On November 4th I filed my  
1775 vote--"

1776 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

1777 Mr. SIMPSON. "--on this matter with Secretary of  
1778 Commission on August 25, 2010," Kristine Suinicki,  
1779 Commissioner. On November 5th, "I have voted and registered  
1780 my vote on September 15, 2010," William Magwood,  
1781 Commissioner. On August 26, 2010, "I entered my vote on the  
1782 adjudicatory matter referenced in your letter." William  
1783 Ostendorff, Commissioner.

1784 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

1785 Mr. SIMPSON. The commissioners believe they have voted  
1786 on this and that you have purposely held up the vote with the  
1787 argument that we will wait until we have a decision, because  
1788 it seems to be split, one would assume, two to two. Do not  
1789 know that. Nobody knows what the votes are. But you have  
1790 stated in testimony before, I believe it was in a letter to  
1791 Congressman Sensenbrenner and testified as recently as  
1792 earlier this month in questions from Congressman Simkus  
1793 before the House Energy and Commerce Committee that you were

1794    ''closing out the NRC's review of Yucca Mountain license  
1795    application under established commission policy'', your  
1796    quote.

1797           Mr. JACZKO.   Correct.

1798           Mr. SIMPSON.   Yet, the motion by the Secretary of Energy  
1799    to withdraw the application has been denied by the NRC's own  
1800    licensing board and the appeal of that denial is still  
1801    pending before the commission and has been since last summer.

1802           Where is this established commission policy to terminate  
1803    the review established?  And by whom was it established?  And  
1804    is not the commission action on the appeal necessary to  
1805    establish the commission's policy on the question?

1806           Mr. JACZKO.   To answer your question, the commission's  
1807    policy with regard to the review of the application is  
1808    established in the commission's budget.  In the fiscal year  
1809    '11 budget, that policy was established to begin close out  
1810    activities in fiscal year '11.

1811           Mr. SIMPSON.   Which budget passed in 2011?

1812           Mr. JACZKO.   We have yet to receive a final  
1813    appropriation, however--

1814           Mr. SIMPSON.   So, there was no budget in 2011  
1815    essentially?

1816           Mr. JACZKO.   That, however, forms a policy document for  
1817    the commission to begin its activity and consistent with  
1818    appropriation law and interpretation of continuing

1819 resolutions, the correct action for the agency at the time  
1820 was to look at the actions taken by Congress.

1821 At the time, on October 1st, in subcommittee or full  
1822 committee in the Senate, they had passed the President's  
1823 budget, which had \$10 million for close down of the program.  
1824 In subcommittee in the House, they had passed an  
1825 appropriations bill that included \$10 million for closure--

1826 Mr. SIMPSON. No bill passed Congress.

1827 Mr. JACZKO. Correct. But--

1828 Mr. SIMPSON. Just because the Administration proposed  
1829 something does not make it law and does not make it a policy  
1830 that needs to be followed because it has not passed.  
1831 Congress has not spoke to this and in fact I have the  
1832 commission's budget request language. It says, 'DoE may  
1833 submit to the NRC a motion to withdraw or suspend its Yucca  
1834 Mountain license application during FY 2010. The NRC budget  
1835 reflects that possibility. Upon withdrawal or suspension,  
1836 the NRC would begin an orderly closure of the technical  
1837 review.'

1838 If the commission still has not--and it sill has the  
1839 question of withdrawal before it and the question is still  
1840 before the commission, how can it be a precondition that has  
1841 been met? It cannot be.

1842 Mr. JACZKO. Looking at totality of the budget, I  
1843 discussed that question with the general counsel and it was

1844 my view, and that view was supported by the Agency, that that  
1845 particular phrase was not the prevailing sense of what the  
1846 budget entailed. We had other programs in other areas that  
1847 we were transferring money and working on resources on and we  
1848 have moved resources to work in those areas.

1849 So, the budget is a total document that provides the  
1850 guideline and the direction for us to move forward in.

1851 Mr. SIMPSON. The budget requests--

1852 Mr. PASTOR. Would you yield?

1853 Mr. SIMPSON. Not the budget, the budget request. Sure.

1854 Mr. PASTOR. Well, as I recall, the 2010--the money that  
1855 was appropriated, and that was signed by the President, was  
1856 to continue the licensing process.

1857 Mr. JACZKO. Actually--

1858 Mr. PASTOR. The 2010, it was all the monies that were  
1859 there was to continue the licensing process and in 2011, we  
1860 did not have--we were not able to pass a bill--

1861 Mr. SIMPSON. We do not have a bill.

1862 Mr. PASTOR. And so we do not have a bill--

1863 Mr. JACZKO. Actually--

1864 Mr. PASTOR. --so, basically are not you still working  
1865 on the--in the dictates of 2010?

1866 Mr. JACZKO. In 2010, we received a reduction in  
1867 funding. The original request at the time was, I think, for  
1868 about approximately \$40 million for license activities.

1869 That, actually what was passed by the Congress was a  
1870 reduction to, I believe, \$29 million with a recognition of my  
1871 belief at that time that the program was on a path towards  
1872 termination.

1873 Mr. PASTOR. I would beg to differ from you because  
1874 we--this subcommittee, in 2010, were not in accord of what  
1875 was happening to Yucca Mountain and we passed a budget with  
1876 the monies--there may have been a reduction, but the  
1877 reduction was not an indication of this subcommittee that we  
1878 were in accordance with the termination of Yucca Mountain.  
1879 So, I can tell you, I do not think that was ever a--this  
1880 subcommittee or this Congress was never--terminate Yucca  
1881 Mountain with any reduction.

1882 Mr. SIMPSON. Yeah. I firmly believe, and I--contrary  
1883 to whatever your counsel says, that you are acting outside  
1884 the law. And, in fact, it says--I have a letter from another  
1885 commissioner, ''The majority of the commission's members  
1886 supported language stipulating that orderly closure of the  
1887 program activities would occur upon withdrawal or suspension  
1888 of the license review. These precursors have not occurred.''

1889 Mr. JACZKO. Again, Congressman, I appreciate you do not  
1890 agree with the decision that we made. However, that  
1891 decision--

1892 Mr. SIMPSON. It does not matter whether I agree with

1893 the decision you made or not, it matters whether you are  
1894 following the law.

1895 Mr. JACZKO. And based on discussions with our general  
1896 counsel, we believe that we are consistent with the legal  
1897 precedent here and--

1898 Mr. SIMPSON. Did this guy go to law school?

1899 Mr. JACZKO. Yes, he did, and he is actually a very good  
1900 general counsel, and I would add that there are multiple  
1901 actions that have been taken by the commission in regard to  
1902 this. The commission has, again, approved a 2012 budget,  
1903 which in 2012 the commission approved zeroing out the  
1904 program.

1905 Mr. SIMPSON. The commission approval of a budget does  
1906 not mean diddly.

1907 Mr. JACZKO. Absent--

1908 Mr. SIMPSON. It is what passes Congress.

1909 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

1910 Mr. SIMPSON. And it is clear--two years ago--I think it  
1911 was two years ago or three years ago, we had a motion on the  
1912 floor to recommit the energy and water budget to strip out  
1913 the full \$192 million. Do you know how many votes that got?  
1914 Thirty-five, I think. Something like that. Which is a clear  
1915 indication that Congress has a different opinion here and the  
1916 unilateral action of the Administration, and specifically the  
1917 NRC, which I think is becoming more politicized, you are

1918 supposed to be a regulatory agency that looks at something  
1919 without prejudice.

1920 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

1921 Mr. SIMPSON. And I think you have taken it upon  
1922 yourself to have prejudice in this case and decide for the  
1923 rest of the commission.

1924 As an example, you testified--

1925 Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, if I could--

1926 Mr. PASTOR. Just a second. You testified before the  
1927 House Energy and Commerce earlier this month that the  
1928 commission had not reached a decision in Yucca Mountain--in  
1929 the Yucca Mountain appeal, that you, as chairman, will not  
1930 schedule a meeting of the commission to resolve this matter  
1931 until you have had, and I quote here, ''per statute, a  
1932 majority position.''

1933 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

1934 Mr. SIMPSON. I asked my staff to go through the  
1935 Agency's website and research your voting procedures. We  
1936 were interested to find that in the commission's own  
1937 procedures an appendix entitled ''Resolution of a Two-Two  
1938 Vote''. It seems that you have a procedure. Is it not true  
1939 that reading from your own procedures that a commission vote  
1940 of two to two results in a denial of a motion in an NRC  
1941 proceeding and in denial of reviewing of license board  
1942 decisions? If so, why do you claim that the commission



1943 meeting to affirm final commission decisions are scheduled  
1944 only if there is, as you testified, a majority opinion?

1945 Are there cases where the NRC has made a two to two  
1946 decision?

1947 Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, I do not want to get into the  
1948 ongoing adjudication and any discussion about--

1949 Mr. SIMPSON. What do you mean you do not want to get  
1950 into it?

1951 Mr. JACZKO. It is something that by law I am not  
1952 allowed to get into, in particular--

1953 Mr. SIMPSON. We have not followed the law so far.

1954 Mr. JACZKO. We have legal precedent that establishes  
1955 that Congress does not interfere with the ongoing  
1956 adjudications and that there is a--

1957 Mr. SIMPSON. I do not want to--I do not want to  
1958 interfere with the ongoing adjudication, what I want to know  
1959 is why have not you scheduled what you would consider a final  
1960 vote? And your argument is, not until we have a majority  
1961 opinion, but that argument falls short of your own policies.

1962 Mr. JACZKO. Again, that is based on an assumption that  
1963 you have about what may or may not be in the adjudication.

1964 Mr. SIMPSON. On your website.

1965 Mr. JACZKO. And that is based on an assumption of what  
1966 you believe may or may not be the votes in this particular  
1967 matter. I am not going to discuss what the votes are, nor

1968 indicate what they may be.

1969 Mr. SIMPSON. There is only like a couple of  
1970 possibilities here. It is either two to two, because one  
1971 person has recused them self. It is either two to two or it  
1972 is three to one for, three to one against, or it is four to  
1973 zero. I mean, there are not too many different options here.

1974 So, the assumption, I think, is fairly clear that it is  
1975 probably two to two.

1976 Mr. JACZKO. And I am not going to comment on what--

1977 Mr. SIMPSON. And I do not expect you to comment on it.  
1978 It is an assumption I am making.

1979 Mr. JACZKO. And, again, the actions that we are  
1980 taking--

1981 Mr. SIMPSON. But you said that--

1982 Mr. JACZKO. The actions that we are taking as a body  
1983 are consistent with the law.

1984 Mr. SIMPSON. You said you would bring it before the  
1985 commission when you had a majority vote. A majority opinion.  
1986 If it was three to one or four to zero, you would have a  
1987 majority opinion and bring it before the board. Why--what is  
1988 your excuse for not bringing it before the board?

1989 Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, I think I have answered this  
1990 question fairly clearly. We have a process--

1991 Mr. SIMPSON. You have answered it, but not clearly.

1992 Mr. JACZKO. We have a process for conducting our voting

1993 | that ultimately requires there to be an order, that order has  
1994 | to have majority support, and it has to have majority support  
1995 | to go forward. That is from the statute. We take action by  
1996 | majority action of the commission.

1997 |       Again, you may disagree or not appreciate that, but that  
1998 | is the current status of this situation. The commission  
1999 | continues to discuss and deliberate this matter.

2000 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Is a two to two vote, if it were a  
2001 | theoretical two to two vote, a non action?

2002 |       Mr. JACZKO. Again, I am not going to speculate about  
2003 | any of the matters in front of the commission. It requires a  
2004 | majority--

2005 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Are you going to rewrite your policies on  
2006 | your website on how a two to two vote--what a two to two vote  
2007 | does?

2008 |       Mr. JACZKO. Our statute is--

2009 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Because if you would like, I can read  
2010 | them.

2011 |       Mr. JACZKO. I am fully aware what the policies and  
2012 | procedures of the commission and everything we have done is  
2013 | consistent with the policies and procedures of the  
2014 | commission.

2015 |       Beyond that, as I said, I am not going to go into the  
2016 | details of what is in the adjudicatory record. And I would  
2017 | add that at the time that we move forward on the budget

2018 decision by the commission, one commissioner did raise a  
2019 concern that that was not consistent with commission policy.  
2020 That concern was rejected by the full commission, so, in  
2021 fact, there is again a commission policy establishing that we  
2022 move forward with close out.

2023 So, that is the policy of the commission. WE fully  
2024 intend, if we receive any appropriation or any direction from  
2025 Congress, to comply with that direction from Congress or  
2026 direction from the courts. And the action that we have  
2027 taken, we believe, is consistent with not precluding any  
2028 action by Congress either to terminate the program or to  
2029 continue working on the program.

2030 So, that is the position we are in. Again, I appreciate  
2031 you may not agree with that, but I feel very comfortable that  
2032 all the actions--

2033 Mr. SIMPSON. No, it's not that I do not agree with it--

2034 Mr. JACZKO. --have been consistent with the law.

2035 Mr. SIMPSON. As I said, Yucca Mountain is going  
2036 to--whatever happens to Yucca Mountain happens to Yucca  
2037 Mountain. To me that is the least important issue here as  
2038 far as Congress is concerned. What is concerning to me is  
2039 the politicization of the NRC--

2040 Mr. JACZKO. And I do not believe the agency--

2041 Mr. SIMPSON. -by this decision, and I think it is, and  
2042 I do not think there is any way you can look at the record

2043 and not come to that conclusion when you look at delaying  
2044 this vote for, how long now--

2045 Mr. JACZKO. Congressman--

2046 Mr. SIMPSON. --when you clearly have procedures under  
2047 appendix 5 of the resolution of a two to two vote, and if it  
2048 is three to one or four to zero, you have met the  
2049 precondition that you set when you said when you have a  
2050 majority opinion.

2051 Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, as I said, I am following the  
2052 procedures of the commission and, again, I do not want to go  
2053 into details because I cannot discuss the details of  
2054 adjudication.

2055 Mr. SIMPSON. In a memorandum dated March 30, 2010, the  
2056 NRC staff laid out a scheduled of tentative completion dates  
2057 for the Safety Evaluation Report volumes--

2058 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

2059 Mr. SIMPSON. --the SERs. This scheduled includes  
2060 that--indicates that each of the volumes will be completed by  
2061 no later than dates that are shown. Did you, as chairman,  
2062 issue any direction to the NRC staff, either orally or in  
2063 writing, which delayed or in any way affected the timing or  
2064 release of the SER volumes related to Yucca Mountain?

2065 For instance, since there was a no later than dates, if  
2066 the NRC staff was ahead of schedule, did you issue any  
2067 directions that impacted the staff timing of completion of

2068 | the public release of these volumes?

2069 |       Mr. JACZKO. Yes, I did. I indicated to them that they  
2070 | should follow their published schedules in a memo and we can  
2071 | provide that memo to you.

2072 |       Mr. SIMPSON. If they were ahead of schedule?

2073 |       Mr. JACZKO. I told them to stick to their published  
2074 | schedules. I do not have the exact memo in front of me and  
2075 | the language, but we can provide that you.

2076 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Could you please provide a copy of that?

2077 |       Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely.

2078 |       Mr. SIMPSON. A number of members of Congress and  
2079 | committees have written to the NRC requesting release of the  
2080 | full unredacted volume three of the SER for Yucca Mountain.  
2081 | Does the commission intend to provide this document to the  
2082 | committees of Congress?

2083 |       Mr. JACZKO. We have provided that to Congressman Issa,  
2084 | I believe yesterday.

2085 |       Mr. SIMPSON. Yesterday? Appreciate it.

2086 |       Mr. JACZKO. Although I would state for the record that  
2087 | I do not agree that we should provide that document. It is a  
2088 | draft pre-decisional document and, again, with an ongoing  
2089 | adjudication like this, I have not seen that document. I am  
2090 | not allowed to see it, nor are any other members of the  
2091 | commission allowed to see that document. So, I think it  
2092 | creates a very dangerous precedent for pre-decisional

2093 | documents to be--when we have hearing processes ongoing in  
2094 | which this information needs to be established formally on  
2095 | the record, I think it creates a very dangerous precedent for  
2096 | us to provide that information and I did not agree with the  
2097 | commission providing that information.

2098 |       Mr. SIMPSON. I appreciate the fact that you provided  
2099 | that information. There is a way to avoid that problem, make  
2100 | a decision.

2101 |       Mr. JACZKO. And, Congressman, as I have indicated, I am  
2102 | not solely responsible for the decisions of the Commission,  
2103 | we function as a body.

2104 |       Mr. SIMPSON. You are responsible for scheduling the  
2105 | vote.

2106 |       Mr. JACZKO. That is not true. Voting matters go to the  
2107 | entire Committee. I propose an agenda to the Commission,  
2108 | that agenda needs to be approved by the full Commission. Any  
2109 | of our particular sessions in which we actually vote on  
2110 | matters require a full Commission and require a majority of  
2111 | Commissioners to move forward. I do not and have not  
2112 | exercised the authority independently to schedule a vote or  
2113 | not schedule a vote. Again, that is the procedures of the  
2114 | agency that we have.

2115 |       There is, in my mind, some outstanding question of  
2116 | whether or not I would have that authority, but it is not an  
2117 | authority that I have exercised in this particular case. And

2118 again, beyond that, I do not intend to go into the matters  
2119 under adjudication in discussion.

2120 Mr. SIMPSON. I appreciate you being here today. I am  
2121 sure we will be back, and I am sure you will be back before  
2122 the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Government Reform  
2123 Committee, because there is real concerns within Congress.  
2124 As I said, those concerns extend much beyond Yucca Mountain,  
2125 to the direction that the NRC is taking, and we believe the  
2126 direction that it is taking beyond the law, and I would check  
2127 the graduation records of that attorney that is advising you.

2128 Thank you.

2129 Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman, I would just like to say  
2130 for the record, if I may, that I have very strong confidence  
2131 in the General Counsel about the Nuclear Regulatory  
2132 Commission, and I appreciate you may have differences of  
2133 opinion about that. Those are certainly matters that the  
2134 courts will deal with at some point, I suppose, but I do not  
2135 think that the General Counsel is at all at fault here, and I  
2136 would just like to state that for the record.

2137 Mr. SIMPSON. Then it only falls back on one person.

2138 Mr. JACZKO. Well, I take full responsibility for the  
2139 actions of this Commission. And as I said, I am very  
2140 comfortable with the decision we have made. And, in fact, I  
2141 believe that that was a very apolitical decision, and it was  
2142 an important decision. It was a difficult decision,



2143 | absolutely, but we are a regulatory body, it is not the  
2144 | responsibility of this body to require the DOE to move  
2145 | forward or not move forward with a particular program or a  
2146 | program direction. Our job is licensing, that is the  
2147 | function and responsibility of this body. No more than you  
2148 | would expect the Fire Marshall to go in and tell a developer  
2149 | to continue developing a building so that they can conduct  
2150 | their fire inspections should we be expected to be in the  
2151 | position of demanding or requiring the Department of Energy  
2152 | to move forward with a program.

2153 |       I believe that that is a very important principal that  
2154 | is at stake here, and it is important for the independence of  
2155 | this agency that we continue to be able to make decisions  
2156 | absent--

2157 |       Mr. SIMPSON. The question before the Commission was  
2158 | whether the DOE could unilaterally withdraw the license  
2159 | application, that was the question before the Board.

2160 |       Mr. JACZKO. And that--

2161 |       Mr. SIMPSON. And they said under--because Congress has  
2162 | a say in this, and Congress and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act  
2163 | determined that Yucca Mountain was the spot. Whether that  
2164 | was a sound or scientific decision or not, it seems to me  
2165 | that the Department, if they do not believe this is the right  
2166 | thing to do, needs to come to Congress and say this is why we  
2167 | have changed our mind, we have found out that this is not

2168 | safe or this is not the right place to put--or politically it  
2169 | is not the right thing to do, and get a vote of Congress.  
2170 | This should not be a universal or a unilateral action by the  
2171 | administration to secure four electoral votes, and we all  
2172 | know that is exactly what it was. And I just wanted to show  
2173 | you something that is going to be very famous. This is the  
2174 | coin put out by the DOE on submission of the Environmental  
2175 | Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain in 2008. Hopefully one  
2176 | day it will be worth something. Any other questions?

2177 |       Mr. PASTOR. Yeah, I just would like to make a comment.  
2178 | In the 2010 budget that was adopted, H.R. 3183,  
2179 | Appropriations for the Energy and Water Development related  
2180 | Committee, we appropriated money for the Blue Ribbon  
2181 | Commission, and in that law, we said that the five million  
2182 | shall be provided to create a Blue Ribbon Commission to  
2183 | consider all alternatives for nuclear waste disposal, not  
2184 | sites, but to consider all alternatives.

2185 |       And we felt that we were going at least--that we were  
2186 | going halfway with the administration, that we were  
2187 | cooperating with the administration and said, all right, have  
2188 | the Blue Ribbon Commission, here is the money, but I think  
2189 | there is enough record to say, in your deliberations, in your  
2190 | consideration, Yucca Mountain should also be part of the mix.

2191 |       And DOE basically told us no way, it is a citing, we are  
2192 | not doing citing. Well, we understand you were not doing

2193 citing. We said, as you consider all alternatives for  
2194 nuclear waste disposal, I do not know how many billions, that  
2195 this be also considered. But DOE just basically, you know,  
2196 said BS to you guys. And so first of all, you had the  
2197 argument of whether you could do it unilaterally, and then  
2198 everything that has gone with that, but then when we make a  
2199 request and cooperation, you basically said go to hell. And  
2200 so I have got to tell you that you are still going to have  
2201 push back with Yucca Mountain, it is probably going to be a  
2202 bipartisan effort, at least for some members, because we felt  
2203 that--and I'm sure that your counsel, and I am not going to  
2204 argue about your legal counsel, but I always felt that--as  
2205 Dr. Lyons said, there were technical reasons and public  
2206 support reasons, and the technical reasons we have not given  
2207 you, but the public support was enough for us to pull it out.

2208 I am saying that was a big investment, and we tried to  
2209 cooperate by saying we will give you the \$5 million to create  
2210 this Blue Ribbon Commission, and we just ask you to consider  
2211 alternatives for nuclear waste disposal, and you basically  
2212 told us go to hell, and I think that has rubbed many members  
2213 in the wrong way, and I am sorry to say that we went that  
2214 way.

2215 Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Pastor, you essentially gave the only  
2216 answer that I think I could have given, that the BRC is not a  
2217 siting Commission, so they are not considering a specific

2218 site.

2219 Mr. PASTOR. We did not ask you to site, we just asked  
2220 you--if you read--you decided to define this alternatives as  
2221 siting, you decided, we did not decide. We asked you to look  
2222 at all alternatives. And a way to get around this law, and a  
2223 way to get around, you decided to make it a siting. So I am  
2224 not arguing that it was a siting, I am arguing that it was  
2225 looking at all alternatives. You decided to get around the  
2226 law by saying it is a siting problem, and so it was not me,  
2227 it was you. And again, you had to find a rational, you could  
2228 not find a technical reason, you said, well, it is lack of  
2229 public support, and the Blue Ribbon Commission, in the eyes  
2230 of the Department of Energy, it is a siting. You made that  
2231 determination, not me, not the Subcommittee, not Congress, it  
2232 was you who made that decision to claim it was a siting  
2233 decision.

2234 Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Olver.

2235 Mr. OLVER. I hesitate truly to get into this point.  
2236 Where is--housed in the government? We do not have a siting  
2237 commission.

2238 Mr. PASTOR. We do not have a siting commission, we have  
2239 a Blue Ribbon Commission. The Blue Ribbon Commission does  
2240 what?

2241 Mr. LYONS. The Blue Ribbon Commission is charged with  
2242 evaluating and making recommendations on the back end of the

2243 fuel cycle.

2244 Mr. OLVER. And where is this Blue Ribbon Commission  
2245 housed? Is it in the Department of Energy? Where is it in  
2246 the government?

2247 Mr. LYONS. It is very much an independent commission.  
2248 We are--we are providing--well, with the funds that you  
2249 provided, we are providing funding to the BIC, yes.

2250 Mr. OLVER. Well, let me just--Dr. Lyons, you pointed  
2251 out that you agree with the decision to terminate Yucca  
2252 Mountain. I do not know whether it is dead forever or not, I  
2253 almost do not care either especially, except that for all  
2254 these years, we have been creating the waste, we have been  
2255 trying to figure out where to put the waste, what to do with  
2256 the long term waste and creating more of it, and you are  
2257 coming in with a budget which intends to create even a whole  
2258 lot more waste, so the question is, the waste is growing,  
2259 somebody has a responsibility to deal with this, and I am not  
2260 sure where the responsibility is at this point, but is the  
2261 administration--you, Dr. Lyons, Secretary Lyons, you say that  
2262 you agree with that decision. What responsibility is DOE  
2263 trying to take--willing to take, if any, to try to figure out  
2264 where this waste is going to go?

2265 Mr. LYONS. The Department clearly recognizes that it  
2266 has the responsibility for the management of the used fuel.  
2267 At the moment--

2268 Mr. OLVER. But it is being stored in large measure at  
2269 the sites of the nuclear plants, and if we are going to have  
2270 more nuclear plants, which the policies clearly are to do  
2271 that, whether those are successful or not, we will see along  
2272 the way, but it took us years and years and years to think  
2273 about Yucca Mountain, and now it looks as if it is  
2274 terminated. How long will it take us to deal with, while all  
2275 of this waste fuel, with all of its 1 percent of plutonium,  
2276 along with whatever it is, the remaining amount of  
2277 fissionable uranium and the other actinides and everything  
2278 else that is there with long half-lives is going to be  
2279 growing in its volume.

2280 Mr. LYONS. I am not sure if there was a question in  
2281 there. I mean I indicated that, number one, the Department--

2282 Mr. OLVER. What are you doing? What is the Department  
2283 of Energy doing to begin to solve that problem, if now you  
2284 agree with the dissolution of the so called solution, which  
2285 was Yucca Mountain for some period of time, is now to be  
2286 taken off the table, what is the alternative?

2287 Mr. LYONS. Well, the statement I made was that I  
2288 welcomed the opportunity to help the Department find a more  
2289 workable solution. And I agreed with Secretary Chu that  
2290 Yucca was not a workable solution. In terms of the programs  
2291 that we have, I mentioned earlier some of the research  
2292 programs we have exploring a range of options from the once

2293 | through cycle all the way through full reprocessing, with a  
2294 | number of options in between, including deep burn, which is  
2295 | one of the very interesting options that may well come  
2296 | through this process. At this point in time, we are within a  
2297 | few months of the Blue Ribbon Commission report. I mean  
2298 | based on the individuals that are on--I am extraordinarily  
2299 | optimistic that the Blue Ribbon Commission will provide very  
2300 | important guidance, first to the Department, and I hope to  
2301 | Congress.

2302 |       Mr. OLVER. Do you think they will do it or tell us  
2303 | where somebody is going to accept the long term, high  
2304 | radiation nuclear waste?

2305 |       Mr. LYONS. I think that one area that the Blue Ribbon  
2306 | Commission--

2307 |       Mr. PASTOR. It is not a siting commission.

2308 |       Mr. OLVER. Oh.

2309 |       Mr. PASTOR. It is not a siting commission.

2310 |       Mr. LYONS. One area that the BRC has evaluated, I know,  
2311 | is experience in other countries. There are very successful  
2312 | programs in other countries that could well prove to be  
2313 | useful models in this country, where, in other countries,  
2314 | they have found ways to build strong public confidence,  
2315 | public interest and public support in repository programs.  
2316 | There may be lessons in there, and I am awaiting the BRC's  
2317 | evaluation of those lessons.

2318 Mr. OLVER. Wow, we are to continue to simply kick this  
2319 one down the road, are we not?

2320 Mr. LYONS. We have a--July.

2321 Mr. OLVER. All of those were considered at one point or  
2322 another. We have known what other countries have been able  
2323 to do and have been willing to do. We want to go--to die and  
2324 we want to go to Heaven, but we do not want to die to do it.

2325 Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman, if I could just make a  
2326 point, too, that one of the issues that the NRC focuses on is  
2327 the safety and security of spent fuel. And the Commission  
2328 recently reaffirmed our view that certainly for the next--if  
2329 you take the operating life of the reactors and add about 60  
2330 years onto that, that we see no concerns with the safety and  
2331 security of that fuel, which gets you basically to about 100  
2332 years. So there is no--

2333 Mr. OLVER. The safety of the fuel is just being added  
2334 to--in pools and so forth at the--

2335 Mr. JACZKO. Correct.

2336 Mr. OLVER. --most of those pools are full. What are we  
2337 going to do, build more pools at every one of their nuclear  
2338 power plants?

2339 Mr. JACZKO. As the pools fill up, you move the fuel  
2340 into dry cask storage, that is the methodology that has been  
2341 established. And again, the Commission has looked at this  
2342 issue and found that basically when you take that 40-year



2343 operation of the plants, and again, looking at new plants, as  
2344 well, that it is safe and secure for at least 60 years beyond  
2345 the lifetime of the plant, so that is a very long period of  
2346 time at which to look at--

2347 Mr. OLVER. And you are telling us we do not need Yucca  
2348 Mountain, are you not?

2349 Mr. JACZKO. I am sorry?

2350 Mr. OLVER. You are telling us we do not need Yucca  
2351 Mountain?

2352 Mr. JACZKO. At this point, there is a need for a longer  
2353 term solution, but for the short term, and again, we are  
2354 talking about decades, multiple decades, there are no safety  
2355 and security issues with the spent fuel.

2356 Mr. LYONS. I think dry casks--

2357 Mr. SIMPSON. Well, we are kicking the can down the  
2358 road.

2359 Mr. LYONS. To me, dry cask storage gives us the  
2360 opportunity to step back, find better, more workable  
2361 solutions, and that is why I accepted this job.

2362 Mr. OLVER. I want to understand something more about  
2363 deep burn. And I think if I were able to do that, and also  
2364 your small modular reactors, I am sorry, I was not--I have  
2365 some real questions, and I do not want to ask them, because I  
2366 do not think I would use the terms that you would understand,  
2367 I could not put the terms correctly enough that I would get

2368 anything back that I would understand, okay.

2369 Mr. LYONS. I would be happy to meet with you or bring  
2370 staff to you or your staff to have further discussions on  
2371 these areas.

2372 Mr. OLVER. Okay, thank you.

2373 Mr. SIMPSON. And let me just say, you know, throughout  
2374 this discussion, I am not critical of the Department. I know  
2375 the Secretary and you are doing what you have to do. I  
2376 actually support the Blue Ribbon Commission on what they are  
2377 doing. I think we ought to look at different ways we can  
2378 deal with this waste, whether we reprocess or other things to  
2379 reduce the volume. We all know that at some point in time,  
2380 we are going to have to have a geological repository for the  
2381 gunk that is left over.

2382 Mr. LYONS. Absolutely.

2383 Mr. SIMPSON. As Mr. Olver said, I think we are kicking  
2384 the can down the road. But I am not critical of what the  
2385 Department is doing in this regard. I understand what you  
2386 are doing and why you are doing it, and I look forward to the  
2387 Blue Ribbon Commission's work and what their recommendations  
2388 are also. I am real critical of what the NRC is doing,  
2389 because I think they are overstepping the bounds of the law.  
2390 And so this is a subject we will follow up with, I am sure,  
2391 in further hearings, in a variety of committees before  
2392 Congress.

2393 I appreciate, you know, in spite of all of that, I do  
2394 appreciate what you do and the tasks you have. It is a  
2395 difficult job right now, particularly in light of events  
2396 around the world, and we look forward to working with you on  
2397 this budget to try to make sure that it advances the cause of  
2398 nuclear energy in this country, and thank you for being here.

2399 Mr. LYONS. Thank you.

2400 [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the Subcommittee was  
2401 adjourned.]

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SPEAKER LISTING  
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FATTAH.	35	36	37	38	39	41	44
	51	52	53	54	55	56	57
JACZKO.	10	16	17	24	25	27	28
	29	30	33	34	39	40	44
	52	53	54	55	56	57	66
	68	70	73	74	75	76	77
	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
	85	86	87	88	89	96	97
LOWEY.	64	66	67	68	69	70	
LYONS.	6	14	15	17	19	22	23
	31	32	35	36	37	38	39
	41	44	45	46	47	48	49
	51	54	58	59	60	61	62
	63	64	67	71	72	92	93
	94	95	96	97	98	99	
NUNNELEE.	39	40	41				
OLVER.	41	58	59	60	61	62	63
	64	92	93	94	95	96	97
	98						
PASTOR.	5	22	23	24	26	27	28
	47	48	49	50	77	78	80
	90	92	95				

REHBERG.	29	30	31	32	33	35	
SIMPSON.	3	6	10	14	15	16	17
	18	19	22	29	35	39	41
	43	44	45	46	51	57	64
	70	71	72	73	74	75	76
	77	78	79	80	81	82	83
	84	85	86	87	88	89	91
	92	97	98				

\*\*\*\*\*  
INDEX OF INSERTS  
\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\* INSERT 1 \*\*\*\*\*

PAGE 9

\*\*\*\*\* INSERT 2 \*\*\*\*\*

PAGE 13

**QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD**  
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT**  
**HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS**

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**Hearing on the 2012 Budget Request for the  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
and  
Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy programs  
Thursday, March 31, 2011**

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<b>OPENING QUESTIONS.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>FUKUSHIMA POWER PLANT IN JAPAN .....</b>	<b>3</b>
1. Impact of events in Japan on nuclear industry .....	3
2. Safety of U.S. reactors compared to Fukushima.....	3
3. Cooperation with Nuclear Regulatory Commission .....	4
<b>NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .....</b>	<b>5</b>
4. Elimination of the Integrated University Program.....	5
5. Lawsuits against the U.S. government.....	5
6. NRC Actions related to Japan .....	6
7. Review of existing facilities .....	6
8. Review of licenses for new plants.....	7
9. Japan 50-mile perimeter? .....	7
10. Claim that the spent fuel ponds in Japan were empty.....	8
11. Oversight of new facilities .....	8
12. Carryover funds.....	8
13. Construction Funding in the request .....	9
<b>YUCCA TERMINATION .....</b>	<b>10</b>
14. Controversy over withholding final report on Yucca Mountain.....	10
15. Administration's plan to assume responsibility of spent fuel.....	11

**ADDITIONAL MEMBER QUESTIONS ..... 12**

16. Additional Questions from Mr. Simpson of Idaho ..... 12



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## Opening Questions

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### Fukushima power plant in Japan

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#### 1. Impact of events in Japan on nuclear industry

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the earthquake and tsunami have created a terrible tragedy for the people of Japan, and our thoughts are with them. I'd like take a moment to discuss with you, Dr. Lyons and Chairman Jaczko, what impact you believe the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan is having—or might have—on the nuclear industry in the United States and abroad.

- Given that nuclear power is and will play an important role in our energy mix, how do you think these events might impact your programs and the nuclear industry in the short-term? And how—if at all—might it impact where we're heading in the long-term?

#### 2. Safety of U.S. reactors compared to Fukushima

Of course, there's a question many people are asking while we've been watching Japan struggle with the Fukushima power plant: "If it happened at the Fukushima power plant, could it happen here?" I'd like to take a minute to get your thoughts on that question.

- First, I hear disagreement over whether there was a flaw in the reactor design at Fukushima, or whether there was a systems issue—a failure to adequately protect the reactor's auxiliary systems. What is your take on that question, Dr. Lyons and Chairman Jaczko?
- I understand that the United States has nuclear reactors of the same "make and model" as the Fukushima Daiichi reactors—six U.S. reactors have the same reactor and secondary containment structure designs, I believe. Do our plants have the same safety risks as Fukushima, or are there regulatory differences, construction differences, and other precautions that make our plants safer?

- What about hydrogen venting? Do our reactors have different venting systems or other precautions that would prevent the hydrogen explosions that affected some of the outer containment building at Fukushima?
- We've talked about our current reactors, but what about the new class of reactors that are just starting construction in the United States? Are those "Gen III+" reactors safer than the Fukushima Daiichi reactors? Can you explain the safety advantages?
- Is the next generation of reactor designs beyond Gen III+, like small modular and high temperature gas reactors, even safer? What would make them safer?

3. **Cooperation with Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

- What are the obstacles to effective cooperation on licensing and safety oversight between the Department and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission?
- What is being done to remove those obstacles?

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## **Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

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### **4. Elimination of the Integrated University Program**

Dr. Lyons and Chairman Jaczko, the budget requests for both of your agencies eliminate funding for the University Program, which this Subcommittee has funded in the past to support a pipeline of nuclear engineers and scientists coming out of American universities.

- With the American nuclear engineer workforce nearing a time of high retirements and the pipeline of graduating students still not growing sufficiently to fill the spots, why have you eliminated the University Program—especially given our need to keep our reactors safe both now and in the future?
- We have heard that only a small portion of nuclear engineers currently go to work for industry. Given that, why do you believe that industry will fill in financial support in place of these university programs, as stated in the Department of Energy's budget request?

### **5. Lawsuits against the U.S. government**

Chairman Jaczko, there was a time when the NRC was seen as a reasoned, non-political safety and technological regulatory body. Now, it seems as if your actions are generating more and more lawsuits. For instance, your decision to allow spent nuclear fuel on-site for 60 years is one of the recent court challenges you're facing. I know of at least three states which are suing the NRC over this.

There are at least two other cases pending against the government specifically because of the Administration's attempts to shut down Yucca Mountain— one to stop the collection of Nuclear Waste Fund fees, and another to show that the Department of Energy doesn't have the authority to remove the Yucca Mountain license application...as was confirmed by the NRC's own Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel.

- How many lawsuits is the U.S. government defending against, resulting from the government's failure to assume responsibility of

spent nuclear fuel or otherwise resulting from the Administration's attempts to shut down Yucca Mountain?

- How much funding is in the fiscal year 2012 budget request for the NRC and other U.S. government agencies for legal fees and/or damages resulting from these or expected cases? What are your estimates for future years?

## **6. NRC Actions related to Japan**

- Chairman Jaczko, what is the NRC doing to support efforts in Japan to stabilize and secure the damaged nuclear plants?
- The NRC announced last week the formation of a task force to conduct both a short- and long-term analysis of the lessons we can learn from the events in Japan. Realizing that we don't yet have all the information on Japan or the task force's recommendations, what types of short-term changes to your regulatory framework do you think are possible? What about long-term changes?
- Will the NRC continue processing existing license applications while the task force conducts its analysis?
- How will the task force's timeline of 90 days for its short-term analysis and approximately six months for its long-term recommendations impact existing license applications?

## **7. Review of existing facilities**

Chairman Jaczko, your budget request includes an increase of \$13.7 million for oversight of operating reactors. Since you submitted this request, you have been charged by the President to undertake a comprehensive review of all nuclear facilities, and last week the NRC announced a task force whose work I assume represents at least part of this review.

- What is the scope of this review? Are enrichment facilities, waste repositories, spent fuel pools, and non-commercial reactors all included?

- Do you expect that applications for reactor extensions or power uprates will be slowed because of this review? What about new reactor licenses?
- How long will it take for you to complete this review? Will the Task Force's anticipated timeframe of six months for its long-term analysis conclude the review?
- How much funding do you expect this review to cost, and do you expect the 2012 request will need to change in order to accommodate it?

#### **8. Review of licenses for new plants**

Chairman, your request for licensing activities for new plants is a slight increase over fiscal year 2010. It looks like your budget would fund two new combined licenses and continued work on new designs and early site permits.

- Have your plans changed following the tragedy in Japan?

#### **9. Japan 50-mile perimeter?**

Chairman Jaczko, your role as Chairman of the NRC should be to provide authoritative guidance on nuclear energy issues. It was reasonable that the government turned to you to give some perspective for U.S. plants following the tragedy in Japan. However, you made a few comments which got you cross-wise with the IAEA and the Japanese authorities.

Could you clarify how you developed the "50-mile" evacuation zone for American citizens around the Fukushima plants? Since this is far wider than the 12 mile zone recommended by IAEA and Japanese authorities, your recommendation caused quite a bit of concern and confusion.

- What scientific basis did you have for your recommendation?
- You said at the time that your recommendation was based on the "possibility of scenarios that we haven't seen yet." What did that mean, precisely?

- Last week, the NRC clarified that its 50-mile recommendation was based on a determination that releases from the Fukushima plant “could...possibly exceed conservatively set safe radiation-exposure limits” based on “limited data and conservative assumptions.” Since your recommendation was far more conservative than that of the Japanese or IAEA experts, you may have had additional information that they did not have...or, perhaps, you didn’t agree with their recommendation. Which was it? What did you know that they didn’t, or what specifically did you disagree with?

#### **10. Claim that the spent fuel ponds in Japan were empty**

Chairman Jaczko, your claim on March 16 that the spent fuel ponds at Fukushima’s Reactor 4 were dry was factually incorrect and caused not a small amount of concern, both within Japan and internationally. What conclusive evidence did you have before you made this claim?

- Please submit for the record this evidence, since the information that we are receiving is that because the area was covered with carbon, the pictures were inconclusive.

#### **11. Oversight of new facilities**

Chairman, one of the largest increases in your request is for oversight activities of new plants. According to your request, you will need to be inspecting a total of four new reactors expected to be under construction this year, an increase of two over last year.

- What are the four reactors you expected to be under construction this year? Have there been any changes to these plans?

#### **12. Carryover funds**

Chairman, the NRC has in the past carried over significant funding.

- What is the estimate of your carryover funds for fiscal year 2010?
- Do you think this amount is appropriate? If not, what are you doing to “spend down” the funding to an appropriate level?

- Can we expect to see a reprogramming?

### **13. Construction Funding in the request**

Chairman, it's somewhat buried on page 47 of your budget request, but your New Reactors program has \$21 million of "one-time" costs associated with the design, construction, and outfitting of a new headquarters office building. I'm not sure how this is one-time, since there is funding in the FY10 and FY11 requests as well for construction of a new office building.

- What is the total is this budget request for construction activities, and how much has already been spent on these activities?
- What is the projected total cost?

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# **Yucca Termination**

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## **14. Controversy over withholding final report on Yucca Mountain**

Chairman Jaczko, the President unilaterally shut down the Yucca Mountain project over the protests of the vast majority of Americans – this is likely one of the least “democratic” actions I have seen from an Administration since I have been in Congress.

One of the greatest tragedies is that the Administration’s approach is to halt any useful understanding from being gained through the expenditure of over \$12 billion in research on the site. Under a Freedom of Information Act filing, your staff recently released a heavily redacted version of Volume 3 of the Safety Evaluation Report...the document which is to show your staff’s technological and scientific qualifications of the site. This report should have been released in November, 2010. Now your staff is saying that they’re not going to even archive an unredacted version because, as they put it, the information is “predecisional” and could cause confusion.

- Chairman, this report was due months ago. Why has no decision been made?
- If I’m to understand correctly, this report is going to be buried because it’s predecisional, and the reason it’s predecisional is that the Administration killed the program?
- Closing down the program before the license application could be approved is shameful enough, but hiding what has been learned betrays the trust of the American people and literally wastes years of hard work and billions of dollars. Chairman Jaczko, what is in this document that the Administration would find so damaging if it were made public? That, perhaps, the site is technically qualified for a million years?
- The Administration may continue to insist that this program is shut down, but you can be assured that it is not. This report must be released, and this project must move forward.



**15. Administration's plan to assume responsibility of spent fuel**

Chairman Jaczko, I would generally ask this to the Department of Energy, but since you're using your position as Chairman of the NRC to fulfill the Administration's plan to shut down Yucca Mountain over the objections of Congress, I figure you can answer this instead. The Associated Press reported last week that the U.S. has 71,862 tons of spent nuclear fuel at reactors in the United States – waste that is stranded there because the Administration killed the Yucca Mountain project. While the waste is safe where it is, estimates are that the pools contain four times the amount of fuel than they were designed to handle. Given that the American public is rightly concerned about this waste spread across the country at 129 sites, especially in the wake of what happened in Japan, what is the Administration's timeline for fulfilling its obligations in assuming responsibility of this waste?

- Frankly, I find the Administration's lack of a real plan not just absurd, but a waste of taxpayer resources. The American public is worried about keeping this waste in pools, and I can't understand why the Administration would support this vulnerability when it can be stored safely at Yucca Mountain.

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## Additional Member Questions

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### **16. Additional Questions from Mr. Simpson of Idaho**

Dr. Jazcko, in your testimony you have repeatedly characterized the voting process in adjudicatory matters as a less than formal process. This seems inconsistent with statements provided by other Commissioners and the procedures identified in Chapter III or the Commission's Internal Procedures. Appendix 3 of those procedures provides an example voting sheet to be used in matters pending before the Commission.

- Was this voting process used in establishing the Commission's position on this matter and were these votes sheets submitted to the Secretary of the Commission for tally and reporting? Or was some other less formal process used? Please clarify the process used in voting and provide any changes to Commission procedures that may not be publicly available.

While this Committee has no intention of presuming the outcome of the Commission's decision, we do not understand why you have not made a timely closure to this matter. In your testimony, you state that in adjudicatory matters, processes used to achieve decisions are different from routine matters.

- Would you explain that process?
- Also, please clarify if the process described in Appendix 5 of the Commission's Internal Procedures is used in resolving 2-2 votes in adjudicatory matters and if not, what process is followed?
- Also, please have the Secretary for the Commission review the historical records and provide the following for each matter before the Commission where a quorum of Commissioners have affirmed their votes but a majority decision was not reached:
  - a. A brief description of the matter.
  - b. The date when the matter was first brought to the Commission.
  - c. The date when a quorum of Commissioners filed their votes with the Secretary of the Commission.

- d. The date when all participating Commissioners filed their votes with the Secretary.
- e. The length of time between the last filing of votes and the issuance of a draft Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) or order.
- f. The length of time between the draft SRM or order and the completion of voting on the final SRM and order.
- g. The length of time between the completion of voting on the final SRM or order and the affirmation of their vote by the Commission.
- h. A copy of each final SRM or order and affirmation statements, if any, by individual Commissioners.

Dr. Jaczko, in your testimony you stated that the Commission policy to begin to close down the review of the application was established in the Commission's FY-11 Budget.

- Yet is it not true that policy was established when the NRC only had 3 Commissioners, two of whom have publicly stated that you are not correctly implementing the Commission's decision?
- Furthermore, this matter was not taken up by the current Commission and therefore is it not true you have acted unilaterally and did not seek the Commission's approval?
- How is that consistent with Commission procedures and statements you have made before this committee?

Dr. Jaczko, you testified that "there are ongoing discussions" among the commissioners to try to reach an agreement on a final order.

- Is that correct?
- When was the last time that such "ongoing discussions" have occurred between you and your fellow commissioners?
- Isn't true that there have been no such discussions since September 2010. Yes or no?

To be requested of all Commissioners to respond-- Chairman Jaczko has stated on several occasions that this matter is under active deliberation within the Commission.

- Would you please explain that deliberative process and what actions each of you are taking to achieve a timely resolution of this matter?

Dr. Jaczko, you testified that “it was your view” supported by the general counsel that budget document provided the guideline and the direction to move forward on Yucca close out activities.

- Please provide the GC’s memo and all citations of precedents for this position.
- Was your view supported by all the other commissioners at that time?

Dr. Jaczko, is there a time limit in which the Commission is required to render a final decision to uphold or reverse the ASLB?

Will you agree not to dissolve the ASLB until you have issued a final order on whether to uphold or reverse their decision that DOE lacks the authority to withdraw the Yucca license?

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:33 AM  
**To:** Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie; 'jason.nelson@dhs.gov'  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; 'John.Berge@osec.usda.gov'  
**Subject:** RE: Japan nuclear regulations

Melanie,

Your questions have been forwarded to the staff. I will get back to you as soon as they respond.

Gene

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie [mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 3:31 PM  
To: 'jason.nelson@dhs.gov'  
Cc: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; 'John.Berge@osec.usda.gov'  
Subject: Re: Japan nuclear regulations

Hi All, Jason Nelson from FEMA directed me to you regarding a few questions my boss has. Can you please help me?

My boss continues to be concerned about reports of radiation being leaked into the ocean from the plant in Japan. Do you know how I can get information on the status of the leak and its impact on public health? Also, my boss is also interested in knowing the impact of the radiation leak on marine life (especially salmon.) Do you how we can get answers to these questions?

Thanks!

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Nelson, Jason [mailto:jason.nelson@dhs.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 03:21 PM  
To: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
Cc: Hart, Patrick <Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov>  
Subject: RE: Japan nuclear regulations

Hi Melanie,

The NRC has the primary responsibility for nuclear plant safety. The Associate Director of Legislative Affairs is [Amy.Powell@nrc.gov](mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov) and the Senior Congressional Affairs Officer is [Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov](mailto:Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov). You may also want to contact [John.Berge@osec.usda.gov](mailto:John.Berge@osec.usda.gov) re: marine life issues.

I hope this helps.

Regards,

Jason

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
[mailto:[Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov](mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov)]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 3:08 PM  
To: 'Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov'; 'jason.nelson@dhs.gov'  
Subject: Japan nuclear regulations

Hi Guys, my boss continues to be concerned about reports of radiation being leaked into the ocean from the plant in Japan. Do you know how I can get information on the status of the leak and its impact on public health? Also, my boss is also interested in knowing the impact of the radiation leak on marine life (especially salmon.). Do you how we can get answers to these questions?

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:28 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Rep. Markey's office releases e-mail

FYI, Rep. Markey's office has released the e-mail exchange with Tim to the media.

AP

-----Original Message-----

From: Burnell, Scott  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:16 PM  
To: Powell, Amy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Virgilio, Martin  
Subject: FW:

Thoughts?

-----Original Message-----

From: Tracy, Tennille [mailto:Tennille.Tracy@dowjones.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:10 PM  
To: Burnell, Scott  
Subject: RE:

Rep. Markey's office has just released the e-mail they received from NRC on this issue. The e-mail comes from Timothy Riley. The e-mail is dated Tuesday, April 5, and states:

>You had asked if the core of Unit 2 had melted into the torus. Here is  
>the view from the NRC Emergency Operations Center:  
>  
>Based on radiation readings in the drywell and the torus (3340 rem/hour  
>and 91 rem/hour, respectively), the NRC staff speculates that part of  
>the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in  
>the lower space of the drywell. Lower radiation readings in the torus  
>suggest that there is not core material in the torus.

Is Markey's office interpreting this correctly? The e-mail - "that part of the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in the lower space of the drywell" - suggests that NRC does in fact believe the core has melted through the reactor vessel. Was Martin Virgilio wrong when he said NRC had no evidence that the core had melted through the vessel? What is the belief of the NRC? Are there conflicting opinions within NRC? .... I'm getting a ton of pressure from editors to sort this out.

Thanks, t

---

From: Burnell, Scott [Scott.Burnell@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:49 AM  
To: Tracy, Tennille  
Subject: RE:

Hi Tennille;

Please refer to the hearing transcript for Marty Virgilio's response to that statement, that speaks for the agency on this issue. Thanks.

Scott

-----Original Message-----

From: Tracy, Tennille [mailto:Tennille.Tracy@dowjones.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:44 AM  
To: Burnell, Scott  
Subject: RE:

Hi ... I'm sure you're getting tons of emails on this now ... But Rep. Ed Markey is saying that the core of at least one unit at Fukushima (Unit Two) has melted through the reactor vessel. Martin Virgilio, who was at the hearing where Markey was speaking, said this is not the case. He said there was no evidence of this in the situation reports from this morning.

Do we have any evidence that the core has breached the reactor vessel?

Did NRC staff tell Markey that this had taken place?

---

From: Burnell, Scott [Scott.Burnell@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:09 AM  
To: Burnell, Scott  
Cc: Brenner, Eliot; Hayden, Elizabeth  
Subject:

Good Morning;

Here is the NRC response to the NY Times article:

The March 26 document represented an interim snapshot of what NRC staff and other experts considered as possible conditions inside the damaged units at Fukushima-Daiichi; the document does not reflect our understanding of the current situation. Based on those possible conditions, the NRC staff's recommendations should be considered prudent measures; they are not offered as the only possible solutions. We shared those recommendations with the Japanese



operator and regulator of the plants. We understand they are pursuing an alternative set of strategies to control the plants and ensure the safety of the people working at the plants and living nearby. We are working with our counterparts to consider these strategies and explore additional steps that could enhance safety.

If the NRC has any further comment, you'll be informed via e-mail. Thank you.

Scott Burnell

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 2:20 PM  
**To:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Thank You  
**Attachments:** Borchardt TU, 03.29.2011.pdf

---

**From:** Campbell, Abigail (Energy) [mailto:[Abigail\\_Campbell@energy.senate.gov](mailto:Abigail_Campbell@energy.senate.gov)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 1:47 PM  
**To:** 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov'  
**Cc:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman); Edwards, Isaac (Energy)  
**Subject:** Thank You

The Committee truly appreciated your time and remarks at last week's Member briefing. Members and staff found the briefing highly informative. Please find attached a thank you letter from Chairman Bingaman and Ranking Member Murkowski.

Best,  
Abby

Abigail Campbell  
United States Senate  
Committee on Energy & Natural Resources  
[Abigail\\_Campbell@energy.senate.gov](mailto:Abigail_Campbell@energy.senate.gov)  
(202) 224-4971

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman  
RON WYDEN, Oregon  
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota  
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MINE CAMPBELL, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR  
KAREN K. BILLUPS, REPUBLICAN CHIEF COUNSEL

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON  
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6150

ENERGY.SENATE.GOV

April 6, 2011

Mr. Bill Borchardt  
Executive Director for Operations  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

Thank you for your participation in the Member briefing before the United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on Tuesday, March 29, 2011, to provide an update for Committee Members and their staff on the recent events at the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi reactor complex due to the earthquake and tsunami that occurred on March 11, 2011.


Your statements helped to provide an informative briefing that educated Members and staff on situational developments.

We hope you will be willing to share your expertise with Congress again in the future.



Lisa Murkowski  
Ranking Member

Sincerely,



Jeff Bingaman  
Chairman

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 2:35 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Status check on response to Sen. Boxer  
**Attachments:** Found a briefing package with answers to Sen. Boxer's questions

It's the next thing on my list, but the good news is that Region IV provided a previously prepared set of responses to all the questions (attached, FYI)! (Apparently Elmo had it done for the site visit he had with Boxer). I'm sure I'll have to do some massaging, but it appears I have lots to work with. Literally haven't had a chance to review it yet.

-----Original Message-----

From: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 2:30 PM  
To: Rihm, Roger  
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Subject: Status check on response to Sen. Boxer

Hi Roger -

How far along is the draft response to Sen. Boxer's (cosigned with Sen. Feinstein) letter re: Japan that included seismic questions?

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 4:03 PM  
**To:** Taylor, Renee  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Thank you letter from Sen Energy  
**Attachments:** Borchardt TU 03 29 2011.pdf

Hi Renee –

We sent this to SECY so you will see it in a more official way, but wanted you to have the attached letter for Bill.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman

RON WYDEN, Oregon

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana

GEORGE SANDERS, Vermont

CELESTE STABENOW, Michigan

MARY MALLORY, Colorado

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RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

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MIKE LEE, Utah

DANIEL COATS, Indiana

BOB PORTMAN, Ohio

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KATHERINE BILLUPS, REPUBLICAN CHIEF COUNSEL

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON  
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6150

ENERGY.SENATE.GOV

April 6, 2011

Mr. Bill Borchardt  
Executive Director for Operations  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

Thank you for your participation in the Member briefing before the United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on Tuesday, March 29, 2011, to provide an update for Committee Members and their staff on the recent events at the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi reactor complex due to the earthquake and tsunami that occurred on March 11, 2011.


Your statements helped to provide an informative briefing that educated Members and staff on situational developments.

We hope you will be willing to share your expertise with Congress again in the future.



Lisa Murkowski  
Ranking Member

Sincerely,



Jeff Bingaman  
Chairman

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 4:20 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Inhofe Letter

If you all put together info on your authority to function in a state of emergency, it would be helpful to have for Tuesday.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 4:24 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** Emergency cites

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 6:54 PM  
**To:** 'Poirier, Bettina (EPW)'; 'Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)'  
**Subject:** Additional citations, info

More follow up from your call:

Chairman as agency "spokesman": Atomic Energy Act established, Sec. 21 that the Chairman of the then-AEC "shall be the official spokesman of the Commission in its relations with the Congress, Government agencies, persons or the public..." In the Reorganization Act of 1974, AEA was updated to reflect the creation of NRC (from the AEC) and deems the NRC Chairman as official spokesperson in Section 201(a)(1)

Going back to the citation that I previously sent for the Reorganization Plan of 1980 re: emergency powers: In transmitting the Plan, President Carter stated:

"The [NRC's] ability to respond decisively and responsibly to any nuclear emergency must be fully ensured in advance. Experience has shown that the Commission as a whole cannot deal expeditiously with emergencies or communicate in a clear, unified voice to civil authorities or to the public. But present law prevents the Commission from delegating its emergency authority to any of its members. The Plan would correct this situation by specifically authorizing the Chairman to act for the Commission in an emergency."

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673



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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 7:48 PM  
**To:** 'Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov'  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** NYT request

Hi Bettina -

Could we talk tomorrow during our call in prep for next week's hearing (still working with Paul on a time) about your request related to the NYT article? The article resulted from an unfortunate leak of dated information that we are trying as best we can to contain so as not to jeopardize our working relationship with our Japanese colleagues. We'd be glad to talk with you on the call to further explain.

Thanks - look forward to talking with you tomorrow.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 7:54 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Note from EJM's staff re NYT, assessment

FYI - I wrote something similar to Sen Bingaman's staff as I did to Bettina. Not sure that would satisfy here... I have not responded thus far and yes, this is how we learned it was posted online (Idahosazit?)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Weil, Jenny; Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 13:26:55 2011  
**Subject:** the NRC assessment document

Hi all

That assessment document leaked to the NYT is online now. It has much more detail than the situation reports that you've sent us every day. Can you please start sending us these RST assessment documents as well? How long have these been prepared - are they daily reports?

Thanks  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**From:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman) <Jonathan\_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 7:56 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Fowler, Sam (Energy); Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Re: NYT

Ok

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Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld - please excuse the typos

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**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 07:51 PM  
**To:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman)  
**Cc:** Fowler, Sam (Energy); Shane, Raeann <Raeann.Shane@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: NYT

Hi Jon and Sam -

Sorry for the delayed response. The article resulted from an unfortunate leak of dated information that we are trying as best we can to contain so as not to jeopardize our working relationship with our Japanese colleagues. I'll give you a call in the am to discuss further.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman) <Jonathan\_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Fowler, Sam (Energy) <Sam\_Fowler@energy.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 09:42:36 2011  
**Subject:** NYT

I read in the NYT an assessment prepared by the NRC

[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/world/asia/06nuclear.html?\\_r=2&hp](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/world/asia/06nuclear.html?_r=2&hp)

is this releasable to us? TX, JE.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 8:04 PM  
**To:** 'Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: Briefing on SOARCA

Peter -

The briefing you attended was what introduced accident mitigation scenarios for Peach Bottom. Those are discussed in publicly available docs (one that includes some overview/background related to SOARCA) that I'll forward in the am. There are also slides that were presented at NRC's annual international conference that I'll send. These were provided in response to follow up questions after the briefing that you attended 3/18. I get in around 730am and will send along to you.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Spencer, Peter <Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 16:22:48 2011  
**Subject:** Briefing on SOARCA

Amy, as discussed, here's the Minority memo.

Becky, my notes from the 3/18/11 briefing by Brian Sheron on the Japan incident, in which I participated with Minority staff, indicate Sheron talked about risk assessment results at Peach Bottom at the end of the briefing. Was this the briefing referred to in the Memo?

Peter L. Spencer  
Majority Professional Staff  
Oversight and Investigations  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
U.S. House of Representatives  
(202) 225-2927  
[peter.spencer@mail.house.gov](mailto:peter.spencer@mail.house.gov)

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS  
**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115

Majority (202) 225-2927  
Minority (202) 225-3641

**SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM**

**April 6, 2011**

**To: Democratic Members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**  
**Fr: Democratic Staff of the Committee on Energy and Commerce**  
**Re: NRC Modeling of Severe Reactor Accident Scenarios at U.S. Nuclear Plants**

This morning, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will hold a hearing on the nuclear crisis in Japan. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff recently briefed the Democratic staff of the Committee regarding NRC's modeling and simulations of severe reactor accident scenarios for a U.S. plant of the same design as the Fukushima reactors in Japan. A draft NRC report found that in a complete loss of power scenario the reactor would come to within one hour of core damage.

These findings may actually understate the risk of core damage at a U.S. nuclear power plant because of the scope and assumptions of the study. This memo discusses the information NRC recently provided to Committee Democratic staff regarding its modeling and simulations and the issues raised by this information.

**NRC's State-of-the Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA)**

The objective of the NRC's State-of-the Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) project is "to analyze the realistic outcomes of postulated severe reactor accidents, even though it is considered highly unlikely that such accidents could occur."<sup>1</sup> According to NRC staff, the SOARCA analyses aim to account for the findings of research that has been conducted during the last 25 years as well as significant plant changes and updates that were not factored into earlier assessments.

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<sup>1</sup> Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Overview of the SOARCA Project (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at: <http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar/overview.html>).

The SOARCA project analyzes two plants: the Peach Bottom GE Mark 1 boiling-water reactor (BWR) near Lancaster, Pennsylvania – co-owned by Exelon and PSEG, whose President and Chief Operating Officer is testifying today – and the Surry pressurized-water reactor (PWR) near Newport News, Virginia. The Peach Bottom reactor is of the same design as the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in Japan. In the United States, 35 boiling water reactors are in operation and 23 of these reactors were constructed with the Mark 1 containment system.

According to NRC staff, NRC modeled three scenarios for the Peach Bottom BWR reactor. Under the “long-term station blackout” scenario, the plant is assumed to lose offsite AC power and its backup diesel generators, but the battery backups operate safety systems for about four hours until the batteries are exhausted. Under the “short-term station blackout” scenario, “the site loses all power (even the batteries) and, therefore, all of its safety systems quickly become inoperable in the ‘short term.’”<sup>2</sup> Both of these scenarios are supposed to reflect the effects of an extreme external event, such as an earthquake, flood, or fire. The third scenario was the random failure of a vital power cable connection. NRC’s modeling showed that the third scenario did not result in core damage because the unaffected safety systems were adequate to keep the core cool.

For each of the two station blackout scenarios, NRC modeled two sub-scenarios: one that assumed the presence and utilization of new equipment and procedures introduced since the September 11 attacks and one that did not account for the new equipment and procedures.

### **Draft Results of SOARCA**

In the more severe “station blackout” scenario in which all power was lost, the operator was able to take mitigation measures to prevent core damage for the first two days after the loss of power. However, under this scenario, the Peach Bottom BWR reactor came within one hour of core damage. NRC staff explained that a simulated meltdown was narrowly averted through the manual turning of steam valves to activate the reactor core isolation cooling system, which does not require AC power and is driven by steam. According to NRC staff, the simulation was structured to end after the two-day period based on the assumption that interventions would only get more numerous and effective after that time.

In the less severe loss of power scenario, in which the plant was assumed to have operational battery backup power for four hours, core damage was prevented. Because modeling showed that it would take the fuel rods ten hours to rupture from overheating, there was adequate time to employ mitigation measures.

Both of these scenarios assumed the Peach Bottom BWR used the new equipment and procedures introduced since the September 11 attacks. Without the new equipment and procedures, both simulated “station blackout” scenarios led to core damage and the release of radioactive contamination within two days. NRC staff explained that the radioactive fuel in the reactor core melts, tears through the reactor vessel, and then ruptures the primary containment

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<sup>2</sup> Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SOARCA Process, Step 2 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at: <http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar/soarca-accident-progression.html>).

drywell if there is no water covering the floor of the drywell. NRC staff noted that most of the radioactive contamination was projected to be contained in the suppression pool and emphasized that the meltdown progressed more slowly than previous calculations from the 1980s would suggest, providing time for nearby residents to evacuate.

Internal NRC emails obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists indicate that NRC analysts disagreed as to whether the new equipment and procedures (known as B5b measures), which allowed Peach Bottom to narrowly avoid core damage in the complete loss of power scenario, would be effective. According to a memo the Union of Concerned Scientists is releasing today, a July 28, 2010, NRC staff e-mail summarized concerns of NRC senior reactor analysts (SRAs) who work in NRC's regional offices as follows:

One concern has been that SOARCA credits certain B5b mitigating strategies (such as RCIC operation w/o DC power) that have really not been reviewed to ensure that they will work to mitigate severe accidents. Generally, we have not even seen licensees credit these strategies in their own PRAs [probabilistic risk assessments] but for some reason the NRC decided we should during SOARCA.

My recollection is that RI [Region I] SRAs in particular have been vocal with their concerns on SOARCA for several years, probably because Peach Bottom is one of the SOARCA plants.

This e-mail specifically references concerns about operating the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system without battery power. According to NRC staff, this is the specific system and mitigation strategy that allowed Peach Bottom to narrowly avert core damage in the simulated full loss-of-power scenario.

The Union of Concerned Scientists memo quotes a second internal NRC e-mail, which refers to the March 2009 reactor security regulation. The e-mail states:

The application of 10 CFR 50.54(hh) mitigation measures still concerns a number of staff in NRR [the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation]. The concern involves the manner in which credit is given to these measures such that success is assumed ... 10 CFR 50.54(hh) mitigation measures are just equipment onsite that can be useful in an emergency when used by knowledgeable operators if post event conditions allow. If little is known about these post event conditions, then assuming success is speculative.

This e-mail indicates that the NRC reactor analysts responsible for ensuring the day-to-day safety of nuclear reactors in the United States were challenging the SOARCA assumption that the presence of new equipment could be equated with the successful use of such equipment in a disaster scenario.

### **Issues Regarding Scope and Assumptions of the Draft SOARCA Report**

NRC staff explained that the first draft of the SOARCA report was completed in mid-2009 and provided to 11 outside scientific and technical experts for external peer review. NRC staff currently is working to address comments from these outside experts, other NRC personnel, and the operators of the Peach Bottom and Surry plants. Before the crisis in Japan, the plan was to release the report for public comment within the next few months and finalize the report in December. According to NRC staff, this schedule will likely slip by several months due to the pressing focus on events in Japan. This delay could provide NRC with the opportunity to further improve the realism of the SOARCA simulations by accounting for important aspects of a major natural disaster.

The Committee does not know all of the facts about what went wrong at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, but the events in Japan raise a number of questions about the scope and assumptions of NRC's modeling. First, the SOARCA simulations explicitly do not consider the impact of a disaster event on spent fuel pools. At crucial points in the Japanese response effort, radiation from uncovered spent fuel rods at Daiichi has been a significant impediment to such efforts.

Second, NRC terminated the models two days after the simulated loss of power. Events in Japan demonstrate that the question of whether a reactor will melt down and release radioactive contamination into the environment cannot be definitively answered in the first two days. In the United States, reactors have lost power for more than two days. For example, in August 1992, Hurricane Andrew passed directly over the Turkey Point plant and knocked out offsite power for six and a half days.<sup>3</sup> Five onsite diesel generators also were unavailable due to moisture problems.

Third, SOARCA postulates that the "station blackout" scenarios occur as a result of a major earthquake, flood, or fire. But during the briefing with Committee staff, NRC staff indicated that NRC assumed that loss of power is the only damaging result of the natural disaster. It is not clear whether all of the new onsite equipment intended to address security threats after the September 11 attacks would remain functional after a natural disaster of a magnitude large enough to cause a partial or complete loss of power.

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<sup>3</sup> Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Effectiveness of Station Blackout Rule at F-2 (Aug. 2003).



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**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 8:35 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Call with Bettina, Kathy

I should be pretty flexible

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 19:37:27 2011  
Subject: Call with Bettina, Kathy

I can do tomorrow afternoon. Later is probably better to give Roger more time to write.

What works for you?  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Ordal, Paul (EPW) <Paul\_Ordal@epw.senate.gov>  
To: Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
Cc: Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 18:13:19 2011  
Subject: RE: Re:

Could we schedule a call tomorrow afternoon? Our staff have flexibility between 1-4pm.

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 1:58 PM  
To: Ordal, Paul (EPW)  
Cc: Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
Subject: Re:

Looping in OCA to assist.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Ordal, Paul (EPW) <Paul\_Ordal@epw.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 13:43:23 2011  
Subject: RE:

Would 10:00am or 10:30am work for you tomorrow?

-----Original Message-----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 1:03 PM  
To: 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov'  
Cc: Ordal, Paul (EPW)  
Subject: Re:

We should schedule time to go over answers to our questions asap, prob tomorrow. Looping in paul to assist.

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:37 PM  
To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Subject: Re:

Working on it..

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 06:41:52 2011  
Subject:

The new york times today has a report on japan prepared by nrc that sounds more like what we are looking for on the conditions and options. Please send that to us this am. Thanks josh.

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 06:03 PM  
To: 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>  
Subject: Can you call me on cell 228 6004

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)

Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:25 PM

To: 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>

Subject: Re: Getting you something today

She is looking for options and plans to solve this. What it means for us, next steps.

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:04 PM

To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)

Subject: Getting you something today

Might not be exactly on target but let us know

Joshua C. Batkin

Chief of Staff

Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko

(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 7:27 AM  
**To:** Rothschild, Trip  
**Subject:** FW: March 26th online source found

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 2:48 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** March 26th online source found

Tim found the spot where the March 26<sup>th</sup> report is posted: Idaho Samizdat

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 7:32 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Re: NYT request

We will also need the nrc answers in writing to senator boxers letters by cob tomorrow. We have indicated that we need the answers in advance of the hearing for some time and after our discussion today of the planned nrc response, we will need a formal set of answers tomorrow. We also need any summaries of the conditions in japan, modeling of impacts and as well as the document referred to in the nyt story--if you have any updates of that, that should be provided in addition. We will need that today. Appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 08:08 PM  
To: 'Powell, Amy' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
Cc: Batkin, Joshua <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>  
Subject: RE: NYT request

We are specifically asking for the kind of information contained in that document. We need an updated version, tomorrow if possible. Senator Boxer is the Chair of this Committee and is entitled to this information as you know. And she has asked for it. We formally ask that you provide that document and any update tomorrow. We greatly appreciate your assistance in this matter.

-----Original Message-----

From: Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 7:48 PM  
To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Cc: Batkin, Joshua  
Subject: NYT request

Hi Bettina -

Could we talk tomorrow during our call in prep for next week's hearing (still working with Paul on a time) about your request related to the NYT article? The article resulted from an unfortunate leak of dated information that we are trying as best we can to contain so as not to jeopardize our working relationship with our Japanese colleagues. We'd be glad to talk with you on the call to further explain.

Thanks - look forward to talking with you tomorrow.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 7:35 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: FROM ANS

I don't know if we need the fatalities part, but the sentence starting with "Given..." may be all we need.

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 7:33 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FROM ANS

There have been no prompt fatalities as a result of radiation exposure from Fukushima Daiichi. Prompt evacuation has minimized radiation exposure to the public, so long-term public health consequences from radiation exposure are expected to be small. Given the small number of MOX fuel assemblies at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 at the time of the event, coupled with the short time of irradiation of the MOX fuel, it can be concluded that MOX fuel has had and will have no perceptible impact on any consequences from the event.

It is also important to put the public health consequences from the event in perspective. There have been no prompt fatalities as a result of radiation exposure. Moreover, prompt evacuation has minimized the exposure of the population to radiation. At this point, the consequences of the event are expected to be small. MOX fuel effects, if any, would be a small change to an already small number.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 7:55 AM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Bettina

**Importance:** High

In addition to her other response, she is pushing for a morning call... Our only real shot at having a good draft to discuss is in the afternoon...

-----Original Message-----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW) [mailto:Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov]

Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 7:33 AM

To: Powell, Amy

Cc: Ordal, Paul (EPW)

Subject: What time can we confirm a call today to go over the nrc answers to senator boxer's question? The morning would be best. Thanks



---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 8:13 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: NYT request

Sure. I think it can safely be Chairman's corr.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Thu Apr 07 08:09:18 2011  
Subject: RE: NYT request

I probably just fanned the fire by telling Paul 1pm... but that was in the range offered. Do you have 5 minutes after the 830 meeting to talk about the letter? COB, given that it is Commission corr, is near impossible (and I never say impossible)

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 8:07 AM  
To: Powell, Amy  
Subject: Re: NYT request

You know you're a good regulator when everyone's mad at you??

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Thu Apr 07 07:53:16 2011  
Subject: RE: NYT request

But did you see the response?!?

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 8:30 PM  
To: Powell, Amy  
Subject: Re: NYT request

Good. Thanks

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy  
To: 'Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov' <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
Cc: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 19:47:30 2011  
Subject: NYT request

Hi Bettina -

Could we talk tomorrow during our call in prep for next week's hearing (still working with Paul on a time) about your request related to the NYT article? The article resulted from an unfortunate leak of dated information that we are trying as best we can to contain so as not to jeopardize our working relationship with our Japanese colleagues. We'd be glad to talk with you on the call to further explain.

Thanks - look forward to talking with you tomorrow.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 11:12 AM  
**To:** Spencer, Peter  
**Subject:** RE: Briefing on SOARCA

No you didn't miss anything. On March 18<sup>th</sup> we did the original briefing in the Ford building on Japan and the reactor info. After that briefing, Jeff had followup questions. Brian then answered them on March 25 in a phone briefing. The topic was SOARCA.

---

**From:** Spencer, Peter [mailto:Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 10:59 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Briefing on SOARCA

Thanks Becky. I didn't even remember it until I went back to my notes. That wasn't the central purpose of the briefing to my recollection. Did I miss something? When Minority invited you, did they ask that Sheron come prepared to discuss SOARCA?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 9:21 AM  
**To:** Spencer, Peter  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Briefing on SOARCA

Peter,

I just found my notes and yes it was. Towards the end, Brian started talking about SOARCA and Peach Bottom. Becky

---

**From:** Spencer, Peter [mailto:Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 4:23 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Briefing on SOARCA

Amy, as discussed, here's the Minority memo.

Becky, my notes from the 3/18/11 briefing by Brian Sheron on the Japan incident, in which I participated with Minority staff, indicate Sheron talked about risk assessment results at Peach Bottom at the end of the briefing. Was this the briefing referred to in the Memo?

Peter L. Spencer  
Majority Professional Staff  
Oversight and Investigations  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
U.S. House of Representatives  
(202) 225-2927  
[peter.spencer@mail.house.gov](mailto:peter.spencer@mail.house.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 11:20 AM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Background on GBJ's testimony  
**Attachments:** Jaczko Invite.pdf; Final - Written Testimony for SAC Energy and Water 3 30 11.docx

FYI, this is what we approached the Chairman's office with toward testimony. David Montes (his speechwriter) and I talked yesterday; he did not seem to think this would take long or be an issue. We need to get a draft from them that is ready to go up to the Commission for review/comment... and still get it to the Committee on Monday. Another rush job.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:19 AM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Montes, David; Bradford, Anna  
**Subject:** Proposed approach for written testimony for April 12th EPW hearing

Josh, Becky and I had a brief conversation about this yesterday, so this is in part follow-up. With the Chairman scheduled to testify before the Senate EPW Committee on Tuesday (April 12<sup>th</sup>), we again need to prepare written testimony ASAP for Commission review and delivery ahead to the Committee. We think a refresh/updated version of his 3/30 written testimony to Senate Approps plus elements of his CNS speech (international engagement) would work for this upcoming hearing. Susan, is this something that you or David have time to work on? Happy to help in any way – the 3/30 Senate Approps testimony as well as the invitation from Senate EPW are attached for reference.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** NEIGA@nei.org  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:12 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** New earthquake/tsunami in Japan



A 7.1 magnitude earthquake as hit the Mayagi Prefecture of Japan, near the Onagawa nuclear power station. The 3 reactors at the Onagawa plant were safely shut down after the March 11 and it still has electricity to power cooling systems for the reactors. Workers at the Fukushima Daiichi plant were evacuated as a safety precaution. There is no report of additional damage at the Fukushima sites.

A tsunami of about 3 feet in height is expected to hit the area, well below the design standard for the Onagawa plant.

More information to come.

Nuclear Energy Institute  
1776 I Street NW, Suite 400  
Washington, DC 20006  
[www.nei.org](http://www.nei.org)  
P: 202-739-8000  
F: 202-785-4019  
Emergency Off-Hours: 703-644-8805

E: [NEIResponseCenter@nei.org](mailto:NEIResponseCenter@nei.org)  
Twitter: <http://twitter.com/neiupdates>

Click [here](#) to unsubscribe



---

**From:** Zach, Andy <Andy.Zach@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Hammond, Tom; Byers, Dan  
**Subject:** RE: SER Volume 3

Amy,

Per our discussion on Tuesday, can we expect a response from Chairman Jaczko today or tomorrow? We appreciate the update. Thanks, Andy

---

**From:** Hammond, Tom  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 6:28 PM  
**To:** 'Amy.powell@nrc.gov'  
**Cc:** Zach, Andy  
**Subject:** SER Volume 3

Amy:

I understand that the Government Reform Committee received an unredacted copy of Volume 3 of the SER. Is this correct? The Science, Space, and Technology Committee requested that very document weeks ago, and NRC still has not delivered it.

If NRC has provided a copy of Volume 3 of the SER, why hasn't the NRC provided that to the Science, Space, and Technology Committee when 1) it has it available, and 2) it is cleared for delivery to Congress?

There are also a number of outstanding requests that the Committee has with NRC (detailed in the previous letters). When can we expect a response to those requests?

I'd like to update the Chairman on the status of these requests and give him an understanding as to why NRC is selectively providing documents.

Thanks.

Tom

*Tom Hammond  
Staff Director  
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight  
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology  
U.S. House of Representatives  
B374 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
(p) 202-225-6371  
(f) 202-226-0113*

---

**From:** Nouri, Ali (Webb) <Ali\_Nouri@webb.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:35 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy.  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Re: Questions re 50 mile radius decision

Thanks Amy, appreciate you putting us in touch!

Dear Raeann,

We would very much appreciate the NRC taking a look at the below questions. After we have those answers we would very much like to set up a phone or in-person briefing to follow up.

Best,

Ali

On Apr 7, 2011, at 10:25 AM, Powell, Amy wrote:

Hi Ali –

Yes, it has been extremely busy as you might expect. I've cc'ed Raeann Shane in our office on your questions; she will follow up with you. As to #8, we'd be happy to set up a briefing with someone from the NRC's protective measures team that works on these issues.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Nouri, Ali (Webb) [mailto:Ali\_Nouri@webb.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 9:50 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Questions re 50 mile radius decision

Dear Amy-

Hope all is well. You must be pretty busy with everything that's going on in Japan! Sorry to say I have a little something that might add to your workload. We're trying to get some clarity into the NRC decision to expand the U.S. suggested evacuation zone to 50 miles. I'm pasting a set of questions in the body of this email regarding the various assumptions and variables that went into the modeling of that final decision. If you could send this and put me in touch with the appropriate folks we'd very much appreciate it. Thanks, Ali

On March 16, 2011, the NRC released maximum dose estimates for hypothetical one reactor and four-reactor accidents out to a radius of 50 miles, "NRC PROVIDES PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON U.S. GUIDELINES," <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-050.pdf>.

However, the basis for these estimates was not provided.

Our office requests the following information:

- 1) The assumed magnitudes of the total releases in Curies to the atmosphere of the radioisotopes dominating the inhalation, cloudshine, and 4-day groundshine effective whole body doses and the thyroid inhalation doses.
- 2) The meaning of the acronym EDE (effective dose equivalent?)
- 3) The assumed duration of the releases.
- 4) The assumed windspeed and deposition velocities.
- 5) Any assumption concerning wind wander.
- 6) The height of the assumed release including any height increase of the mid-line of the plume due to heat buoyancy effects.
- 7) The dose conversion factor that the NRC uses for Iodine-131 for converting exposure to airborne I-131 measured in Ci-seconds/m<sup>3</sup> exposure to thyroid doses in rem for adults and children of different ages.
- 8) A contact e-mail address and phone number for a person involved in making these calculations for any technical followup questions concerning the NRC calculations.

We would appreciate it if you would give this your prompt attention.

Ali Nouri, PhD  
Office of U.S. Senator Jim Webb  
202-224-4024

Ali Nouri  
Legislative Assistant  
Office of U.S. Senator Jim Webb  
202-224-4024



---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:50 PM  
**To:** Decker, David; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: New earthquake

Is this public?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:36 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** New earthquake

Word here in ops ctr is that there is no new damage from earthquake of 7.1. Also, no changes in water levels anywhere at the site. This is the biggest earthquake/aftershock since last month. Info we have is from tepco and their camera analysis. Workers believed to have evacuated as a tsunami precaution. Tsunami predictions are that it will be small, and may have passed already. White house asking is workers have sent back inside. White House Press briefing upcoming and this may come up.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:53 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Fw: New earthquake

Info in question re: "is it public"?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Decker, David  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
Sent: Thu Apr 07 12:35:57 2011  
Subject: New earthquake

Word here in ops ctr is that there is no new damage from earthquake of 7.1. Also, no changes in water levels anywhere at the site. This is the biggest earthquake/aftershock since last month. Info we have is from tepco and their camera analysis. Workers believed to have evacuated as a tsunami precaution. Tsunami predictions are that it will be small, and may have passed already. White house asking is workers have sent back inside. White House Press briefing upcoming and this may come up.

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 1:16 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Subject:** RE: New earthquake

Thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Decker, David  
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 1:15 PM  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; OCA Distribution  
Subject: RE: New earthquake

Here's some info from the Ops Center:

- 1) Apparently, the earlier tsunami warning in Japan has been lifted.
- 2) I'm hearing reports of an unnamed "another" plant in Japan that has lost off-site power and is operating on emergency diesel generators. No additional info on that yet.
- 3) Becky's Question Input - Back on 3/11/11 the decision to go into "Monitoring Response Mode" due to the earthquake/tsunami in Japan was made at 9:46am, and Commissioners (among other senior mgmt and "need-to-know'ers") were notified via e-mail at 10:08am.

David

-----Original Message-----

From: Decker, David  
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:36 PM  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
Subject: New earthquake

Word here in ops ctr is that there is no new damage from earthquake of 7.1. Also, no changes in water levels anywhere at the site. This is the biggest earthquake/aftershock since last month. Info we have is from tepco and their camera analysis. Workers believed to have evacuated as a tsunami precaution. Tsunami predictions are that it will be small, and may have passed already. White house asking is workers have sent back inside. White House Press briefing upcoming and this may come up.

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 1:47 PM  
**To:** OCA Distribution  
**Subject:** FW: URGENT:NISA Press Release issued at 23:50, Thursday, 0:35 and 1:00, Friday

This just in -- below is the is latest we have here at the Ops Center. This is a summary of recent NISA press releases from NRC staff in Japan (at 1:45am!). Hard to sleep through a 7.1 earthquake, I guess!

---

**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 1:44 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Subject:** FW: URGENT:NISA Press Release issued at 23:50, Thursday, 0:35 and 1:00, Friday

---

**From:** LIA02 Hoc  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 1:37 PM  
**To:** LIA08 Hoc; ET07 Hoc; LIA06 Hoc; RST01 Hoc; Hoc, PMT12; PMT02 Hoc  
**Subject:** FW: URGENT:NISA Press Release issued at 23:50, Thursday, 0:35 and 1:00, Friday

---

**From:** Emche, Danielle  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 1:21 PM  
**To:** LIA02 Hoc  
**Subject:** Fw: URGENT:NISA Press Release issued at 23:50, Thursday, 0:35 and 1:00, Friday

Summary of power to nuclear facilities  
Danielle  
Sent from an NRC BlackBerry.

---

**From:** PROTOCOLOFFICE-EM <protocoloffice-em@mofa.go.jp>  
**To:** PROTOCOLOFFICE-EM <protocoloffice-em@mofa.go.jp>  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 07 13:05:35 2011  
**Subject:** URGENT:NISA Press Release issued at 23:50, Thursday, 0:35 and 1:00, Friday

**URGENT**  
**(1:45) Friday, 8 April 2011**

To All Missions (Embassies, Consular posts and International Organizations in Japan)

According to the NISA press release issued at 23:50, 0:35 and 1:00:

- The spent fuel reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura, Aomori Prefecture is in test operation and the uranium enrichment plant is NOT IN OPERATION. The Higashi-dori (Aomori Prefecture), Onagawa (Miyagi Prefecture), Fukushima Dai-ichi and Fukushima Dai-ni nuclear power plants

are NOT IN OPERATION after the Tohoku-Pacific earthquake of March 11. Tokai Dai-ni nuclear power plant (Ibaraki Prefecture) is NOT IN OPERATION.

- The spent fuel reprocessing plant and the uranium enrichment plant at Rokkasho-mura keep power supply by the emergency diesel generator as the power supply from outside has been cut after the earthquake.
- The Higashi-dori nuclear power plant keeps power supply by the emergency diesel generator as the power supply from outside has been cut after the earthquake, and the cooling of the spent fuel rods continues. There is no fuel rod in the core of the plant.
- The Onagawa nuclear power plant keeps power supply from outside though two power lines out of the three have been cut. There is no significant change in the readings of the monitoring posts. The cooling of the spent fuel rods continues.
- There is no significant change in the readings of the monitoring posts of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Water injection into the reactor continues.
- There is no significant change of the parameters of the Fukushima Dai-ni nuclear power plant.
- There is no trouble seen with the Tokai Dai-ni nuclear power plant.

Contact: International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division, Tel 03-5501-8227

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 2:21 PM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan; Montes, David; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Bradford, Anna; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Re: Proposed approach for written testimony for April 12th EPW hearing

Oral needs to be less than 5 minutes

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Montes, David; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Bradford, Anna; Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 07 14:19:14 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Proposed approach for written testimony for April 12th EPW hearing

Amy:  
How long do you want the testimony to be? (Oral)

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director  
Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 10:57 AM  
**To:** Montes, David; Loyd, Susan; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Bradford, Anna; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** RE: Proposed approach for written testimony for April 12th EPW hearing

FYI, Gene Dacus (cc'ed here) will be OCA's lead for this hearing.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Montes, David  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 5:18 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Loyd, Susan; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Bradford, Anna  
**Subject:** RE: Proposed approach for written testimony for April 12th EPW hearing

Susan or I make the necessary changes to the 3/30 Senate Approps testimony as early as possible tomorrow, and shoot it around to you all.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:19 AM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Montes, David; Bradford, Anna  
**Subject:** Proposed approach for written testimony for April 12th EPW hearing

Josh, Becky and I had a brief conversation about this yesterday, so this is in part follow-up. With the Chairman scheduled to testify before the Senate EPW Committee on Tuesday (April 12<sup>th</sup>), we again need to prepare written testimony ASAP for Commission review and delivery ahead to the Committee. We think a refresh/updated version of his 3/30 written testimony to Senate Approps plus elements of his CNS speech (international engagement) would work for this upcoming hearing. Susan, is this something that you or David have time to work on? Happy to help in any way – the 3/30 Senate Approps testimony as well as the invitation from Senate EPW are attached for reference.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 2:23 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRR Price-Anderson meeting

Becky: Ira Dinitz from NRR called about getting an OCA rep to attend an NRR internal informational seminar on Price-Anderson after the events in Japan. The meeting is to be held on April 26 from 1:00-3:00 in T-10-A-01. The meeting is mainly NRR talking about Price-Anderson, but they want an OPA rep and an OCA rep to talk about interactions with our constituencies post Fukushima on issues such as whether we have received any questions about nuclear liability, who pays and whether we are aware of any proposals to change the liability limits, etc.. Ira would like the name of the OCA rep so they can put it in the information announcing the meeting. Who should do this for OCA? Thanks, Spiros



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 3:23 PM  
**To:** Cianci, Sandra  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin; Belmore, Nancy  
**Subject:** Re: Available for phone briefing tomorrow at 3pm?

Great - thanks. Nancy will set up the bridgeline. I expect 4 staffers on the call with us. Marty, I will follow up with more details.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Cianci, Sandra  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin; Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 07 15:20:40 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Available for phone briefing tomorrow at 3pm?

His office, Thank you.

***Sandy Cianci***

*Administrative Assistant to Marty Virgilio, DEDR  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations  
O-17 H13  
301-415-1714  
[sandra.cianci@nrc.gov](mailto:sandra.cianci@nrc.gov)*

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 3:20 PM  
**To:** Cianci, Sandra  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin; Belmore, Nancy  
**Subject:** Re: Available for phone briefing tomorrow at 3pm?

That's great - thanks! We'll have a bridgeline set up for the Congressional staffers to call in, so I can join Marty wherever he would like to have the call (his office? Ops Ctr if he is on tomorrow).

Thanks,

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Cianci, Sandra  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 07 15:16:28 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Available for phone briefing tomorrow at 3pm?

Amy,

Marty is available at 3pm tomorrow. Where will the call take place?

Thanks

***Sandy Cianci***

*Administrative Assistant to Marty Virgilio, DEDR  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations  
O-17 H13  
301-415-1714  
[sandra.cianci@nrc.gov](mailto:sandra.cianci@nrc.gov)*

---

**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 3:13 PM  
**To:** Cianci, Sandra  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Available for phone briefing tomorrow at 3pm?

Sandy

Please work with Amy to fit this into my schedule. They may be negotiable wrt time, but I don't know that to be the case.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:50 PM  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Muessle, Mary; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Available for phone briefing tomorrow at 3pm?

Hi Marty –

Staff to the Senate EPW Committee would like to do a phone briefing with an update on events in Japan **tomorrow at 3pm**. This is, in part, advance work for Tuesday's hearing with Chairman Jaczko. Are you available?

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 3:59 PM  
**To:** Baggett, Steven  
**Subject:** RE: good afternoon can we get a copy of the final Marty's testimony for yesterday's hearing? Thanks EOM  
**Attachments:** Testimony\_April6\_2011\_FINAL.docx

A hard copy was delivered to your office, but attached is the electronic.

Amy

---

**From:** Baggett, Steven  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 3:49 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** good afternoon can we get a copy of the final Marty's testimony for yesterday's hearing? Thanks EOM

**TESTIMONY OF MARTIN VIRGILIO  
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**APRIL 6, 2011**

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is deeply saddened by the tragedy in Japan. I and many of my colleagues on the NRC staff have had many years of very close and personal interaction with our regulatory counterparts and we would like to extend our condolences to them and to the Japanese people.

**Introduction**

The NRC is mindful that our primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety of the American people. We have been very closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing available information. Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing oversight, allows us to say with confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. There has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S. licensees as a result of the substantial effort we are making to assist Japan.

We have a long history of conservative regulatory decision-making. We have been using risk insights to help inform our regulatory process, and, over more than 35 years of civilian nuclear power in this country, we continually make improvements to our regulatory framework as we learn from operating experience.

Notwithstanding the very high level of support being provided to respond to events in Japan, we continue to maintain our focus on our domestic responsibilities.

I'd like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and continuing response, including our recommendation for U.S. Citizens in Japan to evacuate out to 50 miles from the Fukushima-Daiichi site. I then will discuss the reasons for our confidence in the safety of the U. S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward that we will take to ensure we learn any lessons we need to from events in Japan. Finally, I will give you an overview of NRC incident response capabilities here in the U.S.

### **The NRC's immediate and Continuing Response to Events in Japan**

On Friday, March 11<sup>th</sup>, an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the shutdown of more than 10 reactors. From what we know now, it appears possible that the reactors' response to the earthquake went according to design. The ensuing tsunami, however, appears to have caused the loss of normal and emergency AC power to the six units at the Fukushima Daiichi site; it is those six units that have received the majority of our attention since that time. Units One, Two, and Three at the site were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four, Five, and Six were in previously scheduled outages.

Shortly after 4:00 AM EDT on Friday, March 11th, the NRC Emergency Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the earthquake and the potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into the monitoring mode at the Emergency Operations Center and the first concern for the NRC was possible impacts of the tsunami on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. Territories in the Pacific.

On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese regulatory counterparts

and dispatched two experts to help at the U.S. Embassy in Japan. By Monday, we had dispatched a total of 11 staff to Japan. We have subsequently rotated in replacement staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The areas of focus for this team are: 1) to assist the Japanese government with technical support as part of the USAID response; and 2) to support the U.S. Ambassador. The NRC's Chairman, Dr. Gregory Jaczko, traveled to Tokyo on March 28<sup>th</sup> to convey directly to his Japanese counterparts a message of support and cooperation, and to discuss the situation. While our focus now is on helping Japan in any way that we can, the experience will also help us assess the potential implications for U.S. citizens and the U.S. reactor fleet in as timely a manner as possible.

We have had ongoing interaction with the White House, Congressional staff, our state regulatory counterparts, a number of other federal agencies, and international regulatory bodies around the world. We recently sent an NRC staff member to Hawaii to support the United States Armed Forces Pacific Command (USPACOM).

The NRC response in Japan and our Emergency Operations Center continue with the dedicated efforts of NRC staff working in teams on a rotating basis around-the-clock. The entire agency is coordinating and pulling together in response to this event so that we can provide assistance to Japan while continuing the activities necessary to fulfill our domestic responsibilities.

The 50 mile evacuation recommendation that the NRC made to the U.S. Ambassador in Japan was made in the interest of protecting the health and safety of U.S. citizens in Japan. We based our assessment on the conditions as we understood them at the time. Since communications with knowledgeable Japanese officials were limited and there was a large degree of uncertainty about plant conditions at the time, it was difficult to accurately assess the

potential radiological hazard. In order to determine the proper evacuation distance, the NRC staff performed a series of calculations using NRC's RASCAL computer code to assess possible offsite consequences. The computer models used meteorological model data appropriate for the Fukushima Daiichi vicinity. Source terms were based on hypothetical, but not unreasonable, estimates of fuel damage, containment, and other release conditions. These calculations demonstrated that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines could be exceeded at a distance of up to 50 miles from the Fukushima site, if a large-scale release occurred from the reactors or spent fuel pools. The U.S. emergency preparedness framework provides for the expansion of emergency planning zones as conditions require. Acting in accordance with this framework, and with the best information available at the time, the NRC determined that evacuation out to 50 miles for U.S. citizens was a prudent course of action, and would be consistent with what we would do under similar circumstances in the United States, and we made that recommendation to the Ambassador and other U.S. Government agencies.

Let me note here in concluding this section of my remarks that the U.S. government has an extensive network of radiation monitors across this country. Monitoring equipment at nuclear power plants and in the EPA's system has identified trace amounts of radioactive isotopes consistent with the Japanese nuclear incident, but still far below levels of public health concern. We feel confident, based on current data, that there is no reason for concern in the United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan.

#### **Continuing Confidence in the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants**

I will now turn to the factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor safety. We



have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not rely on any single layer for protection of public health and safety. We begin with designs for every individual reactor in this country that take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for any natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site.

There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario.

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including, most significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures for licensees, and made substantive improvements in NRC's incident response capabilities. We also addressed many human factors issues regarding control room indicators and layouts, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves.

Two significant changes after Three Mile Island were the expansion of the Resident Inspector Program and the incident response program. Today, there are at least two

Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. The inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities, and serve as NRC's eyes and ears at the power plant. The NRC headquarters operations center and regional incident response centers are prepared to respond to all emergencies, including any resulting from operational events, security events, or natural phenomena. Multidisciplinary teams in these centers have access to detailed information regarding licensee facilities, and access to plant status information through telephonic links with the Resident Inspectors, an automated emergency response data system, and directly from the licensee over the emergency notification system. NRC's response would include the dispatch of a site team to augment the Resident Inspectors on site, and integration with the licensee's emergency response organization at their Emergency Offsite Facility. The program is designed to provide independent assessment of events, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the events, and to ensure that State officials have the information they would need to make decisions regarding protective actions.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a plant, we want licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe situation.

Our program of continuous improvement based on operating experience will include evaluation of the significant events in Japan as well as what we can learn from them. We already have begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the Resident Inspectors and the region-based inspectors in our four

Regional offices, to look at licensees' readiness to deal with both the design basis accidents and the beyond-design basis accidents. The information that we gather will be used for additional evaluation of the industry's readiness for similar events, and will aid in our understanding of whether additional regulatory actions need to be taken in the immediate term.

NRC has also issued an information notice to the licensees to make them aware of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities we believe they should be engaged in to verify their readiness. In response to the events licensees have voluntarily verified their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and operational. Licensees are verifying the capability to mitigate a total loss of electric power to the nuclear plant. They also are verifying the capability to mitigate problems associated with flooding and the resulting impact on systems both inside and outside of the plant. Also, licensees are confirming that any necessary mitigating equipment is in place to compensate for the potential loss of equipment due to seismic events appropriate for the site, because each site has its own unique seismic profiles.

Subsequent to the 1979 event at Three Mile Island, there have been a number of new regulatory requirements imposed by the NRC that have enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness against some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. The "station blackout" rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the core.

The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable

under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see under a beyond-design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s, which has required installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

The final factor I want to mention with regard to our belief in the ongoing safety of the U.S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and planning requirements in place that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis.

### **The Path Ahead**

Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from the events in Japan, the Chairman, with the full support of the Commission, directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our regulatory processes to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives.

For the near term effort, we are beginning a 90-day review. This review will evaluate all of the available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include: the ability to protect

against natural disasters; response to station blackouts; severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression; radiological consequence analysis; and severe accident management issues. Over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or additional regulations are needed.

This 90-day effort will include a briefing to the Commission after approximately 30 days to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the condition of the U.S. fleet based on information we have available at that time. This briefing will also ensure that the Commission is both kept informed of ongoing efforts and prepared to resolve any policy recommendations that surface. I believe we will have limited stakeholder involvement in the first 30 days to accomplish this. However, over the 90-day and longer-term efforts we will seek additional stakeholder input. At the end of the 90-day period, a report will be provided to the Commission and to the public. The task force's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan.

The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available in accordance with normal Commission processes.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. In light of the events in Japan, there is a near-term evaluation of their relevance to the U.S. fleet underway, and we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the U.S. fleet.

**From:** nuclearcurrents@nei.org  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 4:00 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Japan Rocked by Another Earthquake -- No Effect on Safety at Nuclear Facilities: Nuclear Currents



**Thursday, April 7, 2011**

### **Special Section: Japanese Nuclear Incident**

"Another powerful off shore earthquake has hit Japan's northeast. Diesel generators have replaced grid power at Higashidori nuclear power plant and the Rokkasho reprocessing plant but there has been no effect on safety at Fukushima Daiichi."

[New earthquake disrupts grid power](#)

*World Nuclear News, April 7*

*We encourage you to visit NEI's special Web page – [Information on the Japanese Earthquake and Reactors in the Region](#) – for all the latest updates on the Fukushima nuclear facilities.*

### **What's Being Said**

"Nuclear energy is a safe, reliable, carbon-free, source of base load electricity. Currently, there are 104 nuclear power reactors operating in the United States providing 20 percent of its electricity. Nuclear energy is the only form of base load power that does not burn hydrocarbons. New nuclear power generation will be needed to help meet future environmental goals, as well as future electricity demands and the need to modernize our nation's electric generating fleet. New nuclear plants are also an engine for job creation and economic growth."

[Point: Nuclear Power is Our Best Energy Solution for a Better Tomorrow](#)

*Splashlife, March 30*

"General Electric Co Chief Executive Jeffrey Immelt defended the nuclear industry's safety record on Monday during a trip to Tokyo to show support to the operator of a stricken nuclear plant using reactors designed by the U.S. conglomerate."

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All the research information and news you need, just a click away:

[www.nei.org/112thcongress](http://www.nei.org/112thcongress)

### **On Twitter**

State, energy officials: Oyster Creek better equipped than Japanese plant to withstand disaster <http://bit.ly/h2jSMq>

[Follow Us on Twitter](#)

### **On NEI's Blog**

Three unmanned helicopters are set to be shipped to Japan from France shortly so that Japanese authorities can use them to monitor the unfolding crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant,

GE's Immelt defends nuclear industry safety record

*Reuters, April 4*

"The accident at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station is still far from resolved. A major public health disaster seems to have been avoided, and the long-term impact on health and safety will be dwarfed by the devastating loss of life caused directly by the huge Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. But the nuclear crisis has badly scared people around the world. Predictably, longtime antinuclear activists are calling for an end to any further nuclear development."

Why Fukushima Won't Kill Nuclear Power

*The Wall Street Journal, April 6*

"Over the last fortnight I've made a deeply troubling discovery. The anti-nuclear movement to which I once belonged has misled the world about the impacts of radiation on human health. The claims we have made are ungrounded in science, unsupportable when challenged, and wildly wrong. We have done other people, and ourselves, a terrible disservice."

The unpalatable truth is that the anti-nuclear lobby has misled us all

*The Guardian, April 5*

## **In the Nation**

"The effects of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant grow by the week, creating a lengthening catalogue of worries and proving once again that nuclear power frightens people as few other technologies do. But when the dead and sickened are added up, how dangerous is it really?"

Nuclear power is safest way to make electricity, according to study

*The Washington Post, April 2*

"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined that keeping the second-largest U.S. nuclear-power generating facility, located in southern New Jersey, open for an additional 20 years wouldn't pose an environmental risk."

NRC: No Environmental Risks From Extending PSEG's NJ Nuclear Operations

*Dow Jones Newswire, April 1*

## **At the NRC**

"Regulators are stepping up inspections at three U.S. nuclear reactors in Nebraska, South Carolina and Kansas after finding the facilities had multiple problems that could affect safety. The reactors are still considered safe, Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Scott Burnell said. But each was ranked level three on a scale in which level one is good and level five prompts the NRC to shut down an operation. There are 104 reactors in the U.S. and all the other units are rated in the first two levels."

Inspection Amped Up At Nuclear Facilities

*The Wall Street Journal, April 1*

"At a hearing Thursday on Capitol Hill, Rep. Nita Lowey, D-N.Y., asked Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Gregory Jaczko whether his agency's plan to evacuate people within 10 miles of a U.S. nuclear plant accident was sufficient. Jaczko said NRC's emergency preparedness is 'built on two thresholds.' One is a 'preplanned' evacuation of those living within 10 miles of a plant. The second threshold is 50 miles from a plant. Within that zone, he said, the plan would be to ensure that contaminated food supplies could be dealt with."

the developer of the drones said  
Wednesday.

[Read more...](#)



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NEI is a founding reporter of  
The Climate Registry, voluntarily  
measuring and publicly reporting our  
greenhouse gas emissions each year.



Nuclear crisis puts evacuation zones under scrutiny

*The Associated Press, April 1*

## **Across the Waters**

"Japan has asked nuclear superpower Russia to send a special radiation treatment ship used to decommission nuclear submarines as it fights to contain the world's worst atomic crisis since Chernobyl, Japanese media said late on Monday."

Japan seeks Russian help to end nuclear crisis

*Reuters, April 4*

"The nuclear events in Japan have prompted European decision-makers to take decisions to ensure such an accident never happens in Europe. On 15 March during an extraordinary meeting on the impact of the Japanese accident organised by the European Commission (EC), Energy Ministers, regulators, experts and industry representatives agreed on the introduction of risk and safety assessments (so-called 'stress tests') at nuclear power plants in Europe."

Japanese nuclear accident triggers political debate in Europe

*ForAtom, March 16*

## **Nuclear Education**

"Three weeks after a massive earthquake and tsunami crippled four nuclear reactors in Japan, Americans are displaying only a slight shift in their opinions on nuclear power, a new Harris Interactive/HealthDay poll shows. The U.S. public is almost equally divided on whether or not more nuclear power plants should be built on American soil, with 41 percent supporting the idea and 39 percent opposed. This represents only a slight change from three years ago, when 49 percent supported nuclear plants and 32 percent opposed them, according to a new Harris Interactive/HealthDay poll released today."

Recent Crisis in Japan Has Had Little Impact on Americans' Views on Nuclear Power: Poll

*Harris Interactive, March 31*

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Your questions, comments, suggestions or any additions to the mailing list are welcome. We can be reached at [NuclearCurrents@nei.org](mailto:NuclearCurrents@nei.org). We look forward to hearing from you.

For more information, visit [www.nei.org](http://www.nei.org).

Nikolaus W. Schoenherr  
Legislative Coordinator

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 4:04 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FW: Earthquake info

Roger –

Here is what OCA provided to Sen. Boxer's staff that could be used for Q1 on the Boxer/Carper letter.

Although we often think of the US as having "active " and non-active" earthquake zones, earthquakes can actually happen almost anywhere. Seismologists typically separate the US into low, moderate and high seismicity zones. The NRC requires that every nuclear plant be designed for site specific ground motions that are appropriate for their locations. In addition, the NRC has specified a minimum ground motion level to which nuclear plants must be designed. The designation of type of zone is open to interpretation but a conservative interpretation – meaning a larger zone—would include the following preliminary estimates:

High Seismicity—Diablo Canyon, SONGS

Moderate Seismicity – Brunswick, Robinson, Summer, Vogtle, Hatch, Clinton, Watts Bar, Sequoya, North Anna

In response to a follow-up question, we added that NRC staff's assessment that the rest fall into the low seismicity regions.

Amy

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:10 PM  
**To:** Haynes, Laura (Carper)  
**Subject:** Follow-ups from NRC

Hi Laura –

I think that I've worked through the "IOU's" from our call this morning:

### **Emergency powers to the Chairman**

Summary: Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 strengthened the executive and administrative roles of the NRC Chairman, particularly in emergencies, transferring to the Chairman "all the functions vested in the Commission pertaining to an emergency concerning a particular facility or materials ... regulated by the Commission." This Reorganization Plan also provided that all policy formulation, policy-related rulemaking, and orders and adjudications would remain vested with the full Commission.

Click here for the full text of this legislation: ([full-text version](#))

In transmitting this Reorganization Plan, President Carter stated:

"The [NRC's] ability to respond decisively and responsibly to any nuclear emergency must be fully ensured in advance. Experience has shown that the Commission as a whole cannot deal expeditiously with emergencies or communicate in a clear, unified voice to civil authorities or to the public. But present law prevents the Commission from delegating its emergency authority to any of its members. The Plan would correct this situation by specifically authorizing the Chairman to act for the Commission in an emergency."

Related to our current status in response to events in Japan:

Section 3 of the Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1980 provides the Chairman with substantial additional authority during an emergency. This does not require an "official designation of an emergency." The Commission and staff understand how this authority is executed. The Operations Center went into monitoring mode on March 11th at approximately 0946 in response to the possible impact on the West Coast plants due to potentially high waves. The Chairman has been exercising his emergency authority since that time. The agency will return to a non-emergency status when the situation warrants.

### **Commission vote: NRC actions following events in Japan (establish task force for review)**

Commission voting record: <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/comm-secy/2011/2011-0002comgbj-vtr.pdf>

Staff Requirements Memo (direction to staff resulting from vote): <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/comm-secy/2011/2011-0002comgbj-srm.pdf>

Press Release about and copy of charter for task force for review:  
<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1109/ML110910479.pdf>

### **Safety Culture**

I need to track a bit more down on this. Commission voted it, so there is a staff requirements memo from March 7, 2011, but I do not think that the staff has yet finalized the proposed policy statement for the Federal

Register yet. Here is the SRM: <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2011/2011-0005srm.pdf> and the paper that it amends (as I recall, the actual proposed policy statement is on p. 14): <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2011/2011-0005scy.pdf> I'll check FRN status.

**Emergency Planning briefing**

I understand from David that this may be coming together for Monday afternoon.

**Japan update, Qs**

We're set with Marty via phone bridge for 3pm (dial-in info went out earlier tonight to the 5 we discussed).

If I missed something, let me know.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:12 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Citation

Thanks.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:11 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: Citation

Absolutely. In transmitting the plan, President Carter said:

"The [NRC's] ability to respond decisively and responsibly to any nuclear emergency must be fully ensured in advance. Experience has shown that the Commission as a whole cannot deal expeditiously with emergencies or communicate in a clear, unified voice to civil authorities or to the public. But present law prevents the Commission from delegating its emergency authority to any of its members. The Plan would correct this situation by specifically authorizing the Chairman to act for the Commission in an emergency."

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) [mailto:Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:05 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Citation

Is it fair to say this expansion of the Chairman's authority was in response to what happened at Three Mile Island?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 5:39 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: Citation

Section 3 of the Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1980 provides the Chairman with substantial additional authority during an emergency. This does not require an "official designation of an emergency." The Commission and staff understand how this authority is executed. The Operations Center went into monitoring mode on March 11th at approximately 0946 in response to the possible impact on the West Coast plants due to potentially high waves. The Chairman has been exercising his emergency authority since that time. The agency will return to a non-emergency status when the situation warrants.

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) [mailto:Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 5:36 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Citation

Is the NRC still operating in a state of emergency?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 6:00 PM

**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Poirier, Bettina (EPW)

**Subject:** Citation

**Importance:** High

Per our chat:

Summary: Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 strengthened the executive and administrative roles of the NRC Chairman, particularly in emergencies, transferring to the Chairman "all the functions vested in the Commission pertaining to an emergency concerning a particular facility or materials ... regulated by the Commission." This Reorganization Plan also provided that all policy formulation, policy-related rulemaking, and orders and adjudications would remain vested with the full Commission.

Click here for the full text of this legislation: ([full-text version](#))

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:50 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** FW: Quick turnaround

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:21 PM  
To: Nieh, Ho; Bubar, Patrice; Sharkey, Jeffry; Sosa, Belkys; Rothschild, Trip; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Coggins, Angela; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
Subject: Quick turnaround

Head's up that Senator Boxer has asked (as of today) for a response to her letters about Japan by COB tomorrow in advance of Tuesday's hearing. OCA and EDO and OGC are doing yeoman's work to get them done tonight and we'd appreciate your expedited consideration tomorrow. Thanks Josh

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820



---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 6:59 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Senate EPW.docx  
**Attachments:** Senate EPW.docx

Draft of one-pager for murder-board Monday 2:00 pm

**SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS  
AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY  
JOINT HEARING  
"REVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY IN JAPAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S."**

**Tuesday, April 12, 2011**

**2:45 PM**

**406 Dirksen Senate Office Building**

Expected Attendance: See Face Chart

**Panels:**

Panel One:   **The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko**, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
                  **The Honorable Lisa Jackson**, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

Panel Two:   **The Honorable Sam Blakeslee**, State Senator, California's 15<sup>th</sup> District  
                  **Mr. James D. Boyd**, Vice Chair, California Energy Commission  
                  **Mr. Lewis D. Schiliro**, Cabinet Secretary, Delaware Department of Safety & Homeland Security  
                  **Mr. Curtis S. Sommerhoff**, Director, Miami-Dade County Department of Emergency Management  
                  **Mr. Charles G. Pardee**, Chief Operating Officer, Exelon Generation  
                  **Dr. Thomas B. Cochran**, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council

**Key Issues:**

Update on Japan  
Are U.S. plants safe?  
Differences in Mark One designs  
Design basis for earthquakes  
MSNBC report on seismic risks  
Dry casks vs. spent fuel pools  
Task Force plans – 30, 60, 90-days  
Reorganization Plan – declaration of emergency; invoking emergency authority  
Views on 50-mile EPZ at Indian Point  
KI distribution

**Logistics:**

Written testimony delivered to the committee  
Oral testimony should be 3-5 minutes  
Will be sworn in as witness  
Should be in ante room by 2:15 PM  
Who will accompany?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 7:06 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** B5b

In response to the second half of Boxer/Carper Q6: "If so, how would the NRC respond to such a disaster?" – the IN issued post-Japan has a passage about B5b that may be helpful to draw from  
<http://portal.nrc.gov/edo/nrr/NRR%20TA/FAQ%20Related%20to%20Events%20Occuring%20in%20Japan/ML110760432.pdf>

Could follow that quickly that the task force will consider/examine US plant readiness for disasters...

Still looking..

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 9:53 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Landau, Mindy; Turk, Sherwin; Rothschild, Trip  
**Subject:** RE: Boxer-Feinstein

Great work – thank you

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 5:58 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Landau, Mindy; Turk, Sherwin; Rothschild, Trip; Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Boxer-Feinstein  
**Importance:** High

Here's the version that has everything I can do to it!

Boxer-Carper is half(?) done.

---

**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 7:20 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Shane, Raeann; Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela; Reed, Timothy  
**Subject:** FW: Confirmation that TEPCO's position is that RPVs are "intact" (Task 4273)

FYI

---

**From:** RST06 Hoc  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:24 AM  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin; Brenner, Eliot; LIA06 Hoc; LIA08 Hoc; ET07 Hoc; ET01 Hoc  
**Subject:** Confirmation that TEPCO's position is that RPVs are "intact" (Task 4273)

We confirmed with the NRC site team in Japan that it is TEPCO's assessment that the RPVs are all "intact."

This completes RST action on Task Tracker 4273.

Fred Brown  
On-sift RST Director.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:17 AM  
**To:** Nieh, Ho  
**Subject:** Marty's testimony  
**Attachments:** Testimony\_April6\_2011\_FINAL.docx

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

**TESTIMONY OF MARTIN VIRILIO  
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**APRIL 6, 2011**

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is deeply saddened by the tragedy in Japan. I and many of my colleagues on the NRC staff have had many years of very close and personal interaction with our regulatory counterparts and we would like to extend our condolences to them and to the Japanese people.

**Introduction**

The NRC is mindful that our primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety of the American people. We have been very closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing available information. Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing oversight, allows us to say with confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. There has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S. licensees as a result of the substantial effort we are making to assist Japan.

We have a long history of conservative regulatory decision-making. We have been using risk insights to help inform our regulatory process, and, over more than 35 years of civilian nuclear power in this country, we continually make improvements to our regulatory framework as we learn from operating experience.

Notwithstanding the very high level of support being provided to respond to events in Japan, we continue to maintain our focus on our domestic responsibilities.

I'd like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and continuing response, including our recommendation for U.S. Citizens in Japan to evacuate out to 50 miles from the Fukushima-Daiichi site. I then will discuss the reasons for our confidence in the safety of the U. S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward that we will take to ensure we learn any lessons we need to from events in Japan. Finally, I will give you an overview of NRC incident response capabilities here in the U.S.

### **The NRC's immediate and Continuing Response to Events in Japan**

On Friday, March 11<sup>th</sup>, an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the shutdown of more than 10 reactors. From what we know now, it appears possible that the reactors' response to the earthquake went according to design. The ensuing tsunami, however, appears to have caused the loss of normal and emergency AC power to the six units at the Fukushima Daiichi site; it is those six units that have received the majority of our attention since that time. Units One, Two, and Three at the site were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four, Five, and Six were in previously scheduled outages.

Shortly after 4:00 AM EDT on Friday, March 11th, the NRC Emergency Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the earthquake and the potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into the monitoring mode at the Emergency Operations Center and the first concern for the NRC was possible impacts of the tsunami on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. Territories in the Pacific.

On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese regulatory counterparts



and dispatched two experts to help at the U.S. Embassy in Japan. By Monday, we had dispatched a total of 11 staff to Japan. We have subsequently rotated in replacement staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The areas of focus for this team are: 1) to assist the Japanese government with technical support as part of the USAID response; and 2) to support the U.S. Ambassador. The NRC's Chairman, Dr. Gregory Jaczko, traveled to Tokyo on March 28<sup>th</sup> to convey directly to his Japanese counterparts a message of support and cooperation, and to discuss the situation. While our focus now is on helping Japan in any way that we can, the experience will also help us assess the potential implications for U.S. citizens and the U.S. reactor fleet in as timely a manner as possible.

We have had ongoing interaction with the White House, Congressional staff, our state regulatory counterparts, a number of other federal agencies, and international regulatory bodies around the world. We recently sent an NRC staff member to Hawaii to support the United States Armed Forces Pacific Command (USPACOM).

The NRC response in Japan and our Emergency Operations Center continue with the dedicated efforts of NRC staff working in teams on a rotating basis around-the-clock. The entire agency is coordinating and pulling together in response to this event so that we can provide assistance to Japan while continuing the activities necessary to fulfill our domestic responsibilities.

The 50 mile evacuation recommendation that the NRC made to the U.S. Ambassador in Japan was made in the interest of protecting the health and safety of U.S. citizens in Japan. We based our assessment on the conditions as we understood them at the time. Since communications with knowledgeable Japanese officials were limited and there was a large degree of uncertainty about plant conditions at the time, it was difficult to accurately assess the

potential radiological hazard. In order to determine the proper evacuation distance, the NRC staff performed a series of calculations using NRC's RASCAL computer code to assess possible offsite consequences. The computer models used meteorological model data appropriate for the Fukushima Daiichi vicinity. Source terms were based on hypothetical, but not unreasonable, estimates of fuel damage, containment, and other release conditions. These calculations demonstrated that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines could be exceeded at a distance of up to 50 miles from the Fukushima site, if a large-scale release occurred from the reactors or spent fuel pools. The U.S. emergency preparedness framework provides for the expansion of emergency planning zones as conditions require. Acting in accordance with this framework, and with the best information available at the time, the NRC determined that evacuation out to 50 miles for U.S. citizens was a prudent course of action, and would be consistent with what we would do under similar circumstances in the United States, and we made that recommendation to the Ambassador and other U.S. Government agencies.

Let me note here in concluding this section of my remarks that the U.S. government has an extensive network of radiation monitors across this country. Monitoring equipment at nuclear power plants and in the EPA's system has identified trace amounts of radioactive isotopes consistent with the Japanese nuclear incident, but still far below levels of public health concern. We feel confident, based on current data, that there is no reason for concern in the United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan.

#### **Continuing Confidence in the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants**

I will now turn to the factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor safety. We

have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not rely on any single layer for protection of public health and safety. We begin with designs for every individual reactor in this country that take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for any natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site.

There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario.

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including, most significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures for licensees, and made substantive improvements in NRC's incident response capabilities. We also addressed many human factors issues regarding control room indicators and layouts, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves.

Two significant changes after Three Mile Island were the expansion of the Resident Inspector Program and the incident response program. Today, there are at least two

Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. The inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities, and serve as NRC's eyes and ears at the power plant. The NRC headquarters operations center and regional incident response centers are prepared to respond to all emergencies, including any resulting from operational events, security events, or natural phenomena. Multidisciplinary teams in these centers have access to detailed information regarding licensee facilities, and access to plant status information through telephonic links with the Resident Inspectors, an automated emergency response data system, and directly from the licensee over the emergency notification system. NRC's response would include the dispatch of a site team to augment the Resident Inspectors on site, and integration with the licensee's emergency response organization at their Emergency Offsite Facility. The program is designed to provide independent assessment of events, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the events, and to ensure that State officials have the information they would need to make decisions regarding protective actions.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a plant, we want licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe situation.

Our program of continuous improvement based on operating experience will include evaluation of the significant events in Japan as well as what we can learn from them. We already have begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the Resident Inspectors and the region-based inspectors in our four

Regional offices, to look at licensees' readiness to deal with both the design basis accidents and the beyond-design basis accidents. The information that we gather will be used for additional evaluation of the industry's readiness for similar events, and will aid in our understanding of whether additional regulatory actions need to be taken in the immediate term.

NRC has also issued an information notice to the licensees to make them aware of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities we believe they should be engaged in to verify their readiness. In response to the events licensees have voluntarily verified their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and operational. Licensees are verifying the capability to mitigate a total loss of electric power to the nuclear plant. They also are verifying the capability to mitigate problems associated with flooding and the resulting impact on systems both inside and outside of the plant. Also, licensees are confirming that any necessary mitigating equipment is in place to compensate for the potential loss of equipment due to seismic events appropriate for the site, because each site has its own unique seismic profiles.

Subsequent to the 1979 event at Three Mile Island, there have been a number of new regulatory requirements imposed by the NRC that have enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness against some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. The "station blackout" rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the core.

The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable

under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see under a beyond-design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s, which has required installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

The final factor I want to mention with regard to our belief in the ongoing safety of the U.S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and planning requirements in place that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis.

### **The Path Ahead**

Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from the events in Japan, the Chairman, with the full support of the Commission, directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our regulatory processes to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives.

For the near term effort, we are beginning a 90-day review. This review will evaluate all of the available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include: the ability to protect

against natural disasters; response to station blackouts; severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression; radiological consequence analysis; and severe accident management issues. Over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or additional regulations are needed.

This 90-day effort will include a briefing to the Commission after approximately 30 days to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the condition of the U.S. fleet based on information we have available at that time. This briefing will also ensure that the Commission is both kept informed of ongoing efforts and prepared to resolve any policy recommendations that surface. I believe we will have limited stakeholder involvement in the first 30 days to accomplish this. However, over the 90-day and longer-term efforts we will seek additional stakeholder input. At the end of the 90-day period, a report will be provided to the Commission and to the public. The task force's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan.

The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available in accordance with normal Commission processes.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. In light of the events in Japan, there is a near-term evaluation of their relevance to the U.S. fleet underway, and we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the U.S. fleet.



---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:27 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: thought

I think we should talk to OPA. This is a bigger question. Maybe Jeanette can set up a meeting on Monday between OCA and OPA

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 07:23:14 2011  
**Subject:** Re: thought

Markey staff exchange w Tim  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 07:19:12 2011  
**Subject:** Re: thought

What is the EJM exchange

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 07 19:24:55 2011  
**Subject:** thought

Given the continued and understandable uncertainty at the Japanese sites, would it make sense to not provide site-specific information beyond the daily status reports? Trying to find a workable path forward from the EJM exchange and its lingering aftermath.

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:36 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

Thanks

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 08:34:06 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

The answer would be next to no one, but there will be follow up.

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:33 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

Amy: not sure who's in today. Could you please have someone follow-up on Michal's question? Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 08:29:43 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

Thanks. Are you certain there is an instrumentation failure at unit 1?

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

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Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros [mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 06:06 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>; Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Shane, Raeann <Raeann.Shane@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>; Weil, Jenny <Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 9:01 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Question from Michal

Good morning –

Michal has a question based on the daily status report. Would you take a look at the report? There is a Commission TA call at 10am that might be a way to get more info and/or see if the status has changed since 4am.

Thanks,  
AP

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:33 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

Amy: not sure who's in today. Could you please have someone follow-up on Michal's question? Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 08:29:43 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

Thanks. Are you certain there is an instrumentation failure at unit 1?

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

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Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros [mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 06:06 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>; Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Shane, Raeann <Raeann.Shane@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>; Weil, Jenny <Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Daily Plant Status Report - 4/8/2011

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 9:02 AM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** Are you in today?

Lost track of your schedule - are you in today to field this? If so, would you also please give OPA a heads up that she is asking?

THANKS

-----Original Message-----

From: Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 8:39 AM  
To: Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
Cc: Fischhoff, Ilya  
Subject: Columbia Generating stn

Hi

Can you please send us everything you have on the incident yesterday?

Thanks  
Michal  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 9:58 AM  
**To:** Crockett, Steven; Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Coggins, Angela; Sharkey, Jeffry; Nieh, Ho; Sosa, Belkys  
**Subject:** RE: LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant #570200819#

Commissioner Magwood's office has no comments.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

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**From:** Crockett, Steven  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 2:05 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Coggins, Angela; Sharkey, Jeffry; Nieh, Ho; Sosa, Belkys; Bubar, Patrice  
**Subject:** FW: LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant #570200819#  
**Importance:** High

Attached, FYI, is one of OMB's quick-turnaround requests for comments on a legislative matter. There is no time for the usual "LR". It is likely that the NRC staff will have no comment.

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**From:** Fitter, E. Holly [mailto:E.\_Holly\_Fitter@omb.eop.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:21 PM  
**To:** Fonner, Susan; Rothschild, Trip; Vincent, Leslie; Crockett, Steven; Martin, Circe; Sanchez, Nicola; Hirsch, Patricia  
**Subject:** LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant #570200819#

**DEADLINE: 10:00 AM Friday, April 08, 2011**

**Please review the attached EPA statement on EPA's role in monitoring radiation associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and possible U.S. implications, to be given on 4/12 before SEPW and advise of any comments by 10:00 AM Friday 4/8. Thanks.**

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LRM ID: EHF-112-55  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM  
Thursday, April 07, 2011

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer - See Distribution

FROM: Burnim, John (for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference  
SUBJECT: LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

OMB CONTACT: **Fitter, E**  
E-Mail: **E. Holly Fitter@omb.eop.gov**  
PHONE: **(202) 395-3233**  
FAX: **(202) 395-5691**

In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President. By the deadline above, please reply by e-mail or telephone, using the OMB Contact information above.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for the purposes of the Statutory Pay-as-You-Go Act of 2010.

Thank you.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 10:18 AM  
**To:** Meltzer, Dick  
**Subject:** Confirming 4:30pm today

4:30pm it is! Marty and I will talk with you then.

Per our quick phone conversation, here are links to docs on the task force that we discussed:

Press release on Commission direction to establish task force:

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110821123.pdf>

Press release re: task force members, charter to establish the task force:

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1109/ML110910479.pdf>

We can certainly talk more about this at 4:30pm as well, but this background may be helpful.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

From: Meltzer, Dick [mailto:Dick.Meltzer@mail.house.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 10:06 AM  
To: Powell, Amy  
Subject: RE: Would 1:30pm work for NRC phone briefing?

That works for me. I apologize for asking this of you and Mr. Virgilio so late on Friday afternoon. My direct line is 202-226-1399. Thank you.

-----Original Message-----

From: Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 10:02 AM  
To: Meltzer, Dick  
Subject: RE: Would 1:30pm work for NRC phone briefing?

4:30pm could work - does that fit for you? If so, what is the best number for reaching you?

Thanks so much,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

From: Meltzer, Dick [mailto:Dick.Meltzer@mail.house.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 9:55 AM  
To: Powell, Amy  
Subject: Re: Would 1:30pm work for NRC phone briefing?

I can't do 1:30, unfortunately. Does 3 pm or later work?

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
To: Meltzer, Dick  
Sent: Fri Apr 08 09:52:35 2011  
Subject: Would 1:30pm work for NRC phone briefing?

Hi Dick -

Is there any way that you could do 1:30pm? Marty Virgilio, NRC's Deputy Executive Director of Operations for Reactors and Preparedness, is available then for a phone briefing. He testified before House E&C, O&I subcommittee this week on the events in Japan and NRC's response.

Let me know if this works or if we need to look at other options.

Thanks!  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

From: Meltzer, Dick [mailto:Dick.Meltzer@mail.house.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 9:33 AM  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Batkin, Joshua  
Cc: Powell, Amy



Subject: RE: Japan quake

Thank you, Rebecca. Does 10:30 or noon work for you?

-----Original Message-----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 7:16 AM  
To: Meltzer, Dick; Batkin, Joshua  
Cc: Powell, Amy  
Subject: Re: Japan quake

Dick,

We stopped the briefings after about 2 weeks. We didn't have many Hill staffers on the line after awhile. We would be happy to schedule something for you today. Let Amy know what time is good for you.

----- Original Message -----

From: Meltzer, Dick <Dick.Meltzer@mail.house.gov>  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Thu Apr 07 16:50:07 2011  
Subject: RE: Japan quake

Josh and Rebecca, thank you for the fast turnaround today. It is much appreciated. Karen told me that NRC was holding daily 3 pm briefings on the status of the Japan reactors, but they seem to have ended. I would like to receive a status report if that is possible. The news accounts present a somewhat inconsistent picture - radiation down in certain areas, but cooling systems still inoperable. Would it be possible to arrange a briefing - either in person or by phone?

Thank you, Dick

-----Original Message-----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:06 PM  
To: Batkin, Joshua; Meltzer, Dick  
Subject: RE: Japan quake

Dick--let me call the Ops Center and get back to you. What is a good number for you?

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:03 PM  
To: 'Dick.Meltzer@mail.house.gov'  
Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Subject: Re: Japan quake

Hi Dick - I'm stuck in a meeting but let me get you to our Congressional affairs director to try to help you. Josh

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Meltzer, Dick <Dick.Meltzer@mail.house.gov>

To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Thu Apr 07 11:02:05 2011  
Subject: Japan quake

Josh, I am Leader Pelosi's policy director and am filling in for Karen Wayland on an interim basis. Can you provide me with an update on what the impact of the most recent quake will be on the population and nuclear facilities?

Thank you, Dick

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 10:37 AM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE:

This press release, that includes a copy of the task force charter, has the best info on that at this point:  
<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1109/ML110910479.pdf>

The press release includes the following passage with dates for public briefings of the Commission and recs to be reported:

"On May 12 and June 16, the task force plans to brief the Commission in public meetings on the status of the review. Recommendations will be reported in a July 19 Commission meeting, which will be open to the public."

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) [mailto:Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 10:21 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:**

What dates are the 30, 60 and 90 day milestones for the short-term review that is currently underway?

Kathy Dedrick  
Committee on Environment and Public Works  
410 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510  
Phone: 202-224-8832  
Fax: 202-224-1273

---

**From:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 3:38 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Shane, Raeann; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Japan compensation

Be sure to read the portion that covers the cap:

<http://www.internal.nrc.gov/announcements/items/7833.html>

FYI – I have submitted your names to CFO for them to look at your Japan reported time to see if it can be covered, in particular, because the cap is per pay period and is just like pay, as you get closer to the end of the year you probably will have reached your cap before that. (They tell me this needs to be looked at by you very very closely.)

*Nancy Belmore*  
*Office of Congressional Affairs*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
[nancy.belmore@nrc.gov](mailto:nancy.belmore@nrc.gov)  
301-415-1776

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 1:14 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** More on the 50 mi

FYI – chain starts with a request about a POC to help develop a public statement... turns out OPA worked with GBJ's office already...

---

**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 1:00 PM  
**To:** McDermott, Brian; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Wiggins, Jim; Evans, Michele  
**Subject:** RE: Help needed for development of "plain language" backgrounder on 50 mi recommendation

We have a working statement approved by the chairman's office today, based on verbiage from PMT and Trish Milligan. We are using it as a talking point in OPA.

Once the NRC and other US government agencies have reasonable assurance that plant conditions are improving, radiation is minimized and radiological exposure information is thoroughly analyzed, relaxation of the US recommendations will be considered for the area around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Additional background: The NRC, in conjunction with other federal agencies, is reviewing current information on environmental conditions as part of its ongoing assessment related to the protective action recommendation for US citizens in Japan. Protective action recommendations are based on many factors, including the progression of plant safety system degradation, the actual or projected occurrence of significant radiological releases, and the time necessary to provide notice and implementation of protective actions. The NRC provided recommendations on March 16 based on the deteriorating conditions at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and a need to provide advance actions in the face of considerable uncertainty about the outcome of events.

Considerable data collection by Japan government organizations and US government support organizations, including radiological monitoring results by the NISA and the US Department of Energy are being evaluated to determine an appropriate and reasonable timeframe for relaxing the existing protective action recommendations. Comparison to US protective action guidelines regarding radioactive material exposure are ongoing to make sure that returning populations will not exceed those guidelines.

---

**From:** McDermott, Brian  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 12:33 PM  
**To:** Harrington, Holly; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Wiggins, Jim; Evans, Michele  
**Subject:** Help needed for development of "plain language" backgrounder on 50 mi recommendation  
**Importance:** High

Amy/Holly,

I would like to engage OCA and OPA in the development of a short paper to explain the considerations that went into the NRC's recommendation for a 50 mi evacuation of U.S. citizens around Fukushima. I know that we've answered this question in response to various media and other inquiries, however I would like to have a simple, yet comprehensive written explanation that can be used by anyone at NRC who is asked the question. Since you are the experts at addressing the public and congressional stakeholders, your review and input will be most helpful.

I anticipate development of an initial draft today, with OPA and OCA reviews late today or possibly Saturday. We will do the legwork to incorporate comments and then vet the document with the on-shift ET Director in the Ops Center and the Chairman. My goal is to have a finished product that can be used in multiple forums on Monday, Tuesday, and beyond.

I would appreciate your help and the identification of a POC to work with us at this early stage.

Thanks,  
Brian

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 1:29 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Subject:** verbage

Per our chat...

The article resulted from an unfortunate leak of dated information that we are trying as best we can to contain so as not to jeopardize our working relationship with our Japanese colleagues.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 2:22 PM  
**To:** Sheron, Brian  
**Subject:** Per our chat  
**Attachments:** Supplemental Memo OI 040611.pdf



ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS  
**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115

Majority (202) 225-2927  
Minority (202) 225-3641

**SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM**

**April 6, 2011**

**To: Democratic Members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**  
**Fr: Democratic Staff of the Committee on Energy and Commerce**  
**Re: NRC Modeling of Severe Reactor Accident Scenarios at U.S. Nuclear Plants**

This morning, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will hold a hearing on the nuclear crisis in Japan. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff recently briefed the Democratic staff of the Committee regarding NRC's modeling and simulations of severe reactor accident scenarios for a U.S. plant of the same design as the Fukushima reactors in Japan. A draft NRC report found that in a complete loss of power scenario the reactor would come to within one hour of core damage.

These findings may actually understate the risk of core damage at a U.S. nuclear power plant because of the scope and assumptions of the study. This memo discusses the information NRC recently provided to Committee Democratic staff regarding its modeling and simulations and the issues raised by this information.

**NRC's State-of-the Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA)**

The objective of the NRC's State-of-the Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) project is "to analyze the realistic outcomes of postulated severe reactor accidents, even though it is considered highly unlikely that such accidents could occur."<sup>1</sup> According to NRC staff, the SOARCA analyses aim to account for the findings of research that has been conducted during the last 25 years as well as significant plant changes and updates that were not factored into earlier assessments.

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<sup>1</sup> Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Overview of the SOARCA Project (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at: <http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar/overview.html>).

The SOARCA project analyzes two plants: the Peach Bottom GE Mark 1 boiling-water reactor (BWR) near Lancaster, Pennsylvania – co-owned by Exelon and PSEG, whose President and Chief Operating Officer is testifying today – and the Surry pressurized-water reactor (PWR) near Newport News, Virginia. The Peach Bottom reactor is of the same design as the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in Japan. In the United States, 35 boiling water reactors are in operation and 23 of these reactors were constructed with the Mark 1 containment system.

According to NRC staff, NRC modeled three scenarios for the Peach Bottom BWR reactor. Under the “long-term station blackout” scenario, the plant is assumed to lose offsite AC power and its backup diesel generators, but the battery backups operate safety systems for about four hours until the batteries are exhausted. Under the “short-term station blackout” scenario, “the site loses all power (even the batteries) and, therefore, all of its safety systems quickly become inoperable in the ‘short term.’”<sup>2</sup> Both of these scenarios are supposed to reflect the effects of an extreme external event, such as an earthquake, flood, or fire. The third scenario was the random failure of a vital power cable connection. NRC’s modeling showed that the third scenario did not result in core damage because the unaffected safety systems were adequate to keep the core cool.

For each of the two station blackout scenarios, NRC modeled two sub-scenarios: one that assumed the presence and utilization of new equipment and procedures introduced since the September 11 attacks and one that did not account for the new equipment and procedures.

### **Draft Results of SOARCA**

In the more severe “station blackout” scenario in which all power was lost, the operator was able to take mitigation measures to prevent core damage for the first two days after the loss of power. However, under this scenario, the Peach Bottom BWR reactor came within one hour of core damage. NRC staff explained that a simulated meltdown was narrowly averted through the manual turning of steam valves to activate the reactor core isolation cooling system, which does not require AC power and is driven by steam. According to NRC staff, the simulation was structured to end after the two-day period based on the assumption that interventions would only get more numerous and effective after that time.

In the less severe loss of power scenario, in which the plant was assumed to have operational battery backup power for four hours, core damage was prevented. Because modeling showed that it would take the fuel rods ten hours to rupture from overheating, there was adequate time to employ mitigation measures.

Both of these scenarios assumed the Peach Bottom BWR used the new equipment and procedures introduced since the September 11 attacks. Without the new equipment and procedures, both simulated “station blackout” scenarios led to core damage and the release of radioactive contamination within two days. NRC staff explained that the radioactive fuel in the reactor core melts, tears through the reactor vessel, and then ruptures the primary containment

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<sup>2</sup> Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SOARCA Process, Step 2 (Nov. 2, 2010) (online at: <http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar/soarca-accident-progression.html>).

drywell if there is no water covering the floor of the drywell. NRC staff noted that most of the radioactive contamination was projected to be contained in the suppression pool and emphasized that the meltdown progressed more slowly than previous calculations from the 1980s would suggest, providing time for nearby residents to evacuate.

Internal NRC emails obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists indicate that NRC analysts disagreed as to whether the new equipment and procedures (known as B5b measures), which allowed Peach Bottom to narrowly avoid core damage in the complete loss of power scenario, would be effective. According to a memo the Union of Concerned Scientists is releasing today, a July 28, 2010, NRC staff e-mail summarized concerns of NRC senior reactor analysts (SRAs) who work in NRC's regional offices as follows:

One concern has been that SOARCA credits certain B5b mitigating strategies (such as RCIC operation w/o DC power) that have really not been reviewed to ensure that they will work to mitigate severe accidents. Generally, we have not even seen licensees credit these strategies in their own PRAs [probabilistic risk assessments] but for some reason the NRC decided we should during SOARCA.

My recollection is that RI [Region I] SRAs in particular have been vocal with their concerns on SOARCA for several years, probably because Peach Bottom is one of the SOARCA plants.

This e-mail specifically references concerns about operating the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system without battery power. According to NRC staff, this is the specific system and mitigation strategy that allowed Peach Bottom to narrowly avert core damage in the simulated full loss-of-power scenario.

The Union of Concerned Scientists memo quotes a second internal NRC e-mail, which refers to the March 2009 reactor security regulation. The e-mail states:

The application of 10 CFR 50.54(hh) mitigation measures still concerns a number of staff in NRR [the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation]. The concern involves the manner in which credit is given to these measures such that success is assumed ... 10 CFR 50.54(hh) mitigation measures are just equipment onsite that can be useful in an emergency when used by knowledgeable operators if post event conditions allow. If little is known about these post event conditions, then assuming success is speculative.

This e-mail indicates that the NRC reactor analysts responsible for ensuring the day-to-day safety of nuclear reactors in the United States were challenging the SOARCA assumption that the presence of new equipment could be equated with the successful use of such equipment in a disaster scenario.

### **Issues Regarding Scope and Assumptions of the Draft SOARCA Report**

NRC staff explained that the first draft of the SOARCA report was completed in mid-2009 and provided to 11 outside scientific and technical experts for external peer review. NRC staff currently is working to address comments from these outside experts, other NRC personnel, and the operators of the Peach Bottom and Surry plants. Before the crisis in Japan, the plan was to release the report for public comment within the next few months and finalize the report in December. According to NRC staff, this schedule will likely slip by several months due to the pressing focus on events in Japan. This delay could provide NRC with the opportunity to further improve the realism of the SOARCA simulations by accounting for important aspects of a major natural disaster.

The Committee does not know all of the facts about what went wrong at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, but the events in Japan raise a number of questions about the scope and assumptions of NRC's modeling. First, the SOARCA simulations explicitly do not consider the impact of a disaster event on spent fuel pools. At crucial points in the Japanese response effort, radiation from uncovered spent fuel rods at Daiichi has been a significant impediment to such efforts.

Second, NRC terminated the models two days after the simulated loss of power. Events in Japan demonstrate that the question of whether a reactor will melt down and release radioactive contamination into the environment cannot be definitively answered in the first two days. In the United States, reactors have lost power for more than two days. For example, in August 1992, Hurricane Andrew passed directly over the Turkey Point plant and knocked out offsite power for six and a half days.<sup>3</sup> Five onsite diesel generators also were unavailable due to moisture problems.

Third, SOARCA postulates that the "station blackout" scenarios occur as a result of a major earthquake, flood, or fire. But during the briefing with Committee staff, NRC staff indicated that NRC assumed that loss of power is the only damaging result of the natural disaster. It is not clear whether all of the new onsite equipment intended to address security threats after the September 11 attacks would remain functional after a natural disaster of a magnitude large enough to cause a partial or complete loss of power.

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<sup>3</sup> Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Effectiveness of Station Blackout Rule at F-2 (Aug. 2003).

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**From:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 3:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Letter to Chairman Jaczko

ok

*Nancy Belmore*  
*Office of Congressional Affairs*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
[nancy.belmore@nrc.gov](mailto:nancy.belmore@nrc.gov)  
301-415-1776

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 3:13 PM  
**To:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Cc:** Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** Fw: Letter to Chairman Jaczko

Another ltr - would you please get to SECY?

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Christensen, Adam (Feinstein) <Adam\_Christensen@feinstein.senate.gov>  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Weil, Jenny; Nelson, Matthew (Feinstein) <Matthew\_Nelson@feinstein.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 15:05:11 2011  
**Subject:** Letter to Chairman Jaczko

Dear Joshua,

Please see the attached letter from Senator Feinstein to Chairman Jaczko.

All the best,  
Adam

---  
Adam Christensen, Ph.D.  
2011 ASME/AAAS Congressional Science Fellow  
Senator Dianne Feinstein  
Hart Office Building 331

adam\_christensen@feinstein.senate.gov  
202.224.3841 (main)

PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT  
TOM HARKIN, IOWA  
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND  
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN  
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON  
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS  
TIM JOHNSON, SOUTH DAKOTA  
MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND  
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY  
BEN NELSON, NEBRASKA  
MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS  
JON TESTER, MONTANA  
SHERROD BROWN, OHIO

MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY  
RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA  
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, TEXAS  
LAMAR ALEXANDER, TENNESSEE  
SUSAN COLLINS, MAINE  
LISA MURKOWSKI, ALASKA  
LINDSEY GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA  
MARK KIRK, ILLINOIS  
DANIEL COATS, INDIANA  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
JERRY MORAN, KANSAS  
JOHN HOEVEN, NORTH DAKOTA  
RON JOHNSON, WISCONSIN

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

<http://appropriations.senate.gov>

CHARLES J. HOUY, STAFF DIRECTOR  
BRUCE EVANS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

April 8, 2011

The Honorable Gregory Jaczko  
Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

I am writing to ask that you seriously consider regulatory policies that would encourage the movement of nuclear fuel, once sufficiently cool, out of spent fuel pools and into dry cask storage systems. I am concerned that current Nuclear Regulatory Commission policies allow excessive re-racking and densification of radioactive fuel within spent fuel pools. In fact, there are examples in the U.S. where nuclear fuel rods have been stored in spent fuel pools for decades.


According to "Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage," a report published in 2006 by the National Research Council at the request of Congress, dry cask storage systems have inherent safety advantages over spent fuel pool storage. The report highlighted three main differences between these two storage options:

1. **Less spent fuel is at risk in an accident or attack on a dry storage cask than on a spent fuel pool.** An accident or attack on a dry cask facility would likely affect only a few casks at a time. An accident or attack on a spent fuel pool places the entire fuel inventory at risk.
2. **The consequences of an accident or terrorist attack on a dry cask storage facility are lower than those for a spent fuel pool.** If an accident or attack on a dry cask facility resulted in radioactive material being released, the dispersion could likely be contained easier than if a spent fuel pool were compromised.
3. **The recovery from an attack on a dry cask would be much easier than the recovery from an attack on a spent fuel pool.** Containing radiation that could be released from damage to dry casks can be plugged temporarily with radiation-absorbing materials until permanent fixes are available. Containing radiation from a compromised spent fuel pool is likely to be much more difficult, particularly if the overlying building collapsed preventing workers from reaching the pool.

When taken together, these points assert that the risk of a non-recoverable accident decreases when spent nuclear fuel is kept in smaller, easier to manage, containers that are distributed intelligently on a secure site. The continuous re-racking and addition of fuel rods in spent fuel pools appears to be at odds with these safety recommendations. Based on these findings, I ask the NRC to initiate a rulemaking process to immediately require a more rapid shift of spent fuel to dry casks.

The lesson from Japan's disaster is that we must be prepared to respond to unanticipated threats. Therefore, any policy changes that further reduce risks of an unsafe situation catching the industry off guard should be implemented. I look forward to working with you further on this issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dianne Feinstein", is written over a large, stylized circular flourish.

Dianne Feinstein  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Energy and Water  
Development

DF/mbn/ac



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 3:57 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Re: PAGS attached to 3/16 press release

OK - thanks

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Shane, Raeann  
To: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Fri Apr 08 15:56:40 2011  
Subject: RE: PAGS attached to 3/16 press release

I was just able to get it. I have had trouble before though, I think it is the website.

-----Original Message-----

From: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 3:53 PM  
To: Shane, Raeann  
Subject: PAGS attached to 3/16 press release

Annie just pointed out that the 2-page attachment on the 3/16 press release re: 50 mi evac rec is no longer posted online. Any idea why?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:08 PM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: one more question

I got Raeann's bounceback - re-sending to you guys. Have a good weekend

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:07 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** one more question

Did Unit 1's spent fuel pool have an isolation condenser? If so, do you have an assessment of when it may have stopped performing its intended function?

Thanks  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:24 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: one more question

Sorry to dump and run but I'm sure she would like an answer before I return on Tuesday....she is also looking for info on if U-1 has the same pathway as U-2 for "stuff" to get out of the core even though the reactor vessel remains intact.

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:07 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** one more question

Did Unit 1's spent fuel pool have an isolation condenser? If so, do you have an assessment of when it may have stopped performing its intended function?

Thanks  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:52 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Pace, Patti; Coggins, Angela  
**Cc:** Gibbs, Catina; Hipschman, Thomas  
**Subject:** RE: He needs to sign

I'll be here until it all comes down...

Do I need to do anything/know anything about the Japan memo?

Amy

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 5:37 PM  
To: Pace, Patti; Coggins, Angela  
Cc: Gibbs, Catina; Hipschman, Thomas; Powell, Amy  
Subject: Re: He needs to sign

Boxer/carper and boxer/feinstein need to go tonight when they're ready. Boxer SER letters need to wait until you hear from me but he can sign his. Marty said we have the japan memo.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Pace, Patti  
To: Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela  
Cc: Gibbs, Catina; Hipschman, Thomas  
Sent: Fri Apr 08 17:33:25 2011  
Subject: RE: He needs to sign

OK - just to make sure we have things straight...

There are two Boxer CORRs that Tom is working with SECY

There is a Boxer letter Catina was working on with you. Is that final? She thought we were still waiting on an office to get back to us based on what Angela just said. Please clarify.

Do you know who has the Japan staffing decision memo? I don't think I have seen it to go in to him yet.

Thanks

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Friday, April 08, 2011 5:30 PM  
To: Pace, Patti; Coggins, Angela  
Subject: He needs to sign

The 3 boxer letters and the japan staffing decision memo today

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 6:28 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** GBJ will sign by 8pm

He's okayed autopen and will okay for use after reading the letters en route to the airport for an 8pm flight... Letters on tap are the Boxer/Carper and Boxer/Feinstein; I have GBJ's SER letter but no update on the peace accord for the letter for your signature.

In other news, all the comments are in on the testimony. Perhaps I will read through while I wait...

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 6:26 PM  
**To:** McKelvin, Sheila; Pace, Patti  
**Cc:** Hipschman, Thomas; Gibbs, Catina; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Lewis, Antoinette; Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** RE: Autopen?

Patti –

I'll be here to get pdfs to the Hill once ready.

AP

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**From:** McKelvin, Sheila  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 6:25 PM  
**To:** Pace, Patti  
**Cc:** Hipschman, Thomas; Gibbs, Catina; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Lewis, Antoinette; Batkin, Joshua; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Autopen?

Patti,

SECY will be here to support the Chairman's office in getting the letters signed via autopen.

Sheila

---

**From:** Pace, Patti  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 6:05 PM  
**To:** McKelvin, Sheila  
**Cc:** Hipschman, Thomas; Gibbs, Catina; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Lewis, Antoinette; Batkin, Joshua; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Autopen?  
**Importance:** High

Sheila,

The Chairman is departing for the airport and will need to have these letters auto penned once he approves the final language via email. His flight departs at 8:00PM. Request support for autopen sometime between now and 8:00PM. The appropriate authorization memo has been prepared for Angela to sign once the Chairman directs us to use the autopen. Please confirm.

Thanks,

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

---

**From:** McKelvin, Sheila  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:56 PM  
**To:** Pace, Patti

**Cc:** Hipschman, Thomas; Gibbs, Catina; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Lewis, Antoinette  
**Subject:** RE: Autopen?

Yes, we can use the Autopen. We will need the memo from the Chairman's office giving us direction to do so.

---

**From:** Pace, Patti  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 5:54 PM  
**To:** McKelvin, Sheila  
**Cc:** Hipschman, Thomas; Gibbs, Catina  
**Subject:** Autopen?

Hi Sheila,

If the Chairman has to leave, are you able access the autopen to sign the two letters on his behalf? He has to leave at 6:00pm to head to the airport.

Thanks!

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:53 PM  
**To:** Haynes, Laura (Carper)  
**Subject:** NRC response to Sen. Carper's March 17th letter  
**Attachments:** Response to 03-17-11 Ltr - Carper.pdf

Hi again –

Attached is the NRC's response to Sen. Carper's March 17<sup>th</sup> letter. Hard copy will follow.

Sorry today's call got delayed and cut short for you today. I'll be in late Monday morning if you want to touch base.

AP

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673



CHAIRMAN

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 8, 2011

The Honorable Tom Carper  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Senator Carper:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of March 17, 2011. In light of the recent events in Japan, you asked that NRC perform a thorough review of nuclear power plants and posed a number of questions. Detailed responses to the questions contained in your letter are provided in the enclosure.

Regarding a review of the California facilities, the Commission directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives. We will keep you and our other stakeholders informed as we proceed.

While the NRC continues to provide assistance to the Japanese government, I want to assure you that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. With our near-term evaluation of the relevance of recent events to the U.S. fleet underway, we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, the agency will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American public.

Sincerely,

  
Gregory B. Jaczko

Enclosure: As stated

**Responses to Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer and Senator Tom Carper  
Letter of March 17, 2011**

**1. Please identify all U.S. nuclear facilities subject to significant seismic activity and/or tsunamis.**

Although we often think of the US as having "active " and non-active" earthquake zones, earthquakes can actually happen almost anywhere. Seismologists typically separate the US into low, moderate and high seismicity zones. The NRC requires that every nuclear plant be designed for site-specific ground motions that may be expected at their locations. In addition, the NRC has specified a minimum ground motion level to which all nuclear plants must be designed. The designation of the general type of seismic zone that may apply at any specific site is subject to interpretation but a conservative interpretation – meaning a larger zone—might include the following plants, based upon a preliminary estimate:

High Seismicity – Diablo Canyon, SONGS

Moderate Seismicity – Brunswick, Robinson, Summer, Vogtle, Hatch, Clinton, Watts Bar, Sequoya, North Anna

Low Seismicity – all other plants

**2. U.S. nuclear power plants are designed to be safe based on historical data of the area's maximum credible threat (including earthquakes and tsunamis). What extra safety features does the NRC currently require for facilities that have a credible threat of an earthquake or tsunami? In light of the recent events in Japan, we would also like the NRC to re-examine the assumptions used to determine the maximum credible threat and suggest additional options that could provide a greater margin for safety at plants nationwide that might be subject to challenges similar to this currently being seen in Japan following the earthquake and tsunami.**

The NRC requires that each plant be designed to withstand expected ground motion level specific to the site. Our regulations also require designs which consider the potential for a tsunami.

We have also taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. This includes a number of new regulatory requirements imposed by the NRC that have enhanced the domestic reactor fleet's preparedness for some of the problems we are seeing in Japan.

The "station blackout" (SBO) rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to

the site and provide cooling to the core. The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated in the event of a severe accident and core damage.

With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC initiated a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I Containment Improvement Program in the late 1980. This led to installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

Additionally, following the 9/11 events, reactor licensees have been required to develop strategies to maintain and restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. Licensees are required to develop strategies for fire fighting, operations to mitigate fuel damage, and actions to minimize radiological release

As a result of the events in Japan, the Chairman, with the full support of the Commission, has directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives.

For the near term effort, we have begun a 90-day review. This review will evaluate all of the available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include protection against earthquake, tsunami, flooding, hurricanes; station blackout and a degraded ability to restore power; severe accident mitigation; emergency preparedness; and combustible gas control. Over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed.

The task force's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has obtained sufficient technical information concerning the events in Japan. The longer term review will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to those events to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the NRC. We will also evaluate interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available.

**3. Which U.S. nuclear power plants share similar design features with the affected Japanese reactor facilities? Do these facilities have design vulnerabilities that should be addressed to ensure their cooling systems do not fail when confronted by stresses**

**including those similar to what we have seen in Japan following the earthquake and tsunami?**

Thirty-five of the 104 operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. are BWRs, as are the reactors at Fukushima. Twenty-three of the U.S. BWRs have the same Mark I containment as the Fukushima reactors. Four of the U.S. BWRs are early designs which are similar to Fukushima Unit 1. Nineteen U.S. BWRs are similar to Fukushima Unit 3.

BWR Mark I containments have different designs than other containments. However, the staff does not view the differences in design as vulnerabilities. For example, Mark I designs have relatively small volumes in comparison with most pressurized water reactor (PWR) containments. This makes the BWR Mark I containment relatively more susceptible to containment failure given a core meltdown severe enough to cause the reactor vessel to fail and to breach the containment boundary. On the positive side, BWRs have more ways of adding water to the core than PWRs. This includes the provision of two water injection sources which do not rely on AC electric power. For example these systems include Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and High pressure coolant injection (HPCI).

The NRC initiated a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I Containment Improvement Program in the late 1980s. This led to installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system. These changes mitigate the small containment volume of the Mark I design.

The NRC task force will be looking at the sequence of events and status of equipment during the events in Japan and will consider based on our review whether revisions to our regulatory framework are needed..

**4. How comprehensive is the radiation monitoring system in Japan? Would the U.S. take a similar monitoring approach if a serious accident were to occur here? What increased risk is associated with exposure to mixed oxide fuel?**

The NRC does not currently have sufficient information to describe in detail the radiation monitoring system in Japan. In addition to the radiation monitoring that is required to be performed by all U.S. reactor licensees, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency conducts environmental monitoring of radiation. Questions concerning the EPA's monitoring systems and actions should be directed to the EPA.

Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel involves the use of plutonium as a fuel, in addition to enriched uranium. Plutonium, like uranium is a long-lived alpha emitter, and they present similar biological risks. All commercial reactors produce plutonium from uranium during operation regardless of whether the material was there to begin with. Regarding exposure to mixed oxide fuel, in Japan, prompt evacuation has minimized radiation exposure to the public, so long-term public health consequences from radiation exposure resulting from the events, whether due to MOX or uranium fuel, are expected to be small. NRC has evaluated the use of MOX fuel and concluded

that the design basis accidents consequences were within the acceptance criteria and the differences between MOX and uranium fuel were within the dose consequences calculation uncertainties. The staff has concluded that the presence of a small number of MOX fuel assemblies in Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 constitutes an insignificant change from non-MOX fuel in core operating conditions and accident consequences.

**5. Given what has happened at the Japanese facilities, please describe how the NRC currently ensures the safety of spent fuel pools at U.S. facilities and identify additional steps the NRC could take to better address the vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools at plants in the U.S.**

Information concerning the circumstances and specific sequence of events at the Fukushima plants is incomplete at this time, and the lessons to be learned from those events remain to be determined. The NRC's regulatory focus is to ensure that cooling capability, both for reactors and for spent fuel pools, is maintained in order to prevent fuel damage. This has been accomplished at U.S. plants by redundant and/or diverse capabilities to provide forced cooling and water addition

The NRC task force will be looking at a range of issues, including station blackout and severe accident mitigation at spent fuel pools.

**6. Has the NRC modeled what could happen if the U.S. had multiple nuclear accidents simultaneously? If so, how would the NRC respond to such a disaster?**

In general, the NRC applies the Commission's safety goals on a per-reactor basis. However, in security assessments of two dual-unit sites in the 2002-2004 timeframe, the NRC considered the potential consequences of events simultaneously involving both reactors. The study found that the reactor containments and spent fuel pools are robust structures and resistant to a terrorist attack. The study also found that radiological releases are delayed and smaller than those predicted in past studies. Subsequently, additional mitigation measures were required (10CFR50.44(hh)) to further enhance safety. All U.S. nuclear power plant licensees are required to develop plans to deal with emergencies at their facilities, including the loss of offsite power. In addition, site-specific offsite emergency preparedness plans are required to be developed and exercised on a regular basis, to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. While these capabilities and plans are site-specific, they would apply as well in the event of a broader emergency involving multiple sites.

With regard to the NRC's response to a disaster, the NRC has experience in responding to national events affecting multiple facilities including major hurricanes and regional power blackouts such as the 2003 Northeast blackout. The NRC maintains an emergency operations center that is staffed 24/7. In addition to this emergency response center, the NRC has a backup operations center. Operation of the emergency response centers are tested regularly during facility and national emergency response drills.

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 9:32 PM  
**To:** 'Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: NRC task force, team, and charter

You bet - did my note about the INPO info make sense?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 21:17:48 2011  
**Subject:** Re: NRC task force, team, and charter

Thanks!

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**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 09:03 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Caputo, Annie (EPW); Clifford, Brian (Barrasso); Haynes, Laura (Carper)  
**Subject:** NRC task force, team, and charter

Hi all –

Early on today's call before Marty joined us, I told you I would resend information about the task force that the Commission directed the NRC staff to establish so that you had it for easy reference.

Press release on Commission direction to establish task force:

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110821123.pdf>

Press release re: task force members, charter to establish the task force:

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1109/ML110910479.pdf>

Have a good weekend – thanks for your time today and patience as we got the call going.  
AP

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 6:54 AM  
**To:** Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Dacus, Eugene; Belmore, Nancy  
**Subject:** Fw: NRC responses to Sen. Boxer's letters  
**Attachments:** Response to 3-16-11 Ltr - Boxer.pdf; Response to 03-17-11 Ltr - Boxer.pdf

Jeannette - please include the attached responses, issued Friday night, in the correspondence section of the hearing books.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>; Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 20:49:16 2011  
**Subject:** NRC responses to Sen. Boxer's letters

Bettina and Kathy –

Attached are the responses to Sen. Boxer's letters from March 16<sup>th</sup> and March 17<sup>th</sup>. In response to her letter of March 31<sup>st</sup> related to Yucca Mountain documents, our office will transmit the first of those – a draft pre-decisional version of Volume 3 of the SER – on Monday.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673





CHAIRMAN

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 8, 2011

The Honorable Barbara Boxer  
Chairman, Committee on Environment  
and Public Works  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of March 16, 2011. In light of the recent events in Japan, you asked that we perform a thorough review of the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear power plants and posed a number of questions. Detailed responses to the questions contained in your letter are provided in the enclosure.

Regarding a review of the California facilities, the Commission directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to make recommendations to the Commission whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This review will include an assessment of any regulatory issues in the areas of earthquakes and emergency preparedness mentioned in your letter. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives. We are also pursuing limited actions that appear to be prudent, including inspection activities to look at the readiness of plants to deal with both design basis and beyond design basis accidents. We will keep you and our other stakeholders informed as we proceed.

While the NRC continues to provide assistance to the Japanese government, I want to assure you that the NRC continues to make its domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees its top priority and that the U.S. nuclear power plants continue to operate safely. With the near-term evaluation of the relevance of recent events to the U.S. fleet underway, the NRC is continuing to gather the information needed for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for the NRC. Based on these efforts, the agency will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American public.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Gregory B. Jaczko", is written over a horizontal line.

Gregory B. Jaczko

Enclosure: As stated

**Responses to Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer and Senator Dianne Feinstein  
Letter of March 16, 2011**

**Plant Design and Operations**

**1. What changes to the design or operation of these facilities have improved safety at the plants since they began operating in the mid-1980s?**

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including, most significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures for licensees, and made substantive improvements in NRC's incident response capabilities. We also addressed many human factors issues regarding control room indicators and layouts, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves.

Two significant changes after Three Mile Island (TMI) were the expansion of the Resident Inspector Program and the incident response program. Today, there are at least two Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. The inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities, and serve as NRC's eyes and ears at the power plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Center and regional incident response centers are prepared to respond to all emergencies, including any resulting from operational events, security events, or natural phenomena. Multidisciplinary teams in these centers have access to detailed information regarding licensee facilities, and access to plant status information through telephonic links with the Resident Inspectors, an automated emergency response data system, and directly from the licensee through the emergency notification system. In the case of a significant event the NRC's response would include the dispatch of a site team to augment the Resident Inspectors on site, and integration with the licensee's emergency response organization at its Emergency Offsite Facility. The NRC's incident response program is designed to provide an independent assessment of events, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the events, and to ensure that State officials have the information they would need to make decisions regarding protective actions.

Further, a number of new regulatory requirements were imposed by the NRC following the TMI accident, which enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness to cope with some of the problems have seen seeing in Japan. For example, the "station blackout" rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the core.

Another post-TMI requirement, the hydrogen rule, required modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. In addition, there are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see in a beyond-design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC implemented a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program. This program led to installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

Emergency planning and preparedness was also augmented substantially following the TMI accident, with the adoption of additional regulatory requirements and the conduct of mandatory emergency planning exercises on a biennial basis, including participation by state and local government officials. The NRC's emergency preparedness and planning requirements provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are coordinated with state and local officials and are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a plant, licensees have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe situation.

Since Diablo Canyon went into commercial service, many specific changes in design or operation have been implemented at the plant. These include the following:

- Added sixth on-site emergency diesel generator
- Increased volume of diesel generator fuel oil tanks to supply 7 days of fuel
- Added capacitor banks to the 230 kV offsite power source to improve reliability of offsite power source
- Replaced 500 kV offsite power source circuit breakers with new design that has increased earthquake resistance
- Replaced offsite power source transformers
- Replaced the reactor heads for the reactor vessels with a new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Replaced steam generators with new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Increased the capacity of the 4 kilovolt system circuit breakers
- Replaced plant process computer
- Replaced low pressure turbine rotors with a new design that is more resistant to turbine blade failure

- Replaced the water cooled positive displacement pumps for core injection with air cooled centrifugal charging pumps
- Replaced main feedwater pump control system to digital based control system
- Upgraded residual heat removal system piping to reduce potential flow induced erosion following an accident
- Replaced emergency core cooling system flow orifices to reduce potential potential flow blockage following an accident
- Replaced the containment sump strainer with a new design that is five times larger to minimize susceptibility to clogging
- Removed material from inside containment that could become a potential debris source following a loss of coolant accident
- Developed additional procedures to address potential natural and manmade disasters
- Implemented significant site changes to improve plant security
- Implemented procedures and training to improve human performance and reduce errors
- Implemented procedures and training to increase use of industry nuclear plant operating experience to improve plant safety

Changes in design or operation at San Onofre (SONGS) have included the following:

- Replaced steam generators with new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Developed additional procedures to address potential natural and manmade disasters
- Replaced the containment sump strainer with a new design that is five times larger to minimize susceptibility to clogging
- Removed material from inside containment that could become a potential debris source following a loss of coolant accident
- Implemented significant site changes to improve plant security
- Implemented procedures and training to improve human performance and reduce errors
- Implemented procedures and training to increase use of industry nuclear plant operating experience to improve plant safety
- Replaced all Emergency Planning Zone alert notification sirens in 2005 and 2006, and added paging capability.
- Replaced plant process computer
- Replaced low pressure turbine rotors with new design that is more resistant to turbine blade failure and stress corrosion cracking
- Replaced main feedwater pump control system to digital based control system
- Replaced service air compressors with modern model, and add cross-tie to instrument air
- Added vent to HPSI line to ensure ECCS system free of gas

- Increased safety related battery capacity (1200-1800 amp hours)
- Added degraded grid undervoltage relays to 1E 4KV buses
- Added a portable generator for steam generator water level indication in order to facilitate steam driven pump manual operation during beyond design basis blackout scenarios

**2. What emergency notification systems have been installed at California nuclear power plants? Has there ever been a lapse of these systems during previous earthquakes or emergencies?**

An Early Warning System (EWS) is installed to provide prompt alerting of the public in the event of an emergency at both Diablo Canyon and SONGS. The EWS consists of 131 sirens positioned out to 22 miles from the plant at Diablo Canyon, and 50 sirens spanning 10 miles at SONGS. The EWS is used in conjunction with radio and TV broadcasts, and allows instructions, information, and necessary actions to be immediately communicated to the public. The sirens are equipped with battery or solar-powered back-up capability. This redundancy in power source was upgraded in the 2005-2006 timeframe. The sirens are tested daily, bi-weekly, quarterly, and annually. The sirens are monitored 24/7 with alarms for system failures.

For Diablo Canyon, prior to installing the power-back up capability, some sirens lost power during the December 2003 San Simeon earthquake. The sirens were not used during that earthquake but back-up route alerting was set up if the need for public alerting warranted. The SONGS EWS sirens have not been affected by past seismic activity.

**3. What safety measures are in place to ensure continued power to California reactors in the event of an extended power failure?**

U.S. plants are required to meet 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 17, "Electric Power System." Reactor units must have two physically independent offsite power supplies capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition. Additionally, all plants are required to have onsite power supplies that are also independent and capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition assuming a worst case single failure. All U.S. plants (except Oconee which has an alternate system) have emergency diesel generators and battery backup systems. Most U.S. plants with diesels have two diesels per unit (Diablo Canyon has 3). The regulations do not specify the length of time that the diesels and batteries must be able to operate following a loss of offsite power. The required amount of time is dependent on the plant's site recovery strategy and is based on providing sufficient capacity to assure that the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

If Diablo Canyon experiences a loss of power from the 500 kV and 230 kV offsite power switchyards, three emergency diesel generators (EDGs) are available to supply onsite power in each of the units. A unit can be safely shutdown utilizing any single

EDG. There are two-50,000 gallon diesel fuel oil tanks, sufficient to operate an EDG for seven days. The EDGs are located at an elevation of 85 feet, well above the maximum expected tsunami elevation.

In addition, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are in place that include procedures to cope with the loss of all vital AC power. For example, there are Casualty Procedures in place that have pre-planned actions in the event of earthquakes, tsunami warnings and fires. There are Severe Accident Management Guidelines in place that contain actions to take in extreme conditions that require coolant injection to the reactor core, mitigation of hydrogen flammability in containment, and coolant to flood-up containment and cover the reactor core. There are Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) in place that postulate extensive plant damage due to a natural disaster or terrorist event. The EDMGs are invoked when the control of the plant cannot be established from the Main Control Room or there is no communication with the Main Control Room. The Extreme Damage event is assumed to disable all electric power. The EDMGs provide a procedure to perform multiple actions (if needed) to continue to cool the reactor core, cool the spent fuel pool, and minimize radiation release.

SONGS is similar to Diablo Canyon with 2 EDGs per unit and the EDGs are located 30 feet above sea level. SONGS also has a physical cross-tie ability such that the EDGs on one unit can be used to safely shutdown the other unit in the event that either unit loses both of its EDGs. The comments provided above concerning emergency procedure improvements at Diablo Canyon (i.e., EOPs, Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines, and EDMGs) apply as well to SONGS.

### **Type of Reactor**

- 1. What are the differences and similarities between the reactors being used in California (pressurized water reactors) and those in Japan (boiling water reactors), as well as the facilities used to house the reactors, including the standards to which they were built and their ability to withstand natural and manmade disasters?**

The two types of light-water reactors in operation in the United States are pressurized (PWR) and boiling (BWR) water reactors. The PWRs use a two-stage system where the water in the reactor is maintained at a high pressure, and an additional coolant loop is used to transfer heat from that system to produce steam to drive the turbines, while BWRs use a single-stage system that allows water in the reactor to boil to produce steam to drive the turbines directly. The NRC is not yet fully aware of all of the attributes of the specific BWR reactors in question in Japan and how they are different from or similar to BWRs or other reactors in operation in the U.S. Many changes have been made over the years in the design and operation of U.S. nuclear power plants through our program of safety improvement (as described in our response to Question #1 above), which may or may not have been made to reactors operating in Japan.

We have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, operation, and oversight, and does not rely on any single layer to protect public health and safety. We begin with designs for every individual reactor that take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for any credible natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site. There are multiple physical barriers to the release of radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and are frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario.

Looking at basic design differences between the Japanese BWRs and the California plants, the following can be noted:

- The Japanese reactors have containments that are part of the reactor design and the buildings in which they are placed are not containment structures. By contrast, the California reactors have significantly larger volume containment buildings that house the reactors. This reduces the chance of exceeding the containment design pressure or having a hydrogen explosion inside containment following a natural or manmade disaster that can result in a release of radioactive material to the environment.
- In the event of the loss of power at a U.S. PWR, the reactor core can be cooled using natural circulation of water (without pumps) in the primary coolant loop to transfer heat from the reactor core to the secondary loop. The secondary loop in a PWR can be used to remove the primary loop heat (without power) by pumping non-radioactive water in the secondary loop into heat exchangers (steam generators) with a steam driven pump and releasing non-radioactive steam to the atmosphere via manually operated valves or spring operated safety relief valves. By contrast, venting steam from the Japanese BWRs resulted in a release of radiation to the reactor building from which it escaped to the environment. In addition, there are multiple other pre-planned methods available to provide on-site stored water to the reactor core and to the steam generators to ensure continued core cooling after a disaster.
- The spent fuel pool at a U.S. PWR is contained in a separate building, instead of being contained above the primary containment structure as in a Japanese BWR.
- There are multiple on-site stored water sources and pre-planned measures in place to provide water to the spent fuel pools.

### **Earthquakes and Tsunamis**

1. **We have been told that both Diablo Canyon and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station are designed to withstand the maximum credible threat at both plants, which we understand to be much less than the 9.0 earthquake that hit Japan. What assumptions have you made about the ability of both plants to withstand an**

**earthquake or tsunami? Given the disaster in Japan, what are our options to provide these plants with a greater margin for safety?**

All U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand external hazards, including earthquakes, flooding, and tsunamis, as appropriate. Regarding earthquakes, nuclear plants, are designed based on ground motion levels, not earthquake magnitudes. Ground motion is a function of both the magnitude of an earthquake and the distance from the fault to the site. The existing nuclear plants in the U.S. were designed based on a "deterministic" or "scenario earthquake" basis that accounted for the largest earthquakes that could reasonably be expected in the area around the plant. A margin is further added to the predicted ground motions to provide added robustness. The NRC's Generic Issue 199 (GI-199) project is using the latest probabilistic techniques used for new nuclear plants to review the safety of existing plants.

Both Diablo Canyon and SONGS are known to have a tsunami hazard. As such, they are designed to withstand the maximum predicted tsunami with coincident wave action.

It is too early to tell what the lessons from this earthquake are. The NRC will look closely at all aspects of the plants' response to the earthquake and tsunami to determine if any actions need to be taken in U.S. nuclear plants and if any changes are necessary to NRC regulations.

- 2. Have new faults been discovered near Diablo Canyon or San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station since those plants began operations? If so, how have the plants been modified to account for the increased risk of an earthquake? How will the NRC consider information on ways to address risks posed by faults near these plants that is produced pursuant to state law or recommendations by state agencies during the NRC relicensing process?**

A new Shoreline fault zone near Diablo Canyon was discovered in late 2008. In 2009 and 2010 Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) acquired, analyzed, and interpreted new data to better assess the seismic hazard from the Shoreline fault zone. PG&E submitted the final Shoreline fault zone report to the NRC on January 7, 2011. PG&E has concluded that maximum ground motions at the site from local faults are bounded by ground motions for which the plant had been previously evaluated. PG&E has also stated that the tsunami hazard threat from the Shoreline fault zone is relatively small since it is a strike-slip fault rather than a reverse fault and, therefore, the tsunami hazard is not expected to exceed the plant's design-basis tsunami characteristics.

The NRC staff is evaluating the tsunami hazard and is conducting an independent deterministic seismic hazard analysis of the Shoreline fault based on the information provided by the licensee to confirm the licensee's conclusions regarding the safe operation of the plant. In this regard, the staff has reviewed interim seismic studies related to the Shoreline fault zone. The staff is also in the process of reviewing PG&E's final Shoreline



fault zone report to determine whether any licensee or regulatory action may be needed. In addition to these specific efforts, the staff plans to continue discussions with PG&E on a possible license amendment to codify a Long Term Seismic Program methodology for the management of new geotechnical seismic information.

For SONGS, no new active faults have been discovered.

With regard to studies performed by other entities, such as the State of California, the NRC reviews each study's results for any new information and design challenges. The State of California is funding a new seismic study that is currently in the planning and draft phase. Licensees are required through their Technical Specifications to notify the NRC at any time during a review or study should evidence of a design challenge be identified.

The NRC considers seismic hazards to be an ongoing regulatory concern; therefore, we address seismic hazards as part of our reactor oversight process for operating reactors whenever a significant change is recognized. As a result, the NRC does not separately re-analyze seismic hazards for the license renewal process. The license renewal review is focused on managing the effects of aging and not a re-review of the current licensing basis.

**3. What are the evacuation plans for both plants in the event of an emergency? We understand that Highway 1 is the main route out of San Luis Obispo, what is the plan for evacuation of the nearby population if an earthquake takes out portions of the highway and a nuclear emergency occurs simultaneously?**

Each U.S. nuclear power plant has an emergency plan for ensuring the health and safety of members of the public who live within the emergency planning zone. Emergency plans contain contingencies for alternate evacuation routes, alternate means of notification, and other backup plans in the event of a natural disaster that damages the surrounding infrastructure.

FEMA reviews off-site emergency plans formally every 2 years during a biennial emergency preparedness exercise. The NRC evaluates on-site emergency plans during the same exercise, as well as on an annual basis. Population studies are conducted every 10 years, and evacuation time estimates are re-evaluated at that time. FEMA reviews the offsite emergency plans and evacuation time estimates, and determines whether there is a reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at a nuclear power plant.

Evacuation of members of the general public is the responsibility of San Luis Obispo County for Diablo Canyon and San Diego County for SONGS, working in conjunction with the State of California, and would be carried out in accordance with their prearranged plans. The areas to be evacuated and specific evacuation routes would depend on the meteorological conditions and route viability at the time of the accident. PG&E and Southern California Edison (SCE) would act in an advisory capacity, giving technical assessments of the

conditions at the plants and the probabilities for a potential off-site release as well as other pertinent information. This information, along with the licensee's recommended protective actions, would be assessed by responsible county and state officials in determining appropriate actions to be taken.

For Incidents of National Significance where the critical infrastructure is severely damaged, DHS has a lead role as a coordinating agency to orchestrate Federal, State, and local assets. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework provides for the NRC to be a coordinating agency for incidents involving NRC-licensed materials.

The main route out of San Luis Obispo is Highway 101. The main route for SONGS is Highway 5. For both sites, evacuation studies are conducted by demography specialists and provide information on various evacuation scenarios that could take place. The studies' results consider normal road conditions, time of day, degraded weather/visibility, and road condition.

**4. What is the NRC's role in monitoring radiation in the event of a nuclear accident both here and abroad? What is the role of EPA and other federal agencies?**

A number of U.S. agencies are involved in domestic monitoring and radiation assessment, including the EPA, Department of Energy, and NRC. NRC regulations require nuclear power plants to report any radiation levels detected at the plant that could be harmful to the public. This would include radiation levels generated by the plant or by an external source. EPA and DOE are responsible for more comprehensive domestic radiation monitoring.

The EPA utilizes its existing nationwide radiation monitoring system, RadNet, to continuously monitor the nation's air, and it regularly monitors drinking water, milk, and precipitation for environmental radiation.

**5. What monitoring systems currently are in place to track potential impacts on the U.S., including California, associated with the events in Japan?**

See response to Question #4 above. All U.S. plants are required to have a Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) in the surrounding communities that are monitored at specific intervals and analyzed in a laboratory as part of a normal offsite monitoring and sampling program.

In addition, Diablo Canyon and SONGS have near-site radiation monitoring systems in place utilizing pressurized ion chambers (radiation detectors). The facilities' pressurized ion chambers are owned and operated by the EPA and are a part of the RadNet system. The EPA monitors the real-time data from these monitors on a continuous basis. The EPA is able to share their data with other agencies during emergency situations. Questions

regarding the details of specific monitoring systems of EPA and other federal agencies should be directed to those agencies.

- 6. Which federal agency is leading the monitoring effort and which agencies have responsibility for assessing human health impacts? What impacts have occurred to date on the health or environment of the U.S. or are currently projected or modeled in connection with the events in Japan?**

See response to Question #4 above. The EPA, working with the NRC, DOE and others, has the lead for radiation monitoring activities and regularly samples air, water, and milk. An interagency advisory team that includes the NRC, the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and others, has been established under EPA's leadership and is regularly evaluating potential health and environmental impacts from events in Japan.

Only trace amounts of radioactive material have been identified through U.S. monitoring; those trace amounts are far below levels of natural background radiation and are not of public health concern. The NRC does not expect any U.S. states or territories to experience harmful levels of radioactivity as a result of the events in Japan.

- 7. What contingency plans are in place to ensure that the American public is notified in the event that hazardous materials associated with the events in Japan pose an imminent threat to the U.S.?**

Under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework, the U.S. EPA is the federal lead for plumes that come across our borders. In such situations, EPA would proceed in accordance with its established processes and procedures to work with state and local governments to protect public health and safety.

If an event requiring protective measures were to occur, U.S. residents would be advised to listen to their state and county authorities who are responsible for making protective action decisions for public health and safety. If necessary and, as appropriate, protective action decisions could include: preventing contaminated food from reaching the marketplace, recommending that all local produce be thoroughly rinsed prior to consumption, or sheltering or evacuating affected citizens. The NRC will continue to work with its local, state, and federal partners to ensure that appropriate emergency response procedures are prepared, reviewed, and exercised in accordance with NRC regulations.



CHAIRMAN

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 8, 2011

The Honorable Barbara Boxer  
Chairman, Committee on Environment  
and Public Works  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Madam Chairman:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of March 17, 2011. In light of the recent events in Japan, you asked that NRC perform a thorough review of nuclear power plants and posed a number of questions. Detailed responses to the questions contained in your letter are provided in the enclosure.

Regarding a review of the California facilities, the Commission directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives. We will keep you and our other stakeholders informed as we proceed.

While the NRC continues to provide assistance to the Japanese government, I want to assure you that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. With our near-term evaluation of the relevance of recent events to the U.S. fleet underway, we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, the agency will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American public.

Sincerely,

  
Gregory B. Jaczko

Enclosure: As stated

**Responses to Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer and Senator Tom Carper  
Letter of March 17, 2011**

**1. Please identify all U.S. nuclear facilities subject to significant seismic activity and/or tsunamis.**

Although we often think of the US as having "active " and non-active" earthquake zones, earthquakes can actually happen almost anywhere. Seismologists typically separate the US into low, moderate and high seismicity zones. The NRC requires that every nuclear plant be designed for site-specific ground motions that may be expected at their locations. In addition, the NRC has specified a minimum ground motion level to which all nuclear plants must be designed. The designation of the general type of seismic zone that may apply at any specific site is subject to interpretation but a conservative interpretation – meaning a larger zone—might include the following plants, based upon a preliminary estimate:

High Seismicity – Diablo Canyon, SONGS

Moderate Seismicity – Brunswick, Robinson, Summer, Vogtle, Hatch, Clinton, Watts Bar, Sequoya, North Anna

Low Seismicity – all other plants

**2. U.S. nuclear power plants are designed to be safe based on historical data of the area's maximum credible threat (including earthquakes and tsunamis). What extra safety features does the NRC currently require for facilities that have a credible threat of an earthquake or tsunami? In light of the recent events in Japan, we would also like the NRC to re-examine the assumptions used to determine the maximum credible threat and suggest additional options that could provide a greater margin for safety at plants nationwide that might be subject to challenges similar to this currently being seen in Japan following the earthquake and tsunami.**

The NRC requires that each plant be designed to withstand expected ground motion level specific to the site. Our regulations also require designs which consider the potential for a tsunami.

We have also taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. This includes a number of new regulatory requirements imposed by the NRC that have enhanced the domestic reactor fleet's preparedness for some of the problems we are seeing in Japan.

The "station blackout" (SBO) rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to

the site and provide cooling to the core. The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated in the event of a severe accident and core damage.

With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC initiated a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I Containment Improvement Program in the late 1980. This led to installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

Additionally, following the 9/11 events, reactor licensees have been required to develop strategies to maintain and restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. Licensees are required to develop strategies for fire fighting, operations to mitigate fuel damage, and actions to minimize radiological release

As a result of the events in Japan, the Chairman, with the full support of the Commission, has directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives.

For the near term effort, we have begun a 90-day review. This review will evaluate all of the available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include protection against earthquake, tsunami, flooding, hurricanes; station blackout and a degraded ability to restore power; severe accident mitigation; emergency preparedness; and combustible gas control. Over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed.

The task force's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has obtained sufficient technical information concerning the events in Japan. The longer term review will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to those events to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the NRC. We will also evaluate interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available.

**3. Which U.S. nuclear power plants share similar design features with the affected Japanese reactor facilities? Do these facilities have design vulnerabilities that should be addressed to ensure their cooling systems do not fail when confronted by stresses**

**including those similar to what we have seen in Japan following the earthquake and tsunami?**

Thirty-five of the 104 operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. are BWRs, as are the reactors at Fukushima. Twenty-three of the U.S. BWRs have the same Mark I containment as the Fukushima reactors. Four of the U.S. BWRs are early designs which are similar to Fukushima Unit 1. Nineteen U.S. BWRs are similar to Fukushima Unit 3.

BWR Mark I containments have different designs than other containments. However, the staff does not view the differences in design as vulnerabilities. For example, Mark I designs have relatively small volumes in comparison with most pressurized water reactor (PWR) containments. This makes the BWR Mark I containment relatively more susceptible to containment failure given a core meltdown severe enough to cause the reactor vessel to fail and to breach the containment boundary. On the positive side, BWRs have more ways of adding water to the core than PWRs. This includes the provision of two water injection sources which do not rely on AC electric power. For example these systems include Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and High pressure coolant injection (HPCI).

The NRC initiated a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I Containment Improvement Program in the late 1980s. This led to installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system. These changes mitigate the small containment volume of the Mark I design.

The NRC task force will be looking at the sequence of events and status of equipment during the events in Japan and will consider based on our review whether revisions to our regulatory framework are needed..

**4. How comprehensive is the radiation monitoring system in Japan? Would the U.S. take a similar monitoring approach if a serious accident were to occur here? What increased risk is associated with exposure to mixed oxide fuel?**

The NRC does not currently have sufficient information to describe in detail the radiation monitoring system in Japan. In addition to the radiation monitoring that is required to be performed by all U.S. reactor licensees, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency conducts environmental monitoring of radiation. Questions concerning the EPA's monitoring systems and actions should be directed to the EPA.

Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel involves the use of plutonium as a fuel, in addition to enriched uranium. Plutonium, like uranium is a long-lived alpha emitter, and they present similar biological risks. All commercial reactors produce plutonium from uranium during operation regardless of whether the material was there to begin with. Regarding exposure to mixed oxide fuel, in Japan, prompt evacuation has minimized radiation exposure to the public, so long-term public health consequences from radiation exposure resulting from the events, whether due to MOX or uranium fuel, are expected to be small. NRC has evaluated the use of MOX fuel and concluded

that the design basis accidents consequences were within the acceptance criteria and the differences between MOX and uranium fuel were within the dose consequences calculation uncertainties. The staff has concluded that the presence of a small number of MOX fuel assemblies in Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 constitutes an insignificant change from non-MOX fuel in core operating conditions and accident consequences.

**5. Given what has happened at the Japanese facilities, please describe how the NRC currently ensures the safety of spent fuel pools at U.S. facilities and identify additional steps the NRC could take to better address the vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools at plants in the U.S.**

Information concerning the circumstances and specific sequence of events at the Fukushima plants is incomplete at this time, and the lessons to be learned from those events remain to be determined. The NRC's regulatory focus is to ensure that cooling capability, both for reactors and for spent fuel pools, is maintained in order to prevent fuel damage. This has been accomplished at U.S. plants by redundant and/or diverse capabilities to provide forced cooling and water addition

The NRC task force will be looking at a range of issues, including station blackout and severe accident mitigation at spent fuel pools.

**6. Has the NRC modeled what could happen if the U.S. had multiple nuclear accidents simultaneously? If so, how would the NRC respond to such a disaster?**

In general, the NRC applies the Commission's safety goals on a per-reactor basis. However, in security assessments of two dual-unit sites in the 2002-2004 timeframe, the NRC considered the potential consequences of events simultaneously involving both reactors. The study found that the reactor containments and spent fuel pools are robust structures and resistant to a terrorist attack. The study also found that radiological releases are delayed and smaller than those predicted in past studies. Subsequently, additional mitigation measures were required (10CFR50.44(hh)) to further enhance safety. All U.S. nuclear power plant licensees are required to develop plans to deal with emergencies at their facilities, including the loss of offsite power. In addition, site-specific offsite emergency preparedness plans are required to be developed and exercised on a regular basis, to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. While these capabilities and plans are site-specific, they would apply as well in the event of a broader emergency involving multiple sites.

With regard to the NRC's response to a disaster, the NRC has experience in responding to national events affecting multiple facilities including major hurricanes and regional power blackouts such as the 2003 Northeast blackout. The NRC maintains an emergency operations center that is staffed 24/7. In addition to this emergency response center, the NRC has a backup operations center. Operation of the emergency response centers are tested regularly during facility and national emergency response drills.



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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 9:04 AM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: correspondence

I was told at 8:30 this morning that it would be signed out today.

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) [mailto:Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 9:01 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FW: correspondence

Any update regarding my questions below?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 4:16 PM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Subject:** Re: correspondence

Annie-i'm not at work today so I don't know where the letter is. It was assigned to OGC --

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 14:57:19 2011  
**Subject:** correspondence

Becky,

Will we see a response to Sen. Inhofe's letter today? Also, will we get a copy of the documents Sen. Boxer has requested?

Annie

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 9:28 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRR Price-Anderson meeting

OK, Jenny and Raeann will need to bring him up to speed on any inquiries from Congress after the accident in Japan and whether Congress is considering any changes to Price-Anderson. That is what they want OCA to address.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 9:25 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: NRR Price-Anderson meeting

I think Tom should. He was the expert on it before.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 7:14 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: NRR Price-Anderson meeting

FYI, Jenny has handled most Price Anderson stuff. Raeann is probably next most familiar.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 11 07:06:31 2011  
**Subject:** NRR Price-Anderson meeting

**NRR needs the name of the OCA rep for this meeting.**

Becky: Ira Dinitz from NRR called about getting an OCA rep to attend an NRR internal informational seminar on Price-Anderson after the events in Japan. The meeting is to be held on April 26 from 1:00-3:00 in T-10-A-01. The meeting is mainly NRR talking about Price-Anderson, but they want an OPA rep and an OCA rep to talk about interactions with our constituencies post Fukushima on issues such as whether we have received any questions about nuclear liability, who pays and whether we are aware of any proposals to change the liability limits, etc.. Ira would like the name of the OCA rep so they can put it in the information announcing the meeting. Who should do this for OCA? Thanks, Spiros

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**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 11:30 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Oral Testimony  
**Attachments:** FINAL April 12 Oral Testimony (4).docx

Here it is.  
Susan

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director  
Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov)

STATEMENT  
BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE  
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE  
AND THE  
CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY SUBCOMMITTEE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
APRIL 12, 2011

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to address the response of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the recent tragic events in Japan. People across the country and around the world who have been touched by the magnitude and scale of this disaster are closely following the events in Japan and the repercussions in this country and in other countries. Our hearts go out to all those who have been dealing with the aftermath of these natural disasters.

I made a brief visit to Japan two weeks ago. I wanted to convey a message of support and cooperation to our Japanese counterparts there and to assess the ongoing situation. I also met with senior Japanese government and TEPCO officials, and consulted with our NRC team of experts who are in Japan as part of our assistance effort.

On Friday, March 11, when the earthquake and tsunami struck, the NRC's headquarters Operations Center began operating on a 24-hour basis, consistent with the emergency authorities and responsibilities of the agency under the Reorganization Act of 1980. For the

past three weeks, the Operations Center has been monitoring and analyzing events in Japan. In spite of the evolving situation, the long hours, and the intensity of efforts, the NRC staff has approached their responsibilities with dedication, determination and professionalism, and still remained focused on our essential safety and security mission. I am incredibly proud of their work.

Our agency has a responsibility to the American people to undertake a systematic and methodical review of the safety of our own domestic nuclear facilities, in light of the situation in Japan. On Monday, March 21, my fellow Commissioners and I established a senior level task force to conduct a comprehensive review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make improvements to our regulatory system.

This review will be conducted in a short-term and a longer-term timeframe. The 90-day short-term review has already begun, and will identify potential or preliminary near-term operational or regulatory issues. A longer-term review will begin as soon as we have sufficient information from Japan. That review will be completed in six months from the beginning of the evaluation.

As we move forward with these efforts, we also recognize the importance of sharing our lessons learned with our regulatory counterparts. I recently returned from the Fifth Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which provided an important opportunity for participating nations to address the events in Japan and begin to formulate plans for short- and long-term cooperation.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue

to operate safely. Based on the 90-day review and the longer-term review that we have undertaken, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American people.

On behalf of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 12:36 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: correspondence

Did Ranking Member Cummings receive a copy of the documents requested by Chairman Issa or did he have to file a separate request?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 12:11 PM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: correspondence

Yes. thanks

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) [mailto:Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 11:39 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: correspondence

Yes. Does Sen. Inhofe need to send a letter?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 11:32 AM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: correspondence

With regards to your second question, are you requesting them?

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) [mailto:Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 9:01 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FW: correspondence

Any update regarding my questions below?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 4:16 PM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Subject:** Re: correspondence

Annie-i'm not at work today so I don't know where the letter is. It was assigned to OGC --

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 14:57:19 2011  
**Subject:** correspondence

Becky,

Will we see a response to Sen. Inhofe's letter today? Also, will we get a copy of the documents Sen. Boxer has requested?

Annie



---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) <bcook@usaid.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 3:37 PM  
**To:** 'Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye)'  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Mary, I recommend you contact Amy Powell at NRC. I am looping her in via this message.  
Bette

---

**From:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye) [mailto:Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 3:14 PM  
**To:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Subject:** NRC Contact

Hi Bette,

Hope you had a good weekend. I was hoping that you might have an NRC contact that we might be able to get in touch with. The Senator is scheduled to travel to Japan at the end of May, and we're just trying to keep on top of the nuclear situation. Of course, we hope that things will be settled by then, but also realizing that the Department of State is basing their travel warnings on the NRC's recommendation, I thought it best to go to the source.

Any assistance you might be able to provide would be greatly appreciate.

Thanks!  
Mary

---

**From:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 3:58 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Written Statement Attached  
**Attachments:** FINAL EPW April 12 Testimony (2) (2).docx

*Nancy Belmore  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[nancy.belmore@nrc.gov](mailto:nancy.belmore@nrc.gov)  
301-415-1776*

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 4:33 PM  
**To:** Lee, Katie(EPW)  
**Subject:** Question re: tomorrow's EPW hearing

Hi Katie –

Thanks for your patience with us in getting the testimony through Commission process and finalized. As Nancy mentioned, the hard copies are en route.

Question for you: will tomorrow's hearing being Webcast through the Committee's web site?

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 4:29 PM  
**To:** Katie\_Lee@epw.senate.gov  
**Cc:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Testimony for April 12 hearing - Attached

Mr. Dacus is on his way to bring the 100 copies.

*Nancy Belmore*  
*Office of Congressional Affairs*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
[nancy.belmore@nrc.gov](mailto:nancy.belmore@nrc.gov)  
*301-415-1776*

WRITTEN STATEMENT  
BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE  
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE  
AND THE  
CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY SUBCOMMITTEE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
APRIL 12, 2011

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to address the response of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the recent tragic events in Japan. People across the country and around the world who have been touched by the magnitude and scale of this disaster are closely following the events in Japan and the repercussions in this country and in other countries.

I would first like to reiterate my condolences to all those who have been affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Our hearts go out to all who have been dealing with the aftermath of these natural disasters, and we are mindful of the long and difficult road they will face in recovering. We know that the people of Japan are resilient and strong, and we have every confidence that they will come through this horrific time and move forward, with resolve, to rebuild their vibrant country. Our agency stands together with the people of Japan at this most difficult and challenging time. As part of that, I made a brief visit to Japan two weeks ago. I wanted to convey a message of support and cooperation to our Japanese counterparts there and to assess the ongoing situation. I also met with senior Japanese government and TEPCO

officials, and consulted with our NRC team of experts who are in Japan as part of our assistance effort.

The NRC is an independent regulatory safety agency, with approximately 4000 staff. We play a critically important role in protecting the American people and the environment. Our agency sets the rules by which commercial nuclear power plants operate, and nuclear materials are used in thousands of academic, medical and industrial settings in the United States. We have at least two resident inspectors who work full-time at every nuclear plant in the country, and we are proud to have world-class scientists, engineers and professionals representing nearly every scientific discipline.

Since Friday, March 11<sup>th</sup>, when the earthquake and tsunami struck, the NRC's headquarters 24-hour Emergency Operations Center has been fully activated, with staffing augmented to monitor and analyze events at nuclear power plants in Japan. At the request of the Japanese government, and through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the NRC sent a team of its technical experts to provide on-the-ground support, and we have been in continual contact with them. Within the United States, the NRC has been working closely with other Federal agencies as part of our government's response to the situation.

During these past several weeks, our staff has remained focused on our essential safety and security mission. I want to recognize their tireless efforts and their critical contributions to the U.S. response to assist Japan. In spite of the evolving situation, the long hours, and the intensity of efforts over the past week, NRC staff has approached their responsibilities with dedication, determination and professionalism, and I am incredibly proud of their efforts. The American people also can be proud of the commitment and dedication within the Federal workforce, which is exemplified by our staff every day.

The NRC's primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety of the American people. Toward that end, we have been very closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing all currently available information. Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing oversight, gives us confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. To date, there has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S. licensees.

Our agency has a long history of conservative safety decision-making. We have been intelligently using risk insights to help inform our regulatory process, and, for more than 35 years of civilian nuclear power in this country, we have never stopped requiring needed improvements to plant designs, and modifying our regulatory framework as we learn from operating experience.

At the same time the NRC is providing a very high level of support in response to the events in Japan, we continue to remain focused on our domestic responsibilities.

I'd like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and continuing response to the events in Japan. I then want to further discuss the reasons for our continuing confidence in the safety of the U. S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward for the NRC in order to learn all the lessons we can, in light of these events.

On Friday, March 11<sup>th</sup>, an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the shutdown of more than 10 reactors. The ensuing tsunami appears to have caused the loss of normal and emergency alternating current power to the six unit Fukushima Daiichi site. It is those six units that have received the majority of our attention since that time. Units One, Two, and

Three were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four, Five, and Six were in previously scheduled outages.

Shortly after 4:00 AM EDT on Friday, March 11th, the NRC Emergency Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the earthquake and the potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into monitoring mode later that morning at our Emergency Operations Center, and the NRC's first concern was possible impacts of the tsunami on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, Alaska, and U. S. Territories in the Pacific. We were in communication with licensees and NRC resident inspectors at Diablo Canyon Power Plant and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California, and the Radiation Control Program Directors for California, Washington, Oregon and Hawaii.

On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese regulatory counterparts and dispatched two experts to Japan to help at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo. By Monday, March 14, we had dispatched a total of 11 NRC staff to provide technical support to the American embassy and the Japanese government. We have subsequently rotated in additional staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The areas of focus for this team are: 1) to assist the Japanese government and respond to requests from our Japanese regulatory counterparts; and 2) to support the U. S. ambassador and the U.S. government assistance effort.

On Wednesday, March 16<sup>th</sup>, we collaborated with other U. S. government agencies and decided to advise American citizens to evacuate within a 50-mile range around the plant. The 50 mile evacuation recommendation that the NRC made to the U.S. Ambassador in Japan was made in the interest of protecting the health and safety of U.S. citizens in Japan. We based our assessment on the conditions as we understood them at the time. Since communications with

knowledgeable Japanese officials were limited and there was a large degree of uncertainty about plant conditions at the time, it was difficult to accurately assess the potential radiological hazard. In order to determine the proper evacuation distance, the NRC staff performed a series of calculations using NRC's RASCAL computer code to assess possible offsite consequences. The computer models used meteorological model data appropriate for the Fukushima Daiichi vicinity. Source terms were based on hypothetical, but not unreasonable, estimates of fuel damage, containment, and other release conditions. These calculations demonstrated that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines could be exceeded at a distance of up to 50 miles from the Fukushima site, if a large-scale release occurred from the reactors or spent fuel pools. The U.S. emergency preparedness framework provides for the expansion of emergency planning zones as conditions require. Acting in accordance with this framework, and with the best information available at the time, the NRC determined that evacuation out to 50 miles for U.S. citizens was a prudent course of action, and would be consistent with what we would do under similar circumstances in the United States, and we made that recommendation to the Ambassador and other U.S. Government agencies.

We have an extensive range of stakeholders with whom we have ongoing interaction regarding the Japan situation, including the White House, Congressional staff, our state regulatory counterparts, a number of other federal agencies, and international regulatory bodies around the world.

The NRC response in Japan and our Emergency Operations Center continue with the dedicated efforts of over 250 NRC staff on a rotating basis. The entire agency is coordinating and working together in response to this event so that we can provide assistance to Japan while continuing the vital activities necessary to fulfill our domestic responsibilities.

It is important to note that the U. S. government has an extensive network of radiation



monitors across this country. Monitoring by nuclear power plants and the EPA's system has not identified any radiation levels that affect public health and safety in this country. In fact, natural background radiation from sources such as rocks, the sun, and buildings, is 100,000 times more than doses attributed to any level that has been detected in the U.S. to date. Therefore, based on current data, we feel confident that there is no reason for concern in the United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan.

There are many factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor safety. We have, since the beginning of our regulatory programs, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not rely on any single layer of protection for public health and safety. Designs for every individual reactor in this country take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for natural events, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site.

There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any situation.

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U. S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including most significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we have significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures. We have addressed many human factors issues regarding how control room employees operate the plant, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and

created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves.

The NRC requires licensees to have a post-accident sampling system that enables the monitoring of radioactive material release and potential fuel degradation. One of the most significant changes after Three Mile Island was an expansion of the Resident Inspector Program, which now has at least two full-time NRC inspectors on site at each nuclear power plant. These inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities related to nuclear safety and security.

As a result of operating experience and ongoing research programs, severe accident management guidelines have been developed for use at nuclear power plants. These procedures were developed to ensure that, in the event all of the above-described precautions failed and a severe accident occurred, the plant would still protect public health and safety. Severe accident management guidelines have been in effect for many years and are evaluated by the NRC inspection program.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a plant, the NRC requires licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures and policies to help deal with a severe situation.

Our program of continuous improvement, based on operating experience, will now include evaluation of the significant events in Japan and what we can learn from them. We already have begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the resident inspectors and the region-based inspectors in our four Regional offices, to look at licensees' readiness to deal with both design-basis accidents and beyond-design-basis accidents.

We have also issued an information notice to licensees to make them aware of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities they should undertake to verify the continued operability of these mitigation measures. It is expected that licensees review the information related to their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems.

During the past several decades, there have been a number of new rulemakings that have enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness against some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. The "station blackout" rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current electricity so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current electricity to the site and provide cooling to the core.

The hydrogen control rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design-basis events and core damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see under a design-basis accident.

With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s. This program resulted in the installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

A final factor that underpins our belief in the ongoing safety of the U. S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and planning requirements in place that provide ongoing training,

testing, and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis.

Along with our confidence in the safety of U.S. nuclear power plants, our agency has a responsibility to the American people to undertake a systematic and methodical review of the safety of our domestic facilities, in light of the natural disaster and the resulting nuclear situation in Japan.

Examining all available information is an essential part of the effort to analyze the event and understand its impact on Japan and its implications for the United States. Our focus is always on keeping nuclear plants and radioactive materials in this country safe and secure.

On Monday, March 21, my colleagues on the Commission and I met to review the status of the situation in Japan and identify the steps needed to conduct that review. We consequently decided to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a comprehensive review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system, and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction.

The review will be conducted in both a short-term and a longer-term timeframe. The short-term review has already begun, and the task force will brief the Commission after 30, 60, and 90 day intervals and these meetings will be public web-cast meetings. At the 90 day interval, the staff will produce a public report to identify potential or preliminary near-term operational or regulatory issues. The task force then will undertake a longer-term review as

soon as NRC has sufficient information from the events in Japan. That longer-term review will be completed in six months from the beginning of the evaluation.

The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that may warrant action by the NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input from all key stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within six months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available.

As we move forward with these efforts, we also recognize the importance to sharing our lessons learned with our regulatory counterparts. I recently returned from the Fifth Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which provided an important opportunity for participating nations to address the events in Japan and begin to formulate plans for short- and long-term cooperation. We look forward to continuing this dialogue. We also commend International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Amano's announcement of the Agency's intention to host a ministerial-level conference in June. We are pleased to support the IAEA as it works to address and incorporate the events at Fukushima into its activities, as well as continuing its work in areas that have already been identified as nuclear safety and security priorities.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue

to operate safely. In light of the events in Japan, there will be a near-term evaluation of their relevance to the U.S. fleet, and we are continuing to gather the information necessary to take a longer, more comprehensive and thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American people.

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, and Members of the Committee, on behalf of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I look forward to continuing to work with you to advance the NRC's important safety mission.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 6:00 PM  
**To:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye)  
**Cc:** Cummisky, Margaret (Appropriations)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Hi Mary –

I tried to call you at the office but did not get through – you all must be having a busy day! The NRC has not offered any change to the current US government instructions for citizens' travel. FYI, NRC Chairman Jaczko traveled to Japan late last month as a show of support to our colleagues there. If it would be helpful, we'd be glad to set up a meeting or phone call between him and Senator Inouye. We'd also be glad to set up a staff level briefing for you if that would be helpful. Let me know.

Also FYI, NRC has had staff in Japan since March 12<sup>th</sup>; folks who have returned (we rotated new staff over there recently) posted some of their experiences on the agency's blog at <http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2011/04/07/from-japan-a-first-person-account/>

Hope to talk with you soon – my direct line appears below.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye) [mailto:Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 4:17 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Cummisky, Margaret (Appropriations)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Hi Amy,

Any information/update that you might be able to provide in regards to the NRC's recommendations for changes to the State Department's travel warning to Japan will be greatly appreciated. I cc'd Senator's staff on the Appropriations Committee, Ms. Margaret Cummisky, who is coordinating the Senator's May travel.

Thanks!  
Mary

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 3:37 PM  
**To:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye)

**Cc:** Powell, Amy (Amy.Powell@nrc.gov)

**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Mary, I recommend you contact Amy Powell at NRC. I am looping her in via this message.

Bette



---

**From:** Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 8:03 AM  
**To:** Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** AP article from Becky Schmidt  
**Attachments:** AP Article 4-12-11.pdf

Jeannette V. Quesenberry  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[Jeannette.Quesenberry@nrc.gov](mailto:Jeannette.Quesenberry@nrc.gov)  
301-415-1776  
301-415-8571

NRC Will Not License French-owned Plant (WNN) .....	30	Shaw Net Income Falls On Yen-dollar Swings (AP) .....	44
NRC Challenges Calvert Cliffs Reactor Project Ownership But Continues License Process (NUCSTR) .....	31	Georgia moves to swap drugs for executions (AUGC) .....	45
FEMA To Test Emergency Preparedness At TMI (WHTM) .....	31	Retired General: US Vulnerable To Cyber Attacks (AP) .....	45
Three Mile Island Drill (WTAJ) .....	31	Cyber-security In The Spotlight At URI (PROJO) .....	46
Drills Being Held At Three Mile Island (WFMZ) .....	31	Congress, Administration Grapple With Cyber Defense Authority (NGOV) .....	47
Athens Seeking Grant For Evacuation Route (DECD) .....	32	<b>In the Blogs:</b>	
AARP Defends Opposition To Nuclear Power Development Plan (CRG) .....	32	Avoiding Nuclear Safety   The Energy Collective (ENCOL) .....	47
AARP Says Ad Opposing Nuclear Plan Is Accurate (AP) .....	33	<b>International Nuclear News:</b>	
AARP Speaks Out Against Nuclear Plant Bill (RADIA) .....	33	Japan Regulators Raise Severity Of Nuclear Accident (USAT/AP) .....	49
AARP Calls Iowa Nuclear Plant Bill "bad Public Policy" (DMR) ..	33	Japan Rates Nuclear Crisis At Highest Severity Level (WP) .....	50
Vt. Gov Has Plan For 55-cent Charge (AP) .....	34	Japanese Declare Crisis At Level Of Chernobyl (WSJ) .....	51
Shumlin Wants Energy Fund Redesign (WCAX) .....	35	Japan Nuclear Disaster Put On Par With Chernobyl (NYT) .....	51
Peace Walk Extends From Indian Point To Vermont Yankee (MIDHUD) .....	36	Strong Quake Jolts Tokyo (AP) .....	52
Riverkeeper Warns Lawmakers Of Risks At Indian Point (WESTJN) .....	36	Clinton To Visit Japan In Show Of Support (AFP) .....	53
Entergy, Riverkeeper Officials Invited To Brief Lawmakers On Indian Point Safety; Watch At 3 P.m. (WESTJN) .....	37	Clinton To Visit Germany, Japan, SKorea This Week (AP) .....	53
US Nuclear Output Falls As Units Shut In New Jersey, Nebraska (BLOOM) .....	37	Clinton To Attend NATO Meeting, Visit Seoul, Tokyo (REU) ....	53
Shimkus Says Yucca Mountain Trip A Go Despite Cost Warnings (SLPD) .....	38	Cleaning Up Fukushima: A Challenge To The Core (NPR) .....	53
Lawmakers To Take Buses On Yucca Tour (LVSRJ) .....	39	Nuclear-Reactor Industry Faces Challenge (WSJ) .....	54
US Needs Nuclear Waste Storage Site (HILL) .....	39	Siemens, Areva End Nuclear JV, Legal Spat Goes On (REU) ...	54
Despite House GOP Push, Harry Reid Declares 'Yucca Is Dead' (LVS) .....	40	Anti-Nuclear Protesters Block Entry To EDF's London Offices (BLOOM) .....	54
US Senate Majority Leader Reid Says Yucca Rider Removed From CR (PLATTS) .....	41	Iran Touts Major Advances In Nuclear Program (WP) .....	55
Analyst Questions Safety Of Spent Fuel Storage (AP) .....	41	Iran To Build New Research Reactors (AP) .....	56
Murkowski: Smaller Steps On Energy (POLITCO) .....	41	Germany Rebuffs US Calls To Shut Iran Bank (WSJ) .....	56
Higher MOX Fuel Concentration Weighed For US Reactors (GSN) .....	43	Iran Blames Pipeline Explosion On Western Enemies (NYT) ....	56
Shaw Group, Babcock & Wilcox To Help Dismantle Damaged Japanese Plants (CLTBIZJ) .....	44		

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interactive story index, and links to complete stories where  
appropriate.

## **NRC NEWS:**

### **NRC Chairman Says No Change In 50-mile Evacuation Zone For Japanese Nuclear Crisis (AP)**

By Matthew Daly

Associated Press, April 12, 2011

*(last night's interview)*

WASHINGTON - The top US nuclear regulator said Monday he will not change a recommendation that US citizens stay at least 50 miles away from Japan's crippled nuclear power plant, even as he declared that the crisis in that country remains "static."

Gregory Jaczko, the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, acknowledged in an interview with The Associated Press that the month-old crisis in Japan has not yet stabilized. But he said conditions at the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant have not changed significantly for several days.

"We describe the situation as static but not yet stable," Jaczko said.

"It hasn't really changed too much in the last few days," he added, but it will be weeks or even months before the plant is stabilized.

The March 11 earthquake and tsunami knocked out power at the Fukushima plant and reactors have been overheating ever since. In Japan on Tuesday, the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan raised the severity rating of the crisis from 5 to 7, the highest level and on par with the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

Progress in stabilizing the complex comes slowly most days, or not at all, as new tremors and radiation repeatedly halt work. A new aftershock Monday briefly cut electricity to the plant and halted work while technicians took cover, but did not endanger operations, according to Japanese officials.

The Japanese government, meanwhile, added five communities Monday to a list of places people should leave to avoid long-term radiation exposure. A 12-mile radius has been cleared around the plant already.

Jaczkowski said the most important job at the plant still is keeping water in the spent fuel pools to cool the highly radioactive fuel rods, reducing the threat of a meltdown and a catastrophic release of radiation.

Jaczkowski, who traveled to Japan last month, said the NRC has begun a two-pronged approach to review the safety of the 104 commercial US nuclear reactors in the wake of the Japanese crisis. A 90-day review should be completed in June, with another report expected by the end of the year.

"We want this to be a very systematic and methodical review and make sure we identify all the important issues, and that we work with a sense of urgency and speed to address those issues in the appropriate way," he said, adding that he expects the reviews to result in recommendations for significant regulatory changes.

"Fundamentally, I expect that there will be some things we will want to change and need to change as a result of what comes out of this 90-day review and longer-term review, based on events in Japan," he said.

A task force made up of high-ranking NRC staff is conducting the two reviews, and the five-member commission will act quickly once the reports are released, Jaczkowski said.

On the 50-mile evacuation zone for US citizens in Japan, Jaczkowski called his March 16 recommendation "prudent" and said it was based on projections for continued deterioration at the plant. The Japanese government had set a 12-mile evacuation zone, and the US decision raised questions about US officials' confidence in Tokyo's risk assessments.

"I'm still very comfortable" with the decision, Jaczkowski said.

Asked whether he set up a double standard — one for nuclear plants in foreign countries and another for US plants, where a 10-mile evacuation zone is the current standard — Jaczkowski said no.

"I wouldn't say that's a contradiction," he said, noting that the 10-mile US evacuation zone refers to emergency planning prior to a nuclear disaster. If events warrant, a larger evacuation zone can be created.

"Ultimately, decisions about protective actions (in the event of a nuclear disaster) are made by state and local authorities," he said, not the NRC.

On another topic, Jaczkowski said he believes spent fuel can be stored safely either in pools or in dry cask storage. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., sent Jaczkowski a letter Monday urging the NRC to establish regulations that would encourage plant operators to move more quickly to store spent fuel in dry casks, rather than in pools that must be kept cooled.

Feinstein cited a 2006 study by the National Research Council indicating that dry cask storage systems have inherent safety advantages over spent fuel pools.

Jaczkowski disputed that, saying both methods are safe.

The United States has not had an accident involving spent fuel in decades, and spent fuel at commercial US reactors "continues to be safe and secure," even without a designated site to store nuclear waste, Jaczkowski said. The Obama administration has abandoned plans for a nuclear waste dump in Nevada, prompting sharp criticism from some lawmakers in both parties.

Jaczkowski declined to speculate on whether the Japanese crisis would cause a slowdown in a planned expansion of US nuclear reactors backed by President Barack Obama. Jaczkowski said the NRC has "a very robust system" to license reactors that takes into account a wide range of factors.

"Ultimately safety rests with the (plant operator)," he said. "It's our job to make sure they get there."

If the NRC considers plants unsafe, it will take corrective action, up to and including shutting down plants if necessary, Jaczkowski said.

Three US nuclear power plants — in South Carolina, Kansas and Nebraska — need increased oversight from federal regulators because of safety problems or unplanned shutdowns. But Jaczkowski said all 65 US nuclear plants in 31 states are operating safely.

## Japan Nuke Crisis Not Yet Stable (AP)

Associated Press, April 12, 2011

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**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 8:45 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Double-checking receipt of letter

Yes

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 08:30 AM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Subject:** Double-checking receipt of letter

Hi Annie –

Just double-checking to make sure that you go this last night...

See you later today,  
AP

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 4:56 PM  
**To:** 'Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov'  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Response to Sen. Inhofe's April 6th letter

Hi Annie –

Attached is Chairman Jaczko's response to Sen. Inhofe's April 6<sup>th</sup> letter on emergency powers.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 11, 2011

Chairman  
Senator James M. Inhofe  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Environment and Public Works  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-6175

Dear Senator Inhofe:

This letter responds to your inquiry, dated April 6, 2011, regarding the NRC's response to the events in Japan and, in particular, my actions as Chairman as part of the response to that emergency. The President designated me as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on May 13, 2009. That designation conferred upon me the executive authorities vested in the chairmanship, including the authority to exercise emergency powers, when warranted.

As the events at Fukushima began to unfold following the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and in light of the presence of U.S. citizens and U.S. interests in Japan, not to mention Japan's status as a close ally to the United States, it became clear that the U.S. Government would have a significant interest regarding this foreign nuclear emergency. The NRC is the U.S. agency responsible for monitoring, understanding, and communicating about nuclear plant safety events, and those core competencies have served an important role in our Government's response to the events in Japan.

The NRC's Headquarters Operations Center has served a key role in assisting the U.S. Government's efforts to monitor the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The Operations Center is intended to be managed during events by a traditional management structure with a single responsible official in charge. My exercise of emergency powers facilitates that process. Also, please note that there are no procedures in place for the full Commission to manage ongoing Operations Center response activities, nor would one expect there to be, given the assignment of responsibility to the Chairman under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980. The agency's well-established and oft-tested emergency response procedures serve us well not only in responding to domestic events, but also to international events where NRC's response capabilities can support our government's interests.


As you note, after the initial threat of potential tsunami effects on U.S. territory had passed, our subsequent activities have focused primarily on monitoring potential radiation reaching the U.S. and on providing advice and assistance within our Government and to Japan. To the extent this is said to involve the exercise of my emergency powers, I have been careful to act in the spirit of the Reorganization Plan, with appropriate regard to existing Commission policy and by keeping my fellow Commissioners informed. With respect to the Japanese emergency, many of the NRC's primary activities have involved communications—an authority the Chairman possesses as official spokesman even in non-emergency situations—and monitoring via the NRC's Operations Center—an executive activity that would also fall within the Chairman's authority to manage as the agency's principal executive officer.

Over the course of the events in Japan, I have maintained regular contact with my fellow Commissioners and have briefed them frequently, both individually and as a group on the latest developments. Event notification emails sent throughout the agency by the Headquarters Operations Center, beginning on March 11, also alerted agency personnel generally that the NRC was responding to the emergency. Press releases issued in the days after the earthquake and tsunami also provided notice to the general public that the NRC was engaging in response activities and that the Headquarters Operations Center was monitoring the events in Japan on a 24-hour basis.

As we take steps to understand any implications of the events in Japan for the regulation and safe operation of nuclear facilities in the United States, I have fully engaged my colleagues to obtain their insights and they supported the direction to the NRC staff to establish a task force to look at the near-term and longer-term implications of the Fukushima event.

I appreciate this opportunity to respond to your questions and trust I have satisfied your concerns.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gregory B. Jaczko". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Gregory B. Jaczko

---

**From:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy) <Isaac\_Edwards@energy.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 12:19 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

Thanks

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 12:03 PM  
**To:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

Hi – sorry for the delayed response. I've got a message into a contact on our protective measures team (part of how we divvy up the Operations Center during a response) to see what update there may be.

---

**From:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy) [mailto:Isaac\_Edwards@energy.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 3:10 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

Amy – has there been any further progress in standing up the working group between the NRC, NOAA and OSTP to monitor and model radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi plant in the seawater?

Thanks  
Isaac

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 12:19 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** FW: Results Senate EPW staff briefing

Don't need this level of detail in the news, but FYI in case it helps you write it up (happened 4/11).

AP

---

**From:** Weber, Michael  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 8:55 PM  
**To:** Wiggins, Jim  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin; Carpenter, Cynthia; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Burns, Stephen; Muessle, Mary; Borchardt, Bill; Coggins, Angela; Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Response - Results Senate EPW staff briefing

Thanks. Sounds like a positive outcome.

---

**From:** Wiggins, Jim  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Cc:** Weber, Michael  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 11 18:30:49 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Results Senate EPW staff briefing

---

**From:** McDermott, Brian  
**To:** Wiggins, Jim; Evans, Michele  
**Cc:** Milligan, Patricia; Thaggard, Mark; Morris, Scott  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 11 17:57:16 2011  
**Subject:** Results Senate EPW staff briefing

A dozen or so staffers that attended the briefing presented by Trish Milligan. Was well received and the staffers were engaged, asking good questions.

Questions were almost all centered on EP programs and what is required. Did not ask about specific topics from the short or long term TF activities.

There were two "what if" questions that Trish did a nice job of answering:

Q: Would we need a 50 mi EPZ if all the workers walked away? Basic answer was that additional responders are called in immediately to assist and this is a practiced response.

Q: What would happen to NYC drinking water reservoirs (near IP) if there was a release? Trish described the ongoing monitoring of the water supplies under EPA and that actions would be taken, similar to the bottled water for children in Japan, if needed. She also stressed that the typical limits used by EPA for safe drinking water are based on a 70 year exposure.

Brian



Brian J. McDermott  
202-631-1663 (mobile)

---

**From:** Milligan, Patricia  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** McDermott, Brian  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 11 16:42:37 2011  
**Subject:** Senate committee staff briefing april 11 2011.pptx

David

Attached are the slides and I've also included some of the references I mentioned.

Telephone survey document

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6953/vol2/>

evacuation document

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6864/>

post Katrina evacuation document

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6981/>

NRC's Japan Page

<http://www.nrc.gov/japan/japan-info.html>

---

**From:** NEIGA@nei.org  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 12:45 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NEI Update as of 11:30 A.M. EDT, Tuesday, April 12



**UPDATE AS OF 11:30 A.M. EDT, TUESDAY, APRIL 12**

Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) is planning to pump highly radioactive water from reactor 2 into a condenser, as the utility works to control radiation and restore cooling systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

TEPCO continues to inject cooling water into reactors 1, 2 and 3 and to spray water into the used fuel pools for reactors 1-4. TEPCO also continues injection of nitrogen gas into the containment vessel of reactor 1 to prevent a possible explosion of hydrogen that may be accumulating inside.

A fire that broke out early Tuesday at a distribution switchboard near the south water discharge channel for reactors 1-4 was extinguished without interruption of reactor cooling operations or the release of radioactivity, TEPCO said.

The crisis rating of the Fukushima Daiichi accident was raised from 5 to 7 on the seven-level International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale by the Japan Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. The new level, the highest on the scale, designates Fukushima as a "major accident." The new rating puts the Japanese incident on the same level as the 1986 Chernobyl accident—even though Japanese authorities estimate that radiation released at Fukushima is only 10 percent of the amount released from the Ukrainian plant.

Authorities said much of the high-level radiation leaked from reactor 2 on March 15 and 16, early in the accident. Abnormalities in the reactor's suppression pool caused the radiation release, the Japan Nuclear Safety Commission said. Radiation continues to leak from the suppression pool, the commission said, but the volume has dropped considerably.

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1776 I Street NW, Suite 400  
Washington, DC 20006

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---

**From:** Wittick, Susan  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 1:33 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Burnell, Scott; Solorio, Dave  
**Subject:** FW: COMMISSION E-READER....TUESDAY, APRIL 12th  
**Attachments:** Tab C 04-07-11 J. Rogers.pdf

Becky/Amy,

Forwarded for your review is an email sent to me from Dave Solorio in the Office of Enforcement regarding Congressional correspondence.

Thanks,

Susan

---


**From:** Solorio, Dave  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 1:09 PM  
**To:** Wittick, Susan  
**Cc:** Burnell, Scott  
**Subject:** FW: COMMISSION E-READER....TUESDAY, APRIL 12th

Hi Susan

I read the letter from the MA congressman and I am hoping when we reply to letters like this we educate our representatives (and members of the public that read the responses) that it is NOT the NRC that is holding up licensing of the permanent storage site.

Dave

**Tab "C" 04/07/11 -- Letter from John Rogers, Commonwealth of MA, concerns the safety and soundness of nuclear power plants situated in Massachusetts.**



# *The Commonwealth of Massachusetts*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
STATE HOUSE, BOSTON 02133-1020

**JOHN H. ROGERS**  
REPRESENTATIVE  
12TH NORFOLK DISTRICT

ROOM 162, STATE HOUSE  
TEL: (617) 722-2040  
FAX: (617) 722-2347

Rep.JohnRogers@hou.state.ma.us

**COMMITTEES:**

Education  
Labor and Workforce Development  
Telecommunications, Utilities and Energy

April 7, 2011

Chairman Gregory B. Jackzo  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
One White Flint North  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

Dear Chairman Jackzo:

As a Member of the Joint Committee on Telecommunications, Utilities, and Energy, I am concerned about the safety and soundness of nuclear power plants situated here in Massachusetts in light of the recent tragedy involving the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan. I specifically request an exhaustive safety review of Pilgrim Nuclear power plant located just 30 miles from the families who live within my district. This close proximity to Pilgrim is of major concern to me since my constituents live and work well within the 50-mile evacuation radius currently employed in Japan by American nuclear officials.

As you know, Pilgrim was initially licensed to operate in 1972 and its 40-year license is up for renewal in June of next year. As your agency begins its review of Pilgrim's relicensing efforts this year, please postpone your approval until Pilgrim agrees to utilize safer forms of storage for spent nuclear fuel. Specifically, please consider mandating either total dry cask storage on-site or safe off-site storage facilities, to be located preferably in one of the 19 states that currently do not host nuclear power facilities. The existing practice of on-site wet storage pools is no longer acceptable given the horrific fact that such storage pools are now leaking radioactive water in Japan and trace amounts of Iodine-131 are appearing here in Massachusetts linked to the plant in Japan.

Three decades ago, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which, as you know, was enacted to locate and provide a safe, off-site storage facility for our country's use; but after \$10 billion of taxpayer money having been spent since, no such site exists. We are counting on your efforts and leadership to ensure that this long-neglected need is fulfilled.

I wish you good luck in your endeavors on behalf of the American people and I eagerly await your reply.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John H. Rogers".  
John H. Rogers

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:03 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

Tim is going to send Marty an email with the chart and to ask whether he could talk to Michal tomorrow before he responds to Michal. He will cc all of us.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:02 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

No but someone should call her to let her know

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 16:58:56 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

Ok, I think this has to wait until tomorrow. Marty needs to see the numbers the staff has come up with. Do you have a problem with holding her off until tomorrow?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 4:58 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

No

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 16:53:48 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

Do you have his number?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 4:52 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

Marty is gone. I went with chr. Marty is in the car. You could call him

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy

**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 16:43:03 2011

**Subject:** RE: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

Can you check on Marty's availability before Tim sends this info?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 3:57 PM

**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy

**Subject:** Re: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

I can't open but I think it is ok if they cleared it

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros

**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy

**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy

**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 15:54:10 2011

**Subject:** FW: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

This is the information the RST came up with on pressure and radiation readings. No speculating, just readings. Can Tim send this to Michal? He says it was cleared by the RST with the EOC's ET.

---

**From:** RST09 Hoc

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 1:46 PM

**To:** Droggitis, Spiros

**Cc:** RST01 Hoc

**Subject:** FW: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

Spiros,

Attached are the pressure and radiation readings for Units 1, 2 and 3 as requested.

Ben Beasley

RST Accident Analyst

---

**From:** RST01 Hoc

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 10:49 AM

**To:** RST09 Hoc; RST08 Hoc

**Subject:** FW: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros

**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 10:41 AM

**To:** RST01 Hoc

**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy

**Subject:** Question from Congressman Markey's staff

A staffer from Congressman Markey's office has the following question:

She would like to know what the pressure and radiation readings are for Units 1 and 3 at Fukushima, and what can be inferred from those readings vis the readings at Unit 2.

Thanks

---

**From:** NEIGA@nei.org  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 10:52 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NEI Update as of 10 a.m. EDT, Wednesday, April 13



**UPDATE AS OF 10:00 A.M. EDT, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13:**

Workers at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant are pumping radioactive water from the concrete enclosure near reactor 2 into a turbine condenser. A series of aftershocks that rattled the area Tuesday has put the work behind schedule. Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) is inspecting another storage facility on the site to determine if it can hold contaminated water from the basement of the reactor 2 turbine building. Radioactive water in the turbine buildings is hampering efforts to restore cooling operations at the plant.

TEPCO continues to inject cooling water into reactors 1, 2 and 3 and to spray water as needed into the used fuel pools for reactors 1-4. TEPCO also continues injection of nitrogen gas into the containment vessel of reactor 1 to prevent a possible explosion of hydrogen that may be accumulating inside.

Also, NEI has posted a new fact sheet, "Comparing Chernobyl and Fukushima." The key facts show that although the events at the Fukushima nuclear plant and the Chernobyl accident are both at a level 7 according to the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, the situations are starkly different because of different reactor designs and much less severe public health consequences at Fukushima.

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E: [NEIResponseCenter@nei.org](mailto:NEIResponseCenter@nei.org)



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---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 11:35 AM  
**To:** ICOD Support (FOIA)  
**Subject:** I need help

In responding to these various FOIA requests. Thanks

---

**From:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy) <Isaac\_Edwards@energy.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 6:28 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

NHK

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 06:00 PM  
**To:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

What's the source of the data below?

---

**From:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy) [mailto:Isaac\_Edwards@energy.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 4:56 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

Amy – fyi the water trends are going to start making folks on the Hill (at least the Alaska folks) a bit antsy...

Isaac

High radiation levels in sea off Fukushima coast

The science ministry says radiation levels in seawater off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture are the highest since it began monitoring them about 3 weeks ago.

The ministry says the level of iodine-131 was 88.5 becquerels per liter in a sample taken on Monday in the sea about 30 kilometers east of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The figure is 2.2 times the government's upper limit for wastewater from nuclear facilities.

The level of cesium-137 was also the highest observed so far, but was below the limit.

Tokyo Electric Power Company says the iodine-131 level was 23 times the upper limit in a sample taken 15 kilometers from the plant.

This was the highest figure since TEPCO began taking samples 15 kilometers offshore on April 2nd.

Radiation levels are higher in the sea to the north of the crippled plant.

The government's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency says radioactive substances seem to be flowing and diffusing northward.

The agency says predicting the course of the flow is difficult and it will step up monitoring in locations where high radiation levels have been detected.

Wednesday, April 13, 2011 09:04 +0900 (JST)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 12:03 PM  
**To:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

Hi – sorry for the delayed response. I've got a message into a contact on our protective measures team (part of how we divvy up the Operations Center during a response) to see what update there may be.

---

**From:** Edwards, Isaac (Energy) [mailto:Isaac\_Edwards@energy.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 3:10 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC/NOAA water radiation monitoring

Amy – has there been any further progress in standing up the working group between the NRC, NOAA and OSTP to monitor and model radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi plant in the seawater?

Thanks  
Isaac

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 6:47 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Coggins, Angela  
**Subject:** Re: More on emergency powers

I think the message should be that this is a totally absurd red herring. The only time it is relevant whether a chairman is acting under his emergency authorities versus all of his other authorities is when he or she assumes the powers of the full Commission to issue orders and change requirements for licenses separate and apart from the normal Commission processes. Any Chairman has that legal authority but thankfully after almost two years on the job he has never even once needed to do that.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot; Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 13 18:20:48 2011  
**Subject:** More on emergency powers

Sen. Boxer's EPW staff just called – Politico (Darius Dixon) asked them for comment about the emergency powers issue.

---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 6:09 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: post-hearing scrum

Folks: those who would like to press this issue are not going away. I'll take any help anyone wants to give me. I've already given Steve what I can.

---

**From:** Dolley, Steven [mailto:Steven\_Dolley@platts.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 6:00 PM  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot  
**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

Thanks. I've talked with some more folks since Tuesday.

1. What specific emergency powers, if any, including those under the Reorganization Act, has the chairman invoked in regard to the Fukushima accident? When was that done, if it was done?
2. Were the other commissioners consulted on, or informed of, the chairman's invocation(s)? If they were not, why not?
3. Why did the chairman not mention emergency powers invocation at the March 16 hearings, or in his conversations with Senator Inhofe?
4. Why was the majority staff at the Senate EPW committee notified, but not the minority staff (if that is true)?
5. Why did only Chairman Jaczko appear at yesterday's hearing, rather than the full commission?

6. What basis or authority does the chairman have to use emergency powers under the Reorganization Act, given the emergency in question is at a non-US nuclear facility?

---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot [mailto:Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 5:42 PM  
**To:** Dolley, Steven  
**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

Yeah, a little. I think the senator's office made public our letter, and I asked the chairman about it this morning. He believes that concern about this is misplaced and inappropriate and he believes his action have been fully consistent with his authority and responsibilities.

How's that for an answer?

Eliot

---

**From:** Dolley, Steven [mailto:Steven\_Dolley@platts.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 5:11 PM  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot  
**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

Any luck on this today? I'm writing Thursday afternoon. Thanks, Steve

---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot [mailto:Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 7:45 PM  
**To:** Dolley, Steven  
**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

The answer I was referring to was what he said in the committee hearing, which very roughly translated was that there are authorities that exist with the job and don't necessarily have to be invoked. However, this is a very nuanced legal area and I think it best that I talk with counsel tomorrow to get a real bead on this.

---

**From:** Dolley, Steven [mailto:Steven\_Dolley@platts.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 7:40 PM  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot  
**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

Thanks. But his answer, at least what I heard, was just to refer me to Inhofe. What did I miss?

---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot [mailto:Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 7:36 PM  
**To:** Dolley, Steven  
**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

Take a look at his answer and the letter we sent Inhoffe. I think they'll release it. I will check with counsel in the morning but I believe there is authority to act that comes with being chairman that does not need to be invoked, it exists.

**From:** Dolley, Steven [mailto:Steven\_Dolley@platts.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 6:52 PM  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot  
**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

Thanks for tossing me the question, even though he ducked it. I would like to find out what, if any, extraordinary authority or powers the chairman has invoked since March 11; what the basis was for their activation; whether the commission was consulted on those actions; how long they will remain in effect; and why emergency authority is justified by an accident that is not taking place at an NRC-licensed or regulated facility. Can you help me out with that, should I follow up with Scott? Thanks, Steve

Steven Dolley  
Managing Editor, Inside NRC  
Platts Nuclear  
202-383-2166 Office  
202-383-2187 Fax

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**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 6:50 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Coggins, Angela  
**Subject:** Re: More on emergency powers

Should he call politico?

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

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**Subject:** RE: post-hearing scrum

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Steven Dolley  
Managing Editor, Inside NRC  
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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 1:34 PM  
**To:** Cool, Donald  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** FW: Rad levels in ocean

Hi Don –

FYI, I wanted to pass along a note that I sent to the Ops Center last night. Are you aware of NRC (and/or other Fed) involvement in monitoring and/or modeling rad “plumes” in the ocean off the US in light of events in Japan? I heard some word of a potential working group with NRC, NOAA, and OSTP but not sure who is doing what at this point. Any intel here?

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 7:28 PM  
**To:** Hoc, PMT12  
**Subject:** RE: Rad levels in ocean

Sandra –

To follow up, NHK was the source for this data report.

Thanks,  
Amy

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 6:00 PM  
**To:** Hoc, PMT12  
**Subject:** Rad levels in ocean

Sandra –

Thanks for taking my call. Per our chat, I have two things for you>

1. Congressional staff from the Alaskan delegation sent me the following as an FYI – I will ask him what the source of the data is:

“High radiation levels in sea off Fukushima coast

The science ministry says radiation levels in seawater off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture are the highest since it began monitoring them about 3 weeks ago.

The ministry says the level of iodine-131 was 88.5 becquerels per liter in a sample taken on Monday in the sea about 30 kilometers east of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The figure is 2.2 times the government's upper limit for wastewater from nuclear facilities.

The level of cesium-137 was also the highest observed so far, but was below the limit.

Tokyo Electric Power Company says the iodine-131 level was 23 times the upper limit in a sample taken 15 kilometers from the plant.

This was the highest figure since TEPCO began taking samples 15 kilometers offshore on April 2nd.

Radiation levels are higher in the sea to the north of the crippled plant.

The government's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency says radioactive substances seem to be flowing and diffusing northward.

The agency says predicting the course of the flow is difficult and it will step up monitoring in locations where high radiation levels have been detected.

Wednesday, April 13, 2011 09:04 +0900 (JST)”

2. In the US, who is monitoring and/or modeling radiation “plumes” in the ocean? My limited understanding last week was that NOAA, NRC, and OSTP were standing up a working group related to this. Any update or clarity on who is monitoring?

Thanks so much,

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Morgan Pinnell <mpinnell@psr.org>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 3:05 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: setting up meetings with the commissioners again

Hi Spiros,

I hate to be a pain, but the 26th is Chernobyl day and many of our organizations have things planned (25th anniversary and all). Would another day work?

Morgan

On Thu, Apr 14, 2011 at 1:36 PM, Droggitis, Spiros <[Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov](mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov)> wrote:

I've got 3 lined up for April 26 and am waiting to hear back from one more, so it looks like it's going to be the 26<sup>th</sup>. I'll let you know when I get final confirmation and a schedule.

---

**From:** Morgan Pinnell [mailto:[mpinnell@psr.org](mailto:mpinnell@psr.org)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 3:12 PM

**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: setting up meetings with the commissioners again

Hi Spiros,

Yes on the 1st--not the Chairman, and Yes on the 2nd, as many meetings as possible in one day (since Rockville is a haul).

Morgan

On Tue, Apr 12, 2011 at 3:10 PM, Droggitis, Spiros <[Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov](mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov)> wrote:

Ok, just to confirm – the 4 Commissioners and not the Chairman, correct? Looks like some of the Commissioners are on travel for some of those days. Your preference is to try to do as many as you can in one day, correct? Let me know. Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** Morgan Pinnell [mailto:[mpinnell@psr.org](mailto:mpinnell@psr.org)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 3:03 PM

**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: setting up meetings with the commissioners again

Hi Spiros,

Sorry it took so long to get this info to you--had to herd some cats.

Here are probable participants:

Michele Boyd, PSR

Paul Gunter, Beyond Nuclear

Tom Cochran, NRDC

Michael Mariotte, NIRS

Erich Pica, FOE

Potential dates:

Weeks of April 24, May 1 (whatever dates work best to do the combo of folks).

Topics:

Status of situation in Fukushima

- 90-day review by NRC Task Force
- Long-term review

So let me know if there's interest on the part of the commissioners.

Morgan

On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 5:22 PM, Droggitis, Spiros <[Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov](mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov)> wrote:

If you want to give me a list of the participants, discussion topics and possible dates, I can shop them around to the Commissioners' offices for you. Let me know. Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** Morgan Pinnell [mailto:[mpinnell@psr.org](mailto:mpinnell@psr.org)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 5:21 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: setting up meetings with the commissioners again

We just met with Jaczko's staff here today, so we want to meet with everyone else now. Can't do meetings next week (Michele is in Germany) but beyond that is fine.

Morgan

On Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 5:17 PM, Droggitis, Spiros <[Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov](mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov)> wrote:

Which ones are you trying to see or easier which one are you not trying to see?

---

**From:** Morgan Pinnell [mailto:[mpinnell@psr.org](mailto:mpinnell@psr.org)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 5:14 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** setting up meetings with the commissioners again

Hi Spiros,

I'm going to try and set up meetings with 4 of the commissioners later this month for the Safe Energy Coalition. Wanted to keep you in the loop and see if there's anything you could do to facilitate.

Thanks!

Morgan

--

Morgan Pinnell  
Safe Energy Program Manager  
Physicians for Social Responsibility  
Phone: [202-587-5232](tel:202-587-5232)  
Email: [mpinnell@psr.org](mailto:mpinnell@psr.org)  
Website: [www.nuclearbailout.org](http://www.nuclearbailout.org)

**Error! Filename not specified.**

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**Error! Filename not specified.**

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**Phone: 202-587-5232**  
**Email: mpinnell@psr.org**  
**Website: www.nuclearbailout.org**



**From:** nuclearcurrents@nei.org  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 5:09 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Japanese Raise Severity of Nuclear Incident from 5 to 7 on International Atomic Energy Agency Scale



Thursday, April 14, 2011

### Special Section: Japanese Nuclear Incident

"The government announced Tuesday morning that it had raised its rating of the severity of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to 7, the worst on an international scale, from 5. Officials said that the reactor had released one-tenth as much radioactive material as the Chernobyl accident in 1986, but still qualified as a 7 according to a complex formula devised by the International Atomic Energy Agency."

Japanese Officials on Defensive as Nuclear Alert Level Rises  
*The New York Times*, April 12

*We encourage you to visit NEI's special Web page – Information on the Japanese Earthquake and Reactors in the Region – for all the latest updates on the Fukushima nuclear facilities.*

### What's Being Said

"What a strange turn of events. Instead of uniting the environmental movement in renewed opposition to nuclear power, the Fukushima disaster in Japan has divided it still further. An increasing number of green advocates, including some very prominent voices, have declared their support for nuclear power as a clean energy option, even as radioactive water accumulates and the timeline for cleaning up the contaminated areas extends by decades. Can they be serious? They can."

Why nuclear power is still a good choice  
*Los Angeles Times*, April 10

### On the Hill

### NEI's Online Congressional Resource Guide

All the research information and news you need, just a click away:  
[www.nei.org/112thcongress](http://www.nei.org/112thcongress)

### On Twitter

Are US emergency planning requirements at #nuclear plants adequate to deal with a situation like #Fukushima?  
See #8: <http://bitly.com/qN65bF>

Follow Us on Twitter

### On NEI's Blog

Many commentators have noted that Fukushima does not seem to rise to the same level as Chernobyl, yet both are rated as level 7. Is it incorrect to look at

"A top Senate Democrat on Monday urged the U.S. nuclear regulator to require plants to speed up the shift of radioactive waste to dry cask storage from pools. U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, head of a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that oversees energy agencies, said dry cask storage systems for nuclear waste are safer than spent fuel pools."

[US lawmaker calls for new nuclear waste rules](#)

*Reuters, April 11*

"In testimony before the Senate on March 30, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor of physics Ernest Moniz called for these spent fuel rods to be stored in "dry" casks at regional government facilities. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) agreed. While I agree with the government following its own law and taking control of nuclear waste, I question why we should throw away the \$14.5 billion already spent on Yucca Mountain. We don't need regional sites; we already have designated a consolidated government storage site!" says Rep. John Shimkus (IL-19).

[US needs nuclear waste storage site](#)

*The Hill, April 11*

## **In the Nation**

"The owner of California's Diablo Canyon nuclear-power plant said it wouldn't seek license renewals for its two reactors until new studies of the area's vulnerability to earthquakes can be conducted."

[Diablo Plant Delays License Bid for Quake Study](#)

*The Wall Street Journal, April 12*

"SCE&G officials said Tuesday that a repeat of the nuclear disaster in Japan wouldn't happen at its Jenkinsville plant because the perfect storm of earthquake and tsunami that wrecked the Fukushima facility was impossible in South Carolina."

['Nothing to hide' tour of Jenkinsville nuclear plant](#)

*The State (South Carolina), April 13*

"A new nuclear power plant proposed for eastern Georgia would be safer than the existing U.S. nuclear fleet, and the utility building it plans to proceed despite the ongoing nuclear crisis in Japan, Southern Co. CEO Thomas Fanning said Wednesday."

[Southern Co. CEO: nuclear project remains on track](#)

*Associated Press, April 13*

## **Across the Waters**

"Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of Japan's tsunami-damaged nuclear power plant, said on Wednesday it has begun preparing plans for compensation to those affected by the crisis but added that nothing specific has been decided."

[Japan nuclear plant operator says preparing compensation plans](#)

*Reuters, April 13*

"Hitachi Ltd. and General Electric Co. submitted a plan to dismantle the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi plant they helped build as Japanese engineers battle to contain the worst nuclear crisis since Chernobyl."

[Hitachi, GE Submit Proposal to Dismantle Crippled Fukushima Nuclear Plant](#)

*Bloomberg, April 12*

"South Korea and China agreed on Wednesday to seek ways to tighten their cooperation on

the scale as a precise measuring tool?

[Read more...](#)



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NEI is a founding reporter of  
The Climate Registry, voluntarily  
measuring and publicly reporting our  
greenhouse gas emissions each year.

nuclear safety in the wake of massive radiation leaks from a tsunami-hit nuclear plant in Japan and prevent any spread of damage to neighboring countries, the Seoul government said."

S. Korea, China agree to increase nuclear safety cooperation

*Yonhap News Agency, April 14*

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Your questions, comments, suggestions or any additions to the mailing list are welcome. We can be reached at [NuclearCurrents@nei.org](mailto:NuclearCurrents@nei.org). We look forward to hearing from you.

For more information, visit [www.nei.org](http://www.nei.org).

Nikolaus W. Schoenherr  
Legislative Coordinator

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**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 5:55 PM  
**To:** Nouri, Ali (Webb); Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: nrc letter from Senator Webb to Chairman Jaczko

Thanks Ali, will do.

---

**From:** Nouri, Ali (Webb) [mailto:Ali\_Nouri@webb.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 5:47 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** nrc letter from Senator Webb to Chairman Jaczko

Dear Amy and Raeann,  
Attached is a letter from Senator Webb to Chairman Jaczko. Would you please make sure he gets it?  
Thanks very much,  
Ali

Ali Nouri, PhD  
Legislative Assistant  
Office of U.S. Senator Jim Webb  
202-224-4024

Please open the attached document. This document was digitally sent to you using an HP Digital Sending device.

JIM WEBB  
VIRGINIA

COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
COMMITTEE ON  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
(202) 224-4024

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4605

April 15, 2011

The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko  
Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jaczko:


I write regarding the March 16, 2011 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) evacuation recommendation for U.S. residents within 50 miles of the Fukushima reactors. According to the NRC, this recommendation was issued under guidelines for public safety that would be used in the United States under similar circumstances.

As this recommendation could have important implications for U.S. energy security, public health, and environmental protection, I respectfully request that you disclose all assumptions that were used in reaching this conclusion. In addition to any other relevant information, please address the following points:

- 1) The assumed magnitudes of the total releases (in Curies) to the atmosphere of the radioisotopes dominating the inhalation, cloudshine, and 4-day groundshine effective whole body doses and the thyroid inhalation doses;
- 2) The assumed duration of the releases;
- 3) The assumed wind speed and deposition velocities;
- 4) Any assumption concerning wind wander;
- 5) The height of the assumed release including any height increase of the mid-line of the plume due to heat buoyancy effects; and
- 6) The dose conversion factor that the NRC uses for Iodine-131 for converting exposure to airborne I-131 measured in Ci-seconds/m<sup>3</sup> exposure to thyroid doses in rem for adults and children of different ages.

I appreciate your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Jim Webb  
United States Senator

---

**From:** Franovich, Mike  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 5:56 PM  
**To:** Milano, Patrick  
**Cc:** Nieh, Ho; Powell, Amy; Herr, Linda  
**Subject:** Commissioner Ostendorff's Visit to Watts Bar with Senator Alexander

Pat,

To avoid having too many cooks in the kitchen, Ho will let you know about the time frames and details for the site visit which are still evolving. I understand that the Commissioner, Ho, and Vic McCree would be on site around 8:30 am. OCA is working with the Senator's staff about items that he would be interested in seeing on the tour.

For site tour/discussion, I think it would be important to show how NRC requirements after TMI-2 and 9/11 have continued to contribute to severe accident prevention and mitigation. We might anticipate post Fukushima related site tour areas including the spent fuel pool(s) and measures to prevent or combat station blackout, and external flood mitigation. It is probably worth pointing out B.5.b equipment/strategies that TVA now may be considering to leverage in the event of an extreme, beyond design basis external flood, seismic event, or tornado. Post-accident hydrogen control equipment (hydrogen skimmers, recombiners, and igniters) and procedures given the plant's ice condenser containment design would be germane. TVA might want to point to severe accident management guidance and training for site personnel.

Food for thought,

*Mike Franovich  
Technical Assistant for Reactors  
Office of Commissioner Ostendorff  
301-415-1784*

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 6:49 AM  
**To:** 'isaac\_edwards@energy.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Getting back to you

Isaac - NOAA and EPA created a Radionuclide Sampling Proposal in Nearshore Waters in Response to Release in Japan. Our protective measures folks shared this with me last night.

Amy  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 9:27 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Fw: EJM letter to GJ  
**Attachments:** 04-15-11EJMtoNRCinspections.pdf

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 09:01:31 2011  
**Subject:** EJM letter to GJ

This will go out later this morning.  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836



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<http://markey.house.gov>

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-2107**

April 15, 2011

The Honorable Greg Jaczko  
Chairman  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

I write to express my concern regarding the post-Fukushima meltdown inspections currently being conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) personnel at U.S. nuclear power plants. According to reports I have received, the NRC has decided to keep the results of most of these investigations secret, and their scope and depth may be severely constrained. As such, they may not provide the sort of information needed to adequately assess, let alone remedy, the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities.

As you know, on March 23 the Commission voted to require a multi-phase review<sup>1</sup> of U.S. nuclear reactor safety in the wake of the Japanese meltdown. The near-term review portion of these efforts called for the establishment of a task force to:

“Evaluate currently available technical and operational information from the events that have occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan to identify potential or preliminary near term/immediate operational or regulatory issues affecting domestic operating reactors of all designs, including their spent fuel pools, in areas such as protection against earthquake, tsunami, flooding, hurricanes; station blackout and a degraded ability to restore power; severe accident mitigation; emergency preparedness; and combustible gas control.”

The task force was additionally directed to develop near-term recommendations for regulatory and other changes, and is also required to inform its efforts using stakeholder input. The longer (90 day) review is supposed to include more extensive stakeholder input, and the task force was directed in this phase to “evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be conducted by NRC.” All of the results of these efforts were supposed to be made public.

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<sup>1</sup> Tasking Memorandum – COMBJ-11-0002 – NRC Actions Following The Events In Japan

I have recently learned that the NRC has initiated inspections at operating nuclear power plants for purposes of assessing the operational or regulatory issues that may have arisen as a result of the Fukushima meltdown, and that the results of these inspections, which are intended to inform the 90 day review, must be completed by April 29. I have also learned of the following constraints that have been placed on these inspections:

- The NRC is only allowing its inspectors 40 hours in which to perform each inspection for nuclear power plants that contain one nuclear reactor. For nuclear power plants with more than one unit, inspectors are being provided with only 50-60 hours total in which to complete their work.
- The NRC inspectors were initially told to limit their inspections to the adequacy of safety measures needed to respond to Design Basis Events. This meant that inspectors would be assessing licensees' ability to withstand and respond only to events that have already been contemplated and analyzed by the NRC and for which regulatory requirements have been implemented, but not events such as the ones that occurred in Japan, which were previously believed to be impossible.
- After several NRC inspectors complained that it made no sense to limit the scope of the inspections to Design Basis Events, the guidance was changed to enable inspectors to look beyond them; however, they were explicitly told not to record any of their beyond Design Basis observations or findings in documents that would be made public as part of the Commission's review or public report(s). Instead, these findings would be entered into a private NRC database and kept secret.

These limitations, if true, severely undermines my confidence in the Commission's interests in conducting a full and transparent assessment of the ability of U.S. nuclear power plants to be kept safe in the event of an incident that exceeds the current design basis assumptions regarding earthquakes or electricity outages -- such as the ones that occurred in Japan. This also seems entirely at odds with the Commission-approved direction to study the implications of the Fukushima meltdown on U.S. facilities and report publicly on the findings of the study. This is unacceptable, and must immediately be remedied. We should stand prepared to learn from the catastrophe in Japan and plan ahead to address what was unforeseen but occurred anyway, rather than attempting to hide our vulnerabilities from public view and, potentially, use the fact that the information will be kept secret to avoid taking all necessary regulatory action. In order to better understand what the NRC is doing here, I request that you please respond to the following questions and requests for information:

1. Who at the Commission made the decisions to a) initially direct its inspectors to limit the scope of the inspections to Design Basis Events and b) subsequently direct its inspectors not to record findings or observations of any beyond Design Basis Events in a manner that would result in the public disclosure of any identified vulnerabilities? Please provide me with a copy of all documents (including reports, emails, correspondence, memos, phone or meeting minutes or other materials) related to both the

decisions regarding the scope of the inspections as well as the manner in which inspection findings and observations would be recorded and reported.

2. Will you immediately reverse the current direction to NRC inspectors to keep all findings and observations of vulnerabilities of U.S. reactors to beyond Design Basis events secret and excluded from all public reports on the Commission's Fukushima review? If not, why not?
3. The NRC review is supposed to evaluate the currently available information from the events that occurred in Japan to identify changes that might be needed at U.S. nuclear power plants of all designs. For each of the following events that are known to have occurred in Japan, please indicate a) whether the event in question is considered to be a "design-basis event" by the NRC, b) whether NRC inspectors will be required to evaluate whether the U.S. nuclear power plants they are inspecting are capable of preventing or mitigating such an event, c) if not, why not, since the Commission clearly stated that all such events were supposed to be analyzed, d) if not, how regulatory or other recommendations will be developed that ensure that U.S. nuclear power plants are capable of preventing or mitigating such an event, e) whether the findings and observations associated with the inspections designed to evaluate U.S. ability to prevent or mitigate such an event will be made public as part of the NRC's 30, 60 and 90 day reports (and if not, why not), and f) whether the NRC intends to address U.S. vulnerability to the event at all through regulatory or other requirements.
  - i) An earthquake that is more severe than the one the nuclear power plant was designed to withstand.
  - ii) For coastally-located nuclear power plants, a tsunami that is more severe than the one the nuclear power plant was designed to withstand.
  - iii) A loss of operating power that is longer than current regulations are required to address.
  - iv) A total station blackout (i.e. loss of operating power and failure of emergency diesel generators) that is longer than current regulations are required to address.
  - v) A hydrogen explosion that occurs due to the buildup of hydrogen in the core or other areas of a nuclear reactor due to the failure of mitigation technologies such as hardened vents or hydrogen re-combiners, and the causes of such failures.
  - vi) A hydrogen explosion that occurs due to the buildup of hydrogen in the spent fuel storage area of a nuclear reactor due to the absence of mitigation technologies such as hardened vents or hydrogen re-combiners.


- vii) A breach in the containment vessel of a nuclear reactor core caused by a hydrogen explosion.
- viii) A breach in the structure of a spent nuclear fuel storage area due to an earthquake or hydrogen explosion.
- ix) The failure of the recirculation pump seals within the reactor pressure vessel which may prevent cooling water from fully filling the pressure vessel and thus covering and cooling the nuclear fuel rods contained therein.
- x) The failure of one or more safety relief valves within the primary containment area that could enable the transfer of radioactive core material between the drywell and the torus.
- xi) The potential melting of core material through the pressure vessel and into the drywell or torus of the nuclear reactor.
- xii) The failure of the isolation condenser and/or reactor core isolation cooling systems and subsequent inability to provide cooling function to the nuclear reactor cores.
- xiii) The failure of the primary containment vessel spray cooling and core spray systems.
- xiv) The failure of systems used to cool spent nuclear fuel storage areas, including areas that contain varying amounts of spent nuclear fuel of varying ages.
- xv) The failure of diagnostic equipment to accurately monitor temperature, water levels, hydrogen/oxygen concentrations, pressures and radiation onsite, both during a total station blackout and after basic electricity function is restored (such as if the devices have been damaged by water, radiation or other events).
- xvi) The absence of a source of fresh cooling water with which to cool the reactor core and spent nuclear fuel storage areas.
- xvii) The absence of a means by which to store large quantities of highly radioactive water that has leaked or spilled after being used to cool the core and spent nuclear fuel storage areas.
- xviii) Repeated earthquake aftershocks that further threaten the integrity of the already-compromised reactor core, spent nuclear fuel storage areas, and emergency operations.
- xix) The ability to manually repair or restore function associated with any of the above failures or events when faced with extremely high levels of radiation that may threaten the health and safety of those both on and offsite.

4. The Commission directed its staff to obtain external stakeholder input as part of both its near-term and longer-term work. Please fully describe all plans to solicit such input. Specifically, will any licensee or other nuclear industry personnel be accompanying inspectors during these inspections at nuclear power plants? If so, will NRC also ensure that appropriate non-industry individuals that possess the appropriate expertise and security clearances are also provided such an opportunity?

5. Why have inspectors only been provided with 40 hours (or 50-60, in the case of a multi-unit nuclear power plant) with which to complete their work? Why does the Commission have confidence that the necessary knowledge with which to inform our own safety efforts can be obtained in such a short period of time?

Thank you very much for your attention to this important matter. Please provide your response no later than Friday April 29, 2011. If you have any questions or concerns, please have your staff contact Dr. Michal Freedhoff of my staff at 202-225-2836.

Sincerely,

  
Edward J. Markey

---

**From:** Hoc, PMT12  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 9:30 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Clarificaiton- RE: Rad levels in ocean

Great, thanks

Have a good day

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 9:30 AM  
**To:** Hoc, PMT12  
**Subject:** Re: Clarificaiton- RE: Rad levels in ocean

Hi Sandi -

I did relay the info to my contact in the delegation and suggested that he contact NOAA directly. He's spoken with them before, so he has a connection there.

Thanks  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Hoc, PMT12  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 07:30:42 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Clarificaiton- RE: Rad levels in ocean

Amy

I just came on shift at the Op Ctr and wanted to confirm with you that the Alaska Congressional staff has been put in contact with NOAA to get their questions answered. I want to close the book on this issue and couldn't tell from the e-mail trail whether this had taken place.

Thanks  
Sandi

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 6:46 AM  
**To:** Hoc, PMT12; LIA08 Hoc  
**Subject:** Re: Clarificaiton- RE: Rad levels in ocean

Great - thanks!  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Hoc, PMT12  
**To:** LIA08 Hoc; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 01:28:15 2011  
**Subject:** Clarificaion- RE: Rad levels in ocean

Amy,

Clarification- NOAA and EPA created a Radionuclide Sampling Proposal in Nearshore Waters in Response to Release in Japan. The attachment that Russ provided should give you some background to follow up.

Thanks.

-Jessie Kratchman  
Protective Actions Assistant Director  
NRC Op Center

---

**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 1:05 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Hoc, PMT12  
**Subject:** RE: Rad levels in ocean

Hi Amy,

The PMT ran this question down and arrived at the conclusion that NOAA is the lead for monitoring rad levels in the ocean. NOAA has requested that they communicate directly with the AK delegation staffer (email attached).

Additionally, I've attached an email that provides more specific details on this issue. Please advise if you need additional information on this request.

Best regards,  
Russ Chazell

LT Coordinator  
NRC Operations Center

---

**From:** Hoc, PMT12  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 12:47 AM  
**To:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Subject:** FW: Rad levels in ocean

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 6:00 PM  
**To:** Hoc, PMT12  
**Subject:** Rad levels in ocean

Sandra –

Thanks for taking my call. Per our chat, I have two things for you>

1. Congressional staff from the Alaskan delegation sent me the following as an FYI – I will ask him what the source of the data is:

“High radiation levels in sea off Fukushima coast

The science ministry says radiation levels in seawater off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture are the highest since it began monitoring them about 3 weeks ago.

The ministry says the level of iodine-131 was 88.5 becquerels per liter in a sample taken on Monday in the sea about 30 kilometers east of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The figure is 2.2 times the government's upper limit for wastewater from nuclear facilities.

The level of cesium-137 was also the highest observed so far, but was below the limit.

Tokyo Electric Power Company says the iodine-131 level was 23 times the upper limit in a sample taken 15 kilometers from the plant.

This was the highest figure since TEPCO began taking samples 15 kilometers offshore on April 2nd.

Radiation levels are higher in the sea to the north of the crippled plant.

The government's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency says radioactive substances seem to be flowing and diffusing northward.

The agency says predicting the course of the flow is difficult and it will step up monitoring in locations where high radiation levels have been detected.

Wednesday, April 13, 2011 09:04 +0900 (JST)”

2. In the US, who is monitoring and/or modeling radiation “plumes” in the ocean? My limited understanding last week was that NOAA, NRC, and OSTP were standing up a working group related to this. Any update or clarity on who is monitoring?

Thanks so much,

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission



Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 16, 2011 9:49 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: response to Rep. Markey's staff question

Can't we send Michal to GE-Hitachi directly? I've got contacts in their gov't relations shop.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** RST01 Hoc  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 23:18:16 2011  
**Subject:** GEH Response to Rep. Markey's question

Tim,

GEH responded to our request about Unit 2 vessel breach. Their analysis is **confidential**  
**Withhold Pursuant to FOIA Exemption 4 and Information is Unverified.** Please contact us  
for details. We are not sure how to handle the information and how to inform Rep. Markey's  
office.

RST

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**From:** Weber, Michael  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 11:30 AM  
**To:** Haney, Catherine; Kokajko, Lawrence  
**Cc:** Frazier, Alan; Powell, Amy; Andersen, James; Muesle, Mary; McIntyre, David  
**Subject:** FYI - REPRESENTATIVE SHIMKUS' VIEWS IN POLITICO  
**Attachments:** image001.gif; image002.jpg

# POLITICO

## U.S. needs nuclear storage site

By: Rep. John Shimkus  
April 15, 2011 04:46 AM EDT

The March 11 earthquake in Japan led to a tsunami that crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. While this double tragedy is unlikely at any U.S. nuclear plant, we must take a hard look at our country's lack of a central storage facility for nuclear waste.

Back in 1982, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act made the federal government responsible for collecting nuclear waste. Since then, \$14.5 billion in taxpayer and electricity ratepayer funds have been spent on the project.

In 1987, Yucca Mountain in Nevada was named the sole U.S. site for a permanent repository of nuclear waste. The Department of Energy confirmed the science behind this decision in 1994. In 2002, Congress and then-President George W. Bush approved Yucca Mountain again. In 2008, DOE filed a license application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build at Yucca Mountain.

Then President Barack Obama named a former staffer of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to head the NRC. The agency stopped its analysis of the pending application, and DOE closed the underground mountain site. Was science the determining factor?

Obviously, the decision to move forward with a national nuclear waste repository has been supported by Republican- and Democratic-controlled Congresses and Republican and Democratic presidents throughout these years.

The storage site would be below ground, in a remote desert location owned by the federal government. Earthquakes have had little effect on this area and even less of an effect underground.

Today, we store nuclear waste at 121 nuclear plant sites in 39 states. About one-quarter of this waste is stored in dry casks. The remainder is stored in wet pools — like at Japan's Fukushima site. Such pools are within 50 miles of New York, Chicago and San Diego. Is that really where we want to store nuclear waste?

Just this week, the Senate majority leader himself is quoted as saying about nuclear fuel rods, "The ones that haven't been safe are the ones in the pools, sloshing around, causing all kinds of problems."

On March 30, the president called for an increase in nuclear power as part of a clean energy standard. While I may not agree with a mandated standard like that, I know that nuclear power is likely to remain vital to our nation's electricity portfolio.

I can see three to five new nuclear plants moving forward, given the current regulatory environment. I cannot see, though I would like to, a larger increase in nuclear power until we establish a design standard for new plants — and deal with the long-term storage of

nuclear waste.

Unfortunately, the president and his administration have unilaterally halted work on Yucca Mountain. They would rather see nuclear waste stored all over the country. But if we cannot store nuclear waste 1,000 feet underground in a desert mountain, where can we store it?

The administration is failing to carry out federal law. To find out exactly why the Obama administration halted work on Yucca Mountain, under our oversight, House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-Mich.) and I opened an investigation.

On March 31, we sent letters to Energy Secretary Steven Chu and the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

As part of our official responsibility, I will lead a legislative delegation to tour Yucca Mountain later this month. I have been criticized for this trip — with opponents claiming it is unnecessary and an excessive cost.

DOE estimates included \$175,000 to open the Yucca underground site. Unfortunately, much of that extreme cost is a direct result of the administration's unilateral decision to shut down all functions at the Yucca Mountain facility — which I believe is in violation of the law.

Unsolicited, DOE also had suggested using helicopters to travel — at a minimum cost of \$25,000. Without question, the decision was made to eliminate the underground portion of the trip, and the delegation will travel to the site via ground transportation, as planned all along.

We are basing our trip on practices followed by the Government Accountability Office when it visited Yucca Mountain last November, without fanfare or complaint from DOE — and consistent with site visits conducted routinely to federal facilities. We are simply asking for similar accommodations.

DOE and Yucca opponents want to cast this trip as unnecessary. What do they have to hide?

Past Congresses and administrations have approved Yucca Mountain. While it has taken too long to become reality, this administration should not make unilateral decisions without the consent of Congress.

To expand nuclear power use in the United States, Yucca Mountain must become a reality.

*Rep. John Shimkus is chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, which has jurisdiction over federal nuclear waste policy.*



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 4:10 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

You're thinking of the right scenario, but it turned out that Jim Dyer had the Executive Team that day (4/13), and not Cyndi. Jim and the RST lead (Tim said that was Mike Brown) did the phone briefing. Tim staffed it for us - I doubt there were any slides. This was the one set up after the flurry of emails while we were at the EPW hearing.

Not "classified"...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 16:01:15 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

I'm getting these all mixed up. Was This cindy carpenter's phone briefing?

---

**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 15:54:54 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

Thank you Becky.

Could you please tell me who from the ET and/or Operations Center briefed Congressman Markeys staff on April 13<sup>th</sup>? I had asked for the slides to be provided to the Commission. We have not seen them yet.

Thank you.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 10:07 AM  
**To:** Bubar, Patrice; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

I am not aware of any classified briefing.

---

**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 9:56 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Classified Briefing to Congressman?

Good morning Becky and Amy. I hope all is well with you both.

Can you clarify if there was a recent classified briefing from the Chairman to Congressional members on Japan?

Thank you.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

---

**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 4:31 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

Thank you.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 4:17 PM  
**To:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

It was a phone briefing with ET--Jim Dyer that day and RST--i think Mike Brown. I don't think it was classified and I doubt if there were slides. Tim from OCA staffed it I will ask him on monday

---

**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 15:54:54 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

Thank you Becky.

Could you please tell me who from the ET and/or Operations Center briefed Congressman Markeys staff on April 13<sup>th</sup>? I had asked for the slides to be provided to the Commission. We have not seen them yet.

Thank you.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 10:07 AM  
**To:** Bubar, Patrice; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Classified Briefing to Congressman?

I am not aware of any classified briefing.

**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 9:56 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Classified Briefing to Congressman?

Good morning Becky and Amy. I hope all is well with you both.

Can you clarify if there was a recent classified briefing from the Chairman to Congressional members on Japan?

Thank you.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895



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**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 16, 2011 10:11 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Johnson, Michael  
**Subject:** RE: Request for POC: Response to Hon Rep Edward Markey's letter to President Obama

Thanks Spiros.

Clyde Ragland  
Liaison Team Coordinator  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
email: [lia08.hoc@nrc.gov](mailto:lia08.hoc@nrc.gov)  
Desk Ph: 301-816-5185

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 16, 2011 9:58 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; LIA08 Hoc  
**Cc:** Johnson, Michael  
**Subject:** Re: Request for POC: Response to Hon Rep Edward Markey's letter to President Obama

I called her on Thursday, but she has not called back. NSIR and OGC are on it. Think you can close out.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Cc:** Johnson, Michael; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Sat Apr 16 09:53:24 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Request for POC: Response to Hon Rep Edward Markey's letter to President Obama

Spiros Droggitis, Associate Director for Federal and External Relations within OCA, is following up on the Markey ltr to the WH.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**To:** [Lori.Thomas@nnsa.doe.gov](mailto:Lori.Thomas@nnsa.doe.gov) <[Lori.Thomas@nnsa.doe.gov](mailto:Lori.Thomas@nnsa.doe.gov)>  
**Cc:** Johnson, Michael; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 23:23:25 2011  
**Subject:** Request for POC: Response to Hon Rep Edward Markey's letter to President Obama

Hi Lori,

Amy Powell of the NRC's Office of Public Affairs was planning to contact you about the attached request. We are just looking for confirmation that you have heard from her so that we can close this item in our request tracking system. Please respond when you have an opportunity.

Thanks,  
Rani Franovich  
Liaison Team Coordinator  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
email: [lia08.hoc@nrc.gov](mailto:lia08.hoc@nrc.gov)  
Desk Ph: 301-816-5185

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 17, 2011 6:50 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Fw: Estimating Fukushima Costs

I could not view the whole list, so sorry if this is a rerun.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**To:** Borchardt, Bill; Weber, Michael; Ash, Darren; Muessle, Mary; Andersen, James; Landau, Mindy; Leeds, Eric; Boger, Bruce; Ruland, William; Sheron, Brian; Uhle, Jennifer; Wiggins, Jim; Evans, Michele; Holahan, Patricia; Johnson, Michael; Zimmerman, Roy; Moore, Scott; Haney, Catherine; Casto, Chuck; Reynolds, Steven; Burns, Stephen; Dean, Bill; McCree, Victor; Satorius, Mark; Collins, Elmo; Coggins, Angela; Dyer, Jim; Golder, Jennifer; Givvines, Mary; Monninger, John; Boyce, Thomas (OIS); Stewart, Sharon; Doane, Margaret; Mamish, Nader; OST01 HOC; McDermott, Brian; Merzke, Daniel; Miller, Charles; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Cubbage, Amy; Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Batkin, Joshua; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Apr 16 16:21:28 2011  
**Subject:** Estimating Fukushima Costs

All

As a follow up to the March 31<sup>st</sup> hearing we have been asked by OCFO to estimate the costs going forward associated with our response to the events in Japan

As a first step we need to agree on the assumptions around the work. I have taken a shot at a set of assumptions and would value your comments. Once we agree on the assumptions we can assign resource estimates.

Please make a conscience decision that you are likely starting a conversation if you elect to respond to all.

Marty

#### Assumptions

Site Team remains at full strength until the following conditions are met (assume until June 1<sup>st</sup>)

- Site conditions are stable
- reliable diverse makeup with independent power
- flooded containment

Prompt reduction in size of Site Team when stability is achieved and releases are minimal (assume June 1<sup>st</sup>)

- downsize to 3 NRC personnel in Japan
- Experts travel to Japan as needed to support site team (assume 2 per week - June through August)

Site team transition from 3 to 1 SLS Attaché (assume September 1<sup>st</sup>)

- Attaché remains in Japan throughout 2012

Ops center manned 24/7 at current level until site team is reduced (assume June 1st)

HQ Line organization support continues at current levels until site team is reduced (assume June 1<sup>st</sup>)

Task Force Continues until it completes its 90 day assessment and transitions work to line (assume August 1st)

HQ Line organization develops regulatory products to support implementation of the Task Force recommendations (assume work starts in 2011 and continues through 2012)

- Assume multiple orders are developed and issued to reactors and fuel cycle facilities
- Assume work begins and continues through 2011 on 6 rules – external events, SBO, severe accident measures, B5b, spent fuel storage and emergency preparedness.

Regions inspect implementation of orders (assume 1 inspection per facility in 2012)

HQ Line organization and OIP support domestic and international meetings/conferences (Starts April 2011 and continues throughout 2012 at the rate of 2/month).

HQ Line organization, OPA and OCA support special congressional interactions (Starts April 2011 and continues throughout 2012 at the rate of 1/week)

HQ Line organizations and OPA support special interactions with States, local officials and members of the public ((Starts April 2011 and continues throughout 2012 at the rate of 1/week)

Corporate and overhead costs will be incurred in scheduling and hosting meetings, arranging travel, responding to FOIA requests and more.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 5:35 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Fw: Query - Response to new letter from Congressman Markey

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Weber, Michael  
To: Leeds, Eric; Ruland, William  
Cc: Nelson, Robert; Bowman, Gregory; Virgilio, Martin; Muesse, Mary; Powell, Amy  
Sent: Sun Apr 17 20:23:02 2011  
Subject: Query - Response to new letter from Congressman Markey

Good evening. I did not want you to be caught cold by the latest letter from Congressman Markey. It is another in the fine tradition. I saw it referenced in a news report on Friday afternoon, so I pulled it from his website. This newest letter questions the directions in the TI for the post-Fukushima inspections, why are the vulnerabilities identified being kept secret, have we provided the inspectors sufficient time to perform the inspections, etc. He's asked for a response by 29 April.

We'll respond to the letter using the normal process. If there are any highlights you'd like to pass along now, we'll share them with the Chairman, Commission, and other senior leaders.

Thanks

---

**From:** Spencer, Peter <Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 1:05 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Re:

yes

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 12:40 PM  
**To:** Spencer, Peter  
**Subject:** Re:

My last status mtg on this is set for 345pm. May I call you after that?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Spencer, Peter <Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 19 11:47:47 2011  
**Subject:**

When would be a good time to call today and get an update?

Peter L. Spencer  
Majority Professional Staff  
Oversight and Investigations  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
U.S. House of Representatives  
(202) 225-2927  
[peter.spencer@mail.house.gov](mailto:peter.spencer@mail.house.gov)

---

**From:** Spencer, Peter <Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 1:33 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Re:

If you miss me; leave message, may be running around in rayburn at that point

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 12:40 PM  
**To:** Spencer, Peter  
**Subject:** Re:

My last status mtg on this is set for 345pm. May I call you after that?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Spencer, Peter <Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 19 11:47:47 2011  
**Subject:**

When would be a good time to call today and get an update?

Peter L. Spencer  
Majority Professional Staff  
Oversight and Investigations  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
U.S. House of Representatives  
(202) 225-2927  
[peter.spencer@mail.house.gov](mailto:peter.spencer@mail.house.gov)

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 2:29 PM  
**To:** Champ, Billie; McKelvin, Sheila; Mike, Linda  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Rihm, Roger; Rothschild, Trip  
**Subject:** QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD: 3/16/11- "The FY2012 Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Budgets"  
**Attachments:** QFR- Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko.pdf

Billie, Sheila and Linda,

Here are some Questions for the Record associated with the March 16<sup>th</sup> hearing with the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittees on Energy and Power, and Environment and the Economy that have come in.

David



FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN  
CHAIRMAN

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA  
RANKING MEMBER

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS  
**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115

Majority (202) 225-2927  
Minority (202) 225-3641

April 18, 2011

The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko  
Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, MD 20852


Dear Chairman Jaczko:

Thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power and the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy on March 16, 2011, to testify at the joint hearing entitled "The FY2012 Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Budgets."

Pursuant to the Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the hearing record remains open for ten business days to permit Members to submit additional questions to witnesses, which are attached. The format of your responses to these questions should be as follows: (1) the name of the Member whose question you are addressing, (2) the complete text of the question you are addressing in bold, and then (3) your answer to that question in plain text.


To facilitate the printing of the hearing record, please respond to these questions by the close of business on Monday, May 2, 2011. Your responses should be e-mailed to the Legislative Clerk, in Word or PDF format, at [Allison.Busbee@mail.house.gov](mailto:Allison.Busbee@mail.house.gov).

Thank you again for your time and effort preparing and delivering testimony before the Subcommittees.



Ed Whitfield  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Energy and Power

Sincerely,



John Shimkus  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy

cc: The Honorable Bobby L. Rush, Ranking Member,  
Subcommittee on Energy and Power

The Honorable Gene Green, Ranking Member,  
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy

Attachment

**The Honorable Bobby Rush**

1. What are the qualifications for becoming a NRC inspector and approximately how many qualified inspectors are there currently in the U.S.?
2. What are the protocols for deploying Resident Inspectors? Where and how are they assigned geographically and logistically?
3. What are the protocols for deploying Regional Inspectors? Where and how are they assigned geographically and logistically?
4. What is the rationale for deploying Resident Inspectors at facilities geographically and logistically?
5. What is the rationale for deploying Regional Inspectors at facilities geographically and logistically?
6. What are the term limits for both Resident Inspectors and Regional Inspectors?
7. How do Resident Inspectors receive data for the plants they are assigned? Is this data collected independently or obtained from facility managers?
8. Does the NRC have independent sensors or monitoring equipment at each nuclear facility?
9. If an emergency takes place at a facility does the NRC have the authority to intervene independently or must it wait for permission from facility managers?
10. Does the NRC require each nuclear reactor at each facility to have emergency backup power generators both underground and also off-site?
11. Does the NRC require each nuclear reactor at each facility to have hardened vents installed in the containment areas?

**The Honorable Jim Matheson**

1. I understand that the NRC is currently updating rulemaking and guidance regarding storage for blended radioactive waste and other “unique” waste streams, like depleted uranium. I have long had concerns about these unique waste streams and whether the Class A storage site in Clive, Utah is appropriate to accept these wastes. I am pleased that the State of Utah decided to require a site-specific performance analysis for these types of waste before they are allowed to be stored there, and I hope that the State remains firm in requiring this analysis.
  - a. When will NRC have their Branch Technical Guidance on site-specific performance analysis ready?
  - b. Given the increase in unique waste streams that were not included in the low-level waste classification system as defined in Federal code at 10 CFR 61.55, do you believe this classification system should be revised? If so, how long would this process take?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 2:39 PM  
**To:** 'Decker, David'  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: QFRs from EW Appopriations Hearing

The "public briefing" has QFRs? Nice...

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 2:33 PM  
**To:** McKelvin, Sheila; Champ, Billie  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Rihm, Roger; Rothschild, Trip  
**Subject:** QFRs from EW Appopriations Hearing

One more set of Questions for the Record coming in. This small set is from the March 30<sup>th</sup> hearing with the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.

**QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD  
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
PROPOUNDED BY SENATOR MARY LANDRIEU  
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT  
Hearing on Nuclear Safety  
March 30, 2011**

1. What has and will the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission do to ensure that our U.S. reactors are safe and are prepared for the worst case scenario?
2. I know that 23 of the U.S. reactors are a General Electric Mark I design, the same design at the Fukushima Daiichi facility in Japan. Yet, I believe each of these 23 facilities has been retrofitted and modified to address venting and other concerns with this reactor design. Can you please walk me through why the modifications were needed at the U.S. facilities? Can you confirm that all of these reactors have been modified? Does this make our reactors safer than the reactors in Japan?
3. I am told that in the upcoming year, two of the five NRC Commissioners will be up for replacement. Given the events that have taken place over the past month, and the number of U.S. nuclear facilities that will need renewal licenses, can you please speak to the importance of having a full panel as the NRC moves forward to tackle these issues?

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**From:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 20, 2011 11:32 AM  
**To:** Randall, Bob  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann; Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Decker, David; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** FOIA Search Assistance

Hi Bob,

The following have requested assistance with the FOIA searches:

Raeann Shane (rms2)  
Spiros Droggitis (scd)  
Rebecca Schmidt (rls8)  
Amy Powell (axp10)  
Eugene Dacus (exd2)

Date Range for above is: March 10-April 18

Then, Timothy Riley (tkr1)  
David Decker (dld)

Date Range for above is: April 14-18

If there is anything we can do to assist you, please let us know. We really appreciate all the effort you've been putting into these requests.

*Nancy Belmore, FOIA Coor*  
*Office of Congressional Affairs*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
[nancy.belmore@nrc.gov](mailto:nancy.belmore@nrc.gov)  
301-415-1776

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 9:21 AM  
**To:** Nelson, Matthew (Feinstein)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC response to Sen. Feinstein's March 16th letter

Thanks Matt – I was out of the office yesterday and saw press references but not the letter.

Amy

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**From:** Nelson, Matthew (Feinstein) [mailto:Matthew\_Nelson@feinstein.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 20, 2011 7:41 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC response to Sen. Feinstein's March 16th letter

Amy

Attached is another letter from Senator Feinstein, in case you have not seen a copy yet.

Matt

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**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:50 PM  
**To:** Nelson, Matthew (Feinstein); Clapp, Doug (Appropriations)  
**Subject:** NRC response to Sen. Feinstein's March 16th letter

Hello to you both –

Attached please find the NRC's response to Sen. Feinstein's letter of March 16<sup>th</sup>. Hard copy will follow.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT  
TOM HARKIN, IOWA  
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND  
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN  
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON  
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS  
TIM JOHNSON, SOUTH DAKOTA  
MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND  
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY  
BEN NELSON, NEBRASKA  
MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS  
JON TESTER, MONTANA  
SHERROD BROWN, OHIO

MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY  
RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA  
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, TEXAS  
LAMAR ALEXANDER, TENNESSEE  
SUSAN COLLINS, MAINE  
LISA MURKOWSKI, ALASKA  
LINDSEY GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA  
MARK KIRK, ILLINOIS  
DANIEL COATS, INDIANA  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
JERRY MORAN, KANSAS  
JOHN HOEVEN, NORTH DAKOTA  
RON JOHNSON, WISCONSIN

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

<http://appropriations.senate.gov>

CHARLES J. HOUY, STAFF DIRECTOR  
BRUCE EVANS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

April 20, 2011

The Honorable Gregory Jaczko  
Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

I am writing to request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) begin examining seismic and tsunami hazards, operational issues, plant security, emergency preparedness, spent fuel storage options and other elements of a nuclear power plant's "design basis" within the scope of the relicensing process.

The current relicensing process is focused entirely on identifying and managing the detrimental effects of aging plant facilities. The process does not reevaluate the threat assessment that formed the basis of the plant's original design.

I believe that our understanding of many threats – especially seismic threats, tsunami threats, spent fuel risks, and terrorist threats – has improved dramatically since most nuclear power plants were originally designed and licensed thirty or more years ago. Relicensing these facilities offers a unique opportunity to review the original assessment of potential threats, in order to ensure that a facility is designed to endure all threats safely.

I appreciate that the NRC continuously reviews threats, and has required upgrades to address newly understood concerns outside of the relicensing process. For instance, the Commission issued rules to lower the risk of hydrogen explosions when this threat was identified in the 1980s. However, the ongoing assessment process places the burden of proof on the NRC to demonstrate that a design or operational modification of a fully




licensed facility is necessary. In contrast, the relicensing process would place the burden of proof on the facility to demonstrate that it is designed to endure and survive all potential threats.

Recent events demonstrate that thirty year old threat assessments can be devastatingly inaccurate. In Japan there have been two earthquakes in four years that exceeded the "design basis" of nuclear plants. In California, researchers have recently found new faults close to nuclear power plants, and tsunami experts have learned that submarine landslides can generate local tsunamis far larger than previously believed. Finally, recent research has demonstrated the susceptibility of storing radioactive spent fuel in densely packed pools. These new threats logically should be considered in a relicensing process, just as they would be in the licensing of a new nuclear power plant in the United States.

I strongly encourage the NRC to modify its relicensing policies in order to assure a full reexamination of design basis elements, including seismic and tsunami hazards, operational issues, plant security, emergency preparedness, and spent fuel storage options. If you have any questions or concerns about this request, please do not hesitate to contact me. I look forward to working with you to ensure that the United States has the world's safest nuclear industry.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Dianne Feinstein". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "D" and a long, sweeping underline.

Dianne Feinstein  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Energy and Water  
Development

DF/mbn

**Responses to Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer and Senator Dianne Feinstein  
Letter of March 16, 2011**

**Plant Design and Operations**

- 1. What changes to the design or operation of these facilities have improved safety at the plants since they began operating in the mid-1980s?**

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including, most significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures for licensees, and made substantive improvements in NRC's incident response capabilities. We also addressed many human factors issues regarding control room indicators and layouts, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves.

Two significant changes after Three Mile Island (TMI) were the expansion of the Resident Inspector Program and the incident response program. Today, there are at least two Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. The inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities, and serve as NRC's eyes and ears at the power plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Center and regional incident response centers are prepared to respond to all emergencies, including any resulting from operational events, security events, or natural phenomena. Multidisciplinary teams in these centers have access to detailed information regarding licensee facilities, and access to plant status information through telephonic links with the Resident Inspectors, an automated emergency response data system, and directly from the licensee through the emergency notification system. In the case of a significant event the NRC's response would include the dispatch of a site team to augment the Resident Inspectors on site, and integration with the licensee's emergency response organization at its Emergency Offsite Facility. The NRC's incident response program is designed to provide an independent assessment of events, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the events, and to ensure that State officials have the information they would need to make decisions regarding protective actions.

Further, a number of new regulatory requirements were imposed by the NRC following the TMI accident, which enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness to cope with some of the problems have seen seeing in Japan. For example, the "station blackout" rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the core.

Another post-TMI requirement, the hydrogen rule, required modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. In addition, there are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see in a beyond-design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC implemented a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program. This program led to installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

Emergency planning and preparedness was also augmented substantially following the TMI accident, with the adoption of additional regulatory requirements and the conduct of mandatory emergency planning exercises on a biennial basis, including participation by state and local government officials. The NRC's emergency preparedness and planning requirements provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are coordinated with state and local officials and are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a plant, licensees have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe situation.

Since Diablo Canyon went into commercial service, many specific changes in design or operation have been implemented at the plant. These include the following:

- Added sixth on-site emergency diesel generator
- Increased volume of diesel generator fuel oil tanks to supply 7 days of fuel
- Added capacitor banks to the 230 kV offsite power source to improve reliability of offsite power source
- Replaced 500 kV offsite power source circuit breakers with new design that has increased earthquake resistance
- Replaced offsite power source transformers
- Replaced the reactor heads for the reactor vessels with a new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Replaced steam generators with new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Increased the capacity of the 4 kilovolt system circuit breakers
- Replaced plant process computer
- Replaced low pressure turbine rotors with a new design that is more resistant to turbine blade failure

- Replaced the water cooled positive displacement pumps for core injection with air cooled centrifugal charging pumps
- Replaced main feedwater pump control system to digital based control system
- Upgraded residual heat removal system piping to reduce potential flow induced erosion following an accident
- Replaced emergency core cooling system flow orifices to reduce potential potential flow blockage following an accident
- Replaced the containment sump strainer with a new design that is five times larger to minimize susceptibility to clogging
- Removed material from inside containment that could become a potential debris source following a loss of coolant accident
- Developed additional procedures to address potential natural and manmade disasters
- Implemented significant site changes to improve plant security
- Implemented procedures and training to improve human performance and reduce errors
- Implemented procedures and training to increase use of industry nuclear plant operating experience to improve plant safety

Changes in design or operation at San Onofre (SONGS) have included the following:

- Replaced steam generators with new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Developed additional procedures to address potential natural and manmade disasters
- Replaced the containment sump strainer with a new design that is five times larger to minimize susceptibility to clogging
- Removed material from inside containment that could become a potential debris source following a loss of coolant accident
- Implemented significant site changes to improve plant security
- Implemented procedures and training to improve human performance and reduce errors
- Implemented procedures and training to increase use of industry nuclear plant operating experience to improve plant safety
- Replaced all Emergency Planning Zone alert notification sirens in 2005 and 2006, and added paging capability.
- Replaced plant process computer
- Replaced low pressure turbine rotors with new design that is more resistant to turbine blade failure and stress corrosion cracking
- Replaced main feedwater pump control system to digital based control system
- Replaced service air compressors with modern model, and add cross-tie to instrument air
- Added vent to HPSI line to ensure ECCS system free of gas

- Increased safety related battery capacity (1200-1800 amp hours)
- Added degraded grid undervoltage relays to 1E 4KV buses
- Added a portable generator for steam generator water level indication in order to facilitate steam driven pump manual operation during beyond design basis blackout scenarios

**2. What emergency notification systems have been installed at California nuclear power plants? Has there ever been a lapse of these systems during previous earthquakes or emergencies?**

An Early Warning System (EWS) is installed to provide prompt alerting of the public in the event of an emergency at both Diablo Canyon and SONGS. The EWS consists of 131 sirens positioned out to 22 miles from the plant at Diablo Canyon, and 50 sirens spanning 10 miles at SONGS. The EWS is used in conjunction with radio and TV broadcasts, and allows instructions, information, and necessary actions to be immediately communicated to the public. The sirens are equipped with battery or solar-powered back-up capability. This redundancy in power source was upgraded in the 2005-2006 timeframe. The sirens are tested daily, bi-weekly, quarterly, and annually. The sirens are monitored 24/7 with alarms for system failures.

For Diablo Canyon, prior to installing the power-back up capability, some sirens lost power during the December 2003 San Simeon earthquake. The sirens were not used during that earthquake but back-up route alerting was set up if the need for public alerting warranted. The SONGS EWS sirens have not been affected by past seismic activity.

**3. What safety measures are in place to ensure continued power to California reactors in the event of an extended power failure?**

U.S. plants are required to meet 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 17, "Electric Power System." Reactor units must have two physically independent offsite power supplies capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition. Additionally, all plants are required to have onsite power supplies that are also independent and capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition assuming a worst case single failure. All U.S. plants (except Oconee which has an alternate system) have emergency diesel generators and battery backup systems. Most U.S. plants with diesels have two diesels per unit (Diablo Canyon has 3). The regulations do not specify the length of time that the diesels and batteries must be able to operate following a loss of offsite power. The required amount of time is dependent on the plant's site recovery strategy and is based on providing sufficient capacity to assure that the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

If Diablo Canyon experiences a loss of power from the 500 kV and 230 kV offsite power switchyards, three emergency diesel generators (EDGs) are available to supply onsite power in each of the units. A unit can be safely shutdown utilizing any single

EDG. There are two-50,000 gallon diesel fuel oil tanks, sufficient to operate an EDG for seven days. The EDGs are located at an elevation of 85 feet, well above the maximum expected tsunami elevation.

In addition, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are in place that include procedures to cope with the loss of all vital AC power. For example, there are Casualty Procedures in place that have pre-planned actions in the event of earthquakes, tsunami warnings and fires. There are Severe Accident Management Guidelines in place that contain actions to take in extreme conditions that require coolant injection to the reactor core, mitigation of hydrogen flammability in containment, and coolant to flood-up containment and cover the reactor core. There are Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) in place that postulate extensive plant damage due to a natural disaster or terrorist event. The EDMGs are invoked when the control of the plant cannot be established from the Main Control Room or there is no communication with the Main Control Room. The Extreme Damage event is assumed to disable all electric power. The EDMGs provide a procedure to perform multiple actions (if needed) to continue to cool the reactor core, cool the spent fuel pool, and minimize radiation release.

SONGS is similar to Diablo Canyon with 2 EDGs per unit and the EDGs are located 30 feet above sea level. SONGS also has a physical cross-tie ability such that the EDGs on one unit can be used to safely shutdown the other unit in the event that either unit loses both of its EDGs. The comments provided above concerning emergency procedure improvements at Diablo Canyon (i.e., EOPs, Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines, and EDMGs) apply as well to SONGS.

### **Type of Reactor**

- 1. What are the differences and similarities between the reactors being used in California (pressurized water reactors) and those in Japan (boiling water reactors), as well as the facilities used to house the reactors, including the standards to which they were built and their ability to withstand natural and manmade disasters?**

The two types of light-water reactors in operation in the United States are pressurized (PWR) and boiling (BWR) water reactors. The PWRs use a two-stage system where the water in the reactor is maintained at a high pressure, and an additional coolant loop is used to transfer heat from that system to produce steam to drive the turbines, while BWRs use a single-stage system that allows water in the reactor to boil to produce steam to drive the turbines directly. The NRC is not yet fully aware of all of the attributes of the specific BWR reactors in question in Japan and how they are different from or similar to BWRs or other reactors in operation in the U.S. Many changes have been made over the years in the design and operation of U.S. nuclear power plants through our program of safety improvement (as described in our response to Question #1 above), which may or may not have been made to reactors operating in Japan.

We have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, operation, and oversight, and does not rely on any single layer to protect public health and safety. We begin with designs for every individual reactor that take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for any credible natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site. There are multiple physical barriers to the release of radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and are frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario.

Looking at basic design differences between the Japanese BWRs and the California plants, the following can be noted:

- The Japanese reactors have containments that are part of the reactor design and the buildings in which they are placed are not containment structures. By contrast, the California reactors have significantly larger volume containment buildings that house the reactors. This reduces the chance of exceeding the containment design pressure or having a hydrogen explosion inside containment following a natural or manmade disaster that can result in a release of radioactive material to the environment.
- In the event of the loss of power at a U.S. PWR, the reactor core can be cooled using natural circulation of water (without pumps) in the primary coolant loop to transfer heat from the reactor core to the secondary loop. The secondary loop in a PWR can be used to remove the primary loop heat (without power) by pumping non-radioactive water in the secondary loop into heat exchangers (steam generators) with a steam driven pump and releasing non-radioactive steam to the atmosphere via manually operated valves or spring operated safety relief valves. By contrast, venting steam from the Japanese BWRs resulted in a release of radiation to the reactor building from which it escaped to the environment. In addition, there are multiple other pre-planned methods available to provide on-site stored water to the reactor core and to the steam generators to ensure continued core cooling after a disaster.
- The spent fuel pool at a U.S. PWR is contained in a separate building, instead of being contained above the primary containment structure as in a Japanese BWR.
- There are multiple on-site stored water sources and pre-planned measures in place to provide water to the spent fuel pools.

### **Earthquakes and Tsunamis**

1. **We have been told that both Diablo Canyon and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station are designed to withstand the maximum credible threat at both plants, which we understand to be much less than the 9.0 earthquake that hit Japan. What assumptions have you made about the ability of both plants to withstand an**

**earthquake or tsunami? Given the disaster in Japan, what are our options to provide these plants with a greater margin for safety?**

All U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand external hazards, including earthquakes, flooding, and tsunamis, as appropriate. Regarding earthquakes, nuclear plants, are designed based on ground motion levels, not earthquake magnitudes. Ground motion is a function of both the magnitude of an earthquake and the distance from the fault to the site. The existing nuclear plants in the U.S. were designed based on a "deterministic" or "scenario earthquake" basis that accounted for the largest earthquakes that could reasonably be expected in the area around the plant. A margin is further added to the predicted ground motions to provide added robustness. The NRC's Generic Issue 199 (GI-199) project is using the latest probabilistic techniques used for new nuclear plants to review the safety of existing plants.

Both Diablo Canyon and SONGS are known to have a tsunami hazard. As such, they are designed to withstand the maximum predicted tsunami with coincident wave action.

It is too early to tell what the lessons from this earthquake are. The NRC will look closely at all aspects of the plants' response to the earthquake and tsunami to determine if any actions need to be taken in U.S. nuclear plants and if any changes are necessary to NRC regulations.

- 2. Have new faults been discovered near Diablo Canyon or San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station since those plants began operations? If so, how have the plants been modified to account for the increased risk of an earthquake? How will the NRC consider information on ways to address risks posed by faults near these plants that is produced pursuant to state law or recommendations by state agencies during the NRC relicensing process?**

A new Shoreline fault zone near Diablo Canyon was discovered in late 2008. In 2009 and 2010 Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) acquired, analyzed, and interpreted new data to better assess the seismic hazard from the Shoreline fault zone. PG&E submitted the final Shoreline fault zone report to the NRC on January 7, 2011. PG&E has concluded that maximum ground motions at the site from local faults are bounded by ground motions for which the plant had been previously evaluated. PG&E has also stated that the tsunami hazard threat from the Shoreline fault zone is relatively small since it is a strike-slip fault rather than a reverse fault and, therefore, the tsunami hazard is not expected to exceed the plant's design-basis tsunami characteristics.

The NRC staff is evaluating the tsunami hazard and is conducting an independent deterministic seismic hazard analysis of the Shoreline fault based on the information provided by the licensee to confirm the licensee's conclusions regarding the safe operation of the plant. In this regard, the staff has reviewed interim seismic studies related to the Shoreline fault zone. The staff is also in the process of reviewing PG&E's final Shoreline



fault zone report to determine whether any licensee or regulatory action may be needed. In addition to these specific efforts, the staff plans to continue discussions with PG&E on a possible license amendment to codify a Long Term Seismic Program methodology for the management of new geotechnical seismic information.

For SONGS, no new active faults have been discovered.

With regard to studies performed by other entities, such as the State of California, the NRC reviews each study's results for any new information and design challenges. The State of California is funding a new seismic study that is currently in the planning and draft phase. Licensees are required through their Technical Specifications to notify the NRC at any time during a review or study should evidence of a design challenge be identified.

The NRC considers seismic hazards to be an ongoing regulatory concern; therefore, we address seismic hazards as part of our reactor oversight process for operating reactors whenever a significant change is recognized. As a result, the NRC does not separately re-analyze seismic hazards for the license renewal process. The license renewal review is focused on managing the effects of aging and not a re-review of the current licensing basis.

**3. What are the evacuation plans for both plants in the event of an emergency? We understand that Highway 1 is the main route out of San Luis Obispo, what is the plan for evacuation of the nearby population if an earthquake takes out portions of the highway and a nuclear emergency occurs simultaneously?**

Each U.S. nuclear power plant has an emergency plan for ensuring the health and safety of members of the public who live within the emergency planning zone. Emergency plans contain contingencies for alternate evacuation routes, alternate means of notification, and other backup plans in the event of a natural disaster that damages the surrounding infrastructure.

FEMA reviews off-site emergency plans formally every 2 years during a biennial emergency preparedness exercise. The NRC evaluates on-site emergency plans during the same exercise, as well as on an annual basis. Population studies are conducted every 10 years, and evacuation time estimates are re-evaluated at that time. FEMA reviews the offsite emergency plans and evacuation time estimates, and determines whether there is a reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at a nuclear power plant.

Evacuation of members of the general public is the responsibility of San Luis Obispo County for Diablo Canyon and San Diego County for SONGS, working in conjunction with the State of California, and would be carried out in accordance with their prearranged plans. The areas to be evacuated and specific evacuation routes would depend on the meteorological conditions and route viability at the time of the accident. PG&E and Southern California Edison (SCE) would act in an advisory capacity, giving technical assessments of the

conditions at the plants and the probabilities for a potential off-site release as well as other pertinent information. This information, along with the licensee's recommended protective actions, would be assessed by responsible county and state officials in determining appropriate actions to be taken.

For Incidents of National Significance where the critical infrastructure is severely damaged, DHS has a lead role as a coordinating agency to orchestrate Federal, State, and local assets. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework provides for the NRC to be a coordinating agency for incidents involving NRC-licensed materials.

The main route out of San Luis Obispo is Highway 101. The main route for SONGS is Highway 5. For both sites, evacuation studies are conducted by demography specialists and provide information on various evacuation scenarios that could take place. The studies' results consider normal road conditions, time of day, degraded weather/visibility, and road condition.

**4. What is the NRC's role in monitoring radiation in the event of a nuclear accident both here and abroad? What is the role of EPA and other federal agencies?**

A number of U.S. agencies are involved in domestic monitoring and radiation assessment, including the EPA, Department of Energy, and NRC. NRC regulations require nuclear power plants to report any radiation levels detected at the plant that could be harmful to the public. This would include radiation levels generated by the plant or by an external source. EPA and DOE are responsible for more comprehensive domestic radiation monitoring.

The EPA utilizes its existing nationwide radiation monitoring system, RadNet, to continuously monitor the nation's air, and it regularly monitors drinking water, milk, and precipitation for environmental radiation.

**5. What monitoring systems currently are in place to track potential impacts on the U.S., including California, associated with the events in Japan?**

See response to Question #4 above. All U.S. plants are required to have a Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) in the surrounding communities that are monitored at specific intervals and analyzed in a laboratory as part of a normal offsite monitoring and sampling program.

In addition, Diablo Canyon and SONGS have near-site radiation monitoring systems in place utilizing pressurized ion chambers (radiation detectors). The facilities' pressurized ion chambers are owned and operated by the EPA and are a part of the RadNet system. The EPA monitors the real-time data from these monitors on a continuous basis. The EPA is able to share their data with other agencies during emergency situations. Questions

regarding the details of specific monitoring systems of EPA and other federal agencies should be directed to those agencies.

- 6. Which federal agency is leading the monitoring effort and which agencies have responsibility for assessing human health impacts? What impacts have occurred to date on the health or environment of the U.S. or are currently projected or modeled in connection with the events in Japan?**

See response to Question #4 above. The EPA, working with the NRC, DOE and others, has the lead for radiation monitoring activities and regularly samples air, water, and milk. An interagency advisory team that includes the NRC, the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and others, has been established under EPA's leadership and is regularly evaluating potential health and environmental impacts from events in Japan.

Only trace amounts of radioactive material have been identified through U.S. monitoring; those trace amounts are far below levels of natural background radiation and are not of public health concern. The NRC does not expect any U.S. states or territories to experience harmful levels of radioactivity as a result of the events in Japan.

- 7. What contingency plans are in place to ensure that the American public is notified in the event that hazardous materials associated with the events in Japan pose an imminent threat to the U.S.?**

Under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework, the U.S. EPA is the federal lead for plumes that come across our borders. In such situations, EPA would proceed in accordance with its established processes and procedures to work with state and local governments to protect public health and safety.

If an event requiring protective measures were to occur, U.S. residents would be advised to listen to their state and county authorities who are responsible for making protective action decisions for public health and safety. If necessary and, as appropriate, protective action decisions could include: preventing contaminated food from reaching the marketplace, recommending that all local produce be thoroughly rinsed prior to consumption, or sheltering or evacuating affected citizens. The NRC will continue to work with its local, state, and federal partners to ensure that appropriate emergency response procedures are prepared, reviewed, and exercised in accordance with NRC regulations.

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 12:14 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** More info toward latest Markey letter

Tim –

The most recent Markey letter is ticketed as Commission correspondence, therefore the full Commission must review and comment. Therefore, we will need to pursue an extension. Please see if we can have two additional weeks. One complicating factor to keep in the back of your mind may be that the House E&C R's are considering a hearing with NRC on May 4<sup>th</sup>. Was Roger able to provide updates on the other responses due to Rep. Markey?

Also on the most recent letter from Rep. Markey, I want to mention one thing about it to Roger – I'm calling him now. Please see me and I'll fill you in (I stopped by but you may be hunting and gathering lunch...).

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 3:14 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** 4 for the 4th

FYI, E&C wants to proceed with the 4 Commissioners who can make May 4<sup>th</sup> than look at other dates. Josh with that now known, I'll reply back to Susan L's e-mail re: testimony. It's a general oversight hearing, so an updated RIC speech with a Japan update??

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 5:05 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Markey letter update

Raeann and Becky concluded comments on the Markey letter yesterday and it was returned to SECY. OCA no longer has it.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 9:01 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: G20110278

He has Boxer (transparency letter) - since April 12, and also Cantwell, Menendez, and Gillibrand.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 8:59 AM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: G20110278

What "other 4"? I knew that he was working with you on that Markey letter and Gilibrand - did you hear back from him on Gilibrand? What other 2? I can help unstick if I know what is stuck...

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 8:48 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: G20110278

Haven't heard anything more from Tim about approach on Markey letter (or the other 4(?) that I've sent down recently for OCA review.)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 8:45 AM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: G20110278

Thanks - given the questions about inspections, just wanted to double-check.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 1:40 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: ACTION: G20110278

FYI.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Vito, David  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 1:38 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Cc:** Jarriel, Lisamarie; Solorio, Dave  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: G20110278

Roger,

I do not believe that this matter is allegation-related. Allegations involve assertions of impropriety or inadequacy on the part of regulated entities (licensees, certificate holders, license and certificate applicant, suppliers, vendors, etc.). The issues in the Congressman's letter question the appropriateness of NRC's response to the events in Japan. I believe it has been assigned appropriately, outside of the allegation process.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rihm, Roger  
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2011 1:21 PM  
To: Vito, David  
Subject: FW: ACTION: G20110278

Dave, in Lisamarie's absence.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rihm, Roger  
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2011 1:21 PM  
To: Jarriel, Lisamarie  
Subject: FW: ACTION: G20110278

Amy Powell in OCA suggested I run this past you to see if you think it involves an allegation. Please advise.

-----Original Message-----

From: Clayton, Kathleen  
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 3:23 PM  
To: Rihm, Roger  
Cc: RidsNrrMailCenter Resource; RidsOgcMailCenter Resource; RidsOcaMailCenter Resource  
Subject: ACTION: G20110278

Attached is an action green ticket for EDO. The ADAMS version will be sent after DPC processes.



---

**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 12:37 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: May 4 Hearing

We are pretty overwhelmed with speeches coming up fast. If the Chairman's office has to take the lead on this, it would be me and not David. What are the guidelines as to length of written and oral?

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director  
Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 5:02 PM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: May 4 Hearing

Committee just confirmed May 4<sup>th</sup> (GEA can't make it, so we were not sure what that would do to plans). The subcommittee staff that contacted OCA indicated that this would be posted as a general oversight hearing covering an range of issues. Given recent interests expressed by Members, we would expect Japan, path forward for US in light of Japan, and high-level waste to be key areas of interest.

An update of his RIC speech (his version of "state of the state") plus a portion on Japan (heavy on the task force and actions taken domestically) may make the most sense. Would you or David be able to do that?

---

**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 1:05 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** May 4 Hearing

Amy:  
Do you have more info about the May 4 hearing? Who is taking the lead on the testimony? Thanks.  
Susan

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director  
Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov)

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**From:** Weber, Michael  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 1:09 PM  
**To:** Haney, Catherine; Kokajko, Lawrence  
**Cc:** Young, Mitzi; Powell, Amy; Frazier, Alan  
**Subject:** FYI - Congressional Oversight Hearing on Yucca Mountain

---

**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 12:53 PM  
**To:** Borchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael; Ash, Darren; Boyce, Thomas (OIS); Muessle, Mary  
**Cc:** Andersen, James; Rihm, Roger; Taylor, Renee  
**Subject:** Awareness - Congressional Oversight Hearing

The oversight Hearing will be Wednesday, May 4 (9:30 or 10 a.m.) and OCA has asked that Bill attend with the full Commission testifying.

The hearing will be before two Subcommittees of the House Energy and Commerce Committee – Subcommittee on Energy and Power, and the Subcommittee on the Environment and the Economy.

We have tasked the offices to update about 40 one-pagers (from last year's hearing) and half as many notecards on a variety of subjects, although we expect the focus to be on Japan and Yucca Mountain. Obviously, there's a short turnaround time so we have asked for updates by COB Wednesday.

Mindy

Mindy S. Landau  
Deputy Assistant for Operations  
Communication and Performance Improvement  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555  
301-415-8703  
[mindy.landau@nrc.gov](mailto:mindy.landau@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 2:33 PM  
**To:** OCA Distribution  
**Subject:** FW: CA Note - 4/22/11 - Actions Following the Events in Japan: Near-Term Task Force Activities (To: Commissioners' Assistants; From: Mary Muessle)

fyi

*Nancy Belmore*  
*Office of Congressional Affairs*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
[nancy.belmore@nrc.gov](mailto:nancy.belmore@nrc.gov)  
*301-415-1776*

---

**From:** RidsOcaMailCenter Resource  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 2:27 PM  
**To:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Subject:** FW: CA Note - 4/22/11 - Actions Following the Events in Japan: Near-Term Task Force Activities (To: Commissioners' Assistants; From: Mary Muessle)

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**From:** Hasan, Nasreen  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 2:27:13 PM  
**To:** Andersen, James; Ash, Darren; Blake, Kathleen; Borchardt, Bill; Bozin, Sunny; Bubar, Patrice; Chairman Temp; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Garland, Stephanie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Herr, Linda; Jimenez, Patricia; Lepre, Janet; Lisann, Elizabeth; Mamish, Nader; Muessle, Mary; Nieh, Ho; Pace, Patti; RidsEdoMailCenter Resource; RidsOcaMailCenter Resource; RidsOcoMailCenter Resource; RidsOgcMailCenter Resource; RidsOipMailCenter Resource; RidsOIS Resource; RidsOpaMail Resource; RidsSecyMailCenter Resource; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Savoy, Carmel; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Speiser, Herald; Sprogeris, Patricia; Svinicki, Kristine; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WDM; Virgilio, Martin; Warnick, Greg; Wyatt, Melissa; Cianci, Sandra; Virgilio, Martin; Boyer, Rachel; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Miller, Charles; Doane, Margaret; Taylor, Renee  
**Subject:** CA Note - 4/22/11 - Actions Following the Events in Japan: Near-Term Task Force Activities (To: Commissioners' Assistants; From: Mary Muessle)  
**Auto forwarded by a Rule**

Date: April 22, 2011

From: Mary C. Muessle

**You can access the document in ADAMS by clicking the following link:**  
[CA Note - 4/22/11 - Actions Following the Events in Japan: Near-Term Task Force Activities](#)

ADAMS Package ML1112A075

Hard copies are being mailed to each Commission office.

*cc's electronic Distribution only*

OEDO – Note placed in EDO Daily Information Folder for 4/22/2011

*Nasreen Hasan*

*Acting Administrative Assistant to Mary C. Muessle*

*Office of the Executive Director for Operation*

*301-415-1703*

*"The best preparation for good work tomorrow is to do good work today"*

---

**From:** Boyce, Thomas (OIS)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 4:52 PM  
**To:** Ellmers, Glenn; Ash, Darren; Boger, Bruce; Brenner, Eliot; Brown, Milton; Burns, Stephen; Carpenter, Cynthia; Casto, Chuck; Cohen, Miriam; Collins, Elmo; Dapas, Marc; Dean, Bill; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; Dyer, Jim; Greene, Kathryn; Grobe, Jack; Hackett, Edwin; Haney, Catherine; Hayden, Elizabeth; Holahan, Gary; Howard, Patrick; Johnson, Michael; Kelley, Corenthis; Leeds, Eric; Mamish, Nader; McCrary, Cheryl; McCree, Victor; Miller, Charles; Moore, Scott; Pederson, Cynthia; Plisco, Loren; Poole, Brooke; Powell, Amy; Reyes, Luis; Satorius, Mark; Schaeffer, James; Schmidt, Rebecca; Sheron, Brian; Stewart, Sharon; Uhle, Jennifer; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael; Wiggins, Jim; Williams, Barbara; Zimmerman, Roy; Campbell, Andy; Holahan, Patricia; Dorman, Dan; Muessle, Mary; Wert, Leonard; Tracy, Glenn; Taylor, Renee; Krupnick, David; Evans, Michele; Moore, Scott; Campbell, Andy; Holahan, Patricia  
**Cc:** Akstulewicz, Brenda; Andersen, James; Bellosi, Susan; Belmore, Nancy; Boyd, Lena; Buckley, Patricia; Casby, Marcia; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Flory, Shirley; Garland, Stephanie; Higginbotham, Tina; Hudson, Sharon; Landau, Mindy; Matakas, Gina; Miles, Patricia; Pulley, Deborah; Rihm, Roger; Riner, Janet; Ronewicz, Lynn; Ross, Robin; Salus, Amy; Tannenbaum, Anita; Taylor, Renee; Thomas, Loretta; Walker, Dwight; Warner, MaryAnn; Wright, Darlene; Wyatt, Melissa; Cannady, Ashley; Lockhart, Denise; Perez-Ortiz, Aracelis; Riddick, Nicole; King, Shannon; Penny, Melissa; Sprogeris, Patricia; Banks, Eleasah; Nagel, Cheri; Hasan, Nasreen; Call, Michel; Thaggard, Mark; Young, Gary; Moore, Mary; Daniels, Stanley; Kreuter, Jane; Schumann, Stacy; Rihm, Roger; Schwarz, Sherry; Nichols, Russell; Holonich, Joseph; Sealing, Donna; Janney, Margie; Marshall, Jane  
**Subject:** FOIA Requests - Further Information

Office Directors and Deputy Office Directors:

This is the first of two e-mails I will send today concerning the high number of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests following the earthquake in Japan on March 11, 2011. This message is intended to clarify some issues surrounding the current FOIA requests, your responsibilities, and some specific issues concerning international agreements and their impact on the FOIA request(s).

The second message will be sent in my role as Acting DEDCM, and will be seeking your assistance for a FOIA task force. I apologize for the length of this message, but I want to be sure I am addressing the multiple concerns that you have brought to my attention.

All NRC employees need to be aware of their responsibilities under FOIA as a Federal employee for records retention and responding to FOIA requests. As stated in my earlier e-mail on April 1, these FOIA requests deserve a best effort response - meaning as time permits - even those marked expedited.

I have been asked to provide further guidance as to what constitutes "best effort". I ask that you use your best judgment; I cannot give a specific minimum number of hours per day or week. However, in an early e-mail, I characterized expectations to the extent that progress must be made on a weekly, if not daily basis. Each situation will vary according to your current workload and the criticality of that work. FOIA response is part of our responsibilities as Federal employees. We must make progress in collecting the necessary information to support the Agency response to these requests. I also realize that the level of requests is truly unprecedented and OIS is working with NSIR to bring additional resources to bear.

Given the magnitude of records responsive to these requests, NRC has decided to address some of the Japan-related FOIA requests globally rather than through the usual case-by-case process. A systematic approach is being developed that will be more efficient and should result in a more rapid turnaround for the requestors. NRC is standing up a Task Force (TF) to review the identified records, and determine which are releasable under FOIA regulations. Staff should continue to identify information that is needed in response to the FOIA requests, but the TF will perform the initial review of that information to identify the next steps for information you provide. Offices will be notified which requests the TF is reviewing so that those offices' efforts are included as part of the TF to ensure consistency across the agency. As noted, I will shortly be sending a more targeted message concerning the task force.

Because of the international nature of the event, the FOIA responses will include information provided by Japan to the NRC. NRC's agency-to-agency information exchange Arrangements obligate NRC to hold information in the same manner as the originating countries would hold the information. The exchange arrangements expressly state that NRC will comply with the commitments in the arrangement to the extent allowed under the law. Exchange arrangements are not law, as they are not ratified like treaties. For example, FOIA trumps an exchange arrangement. If information received from a foreign counterpart under an agency-to-agency arrangement cannot be legally withheld under FOIA, NRC would have to disclose it.

To meet NRC's obligations under the exchange arrangements, NRC needs to be sure that it can withhold the information under FOIA. NRC should not accept any documents from its foreign counterparts to be held in confidence without making the determination that NRC can, under the law, withhold it. Otherwise NRC will be in non-compliance with its exchange arrangements.

The Office of the General Counsel (OGC) has concluded that FOIA Exemption 4 should probably provide protection for whatever information obtained from Japan/TEPCO that they would like to keep confidential regarding the situation at the Fukushima reactors. Staff may receive in confidence technical information from foreign counterparts other than Japan in the course of this event. If so, staff should consult with OGC on whether that information also can be withheld under FOIA. Documents should be properly marked once received and prior to disseminating. Finally, the Office of Information Services is attempting to acquire technology to assist NRC staff in searching for records and removing duplicates electronically. Once that is complete, the TF will review and bracket the requested documents and emails for release. Staff should preserve records that are requested by the FOIAs, as identified by your Office FOIA Coordinator.

As noted in an earlier e-mail, to assist with FOIA requests that require e-mail collection, OIS will provide technical support to search for e-mail messages based on specific criteria. This includes searching e-mail boxes, copying the messages into one e-mail folder and consolidating the entire e-mail folder into one document using Adobe that can be forwarded to the NRC Copy Center for printing. If you need assistance with e-mail search, please send an e-mail request to [ICOD.Support@nrc.gov](mailto:ICOD.Support@nrc.gov).

Thomas Boyce  
Deputy Chief Information Officer  
Director, Office of Information Services  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-8700

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 7:52 AM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan  
**Subject:** RE: May 4 Hearing

4 of the 5 on the Commission will be testifying (Cmr Apostolakis will be out of the country, but the hearing will be held without him). Same as March 16<sup>th</sup>, the hearing will be held jointly by two subcommittees of the House Energy and Commerce Committee: 1) Subcommittee on Energy and Power, 2) Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy.

When the Commission testifies, only one written testimony is submitted (from the Chairman on behalf of the Commission). Each Commissioner, like the Chairman, will have 3-5 minutes for opening statements.

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**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 2:45 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: May 4 Hearing

Is this going to be the full Energy and Commerce Committee or a Subcommittee of that, or a combo? And, all the Commissioners are supposed to be testifying?

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director  
Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 5:02 PM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: May 4 Hearing

Committee just confirmed May 4<sup>th</sup> (GEA can't make it, so we were not sure what that would do to plans). The subcommittee staff that contacted OCA indicated that this would be posted as a general oversight hearing covering an range of issues. Given recent interests expressed by Members, we would expect Japan, path forward for US in light of Japan, and high-level waste to be key areas of interest.

An update of his RIC speech (his version of "state of the state") plus a portion on Japan (heavy on the task force and actions taken domestically) may make the most sense. Would you or David be able to do that?

---

**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 1:05 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** May 4 Hearing

Amy:  
Do you have more info about the May 4 hearing? Who is taking the lead on the testimony? Thanks.

Susan

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director  
Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov)



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 12:52 PM  
**To:** jonathan.levenshus@mail.house.gov  
**Subject:** NRC response  
**Attachments:** Response to Rep. Markey ltrs Rep Capps ltr - 042111.pdf

Hi Jonathan – thanks for your time on the phone this morning. Hopefully, we can find time for your boss and the Chairman to meet next week. Patti will work with Sarah on it.

Also FYI, attached is the NRC response to Rep. Capps' letter following the Japan event (cosigned with Mr. Markey). Hard copy will come over later today, but wanted to make sure that you saw it.

Thanks again,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 1:28 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC response

Is there some attachment that actually responds to the questions the Members asked, or do we need to write a followup letter complaining about the lack of responsiveness?

Thanks  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 12:48 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** NRC response

Hi Michal --

Sorry we played phone tag this morning. I've got a call coming up that should go until about 2pm; I will try to reach you again after that.

Attached is a response that just came through from Office of the Secretary. As I mentioned on my voicemail, the response to the April 15<sup>th</sup> letter will be Commission correspondence as well; that will therefore need time for Commission review and comment...

Hopefully we'll connect this afternoon,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673



CHAIRMAN

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 21, 2011

The Honorable Edward J. Markey  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Markey:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letters of March 11, 15, and 18, 2011, which raised a number of important questions and concerns regarding recent events in Japan and their implications for the continuing safety of nuclear power plants in the United States.

Japan is still focused on bringing the nuclear events and their ramifications under control. The NRC's Emergency Operations Center continues to monitor and assess events, and to provide expert assistance and review. We are focused on meeting the near-term technical and information needs of the Japanese Government, various components of the Executive Branch, Members of Congress, and the American public, while ensuring there is no reduction in the domestic licensing and oversight functions of the NRC. The NRC will be prepared to share a complete and accurate summary of events in Japan when the immediate crisis is over and we obtain more complete and verified information over time.

We expect that decisions regarding our domestic regulatory program based on lessons learned from the events in Japan will be made over the course of the next 6 – 9 months. During this time, the NRC staff has established, in accordance with the Commission's March 23rd direction, a senior level task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term components.

For the near-term effort, the task force is beginning a 90-day review. This review will evaluate the currently available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include the ability to protect against natural disasters, response to station blackouts, severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression, radiological consequence analysis, severe accident management issues and emergency preparedness. Over this 90-day period, the NRC staff will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and will recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed. This 90-day effort will include a briefing of the Commission after approximately 30 days to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the condition of the U.S. reactor fleet based on information available at that time.

The NRC's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC staff has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan, with a goal of commencing no later than the completion of the 90-day near-term report. The task force will evaluate all technical and policy

issues related to the events to identify any additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and modifications to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the NRC. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months after the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available in accordance with normal Commission processes.


With those plans in place and underway, we also are currently pursuing prudent actions, even though we do not yet have all the details we need to fully assess the implications of the Japanese events for the U.S. reactor fleet. Specifically, we have begun inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the resident inspectors and the region-based inspectors in our four Regional offices, to look at licensees' readiness to deal with both design basis accidents and beyond-design basis accidents. We have also issued an information notice to our licensees to make them aware of the events in Japan. Nuclear power plant licensees are voluntarily verifying that their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and operational. The NRC will take additional actions that we believe to be appropriate as our understanding of the events in Japan becomes clearer.

In your letter of March 18<sup>th</sup>, you requested that we provide Congress and the public with a daily "situation report" or other similar document providing various updated information on the impacted facilities in Japan. I understand that the NRC Office of Congressional Affairs has begun providing that information to your office. To inform the public, we have prominently placed on the NRC webpage a link to "NRC's Actions on Japan's Emergency." This link, which is updated regularly, provides a range of information that includes Congressional testimony, Commission meeting transcripts, news releases, and Frequently Asked Questions. It also includes links to additional information on the web sites of a number of U.S. Government agencies and other organizations.

Let me assure you that our ongoing monitoring of events in Japan and review of all available information leads us to conclude that U.S. plants continue to operate safely. Let me also assure you that our review of this ongoing and dynamic situation will be systematic and methodical. We will take whatever actions are determined necessary in light of the information we receive.

I want to reiterate that we continue to view our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees as our top priority and that U.S. nuclear plants continue to operate safely. I look forward to being able to provide you with additional information as it becomes available. If you have any additional questions, please contact me or Ms. Rebecca Schmidt, Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, at (301) 415-1776.

Sincerely,



Gregory B. Jaczko

Similar letter sent to:

The Honorable Edward J. Markey  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Lois Capps  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:47 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** More on routing questions: Ops Ctr vs OEDO

FYI, this is the end of a chain that started last night in an effort to track down another Markey answer. I can try to talk to Jim to see what we can work out so that we don't continue bouncing between guidance.

---

**From:** Andersen, James  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:44 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kötzas, Margie; Landau, Mindy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Amy, I am not aware of a change to send questions on Japan to OEDO. I think questions should go through the operations center, and if they need assistance, they reach out to the program offices.

Jim A.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 8:32 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** More from OEDO

FYI, Mindy's response... I think she is on another page. I'll talk to Jim to see if we can get some clarification on where to direct Japan Qs.

AP

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**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:49 AM  
**To:** Andersen, James; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kotzalas, Margie; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

This probably stemmed from the FAQ site that has been set up on the public web. The Qs and As really should be funneled to OPA. Confusion reigns!

Amy, please ask the OCA staff to provide OPA with any final Qs and As they prepare for Congressional briefings in the event they may be appropriate to use on the public site database.

Thanks!  
Mindy

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**From:** Andersen, James  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:44 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kotzalas, Margie; Landau, Mindy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Amy, I am not aware of a change to send questions on Japan to OEDO. I think questions should go through the operations center, and if they need assistance, they reach out to the program offices.

Jim A.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 4:08 PM  
**To:** 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: NRC Contact

Thanks for your note Mary! Let me know when/if you want to set up a briefing or meeting for Sen. Inouye and Chairman Jaczko. I'll keep you posted on any change to recommendations.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye) <Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 26 16:05:23 2011  
**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Hi Amy,

I'm so sorry for the delayed response. Thank you for your note about the NRC's role in the aftermath of the Japan earthquake/tsunami. I really appreciate your attention to this matter. I may take you up on the offer for a briefing in the near future, as the date for the Senator's upcoming travel gets closer (I will have to check with Appropriations staff). In the meantime, we're on the lookout for NRC recommendations to State on changes to instructions for US citizens' travel.

Thanks!  
Mary

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**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 6:00 PM  
**To:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye)  
**Cc:** Cummisky, Margaret (Appropriations)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Hi Mary –

I tried to call you at the office but did not get through – you all must be having a busy day! The NRC has not offered any change to the current US government instructions for citizens' travel. FYI, NRC Chairman Jaczko traveled to Japan late last month as a show of support to our colleagues there. If it would be helpful, we'd be glad to set up a meeting or phone call between him and Senator Inouye. We'd also be glad to set up a staff level briefing for you if that would be helpful. Let me know.

Also FYI, NRC has had staff in Japan since March 12<sup>th</sup>; folks who have returned (we rotated new staff over there recently) posted some of their experiences on the agency's blog at <http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2011/04/07/from-japan-a-first-person-account/>



Hope to talk with you soon – my direct line appears below.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye) [mailto:Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 4:17 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Cummisky, Margaret (Appropriations)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Hi Amy,

Any information/update that you might be able to provide in regards to the NRC's recommendations for changes to the State Department's travel warning to Japan will be greatly appreciated. I cc'd Senator's staff on the Appropriations Committee, Ms. Margaret Cummisky, who is coordinating the Senator's May travel.

Thanks!

Mary

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 11, 2011 3:37 PM  
**To:** Yoshioka, Mary (Inouye)  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy (Amy.Powell@nrc.gov)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC Contact

Mary, I recommend you contact Amy Powell at NRC. I am looping her in via this message.  
Bette

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:24 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO

Raeann or David?

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:22 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO  
**Importance:** High

Who do you want to go to this closed Commission meeting tomorrow? We need to inform SECY by 2:00.

---

**From:** Baval, Rochelle  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:18 AM  
**To:** Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Baval, Rochelle; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Baval, Rochelle; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO  
**Importance:** High

**Response is requested by 2:00pm Today.**

Please provide the names of persons in your office who will attend the following briefing:

**Topic: Part 2 - Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout - Security Issues (Closed Ex. 3)**

**Date: Thursday, April 28, 2011**

**Time: 11:30 am – 12:00 pm**

**Place: Commissioners' Executive Conference Room, 18<sup>th</sup> floor OWFN**

**Level: Safeguards Information and Security Related Information**

This will be a closed session after the public session of the Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout for the Commission to ask questions mainly on B.5.b that cannot be asked in the public session.

**Attendees from OEDO offices should coordinate a list through Denise Wallace, OEDO.**

**All attendees should have appropriate clearance and need to know.**

Thank you,  
*Rochelle*

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**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 9:28 AM  
**To:** Baval, Rochelle; Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Ciani, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** RE: Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO

Patty Bubar and Bill Orders will be in attendance from Commissioner Magwood's office at the closed session tomorrow.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

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**From:** Baval, Rochelle  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:18 AM  
**To:** Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Baval, Rochelle; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Baval, Rochelle; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Ciani, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO  
**Importance:** High

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**Topic: Part 2 - Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout - Security Issues (Closed Ex. 3)**

**Date: Thursday, April 28, 2011**

Time: 11:30 am – 12:00 pm

Place: Commissioners' Executive Conference Room, 18<sup>th</sup> floor OWFN

Level: Safeguards Information and Security Related Information

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**All attendees should have appropriate clearance and need to know.**

Thank you,  
*Rochelle*

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 9:34 AM  
**To:** Baval, Rochelle  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO

Raeann Shane from OCA.

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**From:** Baval, Rochelle  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:18 AM  
**To:** Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Baval, Rochelle; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Baval, Rochelle; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muesle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greatehead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO  
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**All attendees should have appropriate clearance and need to know.**

Thank you,  
*Rochelle*

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 9:45 AM  
**To:** Nieh, Ho  
**Subject:** Evac to 50 QA\_OPA approved.docx  
**Attachments:** Evac to 50 QA\_OPA approved.docx

FYI, this is posted on NRR's "database" of Q&As – to me, it looks very similar to the public Web site posting that we discussed this am with perhaps a bit more detail, explanation. Is this comparable to what you saw in the "Go" book?

AP

**Q: Is there a 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) around U.S. reactors?**

There are two emergency planning zones (EPZ) established around a nuclear power plant. The first zone, the 10-mile EPZ, is where exposure from a radiological release event would likely be from the radioactive plume and it is in this EPZ where protective actions such as sheltering and/or evacuation would be appropriate. Beyond the 10-mile EPZ and out to the 50-mile EPZ is the ingestion exposure pathway where exposure to radionuclides would likely be from ingestion of contaminated food/milk and surface water. These zones are not limits but rather provide for a comprehensive emergency planning framework that would allow expansion of the response efforts beyond the zones should radiological conditions warrant such expansion.

**Q. Why did the NRC decide to recommend evacuation out to 50 miles from the Fukushima Daiichi facility for U.S. citizens in Japan?**

The decision to expand evacuation of U.S. citizens out to 50 miles from the Fukushima Daiichi facility was a conservative decision that was made out of consideration of several factors including an abundance of caution resulting from limited and unverifiable information concerning event progression at several units at the Fukushima Daiichi facility. The NRC based its assessment on information available at the time regarding the condition of the units conditions at Fukushima Daiichi that included significant damage to Units 1, 2, and 3 that appeared to be a result of hydrogen explosions. Prior to the earthquake and tsunami, Unit 4 was in a refueling outage and its entire core had been transferred to the spent fuel pool only 3 months earlier so the fuel was quite fresh. Radiation monitors showed significantly elevated readings in some areas of the plant site which would challenge plant crews attempting to stabilize the plant. Based on analysis results, there were indications from some offsite contamination sampling smears that fuel damage had occurred. There was a level of uncertainty about whether or not efforts to stabilize the plant in the very near term were going to be successful. Changing meteorological conditions resulted in the winds shifting rapidly from blowing out to sea to blowing back onto land.

**Q. How did the NRC develop its computer-based projections that supported the evacuation decision?**

The NRC uses the RASCAL computer code to perform offsite radiation dose projections. The RASCAL computer program contains information about U.S. nuclear reactor design types, radiation release pathways from the nuclear power plant to the environment, radionuclide source terms and meteorology. However, RASCAL is not capable of evaluating concurrent and multiple nuclear plant failures. So, to approximate the events unfolding at the Fukushima Daiichi facility, the NRC developed a model that aggregated information from the three operating reactors and the spent fuel pool. This aggregate



model was then evaluated using the RASCAL computer code. The radiation doses calculated by the RASCAL code were predicted to exceed the protective action guidelines (PAGs) established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) well beyond the 10-mile exposure pathway EPZ and beyond the 30 kilometer sheltering zone recommended by the Japanese authorities. Subsequent aerial monitoring by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) fixed-wing aircraft monitoring showed elevated radiation dose rates that were in excess of the EPA relocation PAGs to a distance beyond 25 miles from the facility.

**Q. Did the NRC consult the Department of Energy (DOE) or the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) for assistance in developing the protective action recommendation?**

Although the DOE assisted in providing radiation dose rate information to support the analysis performed by the NRC, the protective action recommendation was made by the NRC.

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**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 9:50 AM  
**To:** Baval, Rochelle; Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Ciani, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** RE: Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO

Mike Snodderly and Belkys Sosa will be attending from Commissioner Apostolakis' office.

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**From:** Baval, Rochelle  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:18 AM  
**To:** Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Baval, Rochelle; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Baval, Rochelle; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Ciani, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
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**Importance:** High

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Place: Commissioners' Executive Conference Room, 18<sup>th</sup> floor OWFN

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**All attendees should have appropriate clearance and need to know.**

Thank you,  
*Rochelle*

---

**From:** Sharkey, Jeffry  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 11:39 AM  
**To:** Baval, Rochelle; Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** RE: Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO

Pat Castleman and I will attend from Commissioner Svinicki's office.

Thanks,

Jeff

---

**From:** Baval, Rochelle  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:18 AM  
**To:** Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Baval, Rochelle; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Baval, Rochelle; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
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**Attendees from OEDO offices should coordinate a list through Denise Wallace, OEDO.**

**All attendees should have appropriate clearance and need to know.**

Thank you,  
*Rochelle*

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 3:10 PM  
**To:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Subject:** RE: USNRC Emergency Operations Center Status Update

Jeff: I noticed after sending it that it was a little (or a lot) more than we have been sending. The Chairman's initial guidance was plant status, but if you are comfortable over there providing a little more information, I'm sure the folks downtown wouldn't mind getting it. We have received a follow up question from Congressman Markey's staff on what we just sent. We are a little confused here. Do these questions get fed back to the Operations Center or staff here? If staff here, who would be a good contact. I'm at 415-1777 if you want to discuss. Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 3:05 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: USNRC Emergency Operations Center Status Update

Spiros. Please let me know if the document Ned sent you is adequate, or TMI for Congressional folks (we seem to have gone from a 3 pager to a 6 pager for your congressional contacts). Jeff Temple

Liaison Team Coordinator  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
email: [lia08.hoc@nrc.gov](mailto:lia08.hoc@nrc.gov)  
Desk Ph: 301-816-5185

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 2:00 PM  
**To:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Subject:** RE: USNRC Emergency Operations Center Status Update

Thanks

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**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 1:40 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** USNRC Emergency Operations Center Status Update

This information is **Official USE Only**

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 3:27 PM  
**To:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Subject:** FW: Congressman Markey Staffer Questions

See email trail on who should be taking these questions, FYI.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 3:13 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Fw: Congressman Markey Staffer Questions

FYI - Jim is seeking guidance from Marty, based on David's email to Margie...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Andersen, James  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Cc:** Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Kotzalas, Margie  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 28 15:08:31 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Congressman Markey Staffer Questions

Marty, from a process perspective, I talked with Amy Powell, I think these types of questions should first go to the ops center, and then the op center staff decides if they need office help to address them. I think OCA is getting conflicting guidance which is driving them to send the questions to OEDO. Thanks for any clarification.

Jim A.

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 2:22 PM  
**To:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Subject:** Congressman Markey Staffer Questions

Margie,  
I know these two questions on the situation in Japan might not be in your area, but any help in pointing me in the right direction would be really appreciated!

David

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 2:15 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Decker, David; Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Re: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/28/2011

Thanks

This document (the Daily Plant Status Report) has raised another question. So it seems like TEPCO believes that the highly radioactive water in unit 2 is coming from the suppression pool. In NRC staff's view, are there ways for water in the suppression pool to have gotten that highly radioactive in the absence of core material actually being out of the pressure vessel? Could enough core material have gotten out of the pressure vessel through pathways other than a melt-through?

Finally, there are reports that radiation levels at unit 1 were measured to be very high by the robot. NRC staff previously told me that they did not believe that the radiation measurements inside unit 1 were reliable and additionally that no one thought there had been a breach in the unit 1 pressure vessel. Has NRC staff altered its views based on the new radiation readings?

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836



---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 6:20 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: Emergency

We're good. No conflict I can see. kinda depends on your read of "emergency" and we say it didn't require any designation.

-----Original Message-----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2011 6:19 PM  
To: Brenner, Eliot  
Subject: Fw: Emergency

----- Original Message -----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca  
To: Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
Sent: Mon Apr 04 08:45:34 2011  
Subject: RE: Emergency

Section 3 of the Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1980 provides the Chairman with substantial additional authority during an emergency. This does not require an "official designation of an emergency." The Commission and staff understand how this authority is executed. The Operations Center went into monitoring mode on March 11th at approximately 0946 in response to the possible impact on the West Coast plants due to potentially high waves. The Chairman has been exercising his emergency authority since that time. The agency will return to a non-emergency status when the situation warrants.

-----Original Message-----

From: Caputo, Annie (EPW) [mailto:Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 9:29 PM  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Subject: Re: Emergency

Thanks. Have a good weekend.

----- Original Message -----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 08:15 PM  
To: Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
Subject: Re: Emergency

Annie,

I had an appointment and left work at 300 after I talked to you. . I will get you something monday morning. Becky

----- Original Message -----

From: Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>



To: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Sent: Fri Apr 01 16:25:07 2011  
Subject: Emergency

Ms. Schmidt,

Per our phone conversation, what's the reason for the delay in getting this basic information regarding the emergency declaration?

Annie

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2011 10:16 AM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** More from Michal  
  
**Importance:** High

David - I think we need to set up a call for Michal to walk through her Qs vs more email. It helped for a while last time. On the 67 hours of battery at Fukushima, Steve Arndt and Cyndi Carpenter went back through the chronology and confirmed app. 70 hours (67 had been reported) for the RCICs on battery life with the possible rationale that because only RCICs was running perhaps they got extended life.

On the GEH report, my understanding is that it is not final and is not ours to share. I told Michal this yesterday and encouraged her to talk to GEH.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 29 10:06:33 2011  
**Subject:** battery and other questions

Amy and David

I am looking at the April 18 NRC presentation given by Patricia Milligan at the preparedness conference. It's too large to email to you (I already tried. ☺) Slide 8 says that the station batteries were depleted in 8-10 hours. NRC staff have previously told me that in fact the batteries were depleted in 67 hours because that is how long the RCICs worked, and when I questioned that number, I was then told that this duration was possible because the batteries were only running the RCICs and not everything else. Now I see that NRC is still maintaining an 8-10 hour battery lifetime in other venues. Which is it - and if it was 8-10 hours, does that alter the staff's view of the RCICs?

I also thought it would be helpful for me to list the other technical questions that are still outstanding in one place:

- 1) Does NRC staff still believe pressure in unit 1 is stable? There are reports that radiation levels at unit 1 were measured to be very high by the robot. NRC staff previously told me that they did not believe that the radiation measurements inside unit 1 were reliable and additionally that no one thought there had been a breach in the unit 1 pressure vessel. Has NRC staff altered its views based on the new radiation readings?
- 2) Also, for unit 2 - It seems like TEPCO believes that the highly radioactive water in unit 2 is coming from the suppression pool. In NRC staff's view, are there ways for water in the suppression pool to have gotten that

highly radioactive in the absence of core material actually being out of the pressure vessel? Could enough core material have gotten out of the pressure vessel through pathways other than a melt-through?

3) Has the GEH report on unit 2 come out yet?

Thanks

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 2:32 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/28/2011

FYI, David will follow up.

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 2:15 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Decker, David; Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Re: Daily Plant Status Report - 4/28/2011

Thanks

David - I'm still awaiting responses to my other questions but this document has raised another. So it seems like TEPCO believes that the highly radioactive water in unit 2 is coming from the suppression pool. In NRC staff's view, are there ways for water in the suppression pool to have gotten that highly radioactive in the absence of core material actually being out of the pressure vessel? Could enough core material have gotten out of the pressure vessel through pathways other than a melt-through?

Michal  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros [mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 02:01 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>; Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Shane, Raeann <Raeann.Shane@nrc.gov>; Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>; Decker, David <David.Decker@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Combs, Thomas <Thomas.Combs@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Daily Plant Status Report - 4/28/2011

This information is ~~Official Use Only~~

---

**From:** NEIGA@nei.org  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2011 3:05 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NEI Weekly Update on Fukushima Daiichi, April 29, 2011



**April 29, 2011**

**NEI Weekly Update on Fukushima Daiichi**

**Plant Status:**

- Priorities this week at Fukushima continued to be cooling the reactors and fuel pools, draining water from the turbine buildings and concrete structures that house piping to reduce radiation levels, and containing the spread of radioactive materials. Tokyo Electric Power Co. is increasing the amount of cooling water injected into reactor 1 at the Fukushima Daiichi plant as part of a plan to cover the fuel.
- TEPCO plans to build a storage and processing facility that can hold 70,000 tons of highly radioactive water at the plant.
- Overall, site radiation dose rates are stabilizing or decreasing. The most recent radiation readings reported at the plant site gates ranged from 4.8 millirem per hour to 2.2 millirem per hour. TEPCO has released a map showing radiation levels around the site, based on readings taken on different days since the incident began.
- TEPCO said this week that it will build a wall of sandbags along the shoreline at the Fukushima Daiichi site as a temporary measure against another possible tsunami. The company also moved emergency power generators to higher ground to prevent the reactors' cooling systems from failing in case a major tsunami hits the plant again. The utility will sandbag the shoreline at the plant to a height of several meters. Priority will be put on the area near the waste processing facility, where highly radioactive water is being moved from around the reactor buildings. TEPCO is also planning to build a breakwater on the shoreline, as the sandbags cannot remain the long-term solution for a possible tsunami.
- Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission asked the government April 28 to review the ability of the country's nuclear power plants to withstand earthquakes. The commission has requested that the Nuclear Safety Agency "reexamine the fault lines and geographical changes where plant operators have so far said the risk of earthquake damage was low." The utilities' reassessment of earthquake resistance "will likely take several years," the NSC said, and will likely affect the start of operations at new nuclear power plants and the construction of new reactors.

- TEPCO said April 28 that it does not believe the spent fuel pool at reactor 4 of Fukushima Daiichi is leaking, according to a report by Japan television station NHK. The utility said it initially believed that declining water levels in the pool indicated that it might have been damaged in an explosion soon after March 11, but it "now believes that the water has been evaporating at a rate in line with calculations by experts." The fuel storage pool "will be reinforced by July," TEPCO said.

#### **Regulatory/Political Issues:**

- NRC site inspections as a follow-up to the Fukushima event were set to end. A draft report of the results is expected in two weeks.
- The NRC staff briefed the commissioners Thursday on its review of the Fukushima accident and on the station blackout rule. Bill Borchardt, the NRC's executive director for operations, told the commissioners that NRC reviews of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi "have not identified anything that needs immediate action" at U.S. reactors. The briefing also explored preparations at U.S. reactors for a total loss of AC power, or station blackouts. NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko said he is "not convinced that in that situation (station blackout), four hours is a reasonable time to restore off-site power. That may be something we want to look at a little bit more."
- The Group of 20 economic powers (G-20) will meet June 7-8 to discuss nuclear safety "in the light of the events" at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría said this week. The International Atomic Energy Agency also will take part in the G-20 meeting.

#### **New NEI Products:**

- A new video on radiation monitoring, featuring Health Physics Society President Edward Maher, appears on NEI's YouTube channel.

#### **Media Highlights:**

- Alex Marion, NEI's vice president for nuclear operations, briefly discussed implications of Fukushima for the U.S. industry on CNN as part of a larger discussion of industry's emergency preparedness.
- NEI President and CEO Marvin Fertel spoke with New York Times reporter Tom Zeller on claims by the Natural Resources Defense Council and Union of Concerned Scientists that the NRC is a "captive" regulator. He described NRC as an effective regulator and noted transparency in U.S. regulatory process and improvements to better focus on safety over the past decade.
- NEI discussed the 25th anniversary of Chernobyl in the context of Fukushima with Forbes magazine.
- Homeland Security Today magazine is focusing its July issue on challenges of critical infrastructure security, especially from earthquakes tsunamis and other severe events. In an interview, NEI addressed the improvements over the last 10 years, including physical additions to plant security, additional personnel and training, shift drill exercises and NRC-graded exercises.

- Most Americans (57 percent) think a nuclear plant accident is likely in America, according to a McClatchey-Marist poll. Only 40 percent think it is not likely.

#### **The Week Ahead:**

- NEI will conduct focus group sessions May 2 in Los Angeles as part of its public opinion research project on safety and preparedness issues.
- The NRC will meet at 9 a.m. Tuesday, May 3, for a briefing on emergency preparedness. The meeting will be webcast.
- The House Energy and Commerce Committee's subcommittees on energy and power and environment and the economy will conduct a joint hearing at 9:30 a.m. on May 4 to examine the role of the NRC in America's energy future. All the commissioners are expected to testify.

Click [here](#) to unsubscribe





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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2011 5:10 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Re: battery and other questions

And let's add another question.

I hear pressure in unit 1 dropped more than expected which raises the question of whether adding all that water has caused too much steam to condense, which led to a large pressure drop and the possibility that oxygen could get sucked in which could then lead to a hydrogen explosion. True?

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

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Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2011 10:06 AM  
**To:** Amy Powell <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Decker, David <David.Decker@nrc.gov>  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** battery and other questions

Amy and David

I am looking at the April 18 NRC presentation given by Patricia Milligan at the preparedness conference. It's too large to email to you (I already tried. ☺) Slide 8 says that the station batteries were depleted in 8-10 hours. NRC staff have previously told me that in fact the batteries were depleted in 67 hours because that is how long the RCICs worked, and when I questioned that number, I was then told that this duration was possible because the batteries were only running the RCICs and not everything else. Now I see that NRC is still maintaining an 8-10 hour battery lifetime in other venues. Which is it - and if it was 8-10 hours, does that alter the staff's view of the RCICs?

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3) Has the GEH report on unit 2 come out yet?

Thanks

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2011 5:36 PM  
**To:** 'Rob.Blair@mail.house.gov'  
**Cc:** 'Joseph.Levin@mail.house.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: Your most recent favorite topic regarding Chairman Jaczko

"Enjoy" may be relative, but thanks for the sentiment...

There are three citations most relevant to a) Chairman's role and authorities, and b) emergency powers

1. Chairman as agency "spokesman": Atomic Energy Act established, in Sec. 21, that the Chairman of the then-AEC "shall be the official spokesman of the Commission in its relations with the Congress, Government agencies, persons or the public..."
2. In the Reorganization Act of 1974, AEA was updated to reflect the creation of NRC (from the AEC) and deems the NRC Chairman as official spokesperson in Section 201(a)(1).
3. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 strengthened the executive and administrative roles of the NRC Chairman, particularly in emergencies (Section 3) following the 1979 Three Mile Island event. This Reorganization Plan also provided that all policy formulation, policy-related rulemaking, and orders and adjudications would REMAIN vested with the full Commission (ie emergency powers only apply to the emergency itself - not all matters before the Commission).

In dealing with the Japan issue, as the NRC chief executive and its spokesperson, the Chairman exercised both the emergency and executive powers inherent in the Chairman's role under existing statutes. This does not require an "official designation of an emergency." The Commission and staff understand how this authority is executed. There is no need to make a declaration of any type in carrying out these responsibilities. Responding to external emergencies is a basic function of the agency and its designated chairman, as noted when the 1980 plan was sent to the Congress at the time.

All three of these pieces of legislation (both summarized and links to full text) are on NRC's public Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-laws.html> (they are the first three listed on the page)

By design, I'll be back in the office Monday so feel free to call.

Enjoy the weekend,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Blair, Rob <Rob.Blair@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Levin, Joseph <Joseph.Levin@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 29 13:56:28 2011  
**Subject:** Your most recent favorite topic regarding Chairman Jaczko

Hope you're enjoying your day out of the office. Would you please send ASAP the specific statute/regulation that the Chairman invoked for his emergency powers, and the legal justification accompanying his decision?

Thanks...

Robert Blair  
Committee on Appropriations  
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development  
202.225.3421

Group AO

(Records Withheld  
In Part)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 10:11 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Prepare for some craziness

I'm still waiting for my (b)(6) so I'm hoping to be there by noon

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 11 10:08:40 2011  
**Subject:** Prepare for some craziness

- 1) The Ops Ctr is lightly staffing up given the events in Japan, potential impact on West Coast; Raeann is there for OCA.
- 2) Still waiting on KLS comments, then will need Josh's blessing on the testimony before OMB review
- 3) The two YM memos from staff, including the nonconcurrences, may go public today if NMSS (who controls the docs) can prepare them. I'll get 1 hour lead time for the Hill before they are public.
- 4) Gene and Tim are out. David is en route. and (b)(6)  
(b)(6) am still scheduled to go down with WCO unless we want to rethink that (Josh said something yesterday that makes me think that he prefer OCA be with him)
- 5) Trying to keep Trip at bay on the House Science ltr given all the more immediate stuff...

Fridays only come in two flavors: quiet and crazy!

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**Subject:** Re: Disposal of thorium  
**Location:** Re: Phone  
  
**Start:** Fri 3/11/2011 11:00 AM  
**End:** Fri 3/11/2011 12:00 PM  
  
**Recurrence:** (none)  
  
**Meeting Status:** Accepted  
  
**Organizer:** Weil, Jenny  
**Required Attendees:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman); McConnell, Keith; Powell, Amy

**When:** Friday, March 11, 2011 11:00 AM-12:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).  
**Where:** Re: Phone

**Note:** The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*

**Call-in number:** 877-917-3617

**Passcode:** (b)(6) #

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 11:06 AM  
**To:** McConnell, Keith; Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** RE: He's on his way back

Trying to get off other line and dial in

-----Original Message-----

**From:** McConnell, Keith  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 11:03 AM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: He's on his way back

Jon and I are on the bridge line.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 10:59 AM  
**To:** McConnell, Keith  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** He's on his way back

To his office. Should work.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)



---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 2:08 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: FYI from Sen Carper's office

Josh just called with new info—I told him we had already talked to Laura.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 2:06 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: FYI from Sen Carper's office

OK - have we now been okayed to discuss Japan?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 11 13:47:47 2011  
**Subject:** RE: FYI from Sen Carper's office

David is calling her

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 1:24 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** FYI from Sen Carper's office

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) <Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 11 13:22:16 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Update on earthquake in Japan

I'm hearing on the TV that there might be a problem with a plant not being able to cool down in Japan – I haven't heard anything from you on this please provide me with an update. Thank you.

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 10:27 AM  
**To:** Haynes, Laura (Carper)  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Update on earthquake in Japan

Hi Laura,

I'm checking on that right now.

/Jenny

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) [mailto:Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 10:25 AM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Update on earthquake in Japan

Jenny – any update on the status of Japan's nuclear reactors?

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 10:24 AM  
**Subject:** Re: Update on earthquake in Japan

Hi everyone,

A quick update on the earthquake/tsunami situation. NRC went into a monitoring response mode around 9:45 a.m. As part of the monitoring, additional staff reported to the Emergency Operations Center. The staff is prepared to provide oversight at U.S. sites and assistance to international sites in response to impacts from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

/Jenny

*Jenny Weil*  
*Congressional Affairs Officer*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
*301-415-1691 (office)*  

(b)(6)

 (BlackBerry)  
[jenny.weil@nrc.gov](mailto:jenny.weil@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 4:22 PM  
**To:** McKelvin, Sheila  
**Cc:** Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: final NRC letter  
**Attachments:** NRC Japan earthquake letter 03.11.11.pdf

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 3:38 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Fw: final NRC letter

I can't see the pdf. Should we send up to Sheila?

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 11 15:29:32 2011  
**Subject:** FW: final NRC letter

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

COMMITTEES

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ENERGY AND COMMERCE

EDWARD J. MARKEY  
7TH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

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188 CONCORD STREET, SUITE 102  
FRAMINGHAM, MA 01702  
(508) 875-2900

<http://markey.house.gov>

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-2107**

March 11, 2011

The Honorable Greg Jaczko  
Chairman  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

I write to request information related to the potential impacts of the devastating earthquake in Japan on that country's nuclear facilities, as well as on the implications for our own domestic industry.

The 8.9 magnitude earthquake has caused some serious damage at two nuclear facilities in Japan. The Japanese government declared an "atomic power emergency."<sup>1</sup> Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has experienced a failure associated with its emergency diesel generators, preventing the flow of water into its cooling system. To reduce rising pressure inside the Fukushima reactor, slightly radioactive vapor is being released.<sup>2</sup> Residents within a 3 km radius of Fukushima have been evacuated.<sup>3</sup> The United States Air Force also reportedly delivered equipment that could be used to cool the reactor.<sup>4</sup> The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is seeking information about whether the flow of cooling water has been restored, and about other nuclear power plants and research reactors in Japan.<sup>5</sup> Nuclear fuel requires continued cooling even after a plant has shut down. Failure of the cooling system for many hours is what resulted in a partial core melt at Three Mile Island in 1979.<sup>6</sup> There was also a fire in a turbine building at the Onagawa nuclear facility; Japanese authorities reported to the IAEA that it had been extinguished.<sup>7</sup>

The earthquake and tsunami pose threats to nuclear facilities in the United States. Your staff has informed mine that the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in San Luis Obispo, California has declared an 'unusual event' because of the tsunami warnings that have been issued. Taiwan, which has six nuclear reactors, issued a tsunami alert.

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asia/12nuclear.html>

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42025882/ns/world\\_news-asia-pacific/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42025882/ns/world_news-asia-pacific/)

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/11/us-quake-japan-iaea-statement-idUSTRE72A2F820110311>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/11/japan-quake-reactor-idUSL3E7EB2AH20110311>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/tsunamiupdate.html>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asia/12nuclear.html>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/11/us-quake-japan-iaea-statement-idUSTRE72A2F820110311>

This disaster serves to highlight both the fragility of nuclear power plants and the potential consequences associated with a radiological release caused by earthquake-related damage. We must ensure that America's nuclear power plants can withstand a catastrophic event and abide by the absolute highest standards for safety. Last year, I requested a GAO investigation<sup>8</sup> into the adequacy of Commission regulations associated with seismic safety. Earlier this week, I wrote<sup>9</sup> you regarding the Commission's pending approval of the design for the AP1000 nuclear reactor, in light of concerns raised by one of the Commission's most long-serving staff that there is a risk that an earthquake at the AP1000 could result in a catastrophic core meltdown. According to this individual:

- The AP1000 shield building failed tests because it is brittle, and could shatter "like a glass cup". About 60 percent of the shield building would consist of a building material that "failed miserably" in a physical test of its ability to withstand out-of-plane shear, one of the forces caused by an earthquake.
- Weak and inadequate computer simulations were used to "prove" the reactor shield is "strong enough".
- Earthquake forces may have been underestimated by Westinghouse.

My concerns about the vulnerabilities of the AP1000 reactor design are only heightened by the reports of the effect of the Japanese quake on their reactors.

I request your prompt attention to the questions raised in my earlier letter. In addition, I request that you provide me with responses to the following questions:

- 1) Please provide me with a detailed description of the earthquake and tsunami-related damage experienced by the nuclear facilities in Japan. If earthquake and tsunami-related damages are reported at other nuclear facilities, please also provide me with a detailed description of these damages. Please ensure that your response includes:
  - a. a description of each specific failure that occurred
  - b. the cause of each specific failure
  - c. whether any radiological release occurred because of the failure
  - d. whether each specific failure could have caused a radiological release if not promptly mitigated and
  - e. how long each specific failure will take to fully repair
- 2) Please also indicate in your response whether you believe each nuclear power plant design a) that is currently in operation in this country, or b) a license for which has been submitted for approval to the Commission for eventual construction and operation in this country can withstand an earthquake or tsunami that is comparable in strength to the one experienced in Japan.
- 3) Please inform me whether you believe that what happened at the Japanese reactors as a result of the earthquake suggests any need for safety improvements at any U.S. reactor, and if so, what actions the Commission is taking to ensure such improvements are made.

---


<sup>8</sup> <http://markey.house.gov/docs/gaoinspection.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> <http://markey.house.gov/docs/3-7-11.ejmtomrc.pdf>

- 4) Please inform me whether the events in Japan indicate any need for changes to the emergency response plans of U.S. nuclear power plants. Would these plans be adequate in a situation where emergency responders and other resources are needed to deal with many problems simultaneously?
- 5) Please indicate whether NRC regulations require nuclear reactor operators to have emergency backup power for long enough to maintain safe conditions through a crisis such as that occurring in Japan, where power may not come back online for days?<sup>10</sup>

Please provide your response no later than close of business on Friday April 8, 2011. If you have any questions or concerns, please have your staff contact Dr. Michal Freedhoff or Dr. Ilya Fischhoff of my staff at 202-225-2836.

Sincerely,

  
Edward J. Markey

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0063.html>

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 4:30 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Can you followup with Sanders

Raeann has been down there since 10 am. She is going to call me. Ops Center is looking for someone  
. Stand by

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 4:28 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Can you followup with Sanders

Yes

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 11 16:15:04 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Can you followup with Sanders

Just Sanders. Are you available to come in to the Ops center if we need you on the Japanese earthquake?

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 4:13 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Can you followup with Sanders

Sanders and Co.?

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene; Eugene Dacus (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 11 14:32:49 2011  
**Subject:** Can you followup with Sanders

Today (per Josh) to see if they were satisfied with Chr's remarks yesterday? Josh thinks they should be happy with everything he said....

A0/6

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 11:01 AM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Sure. Does the chr want to do the brief? We can setup a call

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 10:58:01 2011  
Subject: Fw: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Can you guys please work on this?

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 10:55:04 2011  
Subject: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Hi Josh - do you all have someone who could brief me, mary frances repko, and maybe a few other dem leadership staff on the nuclear plant situation in japan before 4pm?

Also, might Greg be available to give Reid a 15-20 minute download, if Reid tells me he wants one?

Thanks, chris

(b)(6)

work cell  
personal cell

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld



---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 11:54 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: List

[mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov](mailto:mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov)

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 11:50:12 2011  
**Subject:** RE: List

What release? my 10:00? I sent to Chris miller. I still can't get Mary Frances to go through?? Do you have a good email for her?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 11:42 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** List

Should I send the release to the list of people in the string in Josh's email, along with Oversight?

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 12:14 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** RE: Japan Brief this afternoon?

I'm in contact with her now. You know we aren't saying much. Hill staff complaining that they are getting more info from CNN

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 12:10 PM  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Subject: Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

[mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov](mailto:mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov)

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 11:52:01 2011  
Subject: Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

I resent my 10 am email to congressionals to chris. For some reason Mary Frances' email keeps coming back

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
To: Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 11:01:55 2011  
Subject: Fw: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Fyi and let's add him to the list

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 10:59:08 2011  
Subject: Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Thanks. Mary frances just sent me the ops ctr staff schedule. That should work for my purposes but Reid might still want to talk to greg or someone else.  
Do you get the updates from alex flintV

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 10:57 AM  
To: Miller, Chris (Reid)  
Subject: Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Yes and of course. Let me get our congressional folks on it. Info is still pretty sketchy though.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 10:55:04 2011  
Subject: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Hi Josh - do you all have someone who could brief me, mary frances repko, and maybe a few other dem leadership staff on the nuclear plant situation in japan before 4pm?

Also, might Greg be available to give Reid a 15-20 minute download, if Reid tells me he wants one?

Thanks, chris

(b)(6)

work cell  
personal cell

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 1:59 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

no

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 1:53 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

You give me too much credit. Do we have any better intel yet?

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 13:45:34 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

I haven't screwed anything up yet.....must be related to my teacher

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 1:39 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

Sun night

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann; Dacus, Eugene; Droggitis, Spiros; Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Brenner, Eliot; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 12:48:01 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

The Ops Center has to check a box so I need volunteers to man the following hours:

Sun night 9pm – 7am Monday morning  
Mon 7am – 2PM  
Mon 2pm – 9 pm  
Mon 9 pm – Tues 7am  
Tues 7am to 2pm

First come, first serve!!!

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 5:08 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Dacus, Eugene; Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros; Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Brenner, Eliot; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

Thanks for all your help. Here is a schedule for our participation at the Ops Center:

Friday  
Raeann 10:00 am to 10:00 pm  
Gene 10:00 pm to 7:00 am

Saturday  
Becky 7:00 am to 2:00 pm  
Spiros 2:00 pm to 9:00 pm  
David 9:00 pm to 7:00 am

Sunday  
Amy 7:00 am to 2:00 pm  
Tim 2:00pm to 9:00pm

We will figure out if we need to cycle again later in the weekend. Also, I will send the list of who we are sending the press releases to in my next email

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 2:39 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** FW: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 1:18 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

I'll be happy to volunteer for any, starting with the Monday overnight, (9pm-7am) or the Monday evening (2pm-9pm).  
Tim

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.

Tim Riley

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann; Dacus, Eugene; Droggitis, Spiros; Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Brenner, Eliot; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 12:48:01 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

The Ops Center has to check a box so I need volunteers to man the following hours:

Sun night 9pm – 7am Monday morning  
Mon 7am – 2PM  
Mon 2pm – 9 pm  
Mon 9 pm – Tues 7am  
Tues 7am to 2pm

First come, first serve!!!

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 11, 2011 5:08 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Dacus, Eugene; Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros; Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Brenner, Eliot; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** Schedule for Ops Center -- OCA participation

Thanks for all your help. Here is a schedule for our participation at the Ops Center:

Friday

Raeann 10:00 am to 10:00 pm  
Gene 10:00 pm to 7:00 am

Saturday

Becky 7:00 am to 2:00 pm  
Spiros 2:00 pm to 9:00 pm  
David 9:00 pm to 7:00 am

Sunday

Amy 7:00 am to 2:00 pm  
Tim 2:00pm to 9:00pm

We will figure out if we need to cycle again later in the weekend. Also, I will send the list of who we are sending the press releases to in my next email

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 4:35 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Fw: Japan Brief this afternoon?

We got them the high level ones earlier, right?

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 16:34:13 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Would appreciate any tps when you can

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 04:33 PM  
**To:** Miller, Chris (Reid)  
**Subject:** Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Yep, we're gearing up for that.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 16:23:47 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Japan Brief this afternoon?

check out [www.surfingtheapocalypse.net](http://www.surfingtheapocalypse.net) might be good for NRC to push out some facts to demonstrate that people on the west coast & alaska will not be exposed to 750 rads in the event of a meltdown at Fukushima

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua [Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 12:36 PM



To: Miller, Chris (Reid)  
Subject: Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Seen them. There's a lot of info out there - we're trying to focus on what's confirmed...Please let me know if the ML would like to talk with the boss.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 10:59:08 2011  
Subject: Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Thanks. Mary frances just sent me the ops ctr staff schedule. That should work for my purposes but Reid might still want to talk to greg or someone else.  
Do you get the updates from alex flintV

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 10:57 AM  
To: Miller, Chris (Reid)  
Subject: Re: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Yes and of course. Let me get our congressional folks on it. Info is still pretty sketchy though.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 10:55:04 2011  
Subject: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Hi Josh - do you all have someone who could brief me, mary frances repko, and maybe a few other dem leadership staff on the nuclear plant situation in japan before 4pm?

Also, might Greg be available to give Reid a 15-20 minute download, if Reid tells me he wants one?

Thanks, chris

(b)(6)

work cell  
personal cell

---

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 5:59 PM  
**To:** 'Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: Japan updates

Good - thanks for confirming. My shift is in the am, so we may chat yet.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry .

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
To: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 17:55:56 2011  
Subject: Re: Japan updates

I'm all set. Thanks

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 05:55 PM  
To: Miller, Chris (Reid)  
Subject: Re: Japan updates

Hi Chris - sorry, I've been out of the area today and am just catching up on emails. I believe that you have been added, but will double-check with our staff in the Ops Center.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>

To: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 11:13:50 2011  
Subject: Japan updates

Hi Amy - could you please add me to any e-mail updates on the japan reactors situation? I will be calling in to the ops center around 3pm to get the latest so I can brief my boss at 4pm

Thanks, Chris

(b)(6)

work cell  
personal cell

---

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 6:18 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Another double-check re: Sen. Reid's staff

Great - thanks. How crazy was the ops ctr? It seems like info flow is better than yesterday when I went by, if for no other reason than the situation is more clear.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 18:10:56 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Another double-check re: Sen. Reid's staff

I added him early afternoon and sent him the old ones too. He received. Also called in and josh talked to him. He originally asked for spiros but we sent him to josh. Josh is there. He has the schedule of oca staffing so that is why he asked for spiros. Mary frances gave it to him.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 18:00:30 2011  
**Subject:** Another double-check re: Sen. Reid's staff

Following the email chain, it sounds as though he may have gotten his "briefing" via the Ops Ctr bridgeline?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 10:58:01 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Can you guys please work on this?

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Sat Mar 12 10:55:04 2011  
Subject: Japan Brief this afternoon?

Hi Josh - do you all have someone who could brief me, mary frances repko, and maybe a few other dem leadership staff on the nuclear plant situation in japan before 4pm?

Also, might Greg be available to give Reid a 15-20 minute download, if Reid tells me he wants one?

Thanks, chris

(b)(6)

work cell  
personal cell

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 7:04 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Sen. Reid's POC

9:00 pm

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 7:03 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Sen. Reid's POC

No, but I've been pretty disconnected all day. Just checked out IAEA and TEPCO sites an hour ago, but no word of 2nd explosion.

David on in relief?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 12 18:57:17 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Sen. Reid's POC

Not really hectic, but busy. Chairman is having a briefing at 7:00. Hear anything about a second explosion? We are getting calls, but can't confirm.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 12, 2011 6:05 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Sen. Reid's POC

Thanks - how hectic has the Ops Center been? Sounds as though the communication/info flow has improved since I stopped by last night.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Drogitis, Spiros

To: Powell, Amy

Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca

Sent: Sat Mar 12 17:59:12 2011

Subject: RE: Sen. Reid's POC

He's in.

-----Original Message-----

From: Powell, Amy

Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 5:57 PM

To: Drogitis, Spiros

Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca

Subject: Sen. Reid's POC

Following the email chains, I believe that this may be taken care of, but wanted to double-check - Chris Miller from Sen. Reid's office wanted to be added to our distribution list.

Amy Powell

Associate Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Miller, Chris (Reid) <Chris\_Miller@reid.senate.gov>

To: Powell, Amy

Sent: Sat Mar 12 11:13:50 2011

Subject: Japan updates

Hi Amy - could you please add me to any e-mail updates on the japan reactors situation? I will be calling in to the ops center around 3pm to get the latest so I can brief my boss at 4pm

Thanks, Chris

(b)(6)

work cell

personal cell

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld



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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 8:04 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: What are we "cleared" to send?

Probably easiest on my personal cell - (b)(6)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 8:03 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: What are we "cleared" to send?

Yes. What number should I call you on

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 08:01:57 2011  
**Subject:** What are we "cleared" to send?

David did not send anything to the Hill on his shift (nothing happened other than CNN watching), so our turnover did not give me a sense of what we are okayed to provide. Only NRC press releases and then any other talking points if GBJ/Josh clear them (eg what you sent out yesterday morning)?

AP

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:47 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Can you summarize what you could cover in a call including issues it raises re the us and for earthquake prone areas like ca?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:29 AM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Hi –

If it would be helpful, Chairman Jaczko is available and more than willing to have a call with Senator Boxer today or tomorrow about our activities related to Japan. Let me know and we can set it up.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673  
Cell: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:04 AM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: What are US nuke earthquake stds rated to? Someone is reporting 7 on riChter. True?

I'm in the Ops Center and the reactor safety team is pulling info for me on this. I'll respond to Michal.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:03 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Fw: What are US nuke earthquake stds rated to? Someone is reporting 7 on riChter. True?

Can we add this to the Q&A list? I will check and see if there is already an answer to this on a fact sheet. I didn't think plant standards were based on the Richter scale.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Decker, David; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Fischhoff, Ilya <Ilya.Fischhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 10:53:48 2011  
**Subject:** What are US nuke earthquake stds rated to? Someone is reporting 7 on riChter. True?

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:23 AM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Response from House E&C staff

No. The sitreps have not gone out

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 11:19:12 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Response from House E&C staff

Good. Are we sending around our status updates or no

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 11:15:59 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Response from House E&C staff

Actually earlier – I'll let them know that we'll update our written testimony to include information about NRC's activities related to Japan, coordination with federal agencies, what we know at that point... and of course if they would like a call at any point to let me know.

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:11 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Response from House E&C staff

He'll get testimony on wednesday. ..

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 11:09:33 2011  
**Subject:** Response from House E&C staff

Would prefer something in writing... is that even a possibility given timing, jurisdiction...?

---

**From:** Brown, Maryam [mailto:Maryam.Brown@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:03 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Beckerman, Michael; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Amy- I think what would be most helpful in light of schedules would be a written report from Chairman Jaczko to Chairman Upton, Whitfield and Shimkus. Can you ask that this be prepared?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:26 AM  
**To:** Beckerman, Michael; Brown, Maryam; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko  
**Importance:** High

Hi all –

If your bosses would find it helpful, Chairman Jaczko is available and more than willing to have a call with them (individually or together – whatever works best for them) today or tomorrow about our activities related to Japan. Let me know and we can set it up.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673  
Cell: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:23 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: Response from House E&C staff

Could not agree with you more and had to use restraint not to respond in kind

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:21 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Re: Response from House E&C staff

That is stupid

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 11:09:33 2011  
**Subject:** Response from House E&C staff

Would prefer something in writing... is that even a possibility given timing, jurisdiction...?

---

**From:** Brown, Maryam [mailto:Maryam.Brown@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:03 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Beckerman, Michael; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Amy- I think what would be most helpful in light of schedules would be a written report from Chairman Jaczko to Chairman Upton, Whitfield and Shimkus. Can you ask that this be prepared?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:26 AM  
**To:** Beckerman, Michael; Brown, Maryam; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko  
**Importance:** High

Hi all –

If your bosses would find it helpful, Chairman Jaczko is available and more than willing to have a call with them (individually or together – whatever works best for them) today or tomorrow about our activities related to Japan. Let me know and we can set it up.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673  
Cell: (b)(6)

A0/20

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 12:17 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: More from House E&C

Alex doesn't have it

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 12:08:36 2011  
**Subject:** More from House E&C

If I can't get Gary to call me, I do have Dave's cell phone #

---

**From:** McCarthy, David [mailto:David.McCarthy@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 12:04 PM  
**To:** Brown, Maryam; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Amy – if it takes until Tuesday to go through OMB or interagency review, it would work for me to supply essentially the same information (updates, data, etc) in a non-testimony format tomorrow. Then we can get the actual testimony version on Tuesday AM. Thanks so much. Dave

---

**From:** Brown, Maryam  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:37 AM  
**To:** 'Powell, Amy'; Beckerman, Michael; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Could we get the Japan portion of that testimony by tomorrow for our Members? Normally Tuesday morning would work, but we have a Full Committee mark-up that day and the best opportunity to brief the Chairmen will be Monday.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:32 AM  
**To:** Brown, Maryam; Beckerman, Michael; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Re: a written update/report: We plan to update our written testimony for Wednesday to include NRC activities related to Japan and what we know at that point. You, of course, will get this ahead of Wednesday (Tuesday am at the latest, I hope). We'll also keep updates coming from here, as our office is still participating in the 24-7 coverage of our Operations Center (I'm actually there now). Door remains open for a call if that proves helpful down the road – just let me know.

Thanks,  
AP

---

**From:** Brown, Maryam [mailto:Maryam.Brown@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:03 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Beckerman, Michael; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Amy- I think what would be most helpful in light of schedules would be a written report from Chairman Jaczko to Chairman Upton, Whitfield and Shimkus. Can you ask that this be prepared?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:26 AM  
**To:** Beckerman, Michael; Brown, Maryam; McCarthy, David  
**Subject:** Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko  
**Importance:** High

Hi all –

If your bosses would find it helpful, Chairman Jaczko is available and more than willing to have a call with them (individually or together – whatever works best for them) today or tomorrow about our activities related to Japan. Let me know and we can set it up.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673  
Cell: (b)(6)



**From:** Mike Dudek <(b)(6)>  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:31 PM  
**To:** LIA01 Hoc; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Latest Talking Points

When I get the information, I will send it to you. :-) Please stand by...

Michael

--- On Sun, 3/13/11, Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov> wrote:

> From: Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
> Subject: RE: Latest Talking Points  
> To: "LIA01 Hoc" <LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov>, "Mike Dudek"  
> (b)(6)  
> Date: Sunday, March 13, 2011, 1:28 PM  
> Hi Mike - can you please send me the  
> dial in information for the call?  
>  
> Thanks  
> Amy  
>  
> -----Original Message-----  
> From: LIA01 Hoc  
> Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:27 PM  
> To: Mike Dudek  
> Cc: Powell, Amy  
> Subject: RE: Latest Talking Points  
>  
> Hi Mike,  
>  
> This is the latest document posted. There are no new talking points  
> since the last one I sent you. I figured you could use the document I  
> sent because there was some general language on the second page.  
>  
> I'll forward any updated talking points once they're posted.  
>  
> Regarding the Congressional call, Amy Powell will be supporting that.  
> I've copied her on this message.  
>  
> Thanks,  
> Russ  
>  
> -----Original Message-----  
> From: Mike Dudek [mailto:(b)(6)]  
>  
> Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:23 PM  
> To: LIA01 Hoc

> Subject: Re: Latest Talking Points  
>  
> Russ,  
>  
> Those are the Q&As... Please double check the file that you sent me.  
>  
> Do you have updated talking points?  
>  
> Also, is someone from OCA prepared to support us during the upcoming  
> congressional call?  
>  
> Thanks!  
> Michael  
>  
> --- On Sun, 3/13/11, LIA01 Hoc <[LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov](mailto:LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov)>  
> wrote:  
>  
> > From: LIA01 Hoc <[LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov](mailto:LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov)>  
> > Subject: Latest Talking Points  
> > To: "Mike Dudek" <(b)(6)>  
> > Date: Sunday, March 13, 2011, 12:30 PM Hi Mike,  
> >  
> > Per your request.  
> >  
> > Russ  
> >  
>  
>  
>  
>  
>

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:47 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** USAID Congressional call at 2pm

FYI - USAID was looking for an NRC rep to support a Congressional call at 2pm. Tim is coming into the Ops Center at 2pm; I'll stay for this call. Becky, Spiros was on the same call yesterday, correct?

-----Original Message-----

From: RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC [mailto:RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC@ofda.gov]  
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:44 PM  
To: RMTPACTSU\_DMP; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [USAID]  
Cc: RMTPACTSU\_RM; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A) [USAID]; Larkin, Barbara (LPA) [USAID]; Harper, Ryan (AID/A) [USAID]; Feinstein, Barbara (LPA/AA) [USAID]; RMTPACTSU\_PRO; RMTPACTSU\_ALOAdmin1; RMTPACTSU\_HHS; rodriguezfh@state.gov; Catlin, Steve(DCHA/OFDA) [USAID]; RMTPACTSU\_MLO; Powell, Amy  
Subject: RE: POC's for 2pm Hill call

Gavi, Barbara:

The NRC representative that will be supporting the 2:00 Hill call today is Amy Powell. She can be reached at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thanks!

Michael I. Dudek

-----Original Message-----

From: RMTPACTSU\_DMP  
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:40 AM  
To: Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [USAID]  
Cc: RMTPACTSU\_RM; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A) [USAID]; Larkin, Barbara (LPA) [USAID]; Harper, Ryan (AID/A) [USAID]; Feinstein, Barbara (LPA/AA) [USAID]; RMTPACTSU\_PRO; RMTPACTSU\_ALOAdmin1; RMTPACTSU\_HHS; rodriguezfh@state.gov; Catlin, Steve(DCHA/OFDA) [USAID]; RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC; RMTPACTSU\_MLO  
Subject: POC's for 2pm Hill call

Dear Barbara --

We have identified DOD and State representatives to be on the 2pm calls with the Hill, who should be able to answer some of the questions that have arisen. NRC has also identified someone, and can follow up on this email with a name. We are working to find someone from HHS, and they will send that name as soon as they can.

John Trigilio  
OSD-Policy/Director, Humanitarian Assistance  
703 692 0108 -  
cell (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Hugo Rodriguez

Acting Director  
American Citizen Services and Crisis Management Bureau of Consular Affairs [rodriguezhf@state.gov](mailto:rodriguezhf@state.gov)

Please do let us know if there's anything else you need. My RMT colleagues, copied here, will take it from here.

Best regards,  
Gavi

Gavrielle Rosenthal  
Deputy Manager for Planning  
Pacific Tsunami and Japan Earthquake Response Management Team USAID/DHCA/OFDA [Rmtpactsu\\_dmp@ofda.gov](mailto:Rmtpactsu_dmp@ofda.gov)  
202-712-0039

-----Original Message-----

From: RMTPACTSU\_RM  
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 4:02 PM  
To: Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A) [USAID]; Larkin, Barbara (LPA) [USAID]; Harper, Ryan (AID/A) [USAID]; Feinstein, Barbara (LPA/AA) [USAID]; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [USAID]  
Cc: 'rmtprotsu\_pro@ofda.gov'; 'rmtprotsu\_alolac@ofda.gov'; 'rmtprotsu\_aloadmin1@ofda.gov'; RMTPACTSU\_DMP  
Subject: RE: Barbara

Confirming Gavi will work this one - copying her here ([rmtprotsu\\_dmp@ofda.gov](mailto:rmtprotsu_dmp@ofda.gov))

Gavi, Bette's email with sample questions is attached.

Thanks,

MB

Mary Beth Brennan  
Response Manager  
Pacific Tsunami & Japan Earthquake  
Response Management Team  
USAID/DCHA/OFDA  
202-712-0039  
[rmtprotsu\\_rm@ofda.gov](mailto:rmtprotsu_rm@ofda.gov)

-----Original Message-----

From: Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A) [<mailto:ejaff@usaid.gov>]  
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 2:53 PM  
To: Larkin, Barbara (LPA) [USAID]; Harper, Ryan (AID/A) [USAID]; Feinstein, Barbara (LPA/AA) [USAID]; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [USAID]  
Cc: RMTPACTSU\_RM; 'rmtprotsu\_pro@ofda.gov'; 'rmtprotsu\_alolac@ofda.gov'; 'rmtprotsu\_aloadmin1@ofda.gov'  
Subject: Re: Barbara

Thanks Barbara, we would love to make sure we have state and dod folks on the call who can answer questions posed by the Hill

Gavi is reaching out to our interagency counterparts to get contacts to start being on the 2pm calls. And will send to Bette to set up.

We also want to mention these 2pm calls on the interagency call tonight at 9pm. Does that work for everyone?

Liz Jaff  
Special Assistant  
Office of the Administrator  
USAID

(b)(6)

202 712 1156

----- Original Message -----

From: Larkin, Barbara (LPA)

To: Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); Harper, Ryan (AID/A); Feinstein, Barbara (LPA/AA); Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)

Sent: Sat Mar 12 14:41:14 2011

Subject: Re: Barbara

For whatever reports you're doing today: just concluded Hill Japan call and it went well. Staff from Inouye, HFAC (Kessler, Ohlbaum, and Dennis - did not further identify himself), and Homeland Security Committee. Also a State CA rep. Mark B briefed on AID response. Questions included several on nuclear situation, whether there were missing Americans (there are), and costs to AID. Given recent developments on nuclear reactors (and fact that isn't AID's area) Bette will explore expanding the call to include other agencies. Rick Kessler mentioned the California angle so we will also invite West Coast offices to future calls. Calls will be made daily at least thru next week. A Barbara was on the call.

---

**From:** Mike Dudek (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 2:00 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** 2:00 PM Phone Bridge

Amy,

The bridge # = 202-647-0817

# (b)(6)

Michael

--- On Sun, 3/13/11, Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov> wrote:

> From: Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
> Subject: RE: Latest Talking Points  
> To: "Mike Dudek" <(b)(6)>  
> Date: Sunday, March 13, 2011, 1:35 PM  
> My cell might be easiest -  
> (b)(6)  
>  
> -----Original Message-----  
> From: Mike Dudek [mailto:(b)(6)]  
>  
> Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:34 PM  
> To: Powell, Amy  
> Subject: RE: Latest Talking Points  
>  
> Amy: Do you have a direct number where you can be reached? The OCA  
> rep at USAID would like to talk to you before the 2:00 call.  
>  
> Thanks!  
>  
> --- On Sun, 3/13/11, Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
> wrote:  
>  
>> From: Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
>> Subject: RE: Latest Talking Points  
>> To: "LIA01 Hoc" <LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov>,  
>> "Mike Dudek" <(b)(6)>  
>> Date: Sunday, March 13, 2011, 1:28 PM HI Mike - can you please send  
>> me the dial in information for the call?  
>>  
>> Thanks  
>> Amy  
>>  
>> -----Original Message-----  
>> From: LIA01 Hoc

>> Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:27 PM  
>> To: Mike Dudek  
>> Cc: Powell, Amy  
>> Subject: RE: Latest Talking Points  
>>  
>> Hi Mike,  
>>  
>> This is the latest document posted. There are no  
> new  
>> talking points since the last one I sent you. I figured you could  
>> use the document I sent because  
> there was  
>> some general language on the second page.  
>>  
>> I'll forward any updated talking points once they're posted.  
>>  
>> Regarding the Congressional call, Amy Powell will be supporting  
>> that. I've copied her on this message.  
>>  
>> Thanks,  
>> Russ  
>>  
>> -----Original Message-----  
>> From: Mike Dudek [mailto:(b)(6)]  
>>  
>> Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:23 PM  
>> To: LIA01 Hoc  
>> Subject: Re: Latest Talking Points  
>>  
>> Russ,  
>>  
>> Those are the Q&As... Please double check the file that you sent  
>> me.  
>>  
>> Do you have updated talking points?  
>>  
>> Also, is someone from OCA prepared to support us  
> during the  
>> upcoming congressional call?  
>>  
>> Thanks!  
>> Michael  
>>  
>> --- On Sun, 3/13/11, LIA01 Hoc <LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov>  
>> wrote:  
>>  
>>> From: LIA01 Hoc <LIA01.Hoc@nrc.gov>  
>>> Subject: Latest Talking Points  
>>> To: "Mike Dudek" <(b)(6)>  
>>> Date: Sunday, March 13, 2011, 12:30 PM Hi Mike,  
>>>  
>>> Per your request.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 2:02 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** WH

Different contacts for WH

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Murrie, Eden (b)(6)  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 13:53:47 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Update from US NRC

Yes please....they are wh leg affairs as opposed to me here in the nss

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Murrie, Eden  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 13:41:32 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Update from US NRC

You bet – should we add your other colleagues to our distribution list?

---

**From:** Murrie, Eden [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 1:41 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Arguelles, Adam; Terrell, Louisa; Kang, Christopher  
**Subject:** Re: Update from US NRC

Thanks very much!

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Murrie, Eden  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 12:02:13 2011  
**Subject:** Update from US NRC

Hi Eden –

I wanted to update you on NRC's Congressional outreach related to the events in Japan. As you've seen in e-mails from our staff over the weekend, we have shared the three agency press releases with the Hill. Additionally, we've offered the Chairs and Ranking Members of NRC's oversight



committees/subcommittees in both chambers the opportunity for phone calls with Chairman Jaczko regarding our activities if that would be helpful to them.

We will continue to include you in our e-mail updates and to update you on any other Hill outreach.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 2:46 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** USAid Congressional calls this week

USAid will be holding calls with the Hill Monday - Friday at 2pm EST.

The dial-in (I'm doing this to record it for myself as well, since I jotted this down on paper I need to leave for Tim) is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

We can sort out who gets on for us.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:55 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Her questions include:

- are those reactors being cooled?
- Has radiation escaped, how much, what are the implications?
- What is the worst case scenario right now?
- What is most likely outcome?

Can radiation reach Hawaii or the west coast, other parts of the us? If so should we be distributing iodide? What does the iodide do?

- what are the implications for us nuclear operations/standards.
- Also she needs a clear overview-

\*

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 03:50 PM  
**To:** 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Senator boxer is interested in a briefing and she has several specific questions. If she becomes available today, could you all speak with her? Could you set it up so I can sit in? If not ok too.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 12:48 PM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

You bet – let me see what we can do. You may have seen this in the talking points that Becky Schmidt sent out yesterday, but to answer very generally about requirements in the US: NRC has regulations in place that require licensees to design their plants to withstand the effects of tsunamis. (10CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 2, "Design bases for protection against natural phenomenon" requires licensees to design structures, systems, and components important to safety to withstand the effects of natural phenomenon, including tsunamis.) Nuclear power plants are built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes. Even those plants that are located outside of areas with extensive seismic activity are designed for safety in the event of such a natural disaster. The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems, and components be designed to take into account the most severe natural phenomena historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The NRC then adds a margin for error to account for the historical data's limited accuracy. In other words, U.S. nuclear power plants are designed to be safe based on historical data from the area's maximum credible earthquake.

I'll be back in touch shortly. Thanks so much for your nice note.

Amy

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) [mailto:Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:53 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Nei is discussing the fact that there are similar reactors here-my boss would likely be interested in what level of seismic activity/flood the ca reactors or generally others in the us are designed to withstand, in addition to what you mentioned. If she is unavailable today, can we get a briefing we can share with her? Thanks so much for all you are doing. Bettina

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:14 AM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Cc:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Hi Bettina –

We've reached out to staff to our oversight committee/subcommittee chairs and ranking members – you are the first response I've had, so thank you. The Chairman could talk about NRC's participation in the USAID effort, coordination with other federal agencies, and what we know at this point.

Amy

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) [mailto:Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:48 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Is he briefing other members at this point? Thank you for the offer.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:29 AM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Hi –

If it would be helpful, Chairman Jaczko is available and more than willing to have a call with Senator Boxer today or tomorrow about our activities related to Japan. Let me know and we can set it up.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673  
Cell: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 4:36 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 04:28 PM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Bettina - is there a number where I can call you? Thanks!

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 16:09:43 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

She is flying early tomorrow (sorry word dropped in last email)

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 03:56 PM  
**To:** 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

I will check-let me know what he could do today. She is v early tomorrow back to dc

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 03:51 PM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Bettina - let me check with Chairman Jaczko's scheduler to see what time may be available. Any idea when the Senator could be available?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 15:50:25 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Senator boxer is interested in a briefing and she has several specific questions. If she becomes available today, could you all speak with her? Could you set it up so I can sit in? If not ok too.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 12:48 PM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

You bet – let me see what we can do. You may have seen this in the talking points that Becky Schmidt sent out yesterday, but to answer very generally about requirements in the US: NRC has regulations in place that require licensees to design their plants to withstand the effects of tsunamis.

(10CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 2, "Design bases for protection against natural phenomenon" requires licensees to design structures, systems, and components important to safety to withstand the effects of natural phenomenon, including tsunamis.) Nuclear power plants are built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes. Even those plants that are located outside of areas with extensive seismic activity are designed for safety in the event of such a natural disaster. The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems, and components be designed to take into account the most severe natural phenomena historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The NRC then adds a margin for error to account for the historical data's limited accuracy. In other words, U.S. nuclear power plants are designed to be safe based on historical data from the area's maximum credible earthquake.

I'll be back in touch shortly. Thanks so much for your nice note.

Amy

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) [mailto:Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:53 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Neil is discussing the fact that there are similar reactors here-my boss would likely be interested in what level of seismic activity/flood the ca reactors or generally others in the us are designed to withstand, in addition to what you mentioned. If she is unavailable today, can we get a briefing we can share with her? Thanks so much for all you are doing. Bettina

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:14 AM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Cc:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Hi Bettina –

We've reached out to staff to our oversight committee/subcommittee chairs and ranking members – you are the first response I've had, so thank you. The Chairman could talk about NRC's participation in the USAID effort, coordination with other federal agencies, and what we know at this point.

Amy

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) [mailto:Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:48 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** Re: Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Is he briefing other members at this point? Thank you for the offer.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:29 AM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** Offer of call from NRC Chairman Jaczko

Hi –

If it would be helpful, Chairman Jaczko is available and more than willing to have a call with Senator Boxer today or tomorrow about our activities related to Japan. Let me know and we can set it up.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673  
Cell: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 8:19 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Arrangements for call

I am on with the senator-she is with a group she cannot leave. She could do 9:30 eastern tomorrow. Sorry for the changes. She just called me.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 07:10 PM  
**To:** 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Arrangements for call

She just emailed she is available in an hour. Would that still work?

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 07:08 PM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** Arrangements for call

Call this number 301-816-5100 and ask to be connected to Chairman Jaczko's dedicated bridgeline for the call. This is through our Headquarters Operations Center.

Thanks  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 19:00:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Option

My boss can do it now. Can she call in and you all conference me in.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 06:20 PM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Subject:** Option



Chairman Jaczko would be glad to talk with you if the Senator is not available. Let me know if that might work best given schedules.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
To: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Sun Mar 13 17:58:13 2011  
Subject: Re: Best # for me

Trying to reach her again.

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 05:52 PM  
To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Subject: Best # for me

Bettina - I got pulled into an Ops Ctr call on my cell phone, so best number for me is (b)(6) once you have a time for the Senator.

Thanks,  
AP

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 8:41 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** WH press release, email chain about interagency briefings

FYI on press release below. Also, it looks as though interagency briefings are being attempted (Jeff Lane from DOE is in the mix, so this would apparently subsume what he was working on).

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Murrie, Eden <Eden\_J.\_Murrie@nss.eop.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 20:15:24 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Sorry....just noticed this didn't go through the first time

---

**From:** Terrell, Louisa  
**To:** 'GatzKL@state.gov' <GatzKL@state.gov>; 'john.gray@noaa.gov' <john.gray@noaa.gov>; 'laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov' <laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov>; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov' <kathleen.turner@dni.gov>; Murrie, Eden; 'Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov' <Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov>; 'bcook@usaid.gov' <bcook@usaid.gov>;  
(b)(6); (b)(6); Heimbach, Jay;  
Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.;  
(b)(6); Boots, Michael J.  
**Cc:** 'AdamsDS@state.gov' <AdamsDS@state.gov>; 'TurkDM@state.gov' <TurkDM@state.gov>; 'HatcherSM@state.gov' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'AlwineP@state.gov' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'PedersonED@state.gov' <PedersonED@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 18:07:50 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Fyi

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 13, 2011

Statement from the Press Secretary on the Ongoing U.S. Response to the Earthquakes and Tsunami in Japan

Our thoughts and our prayers remain with the people of Japan. The President has been kept fully briefed on developments and the response throughout the weekend.

As directed by the President, we have offered our Japanese friends whatever assistance is needed as America will stand with Japan as they recover and rebuild. We have already been helping in a number of ways.

USAID is coordinating the overall U.S. government efforts in support of the Japanese government's response to the earthquakes and subsequent tsunami that hit Friday and are currently directing individuals to [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov) for information about response donations.

The U.S. Ambassador declared an emergency which opened up an immediate funding of \$100K from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. They set up a Response Management Team in DC and sent a Disaster Assistance Response Team to Tokyo, which includes people with nuclear expertise from the Departments of Energy and Health and Human Services as well the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC members are experts in boiling water nuclear reactors and are available to assist their Japanese counterparts.

Two Urban Search and Rescue Teams (LA County and Fairfax County teams) which total 144 members plus 12 search and rescue canines and up to 45 metric tons of rescue equipment are also on the ground in Misawa, Japan and will begin searching at first light March 14. The Department of Defense has the USS Reagan on station off the coast of Japan and the USS Essex en route, and is currently using an air facility in Misawa as a forward operating base. The American Red Cross (ARC) International Services team is supporting the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) to assess the impact, determine response efforts, and assist the people of Japan. Officials from the Department of Energy, NRC, and other agencies have maintained contact with Japanese officials and will provide whatever assistance the Japanese government requests as they work to stabilize their damaged nuclear reactors. United States citizens in Japan are encouraged to follow the protective measures recommended by the Japanese government.

The NRC has announced (<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-046.pdf>) that these measures appear to be consistent with steps the United States would take. With regards to the United States, the NRC has released information stating that Hawaii, Alaska, the U.S. Territories and the U.S. West Coast are not expected to experience any harmful levels of radioactivity. For instance, according to the NRC, the U.S. evacuation standard at 10 miles is roughly equivalent to the 20-kilometer distance recommended in Japan. The United States and Japan both have highly advanced capabilities for monitoring and predicting the path of any radioactive release. American citizens in Japan should continue to listen to the local authorities regarding evacuation notices and any other preparedness measures and should contact the State Department if they have any questions. From the moment this earthquake struck our State Department and Embassy and Consulates in Japan have been working around the clock to assist and inform U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens in need of emergency assistance should send an e-mail to [JapanEmergencyUSC@state.gov](mailto:JapanEmergencyUSC@state.gov) with detailed information about their location and contact information, and monitor the U.S. Department of State website at [travel.state.gov](http://travel.state.gov).

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L <[GatzKL@state.gov](mailto:GatzKL@state.gov)>

**To:** John Gray <[john.gray@noaa.gov](mailto:john.gray@noaa.gov)>; laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov <[laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov](mailto:laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov)>; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; kathleen.turner@dni.gov <[kathleen.turner@dni.gov](mailto:kathleen.turner@dni.gov)>; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov <[Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov](mailto:Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov)>; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) <[bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)>; (b)(6)

(b)(6) > (b)(6) >; Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; (b)(6) <(b)(6)>; Boots, Michael J.

**Cc:** Adams, David S <[AdamsDS@state.gov](mailto:AdamsDS@state.gov)>; Turk, David M <[TurkDM@state.gov](mailto:TurkDM@state.gov)>; Hatcher, Stuart M <[HatcherSM@state.gov](mailto:HatcherSM@state.gov)>; Alwine, Patrick <[AlwineP@state.gov](mailto:AlwineP@state.gov)>; Pederson, Erik D <[PedersonED@state.gov](mailto:PedersonED@state.gov)>

**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 15:45:40 2011

**Subject:** RE: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Good to know – we can work on getting briefings scheduled for Tuesday.

---

**From:** John Gray [<mailto:john.gray@noaa.gov>]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:44 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I agree with Jeff.

---

**From:** Lane, Jeff [mailto:laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 03:40 PM

**To:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED]  
(b)(6)

**Cc:** 'AdamsDS@state.gov' <AdamsDS@state.gov>; 'TurkDM@state.gov' <TurkDM@state.gov>; 'HatcherSM@state.gov' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'AlwineP@state.gov' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'PedersonED@state.gov' <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I know the logistics of this are challenging, but on behalf of DOE I'd suggest we do these as quickly as possible, no later than Tuesday. Chu is testifying Tuesday morning before HEWD and Wednesday morning before E and C. He will be questioned about the nuclear plant issues, and the quicker we can get good information to staff the better.

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L <GatzKL@state.gov>

**To:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED]  
(b)(6)

**Cc:** Adams, David S <AdamsDS@state.gov>; Turk, David M <TurkDM@state.gov>; Hatcher, Stuart M <HatcherSM@state.gov>; Alwine, Patrick <AlwineP@state.gov>; Pederson, Erik D <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 15:20:55 2011

**Subject:** RE: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Thanks – we'll work on setting it up tomorrow – mid-week might be a good target time frame. I'll be in touch with more information.

Does anyone think we need to have the briefing classified?

Karen

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:[REDACTED]] (b)(6)

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:14 PM

**To:** Gatz, Karen L; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); [REDACTED] (b)(6); [REDACTED] (b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson,

Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.;  
'john.gray@noaa.gov'  
**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Karen--

We think these are a great idea and like the idea of one bipartisan Leadership and committee staff briefing in each chamber. Please feel free to move forward with this and keep us posted on the timing.

Many thanks,

Shelly

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L <GatzKL@state.gov>  
**To:** kathleen.turner@dni.gov <kathleen.turner@dni.gov>; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Murrie, Eden;  
Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov <Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov>; laneje@hq.doe.gov <laneje@hq.doe.gov>; Cook, Bette  
(DCHA/AA) <bcook@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang,  
Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA <(b)(6)>; Boots, Michael  
J.; John Gray <john.gray@noaa.gov>  
**Cc:** Adams, David S <AdamsDS@state.gov>; Turk, David M <TurkDM@state.gov>; Hatcher, Stuart M  
<HatcherSM@state.gov>; Alwine, Patrick <AlwineP@state.gov>; Pederson, Erik D <PedersonED@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 11:59:04 2011  
**Subject:** Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I understand that AID is considering arranging staff-level Hill briefings for next week. We'd like to get your thoughts on organizing an interagency State, AID, DOD and maybe NRC or DOE staff-level briefing. Perhaps we could arrange one House and one Senate briefing for leadership and key committee staff. Also, we would need to determine classification level.

Thanks -- Karen

Karen L. Gatz  
Senior Congressional Adviser  
Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
Department of State  
Phone: 202-647-8439  
Fax: 202-647-9667

 Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 8:45 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Coggins, Angela  
**Subject:** State Dept update

WH forwarded the State Dept update below. Are you all getting these through OIP?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Murrie, Eden (b)(6)  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 20:19:03 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Japan Earthquake Update 5

Fyi

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L <GatzKL@state.gov>  
**To:** kathleen.turner@dni.gov <kathleen.turner@dni.gov>; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov <Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov>; laneie@hq.doe.gov <laneie@hq.doe.gov>; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) <bcook@usaid.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; John Gray <john.gray@noaa.gov>  
**Cc:** Adams, David S <AdamsDS@state.gov>; Turk, David M <TurkDM@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 20:11:57 2011  
**Subject:** Japan Earthquake Update 5

## JAPAN EARTHQUAKE UPDATE 5

The National Police Agency of Japan reported 1353 deaths and 1085 missing. Media reports carry higher numbers. About 380,000 people are sheltering in 2050 evacuation centers.

Japan's meteorological agency estimates the possibility of aftershocks with magnitude 7.0 or higher is 70 percent until 2000 EDT March 15, followed by 50 percent until 2000 EDT March 18. Although most aftershocks are concentrated in the area of the original earthquake, there have been others elsewhere in Japan, indicating additional damaging quakes are possible throughout the main islands.

Rolling electricity blackouts will begin March 14. They will affect 13 out of 23 wards in Tokyo. The wards, which include government and Diet offices, Embassy housing, and the chancery, will be exempt. Some cities where U.S. bases are located will be included in the blackouts, but it is not clear if the bases will be affected.

## NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES AND RELATED ISSUES

U.S. DOE, HHS, and USAID DART members met with Japanese officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nuclear Industry Safety Agency on March 13. The DART team reports the Japanese government appears to be getting a handle on the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, where cooling systems on reactors No. 1 and No. 3 have shut down. The containment vessels for all six reactors are intact, and there has been no major release of radioactive material.

Officials are concerned the same hydrogen buildup that resulted in an explosion at Daiichi reactor No. 1 might occur at Daiichi reactor No. 3. If that is the case, a similar visible explosion in reactor No. 3's outer building could occur, though that would not likely result in any significant release of radiation. There are no immediate concerns of radiation leakage from reactor No. 2.

At the Fukushima Dainii nuclear power plant, media report Japanese authorities are still trying to reduce the temperature of reactors Nos. 1, 2, and 4.

A cooling system pump stopped at the Tokai No. 2 nuclear power plant in the Ibaraki prefecture, approximately 75 miles north of Tokyo, according to press. The reactor automatically shut down due to the earthquake, and an emergency generator is now cooling the reactor. This is the first report of trouble related to cooling efforts at the Tokai plant since the earthquake.

A state of emergency at the Onagawa nuclear power plant, 40 miles east of Sendai city, was lifted when radioactivity levels returned to normal. All three reactors at the plant are under control.

The Fukushima prefecture requested the central government provide more equipment and staff so it could start radiation exposure screening at all evacuation stations by March 15.

After detecting radiological material on four helicopters operating from ships of the *USS Ronald Reagan* battle group, the Navy ordered all of their vessels to remain more than 100 nautical miles off the Japanese coast until an assessment of the impact of contamination on operations is completed. According to initial reports, one helicopter had visited a Japan Self Defense Forces vessel approximately 60 nautical miles northeast of Fukushima. Three others had engaged in ship-to-shore overland flights 60-70 nautical miles north of Fukushima.

American Airlines reports it is slightly adjusting its routes and will carry contingency fuel in case rerouting is required due to the nuclear power plant situation. The Federal Aviation Administration reports no known changes or cancellations to routes.

#### **U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE**

The DART team has seven members in Tokyo and four in Misawa, not including search and rescue personnel. Three additional members are scheduled to arrive March 14 in Tokyo.

The U.S. Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams will begin rescue efforts March 14 in Ofunato town, Iwate Prefecture, in northeastern Japan. They will coordinate with the UN disaster assistance team, which arrived in Tokyo March 13. The second USAID cargo plane carrying supplies arrived at Misawa Air Base at 1015 EDT.

#### **INTERNATIONAL REACTION**

An Embassy Tokyo consular team is in Sendai city to check on the welfare and whereabouts of U.S. citizens, working with Australian, Canadian, and UK consular officers.

France warned French citizens to avoid all travel to Japan. The French Embassy in Tokyo instructed French citizens to leave Tokyo, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed this was not the official French position.

Germany warned citizens against travel to northeast Japan, and is organizing a bus to evacuate German residents in Sendai to Tokyo.

Germany and Finland are going to authorized departure status for eligible family members.

Kandahar's mayor announced the Afghan city would donate \$50,000 to "brothers and sisters" in Japan.

Japan has accepted offers of assistance from 69 countries. USAR teams from ten countries have arrived and 17 additional teams from other countries are on standby.

Karen L. Gatz  
Senior Congressional Adviser  
Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
Department of State  
Phone: 202-647-8439  
Fax: 202-647-9667



Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:19 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Re: Updated distribution

How goes it?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 22:18:39 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Updated distribution

Roger that

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:08 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Double-check Re: Updated distribution

I cannot open the attachment on Bberry, but the list pasted into the email text cuts off after names starting with S (eg Taunja Berquam is not there). Make sure we did not lose anything with the update before sending out the next distribution.

Thanks

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 21:20:52 2011  
**Subject:** Updated distribution

Here is the most up-to-date distribution list. Hopefully, you can copy and paste the distro list (attached) into the To: field for any emails.

Otherwise, here is the list of emails:

[abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov](mailto:abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov)

(b)(6)

ali\_nouri@webb.senate.gov  
annie\_caputo@epw.senate.gov  
Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov  
Brian\_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov  
Carrie\_apostolou@appro.senate.gov  
chris\_miller@reid.senate.gov  
chris.sarley@mail.house.gov

(b)(6)

david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov  
Doug\_clapp@appro.senate.gov

(b)(6)

elizabeth\_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov  
isaac\_edwards@energy.senate.gov  
jay.cranford@mail.house.gov  
jeff.baran@mail.house.gov  
JohnM@mail.house.gov  
jonathan\_epstein@bingaman.senate.gov  
Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov  
kathy\_dedrick@epw.senate.gov  
laura\_haynes@carper.senate.gov

(b)(6)

mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov  
mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov  
maryam.brown@mail.house.gov  
michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov  
micah.freedhoff@mail.house.gov  
Neil\_Chatterjee@mccconnell.senate.gov  
Rob.blair@mail.house.gov  
ruth\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 7:30 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela  
**Subject:** RE: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

OPA is aware, has a barebones release drafted but will await coordination with White house, at least temporarily, because other USG assets involved..

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 7:18 AM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Brenner, Eliot; Coggins, Angela  
**Subject:** FW: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

FYI—this went out about 30 minutes ago

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 7:05 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FW: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:49 AM  
**To:** 'abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov'; (b)(6); 'ali\_nouri@webb.senate.gov';  
'annie\_caputo@epw.senate.gov'; 'Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov'; 'Brian\_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov';  
'Carrie\_apostolou@appro.senate.gov'; 'chris\_miller@reid.senate.gov'; 'chris.sarley@mail.house.gov';  
(b)(6); 'david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov'; 'Doug\_clapp@appro.senate.gov';  
(b)(6); 'elizabeth\_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov'; 'isaac\_edwards@energy.senate.gov';  
'jay.cranford@mail.house.gov'; 'jeff.baran@mail.house.gov'; 'JohnM@mail.house.gov';  
'jonathan\_epstein@bingaman.senate.gov'; 'Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov'; 'kathy\_dedrick@epw.senate.gov';  
'laura\_haynes@carper.senate.gov'; (b)(6); 'mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov';  
'mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov'; 'maryam.brown@mail.house.gov'; 'michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov';  
'michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov'; 'Neil\_Chatterjee@mcconnell.senate.gov'; 'Rob.blair@mail.house.gov';  
'ruth\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov'; (b)(6); 'gov'; 'ali\_nouri@webb.senate.gov';  
'abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov'; 'Caputo, Annie (EPW)'  
**Subject:** Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

We've been advised by the NRC technical experts assisting the U.S. ambassador in Japan that the Japanese government has asked for U.S technical help to cool the cores of the three damaged reactors. Japan has also requested NRC experts to be embedded with their emergency response centers on a 24/7 basis. Approximately 6-hours ago, the same NRC experts notified us that cooling systems at units 1, 2, and 3 had been degraded/lost for about 12-hours. The NRC is marshalling resources and coordinating the interagency effort with the State Dept, DoD, and DOE. We are arranging an interagency planning/strategy call within an hour. I will provide you more detail as soon as necessary actions have more clarity.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 8:13 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

In ops center.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 08:12:01 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

Got it – I'll just get the list back together. Are you on the Office Directors' call?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 7:47 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

Don't send it to anyone. This was not blessed

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 07:41:45 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

At a glance, I think some names dropped off - will check when I get there  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 07:21:59 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

This went out 30 minutes ago

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 7:05 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FW: Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:49 AM

**To:** 'abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov'; '(b)(6)'; 'ali\_nouri@webb.senate.gov';  
'annie\_caputo@epw.senate.gov'; 'Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov'; 'Brian\_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov';  
'Carrie\_apostolou@appro.senate.gov'; 'chris\_miller@reid.senate.gov'; 'chris.sarley@mail.house.gov';  
'(b)(6)'; 'david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov'; 'Doug\_clapp@appro.senate.gov';  
'(b)(6)'; 'elizabeth\_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov'; 'isaac\_edwards@energy.senate.gov';  
'jay.cranford@mail.house.gov'; 'jeff.baran@mail.house.gov'; 'JohnM@mail.house.gov';  
'jonathan\_epstein@bingaman.senate.gov'; 'Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov'; 'kathy\_dedrick@epw.senate.gov';  
'laura\_haynes@carper.senate.gov'; '(b)(6)'; 'mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov';  
'mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov'; 'maryam.brown@mail.house.gov'; 'michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov';  
'michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov'; 'Neil\_Chatterjee@mccconnell.senate.gov'; 'Rob.blair@mail.house.gov';  
'ruth\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov'; '(b)(6)'.gov'; 'ali\_nouri@webb.senate.gov';  
'abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov'; 'Caputo, Annie (EPW)'

**Subject:** Update - Japanese Nuclear Power Plant Damage

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---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:17 AM  
**To:** Mail, Norah  
**Subject:** RE: Call with Mr. Waxman, Chairman Jaczko

Yachts (like the boats) –go

I'm at my desk at 301-415-1673 if you need/want to hear it!

---

**From:** Mail, Norah [mailto:Norah.Mail@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:14 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Call with Mr. Waxman, Chairman Jaczko

Amy, please – how do you pronounce his name?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:05 AM  
**To:** Mail, Norah  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti  
**Subject:** Call with Mr. Waxman, Chairman Jaczko

Hi Norah –

Yes, 10am is on. I've cc'ed Patti Pace, who holds Chairman Jaczko's calendar and who will be facilitating the call through to him. Please call in at 301-415-1820 and Patti will put Mr. Waxman through to the Chairman.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Mail, Norah [mailto:Norah.Mail@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:02 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Could we do 10am?

Amy, just confirming that this call is at 10:00 this morning. Also, I'll need a number –  
Thanks  
Norah

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:47 PM

**To:** Baran, Jeff  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti; Mail, Norah  
**Subject:** Re: Could we do 10am?

Thanks Jeff and Norah!

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Baran, Jeff <Jeff.Baran@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti; Mail, Norah <Norah.Mail@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 22:32:21 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Could we do 10am?

Hi Amy,

It looks like 10am will work. I've copied Norah Mail, who handles Mr. Waxman's schedule. She can also provide the number to call.

Thanks,

Jeff

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Baran, Jeff  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti <Patti.Pace@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 21:36:18 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Could we do 10am?

Thanks so much for checking on 10am - we appreciate it.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Baran, Jeff <Jeff.Baran@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 21:33:05 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Could we do 10am?

9:45 definitely would work. 10am probably works too - I'll confirm.

Jeff

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Baran, Jeff  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti <Patti.Pace@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 20:37:59 2011  
**Subject:** Could we do 10am?

Jeff - could we move back to 10am?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Baran, Jeff <Jeff.Baran@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 19:04:09 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

I think 9:45 will work on our end. I'll confirm with Mr. Waxman's scheduler. Once we get a time finalized, I'll invite Reps Rush and Green to join as well.

Thanks,

Jeff

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Baran, Jeff  
**Cc:** Pace, Patti <Patti.Pace@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 18:44:10 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Jeff - would 945am work for Mr. Waxman? I've cc'ed Patti Pace who holds the Chairman's schedule in case we need to explore other options.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Baran, Jeff <Jeff.Baran@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy



**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 18:39:19 2011

**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Mr. Waxman would be interested in getting an update from the Chairman. He's already in town. When would be a good time for the Chairman tomorrow morning?

Jeff

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 6:06 PM

**To:** Baran, Jeff

**Subject:** Re: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

OK - looking at schedules, tomorrow may work best. Is he flying back tomorrow? I know the Chairman has some time in the am.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Baran, Jeff <Jeff.Baran@mail.house.gov>

**To:** Powell, Amy

**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 17:52:19 2011

**Subject:** RE: Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

Thanks for the offer, Amy. Let me check with Mr. Waxman and get back to you.

Jeff

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:28 AM

**To:** Baran, Jeff; Pinkele, Abigail; Marshall, John

**Subject:** Offer for calls with NRC Chairman Jaczko

**Importance:** High

Hi all –

If your bosses would find it helpful, Chairman Jaczko is available and more than willing to have a call with them (individually or together – whatever works best for them) today or tomorrow about our activities related to Japan. Let me know and we can set it up.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Cell: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L <GatzKL@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:28 AM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; John Gray; laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA);  
(b)(6) Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; Schmidt, Rebecca; patrick.hart@dhs.gov; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
**Subject:** RE: Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

Yes. I will participate in the 10:30 call. Here is the email information:

Email for the consular task force is [japanemergencyusc@state.gov](mailto:japanemergencyusc@state.gov); email for inquiries in the tsunami zone overseas outside of Japan is [pacifictsunamiusc@state.gov](mailto:pacifictsunamiusc@state.gov).

The most recent information posted on the Embassy Tokyo website is at <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/acs/tacs-warden20110312-01.html>. Online information with the latest updates is at [travel.state.gov](http://travel.state.gov) and the [embassy Tokyo](http://japan.usembassy.gov) websites for the latest updates.

The Department of State has issued a travel warning for Japan. U.S. citizens should avoid travel to Japan at this time. This Travel Alert expires on April 1, 2011. Full text of the travel alert is at [http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis\\_pa\\_tw/pa/pa\\_5377.html](http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_5377.html)

**How to help:** We encourage cash donations. The web site [www.interaction.org](http://www.interaction.org) has a list of organizations accepting contributions. The American Red Cross is accepting donations of \$10 by texting REDCROSS to 90999.

AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is coordinating the overall response management and humanitarian assistance effort. AID/OFDA can be reached at [RMT\\_PACTSU@ofda.gov](mailto:RMT_PACTSU@ofda.gov) (underscore between RMT and PACTSU), Phone: 202 712 0039.

Karen

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:26 AM  
**To:** Gatz, Karen L; John Gray; laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); (b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; Patrick Hart (patrick.hart@dhs.gov); Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Gatz, Karen L; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
**Subject:** Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

Good morning,

Can we all jump on a **call at 10:30** this morning to discuss the proposed inter-agency briefing for the Hill? We have received some reports of additional separate briefings being set up with committees today, but think the better approach is to hold two briefings – one for each chamber—with leadership staff, all relevant agencies and their client committees at the earliest opportunity, which sounds like it may be tomorrow morning. Agency leg folks, please come prepared to discuss the list of requests you may have received from your committees thus far and updates on any regular email update that are being sent to the Hill. We also need to determine the best recipient for Member offices who have constituents or organizations want to provide assistance, expertise or additional resources.

On that point, Dave Adams, can you resend to this group the hotline number or email address where Member offices can forward constituent inquiries about families, friends, etc?

And DOD – can you all provide us an update on the call on any issues related to the U.S. military presence in Japan?

We will circulate the call info shortly. Thanks to everyone for your great work over the weekend staying coordinated and keeping the Hill informed about the latest updates.

Thanks,

Shelly and Louisa

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L [mailto:GatzKL@state.gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:46 PM

**To:** John Gray; laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); (b)(6) Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.

**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D

**Subject:** RE: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Good to know – we can work on getting briefings scheduled for Tuesday.

---

**From:** John Gray [mailto:john.gray@noaa.gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:44 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I agree with Jeff.

---

**From:** Lane, Jeff [mailto:laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 03:40 PM

**To:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED]

(b)(6)

**Cc:** 'AdamsDS@state.gov' <AdamsDS@state.gov>; 'TurkDM@state.gov' <TurkDM@state.gov>; 'HatcherSM@state.gov' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'AlwineP@state.gov' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'PedersonED@state.gov' <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I know the logistics of this are challenging, but on behalf of DOE I'd suggest we do these as quickly as possible, no later than Tuesday. Chu is testifying Tuesday morning before HEWD and Wednesday morning before E and C. He will be questioned about the nuclear plant issues, and the quicker we can get good information to staff the better.

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L <GatzKL@state.gov>

**To:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED]

(b)(6)

**Cc:** Adams, David S <AdamsDS@state.gov>; Turk, David M <TurkDM@state.gov>; Hatcher, Stuart M <HatcherSM@state.gov>; Alwine, Patrick <AlwineP@state.gov>; Pederson, Erik D <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 15:20:55 2011

**Subject:** RE: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Thanks – we'll work on setting it up tomorrow – mid-week might be a good target time frame. I'll be in touch with more information.

Does anyone think we need to have the briefing classified?

Karen

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:[REDACTED] (b)(6)]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:14 PM

**To:** Gatz, Karen L; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); [REDACTED] (b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; [REDACTED] (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'

**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Karen--

We think these are a great idea and like the idea of one bipartisan Leadership and committee staff briefing in each chamber. Please feel free to move forward with this and keep us posted on the timing.

Many thanks,

Shelly

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L <GatzKL@state.gov>

**To:** kathleen.turner@dni.gov <kathleen.turner@dni.gov>; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov <Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov>; laneje@hq.doe.gov <laneje@hq.doe.gov>; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) <bcook@usaid.gov>; (b)(6)

(b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA <(b)(6)>; Boots, Michael J.; John Gray <john.gray@noaa.gov>

**Cc:** Adams, David S <AdamsDS@state.gov>; Turk, David M <TurkDM@state.gov>; Hatcher, Stuart M <HatcherSM@state.gov>; Alwine, Patrick <AlwineP@state.gov>; Pederson, Erik D <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 11:59:04 2011

**Subject:** Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I understand that AID is considering arranging staff-level Hill briefings for next week. We'd like to get your thoughts on organizing an interagency State, AID, DOD and maybe NRC or DOE staff-level briefing. Perhaps we could arrange one House and one Senate briefing for leadership and key committee staff. Also, we would need to determine classification level.

Thanks -- Karen

Karen L. Gatz  
Senior Congressional Adviser  
Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
Department of State  
Phone: 202-647-8439  
Fax: 202-647-9667



Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail

---

**From:** kathleen.turner@dni.gov  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:32 AM  
**To:**

(b)(6)

**Cc:** HatcherSM@state.gov; AlwineP@state.gov; PedersonED@state.gov; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov  
**Subject:** RE: Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

John Gise will be on the DNI Office. Again, we do not believe the Intell Community needs to participate in the bfngs, but we will be on the call this am in case. Kathleen

Kathleen Turner  
Director of Legislative Affairs  
Office of the DNI  
W: 703-275-2473  
Cell: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:26 AM  
**To:** 'Gatz, Karen L'; John Gray; laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov; Kathleen P Turner; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); (b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; Patrick Hart (patrick.hart@dhs.gov); Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; 'Gatz, Karen L'; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
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**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D

**Subject:** RE: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Good to know – we can work on getting briefings scheduled for Tuesday.

---

**From:** John Gray [mailto:john.gray@noaa.gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:44 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I agree with Jeff.

---

**From:** Lane, Jeff [mailto:laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 03:40 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** 'AdamsDS@state.gov' <AdamsDS@state.gov>; 'TurkDM@state.gov' <TurkDM@state.gov>; 'HatcherSM@state.gov' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'AlwineP@state.gov' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'PedersonED@state.gov' <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

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**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** Adams, David S <AdamsDS@state.gov>; Turk, David M <TurkDM@state.gov>; Hatcher, Stuart M <HatcherSM@state.gov>; Alwine, Patrick <AlwineP@state.gov>; Pederson, Erik D <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 15:20:55 2011

**Subject:** RE: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

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Does anyone think we need to have the briefing classified?

Karen

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:(b)(6)]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:14 PM

**To:** Gatz, Karen L: 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Murrie, Eden: 'Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); (b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'

**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

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Many thanks,

Shelly

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(b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA <(b)(6)>; Boots, Michael J.; John Gray <john.gray@noaa.gov>

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**Sent:** Sun Mar 13 11:59:04 2011

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Thanks -- Karen

Karen L. Gatz  
Senior Congressional Adviser  
Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
Department of State  
Phone: 202-647-8439  
Fax: 202-647-9667



Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:57 AM  
**To:** Murrie, Eden; Dacus, Eugene; Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

Thanks – got it. I'll be on the call from OCA.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Murrie, Eden [mailto: (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:57 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** FW: Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

Just passing this along in case Rebecca or Amy was out this am...

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:53 AM  
**To:** 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; GatzKL@state.gov; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; bcook@usaid.gov; (b)(6) Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam (b)(6) Boots, Michael J.; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; patrick.hart@dhs.gov; Papa, Jim; AdamsDS@state.gov; TurkDM@state.gov; GatzKL@state.gov; bcook@usaid.gov; 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov'  
**Cc:** HatcherSM@state.gov; AlwineP@state.gov; PedersonED@state.gov; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov  
**Subject:** RE: Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

Here is the call-in information. Talk to you all at 10:30.

CALL NUMBER: (b)(6)

CONFERENCE PASSCODE: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto: (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:26 AM  
**To:** 'Gatz, Karen L'; John Gray; laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov; Kathleen P Turner; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); (b)(6) Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; (b)(6) Boots, Michael J.; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; Patrick Hart (patrick.hart@dhs.gov); Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; 'Gatz, Karen L'; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
**Subject:** Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

Good morning,

Can we all jump on a call at 10:30 this morning to discuss the proposed inter-agency briefing for the Hill? We have received some reports of additional separate briefings being set up with committees today, but think the better approach is to hold two briefings – one for each chamber—with leadership staff, all relevant agencies and their client committees at the earliest opportunity, which sounds like it may be tomorrow morning. Agency leg folks, please come prepared to discuss the list of requests you may have received from your committees thus far and updates on any regular email update that are being sent to the Hill. We also need to determine the best recipient for Member offices who have constituents or organizations want to provide assistance, expertise or additional resources.

On that point, Dave Adams, can you resend to this group the hotline number or email address where Member offices can forward constituent inquiries about families, friends, etc?

And DOD – can you all provide us an update on the call on any issues related to the U.S. military presence in Japan?

We will circulate the call info shortly. Thanks to everyone for your great work over the weekend staying coordinated and keeping the Hill informed about the latest updates.

Thanks,

Shelly and Louisa

---

**From:** Gatz, Karen L [mailto:GatzKL@state.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:46 PM  
**To:** John Gray; laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); (b)(6) Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.  
**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
**Subject:** RE: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

Good to know – we can work on getting briefings scheduled for Tuesday.

---

**From:** John Gray [mailto:john.gray@noaa.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:44 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D  
**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

I agree with Jeff.

---

**From:** Lane, Jeff [mailto:laneje@Hq.Doe.Gov]

**Sent:** Sunday, March 13, 2011 03:40 PM

**To:** [REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

**Cc:** 'AdamsDS@state.gov' <AdamsDS@state.gov>; 'TurkDM@state.gov' <TurkDM@state.gov>; 'HatcherSM@state.gov' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'AlwineP@state.gov' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'PedersonED@state.gov' <PedersonED@state.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Possible Hill Briefings on Japan Earthquake

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Does anyone think we need to have the briefing classified?

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Many thanks,

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Senior Congressional Adviser  
Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
Department of State  
Phone: 202-647-8439  
Fax: 202-647-9667



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**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 11:10 AM  
**To:** 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; GatzKL@state.gov; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov; bcook@usaid.gov; (b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; Schmidt, Rebecca; patrick.hart@dhs.gov; Papa, Jim; AdamsDS@state.gov; TurkDM@state.gov; GatzKL@state.gov; bcook@usaid.gov; (b)(6); 'ejaff@usaid.gov'  
**Cc:** HatcherSM@state.gov; AlwineP@state.gov; PedersonED@state.gov; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov  
**Subject:** RE: Coordination call 10:30 on earthquake response efforts

Thanks to you all for your help on the call.

I am adding a few more leg folks to our Earthquake Leg list-serve, to ensure we have the right list for USAID's 2pm call today. If I am missing people at your agencies who need to be added, please loop them into this email rather than forwarding me separately so that we are all working from the correct list.

Thank you.

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 9:26 AM  
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(b)(6); Terrell, Louisa; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Wilson, Denise R.; Papa, Jim; Kang, Christopher; Turton, Daniel A.; Maher, Shawn P.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.; John Gray <john.gray@noaa.gov>

**Cc:** Adams, David S <AdamsDS@state.gov>; Turk, David M <TurkDM@state.gov>; Hatcher, Stuart M <HatcherSM@state.gov>; Alwine, Patrick <AlwineP@state.gov>; Pederson, Erik D <PedersonED@state.gov>



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Karen L. Gatz  
Senior Congressional Adviser  
Bureau of Legislative Affairs  
Department of State  
Phone: 202-647-8439  
Fax: 202-647-9667



Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 11:25 AM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Shane, Raeann; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: SONGS, Diablo Canyon

Raeann is in the Ops Center with another "similar design" question from Sen. Carper, so she can respond.

Amy

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 11:22 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: SONGS, Diablo Canyon

Have we released a list?

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 10:58:46 2011  
**Subject:** SONGS, Diablo Canyon

Jenny,

Can you tell me if the reactors at SONGS and Diablo Canyon have a design similar to that having problems in Japan? I'm not sure if you all have put together a list of all the plants that are similar, but I've heard there are 23 to 26 in the US that are similar.

Thank you.

-Kathy

Kathy Dedrick  
Committee on Environment and Public Works  
410 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510  
Phone: 202-224-8832  
Fax: 202-224-1273

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 11:43 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene; Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca; Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Belmore, Nancy; Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Subject:** RE: E-mail distribution list for updates re: situation in Japan

New staffer request for inclusion the distribution list. [Lisa.wright@mail.house.gov](mailto:Lisa.wright@mail.house.gov) She's from Congressman Bartlett's office (MD-District 6).

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 8:39 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene; Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Belmore, Nancy; Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Subject:** E-mail distribution list for updates re: situation in Japan  
**Importance:** High

Since this list has been a work in progress through the weekend, I want to make sure that everyone has the complete, updated list to start the week. Please use the list of e-mail addresses below for any NRC updates on the situation in Japan that we are asked to send out:

[jeff.baran@mail.house.gov](mailto:jeff.baran@mail.house.gov)  
[abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov](mailto:abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov);  
[mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov](mailto:mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov);  
[david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov](mailto:david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov);  
[JohnM@mail.house.gov](mailto:JohnM@mail.house.gov);  
[maryam.brown@mail.house.gov](mailto:maryam.brown@mail.house.gov);  
[michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov](mailto:michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov);  
[chris.sarley@mail.house.gov](mailto:chris.sarley@mail.house.gov);  
[kathy\\_dedrick@epw.senate.gov](mailto:kathy_dedrick@epw.senate.gov);  
[ruth\\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov](mailto:ruth_vanmark@epw.senate.gov);  
[annie\\_caputo@epw.senate.gov](mailto:annie_caputo@epw.senate.gov);  
[laura\\_haynes@carper.senate.gov](mailto:laura_haynes@carper.senate.gov);  
[Brian\\_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov](mailto:Brian_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov);  
[elizabeth\\_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov](mailto:elizabeth_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov);  
[Doug\\_clapp@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Doug_clapp@appro.senate.gov);  
[Carrie\\_apostolou@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Carrie_apostolou@appro.senate.gov);  
[Taunia.berquam@mail.house.gov](mailto:Taunia.berquam@mail.house.gov)  
[Rob.blair@mail.house.gov](mailto:Rob.blair@mail.house.gov)  
[Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov](mailto:Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov)  
[Bettina\\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov](mailto:Bettina_Poirier@epw.senate.gov)  
[mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov](mailto:mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov)  
[chris\\_miller@reid.senate.gov](mailto:chris_miller@reid.senate.gov)  
[jay.cranford@mail.house.gov](mailto:jay.cranford@mail.house.gov)  
[Neil\\_Chatterjee@mccconnell.senate.gov](mailto:Neil_Chatterjee@mccconnell.senate.gov)  
[Isaac\\_Edwards@energy.senate.gov](mailto:Isaac_Edwards@energy.senate.gov)  
[Jonathan\\_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov](mailto:Jonathan_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov)

(b)(6)

Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov

Ali Nouri@webb.senate.gov

(b)(6)

Lisa.Wright@mail.house.gov

Thanks,  
Amy

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 11:50 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** (b)(6) appointment

The timing couldn't be worse, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

My appointment is at 6000 Executive Boulevard. That must be near NRC, I think. I'll be back after that.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:16 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Subject:** RE: UPDATED distribution list for NRC updates on Japan

Thanks – Nancy, this list includes our usual press release distribution list, so don't worry about sending this one along since Raeann's got it from the Ops Center.

AP

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**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:15 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene; Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Belmore, Nancy; Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Subject:** RE: UPDATED distribution list for NRC updates on Japan

Thank you, I'm sending out the latest press release

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:14 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene; Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Belmore, Nancy; Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Subject:** UPDATED distribution list for NRC updates on Japan

Additional names have been added to the list, based on requests received this morning. Here is the updated list:

[jeff.baran@mail.house.gov](mailto:jeff.baran@mail.house.gov)  
[abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov](mailto:abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov);  
[mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov](mailto:mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov);  
[david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov](mailto:david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov);  
[JohnM@mail.house.gov](mailto:JohnM@mail.house.gov);  
[maryam.brown@mail.house.gov](mailto:maryam.brown@mail.house.gov);  
[michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov](mailto:michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov);  
[chris.sarley@mail.house.gov](mailto:chris.sarley@mail.house.gov);  
[kathy\\_dedrick@epw.senate.gov](mailto:kathy_dedrick@epw.senate.gov);  
[ruth\\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov](mailto:ruth_vanmark@epw.senate.gov);  
[annie\\_caputo@epw.senate.gov](mailto:annie_caputo@epw.senate.gov);  
[laura\\_haynes@carper.senate.gov](mailto:laura_haynes@carper.senate.gov);  
[Brian\\_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov](mailto:Brian_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov);  
[elizabeth\\_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov](mailto:elizabeth_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov);  
[Doug\\_clapp@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Doug_clapp@appro.senate.gov);  
[Carrie\\_apostolou@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Carrie_apostolou@appro.senate.gov);  
[Taunja.berquam@mail.house.gov](mailto:Taunja.berquam@mail.house.gov)  
[Rob.blair@mail.house.gov](mailto:Rob.blair@mail.house.gov)  
[Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov](mailto:Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov)

Bettina Poirier@epw.senate.gov  
mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov  
chris\_miller@reid.senate.gov  
jay.cranford@mail.house.gov  
Neil Chatterjee@mcconnell.senate.gov  
Isaac Edwards@energy.senate.gov  
Jonathan Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov

(b)(6)

Michal Freedhoff@mail.house.gov  
Ali Nouri@webb.senate.gov

(b)(6)

Bob.Schwalbach@mail.house.gov  
PABLO.DURAN@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV  
Lisa.wright@mail.house.gov

Thanks,  
Amy

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:20 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Terrell, Louisa  
**Subject:** Follow-up from NRC re: interagency briefing

Hi Shelly and Louisa –

To follow up on our conference call and subsequent chat, it's important for NRC that Senate EPW be included in an interagency briefing tomorrow. Here are our primary points of contact:

**Full Committee:**

**Majority**

Bettina Poirier [Bettina\\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov](mailto:Bettina_Poirier@epw.senate.gov)

Kathy Dedrick [kathy\\_dedrick@epw.senate.gov](mailto:kathy_dedrick@epw.senate.gov)

**Minority**

Ruth Van Mark [ruth\\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov](mailto:ruth_vanmark@epw.senate.gov)

Annie Caputo [annie\\_caputo@epw.senate.gov](mailto:annie_caputo@epw.senate.gov)

**Clean Air and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee:**

Laura Haynes – Sen. Carper [laura\\_haynes@carper.senate.gov](mailto:laura_haynes@carper.senate.gov)

Brian Clifford – Sen. Barrasso [Brian\\_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov](mailto:Brian_Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov)

On the House side, we're under House E&C and its two new subcommittees (Energy and Power; Environment and the Economy) – I presume you have them already, but let me know if you need anything from me on that.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 11:01 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Terrell, Louisa  
**Subject:** RE: Quick chat with NRC?

Calling you now.

Shelly O'Neill Stoneman  
Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office of Legislative Affairs  
(b)(6) (office)



(b)(6)

(direct)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 11:00 AM  
**To:** Terrell, Louisa; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** Quick chat with NRC?

Hi Shelly and Louisa –

What is the best number to reach either of you for a quick chat re: briefings?

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:26 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; GatzKL@state.gov;  
john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; Nelson.Peacock@dhs.gov;  
bcook@usaid.gov; (b)(6); Terrell, Louisa;  
Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; (b)(6); Boots, Michael J.;  
patrick.hart@dhs.gov; Papa, Jim; AdamsDS@state.gov; TurkDM@state.gov;  
GatzKL@state.gov; bcook@usaid.gov  
**Cc:** HatcherSM@state.gov; AlwineP@state.gov; PedersonED@state.gov; DNI-OLA-  
FO@dni.gov  
**Subject:** NRC participation in today's 2pm USAID-coordinated call

Martin Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs at the NRC, will join me on today's 2pm call.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:00 PM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David  
**Subject:** RE: San Onofre

Yes send to region. We have the ok to have the regions answer questions on their plants. Region one is talking Indian Point today

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:58 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: San Onofre

I was treating the tour inquiry as a routine request and asked Ryan Lantz in RIV whether something could be set up. I assume we would use have the staff there follow the earthquake/tsunami talking points?

See Chris's note below on Senator Feinstein.

What should I do if other requests for plant visits come in?

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein) <Chris\_Carrillo@feinstein.senate.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Field, Katherine (Feinstein) <Katherine\_Field@feinstein.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 12:34:18 2011  
**Subject:** Re: San Onofre

We would want to know how the plant is prepared in the event of a major earthquake/tsunami or other major natural disaster. The Senator asked us to look into it this morning. Just between us at this point she may be interested in seeing the facility next week when she recesses in San Diego so a tour for myself and Katherine Field our San Diego Field Rep this week would want to look the same for what you may give the Senator next week.

Tomorrow at 1PM works for Katherine and I. Thanks Jenny..

Chris

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]

Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 12:28 PM  
To: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein)  
Subject: Re: San Onofre

Hi Chris,

We are checking with the plant about a site visit. Do you have specific questions or want to know about emergency preparedness/plant safety?

Jenny

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein) <Chris\_Carrillo@feinstein.senate.gov>  
To: Weil, Jenny  
Sent: Mon Mar 14 11:54:17 2011  
Subject: Re: San Onofre

Tomorrow I have some time late morning and early afternoon.

----- Original Message -----

From: Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 11:50 AM  
To: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein)  
Subject: Re: San Onofre

Hi Chris,

I will check and see if this can be arranged. I believe we would have to work with the utility if you wanted to visit the plant.

Stay tuned,

Jenny

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein) <Chris\_Carrillo@feinstein.senate.gov>

To: Weil, Jenny  
Sent: Mon Mar 14 10:57:24 2011  
Subject: San Onofre

Hi Jenny—I hope all is well. In light of the terrible tragedy in Japan I'd like to see if I can visit San Onofre again and get a briefing on the level of preparedness the facility has during a large earthquake event. Can you arrange for someone to give me a briefing in the next day or two onsite?

Chris

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) <Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:26 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in interagency call coordinated by USAID

Ok – I will definitely call in

Did we set a time for the NRC briefing?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:25 PM  
**To:** Haynes, Laura (Carper)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in interagency call coordinated by USAID

Yes, USAID told me that there will be lines available.

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) [mailto:Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:22 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in interagency call coordinated by USAID

So I can call in?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:17 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC to participate in interagency call coordinated by USAID  
**Importance:** High

Hi all -

FYI, NRC will participate in a conference call coordinated by USAID for Congressional staff **today at 2pm**. I apologize for the late notice, but our participation was just confirmed and additional dial-in lines added.

The dial-in for the call is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Murrie, Eden (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:40 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Schmidt, Rebecca; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Adding Nicole Issac...

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:55 PM  
**To:** 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

We appreciate all of your agency representatives getting on this call and your help in coordinating this in such a short turnaround. Please make sure to send Bette Cook at USAID the name of the person who will be briefing from your agency, including their title, so that we will have a full list of the combined expertise and agencies represented on the call. Her contact information is: [bcCook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcCook@usaid.gov) or 202-712-4417.

Also, just a gentle reminder to have your principals prepared to provide short 2-5 minute presentations and then answer questions at the end when an inquiry comes up in your subject matter. The more fulsome we can make today's call in terms of questions answered will likely alleviate some of the demand for additional one-off briefings going forward, but also assure the Hill that we have a focused, inter-agency approach to the response effort. Plus, we can avoid any awkward silences and need to keep the call moving, so feel free to jump in with the answer or let them know that we may not have that particular answer yet but hope to soon.

Remember, tomorrow's briefing will only be House/Senate Leadership staff and committee staff directors, so please don't reference that briefing on the call since that will likely increase demand for additional personal office staff to be included, which we do not have capacity for at this time.

Thanks again.

Shelly O'Neill Stoneman  
Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office of Legislative Affairs

(b)(6)

(office)  
(direct)

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)

**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

**Subject:** FW: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

The notice below has been sent to staff on our earlier list. As discussed on our call this morning, please forward it to those Hill staff that you want to add to the list, and copy me so that I can do reminder notices each morning. Thanks. •

Bette

202-712-4417

bcook@usaid.gov

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM

**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simier@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:

**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**

with

**Nancy Lindborg**

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

and

Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,

including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human

Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: ( 202 ) 647 - 0817



Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook  
USAID Legislative and Public Affairs  
Tel. (202) 712-4416  
Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:40 PM  
**To:** 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Schmidt, Rebecca; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

+ Nathan Howard at PACOM and Arvin Ganesan at EPA.

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
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The notice below has been sent to staff on our earlier list. As discussed on our call this morning, please forward it to those Hill staff that you want to add to the list, and copy me so that I can do reminder notices each morning. Thanks.

Bette  
202-712-4417  
[bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM  
**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DelLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov';

'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov';  
'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:  
**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**

with

**Nancy Lindborg**

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

and

Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human  
Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: **( 202 ) 647 - 0817**

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook

USAID Legislative and Public Affairs

Tel. (202) 712-4416

Email: [bcCook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcCook@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 2:33 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** Re: Nuclear updates

One of Jenny's peeps

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my BlackBerry

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**To:** Decker, David; OCA Distribution  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 14:32:41 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Nuclear updates

On second look, this doesn't seem to be a request for Japanese issue related e-mails, just regular ones.

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 2:30 PM  
**To:** OCA Distribution  
**Subject:** FW: Nuclear updates

One more request to be on distribution list. -David

---

**From:** Marklund, Chris [mailto:Chris.Marklund@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 2:27 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Subject:** Nuclear updates

David,

Maria Bowie is currently out of the office on (b)(6) While she is out, I have taken over the nuclear issues. Can you please add me to the NRC's emailing list?

Thank you.

Chris

--  
As of 12/7/10 we have moved offices. Please note the change in room number.

Chris Marklund  
Office of Congressman Ken Calvert

2269 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
Ph: (202) 225-1986  
Fx: (202) 225-2004

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 2:52 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Idea for hearing

Beth and Spiros have a draft now

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 2:10 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Idea for hearing

Let's look at his transcript - could that be turned into oral statement or testimony augment?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 14:01:40 2011  
**Subject:** RE: 2:00 PM Conference Call with Congress Staffers

Thank.

Our OPA message is to stick to the latest press release about no radiation coming to U.S. Also forthcoming will be transcript of Chairman press briefing at the WH this morning.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 2:00 PM  
**To:** Harrington, Holly; Decker, David; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: 2:00 PM Conference Call with Congress Staffers

I'm on it now with Marty

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca

**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 13:58:45 2011

**Subject:** FW: 2:00 PM Conference Call with Congress Staffers

Can you guys support?

---

**From:** RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC [mailto:RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC@ofda.gov]

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:25 PM

**To:** LIA11 Hoc; LIA01 Hoc; LIA07 Hoc; LIA08 Hoc; Burnell, Scott; Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David

**Subject:** 2:00 PM Conference Call with Congress Staffers

OCA & OPA,

From what I have been told, the USAID Administrator would like to "step-up" the communications that are being made to Congress and the public. He has specifically asked the NRC for its "plan for public communications" and a proactive list of Q&As. I assured him that we have a good working set of Q&As; however, I wasn't sure about the communications plan. Thoughts?

Also, I think that they are predicting a lot of participation and nuclear questions on today's 2:00 conference call with Congress staffers. Can we have a contingent of NRC folks on the line to help support this and answer questions?

The phone number for the 2:00 call is: 202-647-0817, Code (b)(6)

Thanks!

Michael I. Dudek

---

**From:** Lantz, Ryan  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:06 PM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: San Onofre

I have contacted licensing (Rich St. Onge) at SONGS. They now have the request and will be acting to support as they are able. I have given them Chris and Katherine's names, the purpose of the visit, the desired time tomorrow, as well as info that the Senator may also visit next week. I gave them your number Jenny, in case they had more questions.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:26 PM  
**To:** Lantz, Ryan  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: San Onofre

Here's a note I just received from Chris Carrillo. He and a Feinstein staffer from her San Diego District Office - Katherine Field - want to tour the plant and learn about emergency operations/planning. He anticipates the Senator will want a similar tour next week.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein) <Chris\_Carrillo@feinstein.senate.gov>  
**To:** 'Joellen.allen@sce.com' <Joellen.allen@sce.com>; 'goldenrr@songs.sce.com' <goldenrr@songs.sce.com>; 'mgaughan@sdge.com' <mgaughan@sdge.com>; 'bichord@sempa.com' <bichord@sempa.com>  
**Cc:** Field, Katherine (Feinstein) <Katherine\_Field@feinstein.senate.gov>; Weil, Jenny; Peterson, James (Feinstein) <James\_Peterson@feinstein.senate.gov>; Nunn, Laura (Feinstein) <Laura\_Nunn@feinstein.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 13:13:17 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: San Onofre

Dr. Allen, Ray & Mark,

I hope all is well. In light of the disaster in Japan the Senator has expressed an interest in seeing the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant while she is recessing in San Diego next week. I would like to set up a site visit/walk through of the facility tomorrow and get debriefed on plant operations and planning in the event of a major earthquake/tsunami or other comparable natural disaster. I reached out to Jenny Weil this morning with NRC but wanted to loop you all in and let you know there is a good chance the Senator will be touring SONGS next week. Any of you who can join me this week for a preliminary tour would be greatly appreciated. Katherine Field, our San Diego Field Rep will also be joining.



Thank you. I look forward to hearing back from you regarding availability for a possible site visit with our office staff tomorrow.

Chris Carrillo

----- Original Message -----

From: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein)  
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 12:34 PM  
To: 'jenny.weil@nrc.gov' <jenny.weil@nrc.gov>  
Cc: Field, Katherine (Feinstein)  
Subject: Re: San Onofre

We would want to know how the plant is prepared in the event of a major earthquake/tsunami or other major natural disaster. The Senator asked us to look into it this morning. Just between us at this point she may be interested in seeing the facility next week when she recesses in San Diego so a tour for myself and Katherine Field our San Diego Field Rep this week would want to look the same for what you may give the Senator next week.

Tomorrow at 1PM works for Katherine and I. Thanks Jenny..

Chris

----- Original Message -----

From: Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 12:28 PM  
To: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein)  
Subject: Re: San Onofre

Hi Chris,

We are checking with the plant about a site visit. Do you have specific questions or want to know about emergency preparedness/plant safety?

Jenny

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein) <Chris\_Carrillo@feinstein.senate.gov>  
To: Weil, Jenny  
Sent: Mon Mar 14 11:54:17 2011  
Subject: Re: San Onofre

Tomorrow I have some time late morning and early afternoon.

----- Original Message -----

From: Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]

Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 11:50 AM  
To: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein)  
Subject: Re: San Onofre

Hi Chris,

I will check and see if this can be arranged. I believe we would have to work with the utility if you wanted to visit the plant.

Stay tuned,

Jenny

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Carrillo, Chris (Feinstein) <Chris\_Carrillo@feinstein.senate.gov>  
To: Weil, Jenny  
Sent: Mon Mar 14 10:57:24 2011  
Subject: San Onofre

Hi Jenny--I hope all is well. In light of the terrible tragedy in Japan I'd like to see if I can visit San Onofre again and get a briefing on the level of preparedness the facility has during a large earthquake event. Can you arrange for someone to give me a briefing in the next day or two onsite?

Chris

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:53 PM  
**To:** Nieh, Ho; Sharkey, Jeffry; Bubar, Patrice; Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: hearing book -- Wed hearing

We are writing a new oral statement. We will probably add a paragraph or two to the written statement about Japan. We are focusing on that now. We will move to the briefing material next. I need to see what we already have from the Ops Center

---

**From:** Nieh, Ho  
**To:** Sharkey, Jeffry; Bubar, Patrice; Schmidt, Rebecca; Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 15:28:29 2011  
**Subject:** RE: hearing book -- Wed hearing

Agree with Jeff's logic.

Thanks.

Ho

Ho Nieh  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William C. Ostendorff  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
(301) 415-1811 (office)  
(b)(6) (mobile)  
(301) 415-1757 (fax)  
[ho.nieh@nrc.gov](mailto:ho.nieh@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Sharkey, Jeffry  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:28 PM  
**To:** Bubar, Patrice; Schmidt, Rebecca; Nieh, Ho; Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: hearing book -- Wed hearing

Becky,

Building on Patty's question, will there be an updated briefing book and/or testimony? If so, it seems that the Commission should have whatever materials were provided to GBJ in preparation for the hearing.

Please advise.

Jeff

---

**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:36 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Nieh, Ho; Sharkey, Jeffry; Sosa, Belkys

**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: hearing book -- Wed hearing

Rebecca -- is a new briefing book being prepared? I know everything is so real time so that may be challenging.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 1:29 PM  
**To:** Nieh, Ho; Sharkey, Jeffry; Bubar, Patrice; Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** hearing book -- Wed hearing

We have a budget hearing book prepared for you all that we started Friday. Obviously, the focus of the hearing has moved to the Japanese earthquake. I would prefer to hold this budget material and give it to you for the next budget hearing that is scheduled at the end of the month. Is that ok with everyone? I can give it to you, but it is sorta useless for the hearing.....

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 4:03 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

I've e-mailed with Shelly all day and she still does not have me on here. Can you respond to her and cc me? Bill Borchardt will be NRC's briefer, coming with you or me. Do you want to go with him? Most of these legislative affairs folks are your level but let me know what works for you.

The last line actually asks us NOT to forward briefing details to the Hill...

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:56 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Should we make sure our list is aware--ie more than just our oversight? Let them fight to get on the list?

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: 'Hatcher, Stuart M' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'Alwine, Patrick' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'Pederson, Erik D' <PedersonED@state.gov>; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov' <DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov>; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov' <Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov>; 'Dietch, Sarah' <Sarah.Dietch@dhs.gov>; Maher, Jessica A.

(b)(6) Degen, Greg

**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 15:50:09 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Can everyone please send Louisa and I the name and title of your agency's briefers tomorrow? **We are looking at a 1pm briefing on the Senate side, room TBD.** We realize this timing is not optimal for everyone's briefers, but this is the best we could do in order to get the key folks from both chambers in one room at the same time. Thanks in advance for quick replies. Senate Leadership will issue invitations for the appropriate Leadership staff and Senate Full Committee staff directors (or their designees), while WHLA will issue the invitation for House Leadership staff, Full Committee staff directors or their designees, so no need for anyone to forward briefing details to the Hill at this time.

Thanks.

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)

**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

**Subject:** FW: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

The notice below has been sent to staff on our earlier list. As discussed on our call this morning, please forward it to those Hill staff that you want to add to the list, and copy me so that I can do reminder notices each morning. Thanks.

Bette

202-712-4417

bcook@usaid.gov

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM

**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvac, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:

**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**

with

**Nancy Lindborg**

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

and

Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human  
Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: **( 202 ) 647 - 0817**

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook  
USAID Legislative and Public Affairs  
Tel. (202) 712-4416  
Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 4:29 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Terrell, Louisa  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Tomorrow's 1pm interagency briefing

Shelly and Louisa –

Bill Borchardt, NRC's Executive Director for Operations, will be the briefer for the US NRC tomorrow. Rebecca Schmidt, NRC's Director of Congressional Affairs, will accompany him.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'Alwine, Patrick' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'Pederson, Erik D' <PedersonED@state.gov>; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov' <DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov>; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov' <Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov>; 'Dietch, Sarah' <Sarah.Dietch@dhs.gov>; Maher, Jessica A. (b)(6); Sharp, Amy (b)(6); Degen, Greg

**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 15:50:09 2011

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

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A0/55



Thanks.

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** FW: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

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Bette  
202-712-4417  
bcook@usaid.gov

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**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM  
**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymmer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:  
**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**  
with  
**Nancy Lindborg**  
Assistant Administrator  
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
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Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human  
Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: ( 202 ) 647 - 0817

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook

USAID Legislative and Public Affairs

Tel. (202) 712-4416

Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 5:09 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Subject:** Re: Change in schedule, gap in coverage

If you could hold until 6, that would be great - thanks!

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 16:53:15 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Change in schedule, gap in coverage

Do you need me to stay here until 6pm? I can stay until then,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 4:47 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Change in schedule, gap in coverage  
**Importance:** High

David -

There is now another hearing on Thursday (Senate EPW). I've asked Tim to come in early for his shift, so he will be here at 7pm. Would you let Jeff Temple or whomever is staffing the Liaison Team room know that OCA will have a gap in coverage at our desk, but that I will be around my desk in the interim if anything is needed.

Thanks  
AP

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA <(b)(6)>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 5:41 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); 'Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Gatz, Karen L; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Paolucci, Robert A LTC JCS DOM OCJCS LA; Arguelles, Adam; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.; Davis, Jenny LTC JCS OCJCS LA  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

DOD's briefers will be:

- PDASD Derek Mitchell, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, OSD Policy
- Brigadier General Jeff Newell, Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff J-5

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 5:38 PM  
**To:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); 'Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill'; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Gatz, Karen L; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
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Rebecca Schmidt

Director of Congressional Affairs

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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For USAID, the briefer for tomorrow's 1 pm Hill briefing will be Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. Would you let us all know who all the briefers will be and where the meeting will be held. Thanks.

Also, I want to share with everyone the daily fact sheets that USAID publishes. Attached is yesterday's fact sheet, and I will circulate them regularly to this group.

Most importantly, I want to thank everyone for a very informative briefing today at 2:00. Your help is greatly appreciated.

Bette

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Subject: RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:

Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response  
with

Nancy Lindborg

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

and

Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,

including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human

Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.

Call-in number: ( 202 ) 647 - 0817

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.


Bette Cook

USAID Legislative and Public Affairs

Tel. (202) 712-4416

Email: bcook@usaid.gov

# EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI IN JAPAN







**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

**BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (DCHA)  
OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (OFDA)**

***Japan Earthquake and Tsunami***

Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011

March 13, 2011

*Note: The last fact sheet was dated March 12, 2011.*

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS**

- As of 1100 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 13, or 0000 hours Japan Standard Time (JST) on March 14, the Government of Japan (GoJ) National Police Agency (NPA) reported that the earthquake and tsunami resulted in 1,597 deaths, 1,481 missing persons, and 1,923 injured people. In addition, the earthquake damaged or destroyed nearly 37,700 buildings throughout northeastern Japan. International media sources have reported that the earthquake and tsunami death toll estimates range from 800 to 2,000 individuals, with more than 10,000 individuals missing. According to the NPA, nearly 96 percent of deaths have occurred in the northeastern coastal prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. The U.N. reported that the extent of damage along the coast indicates that the death toll may increase significantly in the coming days.
- On March 12, an explosion occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi (Fukushima 1) nuclear power plant, located approximately 150 miles north of Tokyo. Japanese authorities reported that the primary containment vessel at the reactor remains intact despite the explosion, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The GoJ will continue to closely monitor the situation, as the building housing an additional reactor at the same site remains at risk. An estimated 200,000 people have been evacuated from the areas around the Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini (Fukushima 2) nuclear plants, according to the IAEA.
- On March 11, U.S. Ambassador to Japan John V. Roos declared a disaster due to the effects of the earthquake and tsunami. In response, USAID activated a Response Management Team (RMT) in Washington, D.C., and deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Japan to coordinate U.S. Government (USG) response efforts in Japan. On March 13, the two urban search and rescue (USAR) teams arrived in Japan as part of the DART.
- On March 11, USAID/OFDA provided \$100,000 through the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to assist with local relief efforts. In addition, USAID/OFDA has provided more than \$640,000 to support USAID/DART response activities in Japan.
- According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Forces-Japan (USFJ) began coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to support the GoJ response. DoD is also permitting the GoJ to use Misawa and Yokota airbases for aircraft carrying humanitarian personnel and supplies. To date, the DoD aircraft carrier *USS Ronald Reagan* has conducted six maritime search and rescue missions and 20 helicopter missions to deliver supplies to ships at sea and three towns near Sendai.

NUMBERS AT A GLANCE		SOURCE
Confirmed Deaths	1,597	GoJ NPA <sup>1</sup>
Missing Persons	1,481	GoJ NPA <sup>1</sup>

**FY 2011 HUMANITARIAN FUNDING PROVIDED TO JAPAN TO DATE**

USAID/OFDA Assistance for the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami ..... \$740,600  
Total USAID Humanitarian Assistance for the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami ..... \$740,600

**CONTEXT**

- On March 11 at 0046 hours EST, or 1446 hours local time, a magnitude 8.9 earthquake occurred near the east coast of Honshu—the largest and main island of Japan—at a depth of approximately 15 miles. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the epicenter of the earthquake was located 80 miles east of Sendai, the capital of Miyagi Prefecture, and 231 miles northeast of Tokyo. The earthquake also generated a large tsunami that resulted in additional fatalities and damage.

<sup>1</sup> Figures remain preliminary and are expected to change.

- InterAction, an alliance of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations, maintains a listing of organizations accepting donations for the Japanese earthquake response. The American Red Cross (ARC) announced capacity to receive donations through individual texts containing the message “redcross” sent to 90999.

#### **Infrastructure and Public Services**

- According to the GoJ NPA, the earthquake has damaged an estimated 580 roads, 30 bridges, and 7 railways throughout the country. The GoJ NPA also reported more than 65 landslides throughout the country. Main highways in the most-affected areas of northeastern Japan remain closed, according to international media sources.
- On March 13, Ambassador of Japan to the U.S. Ichiro Fujisaki reported that approximately 2.5 million households—or four percent of Japan’s total population—were without electricity.
- As of March 13, a fire at the Cosmo Oil Company refinery in Ichihara city, located 25 miles east of Tokyo, remains ablaze despite firefighters’ attempts to extinguish the flames since March 11.
- As of March 13, more than 2,050 GoJ-established emergency evacuation centers throughout Japan continue to shelter approximately 380,000 people, according to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

#### **Urban Search and Rescue Teams**

- As of March 13, the GoJ had increased the number of Japanese defense forces assisting in USAR operations to an estimated 50,000 personnel, including in Miyagi Prefecture, where as many as 10,000 people remain missing, according to international media sources. To date, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan reported that more than 3,000 people have been rescued from collapsed homes or high flood waters.
- At approximately 0130 EST on March 13, two USAR teams from Fairfax and Los Angeles counties arrived at Misawa Air Force Base (AFB) in the northern part of Japan’s Honshu Island with emergency medical and water rescue capacities. The teams—composed of 144 personnel and 12 canines trained to detect live victims—will begin search and rescue activities in affected areas on March 14.
- As of March 13, ten countries—including China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand—had deployed USAR teams to Japan to assist in search and rescue efforts in the coming days.

#### **USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO JAPAN**

<b>Implementing Partner</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE<sup>1</sup></b>			
U.S. Embassy in Tokyo	Emergency Relief Support	Japan	\$100,000
	USAID/DART Support Costs		\$640,600
<b>TOTAL USAID/OFDA</b>			<b>\$740,600</b>
<b>TOTAL USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO JAPAN IN FY 2011</b>			<b>\$740,600</b>

<sup>1</sup> USAID/OFDA funding represents anticipated or actual obligated amounts as of March 13, 2011.

#### **PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION**

- The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations. A list of humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations for earthquake and tsunami response efforts in Japan can be found at [www.interaction.org](http://www.interaction.org).
- USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such as transportation routes, staff time, warehouse space, etc.); can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.
- More information can be found at:
  - USAID: [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)
  - The Center for International Disaster Information: [www.cidi.org](http://www.cidi.org) or (703) 276-1914
  - Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

USAID/OFDA bulletins appear on the USAID web site at [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/disaster\\_assistance/](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 5:51 PM  
**To:** Kundrat, Christine  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly  
**Subject:** RE: Wed video record

Hi Christine -

I talked to the Committee staff. No press pass is needed. Committee staff should be available around the hearing room (Rayburn 2123) no later than 845am to allow for set up. I would recommend going early, as I would imagine that there will be a heavy media presence for this hearing!

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Kundrat, Christine  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 5:47 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kundrat, Christine  
**Subject:** Wed video record

Just wanted to follow up with a quick email.

The videographer will be Matt Williams. Photographer is tbd. Do you need specific names for the media passes?

Thank you!

Sent from an NRC blackberry  
Christine Kundrat

(b)(6)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:02 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

I let the WH know, since they are coordinating...

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:00 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

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**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) <bcook@usaid.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 17:56:57 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Thanks. Appreciate your joining us tomorrow. -- Bette

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**Nancy Lindborg**  
Assistant Administrator  
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
and  
Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human  
Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: **( 202 ) 647 - 0817**

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

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USAID Legislative and Public Affairs  
Tel. (202) 712-4416  
Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

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**From:** Gatz, Karen L <GatzKL@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:14 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; Peacock, Nelson; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Schmidt, Rebecca; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO; Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm.

Shelly/Louisa – The following are State Department briefers:

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Donovan, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Deputy Assistant Secretary James Pettit, Bureau of Consular Affairs covering the Office of Citizens Services

I will accompany them from Legislative Affairs

Any thoughts on how we will structure the briefing? Perhaps State would open with an overview of U.S.-Japan contacts and cooperation and an update on Americans in Japan, including those not yet heard from, followed by AID and DOD on various types of assistance being implemented, and DOE and other agencies on the nuclear issues.

Karen

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:50 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Gatz, Karen L; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Can everyone please send Louisa and I the name and title of your agency's briefers tomorrow? **We are looking at a 1pm briefing on the Senate side, room TBD.** We realize this timing is not optimal for everyone's briefers, but this is the best we could do in order to get the key folks from both chambers in one room at the same time. Thanks in advance for quick replies. Senate Leadership will issue invitations for the appropriate Leadership staff and Senate Full Committee

staff directors (or their designees), while WHLA will issue the invitation for House Leadership staff, Full Committee staff directors or their designees, so no need for anyone to forward briefing details to the Hill at this time.

Thanks.

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**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)

**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

**Subject:** FW: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

The notice below has been sent to staff on our earlier list. As discussed on our call this morning, please forward it to those Hill staff that you want to add to the list, and copy me so that I can do reminder notices each morning. Thanks.

Bette

202-712-4417

bcook@usaid.gov

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM

**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:

**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**

with

**Nancy Lindborg**

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

and

Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human



Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: **( 202 ) 647 - 0817**

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook  
USAID Legislative and Public Affairs  
Tel. (202) 712-4416  
Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 5:24 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Emails to Hill

I think we already had Karen W from Pelosi's office.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 20:24:06 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Emails to Hill

More to add except we already have the correct address for mary frances

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**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**To:** 'Gatz, Karen L' <GatzKL@state.gov>; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 20:19:08 2011  
**Subject:** Emails to Hill

Hello--

Can you both please add the following folks to your Hill email lists if you haven't already:

[Karen.veyland@mail.house.gov](mailto:Karen.veyland@mail.house.gov); [jen.stewart@mail.house.gov](mailto:jen.stewart@mail.house.gov); [Wyndee.parker@mail.house.gov](mailto:Wyndee.parker@mail.house.gov);  
[Mariah.sixkiller@mail.house.gov](mailto:Mariah.sixkiller@mail.house.gov); [maryfrances.repko@mail.house.gov](mailto:maryfrances.repko@mail.house.gov); [shimmy.stein@mail.house.gov](mailto:shimmy.stein@mail.house.gov); and then also,  
Brian Kamoie from NSS (b)(6)

Thank you very much.

Shelly O'Neill Stoneman  
Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office of Legislative Affairs

(b)(6)

(office)  
(direct)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 5:25 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Re: How are you doing?

(b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Shane, Raeann  
To: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Mon Mar 14 20:31:26 2011  
Subject: Re: How are you doing?

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy  
To: Shane, Raeann  
Sent: Mon Mar 14 20:05:08 2011  
Subject: RE: How are you doing?

I'm still here, just doing different stuff. Was about to leave then Josh called with feedback on the oral statement. Thanks a lot for asking - I appreciate it.

Gotta go home and (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Shane, Raeann  
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2011 7:53 PM  
To: Powell, Amy  
Subject: How are you doing?

I just saw the press release from Tim...I hope this means you went home.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:50 AM  
**To:** Terrell, Louisa  
**Subject:** RE: Location for today's briefing?

Got it - thanks

---

**From:** Terrell, Louisa [mailto: (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:50 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Location for today's briefing?

Hart 902

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Terrell, Louisa; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 08:48:47 2011  
**Subject:** Location for today's briefing?

Good morning –

What is the location of today's interagency briefing? I did not see that on the e-mails I received.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Terrell, Louisa [mailto: (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:18 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** RE: Confirming Senate EPW included for tomorrow's briefing

The notice is not out yet, and yes, EPW will be included – thanks!

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto: Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:17 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Terrell, Louisa  
**Subject:** Confirming Senate EPW included for tomorrow's briefing

Hi again Shelly and Louisa –

Were Senate EPW's staff directors included (or will they be if it is still a working in progress...) in the notice for tomorrow's 1pm briefing?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:07 AM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Terrell, Louisa  
**Subject:** RE: Location for today's briefing?

Got it – thanks to you both!

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto: (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:04 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Terrell, Louisa  
**Subject:** RE: Location for today's briefing?

Amy—

Here is the briefing information . It will be today at 1pm in 902 Senate Hart Office Building. We have suggested that the briefers go in order of the list below, offering no more than 2-5 minutes of remarks (ideally on the shorter side) so that we will have time for questions at the end.

#### STATE DEPARTMENT

- Joseph Donovan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- James Pettit, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs covering the Office of Citizens Services

#### USAID

- Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

- Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, OSD Policy
- Brigadier General Jeff Newell, Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff J-5

#### DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

- Dr. Pete Lyons, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy
- Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration

#### NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

- Bill Borchardt, Executive Director of Operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

#### ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

- Dana Tulis, Acting Head of the EPA Emergency Operations Center

#### NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

- Laura Furgione, Deputy Director, National Weather Service

Attendees at this briefing will include House and Senate Leadership staff, as well as staff directors, or their designee, from Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce, Energy and Commerce, Environment and Public Works, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Natural Resources, and Science and Technology. At this point, we're not going to drill down to the subcommittee level, but staff directors can tap the appropriate person from each committee to represent them at this briefing. From the House side, staffers from CAPAC and the Nuclear Security Caucus will also attend.

Thanks so much,

Shelly

Shelly O'Neill Stoneman  
Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office of Legislative Affairs

(b)(6)

(office)  
(direct)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:49 AM  
**To:** Terrell, Louisa; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** Location for today's briefing?

Good morning –

What is the location of today's interagency briefing? I did not see that on the e-mails I received.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Terrell, Louisa [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:18 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** RE: Confirming Senate EPW included for tomorrow's briefing

The notice is not out yet, and yes, EPW will be included – thanks!

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:17 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Terrell, Louisa  
**Subject:** Confirming Senate EPW included for tomorrow's briefing

Hi again Shelly and Louisa –

Were Senate EPW's staff directors included (or will they be if it is still a working in progress...) in the notice for tomorrow's 1pm briefing?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:42 AM  
**To:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Cc:** Ordal, Paul (EPW); Pace, Patti  
**Subject:** 330 Wed for Chr Jaczko w/EPW  
  
**Importance:** High

Chairman Jaczko will be there tomorrow at 3:30pm. I look forward to details as you have them.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) [mailto:Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:14 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Time sensitive

Senator boxer asked that I speak with you asap. Can you try my cell (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 09:59 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

Hi all –

Through Friday, USAID is coordinating conference calls for Congressional staff each day at **2pm EST**. NRC will participate on these calls.

The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) <Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:06 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

Do we know how much radiation is coming off the spent fuel rods that are uncovered in unit 4?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:00 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation  
**Importance:** High

Hi all –

Through Friday, USAID is coordinating conference calls for Congressional staff each day at **2pm EST**. NRC will participate on these calls.

The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:21 AM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

Yes

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) [mailto:Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:19 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

Is this in addition to the 1:00 bfg in Hart 902 today?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:59 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation  
**Importance:** High

Hi all –

Through Friday, USAID is coordinating conference calls for Congressional staff each day at **2pm EST**. NRC will participate on these calls.

The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:44 AM  
**To:** Zach, Andy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

It's quite a week – I think we will miss yet another deadline with you...

---

**From:** Zach, Andy [mailto:Andy.Zach@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:04 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

Thank you. I hope you're hanging in there.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:00 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation  
**Importance:** High

Hi all –

Through Friday, USAID is coordinating conference calls for Congressional staff each day at **2pm EST**. NRC will participate on these calls.

The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:45 AM  
**To:** Repko, Mary Frances  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

You bet!

---

**From:** Repko, Mary Frances [mailto:Mary.Frances.Repko@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:08 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation

Great, thanks Amy!

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:59 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC to participate in USAID calls re: Japan situation  
**Importance:** High

Hi all –

Through Friday, USAID is coordinating conference calls for Congressional staff each day at **2pm EST**. NRC will participate on these calls.

The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) <bcook@usaid.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:03 PM  
**To:** 'Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Gatz, Karen L; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Schmidt, Rebecca; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

I have arranged for a room (446 Dirksen Bldg) for those who plan to be on the regular 2:00 p.m. conference call with Hill staff. Since we will not have time to get back to our offices for this call following the 1:00 pm briefing on the Hill, you may want to join us there. It's a small room that seats approximately 10 people. -- Bette

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill [mailto: (b)(6) ]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 8:13 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; Gatz, Karen L; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A); 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Thanks to you all for sending me the list of briefers for your agency. Below is the final lineup I have, plus the briefing will be **tomorrow at 1pm in 902 Senate Hart Office Building**. Might I suggest that the briefers go in order of the list below, offering no more than 2-5 minutes of remarks (ideally on the shorter side) so that we will have time for questions at the end.

**STATE DEPARTMENT**

- Joseph Donovan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- James Pettit, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs covering the Office of Citizens Services

**USAID**

- Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

- Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, OSD Policy
- Brigadier General Jeff Newell, Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff J-5

**DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**

A0/10

- Dr. Pete Lyons, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy
- Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration

#### NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

- Bill Borchardt, Executive Director of Operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

#### ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

- Dana Tulis, Acting Head of the EPA Emergency Operations Center

#### NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

- Laura Furgione, Deputy Director, National Weather Service

Attendees at this briefing will include House and Senate Leadership staff, as well as staff directors, or their designee, from Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce, Energy and Commerce, Environment and Public Works, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Natural Resources, and Science and Technology. At this point, we're not going to drill down to the subcommittee level, but staff directors can tap the appropriate person from each committee to represent them at this briefing. From the House side, staffers from CAPAC and the Nuclear Security Caucus will also attend.

Many thanks for all of your assistance today and we look forward to seeing you all at the briefing tomorrow.

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM

**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inchofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:

**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**

with

**Nancy Lindborg**

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

**U.S. Agency for International Development  
and  
Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human  
Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others**

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

**Call-in number: ( 202 ) 647 - 0817**

**Access code:** (b)(6)

**We hope you can join us.**

**Bette Cook  
USAID Legislative and Public Affairs  
Tel. (202) 712-4416  
Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)**



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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:08 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Thanks

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**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 12:06:48 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Have no idea about outside, but this is a closed briefing so no press in the room.

**Shelly O'Neill Stoneman**  
**Special Assistant to the President**  
**White House Office of Legislative Affairs**

(b)(6) (office)  
(b)(6) (direct)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:06 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** Re: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Will there be press in the room? Or outside the room?

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'Alwine, Patrick' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'Pederson, Erik D' <PedersonED@state.gov>; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov' <DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov>; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov' <Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov>; 'Dietch, Sarah' <Sarah.Dietch@dhs.gov>; Maher, Jessica A.

(b)(6) >; Sharp, Amy <(b)(6)>; Degen, Greg  
(b)(6)

Sent: Tue Mar 15 11:53:57 2011

Subject: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Good morning,

I just wanted to touch base this morning after the Deputies Committee meeting, in which most if not all of your Deputies participated. We are still all set for today's briefing at 1pm in 902 Senate Hart Office Building. The audience will include House/Senate Leadership staff, staff directors (or their designees) from all of the various committees of jurisdiction, including: Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce, Energy and Natural Resources, Energy and Commerce, Environment and Public Works, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Natural Resources, and Science and Technology (additionally, from the House side, staffers from CAPAC and the Nuclear Security Caucus will also attend):

As suggested below, we recommend that folks go in the order listed in the listed and ideally, sit in that order for simplicity's sake. We want to keep these presentations short and sweet—with up to 11 briefers, if they can average 3 minutes, then we should have about 25-27 minutes left for questions, which would be ideal. White House Legislative Affairs will kick off the briefing and will remind the audience that the briefers have a hard stop of 2pm, since many of them will need to jump on the broader Hill briefing call leg by USAID at 2pm.

A few additional items for the group:

- 1.) On that last point, **USAID—do you all have the email addresses you need to broaden the invite/reminder email for today's call, or will all of the leg shops on this chain continue to share with their Hill contacts?**
- 2.) Additionally, we understand that many of you are receiving requests for briefings from your client committees and there are plenty of hearings already scheduled for FY12 budget or other oversight matters at which questions about this issue could arise. Our understanding is that there will be a set of inter-agency Q&A's that your principals will be able to talk from that will hopefully be completed by the end of the day. While it would have been great had they been completed prior to today's briefing, that is not to pass, so I assume briefers will continue to speak off of the current updates that are being shared publicly at this point and we will aim to have these Q&A's out before additional engagements commence tomorrow. We will get those around as soon as we get them. However, **please keep us informed about additional upcoming Congressional engagements in which your principals are planning to participate so that we have comprehensive visibility on these events and keep folks at the WH informed.** We would like the following information: Committee requesting; agency principal requested; date/time scheduled; briefing or hearing; open/closed format; short summary of issues to be discussed or the formal request the committee sent, as well as any other useful information about the event.
- 3.) Finally, thanks to you all for the great work sharing your agencies' releases with the Hill. I mentioned this in the DC today and urged the public affairs folks to stay closed lashed up with you all as new releases get teed up to ensure that we are sending information to the Hill more broadly. **Ideally, releases are being sent to H/S Leadership staff, the relevant committees and appropriations subcommittees of jurisdiction, and the Senators and Members' offices who represent impacted states (i.e. West Coast cities affected by more minor tsunami effects, those who may have concerns about radiation, those with nuclear sites, CAPAC etc.).** Let me know if you need contact information for anyone specific and we'll see what we have.

Thanks again and see you at 1pm.

--Shelly

Shelly O'Neill Stoneman

Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office of Legislative Affairs

(b)(6)

(office)  
(direct)

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 8:13 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Thanks to you all for sending me the list of briefers for your agency. Below is the final lineup I have, plus the briefing will be **tomorrow at 1pm in 902 Senate Hart Office Building**. Might I suggest that the briefers go in order of the list below, offering no more than 2-5 minutes of remarks (ideally on the shorter side) so that we will have time for questions at the end.

STATE DEPARTMENT

- Joseph Donovan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- James Pettit, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs covering the Office of Citizens Services

USAID

- Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

- Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, OSD Policy
- Brigadier General Jeff Newell, Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff J-5

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

- Dr. Pete Lyons, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy
- Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

- Bill Borchardt, Executive Director of Operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

- Dana Tulis, Acting Head of the EPA Emergency Operations Center

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

- Laura Furgione, Deputy Director, National Weather Service

**U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY**

Attendees at this briefing will include House and Senate Leadership staff, as well as staff directors, or their designee, from Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce, Energy and Commerce, Environment and Public Works, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Natural Resources, and Science and Technology. At this point, we're not going to drill down to the subcommittee level, but staff directors can tap the appropriate person from each committee to represent them at this briefing. From the House side, staffers from CAPAC and the Nuclear Security Caucus will also attend.

Many thanks for all of your assistance today and we look forward to seeing you all at the briefing tomorrow.

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:50 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Can everyone please send Louisa and I the name and title of your agency's briefers tomorrow? **We are looking at a 1pm briefing on the Senate side, room TBD.** We realize this timing is not optimal for everyone's briefers, but this is the best we could do in order to get the key folks from both chambers in one room at the same time. Thanks in advance for quick replies. Senate Leadership will issue invitations for the appropriate Leadership staff and Senate Full Committee staff directors (or their designees), while WHLA will issue the invitation for House Leadership staff, Full Committee staff directors or their designees, so no need for anyone to forward briefing details to the Hill at this time.

Thanks.

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)

**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

**Subject:** FW: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

The notice below has been sent to staff on our earlier list. As discussed on our call this morning, please forward it to those Hill staff that you want to add to the list, and copy me so that I can do reminder notices each morning. Thanks.

Bette  
202-712-4417

bcook@usaid.gov

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM

**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

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with

**Nancy Lindborg**

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Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

and

Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,

including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human

Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: ( 202 ) 647 - 0817

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook

USAID Legislative and Public Affairs

Tel. (202) 712-4416

Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Burnell, Scott  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:45 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Decker, David; Taylor, Robert  
**Subject:** Re: Question re: Q&As

Yes.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Scott Burnell

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Burnell, Scott  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Decker, David; Taylor, Robert  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 12:40:18 2011  
**Subject:** Question re: Q&As

Scott –

Does “blessed by the Ops Center” mean that they are okay to share with the Chairman for his hearing prep?

Thanks,  
Amy

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:33 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Chairman JaczkoQA7\_031511.docx

---

**From:** Taylor, Robert  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:27 PM  
**To:** Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Burnell, Scott  
**Subject:** Chairman JaczkoQA7\_031511.docx

As requested. Scott can confirm that these were blessed by the Ops Center ET.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 1:12 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: (b)(5)

(b)(5) No idea what (b)(5) is talking about... we have not sent any sitreps

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 1:10 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** (b)(5)

Leg affairs just said the NRC is sending daily updates that are really helpful so you all should get those too. Annie turned and looked like where is mine? (b)(5)

**From:** Murrie, Eden (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 1:47 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Schmidt, Rebecca; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.; David Applegate; Mansour, Christopher; Heather\_Urban@ex.ios.doi.gov; Timothy J West; 'Kathleen K Gohn'  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg; Walsh, Todd  
**Subject:** RE: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Looping in one more...Todd Walsh...for future emails

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:54 AM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.; David Applegate; Mansour, Christopher; Heather\_Urban@ex.ios.doi.gov; Timothy J West; 'Kathleen K Gohn'  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

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A few additional items for the group:

1.)

(b)(5)



2.)

(b)(5)

3.)

(b)(5)

Thanks again and see you at 1pm.

--Shelly

**Shelly O'Neill Stoneman**  
**Special Assistant to the President**  
**White House Office of Legislative Affairs**

(b)(6)

(office)  
(direct)

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 8:13 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

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- James Pettit, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs covering the Office of Citizens Services

#### USAID

- Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

- Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, OSD Policy
- Brigadier General Jeff Newell, Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff J-5

#### DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

- Dr. Pete Lyons, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy
- Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration

#### NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

- Bill Borchardt, Executive Director of Operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

#### ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

- Dana Tulis, Acting Head of the EPA Emergency Operations Center

#### NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

- Laura Furgione, Deputy Director, National Weather Service

#### U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

- Dr. David Applegate, USGS Senior Science Advisor for Earthquake and Geologic Hazards

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Many thanks for all of your assistance today and we look forward to seeing you all at the briefing tomorrow.

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**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:50 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov';

'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Can everyone please send Louisa and I the name and title of your agency's briefers tomorrow? **We are looking at a 1pm briefing on the Senate side, room TBD.** We realize this timing is not optimal for everyone's briefers, but this is the best we could do in order to get the key folks from both chambers in one room at the same time. Thanks in advance for quick replies. Senate Leadership will issue invitations for the appropriate Leadership staff and Senate Full Committee staff directors (or their designees), while WHLA will issue the invitation for House Leadership staff, Full Committee staff directors or their designees, so no need for anyone to forward briefing details to the Hill at this time.

Thanks.

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**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** FW: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

The notice below has been sent to staff on our earlier list. As discussed on our call this morning, please forward it to those Hill staff that you want to add to the list, and copy me so that I can do reminder notices each morning. Thanks.

Bette  
202-712-4417  
bcook@usaid.gov

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**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM  
**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:  
**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**  
with

**Nancy Lindborg**  
Assistant Administrator  
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
and  
Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human  
Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: **( 202 ) 647 - 0817**

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook  
USAID Legislative and Public Affairs  
Tel. (202) 712-4416  
Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

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**Subject:** US AID  
**Start:** Wed 3/16/2011 2:00 PM  
**End:** Wed 3/16/2011 3:00 PM  
**Recurrence:** (none)  
**Organizer:** Powell, Amy

202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

**Subject:** Long-Term Ops Center Staffing - Conference Call  
**Location:** Teleconference

**Start:** Tue 3/15/2011 4:00 PM  
**End:** Tue 3/15/2011 5:00 PM  
**Show Time As:** Tentative

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Meeting Status:** Not yet responded

**Organizer:** Evans, Michele  
**Required Attendees:** Hackett, Edwin; Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Doane, Margaret; Mamish, Nader; Dyer, Jim; Brown, Milton; Greene, Kathryn; Stewart, Sharon; Howard, Patrick; Miller, Charles; Moore, Scott; Cohen, Miriam; Tracy, Glenn; Haney, Catherine; Dorman, Dan; Johnson, Michael; Holahan, Gary; Leeds, Eric; Boger, Bruce; Grobe, Jack; Zimmerman, Roy; Campbell, Andy; Sheron, Brian; Uhle, Jennifer; Dean, Bill; Lew, David; McCree, Victor; Wert, Leonard; Casto, Chuck; Satorius, Mark; Pederson, Cynthia; Collins, Elmo; Howell, Art; Muesle, Mary; Andersen, James; Higginbotham, Tina; Ross, Brenda; Boyce, Thomas (OIS); Schaeffer, James

**Optional Attendees:** Akstulewicz, Brenda; Belmore, Nancy; Quesenberry, Jeannette; Kreuter, Jane; Armstrong, Janine; Hudson, Sharon; Ellis, Marv; Hasan, Nasreen; Ronewicz, Lynn; Schumann, Stacy; Daniels, Stanley; Casby, Marcia; Thomas, Loretta; Walker, Dwight; Sprogeris, Patricia; Schwarz, Sherry; Ross, Robin; Cohen, Shari; Riddick, Nicole; Flory, Shirley; Veltri, Debra; Matakas, Gina; ODaniell, Cynthia; Miles, Patricia; Lee, Pamela; Dubose, Sheila; Buckley, Patricia; Tomczak, Tammy; Owen, Lucy; Tannenbaum, Anita; Gusack, Barbara; Harrington, Holly; Ricketts, Paul; Howell, Linda

**When:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 4:00 PM-5:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).  
**Where:** Teleconference

**Note:** The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

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**Update: Please find attached background for 4:00 pm EST Conference Call.**



**Requested by:** Michele Evans, NSIR Acting Deputy Director

**Purpose:** To discuss long-term staffing of the HQ Ops Center

**\*\*\*Bridge Line Information:**

**Passcodes/Pin codes:**

Participant passcode:	(b)(6)	
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For security reasons, the passcode will be required to join the call.

**Dial in numbers:**

Country	Toll Numbers		Freephone/ Toll Free Number
USA			800-779-4364

Restrictions may exist when accessing freephone/toll free numbers using a mobile telephone.

**In-Conference Features:**

<p>All participants must use a touch-tone phone to participate in an Audio Conference. The following features are available for you to use on your phone during an active conference:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>◆ Press *0 operator assistance (small fee may apply)</li><li>◆ Press *6 mute/unmute individual line</li></ul>
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OD/RA Conference Call to Discuss  
Long Term Staffing of the Operations Center to Respond to Japanese  
Events

March 15, 2011, 4 pm

**Purpose:** To communicate to OD/RAs plans for longer term staffing of the Ops Center and provide additional support on the ground in Japan.

1. Per EDO direction we plan to staff the Ops Center 24/7 while we have staff dispatched in Japan. Staffing will remain at the current levels for potentially another week. Possibly we will be able to scale back somewhat at the point. Intent is to develop a schedule for the next month, through April 15.
  - Request Office Directors support staffing of the Ops Center as a high priority. Get word out to their staffs **ASAP**.
  - Request ODs identify any additional staff that could fill Ops Center Positions (**By COB March 16**) (These would be staff who are not officially current Response Team Members.)
2. NSIR also has lead to identify a second team of staff to replace the 11 staff we've sent to Japan, if we determine that is needed. Current target for dispatching a replacement team is in approximately 2 weeks (March 28).
  - Request OD to review and update the list of available staff that was generated on March 14 **by COB March 17**.
3. HR to provide any update on compensation for staff working in Ops Center.



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**From:** Meighan, Sean  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 4:13 PM  
**To:** Wittick, Brian  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Kotzalas, Margie; Decker, David  
**Subject:** RE: HOT - CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST: RE: Request  
**Attachments:** Owens, Tyler (Appropriations).docx

Brian:

As promised.

Very Respectfully  
Sean

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**From:** Wittick, Brian  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:05 AM  
**To:** Meighan, Sean; Nguyen, Quynh  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Kotzalas, Margie; Decker, David  
**Subject:** HOT - CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST: RE: Request

Sean

As discussed.

Brian Wittick  
Executive Technical Assistant for Reactors  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-2496 (w); (b)(6) (c)

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**From:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:01 AM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Wittick, Brian  
**Subject:** RE: Request

I would check with the License Renewal people first. You can try Brian Holian or Melanie Galloway. If you can't reach them, you can try one of the branch chiefs like Bo Pham.

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**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:16 AM  
**To:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Request  
**Importance:** High

Margie,  
Do you know who in NRR might be best to answer this question? Thanks.

David

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**From:** Owens, Tyler (Appropriations) [mailto:Tyler\_Owens@appro.senate.gov]

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:14 AM

**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David

**Subject:** Request

**Importance:** High

I know you are smashed right now, but do you have any information on required retrofits for the US reactor fleet? What retrofits has NRC required, and when? Are they required to retrofit as part of the permit renewal process? I would appreciate anything you could get us, and (again, cognizant of what's going on) as quickly as possible. I really appreciate everything you do!

-Tyler

**From:** Owens, Tyler (Appropriations) [[mailto:Tyler\\_Owens@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Tyler_Owens@appro.senate.gov)]

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:14 AM

**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David

**Subject:** Request

**Importance:** High

I know you are smashed right now, but do you have any information on required retrofits for the US reactor fleet? What retrofits has NRC required, and when? Are they required to retrofit as part of the permit renewal process? I would appreciate anything you could get us, and (again, cognizant of what's going on) as quickly as possible. I really appreciate everything you do!

-Tyler

\*\*\*\*\*

Question

Do you have any information on required retrofits for the US reactor fleet? What retrofits has NRC required, and when?

Answer

The NRC evaluates incidents that occur at operating nuclear power plants. If evaluation of an incident indicates that a modification (retrofit) to a licensed plant is needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC has the authority to require changes to these facilities. Selected examples of NRC required modifications are provided below:

The accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 in March 1979 was caused by a combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures. Following the accident, the NRC took a number of actions to require safety improvements at power reactors based on lessons-learned from the accident and official studies and investigations of the accident. Examples of some of the changes required include: improved training and qualification of plant operations personnel, improvements in control room instruments and controls for operating the plant, installation of additional equipment to mitigate accident conditions and to monitor radiation levels and plant status, and enhancements to emergency preparedness requirements;

In 1988, the NRC amended its regulations to require that nuclear power plants be capable of withstanding a total loss of alternating current (AC) electric power ("station blackout") for a specified duration and maintaining reactor core cooling during this period. The objective of the rule change was to reduce the risk of severe accidents resulting from station blackout by maintaining highly reliable AC power systems and, as additional defense-in-depth, assuring that plants can cope with a station blackout for some period of time.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued Orders requiring licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and

spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that could be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire, including those that an aircraft impact might create. Although it was recognized prior to September 11, 2001, that nuclear reactors already had significant capabilities to withstand a broad range of attacks, implementing these mitigation strategies would significantly enhance the plants' capabilities to withstand a broad range of threats.

In 2002, maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into, but not through, the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident. A task force review of the incident made recommendations in a number of areas that resulted in the NRC instituting strict inspection requirements for reactor vessel heads and other susceptible components to ensure cracks and/or leaks will be detected and repaired long before corrosion could affect plant safety. Many nuclear power plants installed new reactor vessel heads following these inspections.

Are they required to retrofit as part of the permit renewal process?"

Regarding the license renewal process, the intent of the NRC's license renewal application review is to determine if the applicant has adequately demonstrated that the effects of aging will not adversely affect any systems, structures, or components that are within the scope of the review. When the plants were designed, certain assumptions were made about the length of time the plant would be operated. During the renewal process, the applicant must confirm whether these design assumptions will continue to be valid throughout the renewal period or whether plant aging effects will be adequately managed. If an applicant were to determine that certain design assumptions would not be valid or that aging effects could not adequately be managed without equipment replacement, then the applicant would need to replace (or commit to replace) certain components before or during the renewal period.

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**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 6:54 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/15/2011

I have an inquiry from a staffer for Majority on House Homeland Security Committee -- KI-related. I think a couple of questions should be directed to other places, but will work on getting responses tomorrow.

I saw that Markey had a press release on KI (not directed at NRC):  
[http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=4257&Itemid=176](http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4257&Itemid=176)

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

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**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 18:39:56 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/15/2011

Thanks Jenny, this is great.

Becky: With all the talk of KI, do you think it's worth raising the idea of an NRC statement telling people in the US they do not need to take their KI? I know it sounds stupid, but I could see people in California doing it, if they have it. Just food for thought.

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**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 6:07 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** FYI: Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/15/2011

Questions from the WH press corps on Japan. I cut out non-earthquake/tsunami-related questions.

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**From:** White House Press Office  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 4:54 PM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/15/2011

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 15, 2011

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY PRESS SECRETARY JAY CARNEY

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

2:18 P.M. EDT

MR. CARNEY: Good afternoon. I apologize for the fact that we're running a little late here today. Before I get started, I'd just like to give you a short update on the response to the situation in Japan.

The United States is continuing to do everything in its power to help Japan and American citizens who were there at the time of these tragic events. USAID is coordinating the overall U.S. government efforts in support of the Japanese government's response, and we are currently directing individuals to [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov) for information about response donations.

The President is being kept up to date and is constantly being briefed by his national security staff. The national security staff in the White House is also coordinating a large interagency response with experts meeting around the clock to monitor the latest information coming out of Japan.

We have offered our Japanese friends disaster response experts, search and rescue teams, technical advisors with nuclear expertise, and logistical support from the United States military. Secretary Chu announced earlier today that the Department of Energy has offered and Japan has accepted an aerial measuring system capability, including detectors and analytical equipment used to provide assessments of contamination on the ground. In total, the DOE team includes 34 people.

To support our citizens in Japan, the embassy is working around the clock. We have our consular services available 24 hours a day to determine the whereabouts and well-being of all U.S. citizens in Japan. A short while ago the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State Department each issued an update on the ongoing situation at the nuclear plant in question in Japan. The guidance, once again, was that after careful analysis of data, radiation levels and damage assessments to all units at the plant, our independent experts at the NRC are in agreement with the response and measures taken by Japanese technicians, including their recommended 20-kilometer radius for evacuation and additional shelter-in-place recommendations out to 30 kilometers.

Both the NRC and the State Department are continuing to ask American citizens in Japan to listen to the local Japanese officials for the very latest information regarding the situation there.

With that, I will take your questions. Julie.

Q I know you just said that you're urging Americans in Japan to listen to the local officials there. We are starting to see, though, some other governments -- China, France, Austria -- taking steps to either urge

their citizens or recommend their citizens leave Tokyo. Does the U.S. feel like its citizens in Tokyo are safe at this point?

MR. CARNEY: The assessment that I just mentioned made by the NRC is that the actions and recommendations taken by the Japanese government are the same that we would take in the situation and therefore they support and are recommending to American citizens that they listen to and follow the instructions of the Japanese government or local Japanese officials.

Q So taking into account all of the possible options that could happen at this point, there's no recommendation that U.S. citizens leave Tokyo at this point?

MR. CARNEY: There is not that I'm aware of. I refer you -- obviously the State Department issues those kinds of advisories, but again, I would refer you to what the NRC has just put out.

Q Given that the situation at this plant took a turn for the worse overnight, do your comments from yesterday that there is no threat to Hawaii or the West Coast of the U.S. -- do those comments still stand?

MR. CARNEY: Well, as you know, those comments were not mine, because I'm not the expert, but the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is an independent agency charged specifically with safety regarding our nuclear industry. And he -- Chairman Jaczko made clear that he believes based on his analysis and the NRC's analysis that there is no threat posed by --

Q Actually he said "highly unlikely." He didn't say no. They later sent out --

MR. CARNEY: Let me actually -- I have language precisely what he said. "You aren't going to have any radiological material that, by the time it traveled those large distances, could present any risk to the American public." That's a quote from yesterday.

So I will defer to him as he is the expert on this.

Q But as far as you know, that comment stands, even given the developments overnight?

MR. CARNEY: Again, I think the NRC has put out additional information today, but on that issue, yes.

Yes, Jake.

Q How satisfied is President Obama with the information coming from Japanese authorities? Does the U.S. government, does the White House feel that you are getting all the information when it -- as soon as the

Japanese officials know it? I say this because on Friday President Obama, when I asked him about the nuclear threat in Japan, offered reassuring words, I could say, as conveyed from the Prime Minister. Obviously, the situation seems a little more dire today.

MR. CARNEY: What I can point you to, Jake, is the statement that the NRC has put out. And it's -- you have to remember that the NRC has its own independent experts on the ground there making assessments about the situation in Japan, determinations about advice that American citizens in Japan should follow. And we have an overall team, the number of which I gave you, on the ground there that is making its own assessments and working very closely with Japanese officials to make those assessments.

Q But that -- I appreciate the fact that we have our own independent experts there, but that wasn't the question. The question is how comfortable is the President with -- that the information the Japanese are giving to the U.S. from Prime Minister Kan to him and below is accurate and not just best-case scenarios and hopes and wishes?

MR. CARNEY: Again, Jake, I would point you to the fact that we have a certain amount of expertise in this area. We have people on the ground there. We are working with Japanese officials who are providing us information, and we are making our independent assessments with our own experts, as well as consulting with the Japanese.

And I just want to point to you right now, our focus is on helping the Japanese, helping our good friends and allies deal with this terrible tragedy that they've encountered -- the combination of an earthquake, a tsunami, and now the nuclear reactor problem that they have.

So we are obviously, in the ways that I mentioned at the top, coordinating very closely with the Japanese and offering assistance that's being accepted; our expertise that they can tap when they need it; and giving advice when it's solicited. So there's a great deal of coordination, and right now our focus obviously is on American citizens in the country, and those assessments are being made, and then also focus very closely on what we can do to help Japan deal with this series of really tragic events.

Q Are our independent experts there at least in part because we don't trust the assessments being made by the Japanese?

MR. CARNEY: No, Jake, they're there because we are a close ally and friend to Japan, and we are coordinating with the Japanese to assist them in any way that we can and in any way that they request in dealing with this terrible tragedy and historic tragedy. We are obviously, because we have expertise in this area, making independent assessments, and using them to evaluate decisions we make about advising American citizens in Japan and obviously about advising Americans on American soil about any impact they may face because of this, which is what Chairman Jaczko was talking about yesterday.



Q So just to button it -- the President is satisfied with the information he's been getting from the Japanese government? Yes?

MR. CARNEY: I have no reason to say that he's not, Jake. The coordination is deep in many ways. I would refer you for details on how that works and who's talking to whom to the NRC, the Department of Energy, the State Department, and the Embassy in Tokyo.

Chip.

Q Jay, could you clarify -- Secretary Chu -- and I'm not asking you to be a brilliant scientist here -- but he said two things that seemed a bit in contradiction. First of all, he said that the reactors in the U.S. are designed above what would be required to withstand a worst-case earthquake scenario. But he also said that the United States can learn from this to strengthen and -- strengthen the safety at its 104 reactors. So why do you need to strengthen the safety of the reactors if they're all designed above a worst-case scenario?

MR. CARNEY: I think as Chairman Jaczko made clear from this podium yesterday, that independent agency exists in order to ensure that the highest safety standards are met by the nuclear reactors that are part of the energy industry in this country. And it is -- part of their procedure is to constantly review information and data that comes in, to review incidents that happen around the world. I believe Chairman Jaczko even mentioned that they'd performed a review of safety measures in the wake of the tsunami in Indonesia and made evaluations based on that in terms of the safety and security of our facilities here in the United States.

So it simply stands to reason that you make models for various scenarios and every time there is new information that comes in from an actual event you take that data and you analyze it and you examine whether or not it affects the models you have for safety and security of your facilities.

To suggest that everything is static forever obviously would be wrong, because there obviously -- there's new information to be gleaned from incidents. And I'm sure that's what Secretary Chu, a far wiser man than I, was talking about.

Q On nuclear energy in this country, Congressman Markey is calling for a moratorium on new reactors that could be built in seismically sensitive areas. Does the President believe that's an overreaction?

MR. CARNEY: I think, Mike, as you know, we have a program, a loan-guarantee program at the Department of Energy. I believe that's what some of the calls for a moratorium would address because those are -- that is

the program through which potentially new reactors are being assisted through a loan-guarantee program that is conditional.

And right now we have one conditional loan commitment to one nuclear project, and there are several others that are under consideration. It's a conditional loan agreement precisely because there are conditions attached, and one of those conditions is that any license would have to be granted by, of course, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the independent agency that ensures the safety and security of our nuclear reactors. And they would not issue that license if they felt that a proposed plant were not safe and secure to operate in the United States.

So that is the process we follow. The agency in question here, the NRC, as Chairman Jaczko said yesterday, focuses day to day, including prior to the events in Japan -- for days, weeks, months and years -- day to day on the safety and security of the nuclear facilities in the United States. And that would certainly apply going forward.

Q Is the President worried about an overreaction here in Washington as you view the events in Japan when it comes to nuclear energy and how it may affect U.S. energy policy?

MR. CARNEY: The President sees what's happening in Japan and feels, as most Americans do, a great -- he is -- I believe I heard him use the phrase today -- heartbroken by what he sees unfolding in Japan and the effect on the Japanese people. He is, every day, concerned about the safety and security of the American people.

He believes that our energy future will be best served by the approach that he's taking, which is to take an all-of-the-above approach in terms of our goals to reaching a clean energy standard, and that includes wind, solar, biofuels. It includes responsible drilling in the deepwater areas that, even in the wake of the deep -- of the Gulf spill -- I think as I mentioned the other day, we have issued our first permit several weeks ago since the Gulf spill for deepwater drilling, then just several days ago issued the second permit.

And we were able to do that because we're committed to responsible drilling because we need it for our energy demands, but we insist, in the wake of that spill, which demonstrated a weakness in our system and the dangers associated with that, with a terrible spill, that any industry that get a permit demonstrate that it can contain the kind of spill that we saw in the Gulf. And those permits are now being issued to those industries that demonstrate that capacity.

So, more broadly, I would just say that he is committed to a multidimensional or multisource approach to our energy needs in the future. Nuclear is one of those sources. And he believes that we need to proceed responsibly with the safety and security of the American people in mind, and if we do that, that nuclear can continue to be an element in our energy arsenal.

Q -- any sort of -- on that? On Japan, there is a pharmaceutical -- this run on potassium iodide that's taking place. One of the pharmaceutical companies here in the United States that makes it, the oral solution, says that the national stockpile of this actually begins expiring in April of 2011. Has there been any decision by the administration to look into that and make sure all of that is up to date, order more of it, if necessary, especially now that suddenly there's obviously a worldwide run on this right now?

MR. CARNEY: Well, let me refer to HHS for specifics about the program and the stockpiling of that. I would take this opportunity to remind you and the American people that this is an accident and a situation that's happening in Japan and not in the United States, and the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission made clear yesterday his belief, based on the NRC's analysis, that there are no harmful effects that can come from any radiation spillage -- that's probably not the word -- but radiation emissions that might come from the reactors that had been damaged in Japan; any harm that could come to Americans on American soil, because of the great distances involved here.

Q To follow up on Jake's question, every single independent nuclear expert that we've talked to seems to think that this is at such a catastrophic level that the Japanese -- they don't have the capacity anymore to handle this on their own, that there needs to be a ton of international support.

Has the NRS -- has the NRC come to that same conclusion, that this is now beyond the scope of what the Japanese government can handle?

MR. CARNEY: Well, let me refer you to the NRC for questions to the NRC. But I would say that the NRC's role is tailored to its expertise. The Department of Energy, as I mentioned, is very engaged in this and has experts also on the ground, and we are participating in international assistance to the Japanese to help them deal with this tragedy, both the --

Q But dealing with the nuclear reactor itself, that this is -- they don't have the capacity anymore --

MR. CARNEY: Well, I don't know about the assessments of Japanese capacity except, of course, they do have a certain amount of expertise and -- a large amount of expertise. Again, I'm telling you what I know based on talking to those experts including the one who heads the NRC.

However, this is a huge event, and it requires the kind of concerted international response that we're seeing and which we are participating in a robust way. Because Japan is a close friend and ally, and we will do everything we can to help them in this situation.

Q Very quickly to follow up on Chip's question which is this -- safety at our own nuclear plants. Does the President not need to order a review of safety plans because they're constantly going on? Is that what you're trying to imply here?

MR. CARNEY: He doesn't have to order a review because they're constantly going on. He has, however -- I spoke with him about this within the last couple of hours -- asked, requested the NRC to evaluate the situation, the lessons learned from Japan as that information comes available and to incorporate it in its overall reviews of the safety and security of the reactors here in the United States.

Now, as we learned from Chairman Jaczko yesterday, that is what they do in any case. The President has added his voice, which is a singular and substantial voice, to the call for the need to do that today.

Yes, Jonathan.

Q Follow-up on Chuck's point. When the BP -- when Deepwater Horizon, when the President ordered a moratorium on new permitting while he did a review on response on that, in that case, there exactly was a planned incident response to a deepwater disaster. In the case of nuclear meltdowns, there is no such thing. There are seven different agencies, no clear lines of command.

MR. CARNEY: I disagree with that, Jonathan. I think that obviously there are a variety of incidents that could happen with a nuclear facility, including, as I believe Chairman Jaczko discussed, maybe Secretary Poneman discussed yesterday, the reviews that were done in the wake of 9/11 in terms of the security of our nuclear facilities and other potentially vulnerable facilities to terrorist attack.

That is one incident and would require a response by -- with a different lead, perhaps -- a different agency in response. There could be the kind of meltdown, I guess, like occurred -- partial meltdown that occurred at Three Mile Island, and that would -- another agency might have the lead -- because they would have the expertise, so they would have the lead in responding to that. And then you have the natural disaster possibility that we've seen in Japan.

We have very specific and detailed plans in how response would be coordinated and which agencies would take the lead. Depending on what kind of incident we're discussing here, you would not -- there is not a one-size-fits-all response, we believe, and that's why we take the approach we take.

Q And in 2002, in the wake of 9/11, there was an amendment passed by Congress that ordered the distribution of potassium iodide to a 20-mile radius around all nuclear plants. The Bush administration ignored it and Markey sent a letter to President Obama. It's been ignored by the Obama administration as well. Is there any effort to follow the law and begin distributing potassium iodide on a 20-mile radius?

MR. CARNEY: Jonathan, I don't have any information on that law or how the previous administration or this one has handled it. I would just say that, again, this incident happened in Japan, not in the United States. It is not in a place in the world where it could have harmful effects -- according to the independent NRC -- it could have harmful effects on Americans, on American soil.

And we -- the NRC has as its mission to constantly review the safety and security of the facilities we have here in the United States.

Julianna.

Q When you were speaking with the President earlier, was there any specific mention of reviewing older nuclear facilities, and that those should be an area that you might want to inspect in the wake of what we're seeing in the aftermath?

MR. CARNEY: Not in any conversation I had with him. But I would just refer you to the NRC and the Department of Energy for this. And again, the NRC is responsible for all the facilities and for the licensing and permitting the evaluations of their safety standards and the upgrade of their safety procedures if they so deem it necessary. And again, it would be -- if the NRC decided that a facility was no longer safe, either because of something that had happened in that facility or because of new information, it has the authority to take the steps necessary to suspend activity at that facility or to shut it down.

So these procedures -- this agency is in place precisely for this reason, and the procedures are in place so that they can be followed if that contingency occurred.

Q Is there any response to what we saw in Germany earlier today where **Chancellor Merkel has ordered the -- I think it was all pre-1980s plants to be shut down -- I think it was seven nuclear plants to be shut down, pending a review of their safety,** until June? Does the administration have any response to that, or did the President talk about that at all?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I don't have a response to actions taken by other countries. What we know and what we're responsible for is the safety and security of those facilities in the United States. And that responsibility lies with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They have made the judgment that our facilities are safe and secure. They are constantly, as Chairman Jaczko said, evaluating their standards, their procedures, taking in new information, and making adjustments accordingly. And that would apply to old reactors as well as newer ones.

---

**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 6:59 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Senate Hearing on Thursday

Ok thanks

Sent from my NRC Blackberry  
Mindy Landau

(b)(6)

[Mindy.Landau@nrc.gov](mailto:Mindy.Landau@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 18:53:20 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Senate Hearing on Thursday

Hearing sorta but it is wednesday afternoon.

---

**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**To:** Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 18:50:48 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Senate Hearing on Thursday

Can you confirm? Is this a new briefing or hearing?

Sent from my NRC Blackberry  
Mindy Landau

(b)(6)

[Mindy.Landau@nrc.gov](mailto:Mindy.Landau@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot; Burnell, Scott; Couret, Ivonne; Hayden, Elizabeth; McIntyre, David; Chandrathil, Prema; Dricks, Victor; Hannah, Roger; Ledford, Joey; Mitlyng, Viktoria; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil; Uselding, Lara  
**Cc:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 17:47:20 2011  
**Subject:** Senate Hearing on Thursday

New: Nuclear Crisis in Japan

Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (Chairwoman Boxer, D-Calif.) will hold a briefing on the ongoing crisis associated with nuclear power facilities in Japan, including potential ramifications for the United States. 3:30 p.m., 406 Dirksen

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 7:02 PM  
**To:** Landau, Mindy; Decker, David; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** Re: Senate Hearing on Thursday

It is unusual - it is a public briefing for the Senators (ie no written testimony needed but it will look and feel like a hearing).  
And it is WED at 330  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**To:** Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 18:50:48 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Senate Hearing on Thursday

Can you confirm? Is this a new briefing or hearing?

Sent from my NRC Blackberry  
Mindy Landau  
(b)(6)  
[Mindy.Landau@nrc.gov](mailto:Mindy.Landau@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot; Burnell, Scott; Couret, Ivonne; Hayden, Elizabeth; McIntyre, David; Chandrathil, Prema; Dricks, Victor; Hannah, Roger; Ledford, Joey; Mitlyng, Viktoria; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil; Uselding, Lara  
**Cc:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 17:47:20 2011  
**Subject:** Senate Hearing on Thursday

**New: Nuclear Crisis in Japan**

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---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:29 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** GEA on board

California here we come...

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:11 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Any luck?

Awesome! Thanks. Handing you off to Amy to make it happen. Amy, can you please let Doug know tonight its a go? We will have to work his travel schedule around an as yet unscheduled (probably monday) Commission meeting.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 21:05:57 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Any luck?

Josh, yes! he is on board. I'll wait to hear all the details sometime tomorrow.  
Stay strong and get some zzz.  
Thks,

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 20:46:49 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Any luck?

Thanks

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820



----- Original Message -----

From: Sosa, Belkys

To: Batkin, Joshua

Sent: Tue Mar 15 20:45:40 2011

Subject: Re: Any luck?

I haven't heard; but I'm recommending him to say yes. My guess is that he will. He is on board an aircraft carrier or some Navy ship at this time. Will probably contact me after dinner. I'll text you as soon as I hear from him.  
Thks

Sent from an NRC Blackberry

Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua

To: Sosa, Belkys

Sent: Tue Mar 15 20:40:21 2011

Subject: Any luck?

We'll make sure he doesn't miss the Commission meeting

Joshua C. Batkin

Chief of Staff

Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko

(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:36 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Update on NRC Hill outreach

(b)(5)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Terrell, Louisa  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 22:59:41 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Update on NRC Hill outreach

Thanks so much for all of your efforts, Amy

(b)(5)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Terrell, Louisa; Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 22:35:29 2011  
**Subject:** Update on NRC Hill outreach

Hi again –

As I have since the weekend, I wanted to update you on NRC's Hill outreach. Chairman Jaczko had three more calls today, all House-side ahead of tomorrow's hearing: Rep. Markey, Rep. Burgess, and Rep. Whitfield. I believe that we briefly discussed his Senate calls yesterday when we were on the phone.

We will again join the USAID call tomorrow at 2pm and through the end of the week.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Neimeyer, Sarah (Durbin) <Sarah\_Neimeyer@durbin.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:41 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Daily briefings on Japan

Thanks!

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:29 PM  
**To:** Neimeyer, Sarah (Durbin)  
**Cc:** Hunt, Jasmine (Durbin)  
**Subject:** RE: Daily briefings on Japan

Sure- we'll add you to distribution. Content thus far has been largely press releases.

Also FYI: Through Friday, USAID is coordinating conference calls for Congressional staff each day at **2pm EST**. NRC will participate on these calls.

The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy

---

**From:** Neimeyer, Sarah (Durbin) [mailto:Sarah\_Neimeyer@durbin.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 4:22 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Hunt, Jasmine (Durbin)  
**Subject:** Daily briefings on Japan

Can you add Jasmine and I to your list for daily updates? Thanks, Sarah

Sarah C. Neimeyer  
Senior Domestic Policy Advisor  
U.S. Senator Richard J. Durbin

202/224-3650

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:04 AM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Re: USAID call on Wednesday

Thanks so much

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:02:59 2011  
**Subject:** Re: USAID call on Wednesday

Will do

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 22:31:15 2011  
**Subject:** USAID call on Wednesday

Gene –

Would you cover the USAID call again on Wednesday at 2pm? Same time same channel, but this time Marty is on tap.

The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

A0/84

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 8:15 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

News looks grim, to say the least. The 8:00 CA briefing was canceled.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:26:38 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Heroic efforts mean fatal doses.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:11:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Yes, I noticed that we time traveled a bit...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:07:25 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

This is great, except for the error in the first line - the date.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann

**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 06:06:40 2011  
**Subject:** Q&As re: Japan

Attached is a document of Q&A responses prepared by OPA and technical experts in the Ops Ctr. We CANNOT send this document in its entirety down to the Hill as is, but we can use it to respond to individual questions. I know that we "owe" answers to questions to a number of staffers. Please read through here and see if answers are provided to questions that came into you and get back to the requesting staff. This may also help those of you in the Ops Ctr with calls.

Questions that speculate about what could happen, compare Japan regs with US, and other speculative Qs are NOT included here. Just not the focus now.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Coggins, Angela; Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 21:51:03 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela, Amy, Becki – These are fully approved by relevant folks in the Op Center. For your use. I have not added to WebEOC yet as it's not clear these should also be used by others . . .

---

**From:** Coggins, Angela  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:36 PM  
**To:** Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Thanks so much!! I appreciate all the effort!  
Angela Coggins  
Policy Director  
Office of Chairman Gregory B Jaczko  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[angela.coggins@nrc.gov](mailto:angela.coggins@nrc.gov)/301-415-1828

---

**From:** Taylor, Robert  
**To:** Coggins, Angela  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 20:29:17 2011  
**Subject:** Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela,

We have done our best to incorporate your questions into the Chairman's Q&As that were developed earlier today and provided to OCA. The updated set of Q&As is undergoing ET review and we will hopefully have it to you in the near future. The attached provides a roadmap of where we believe the responses can be found. A

few questions fell into the broader "After this event is over, we will determine what changes need to be made in the US" message. I did not directly incorporate them, but you can see a draft response in the attached.

Regarding the third question about past events, I did not try to evaluate all of the events you listed. I would propose sticking to the party line, in that, "The NRC routinely reassess its regulatory requirements in light of new operating experience and plant events."

Regards,  
Rob



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 8:21 AM  
**To:** Collins, Elmo  
**Subject:** Re: CA trip next week

Call failed 5 times - want to try me at (b)(6) ?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Collins, Elmo  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 08:16:46 2011  
**Subject:** RE: CA trip next week

Any chance you can give me a call - 817 869 8225?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:13 AM  
**To:** Collins, Elmo; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Borchardt, Bill; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: CA trip next week

I plan to talk with Sen. Feinstein's staff later this morning to get more details on timing.

Thanks.  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Collins, Elmo  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Borchardt, Bill; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 08:10:21 2011  
**Subject:** RE: CA trip next week

Josh

I'll work with Bill and Amy accordingly.

Elmo

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua

Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:46 PM

To: Collins, Elmo; Borchardt, Bill

Cc: Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy

Subject: CA trip next week

Elmo, it looks like Senator Feinstein, the new chairman of our Senate Appropriations subcommittee, is going to go to Diablo and/or SONGS next week (Tuesday?). Commissioner Apostolakis is going to fly out to join her. If your schedule allows it and Bill blesses it, would you be able to join them? OCA has the lead to arrange. Thank you, Josh

Joshua C. Batkin

Chief of Staff

Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko

(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 9:55 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Copy

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 09:50:53 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

(b)(5)

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 09:49:04 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Ouch!

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:33:49 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Q&As re: Japan

Call has now ended.

(b)(5)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:12 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Yes, I noticed that we time traveled a bit...

Amy Powell

Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
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Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Coggins, Angela; Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 21:51:03 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

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**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:36 PM  
**To:** Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Thanks so much!! I appreciate all the effort!  
Angela Coggins  
Policy Director  
Office of Chairman Gregory B Jaczko  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[angela.coggins@nrc.gov](mailto:angela.coggins@nrc.gov)/301-415-1828

---

**From:** Taylor, Robert  
**To:** Coggins, Angela  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 20:29:17 2011  
**Subject:** Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela,

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Regards,  
Rob

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 10:51 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Fw: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 12:06:48 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Have no idea about outside, but this is a closed briefing so no press in the room.

Shelly O'Neill Stoneman  
Special Assistant to the President  
White House Office of Legislative Affairs

(b)(6)

(office)  
(direct)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:06 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** Re: Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Will there be press in the room? Or outside the room?

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill <(b)(6)>  
**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M' <HatcherSM@state.gov>; 'Alwine, Patrick' <AlwineP@state.gov>; 'Pederson, Erik D' <PedersonED@state.gov>; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov' <DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov>; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov' <Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov>; 'Dietch, Sarah' <Sarah.Dietch@dhs.gov>; Maher, Jessica A.

(b)(6)

>; Sharp, Amy <(b)(6)>; Degen, Greg

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 11:53:57 2011

**Subject:** Hill Briefing at 1pm today, 902 Senate Hart Office Building

Good morning,

I just wanted to touch base this morning after the Deputies Committee meeting, in which most if not all of your Deputies participated. We are still all set for today's briefing at 1pm in 902 Senate Hart Office Building. The audience will include House/Senate Leadership staff, staff directors (or their designees) from all of the various committees of jurisdiction, including: Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce, Energy and Natural Resources, Energy and Commerce, Environment and Public Works, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Natural Resources, and Science and Technology (additionally, from the House side, staffers from CAPAC and the Nuclear Security Caucus will also attend).

As suggested below, we recommend that folks go in the order listed in the listed and ideally, sit in that order for simplicity's sake. We want to keep these presentations short and sweet—with up to 11 briefers, if they can average 3 minutes, then we should have about 25-27 minutes left for questions, which would be ideal. White House Legislative Affairs will kick off the briefing and will remind the audience that the briefers have a hard stop of 2pm, since many of them will need to jump on the broader Hill briefing call leg by USAID at 2pm.

A few additional items for the group:

1.)

(b)(6)

2.)

(b)(5)

3.)

(b)(5)

Thanks again and see you at 1pm.

--Shelly

Shelly O'Neill Stoneman  
Special Assistant to the President

White House Office of Legislative Affairs

(b)(6)

(office)  
(direct)

---

**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 8:13 PM

**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Thanks to you all for sending me the list of briefers for your agency. Below is the final lineup I have, plus the briefing will be tomorrow at 1pm in 902 Senate Hart Office Building. Might I suggest that the briefers go in order of the list below, offering no more than 2-5 minutes of remarks (ideally on the shorter side) so that we will have time for questions at the end.

STATE DEPARTMENT

- Joseph Donovan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- James Pettit, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs covering the Office of Citizens Services

USAID

- Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

- Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, OSD Policy
- Brigadier General Jeff Newell, Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff J-5

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

- Dr. Pete Lyons, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy
- Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of National Nuclear Security Administration

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

- Bill Borchardt, Executive Director of Operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

- Dana Tulis, Acting Head of the EPA Emergency Operations Center

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

- Laura Furgione, Deputy Director, National Weather Service

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

- Dr. David Applegate, USGS Senior Science Advisor for Earthquake and Geologic Hazards



Attendees at this briefing will include House and Senate Leadership staff, as well as staff directors, or their designee, from Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce, Energy and Commerce, Environment and Public Works, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Natural Resources, and Science and Technology. At this point, we're not going to drill down to the subcommittee level, but staff directors can tap the appropriate person from each committee to represent them at this briefing. From the House side, staffers from CAPAC and the Nuclear Security Caucus will also attend.

Many thanks for all of your assistance today and we look forward to seeing you all at the briefing tomorrow.

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**From:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 3:50 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; Boots, Michael J.; 'Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA'; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; 'kathleen.turner@dni.gov'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'john.gray@noaa.gov'; 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; Murrie, Eden; 'King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA'; 'Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA'; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Hart, Patrick'; Papa, Jim; 'Adams, David S'; 'Turk, David M'; 'Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO'; 'Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)'; 'Howard, Nathan R US PACOM WLO'; 'Ganesan.Arvin@epamail.epa.gov'; Isaac, Nicole M.  
**Cc:** 'Hatcher, Stuart M'; 'Alwine, Patrick'; 'Pederson, Erik D'; 'DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov'; 'Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov'; 'Dietch, Sarah'; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

Can everyone please send Louisa and I the name and title of your agency's briefers tomorrow? **We are looking at a 1pm briefing on the Senate side, room TBD.** We realize this timing is not optimal for everyone's briefers, but this is the best we could do in order to get the key folks from both chambers in one room at the same time. Thanks in advance for quick replies. Senate Leadership will issue invitations for the appropriate Leadership staff and Senate Full Committee staff directors (or their designees), while WHLA will issue the invitation for House Leadership staff, Full Committee staff directors or their designees, so no need for anyone to forward briefing details to the Hill at this time.

Thanks.

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**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcook@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:40 PM  
**To:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill; Boots, Michael J.; Gillerman, Elliot CIV OSD LA; 'Peacock, Nelson'; Terrell, Louisa; kathleen.turner@dni.gov; Gatz, Karen L; john.gray@noaa.gov; laneje@hq.doe.gov; Murrie, Eden; King, Elizabeth L, HON OSD LA; Lettre, Marcel Mr. (SES) OSD LA; Heimbach, Jay; Arguelles, Adam; Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov; Hart, Patrick; Papa, Jim; Adams, David S; Turk, David M; Carretta, Robert T US PACOM WLO; Jaff, Elizabeth (AID/A)  
**Cc:** Hatcher, Stuart M; Alwine, Patrick; Pederson, Erik D; DNI-OLA-FO@dni.gov; Christopher\_Mansour@ios.doi.gov; Dietch, Sarah; Maher, Jessica A.; Sharp, Amy; Degen, Greg  
**Subject:** FW: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

The notice below has been sent to staff on our earlier list. As discussed on our call this morning, please forward it to those Hill staff that you want to add to the list, and copy me so that I can do reminder notices each morning. Thanks.

Bette  
202-712-4417  
bcook@usaid.gov

---

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)

**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 12:31 PM

**To:** 'Steven\_Feldstein@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Lori\_Rowley@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Patrick\_DeLeon@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer\_Tyree@akaka.senate.gov'; 'Jennifer.Beppu@mail.house.gov'; 'Christopher.Raymond@mail.house.gov'; 'Mary\_Yoshioka@inouye.senate.gov'; 'Gene.Kim@mail.house.gov'; 'Amelia.Wang@mail.house.gov'; 'Daniel.Walls@mail.house.gov'; 'JJ.Ong@mail.house.gov'; 'Elana\_Broitman@gillibrand.senate.gov'; 'Cep, Melinda (Rep DeLauro)'; 'Gibbons, David (HACAG)'; 'Gillen, Alex (HAC-AG)'; 'Adams, Susan (HACFO)'; 'Chotvacs, Annemarie (HACFO)'; 'Higgins, Craig (HACFO)'; 'Marchese, Steve'; 'Gage, Mark (HFAC)'; 'Harsha, Daniel (HFAC)'; 'Ohlbaum, Diana (HFAC)'; 'Quinones, Jackie (HFAC)'; 'Dunlap, Mike (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Kuschmider, Scott (House Ag)'; 'Larew, Rob (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Scott, Nicole (House Ag Cmte)'; 'Straughn, Pelham (House Ag Cmte)'; 'McBride, Stacy (Appropriations) (Stacy\_McBride@appro.senate.gov)'; 'Fountain, Galen (SACAG)'; 'Nellor, Dianne (SAC-AG)'; 'Grove, Paul (SACFO)'; 'Manatt, Nikole (SACFO)'; 'Rieser, Tim (Appropriations)'; 'Stormes, Janet (SACFO)'; 'Wymer, Michele (SACFO)'; 'Adamo, Chris (Senate Ag)'; 'Fisher, Max (Senate Ag)'; 'Jannuzi, Frank (SFRC)'; 'Keith\_Luse@foreign.senate.gov'; 'Altman.Trivedi@mail.house.gov'; 'Marta\_McLellanross@webb.senate.gov'; 'Joel\_Starr@inhofe.senate.gov'; 'Rayanne\_Bostick@lieberman.senate.gov'; 'Marybeth\_Schultz@hsgac.senate.gov'; 'Dennis.Halpin@mail.house.gov'; 'Nien.Su@mail.house.gov'; 'Lisa.Williams@mail.house.gov'; 'russ\_shaffer@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'christian\_brose@armed-services.senate.gov'; 'Jenness.Simler@mail.house.gov'; 'william.johnson@mail.house.gov'; 'matthew.herrmann@mail.house.gov'; 'Gordon\_Peterson@webb.senate.gov'

**Subject:** RE: Conference call on Japan earthquake/tsunami disaster daily at 2 pm

You are invited to join daily conference calls to discuss:

**Humanitarian Assistance Needs in Japan and the U.S. Government's Response**

with

**Nancy Lindborg**

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

and

Representatives from other U.S. Government agencies engaged in this effort,  
including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Health and Human  
Services, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others

**Monday, March 14, at continuing daily at 2:00 p.m.**

Call-in number: **( 202 ) 647 - 0817**

Access code: (b)(6)

We hope you can join us.

Bette Cook

USAID Legislative and Public Affairs

Tel. (202) 712-4416

Email: [bcook@usaid.gov](mailto:bcook@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 11:42 AM  
**To:** 'Christopher\_Griffin@lieberman.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: Japan Update Emails

Thanks Chris - I appreciate it.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Griffin, Christopher (Lieberman) <Christopher\_Griffin@lieberman.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 11:41:19 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Japan Update Emails

Thanks much, and all best hopes for your team's efforts in Japan.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 11:23 AM  
**To:** Decker, David; Griffin, Christopher (Lieberman)  
**Subject:** Re: Japan Update Emails

Chris, also FYI: through Friday, USAID is coordinating conference calls for Congressional staff each day at 2pm EST. NRC will participate on these calls.  
The dial-in for these calls is 202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Decker, David  
**To:** Griffin, Christopher (Lieberman) <Christopher\_Griffin@lieberman.senate.gov>  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 11:16:52 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Japan Update Emails

Chris,  
We will put you on the distribution list for any info we send out on this. We have two hearing on the hill today where the topic will almost all be about Japan, and may have some good information for you. The first hearing

is going on right now (although DOE is the witness at the moment, then Chairman Jaczko will be next) with House Energy and Commerce and is on C-SPAN, while the second hearing will be this afternoon at 3:30pm with Senate EPW.

David

---

**From:** Griffin, Christopher (Lieberman) [mailto:Christopher\_Griffin@lieberman.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 11:12 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Subject:** Japan Update Emails

Amy/David,

I understand that the NRC is sending out occasional updates on developments in Japan to Hill offices. Could I ask that you add the following addresses to your distribution list:

[christopher\\_griffin@lieberman.senate.gov](mailto:christopher_griffin@lieberman.senate.gov); [marybeth\\_schultz@hsgac.senate.gov](mailto:marybeth_schultz@hsgac.senate.gov); [vance\\_serchuk@hsgac.senate.gov](mailto:vance_serchuk@hsgac.senate.gov)

If there is an opportunity to provide additional background, I feel as though we have a fairly decent grasp of what the current level of radiation escape from the plant means, but do not understand the effects of a worst-case scenario; namely, a full meltdown at the three stricken reactors and/or a zirconium fire at the spent fuel pool in Reactor No. 4. If this is something that NRC can provide additional insight into, we would be deeply grateful.

Thank you,  
Chris

Christopher Griffin  
Legislative Assistant  
Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman  
202.224.8787

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:44 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Update from NRC

Thanks.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:43 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** Fw: Update from NRC

FYI

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** 'Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov' <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 12:43:12 2011  
**Subject:** Update from NRC

Bettina -

Bill Borchardt, NRC's Executive Director for Operations, is available and prepared to step in if needed. However, we've told House E&C that we have a stop to get the Chairman to EPW at 330. Committee staff believes that we'll make it and the Chairman will make it. However, we are prepared either way.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Clapp, Doug (Appropriations) <Doug\_Clapp@appro.senate.gov>

To: Powell, Amy

Sent: Wed Mar 16 14:15:30 2011

Subject: RE: Cell # for me

I'm generally at my desk for rest of the day. Try me when you are free.

-----Original Message-----

From: Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]

Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 11:24 AM

To: Clapp, Doug (Appropriations)

Subject: Cell # for me

I've got kind of a start and stop with the House E&C hearing, so if you get a chance my cell is (b)(6) I'll be in and out of availability, but let's try as we can.

Amy Powell

Associate Director

Office of Congressional Affairs

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**Subject:** US AID  
**Start:** Wed 3/16/2011 2:00 PM  
**End:** Wed 3/16/2011 3:00 PM  
**Recurrence:** (none)  
**Organizer:** Powell, Amy

202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)



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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 3:04 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FYI re: Geri Shapiro

Wanted to make sure that you see this.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 15:01:29 2011  
**Subject:** RE: LATEST DISTRIBUTION LIST RE: JAPAN

Amy, we need to put Geri Shapiro on the list. [Geri\\_shapiro@gillibrand.senate.gov](mailto:Geri_shapiro@gillibrand.senate.gov) she had the press release and called saying she could not get a hold of Gene and she is not getting the info straight from us. We might want to put someone from all the members of our Committees on the list instead of just the heads.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:29 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca; Decker, David; Dacus, Eugene; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Weil, Jenny; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Quesenberry, Jeannette; Belmore, Nancy  
**Subject:** LATEST DISTRIBUTION LIST RE: JAPAN  
**Importance:** High

Two more to the list today – please use the list below:

[jeff.baran@mail.house.gov](mailto:jeff.baran@mail.house.gov); [abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov](mailto:abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov); [mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov](mailto:mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov); [david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov](mailto:david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov); [JohnM@mail.house.gov](mailto:JohnM@mail.house.gov); [maryam.brown@mail.house.gov](mailto:maryam.brown@mail.house.gov); [michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov](mailto:michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov); [chris.sarley@mail.house.gov](mailto:chris.sarley@mail.house.gov); [kathy.dedrick@epw.senate.gov](mailto:kathy.dedrick@epw.senate.gov); [ruth.vanmark@epw.senate.gov](mailto:ruth.vanmark@epw.senate.gov); [annie.caputo@epw.senate.gov](mailto:annie.caputo@epw.senate.gov); [laura.haynes@carper.senate.gov](mailto:laura.haynes@carper.senate.gov); [Brian.Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov](mailto:Brian.Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov); [elizabeth.craddock@landrieu.senate.gov](mailto:elizabeth.craddock@landrieu.senate.gov); [Doug.clapp@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Doug.clapp@appro.senate.gov); [Carrie.apostolou@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Carrie.apostolou@appro.senate.gov); [Taunja.berquam@mail.house.gov](mailto:Taunja.berquam@mail.house.gov); [Rob.blair@mail.house.gov](mailto:Rob.blair@mail.house.gov); [Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov](mailto:Karen.Wayland@mail.house.gov); [Bettina.Poirier@epw.senate.gov](mailto:Bettina.Poirier@epw.senate.gov); [mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov](mailto:mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov); [chris.miller@reid.senate.gov](mailto:chris.miller@reid.senate.gov); [jay.cranford@mail.house.gov](mailto:jay.cranford@mail.house.gov); [Neil.Chatterjee@mccconnell.senate.gov](mailto:Neil.Chatterjee@mccconnell.senate.gov); [Isaac.Edwards@energy.senate.gov](mailto:Isaac.Edwards@energy.senate.gov); [Jonathan.Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov](mailto:Jonathan.Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov); [\(b\)\(6\)@mail.house.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@mail.house.gov); [michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov](mailto:michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov); [Ali.Nouri@webb.senate.gov](mailto:Ali.Nouri@webb.senate.gov);

[\(b\)\(6\)@mail.house.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@mail.house.gov); [\(b\)\(6\)@mail.house.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@mail.house.gov); [Bob.Schwalbach@mail.house.gov](mailto:Bob.Schwalbach@mail.house.gov); [PABLO.DURAN@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV](mailto:PABLO.DURAN@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV); [Lisa.wright@mail.house.gov](mailto:Lisa.wright@mail.house.gov); [Jetta.Wong@mail.house.gov](mailto:Jetta.Wong@mail.house.gov); [Andy.Zach@mail.house.gov](mailto:Andy.Zach@mail.house.gov); [Karen.wayland@mail.house.gov](mailto:Karen.wayland@mail.house.gov); [jen.stewart@mail.house.gov](mailto:jen.stewart@mail.house.gov); [Wyndee.parker@mail.house.gov](mailto:Wyndee.parker@mail.house.gov); [Mariah.sixkiller@mail.house.gov](mailto:Mariah.sixkiller@mail.house.gov); [shimmy.stein@mail.house.gov](mailto:shimmy.stein@mail.house.gov);

[\(b\)\(6\)@mail.house.gov](mailto:(b)(6)@mail.house.gov); [Ethan.Rosenkranz@mail.house.gov](mailto:Ethan.Rosenkranz@mail.house.gov); [Jasmine.Hunt@durbin.senate.gov](mailto:Jasmine.Hunt@durbin.senate.gov); [Sarah.Neimeyer@durbin.senate.gov](mailto:Sarah.Neimeyer@durbin.senate.gov)



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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 5:48 PM  
**To:** 'Jonathan\_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: you around for a quick call

Just called out of pocket - will call when I can

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman) <Jonathan\_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 17:46:19 2011  
**Subject:** RE: you around for a quick call

call me 224-3357 or my cell (b)(6), or I can meet up

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 5:45 PM  
**To:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman)  
**Subject:** Re: you around for a quick call

(b)(6) or on ground floor of Dirksen

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman) <Jonathan\_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 17:37:58 2011  
**Subject:** you around for a quick call

if so what's your number

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 5:49 PM  
**To:** Pace, Patti; Coggins, Angela; Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Re: WH Sit Room Called

Trying to find JB

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Pace, Patti  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Coggins, Angela; Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 17:45:18 2011  
**Subject:** WH Sit Room Called

They would like someone from NRC to join if Chairman cannot get on.

If difficulties are technical, you can contact Crista at WH Sit Room Comm Center who can walk someone through the process to join (b)(6) 1

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

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**From:** Pace, Patti  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 8:00 PM  
**To:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence); Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

No, thank you. Again, appreciate your help!

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

---

**From:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence) [mailto:J\_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:59 PM  
**To:** Pace, Patti; Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

Is there any need for the 8:00 a.m. secure conference call tomorrow morning?

James A. Wolfe  
Director of Security  
United States Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510  
T 202.224.1751  
F 202.224.1772

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**From:** Pace, Patti [mailto:Patti.Pace@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:58 PM  
**To:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence); Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

At the last minute we were able to arrange for the Chairman to attend the meeting in person and we will not need to use your assistance. Sincere thanks for your willingness to assist on short notice!!

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

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**From:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence) [mailto:J\_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:14 PM

A0195

**To:** Pace, Patti; Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

We don't have secure video conference capability here.

James A. Wolfe  
Director of Security  
United States Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510  
T 202.224.1751  
F 202.224.1772

---

**From:** Pace, Patti [mailto:Patti.Pace@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:12 PM  
**To:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence); Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

Thank you. Is there a possibility of a TS/SCI video conference at your location? If not, would it be possible elsewhere in the Capitol complex this evening?

Again, thank you very much for your assistance!!

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

---

**From:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence) [mailto:J\_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:10 PM  
**To:** Pace, Patti; Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

Yes. It will be the same comms he used when he was here around 5:45 p.m.

James A. Wolfe  
Director of Security  
United States Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510  
T 202.224.1751  
F 202.224.1772

---

**From:** Pace, Patti [mailto:Patti.Pace@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:08 PM  
**To:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence); Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua

**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

Thank you very much. Can you confirm that there is access to secure voice up to TS/SCI?

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

---

**From:** Wolfe, J (Intelligence) [mailto:J\_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:03 PM  
**To:** Pace, Patti; Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Wolfe, J (Intelligence)  
**Subject:** RE: Tonight

Have him come to SH-211 and I'll be here.

James A. Wolfe  
Director of Security  
United States Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510  
T 202.224.1751  
F 202.224.1772

---

**From:** Pace, Patti [mailto:Patti.Pace@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:02 PM  
**To:** Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence); Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Wolfe, J (Intelligence)  
**Subject:** Tonight

Dear Hayden,

Thanks for your assistance. We are looking for a location for the Chairman to conduct a TS-SCI SVTC or phone call this evening at **8:00PM**. I tried calling the Senate Security Office at 202-224-5632 and was unable to reach anyone. Wayne Rutz from the NRC Security Office can verify security clearances for the Chairman and Josh. The Chairman is in the Russell Building right now. Can you help?

Many thanks!

Patti Pace  
Assistant to Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1820 (office)  
301-415-3504 (fax)

---

**From:** Milberg, Hayden (Intelligence) [mailto:Hayden\_Milberg@ssci.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:57 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Pace, Patti; Wolfe, J (Intelligence)  
**Subject:** Tomorrow

Josh, we can make the conference room available to you at 8AM. Just let us know if that is what you need. Also, let us know if Senate Security is not being helpful. Are you all going to be up here in the morning for Member briefings or a hearing? Talk to you soon.

Hayden Milberg  
Senior Policy Advisor  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
211 Hart Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510  
(202) 224-1700  
(202) 224-0008 (direct)  
(b)(6) (mobile)  
[Hayden\\_Milberg@ssci.senate.gov](mailto:Hayden_Milberg@ssci.senate.gov)

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 11:12 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FW: Resend Press Release: NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on US Guidelines

I trust you understand how dangerous speculation like this is?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 10:45 AM  
**To:** Caputo, Annie (EPW)  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** RE: Resend Press Release: NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on US Guidelines

Annie –

Raeann has looked at the numbers and talked with the protective measures team who worked on the calculations/modeling. She will call you this morning.

Amy

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) [mailto:Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:44 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Resend Press Release: NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on US Guidelines

Becky/Amy,

What is the basis for these calculation? I haven't seen anything coming from Japanese sources that would suggest these levels. Are you privy to information that is not being shared with Members?

Annie

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 2:22 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Resend Press Release: NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on US Guidelines

## **NRC PROVIDES PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON U.S. GUIDELINES**

Under the guidelines for public safety that would be used in the United States under similar circumstances, the NRC believes it is appropriate for U.S. residents within 50 miles of the Fukushima reactors to evacuate.

Among other things, in the United States protective actions recommendations are implemented when projected doses could exceed 1 rem to the body or 5 rem to the thyroid. A rem is a measure of radiation dose. The average American is exposed to approximately 620 millirems, or 0.62 rem, of radiation each year from natural and manmade sources.

In making protective action recommendations, the NRC takes into account a variety of factors that include weather, wind direction and speed, and the status of the problem at the reactors.

Attached are the results of two sets of computer calculations used to support the NRC recommendations.

In response to nuclear emergencies, the NRC works with other U.S. agencies to monitor radioactive releases and predict their path. All the available information continues to indicate Hawaii, Alaska, the U.S. Territories and the U.S. West Coast are not expected to experience any harmful levels of radioactivity.

###

News releases are available through a free subscription at the following Web address: <http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html>. The NRC homepage at [www.nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov) also offers a SUBSCRIBE link. E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are posted to NRC's website.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)



---

**From:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 11:25 AM  
**To:** 'Ethan.Rosenkranz@mail.house.gov'; Weil, Jenny; OCA Distribution  
**Subject:** Re: Radioactive releases

We have a DOE rep here who's checking what the latest data is. Will provide as soon as I get it.

---

**From:** Rosenkranz, Ethan <Ethan.Rosenkranz@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; OCA Distribution  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 11:18:37 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Radioactive releases

Thanks David,

Can you please expand on "any radiological matter is still expected to be negligible?"

Thanks,

Ethan

---

**From:** Decker, David <David.Decker@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny <Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov>; Rosenkranz, Ethan; OCA Distribution <OCADistribution@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 11:15:40 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Radioactive releases

Feeling in Liaison Team is that although wind could travel this far by tomorrow, the amount of any radiological matter is still expected to be negligible. Will try to confirm that here.

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**To:** 'Ethan.Rosenkranz@mail.house.gov' <Ethan.Rosenkranz@mail.house.gov>  
**Cc:** Decker, David  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 11:06:13 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Radioactive releases

Hi Ethan,

I will check to see what is the latest information.

Jenny

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Rosenkranz, Ethan <Ethan.Rosenkranz@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny

**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 11:01:02 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Radioactive releases

Hi Jenny,

Do you have an update that I can share with Congresswoman Woolsey regarding the radioactive isotopes that may reach California by Friday?

Thanks,

Ethan

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 11:44 AM  
**To:** Rosenkranz, Ethan  
**Subject:** Re: Radioactive releases

Hi Ethan,

Not sure if you heard back yet on your question. The staff is working to update information, based on its knowledge of the current situation in Japan. The NRC is working with DOE, EPA and other government agencies to monitor radioactive releases from Japan and to predict their path. All the data that were available yesterday indicated weather conditions were taking radiation releases out to sea, away from the population. Given the distance between Japan and West Coast/Hawaii/Alaska, the NRC, at this time, doesn't expect the U.S. to experience any harmful levels of radioactivity from the events in Japan. We are constantly monitoring, in case anything changes.

EPA has a program called RadNet (formerly the Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring Systems (ERAMS)), which is a national network of monitoring stations that regularly collect air, precipitation, drinking water, and milk samples for analysis of radioactivity. This network has been used to track environmental releases resulting from nuclear emergencies. Here is a link with an overview:  
<http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/erams/overview.html>.

We'll keep you posted on all updates.

/Jenny

*Jenny Weil*  
*Congressional Affairs Officer*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
*301-415-1691 (office)*  

(b)(6)

*(BlackBerry)*  
[jenny.weil@nrc.gov](mailto:jenny.weil@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:16 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** FW: Karen Wayland from Nancy Pelosi's office called

Would you mind calling? I am pushing on this conference call; I tried to get Angela for some background about these unknown conversations...

---

**From:** Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 11:19 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Karen Wayland from Nancy Pelosi's office called

She has been speaking with Angela Coggins but doesn't want to overburden her with more questions.

She is seeking an answer to further clarification about any subsequent plumes that may come to the west coast as additional units may release radioactive particulates into the air as they fail and that will travel to the United States.

Please refer someone to her that can give this information. Her personal cell phone: (b)(6)

Like everyone else she is experiencing anxiety and sleeplessness.

Jeannette V. Quesenberry  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[Jeannette.Quesenberry@nrc.gov](mailto:Jeannette.Quesenberry@nrc.gov)  
301-415-1776  
301-415-8571

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:59 PM  
**To:** Jared\_brown@hatch.senate.gov  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** FW: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
  
**Importance:** High

Hi JJ – Raeann mentioned that she talked with you earlier today. I am forwarding you info on a phone briefing that NRC is conducting today. Please see below.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

All –

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760  
Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 1:06 PM  
**To:** Benner, Janine  
**Subject:** FW: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

**Importance:** High

Janine –

This just got set up within the last hour if you want to call in.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

All –

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760  
Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Terrell, Louisa (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 1:28 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** Re: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Got it. Thanks.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Terrell, Louisa  
**Cc:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 13:09:44 2011  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Hi Louisa –

I spoke with Shelly about this early today. NRC's oversight committees' staff (both chambers), leadership offices, our approps staff (both chambers), as well as staff to with plants in their district/states received the notice of the call. Anticipate much focus on NRC requirements for plants, what we'll do with info learned from Japan events, and our efforts to monitor radiation.

Amy

---

**From:** Terrell, Louisa [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:31 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Stoneman, Shelly O'Neill  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Who is invited to this?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

All –

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760  
Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) <Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 1:37 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Can you send the ops line again?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:57 PM  
**To:** Haynes, Laura (Carper)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

yep

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) [mailto:Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:56 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Kathy, Brian and Annie invited?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:56 PM  
**To:** Haynes, Laura (Carper)  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Good – we plan on these being daily (the time may change after today's call, but 1:30pm was the best we could do today)

---

**From:** Haynes, Laura (Carper) [mailto:Laura\_Haynes@carper.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:42 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Great – I will be on – sorry been in a hearing all morning that TC chaired and bb died.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

All –

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.



Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760

Participant passcode:

(b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 1:51 PM  
**To:** 'Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

It will open up for questions.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Caputo, Annie (EPW) <Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 13:33:17 2011  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

"listen-only" mode?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

All –

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760  
Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

A0/103

---

**Subject:** US AID call  
**Start:** Thu 3/17/2011 2:00 PM  
**End:** Thu 3/17/2011 3:00 PM  
**Recurrence:** (none)  
**Organizer:** Powell, Amy

202-647-0817, passcode (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 2:17 PM  
**To:** 'Marc.Rigas@mail.house.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: NRC Congressional email list

Sure Mac - sorry we missed you in our haste to assemble.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Rigas, Marc <Marc.Rigas@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 14:07:07 2011  
**Subject:** NRC Congressional email list

Hi, Amy:

I am on this call right now. I am an Energy/Environment Congressional Fellow in Rep. DeGette's Office. Can I get on your email list so that I can get the announcements for future calls directly?

Many thanks!

Best wishes,  
Marc

---

**Marc Rigas**  
*Congressional Fellow*  
Congresswoman Diana DeGette | Colorado-01  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Ranking Member  
202-225-4431 | [Marc.Rigas@mail.house.gov](mailto:Marc.Rigas@mail.house.gov)  
2335 Rayburn HOB | [www.degette.house.gov](http://www.degette.house.gov)

---

**From:** Angell, Laurel

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [<mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

All -

A0/105

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760

Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 4:21 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Remarks by the President on the Situation in Japan

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

---

**From:** White House Press Office <noreply@messages.whitehouse.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 16:11:41 2011  
**Subject:** Remarks by the President on the Situation in Japan

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 17, 2011

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON THE SITUATION IN JAPAN

Rose Garden

3:35 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, everyone. Over the last several days, the American people have been both heartbroken and deeply concerned about the developments in Japan.

We've seen an earthquake and tsunami render unimaginable -- an unimaginable toll of death and destruction on one of our closest friends and allies in the world. And we've seen this powerful natural disaster cause even more catastrophe through its impact on nuclear reactors that bring peaceful energy to the people of Japan.

Today, I wanted to update the American people on what we know about the situation in Japan, what we're doing to support American citizens and the safety of our own nuclear energy, and how we are helping the Japanese people contain the damage, recover and rebuild.

First, we are bringing all available resources to bear to closely monitor the situation, and to protect American citizens who may be in

A0/106

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 5:15 PM  
**To:** King, Christopher  
**Subject:** RE: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

Sure – we'll get you on.

Amy

---

**From:** King, Christopher [mailto:Christopher.King@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 5:12 PM  
**To:** 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov'  
**Subject:** FW: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

Hi Amy-

Can you have me added to your email list for this, or tell me who I should ask? I may be out of the office tomorrow but would like to call in. Thanks.

-Chris

**Christopher King**  
Democratic Staff Director - Energy & Environment  
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology  
U.S. House of Representatives  
394 Ford H.O.B.  
Washington D.C. 20515  
(202)225-6375  
[sciencedems.house.gov](mailto:sciencedems.house.gov)

---

**From:** Wong, Jetta  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 2:43 PM  
**To:** King, Christopher; Williams, Shimere  
**Subject:** Fw: NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm  
**Importance:** High

---

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 12:30:13 2011  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

All –

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760

Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673



---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 7:10 AM  
**To:** Johnson, Michael  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FW: NRC phone briefing 3:00pm 3/18/11

Mike: Information for today's call. Like yesterday, Becky or someone from OCA will come over to MC. The Leader Passcode is: (b)(6). Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 6:54 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Decker, David; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Fw: NRC phone briefing 3:00pm 3/18/11

The email below was sent late yesterday afternoon to all contacts on the Japan distribution list and to contacts from the Excel sheets for each Region.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** tim.riley@nrc.gov <tim.riley@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 17 17:57:05 2011  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing 3:00pm 3/18/11

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a phone briefing on **Friday, March 18, at 3pm** to address domestic concerns following events in Japan. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-800-593-7189  
Participant passcode: (b)(6)

We are working to schedule daily calls, including during the weekend, and will provide details shortly.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 11:08 AM  
**To:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Dial in for USAID call

Bette -

Tim Riley will be on the call from our office along with either Mike Weber or Martin Virgilio from NRC's senior management team.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA) [mailto:bcCook@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 11:06 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Dial in for USAID call

Thanks. Sorry for the confusion yesterday. We'll keep the same new dial-in number and password for today thru March 26 (including Sat & Sun). Hope you and your speaker (Who will it be?) will join us today on the Leaders' pre-conference call at 1:30. (877) 334-8037; password (b)(6)

Bette

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 8:59 PM  
**To:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)  
**Subject:** Dial in for USAID call

Hi Bette -

I am sorry that NRC did not get on the USAID call today until the very end. I did not receive the new dial in information, so our staff called on the number/passcode used for the previous days. We would like to continue to participate on these calls. Now that we have the new info, we'll be there.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** St. Cyr II, Zeno W. (HHS/ASPR/COO) <Zeno.W.StCyr@hhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 12:03 PM  
**To:** 'Fertig, Rebecca (LPA/CL)'; 'Gatz, Karen L'; 'Manning, Nicholas J'; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy; 'john.sokich@noaa.gov'; Huguley, Maurice (HHS/ASL); Sharp, Jeremy (HHS/ASL); (b)(6); 'Jason.Nelson@dhs.gov'; 'Pat.Hart@dhs.gov'; (b)(6); 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; 'crowellbr@hq.doe.gov'  
**Cc:** 'Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA)'; 'Feinstein, Barbara (LPA/AA)'  
**Subject:** RE: Speaker Info Needed: Japan Daily Call

HHS: Dr. Kevin Yeskey  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations  
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response

Zeno W. St. Cyr, II, MPH  
Director of Legislative Coordination  
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response  
Department of Health and Human Services  
(202) 205-8189  
(202) 690-6512 Fax  
[zeno.w.stcyr@hhs.gov](mailto:zeno.w.stcyr@hhs.gov)

---

**From:** Fertig, Rebecca (LPA/CL) [mailto:rfertig@usaid.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 12:00 PM  
**To:** Gatz, Karen L; Manning, Nicholas J; 'Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov'; 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov'; 'john.sokich@noaa.gov'; St. Cyr II, Zeno W. (HHS/ASPR/COO); Huguley, Maurice (HHS/ASL); Sharp, Jeremy (HHS/ASL); (b)(6); 'Jason.Nelson@dhs.gov'; 'Pat.Hart@dhs.gov'; (b)(6); 'laneje@hq.doe.gov'; 'crowellbr@hq.doe.gov'  
**Cc:** Cook, Bette (DCHA/AA); Feinstein, Barbara (LPA/AA)  
**Subject:** Speaker Info Needed: Japan Daily Call

Hi All,

Thanks so much for your contact information yesterday, we hope it will make the calls moving forward go more smoothly.

To that end, I need the name and title for your agency's speaker today. Thus far, I have:

USAID: Nancy Limborg (DCHA AA)

State: Jim Pettit (Dept Asst Sec, Consular Affairs, Office of Citizen Services) & Peggy Petrovich (Special Asst for Asia Bureau for Mgt)

NRC: Mike Johnson (Senior Management Rep)

I still need:

NOAA:

HHS:  
OSD:  
DoE:  
DHS:  
CEQ:

Many thanks, and please give Bette or me a call if you have any questions.

Becky

**Becky Fertig**  
Congressional Liaison Officer  
Bureau for Legislative & Public Affairs  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
(202) 712-4216 - voice  
(202) 216-3035 - fax  
[rfertig@usaid.gov](mailto:rfertig@usaid.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 2:17 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: I-131 detected in CA

Just talked to him - he and Raeann are heading to Ops Center to get coordinated with OPA desk about what he can/can't say, what we do/don't know. Also had a quick chat with Angela in GBJ's. DOE has federal lead on radiation detection, plume, etc. so this could get thorny on the call.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 1:50 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: I-131 detected in CA

Make sure mike johnson knows this

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Droggitis, Spiros; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 13:46:23 2011  
**Subject:** I-131 detected in CA

First reports of coastal detection of elevated levels of I-131 (barely above background levels).  
AP has breaking news on this.  
Rep. Mike Thompson (CA) expected to ask questions during USAID call.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.

Tim Riley

(b)(6)

A0/11

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**Subject:** NRC Congressional call

**Start:** Fri 3/18/2011 3:00 PM

**End:** Fri 3/18/2011 4:00 PM

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Organizer:** Powell, Amy

**Dial-in:** 1-800-593-7189

**Participant passcode:** (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 7:42 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** RE: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Yep - thanks (my last act before I head West :))

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 7:41 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Amy  
Do you have this covered?

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie <Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov>  
**Cc:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 18:51:29 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Melanie -

Is there a number where I can reach you?

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie [mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov]



Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 6:08 PM  
To: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene  
Cc: Hogan, Caroline; McNeill, Carla  
Subject: Fw: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Amy and Eugene,

Your names were provided to me from FEMA. Can you please help us with a media request? I imagine you already fielded these questions already, but can you provide us with any background and talking points you have on what the Admin has been doing to make sure that the US nuclear plants are safe. Also, if there are any additional actions that have been taken with respect to CA nuclear plants which may be at extra risk due to earthquakes, can you share that, too? This is for a radio interview that my boss would do on the topic.

Thanks in advance for your assistance. Any information you can share would be greatly appreciated!

Melanie

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Nelson, Jason <[jason.nelson@dhs.gov](mailto:jason.nelson@dhs.gov)>  
To: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie; Hart, Patrick <[Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov](mailto:Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov)>  
Sent: Fri Mar 18 17:50:22 2011  
Subject: RE: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Hi Melanie,

The NRC has the primary responsibility for nuclear plant safety. The Associate Director of Legislative Affairs is [Amy.Powell@nrc.gov](mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov) and the Senior Congressional Affairs Officer is [Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov](mailto:Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov).

I hope this helps.

Regards,

Jason

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
[mailto:[Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov](mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov)]  
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 5:39 PM  
To: 'Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov'; 'jason.nelson@dhs.gov'  
Subject: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Do you guys have info you can share on what the Admin is doing to keep US nuclear plants safe? We have received media requests and we are trying to find out what we can say. If you don't know the answer, do you have another Leg Affairs contact that you can connect us with?  
Thanks Guys!

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 10:48 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Fw: Another hearing on the horizon

Need something monday for sure

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 22:41:07 2011  
**Subject:** Another hearing on the horizon

See below from Bettina, re: GBJ commitment to get back on #s of plants in seismic and potential April full committee hearing.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 22:13:04 2011  
**Subject:**

Can you check on when nrc will reply to senator boxers question about how many reactors are in areas with seismic activity. In the briefing, there was a commitment to get that to her and she had not heard back. Also, we are looking at april 7 for a full committee hearing and ask that the questions be answered as quickly as possible so we can look at what else might be considered for followup in the us. Let me know as soon as you can. Thank you for your assistance on this.  
Bettina

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 17, 2011 12:30 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing today at 1:30pm

All –

The NRC will conduct a phone briefing **TODAY at 1:30pm**. The briefer for this call will be Mike Johnson, NRC's Director of New Reactors.

Mr. Johnson will begin with an update on the status in Japan, then discuss domestic concerns and safety considerations for US plants. He will then introduce NRC staff who are experts in radiation and in seismic design.

Here is the dial-in information for the call:

Dial-in: 1-888-769-8760

Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

---

**From:** Hogan, Caroline <Caroline.Hogan@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 19, 2011 11:50 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

I think we've got what we need - thanks Amy!

Caroline

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Hogan, Caroline; Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
**Cc:** Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 11:48:25 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Hi Caroline - Melanie and I talked last night. Melanie, let me know if you got my follow up email. I'm on travel today and tomorrow, but will be checking email intermittently.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Hogan, Caroline <Caroline.Hogan@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie <Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov>; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 10:42:19 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

My number is (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
**To:** 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Cc:** 'Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov' <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Hogan, Caroline  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 19:37:50 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Forgot to cc Caroline

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson

231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
To: 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
Cc: 'Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov' <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>  
Sent: Fri Mar 18 19:37:09 2011  
Subject: Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

(b)(6). Caroline, is there a number for the NRC folks to catch you at? (Caroline is our communications director).  
Thanks!

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
To: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
Cc: Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>  
Sent: Fri Mar 18 18:51:29 2011  
Subject: RE: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Melanie -

Is there a number where I can reach you?

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie [mailto:[Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov](mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov)]  
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 6:08 PM  
To: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene  
Cc: Hogan, Caroline; McNeill, Carla

Subject: Fw: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Amy and Eugene,

Your names were provided to me from FEMA. Can you please help us with a media request? I imagine you already fielded these questions already, but can you provide us with any background and talking points you have on what the Admin has been doing to make sure that the US nuclear plants are safe. Also, if there are any additional actions that have been taken with respect to CA nuclear plants which may be at extra risk due to earthquakes, can you share that, too? This is for a radio interview that my boss would do on the topic.

Thanks in advance for your assistance. Any information you can share would be greatly appreciated!

Melanie

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Nelson, Jason <[jason.nelson@dhs.gov](mailto:jason.nelson@dhs.gov)>  
To: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie; Hart, Patrick <[Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov](mailto:Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov)>  
Sent: Fri Mar 18 17:50:22 2011  
Subject: RE: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Hi Melanie,

The NRC has the primary responsibility for nuclear plant safety. The Associate Director of Legislative Affairs is [Amy.Powell@nrc.gov](mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov) and the Senior Congressional Affairs Officer is [Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov](mailto:Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov).

I hope this helps.

Regards,

Jason

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
[mailto:[Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov](mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov)]  
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 5:39 PM  
To: 'Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov'; 'jason.nelson@dhs.gov'  
Subject: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Do you guys have info you can share on what the Admin is doing to keep US nuclear plants safe? We have received media requests and we are trying to find out what we can say. If you don't know the answer, do you have another Leg Affairs contact that you can connect us with?  
Thanks Guys!

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)



---

**From:** Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie <Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 19, 2011 11:51 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Hogan, Caroline  
**Cc:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

I did your email and forwarded it to Caroline. Thanks!

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
To: Hogan, Caroline; Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
Cc: Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>  
Sent: Sat Mar 19 11:48:25 2011  
Subject: Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Hi Caroline - Melanie and I talked last night. Melanie, let me know if you got my follow up email. I'm on travel today and tomorrow, but will be checking email intermittently.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Hogan, Caroline <Caroline.Hogan@mail.house.gov>  
To: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie <Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov>; Powell, Amy  
Cc: Dacus, Eugene  
Sent: Sat Mar 19 10:42:19 2011  
Subject: Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

My number is (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
To: 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
Cc: 'Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov' <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Hogan, Caroline  
Sent: Fri Mar 18 19:37:50 2011

Subject: Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Forgot to cc Caroline

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Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
To: 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov' <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
Cc: 'Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov' <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>  
Sent: Fri Mar 18 19:37:09 2011  
Subject: Re: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

(b)(6)

Caroline, is there a number for the NRC folks to catch you at? (Caroline is our communications director).

Thanks!

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
To: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie  
Cc: Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>  
Sent: Fri Mar 18 18:51:29 2011  
Subject: RE: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Melanie -

Is there a number where I can reach you?

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie [mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov]

Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 6:08 PM

To: Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene

Cc: Hogan, Caroline; McNeill, Carla

Subject: Fw: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Amy and Eugene,

Your names were provided to me from FEMA. Can you please help us with a media request? I imagine you already fielded these questions already, but can you provide us with any background and talking points you have on what the Admin has been doing to make sure that the US nuclear plants are safe. Also, if there are any additional actions that have been taken with respect to CA nuclear plants which may be at extra risk due to earthquakes, can you share that, too? This is for a radio interview that my boss would do on the topic.

Thanks in advance for your assistance. Any information you can share would be greatly appreciated!

Melanie

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

----- Original Message -----

From: Nelson, Jason <jason.nelson@dhs.gov>

To: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie; Hart, Patrick <Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov>

Sent: Fri Mar 18 17:50:22 2011

Subject: RE: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Hi Melanie,

The NRC has the primary responsibility for nuclear plant safety. The Associate Director of Legislative Affairs is [Amy.Powell@nrc.gov](mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov) and the Senior Congressional Affairs Officer is [Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov](mailto:Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov).

I hope this helps.

Regards,

Jason

-----Original Message-----

From: Rhinehart Van Tassell, Melanie

[mailto:Melanie.RhinehartVanTassell@mail.house.gov]

Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 5:39 PM

To: 'Patrick.Hart@dhs.gov'; 'jason.nelson@dhs.gov'

Subject: Admin actions to make sure us nuclear plants are safe?

Do you guys have info you can share on what the Admin is doing to keep US nuclear plants safe? We have received media requests and we are trying to find out what we can say. If you don't know the answer, do you have another Leg Affairs contact that you can connect us with?

Thanks Guys!

Melanie Rhinehart Van Tassell  
Legislative Director  
Congressman Mike Thompson  
231 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-3311  
[melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov](mailto:melanie.rhinehart@mail.house.gov)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 19, 2011 3:19 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

Yes, unless we can straighten things out with Verizon. They only have Mon-Fri scheduled and they wouldn't allow me to add.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 15:16:55 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

Tim, is this the number for tomorrow too?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 15:12:27 2011  
**Subject:** Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a phone briefing **at 3:30 TODAY** (due to technical difficulties) to address domestic concerns following events in Japan.

Here is the dial-in information for TODAY's call:

Dial In: 800-772-3842

Passcode: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 19, 2011 4:33 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

Don Cool is very knowledgeable. Glad that worked out. Sorry about the call. I guess Nancy didn't realize we were doing this Sat and Sun. Thanks for setting up tomorrow's call.

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:24:58 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

Verizon only had us scheduled for Monday – Friday. They wouldn't let me add weekend slots without changing call-in numbers, so the Ops Center came to the rescue.

Only Michal Friedhoff and Mary Ann Repko asked questions. Michal even sent a thank-you (Don Cook was great, he was direct and engaged her and gave her everything he knew).

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 19, 2011 4:22 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

What happened?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 15:12:27 2011  
**Subject:** Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a phone briefing **at 3:30 TODAY** (due to technical difficulties) to address domestic concerns following events in Japan.

Here is the dial-in information for TODAY's call:

Dial In: 800-772-3842

Passcode: (b)(6)

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 19, 2011 4:51 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

Eric is on for tomorrow.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:49:51 2011  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

Yes!

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:45:08 2011  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

Great. Of course we screwed up on the calling information. Guess Nancy and Verizon did not realize we were doing this on Sat and Sun and I guess I was not clear. Bruce Boger, John Lubinski and Don Cool were the briefers. Maybe we should use them again.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:31:40 2011  
**Subject:** From Rep. Markey's office

FYI!  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Joseph, Avenel <Avenel.Joseph@mail.house.gov>; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:00:58 2011  
**Subject:** Re: [LIKELY\_SPAM]Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

Thanks. Please also tell your briefers that I very much appreciated the info they provided. Hope you guys get some time off this weekend.

Michal  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Decker, David <David.Decker@nrc.gov>; Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Weil, Jenny <Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov>; Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>; Shane, Raeann <Raeann.Shane@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 15:12:27 2011  
**Subject:** [LIKELY\_SPAM]Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a phone briefing **at 3:30 TODAY** (due to technical difficulties) to address domestic concerns following events in Japan.

Here is the dial-in information for TODAY's call:

Dial In:

(b)(6)

Passcode:



---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 19, 2011 4:58 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

Tomorrow. Sleep tonight.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:53:23 2011  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

I noticed no press release on it - wonder if there will be one after the fact. Birchmere tonight or tomorrow?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:50:30 2011  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

You'd think. Yes, he had to go to that meeting and no word on result. I overheard Bill B say before the meeting that the industry was cold to the idea.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:47:20 2011  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

You were clear about Sat/Sun, as was Becky in staff meeting. Sigh.... What happened to Eric - the industry consortium mtg? Any read on how that went?

Rest up  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca

**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:45:08 2011  
**Subject:** Re: From Rep. Markey's office

Great. Of course we screwed up on the calling information. Guess Nancy and Verizon did not realize we were doing this on Sat and Sun and I guess I was not clear. Bruce Boger, John Lubinski and Don Cool were the briefers. Maybe we should use them again.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:31:40 2011  
**Subject:** From Rep. Markey's office

FYI!  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Joseph, Avenel <Avenel.Joseph@mail.house.gov>; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 16:00:58 2011  
**Subject:** Re: [LIKELY\_SPAM]Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

Thanks. Please also tell your briefers that I very much appreciated the info they provided. Hope you guys get some time off this weekend.

Michal  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Decker, David <David.Decker@nrc.gov>; Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Weil, Jenny <Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov>; Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>; Shane, Raeann <Raeann.Shane@nrc.gov>  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 19 15:12:27 2011  
**Subject:** [LIKELY\_SPAM]Conference Call Update 3/19/11 3:30

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a phone briefing **at 3:30 TODAY** (due to technical difficulties) to address domestic concerns following events in Japan.

Here is the dial-in information for TODAY's call:

Dial In: (b)(6)  
Passcode:

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 6:37 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: More info from OCA

Thks Amy. We arrive Monday night around 9:00pm. I'll call or text you when we get there.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 18:34:28 2011  
**Subject:** More info from OCA

Belkys -

I dropped off copies of Senators' ltrs and a CQ article about Sen. Feinstein's reaction to events in Japan with Kathleen late Friday. I'm pulling together some local media clips that include comments by Sen Boxer and/or Feinstein and will have OCA deliver to your office in the am.

FYI, I fly out at 1030am tomorrow. My cell is (b)(6) if you need to reach me. When do you all arrive in CA?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy; Collins, Elmo; Apostolakis, George  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:46:31 2011  
**Subject:** Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Mike, we haven't seen the responses to the senators questions.  
Any idea when to expect them?

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 17:02:35 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Mike. - Belkys

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 4:27 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys and Amy,  
Attached are two briefing packages, for San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

This weekend I will send you both another document that will contain "draft" answers to a recently submitted letter from Senator Boxer to the NRC asking us a number of things. As previously discussed, these answers are not the "official" NRC response, but should prepare Elmo and the Commissioner for general discussion on the topics should they develop.

Belkys, please be aware that there may be some information related to Diablo Canyon that may need to be withheld from Commissioner Apostolakis based on its relationship to license renewal and his involvement in that process. I'll let you and council deal with that.

If you need anything else please don't hesitate to call or send me an email.

Mike Hay  
Chief/DRS

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:47 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fw: NRC updates seismic Q&As

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 20:00:30 2011  
**Subject:** NRC updates seismic Q&As

This is posted in the press releases portion of NRC's public Web site, but I do not recall seeing this Friday. Did it go out? If not, might be good to send out to The List.

**NRC POSTS UPDATED SEISMIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS**

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has posted a series of updated seismic and tsunami questions and answers on its website. The Q&A provides basic information on earthquakes and tsunamis, details on U.S. nuclear power plant seismic design and an explanation of NRC's recent study on earthquake risk. The document is available at <http://www.nrc.gov/japan/faqs-related-to-japan.pdf>, and other NRC information related to the March 11 earthquake and tsunami is available at <http://www.nrc.gov/japan/japan-info.html>. \_

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 10:57 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela  
**Subject:** Re: FYI re: GEA

Message relayed to staff - I believe they get it but would not hurt to have it come from OEDO. Given the pushing, not as confident about your colleague.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 22:45:47 2011  
**Subject:** Re: FYI re: GEA

Amy, Belkys can't have access to information that A can't have access to as part of the hearing process. Please let me know if we need to convey that information to staff directly.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 22:05:50 2011  
**Subject:** FYI re: GEA

FYI, I had this chat live and now e-mail, to be revisited upon arrival. If someone can call me tomorrow with an idea of how the Commission mtg goes, I'd appreciate it...

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Collins, Elmo; Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 22:01:45 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Hi Belkys -

Just a quick note to follow up on Elmo's email...

Per our talk last week, it is of course important that GEA not get out ahead of the Commission's response. I plan to talk with the Senators' staff tomorrow late afternoon/evening (depending on time zone perspective!) about the Commission meeting in an effort to direct attention to that as the most recent Commission action. I hope this tees up an opportunity for him to speak to that.

Safe travels and I'll talk with you when you get to CA.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Collins, Elmo  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin; Howell, Art; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Powell, Amy; Leeds, Eric; Kennedy, Kriss; Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 21:29:01 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys

The agency's formal response to the Senator's questions has not yet been developed.

As I'm sure you realize, the info provided by Mike only represents Region IV's understanding of Diablo and SONGS data that could be considered responsive to the Senator's questions. This material is useful as preparation material considering that we expect the same or similar question to surface during the site visit.

See you onsite.

Elmo

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Vogel, Anton; Kennedy, Kriss; Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 18:36:24 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys,

Attached is the regions draft responses to the questions posed by the California Senators. As you know, the agencies official process for responding is underway.

Please be advised that some of this material may be in the area of license renewal and should be reviewed prior to giving the commissioner to ensure it is acceptable.

I hope this helps. If you have any questions don't hesitate to contact me.

Mike Hay

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 4:55 PM  
**To:** Hay, Michael  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Yes. The Commissioner needs to prepare and tomorrow morning he has a Commission meeting. Elmo said we would get it over the wknd.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:52:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Our plan is to have them to you early tomorrow morning as previously discussed.

Is there an urgency?

Mike  
Blackberry message

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy; Collins, Elmo; Apostolakis, George  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:46:31 2011  
**Subject:** Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Mike, we haven't seen the responses to the senators questions.  
Any idea when to expect them?

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 17:02:35 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Mike. - Belkys

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 4:27 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package



Belkys and Amy,  
Attached are two briefing packages, for San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

This weekend I will send you both another document that will contain "draft" answers to a recently submitted letter from Senator Boxer to the NRC asking us a number of things. As previously discussed, these answers are not the "official" NRC response, but should prepare Elmo and the Commissioner for general discussion on the topics should they develop.

Belkys, please be aware that there may be some information related to Diablo Canyon that may need to be withheld from Commissioner Apostolakis based on its relationship to license renewal and his involvement in that process. I'll let you and council deal with that.

If you need anything else please don't hesitate to call or send me an email.

Mike Hay  
Chief/DRS

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:08 PM  
**To:** 'Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Fw: NRC Commission mtg Monday am

FYI  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Powell, Amy  
To: 'grant\_cope@epw.senate.gov' <grant\_cope@epw.senate.gov>  
Sent: Sun Mar 20 23:07:05 2011  
Subject: NRC Commission mtg Monday am

Hi Grant -

Sorry that we did not connect last week. Looking forward to Tuesday's site visit to SONGS. FYI, the NRC Commission is holding a public meeting tomorrow morning (9am EST) to receive a briefing from NRC staff re: response to events in Japan. The event will be Webcast live and then archived on NRC's Website at [www.nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov). I have asked to get a rundown of this meeting since I will be traveling most of the day, so I hope to relay some general sense of the meeting to you once I arrive in CA in case it impacts any discussion Tuesday.

My cell is (b)(6) I will see you Tuesday!

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 21, 2011 6:34 AM  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin; Collins, Elmo  
**Subject:** Re: Commissioner Briefing Package

With the ongoing adjudication on DC, please be mindful that Cmrs and their staff cannot receive certain info related to that plant. Are we okay with what just went to Belkys?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**To:** Collins, Elmo; Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Howell, Art; Powell, Amy; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 04:17:05 2011  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package

FYI

---

**From:** Kammerer, Annie  
**Sent:** Monday, March 21, 2011 12:24 AM  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Subject:** RE: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Please see attached. I defer to your judgment as to what to do with the information. The only thing that I would ask for strongly is the one change that makes it clear that the review of the tsunami hazard is only for the shoreline fault. We have been looking at DCNP and SONGS tsunami informally to this point, though many people know the DCNP PTHA is out there and that we have seen it. I don't want to mislead anyone that we formally reviewed the full report.

I see your other email...will check on that.

Regards,  
Annie

---

**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:26 PM  
**To:** Kammerer, Annie  
**Subject:** FW: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Annie

Any problems with the attached briefing book

---

**From:** Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 9:29 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin; Howell, Art; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Powell, Amy; Leeds, Eric; Kennedy, Kriss; Hay, Michael  
**Subject:** Fw: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys

The agency's formal response to the Senator's questions has not yet been developed.

As I'm sure you realize, the info provided by Mike only represents Region IV's understanding of Diablo and SONGS data that could be considered responsive to the Senator's questions. This material is useful as preparation material considering that we expect the same or similar question to surface during the site visit.

See you onsite.

Elmo

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Vogel, Anton; Kennedy, Kriss; Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 18:36:24 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

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Please be advised that some of this material may be in the area of license renewal and should be reviewed prior to giving the commissioner to ensure it is acceptable.

I hope this helps. If you have any questions don't hesitate to contact me.

Mike Hay

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 4:55 PM  
**To:** Hay, Michael  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Yes. The Commissioner needs to prepare and tomorrow morning he has a Commission meeting. Elmo said we would get it over the wknd.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

---

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**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:52:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

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Is there an urgency?

Mike  
Blackberry message

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**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy; Collins, Elmo; Apostolakis, George  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:46:31 2011  
**Subject:** Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

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Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

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**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 17:02:35 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Mike. - Belkys

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**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 4:27 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys and Amy,  
Attached are two briefing packages, for San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

This weekend I will send you both another document that will contain "draft" answers to a recently submitted letter from Senator Boxer to the NRC asking us a number of things. As previously discussed, these answers are not the "official" NRC response, but should prepare Elmo and the Commissioner for general discussion on the topics should they develop.

Belkys, please be aware that there may be some information related to Diablo Canyon that may need to be withheld from Commissioner Apostolakis based on its relationship to license renewal and his involvement in that process. I'll let you and council deal with that.

If you need anything else please don't hesitate to call or send me an email.

Mike Hay  
Chief/DRS

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 21, 2011 9:49 AM  
**To:** 'John.Ohly@mail.house.gov'; 'erin.alexander@mail.house.gov'  
**Subject:** Fw: NRC: Public Meeting, FAQs and Daily phone Briefing

John - thanks for your time on the phone this am. Per our chat, I've asked that you be added to our Japan list. Here is an announcement that went out this am that includes dial-in info for today's call.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 08:58:26 2011  
**Subject:** NRC: Public Meeting, FAQs and Daily phone Briefing

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has posted a series of updated seismic and tsunami questions and answers on its website. The Q&A provides basic information on earthquakes and tsunamis, details on U.S. nuclear power plant seismic design and an explanation of NRC's recent study on earthquake risk. Other NRC information related to the March 11 earthquake and tsunami is available at <http://www.nrc.gov/japan/japan-info.html>.

The Commission is holding a public meeting this morning at 9am to discuss the NRC response to recent nuclear events in Japan. Meeting information, including slides and webcast information, are available via our public meetings page.

The NRC will continue to conduct a phone briefing at **3pm daily** to address domestic concerns following events in Japan.

Dial-in information for the call Monday-Friday:

Dial-in: 1-800-593-7189  
Participant passcode: (b)(6)

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

---

**From:** Merzke, Daniel  
**Sent:** Monday, March 21, 2011 2:19 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package  
**Attachments:** brief.docx

Amy, I don't know if you've seen the responses to the questions posed by Senators Boxer and Feinstein. I'm sending them to you so you know what's going on.

Dan

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:42 PM  
**To:** Sanfilippo, Nathan; Merzke, Daniel; Markley, Michael  
**Subject:** Fw: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

The attached info was provided to Belkys today to support the Commissioner's visit to California this week.

Mike  
Blackberry message

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Vogel, Anton; Kennedy, Kriss; Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 18:36:24 2011  
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Belkys,

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Mike Hay

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**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 4:55 PM  
**To:** Hay, Michael  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

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Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

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**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:52:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

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Mike  
Blackberry message

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**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:46:31 2011  
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Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

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**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 17:02:35 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Mike. - Belkys

---

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**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package

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This weekend I will send you both another document that will contain "draft" answers to a recently submitted letter from Senator Boxer to the NRC asking us a number of things. As previously discussed, these answers are not the "official" NRC response, but should prepare Elmo and the Commissioner for general discussion on the topics should they develop.

Belkys, please be aware that there may be some information related to Diablo Canyon that may need to be withheld from Commissioner Apostolakis based on its relationship to license renewal and his involvement in that process. I'll let you and council deal with that.

If you need anything else please don't hesitate to call or send me an email.

Mike Hay  
Chief/DRS

1. What changes to the design or operation of these facilities have improved safety at the plants since they began operating in the mid-1980s?

Answer: The NRC evaluates incidents that occur at operating nuclear power plants. If evaluation of an incident indicates that a modification (retrofit) to a licensed plant is needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC has the authority to require changes to these facilities. Selected examples of NRC required modifications are provided below:

The accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 in March 1979 was caused by a combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures. Following the accident, the NRC took a number of actions to require safety improvements at power reactors based on lessons-learned from the accident and official studies and investigations of the accident. Examples of some of the changes required include: improved training and qualification of plant operations personnel, improvements in control room instruments and controls for operating the plant, installation of additional equipment to mitigate accident conditions and to monitor radiation levels and plant status, and enhancements to emergency preparedness requirements.

In 1988, the NRC amended its regulations to require that nuclear power plants be capable of withstanding a total loss of alternating current (AC) electric power ("station blackout") for a specified duration and maintaining reactor core cooling during this period. The objective of the rule change was to reduce the risk of severe accidents resulting from station blackout by maintaining highly reliable AC power systems and, as additional defense-in-depth, assuring that plants can cope with a station blackout for a specified period of time while actions are being taken to restore normal and emergency power supplies.

In 1988, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) No. 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination [IPE] for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," under Section 54(f) of Title 10 (10 CFR) to the *Code of Federal Regulations*, requesting licensees to perform a systematic evaluation of plant-specific vulnerabilities and report the results to the Commission. For many plants, the IPEs became the basis for the plant's initial Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Later the NRC issued Supplement 4 to GL 88-20 for licensees to evaluate vulnerabilities to external events (IPEEE). Most licensees made improvements to their facilities to reduce vulnerabilities identified in their IPEs and IPEEEs.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued Orders requiring licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that could be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire,

including those that an aircraft impact might create. Although it was recognized prior to September 11, 2001, that nuclear reactors already had significant capabilities to withstand a broad range of attacks, implementing these mitigation strategies would significantly enhance the plants' capabilities to withstand a broad range of threats.

In 2002, maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized hole into, but not through, the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident. A task force review of the incident made recommendations in a number of areas that resulted in the NRC instituting strict inspection requirements for reactor vessel heads and other susceptible components to ensure cracks and/or leaks will be detected and repaired long before corrosion could affect plant safety. Many nuclear power plants installed new reactor vessel heads following these inspections.

Licensees have also made many changes to their plants. Some required NRC approval while others met screening criteria for changes under the regulations in 10 CFR 50.59.

Diablo Canyon response:

- Added sixth on-site emergency diesel generator
- Increased volume of DG fuel oil tanks to supply 7 days of fuel
- Added capacitor banks to the 230 kV offsite power source to improve reliability of offsite power source
- Replaced 500 kV offsite power source circuit breakers with new design that has increased earthquake resistance
- Replaced offsite power source transformers
- Replaced the reactor heads for the reactor vessels with new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Replaced steam generators with new design that has improved resistant to corrosion
- Increased the capacity of the 4 kilovolt system circuit breakers
- Replaced plant process computer
- Replaced low pressure turbine rotors with new design that is more resistant to turbine blade failure
- Replaced the water cooled positive displacement pumps for core injection with air cooled centrifugal charging pumps
- Replaced main feedwater pump control system to digital based control system
- Upgraded residual heat removal system piping to reduce potential flow induced erosion following an accident
- Replaced emergency core cooling system flow orifices to reduce potential potential flow blockage following an accident

- Replaced the containment sump strainer with a new design that is five times larger to minimize susceptibility to clogging
- Removed material from inside containment that could become a potential debris source following a loss of coolant accident
- Developed additional procedures to address potential natural and manmade disasters
- Implemented significant site changes to improve plant security
- Implemented procedures and training to improve human performance and reduce errors
- Implemented procedures and training to increase use of industry nuclear plant operating experience to improve plant safety

2. What emergency notification systems have been installed at California nuclear power plants? Has there ever been a lapse of these systems during previous earthquakes or emergencies?

The NRC requires plant designs to include multiple and diverse safety systems, and plants must test their emergency preparedness capabilities on a regular basis. Plant operators are highly trained and periodically tested to ensure they are effective when responding to significant events. In addition, NRC regulations require plants to have plans in place that would allow them to mitigate even "worst case scenarios."

During the December 2003 San Simeon earthquake affecting Diablo Canyon, a number of sirens lost power. Following this event the licensee upgraded the sirens and provided battery and/or solar backup power. There are 131 sirens around DC some as far out as 22 miles from the site.

Diablo Canyon response:

Diablo Canyon Power Plant has an Early Warning System (EWS) installed to provide prompt alerting of the public in the event of an emergency at Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The EWS (131 sirens spanning 18 to 22 miles from the plant), used in conjunction with radio and TV broadcasts, allows instructions, information, and necessary actions to be immediately communicated to the general public. The sirens are equipped with battery or solar-powered back-up capability. This redundancy in power source was upgraded in the 2005-2006 timeframe. Prior to the power-back up capability, some sirens lost power during the December 2003 San Simeon earthquake. The sirens were not used during that earthquake but back-up route altering was set-up if the need for public alerting warranted.

The sirens are tested daily, bi-weekly, quarterly and annually. The sirens are monitored 24/7 with alarms for system failures. Currently, Diablo Canyon's siren system is an industry top performer in reliability.

3. What safety measures are in place to ensure continued power to California reactors in the event of an extended power failure?

US plants are required to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Criterion 17, "Electric Power System," design criteria. Reactor units must have 2 physically independent offsite power supplies capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition. Additionally, all plants are required to have onsite power supplies that are also independent and capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition assuming a worst case single failure. All US (except Oconee) plants have emergency diesel generators and battery backup systems. Most of the US plants with diesels have two diesels per unit (Diablo Canyon has 3).

Diablo Canyon response:

If Diablo Canyon experiences a loss of power from the 500 kV and 230 kV offsite power switchyards, there are three emergency diesel generators (EDGs) available to supply onsite power in each of the units. A Unit can be safely shutdown utilizing any single EDG. There are two-50,000 gallon diesel fuel oil tanks, sufficient to operate a EDG for seven days. The EDGs are located at an elevation of 85 feet, well above the maximum expected tsunami elevation.

There are Emergency Operating Procedures in place that include procedures to cope with the loss of all vital AC power. There are Casualty Procedures in place that have pre-planned actions in the event of earthquakes, tsunami warnings and fires. There are Severe Accident Management Guidelines in place that contain actions to take in extreme conditions that require coolant injection to the reactor core, mitigation of hydrogen flammability in containment, and coolant to flood-up containment and cover the reactor core. There are Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMG) in place that postulate extensive plant damage due to a natural disaster or terrorist event. The EDMGs are invoked when the control of the plant cannot be established from the Main Control Room or there is no communication with the Main Control Room. The Extreme Damage event is assumed to disable all electric power. The EDMGs provide a procedure to perform the following actions (if needed) to continue to cool the reactor core, cool the spent fuel pool, and minimize radiation release:

- Provide makeup water to the spent fuel pool by diverse means or by using a portable, power-independent pumping capability (Fire Truck).
- Provide spray to the spent fuel pool using a portable, power-independent pumping capability (Fire Truck).
- Provide makeup water to the Refueling Water Storage Tank to supply the emergency core cooling system long term.

- Provide a power independent means to depressurize the steam generators by locally manually opening atmospheric dump valves in order to reduce pressure and reactor core temperature/pressure.
  - Provide a power-independent means to provide reactor core cooling and prevent or delay core damage.
  - Provide a high volume makeup source to the Condensate Storage Tank in order to supply water to the steam generators long term to cool the reactor core.
  - Provide a power-independent means to inject water into the containment to flood the containment floor and cover core debris from the reactor core.
  - Provide a means to reduce the magnitude of any core radioactive releases by spraying.
  - Provide a means to vent the containment with no power or instrument air to reduce containment pressure.
  - Provide a means to start a diesel generator with no DC control power.
  - Provide guidance for large scale fire fighting in conjunction with the EDG's.
4. What are the differences and similarities between the reactors being used in California (pressurized water reactors) and those in Japan (boiling water reactors), as well as the facilities used to house the reactors, including the standards to which they were built and their ability to withstand natural and manmade disasters?

The NRC is currently assessing the event in Japan and will be evaluating the differences and similarities between the reactor designs to determine if US plants warrant modifications to improve plant safety. Specifically:

- a. Since the beginning of the event, the NRC has continuously manned its Operations Center in Rockville, MD in order to gather and examine all available information as part of the effort to analyze the event and understand its implications both for Japan and the United States.
- b. A team of 11 officials from the NRC with expertise in boiling water nuclear reactors have deployed to Japan as part of a U.S. International Agency for International Development (USAID) team.
- c. The NRC has spoken with its counterpart agency in Japan, offering the assistance of U.S. technical experts.
- d. The NRC is coordinating its actions with other Federal agencies as part of the U.S. government response.



- e. The NRC is currently developing a generic communication that will be issued to all US nuclear facilities that addresses the importance for licensee's to verify their capability to cope with a wide spectrum of external events including earthquakes, tsunamis, fires, explosions, and loss of large areas of the plant.
- f. The NRC is currently preparing to conduct inspections at every nuclear facility in the US. These inspections will assess the adequacy of actions taken by the licensee in response to the event in Japan and aid the agency in evaluating whether additional NRC regulatory actions are warranted.

Diablo Canyon response:

California reactors have significantly larger volume containment buildings that house the reactors. This significantly reduces the chance of exceeding the containment design pressure or having a hydrogen explosion inside containment following a natural or manmade disaster.

In the event of the loss of power, the the Diablo Canyon reactor core can be cooled using natural circulation of water (without pumps) in the primary coolant loop to transfer heat from the reactor core to the secondary loop. The secondary loop can be used to remove the primary loop heat (without power) by pumping non-radioactive water in the secondary loop into heat exchangers (steam generators) with a steam driven pump and releasing non-radioactive steam to the atmosphere via manually operated valves or spring operated safety relief valves. In addition, there are multiple other pre-planned methods available to provide on-site stored water to the reactor core and to the steam generators to ensure continued core cooling after a disaster.

The Diablo Canyon spent fuel pool is contained in a separate building, instead of being contained above the primary containment structure. The Diablo Canyon spent fuel pool location minimizes the chance of loss of spent fuel pool leakage being caused by explosions in the containment structure.

There are multiple on-site stored water sources and pre-planned measures in place to provide water to the spent fuel pools.

5. We have been told that both Diablo Canyon and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station are designed to withstand the maximum credible threat at both plants, which we understand to be much less than the 9.0 earthquake that hit Japan. What assumptions have you made about the ability of both plants to withstand an earthquake or tsunami? Given the disaster in Japan, what are our options to provide these plants with a greater margin for safety?

All U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis. Even those plants that are located outside of areas with extensive seismic activity are designed for safety in the event of such a natural disaster. The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems, and components be designed to take into account the most severe natural phenomena historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The NRC is confident that the robust design of these plants makes it highly unlikely that a similar event could occur in the United States.

The NRC is currently assessing the event in Japan and will be evaluating the differences and similarities between the reactor designs to determine if US plants warrant modifications to improve plant safety.

6. Have new faults been discovered near Diablo Canyon or San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station since those plants began operations? If so, how have the plants been modified to account for the increased risk of an earthquake? How will the NRC consider information on ways to address risks posed by faults near these plants that is produced pursuant to state law or recommendations by state agencies during the NRC relicensing process?

A new Shoreline fault zone near Diablo Canyon was discovered in late 2008. In 2009 and 2010 PG&E acquired, analyzed, and interpreted new data to better assess the seismic hazard from the Shoreline fault zone. PG&E submitted the final Shoreline fault zone report to the NRC on January 7, 2011. PG&E has concluded that maximum ground motions at the site from local faults are bounded by ground motions for which the plant had been previously evaluated. The NRC staff has performed an evaluation of the tsunami hazard and an independent deterministic seismic hazard analysis of the fault based on the information provided by the licensee to confirm the licensee's conclusions regarding the safe operation of the plant. PG&E has stated that the tsunami hazard threat from the Shoreline fault zone is relatively small since it is a strike-slip fault rather than a reverse fault and, therefore, the tsunami hazard is not expected to exceed the plant's design-basis tsunami characteristics.

The NRC staff has reviewed interim seismic studies related to the Shoreline fault zone. The staff is in the process of reviewing PG&E's final Shoreline fault zone report to determine what the appropriate characterization and impact of the fault may be and any licensee or regulatory action that may be needed.

The staff will continue discussions with PG&E on an amendment to codify a Long Term Seismic Program methodology for the management of new geotechnical seismic information.

7. What are the evacuation plans for both plants in the event of an emergency? We understand that Highway 1 is the main route out of San Luis Obispo, what is the plan for evacuation of the nearby population if an earthquake takes out portions of the highway and a nuclear emergency occurs simultaneously?

These considerations would be contained in the State and local (City, County) emergency plans, which are reviewed by FEMA. FEMA then certifies to the NRC that they have "reasonable assurance" that the off-site facilities can support operation of the plants in an emergency.

Diablo Canyon response: Evacuation of members of the general public is the responsibility of the San Luis Obispo County, working in conjunction with the State of California, and would be carried out in accordance with their prearranged plans. Evacuation routes are dependent on the meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. PG&E will act in an advisory capacity, giving technical assessments of the conditions at the plant and the probabilities for a potential off-site release as well as other pertinent information. This information, along with PG&E's recommended protective actions, will be assessed by responsible county officials in determining appropriate actions to be taken.

The main route out of San Luis Obispo is Highway 101. Evacuation studies are conducted by demography specialists and provide information on various evacuation scenarios that could take place. The studies results consider normal road conditions, time of day, degraded weather/visibility, and road destruction.

8. What is the NRC's role in monitoring radiation in the event of a nuclear accident both here and abroad? What is the role of EPA and other federal agencies?

NRC regulations require nuclear power plants to report any radiation doses detected at the plant that could be harmful to the public. This would include doses that are generated by the plant or by an external source. During an event in the U.S., it is the state's responsibility to provide protective action decisions for public health and safety. For this incident, the Japanese are responsible for reporting the public dose; nevertheless, should radiation doses be detected within the U.S., it would still be the state's responsibility to provide protective action decisions for public health and safety.

In response to nuclear emergencies, the NRC works with other U.S. agencies to monitor radioactive releases and predict their path. The NRC continues to monitor information regarding wind patterns near the Japanese nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, given the thousands of miles between the two countries, Hawaii, Alaska, the U.S. Territories and the U.S. West Coast are not expected to experience any harmful levels of radioactivity.

The EPA is utilizing its existing nationwide radiation monitoring system, RadNet, to monitor continuously the nation's air and regularly monitors drinking water, milk and precipitation for environmental radiation.

9. What monitoring systems currently are in place to track potential impacts on the U.S., including California, associated with the events in Japan?

See response to question 8.

Diablo Canyon response: PG&E has radiation environmental monitoring system in place, utilizing pressurized ion chambers. PG&E is presently performing enhanced monitoring that was initiated on 3/14/11.

10. Which federal agency is leading the monitoring effort and which agencies have responsibility for assessing human health impacts? What impacts have occurred to date on the health or environment of the U.S. or are currently projected or modeled in connection with the events in Japan?

A number of U.S. agencies are involved in monitoring and assessing radiation including EPA, DOE, and NRC. Currently the EPA is coordinating the radiation monitoring effort and assessing human health impacts in regards to the nuclear power event in Japan. There is not expected to be radiation at harmful levels reaching the U.S. from damaged Japanese nuclear power plants.

The United States Government has an extensive network of radiation monitors around the country and no radiation levels of concern have been detected. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency RadNet system is designed to protect the public by notifying scientists, in near real time, of elevated levels of radiation so they can determine whether protective action is required. The EPA's system has not detected any radiation levels of concern.

In addition to EPA's RadNet system, the U.S. Department of Energy has radiation monitoring equipment at research facilities around the country, which have also not detected any radiation levels of concern.

On March 18, one of the monitoring stations in Sacramento, California detected miniscule quantities of iodine isotopes and other radioactive particles that pose no health concern at the detected levels. Similarly, between March 16 and 17, a detector at the Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Washington State detected trace amounts of Xenon-133, which is a radioactive noble gas produced during nuclear fission that poses no concern at the detected level. The doses received by people per day from natural sources of radiation - such as rocks, bricks, the sun and other background sources - are 100,000 times the dose rates from the particles and gas detected in California or Washington State.

11. What contingency plans are in place to ensure that the American public is notified in the event that hazardous materials associated with the events in Japan pose an imminent threat to the U.S.?

The US has a comprehensive "National Response Framework" for responding to hazards affecting the US. This plan involves Federal, State and Local Governments, the private

sector, and nongovernmental organizations. As previously discussed a number of U.S. agencies are involved in monitoring and assessing radiation including EPA, DOE, and NRC. Currently the EPA is coordinating the radiation monitoring effort and assessing human health impacts in regards to the nuclear power event in Japan. There is not expected to be radiation at harmful levels reaching the U.S. from damaged Japanese nuclear power plants.

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 21, 2011 2:43 PM  
**To:** Collins, Elmo  
**Subject:** Re: Commissioner Briefing Package

About 340 - in Denver now. I'll come to your gate in San Fran

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Collins, Elmo  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 10:17:50 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Commissioner Briefing Package

I'm arriving 3:55 pm  
How about you?  
Elmo

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 07:13:46 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Elmo -  
I don't necessarily need an answer, just want folks to be mindful of the situation. Thanks for having Karla engaged. He's not going to Diablo, so this should be simple. Heading to the airport - will I see you around 330pm PST?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Collins, Elmo  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Virgilio, Martin  
**Cc:** Fuller, Karla; Howell, Art  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 06:40:16 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Commissioner Briefing Package

Marty

I'll have my Regional Counsel double check to get an answer for Amy

Elmo

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin; Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 06:34:03 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Commissioner Briefing Package

With the ongoing adjudication on DC, please be mindful that Cmrs and their staff cannot receive certain info related to that plant. Are we okay with what just went to Belkys?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**To:** Collins, Elmo; Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Howell, Art; Powell, Amy; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 04:17:05 2011  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package

FYI

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**From:** Kammerer, Annie  
**Sent:** Monday, March 21, 2011 12:24 AM  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Subject:** RE: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Please see attached. I defer to your judgment as to what to do with the information. The only thing that I would ask for strongly is the one change that makes it clear that the review of the tsunami hazard is only for the shoreline fault. We have been looking at DCNP and SONGS tsunami informally to this point, though many people know the DCNP PTHA is out there and that we have seen it. I don't want to mislead anyone that we formally reviewed the full report.

I see your other email...will check on that.

Regards,  
Annie

---

**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:26 PM  
**To:** Kammerer, Annie  
**Subject:** FW: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Annie

Any problems with the attached briefing book

---

**From:** Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 9:29 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin; Howell, Art; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Powell, Amy; Leeds, Eric; Kennedy, Kriss; Hay, Michael  
**Subject:** Fw: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys

The agency's formal response to the Senator's questions has not yet been developed.

As I'm sure you realize, the info provided by Mike only represents Region IV's understanding of Diablo and SONGS data that could be considered responsive to the Senator's questions. This material is useful as preparation material considering that we expect the same or similar question to surface during the site visit.

See you onsite.

Elmo

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**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Vogel, Anton; Kennedy, Kriss; Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 18:36:24 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys,

Attached is the regions draft responses to the questions posed by the California Senators. As you know, the agencies official process for responding is underway.

Please be advised that some of this material may be in the area of license renewal and should be reviewed prior to giving the commissioner to ensure it is acceptable.

I hope this helps. If you have any questions don't hesitate to contact me.

Mike Hay

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**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 4:55 PM  
**To:** Hay, Michael  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Yes. The Commissioner needs to prepare and tomorrow morning he has a Commission meeting. Elmo said we would get it over the wknd.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa  
202-590-0068

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**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:52:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Our plan is to have them to you early tomorrow morning as previously discussed.



Is there an urgency?

Mike  
Blackberry message

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy; Collins, Elmo; Apostolakis, George  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:46:31 2011  
**Subject:** Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Mike, we haven't seen the responses to the senators questions.  
Any idea when to expect them?

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

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**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 17:02:35 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Mike. - Belkys

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 4:27 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys and Amy,  
Attached are two briefing packages, for San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

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If you need anything else please don't hesitate to call or send me an email.

Mike Hay  
Chief/DRS

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 21, 2011 2:57 PM  
**To:** Merzke, Daniel  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

I do have them and know what's going on.

Thanks  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Merzke, Daniel  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 21 14:18:44 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Amy, I don't know if you've seen the responses to the questions posed by Senators Boxer and Feinstein. I'm sending them to you so you know what's going on.

Dan

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:42 PM  
**To:** Sanfilippo, Nathan; Merzke, Daniel; Markley, Michael  
**Subject:** Fw: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

The attached info was provided to Belkys today to support the Commissioner's visit to California this week.

Mike  
Blackberry message

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**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Vogel, Anton; Kennedy, Kriss; Collins, Elmo  
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Mike Hay

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Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

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**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:52:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

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Blackberry message

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Mike Hay  
Chief/DRS

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 7:03 AM  
**To:** Merzke, Daniel  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Dan - opened just fine this am...ghosts in the machine?!? Appreciate your help.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Merzke, Daniel  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 22 06:57:58 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Amy, here's the e-mail again. Hopefully you'll be able to open the attachment.

---

**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:42 PM  
**To:** Sanfilippo, Nathan; Merzke, Daniel; Markley, Michael  
**Subject:** Fw: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

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Mike  
Blackberry message

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**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Vogel, Anton; Kennedy, Kriss; Collins, Elmo  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 18:36:24 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys,

Attached is the regions draft responses to the questions posed by the California Senators. As you know, the agencies official process for responding is underway.

Please be advised that some of this material may be in the area of license renewal and should be reviewed prior to giving the commissioner to ensure it is acceptable.

I hope this helps. If you have any questions don't hesitate to contact me.

Mike Hay

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**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 20, 2011 4:55 PM  
**To:** Hay, Michael  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Yes. The Commissioner needs to prepare and tomorrow morning he has a Commission meeting. Elmo said we would get it over the wknd.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa  
(b)(6)

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**From:** Hay, Michael  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:52:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Our plan is to have them to you early tomorrow morning as previously discussed.

Is there an urgency?

Mike  
Blackberry message

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**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy; Collins, Elmo; Apostolakis, George  
**Sent:** Sun Mar 20 17:46:31 2011  
**Subject:** Query: Commissioner Briefing Package

Mike, we haven't seen the responses to the senators questions.  
Any idea when to expect them?

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa  
(b)(6)

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**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**To:** Hay, Michael; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 18 17:02:35 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Commissioner Briefing Package

Thanks Mike. - Belkys

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**From:** Hay, Michael  
**Sent:** Friday, March 18, 2011 4:27 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Commissioner Briefing Package

Belkys and Amy,  
Attached are two briefing packages, for San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

This weekend I will send you both another document that will contain "draft" answers to a recently submitted letter from Senator Boxer to the NRC asking us a number of things. As previously discussed, these answers

are not the "official" NRC response, but should prepare Elmo and the Commissioner for general discussion on the topics should they develop.

Belkys, please be aware that there may be some information related to Diablo Canyon that may need to be withheld from Commissioner Apostolakis based on its relationship to license renewal and his involvement in that process. I'll let you and council deal with that.

If you need anything else please don't hesitate to call or send me an email.

Mike Hay  
Chief/DRS

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**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 6:21 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Quesenberry, Jeannette  
**Subject:** FW: Briefing

(b)(6). Probably will happen, but I might be able to come in around noon. If not, may need some help setting this one up. I'm thinking Borchardt.

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**From:** Van Etten, John [mailto:John.VanEtten@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 5:38 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Cc:** Sadlosky, Dan  
**Subject:** Briefing

Eugene-

The Congresswoman has asked that we arrange a phone briefing between her and representatives of the NRC regarding the current status of the Japanese nuclear plants, any lessons learned and how they will be applied to Indian Point, and the process for examining Japan's experience and updating the regulatory requirements for domestic nuclear power facilities. The Congresswoman is available by phone both tomorrow and Thursday. We appreciate your assistance in arranging this meeting. Let us know if there is anything we can do to help.

Best,  
John

John D. Van Etten  
Office of Congresswoman Nan Hayworth, M.D.  
U.S. House of Representatives  
1440 Longworth House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
Phone: (202) 225-5441



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**From:** Kammerer, Annie  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 6:47 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Dricks, Victor; Uselding, Lara  
**Subject:** RE: Earthquake info  
**Attachments:** SONGS Q&As.docx

Here's my best shot. I am not nearly as involved with SONGS, but I got some good info from the resident inspectors.

Can RIV PA, please take a look.

Annie

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 4:48 PM  
**To:** Kammerer, Annie  
**Subject:** Re: Earthquake info

We can try

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**From:** Kammerer, Annie  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Sheron, Brian  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Dricks, Victor; Uselding, Lara  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 22 16:35:29 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Earthquake info

Becky,

I apologize for the delay. This is not a document that existed and the information about everything that we have done in terms of reassessing seismic tsunami hazard at these sites is mostly in my head and files.

There are two things. First, please see the note highlighted. I'm not sure what became of that communication back and forth with Capps since I got dropped out of the loop. This relates to the 3D seismic stuff that the Senators staff was discussing with Josh.

Also you may want to note the very last item at SONGS. There is a new "shoreline fault" showing up in literature discussing seismology of the region around SONGS (sound familiar?). I'm almost scared to bring it up, but we are on top of it and are trying to get information about it.

A lot of what we are doing with regard to SONGS is keeping an eye on things...but not formal actions yet, since it isn't part of relicensing. Of course everyone uses the SAMA to bring up other issues, and we expect this for SONGS as well and are preparing.

Please have someone read through this before sending it on. I tried to brainstorm everything that is outside of the stuff I can't talk about (legal actions).

I hope this is what you need. Please call me with any questions. (b)(6)

Also, I didn't realize the senator was going to SONGS today as well (that's quite the tour). If I can get a fact sheet done in an hour, would it be too late? I had already started at Victor's request this morning...and may be able to pull it off.

Annie

## **What does the Japanese Earthquake Mean to San Onofre?**

### **1) Could an earthquake and tsunami the size of the one in Japan happen at San Onofre?**

No. This earthquake occurred on a "subduction zone", which is the type of tectonic region that produces the largest magnitudes earthquake. A subduction zone is a tectonic plate boundary where one tectonic plate is pushed under another plate. Subduction zone earthquakes are also required to produce the kind of massive tsunami seen in Japan. In the continental US, the only subduction zone is the Cascadia subduction zone which lies off the coast of far northern California, Oregon and Washington. So, a continental earthquake and tsunami as large as in Japan could only happen there. Outside of the Cascadia subduction zone, earthquakes are not expected to exceed a magnitude of approximately 8.25; and that would only occur on the largest fault lines, such as the San Andreas fault, which is 50 miles away onshore.

### **2) What magnitude earthquake are currently operating US nuclear plants such as SONGS designed to?**

Each reactor is designed for a different ground motion that is determined on a site-specific basis. Ground motion is a function of both the magnitude of an earthquake and the distance from the fault to the site; and it is ground motion that causes damage. So, Nuclear plants, and in fact all engineered structures, are actually designed based on ground motion levels, not earthquake magnitudes. The existing nuclear plants were designed based on a "deterministic" or "scenario earthquake" basis that accounted for the largest earthquakes expected in the area around the plant. The scenario earthquake at SONGS is a magnitude 7 approximately 5 miles from the main plant. This earthquake results in a ground motion that has a peak ground acceleration of 0.67g, that is 67% of the acceleration of gravity.

### **3) Could San Onofre withstand an earthquake of the magnitude of the Japanese earthquake?**

It could withstand the ground shaking experienced by the Japanese nuclear plants. As discussed above, it is actually ground motions that structures, systems, and components "feel". We do not have direct recordings of ground motion at the Japanese reactors. However, we do have estimates of shaking that come from a ShakeMap produced by the K-NET system. The ground motion at the Japanese nuclear reactors is believed to be somewhat on the order of the 0.67g, or possibly slightly higher, that San Onofre peak ground acceleration has been analyzed to. However, US nuclear plants have additional seismic margin, as demonstrated by the result of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events program carried out by the NRC in the mid-90s.

It should be noted that, the Fukushima plant also withstood the earthquake. In the hour or so after the earthquake the Fukushima plant's safety systems, including the diesel generators, performed as expected and effectively shut down the reactor. The cause of the problems at the plant stemmed from the loss of emergency power that appears to be the direct result of the subsequent tsunami, which far exceeded the design basis tsunami for the Fukushima plant.

### **4) Is possible to have a tsunami at San Onofre that is capable of damaging the plant?**

The San Onofre Units 2 and 3 plant grade is elevation +30.0 feet MLLW. San Onofre has reinforced concrete cantilevered retaining seawall and screen well perimeter wall designed to withstand the design basis earthquake, followed by the maximum predicted tsunami with coincident storm wave action. The controlling tsunami for San Onofre occurring during simultaneous high tide and storm surge produces a maximum runup to elevation +15.6 feet MLLW at the Unit 2 and 3 seawall. When storm waves are superimposed, the predicted maximum runup is to elevation +27 MLLW. Tsunami protection for the

SONGS site is provided by a reinforced concrete seawall constructed to elevation +30.0 MLLW. A tsunami larger than this is extremely unlikely.

**5) Has the earthquake hazard at San Onofre been reviewed like Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant is doing? Are they planning on doing an update before relicensing?**

Relicensing does not evaluate seismic hazard or other siting issues. Seismic safety is part of NRC's ongoing licensing activities. If an immediate safety concern emerged, the issue would be addressed as part of NRC's response, regardless of relicensing status.

The closest active fault is approximately five miles offshore from San Onofre, a system of folds and faults exist called the offshore zone of deformation (OZD). The OZD includes the Newport-Inglewood-Rose Canyon fault system. The Cristianitos fault is ¼ mile southeast, but is an inactive fault. Other faults such as the San Andreas and San Jacinto, which can generate a larger magnitude earthquake, are far enough away that they would produce ground motions much less severe than earthquakes in the OZD for San Onofre.

Notwithstanding the above, the NRC is considering extending the Generic Issue 199 program to all operating reactors. This would require a reassessment of hazard for San Onofre using the latest probabilistic seismic hazard assessment approaches. Based on a preliminary assessment using the source model developed by the USGS for the national seismic hazard maps, the annual probability of occurrence of a 0.67g ground motion at the San Onofre site is only slightly higher than is than the annual probability of occurrence that is recommended for new nuclear plants.

**6) How do we know that the emergency diesel generators in San Onofre will not fail to operate like in Japan?**

Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) are installed in a seismically qualified structure and are seismic Category I equipment. Even if these EDGs did fail, plants can safely shutdown using station blackout power source law 10 CFR 50.63. In 1988 the NRC concluded that additional regulatory requirements were justified in order to provide further assurance that a loss of both offsite and onsite emergency ac power systems would not adversely affect public health and safety and the station blackout rule was enacted. Studies conducted by the NRC since this rule has been in effect confirms that the hardware and procedures that have been implemented to meet the station blackout requirements have resulted in significant risk reduction and have further enhanced defense-in-depth. However, we plan to carefully evaluate the lessons learned from the events in Japan to determine if enhancements to the station blackout rule are warranted.

**7) Was there any damage to San Onofre from either the earthquake or the resulting tsunami?**

There was no damage at the San Onofre nuclear plant from either the earthquake or tsunami.

**8) What about emergency planning for San Onofre. Does it consider tsunami?**

FEMA reviews off-site evacuation plans formally every 2 years during a biennial emergency preparedness exercise. NRC evaluates on-site evacuation plans during the same exercise. Population studies are formally done every 10 years, and evacuation time estimates are re-evaluated at that time. FEMA reviews these evacuation plans, and will conclude their acceptability through a finding of "reasonable assurance" that the off-site facilities and infrastructure is capable of protecting public health and safety in the event of an emergency at San Onofre. The next such exercise is planned for April 12, 2011.

The San Onofre emergency plan initiates the emergency response organization and results in declaration of emergency conditions via their Emergency Action Levels. The facility would then make protective action recommendations to the Governor, who would then decide on what protective actions would be ordered for the residents around San Onofre. The consideration of tsunami would be contained in the State and local (City, County) emergency plans, which are reviewed by FEMA.

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**From:** Van Etten, John <John.VanEtten@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 9:59 AM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: Briefing

Thanks everyone for your assistance setting up a briefing for Congresswoman Hayworth. She will be meeting with Eric Leeds tomorrow at 11:00. Best, John

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene [mailto:Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 6:34 PM  
**To:** Van Etten, John  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: Briefing

John,

Got it. I've informed my director and colleagues of the congresswoman's request and the ball is rolling. Unfortunately, I'm having (b)(6) done in the morning and may not be able to come in tomorrow. So, someone else will be working with you initially to finalize the briefing. I will however contact as soon as I can.

Regards

Gene

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**From:** Van Etten, John [mailto:John.VanEtten@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 5:38 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Cc:** Sadlosky, Dan  
**Subject:** Briefing

Eugene-

The Congresswoman has asked that we arrange a phone briefing between her and representatives of the NRC regarding the current status of the Japanese nuclear plants, any lessons learned and how they will be applied to Indian Point, and the process for examining Japan's experience and updating the regulatory requirements for domestic nuclear power facilities. The Congresswoman is available by phone both tomorrow and Thursday. We appreciate your assistance in arranging this meeting. Let us know if there is anything we can do to help.

Best,  
John

John D. Van Etten  
Office of Congresswoman Nan Hayworth, M.D.  
U.S. House of Representatives  
1440 Longworth House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

Phone: (202) 225-5441

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 1:47 PM  
**To:** Reynoso, John  
**Cc:** Collins, Elmo  
**Subject:** Re: SONGS VIP visit including Senator Boxer and Feinstein

Thanks John - for anything asked for in follow up from NRC, please work through me to provide. OCA needs to be the conduit on that (happy to take work from you : ) ).

Also, please confirm: when did Rep. Capps visit SONGS? We had her at Diablo all morning, so that note surprised/confused me.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Reynoso, John  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 11:13:42 2011  
**Subject:** FW: SONGS VIP visit including Senator Boxer and Feinstein

Amy,  
Elmo Collins wanted me to provide you a copy of this email for your information.

*John Reynoso, PE Resident Inspector*

*San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station*

*USNRC-RIV Division Reactor Projects, Branch D*

*949-492-2642*

(b)(6) (cell)

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**From:** Reynoso, John  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 22, 2011 6:26 PM  
**To:** Lantz, Ryan  
**Cc:** Warnick, Greg  
**Subject:** SONGS VIP visit including Senator Boxer and Feinstein

Ryan,



The licensee was well prepared for the VIP visitors on Tuesday. Everything I heard about the presentations was positive and the meetings went well. SONGS senior management and experts lead the discussions and provided details of the differences in SONGS design and the Japan design at Fukushima plants. They were available to take questions from the senators and representatives. There some questions the licensee needed to follow up on; mainly having to deal with evacuation plans and spent fuel storage.

All agreed there are lessons to be learned from the Fukushima event. Parties expressed common interest on improving safety at US nuclear plants, especially those sited near active seismic zones, like SONGS and Diablo Canyon.

#### Details.

US Congress Representatives Lois Capp and Susan Davis and US Senators Boxer and Feinstein all visited the site separately. Each were provided an overview of SONGS layout and a brief explanations of the differences in design between the Japan BWR and SONGS PWR.

From the information I received from the SONGS public affairs personnel; the Congressional Representatives completed a plant tour and met with senior management to answer questions. There were very positive comments from those who attended. The resident inspectors did not met with the US congress representatives. Neither Senator wanted a plant tour.

Commissioner Apostolakis and Chief of Staff Sosa, arrived before either Senator. Resident inspectors met with him and help him understand the major issue facing SONGS. He asked questions about resident duties, recent issues with spent fuel pool and Zach Hollcraft provide a good summary of recent allegations and Greg Tutak helped with discussions of resident inspector duties. He visited with Senator Boxer and discussed some of aspects of the preparation of evacuation zones promoted by the NRC.

Regional Administrator Elmo and Amy Powell, arrived after Senator Boxer departed. Elmo traveled with Senator Feinstein and Ted Craver (Edison, CEO).

The resident inspectors did met the two US senators when they arrived.

**Senator Boxer** was given a question and answer session with SONGS management and her staff. She met with Commissioner Apostolakis.

#### Major issues:

- Will ask for another congressional hearing on Lessons learned from Japan.
- Evacuation of 7.4 million people within a 50 mile radius
- How often are evacuation plans changed, very adamant on why NRC is not more involved ?
- Wants copies of draft evacuation plans from the inter-jurisdictional committee and SONGS
- Future siting of nuclear plants will not be near population zones
- Closing of Indian Point high on the agenda

- Very interested in how well SONGS copes with Station Blackout scenarios
- Objectivity of seismic studies, who's reviewing the results
- Surprised that NRC did not know of the recent seismic studies in the area

#### Summary -Boxer.

Senator Boxer had many positive comments and concluded that discussions were "very helpful" and that she was "very impressed with everyone". However, it doesn't matter how well we design plants "mother nature doesn't listen" and we must keep an open mind to the facts.

She learned of positive differences in Japan BWR and SONGS design regarding spent fuel pool and emergency diesel generator (underground fuel storage and electrical bussed protection from flooding). She concluded that she wanted to keep an open dialogue and has an open door policy.

**Senator Feinstein** arrived after Boxer left the site. She also received a separate presentation. Elmo and Commissioner Apostolakis met with the Senator. Another presentation was provided but this time Ted Craver, Edison CEO was present.

#### Major Issues:

- Dry Cast Storage issues, is this good thing not to have long term storage?
- Questions on what being done to inspect the insides of "interim storage casks"
- What's the longest spent fuel is stored
- How many storage casks are in US, (104 plants)
- Design of Spent Fuel Pool and Plants should NRC standardized (Elmo talked about GDC's as standards)
- Should better standards be proposed for dry cask long term storage
- The height of the Tsunami and size of the seawalls, is SCE willing to increase height if necessary?
- Impact of a freighter against the seawall, is this a credible event?

#### Summary-Feinstein.

Senator Feinstein thanked everyone for the presentation of the plant design and differences between Japan and SONGS. Very appreciative of the professional and dedication. However, her biggest issue is the dry cask storage of spent fuel. Interim storage is "forever." This can't be good not having a central depository, didn't understand why the nuclear industry never lobbied her to support Yucca Mountain.

I can discuss more with you if you like.

Sincerely,

*John Reynoso, PE Resident Inspector*

*San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station*

*USNRC-RIV Division Reactor Projects, Branch D*

*949-492-2642*

(b)(6)

(cell)

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 5:23 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: Testimony circulated for concurrence

Commission Ostendorff's office submitted 3 minor grammar edits and suggested we enhance the discussion of the spent fuel pools.  
No other responses, yet.

I introduced an error in my re-write concerning the GE Morris facility's location and spoke with Cindy about it. That's the only must-change that she had.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 5:18 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Testimony circulated for concurrence

How is the 18th floor?

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 16:43:07 2011  
**Subject:** Testimony circulated for concurrence

Here's the copy we circulated re: Cindy Pederson's testimony on Friday at the forum hosted by Senators Durbin and Kirk.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

Written Testimony  
Of  
Cynthia Pederson  
Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III, Lisle, IL  
On behalf of the  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Senator Durbin and Senator Kirk, I'm honored to appear before you today on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to address the continuing safety of the nuclear power plants in Illinois.

I would first like to offer my condolences to all those affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Our hearts go out to all those who have been dealing with the aftermath of these natural disasters, and we are mindful of the long and difficult road they will face in recovery. We know that the people of Japan are resilient and strong, and we have every confidence that they will come through this difficult time and move forward, with resolve, to rebuild their vibrant country. As an NRC employee, I am especially proud of the efforts of my colleagues who are providing technical assistance to Japan, to aid in their efforts to control a very challenging situation at the Fukushima plants. Since Friday, March 11, when the earthquake and tsunami struck, the NRC's headquarters' operations center has been substantially augmented in order to monitor events and provide expert assistance and review. At the request of the Japanese government, and through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the NRC sent a team of 12 experts to provide on-the-ground support. Within the United States, the NRC has been working closely with other Federal agencies as part of our government's response to the situation.

**Background to the NRC**

The recent events in Japan may have introduced many of you to my agency and you may be asking, "What is the NRC?" The NRC is a relatively small federal agency, with approximately 4000 staff, but we play a critical role in protecting the American people and the environment. We have inspectors who carry out duties full-time at every operating nuclear power plant in the United States, and we have world-class scientists, engineers, and professionals who work together to assure that the nuclear material and nuclear power plants in our country are safe and secure. From the NRC resident

inspectors, who work at and live near the reactors, to the dozens of region-based specialists, who visit the plants regularly to assess emergency planning, security, maintenance, or engineering, there are about 225 people in NRC's Region III office in Lisle, Illinois; we are absolutely dedicated to making sure that the 24 reactors in the Midwest are safe.

I would like to tell you why people in Illinois should have confidence that our plants are safe. All commercial U.S. nuclear power plants are designed and built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes, tornados, and tsunamis. Even those plants located outside of areas with high seismic activity are designed for safety in the event of such a natural disaster.

The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems and components be designed to take into account the most severe natural phenomenon historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The NRC requires an additional safety margin to provide added robustness. This basically means that U.S. nuclear power plants are designed to be safe based on historical data from the area's maximum credible earthquake.

When assessing the safety of US nuclear reactors, consider the following:

- Every reactor in this country is required by NRC regulation to be designed for natural events based upon the specific site that that reactor is located
- There are multiple fission product barriers at every reactor
- There are a wide range of diverse and redundant safety features in order to provide assurance of public health and safety
- The NRC has a long regulatory history of conservative decision-making. We use sound risk insights to help inform our regulatory process, and have continued to require improvements to the plant design and operation as we learn from operating experience over the more than 35 years of civilian nuclear power in this country. Some have been derived from lessons learned from previous significant events, such as Three Mile Island
- We also have severe accident management guidelines, emergency operating procedures, and procedures and processes for dealing with large fires and explosions, regardless of the cause.
- Further, we have a station blackout rule which ensures an appropriate response to loss of power at a plant, and a hydrogen rule for reactors, to prevent explosions within containment; these are but two examples of many, to be addressed later

### **Reactor Safety**

I would like to focus on the factors that go into assuring the NRC of domestic reactor safety; including the safety of the nuclear reactors here in Illinois. The NRC has, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that the nuclear industry requires the highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation. But even with these high standards, the NRC will not rely on any one level of protection for maintaining public health and safety. So, the design for every single reactor in this country, after accounting for site-specific threats –such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, or tsunamis– also has multiple physical barriers to prevent fission-product release. On top of this, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems. NRC regulations require these safety systems be maintained operable and frequently tested; it is my job to ensure that they are and, as representatives of the industry can attest, my inspectors and I are determined, exacting, and thorough in this pursuit. Should a very unlikely significant event occur, each plant has emergency preparedness plans, developed with the NRC, FEMA, and Illinois State and local officials, to appropriately respond.

The NRC has always sought to learn from previous operating experience to review and amend our requirements as necessary –and we will continue to do so. The most significant nuclear event in this country was the Three Mile Island accident in the late 1970s. As a result of lessons-learned from that event, changes were introduced across the spectrum of NRC regulatory focus. The NRC significantly revised emergency planning and emergency operating procedures. Many rules for control room operators were enhanced. We created requirements for enhanced indication of pumps and valves. To help prevent explosions inside of reactor containments, the NRC added new requirements for hydrogen control. The NRC introduced requirements for a post-accident sampling system that monitors for potential radioactive material release and possible fuel degradation.

By far the most significant change after Three Mile Island was the establishment of the Resident Inspector Program, which has at least two full time NRC inspectors at each plant. These inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities 24 hours a day, seven days a week; they also live in the community and have a direct stake in the safety of the facility.

Also as a result of operating experience and ongoing research programs, the NRC has developed requirements for severe accident management guidelines. These are programs that perform the "what if" scenario. What if all of this careful design work, all of these important procedures and practices and instrumentation all failed? What procedures, policies, training, and equipment should be in place to deal with the extremely unlikely scenario of a severe accident? Those have been in effect for many years and are evaluated by the NRC.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we went even further, and identified mitigation strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the explosions or fire. These enhancements and strategies are directly applicable to the kinds of very significant events that are taking place in Japan.

There is the station blackout rule: every plant in the country had to develop a response for loss of power. A plant could respond by using batteries for a while, but must also have procedures and arrangements in place in order to restore power to the site and to provide cooling to the core. As I mentioned earlier, there's a hydrogen rule to mitigate the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, indication equipment, as well as pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of environmental temperature, and radiation conditions that you would see under a design basis accident.

I also mentioned earlier that we have emergency preparedness and planning requirements that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations. In coordination with our federal partner, FEMA, and with state and local governments, these emergency preparedness programs are evaluated and tested on a yearly basis.

#### **Local Concerns from events in Japan**

Speaking directly to the containment design at Fukushima which has received considerable attention in the press, the NRC has had a Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the very late 1980s. This initiative required the installation of fission-product scrubbing, enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system, and new hardened vent systems for the containment cooling for all BWR Mark I's—including 4 units here in Illinois.



Another local issue I specifically want to address is regarding the spent fuel pools at Zion nuclear power plant. Zion actually consists of two facilities, the shutdown nuclear power plant and the adjacent GE Morris facility; both maintain cooling systems and closely monitor water levels and temperatures. The spent fuel at these facilities has been in the pools cooling for many years allowing for the residual heat to dissipate significantly. At this point, there is not enough heat being generated in the GE spent fuel pool for the water to boil; therefore, it would take months to evaporate if the facility lost cooling ability. If you were to assume a total loss of cooling at Zion, it would take weeks for the water to boil off.

### **Learning from Fukushima**

Despite our confidence in the safety of U.S. reactors, more will be done. Over the near term, the NRC will be enhancing our activities through additional inspection, utilizing the resident inspectors and the region-based inspectors in our four Regional offices, to verify the readiness of licensees to deal with both the design basis accidents and the beyond-design basis accidents.

The NRC proactively issued an Information Notice to the reactor licensees to make them aware of the events, and what kinds of activities we believe they should be engaged in to verify their readiness. The additional inspections I have referred to will focus on the capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems. NRC inspectors will be verifying the capability to mitigate a total loss of electric power to the nuclear plant. They will also verify the capability to mitigate problems associated with flooding, and the impact of floods on systems both inside and outside of the plant. And they will identify the equipment that is needed for the potential loss of equipment due to seismic events.

The information that we gather from these near-term inspections will be used to evaluate the industry's readiness for similar events, and aid in our understanding of whether additional regulatory actions need to be taken in the near term.

On the longer term, the NRC will be developing lessons learned from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. The NRC will evaluate the technical and policy issues to identify additional research, or generic communications, changes to our reactor oversight program, potential new rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be conducted by the NRC. This evaluation will then consider inter-agency issues and applicability of these lessons learned to other, non-reactor

facilities. This will be a very substantial and lengthy undertaking, but in order to fully learn and appropriately respond to the lessons of the recent events in Japan, we must proceed methodically and systematically.

In conclusion, the NRC has full confidence that the current fleet of reactors and materials licensees are operated in a manner that protects the public health and safety and the environment. There are a number of immediate, short-term, and long-term evaluations that we are embarking upon with an aim to ensure the continued safety of U.S. facilities. After we have been able to thoroughly study and understand the events in Japan, we will apply the lessons learned to our domestic fleet of nuclear reactors and facilities. We are strongly committed to taking additional actions, as warranted.

Thank you.

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 5:37 PM  
**To:** Belmore, Nancy; Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** FW: Press Release: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DIRECTS STAFF ON CONTINUING AGENCY RESPONSE TO JAPAN EVENTS; ADJUSTS COMMISSION SCHEDULE  
**Attachments:** 11-055.docx

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 5:36 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Press Release: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DIRECTS STAFF ON CONTINUING AGENCY RESPONSE TO JAPAN EVENTS; ADJUSTS COMMISSION SCHEDULE

Please see attached press release.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)



# NRC NEWS

## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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No. 11-055

March 23, 2011

### NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DIRECTS STAFF ON CONTINUING AGENCY RESPONSE TO JAPAN EVENTS; ADJUSTS COMMISSION SCHEDULE

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has voted to launch a two-pronged review of U.S. nuclear power plant safety in the aftermath of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami and the resulting crisis at a Japanese nuclear power plant.

The Commission supported the establishment of an agency task force, made up of current senior managers and former NRC experts with relevant experience. The task force will conduct both short- and long-term analysis of the lessons that can be learned from the situation in Japan, and the results of their work will be made public.

"Our focus is always on ensuring the health and safety of the American people through our licensing and oversight of plants and radioactive materials in this country," Chairman Jaczko said. "Examining all the available information from Japan is essential to understanding the event's implications for the United States. We will perform a systematic and methodical review to see if there are changes that should be made to our programs and regulations to ensure protection of public health and safety."

The Commission set an aggressive schedule for the task force to provide formal updates on the short-term effort in 30, 60 and 90 days. NRC senior technical staff provided the Commission a 90-minute briefing on Monday, as a first step. The staff reiterated their conclusions that the United States and its territories will avoid any harmful radiation levels as a result of the ongoing events at the Fukushima Daiichi plant damaged by the quake and subsequent tsunami.

NRC inspectors who are posted at every U.S. nuclear power plant will also support the task force's short-term effort, supplemented as necessary by experts from the agency's regional and headquarters offices.

"This work will help determine if any additional NRC responses, such as Orders requiring immediate action by U.S. plants, are called for, prior to completing an in-depth investigation of the information from events in Japan," said NRC Executive Director for Operations Bill Borchardt.

The longer-term review will inform any permanent NRC regulation changes determined to be necessary. The Commission said it hopes the task force can begin the long-term evaluation in no later than 90 days, and added that the task force should provide a report with recommended actions within six months of the beginning of that effort.

The Commission also decided to revise its schedule for meetings and briefings to allow ample focus on the agency's response to events in Japan. Open Commission meetings on the status of the NRC response to the Japan earthquake are scheduled for April 14 and 28, a meeting on the staff's 30-day response is planned for May 3 and a meeting on the staff's 60-day response is planned for June 16. A revised Commission meeting schedule will be posted shortly on the NRC website.

###

News releases are available through a free *listserv* subscription at the following Web address: <http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html>. The NRC homepage at [www.nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov) also offers a SUBSCRIBE link. E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are posted to NRC's website.

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 5:37 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Japan Distribution as of 3/23/11

[abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov](mailto:abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov); [adam\\_christensen@feinstein.senate.gov](mailto:adam_christensen@feinstein.senate.gov); [Adam\\_J\\_Arguelles@who.eop.gov](mailto:Adam_J_Arguelles@who.eop.gov);  
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Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 6:04 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

Not before I left.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:54:35 2011  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

What about sharkey

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:47:45 2011  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

My impression is someone asks a question, it goes into a tracking system, never to be removed, so you get the same question - over and over.

It is the end of my day, so cob for me. I think Ho is the only one to comment on testimony. Going to Ops Center duty in am.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:42:12 2011  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

No. If he is talking about the sitrep info tell him we are fine

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:39:34 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: status of congressional briefing/talking points

Any idea what he is referencing?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry



---

**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 16:14:31 2011  
**Subject:** status of congressional briefing/talking points

We are getting daily or more frequent questions from Mike Weber and others about the congressional briefing/talking points. Any idea where we stand, and is there anything I can do to help?

Thanks

Jeff Temple  
Response Program Manager  
301-816-5185

(b)(6) (cell)

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 7:45 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** Bettina call --Plants to be Reviewed

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 19:43:47 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Plants to be Reviewed

Thanks. Bettina is going to talk with Josh.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 07:39 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Fw: Plants to be Reviewed

---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 19:34:31 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Plants to be Reviewed

I believe All plants will get a letter asking them to check their seismic basis. The first ones to get reviewed will be those where the latest USGS info indicates a slight increase in the likelihood of core damage – i.e. The 27 with changes based on latest data bringing them closest to the line where we would start to have concern. I will try to get online to get more for you in a few minutes.

Eliot  
Eliot Brenner  
Director, Office of Public Affairs  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Protecting People and the Environment  
301 415 8200  
C: (b)(6)  
Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** 'Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov' <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>; Powell, Amy; Brenner, Eliot  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 19:24:05 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Plants to be Reviewed

Did Josh mention it in the call? I wasn't there. I had gathered up all the earthquake experts in one room for a call with Bettina and she was on the phone with Josh. I can forward to public affairs and see if they have gotten the question

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 19:16:11 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Plants to be Reviewed

We have a press call tonight.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 7:15 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Plants to be Reviewed

Don't know. We will get back to you tomorrow. This was based on a study a few years ago

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 19:09:12 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Plants to be Reviewed

Can we assure folks that CA plants will be reviewed too?

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca [mailto:Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 07:00 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Plants to be Reviewed

Kathy--it is based on new seismic risk not already known seismic risk like the plants in CA. Josh talked to Bettina about it yesterday to explain. I can have someone call you tomorrow if you like. All the plants are in the central or eastern part of the US because the fault lines are not as well known.

---

**From:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW) <Kathy\_Dedrick@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 18:53:30 2011  
**Subject:** Plants to be Reviewed

Can you tell me how you came up with the list of 27 plants to be reviewed and why CA's plants are not on it? I think Senator Boxer will want hers reviewed soon.

Thanks.

US NRC to check seismic risk of 27 nuke units; Indian Point first

Washington (Platts)--23Mar2011/1033 am EDT/1433 GMT

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission will conduct a seismic risk assessment of Entergy's Indian Point plant in New York next year, the first of 27 reviews of nuclear power units at 17 plants, agency spokeswoman Beth Hayden said Tuesday.

SepRately, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko "has personally committed to inspect Indian Point," located about

35 miles north of New York City, although "no date has not been determined" for the visit, Hayden said.

The NRC reported these nuclear units will receive the seismic review next year: Indian Point 2, Indian Point 3, Limerick 1, Limerick 2, Peach Bottom 2, Peach Bottom 3, Seabrook, Crystal River 3, Farley 1, Farley 2, North Anna 1, North Anna 2, Oconee 1, Oconee 2, Oconee 3, St. Lucie 1, St. Lucie 2, Sequoyah 1, Sequoyah 2, Summer, Watts Bar 1, Dresden 2, Dresden 3, Duane Arnold, Perry 1, River Bend and Wolf Creek.

The earthquake risk review is part of a new assessment NRC conducted based on 2008 revised US Survey data of seismic activity in the eastern and central US, said Scott Burnell, an NRC spokesman. The review pre-dated the earthquake and tsunami that wreaked havoc this month on the Fukushima nuclear stations.

Burnell categorized the findings as a "very broad bush indicator" that is not sufficient to determine the odds for earthquakes at a given nuclear reactor site.

The NRC is planning to send letters to plant operators late this year.

"The expectation is this analysis would show where plants could improve what already is an acceptable response to seismic events," Burnell said. The 27 units selected for review showed the largest increase in seismic risk from a 1980s-era USGS study, he said.

The Indian Point site was selected as the first to be inspected by NRC next year because the revised seismic data showed the largest increase in seismic risk increase from the previous study, Hayden said.

Senator Barbara Boxer, chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and Senator Dianne Feinstein, both Democrats, on March 16 wrote to Jaczko asking that NRC inspect both the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear units, saying they are concerned that the plants "are near earthquake faults."

New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, a Democrat, urged NRC to shut Indian Point during the past decade when he was the state's attorney general. Cuomo raised concerns about the two-unit plant's proximity to the Ramapo fault and its discharge of heated water into the Hudson River.

"It is essential that the NRC move quickly to answer the significant and long-standing safety questions surrounding Indian Point," Cuomo said in a statement Tuesday.

Entergy said in a statement Tuesday: "All citizens of New York need to have access to the pertinent facts regarding Indian Point. We strongly believe that knowing the facts will answer the public's questions and will also clearly demonstrate that this facility is safe -- designed with a margin of safety beyond the strongest earthquake anticipated in the area. Accordingly, Entergy welcomes Governor Cuomo's call for a review of Indian Point by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and stands ready to assist."

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 6:13 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

OK - she mentioned a hearing table on her desk. See you around 8 (it ain't pretty - the whole time change travel thing finally caught up to me...)

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 18:03:06 2011  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

For sure. There are notes on Becky's desk that you should bring.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:53:43 2011  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

With Rebecca on travel, may I stop by in the am for a run down?

Nice weather we're having here...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:47:45 2011  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

My impression is someone asks a question, it goes into a tracking system, never to be removed, so you get the same question - over and over.

It is the end of my day, so cob for me. I think Ho is the only one to comment on testimony. Going to Ops Center duty in am.

A0/140

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:42:12 2011  
**Subject:** Re: status of congressional briefing/talking points

No. If he is talking about the sitrep info tell him we are fine

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 17:39:34 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: status of congressional briefing/talking points

Any idea what he is referencing?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Dacus, Eugene; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 16:14:31 2011  
**Subject:** status of congressional briefing/talking points

We are getting daily or more frequent questions from Mike Weber and others about the congressional briefing/talking points. Any idea where we stand, and is there anything I can do to help?

Thanks

Jeff Temple  
Response Program Manager  
301-816-5185

(b)(6) (cell)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 8:51 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Speaking Invitation for GAI program

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 2:52 PM  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; 'nadelm@georgetown.edu'; Brenner, Eliot  
Cc: Droggitis, Spiros  
Subject: RE: Speaking Invitation for GAI program

Mark--I will have to cancel due to the events in Japan. I have 5 hearings now next week. I will send my Deputy, Spiros, to speak in my place.

-----Original Message-----

From: Schmidt, Rebecca  
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 3:33 PM  
To: 'nadelm@georgetown.edu'; Brenner, Eliot  
Subject: Re: Speaking Invitation for GAI program

Mark,

I'm on the Hill right now. Let me check my calendar tomorrow when I get back to Rockville. I will get back to you.

----- Original Message -----

From: Mark <nadelm@georgetown.edu>  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Brenner, Eliot  
Sent: Thu Mar 10 15:31:20 2011  
Subject: Speaking Invitation for GAI program

GAI is conducting another program for NRC staff on Capitol Hill from March 29-31, and I'm writing to see if we can again have your participation. Specifically, I'd like you both to speak, as you have in the past, on the roles of the NRC offices of Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs. The session would be on Tuesday, March 29 from 12:30 to 1:30 in Rayburn B-369.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Mark Nadel

--  
Mark V. Nadel, Ph.D.  
Senior Fellow  
Government Affairs Institute at Georgetown University  
3333 K Street, NW, Suite 112

Washington, DC 20007

202-333-4838(o)

(b)(6)

(c)



---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 9:09 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Upcoming Congressional Hearings

Amy,  
For next Wednesday's hearing, will David be accompanying? I'll ask them for a van, as I believe it will be Mike Weber, David Decker, and Trish (Milligan?). The Hearing is at 10am, so we should ask for a 0830 departure, yes?  
I believe I'll be with the House Transportation Committee conducting the biometric screening at 10. Should I try to carpool both groups?  
Tim

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Cianci, Sandra  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 8:46 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Boyer, Rachel; Muessle, Mary; Landau, Mindy; Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: Upcoming Congressional Hearings

Tim,

In David's absence, please see below. Let me know if I can assist with travel arrangements.

Sandy Cianci  
Administrative Assistant to Marty Virgilio, DEDR Office of the Executive Director for Operations  
O-17 H13  
301-415-1714  
sandra.cianci@nrc.gov

**From:** Cianci, Sandra  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 8:43 AM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** Boyer, Rachel; Muessle, Mary; Landau, Mindy; Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** FW: Upcoming Congressional Hearings

Hi David,

Are you arranging transportation for the hearing? Please let me know if I can assist with scheduling, I understand the hearing is scheduled for 10am. Is Trish attending with Mike?

Also, please include Rachel Boyer to your emails. She is Mike's Administrative Assistant beginning on Monday 3/28. Thanks much!

Sandy Cianci  
Administrative Assistant to Marty Virgilio, DEDR Office of the Executive Director for Operations  
O-17 H13  
301-415-1714  
sandra.cianci@nrc.gov

From: Muessle, Mary  
Sent: Friday, March 25, 2011 7:55 AM  
To: Cianci, Sandra  
Cc: Boyer, Rachel; Landau, Mindy  
Subject: FW: Upcoming Congressional Hearings

Mike is doing the Wednesday briefing below on EP. We will need to get the time from OCA unless Mindy already knows it.

Mary Muessle  
Assistant for Operations - Acting  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1703 office  
301-415-2700 fax

From: Landau, Mindy  
Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 5:51 PM  
To: Muessle, Mary  
Subject: Re: Upcoming Congressional Hearings

NSIR already prepared the testimony - we just received it and haven't reviewed it yet. Mike is testifying.

Sent from my NRC Blackberry  
Mindy Landau

(b)(6)

Mindy.Landau@nrc.gov

---

From: Muessle, Mary  
To: Landau, Mindy  
Sent: Thu Mar 24 17:33:41 2011

Subject: FW: Upcoming Congressional Hearings Just talked with Amy, and I wanted to confirm that your group is doing the testimony for #3 the EP hearing. I had thought NSIR was doing it. Also, did you hear who was doing the briefing? We had at one point talked about Wiggins, but I heard it might be Weber.

Mary Muesle  
Assistant for Operations - Acting  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1703 office  
301-415-2700 fax

From: Muesle, Mary  
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 1:02 PM  
To: Borchardt, Bill; Weber, Michael; Virgilio, Martin; Ash, Darren  
Cc: Landau, Mindy; Ellmers, Glenn; Rihm, Roger; Andersen, James  
Subject: Upcoming Congressional Hearings

1. Friday, March 25th -Member Briefing – in Illinois – Cynthia Pedersen approved by Chairman to provide testimony Senators Durbin and Kirk Topics -Safety of Illinois Plants -Potential Risks -How to mitigate risks -Differences between Japan and US licensing process -Safety Priorities in US License Renewals

Panel includes NRC, Chip Pardee (Exelon) and member of Illinois Emergency Mgmt Office

Action – Glenn is working up draft testimony for Region III

2. Tuesday, March 29th- Member Briefing

Senate Energy Members

Panel includes NRC ( Bill?), Pete Lyons (DOE), UCS, and GE Action – Becky is offering Bill as 1st choice to testify. Roger is pulling together Bill's remarks at the Commission meeting to transfer them into written and oral testimony. We will update with info from the "GoTo" Book.

3. Wednesday, March 30th- House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee meeting around Emergency Preparedness around Nuclear Power Plants Jeff Denham Chair (Freshman from CA), Ranking Democrat Eleanor Holmes Norton

2 panels – 1st Director of FEMA, Deputy Chief of the Forest Service, NRC rep (Marty or Mike suggested may need to be Jim Wiggins if they are still on watch) 2nd panel – rep of CA local EP, rep of CA state EP, Red Cross

Action – This will be tasked to NSIR, I already called to give them a heads up. We need testimony on NRC's EP program, and an explanation of the 50-mile evacuation decision in Japan. Becky mentioned the House side are mostly freshman and they might be a little testy.

4. Wednesday, March 30th-Senate Appropriations – Energy and Water Development Subcommittee Likely topic Japan and maybe some budget Two panels to include: NRC Chairman, Pete Lyons, UCS

5, Thursday, March 31st -House Appropriations Committee on FY 2012 Budget  
NRC Chairman

Action for 4 and 5—we are proposing to ask the Chairman's communication staff to handle because of overload on communications group. They just need to update his previous written budget testimony that was going to be given at the House hearing last week. Also, Jim Dyer would need to include any supplemental budget request for the Japan event.

6. April – TBD Senate Environment and Public Works Where do we go from here? Feedback to OCA- would be better to do after the 30 day report.

Action – this will be focused on the task force report so we can hold off planning until that information is more stable.

Mary Muessle  
Assistant for Operations - Acting  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1703 office  
301-415-2700 fax

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 9:51 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: OCA briefing info

OK , so no timeframes for delivering testimony upstairs?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 9:48 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: OCA briefing info

Here's what I do know about the hearings.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Hudson, Sharon  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 23 16:05:54 2011  
**Subject:** OCA briefing info

Sharon,

I spoke this afternoon with Becky Schmidt about next week's hearings. Here is what we know:  
The Senate Appropriations Committee hearing will focus on the events in Japan and what it means for the US.  
Likely topics: New Reactors, Spent Fuel storage, Cost of US response/assistance to Japan (~\$15mil?)

The House Appropriations Committee hearing will be a budget-focused hearing and no new materials are expected to be needed (re-use hearing materials from the 16<sup>th</sup>).

For both of these hearings, Susan Lloyd is providing the written testimony.

Please let me know if I can help further,  
Thank you,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:24 AM  
**To:** OCA Distribution  
**Subject:** Earthquake/tsunami 2.206 petitions

About 4 or 5 inquiries on the earthquake and tsunami in Japan are being considered as 2.206 petitions because they request that the agency take action (mostly shut down a particular unit or all US reactors). The staff is expecting more and met this morning to figure out a strategy - consolidate or have a lead petition that could be referenced. (No firm decision on that, though seems to be leaning toward separating requests.)

OGC has determined, at the moment, that requests from foreign citizens can be processed as 2.206 petitions, which led one staffer to conclude that we may turn into McDonald's, serving millions. Another staffer was concerned that some may use the petition process to effectively shut down the agency because it is resource-intensive.

For now, the staff is working on a plan for handling the requests. I'll let you know if there is a petition in your region/area, in case the petitioner contacts his/her representative. Most are Region IV-related. A letter from a Canadian citizen regarding Nine Mile may be treated as general correspondence. Another regarding Vermont Yankee came in this morning - no decision yet.

If you receive a letter via a congressman/senator's office that looks like it might be requesting NRC action, you might want to have it screened by NRR. Most don't come in as a 2.206 because the individual isn't aware of the process.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  

(b)(6)

AO/144

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:38 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Question from Roger Rihm

Oca needs to be the one to circulate it to the Commission. Roger needs to get their draft to us electronically, we'll review, then circulate.

Thanks  
AP

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:28 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Question from Roger Rihm

Roger replied that he'll be circulating draft testimony for Mike Weber after he receives it COB today, but that Bill's testimony for Tuesday would be sent out soon today.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:20 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Question from Roger Rihm

First I am hearing of this plan so I am not much help. There have been a number of conversations re: Sen. Boxer in the last 24 hours that I need to get the download on. I've asked Josh for some time to do this – let me get back to you on that. Please let Roger that we'll get back on that – ask him how testimony is going... He and Mindy are working on Mike Weber's testimony for House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee subcommittee hearing on 3/30

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:12 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Question from Roger Rihm

Becky had wanted to respond to the Boxer/Feinstein letter with a briefing, instead of a lengthy response. Is that still the plan? What guidance can I give Roger regarding the 13 questions in their letter?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492

AO/145

Blackberry (b)(6)



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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 11:58 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Pederson testimony  
**Attachments:** Pederson written testimony rev 5 3-21-2011.docx

Becky,

Attached is the version of the testimony that we are putting in front of the Chairman's office shortly. It incorporates edits from all the commissioners' offices. Amy is reviewing it now for any major issues and suggested you might want to as well.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

**Written Testimony  
Of  
Cynthia Pederson  
Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III, Lisle, IL  
On behalf of the  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thank you.

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 2:03 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Pederson, Cynthia  
**Subject:** Written testimony review  
**Attachments:** Pederson written testimony rev 6 3-21-2011.docx

Attached is the testimony with the final edits denoted in track changes. Please review and confirm no additional changes needed.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)



**Written Testimony  
Of  
Cynthia Pederson  
Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III, Lisle, IL  
On behalf of the  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

(b)(5)

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(b)(5)

Thank you.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 2:58 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Circulation of draft

On phone with Angela now – will ask (she has not read the last revision and may waive review...).

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 2:56 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Circulation of draft

Amy,  
Does this version go back up to Josh and Angela?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)




**Written Testimony  
Of  
Cynthia Pederson  
Deputy Regional Administrator, Region III, Lisle, IL  
On behalf of the  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission**

(b)(5)

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(b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thank you.

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**Subject:** FW: Revised With Bridge line Info.- Request for Information after Events in Japan  
**Location:** HQ-TWFN-10A01-40p

**Start:** Thu 3/24/2011 3:00 PM  
**End:** Thu 3/24/2011 4:00 PM  
**Show Time As:** Tentative

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Meeting Status:** Not yet responded

**Organizer:** Janney, Margie

When: Thursday, March 24, 2011 3:00 PM-4:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).  
Where: HQ-TWFN-10A01-40p

Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*

Nancy: Can you call in on this? I forgot I have the 3:00 pm Congressional call. Thanks, Spiros

-----Original Appointment-----

**From:** Janney, Margie

**Sent:** Wednesday, March 23, 2011 4:23 PM

**To:** Janney, Margie; Nichols, Russell; Sealing, Donna; Paradiso, Karen; Landau, Mindy; Clayton, Kathleen; McDermott, Brian; Morris, Scott; Holahan, Patricia; Erlanger, Craig; Thaggard, Mark; Correia, Richard; Layton, Michael; Wimbush, Andrea; Glitter, Joseph; Nelson, Robert; Howe, Allen; Ruland, William; Bahadur, Sher; Craver, Patti; Mamish, Nader; Mitchell, Linda; Hayden, Elizabeth; Shannon, Valerie; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Champ, Billie; Case, Michael; Richards, Stuart; Gibson, Kathy; Scott, Michael; Coe, Doug; Coyne, Kevin; Parks, Jazel; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Belmore, Nancy; Hirsch, Patricia; Remsburg, Kristy; Pulliam, Timothy; Rodgers, Mary; Whetstone, Jack; Corbett, James; Shields, James; Rich, Thomas; Holonich, Joseph; Boyce, Thomas (OIS); Schaeffer, James; Evans, Michele; Rheaume, Cynthia; Boger, Bruce; Grobe, Jack; Givvines, Mary; Uhle, Jennifer; Valentin, Andrea; Dorman, Dan; Matthews, David; Akstulewicz, Frank; Madden, Patrick; Correa, Yessie; Baker, Pamela; Manning, Louis; Coleman, Judy; Travick, Vanette; Holt, BJ; Choe, Jeannie; Hays, Myra; Munroe, Stacey; Holahan, Gary; Dean, Bill; Wert, Leonard; Howell, Art; Casto, Chuck

**Cc:** Kardaras, Tom; Ordaz, Vonna; Ferrell, Kimberly; McKelvin, Sheila; Mike, Linda; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Bavol, Rochelle; Shea, Pamela; Bates, Andrew; Wright, Darlene; Lewis, Antoinette; Raphael, Mary Jean; Muessele, Mary; Andersen, James; Wagner, Katie; Flanagan, Michelle; Marshall, Jane; Haney, Catherine; Kinneman, John; Kokajko, Lawrence; Doolittle, Elizabeth; Ford, William; Smith, James; Smith, Shawn; White, Bernard; Bailey, Marissa; Davis, Jack; Mohseni, Aby; Tschiltz, Michael; Weaver, Doug; Eitreim, Anthony; Hiltz, Thomas; Smith, Brian; Habighorst, Peter; Johnson, Robert; Campbell, Larry; Silva, Patricia; Rivera-Lugo, Richard; Larche, Linda; Walker, Tracy; Smith, Sharon; Trent, Glenn

**Subject:** Revised With Bridge line Info.- Request for Information after Events in Japan

**When:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 3:00 PM-4:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

**Where:** HQ-TWFN-10A01-40p

When: Thursday, March 24, 2011 3:00 PM-4:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: HQ-TWFN-10A01-40p

Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.



\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*

Revised Information: Bridge line: 888-677-5809 Pass Code (b)(6)

Hi Everyone,

The agency is receiving a significant increase in requests for information after the events in Japan. Your help is needed to provide solutions as to how we can expeditiously complete the requests without significantly impacting mission-related work.

Some topics which we'd like to discuss include:

A quick FOIA request overview

A quick Congressional Inquiry overview

What is considered due diligence in searching for the requested material?

Can OIS provide an automated enterprise search for the pertinent information needed; if so, what are the search criteria?

Please forward this meeting notice to appropriate staff.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks!

-Margie

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 7:10 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Re: Nuclear Safety Discussion

Yep

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 24 18:58:58 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: Nuclear Safety Discussion

Don't know how this came about. I'm clearly not the one. Should I send this to the EDO's office for "consideration"?

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Shields, Albert <Albert.Shields@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 24 17:52:14 2011  
**Subject:** Nuclear Safety Discussion

Good afternoon Mr. Dacus,

Congressman Carney asked me to reach out to you as a representative of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Our office is thinking of putting together a panel discussion about the safety of nuclear power plants. We think that with the emergency occurring in Japan earlier this month, Delaware residents have legitimate questions about the safety of the Salem nuclear power plant just across the river from our state in Salem, NJ.

Right now, we're just starting to work out the details. However, we've envisioned an evening panel discussion with 3-4 participants and a moderator. Congressman Carney would introduce the event and then let the participants and moderator handle questions and the discussion. We would very much like to have you or a representative from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission participate as a panelist. We're also reaching out to representatives from PSE&G/Exelon, the owners of the plant, and state and local officials for their perspective.

Do you know if this would be something your office would be interested in? We don't have a specific date or location yet, but we're trying to schedule the event for mid-April.

Thank you for any assistance you can give me.

Sincerely,

Albert Shields

Albert Shields

A0/150

Office of Congressman John Carney  
Delaware Press & Policy Advisor  
201 N. Walnut St., Ste. 107  
302.428.1902 (phone)  
(b)(6) (Mobile)  
[Albert.Shields@mail.house.gov](mailto:Albert.Shields@mail.house.gov)  
[www.johncarney.house.gov](http://www.johncarney.house.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 8:51 AM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela  
**Cc:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** RE: Draft testimony for Sen Energy

OK – Tim is out this morning and I've got the OEDO monthly meeting. Would you please get your edits to Raeann so we can get it up to 18th? We'll be asking for their comments by COB today.

Thanks,  
Amy

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 8:41 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Coggins, Angela  
**Subject:** Re: Draft testimony for Sen Energy

I'll be in by 9 and just have a couple edits

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 24 22:03:17 2011  
**Subject:** Draft testimony for Sen Energy

In case you did not see this from Tim... We really need to circulate this to Comm offices early tomorrow in order to get comments by COB Fri and finalize/get to Committee Monday. Any comments/changes that you want to see? Seems to follow Bill's opening remarks from Monday's Comm mtg fairly closely save for some tone changes from yours truly.

Also, we will hopefully have Mike's House T&I testimony from OEDO in the am - that too will need a quick turnaround. On GBJ's two approps hearings, I'll check with Susan in the am to see where she is with that...

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 24 15:32:07 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Draft testimony for 3/29/11 -attachment

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 3:31 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Draft testimony for 3/29/11

The attached draft testimony is consistent with Bill Borchardt's testimony from Monday's Commission meeting.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

**NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan and the Continuing Safety of  
the U.S. Commercial Nuclear Reactor Fleet**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

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(b)(5)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 12:39 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Request for Ms. Petersen's Testimony

I already sent the final to all Commission offices – I'll forward to Mike.

Thanks

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 12:38 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Request for Ms. Petersen's Testimony

I believe Nancy submitted the final version to adams, should I send that?

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

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**From:** Snodderly, Michael  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 12:36:15 2011  
**Subject:** Request for Ms. Petersen's Testimony

Tim,

I was reviewing the draft testimony for next Tuesday and would like to have the revised statement that Ms. Petersen made. I never saw the revised.

Thanks,

Mike Snodderly  
Technical Assistant for Reactors  
to Commissioner Apostolakis  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Phone: 301-415-2241  
Email: [michael.snodderly@nrc.gov](mailto:michael.snodderly@nrc.gov)

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**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 1:04 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: trying to fact check something

FYI, I forwarded to Raeann.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Dewey, Eliza <Eliza.Dewey@mail.house.gov>; Fischhoff, Ilya <Ilya.Fischhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 13:00:07 2011  
**Subject:** trying to fact check something

Hi Jenny

The attached article contains a very interesting statement: "**Peter Bradford**, a former member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), has calculated that of the 26 new applications submitted to the NRC since 2007, nine have been canceled or suspended indefinitely, and 10 more have been delayed by one to five years." But the article is more than a year old. We would like to put together our own list of these. Is there a list you maintain, or somewhere on your website that might contain this information? I am happy to stick it into a formal letter too, but I think you probably have some status/list readily available. Basically what we would want is for every application since 2007, a list of the applicant, location, type of application (design, construction etc), original projected date of completion and current status.

Thanks very much  
Michal

<http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1964846,00.html#ixzz1HdAHtU6S>

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
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**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 1:11 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David  
**Subject:** FW: Japan Distribution as of 3/25/11

As of 3/25/11

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Timothy Riley  
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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 4:59 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Shane, Raeann; Decker, David; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** RE: Follow up to today's NRC conference call

Thanks very much.

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 4:55 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Shane, Raeann; Decker, David; Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Follow up to today's NRC conference call

Michal,

Here is the response to your question today regarding the increased prioritization of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi:

The main source of information for the prioritization table has not been updated, but the Assessment report and the analysis by the RST led to a decision to assign a revised priority to Units 1 through 4. Unit 1 became priority 1 based on the fact that primary containment integrity can still be preserved, if the responders take the correct actions to inject to the RPV and Primary containment. Unit 2 is priority 2 because of the apparent damage to primary containment and the other barriers to release, requiring continued attention to cool the core and provide water to the primary containment to minimize potential for release. Unit 3 is priority 3, because primary containment may be OK but continued attention is required to pursue core cooling and injection. Unit 4 is priority 4 because of progress in addressing the spent fuel pool heat removal requirements, and indicated SFP area temperatures of less than 100degrees C.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
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A0/155

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 6:01 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Japan Distribution 3/25/11 update

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[michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov](mailto:michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov); [michael.biagi@mail.house.gov](mailto:michael.biagi@mail.house.gov); [michael.weems@mail.house.gov](mailto:michael.weems@mail.house.gov);  
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[nathan.rea@mail.house.gov](mailto:nathan.rea@mail.house.gov); [Neena.Imam@alexander.senate.gov](mailto:Neena.Imam@alexander.senate.gov); [neil\\_chatterjee@mcconnell.senate.gov](mailto:neil_chatterjee@mcconnell.senate.gov);  
[pablo.duran@mail.house.gov](mailto:pablo.duran@mail.house.gov); [Patrick.Lehman@johanns.senate.gov](mailto:Patrick.Lehman@johanns.senate.gov); [Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov](mailto:Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov);  
[Philip.Moore@boozman.senate.gov](mailto:Philip.Moore@boozman.senate.gov); [Rob.Blair@mail.house.gov](mailto:Rob.Blair@mail.house.gov); [ruth\\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov](mailto:ruth_vanmark@epw.senate.gov);  
[ryan.tracy@mail.house.gov](mailto:ryan.tracy@mail.house.gov); [Sam.Fowler@energy.senate.gov](mailto:Sam.Fowler@energy.senate.gov); [Sandra.Luff@sessions.senate.gov](mailto:Sandra.Luff@sessions.senate.gov);  
[sarah\\_neimeyer@durbin.senate.gov](mailto:sarah_neimeyer@durbin.senate.gov); [Scott.Tranter@mail.house.gov](mailto:Scott.Tranter@mail.house.gov); [shane.skelton@mail.house.gov](mailto:shane.skelton@mail.house.gov);  
[Shea.Loper@barrasso.senate.gov](mailto:Shea.Loper@barrasso.senate.gov); (b)(6) [shimmy.stein@mail.house.gov](mailto:shimmy.stein@mail.house.gov);  
[taunia.berquam@mail.house.gov](mailto:taunia.berquam@mail.house.gov); [tuley.wright@mail.house.gov](mailto:tuley.wright@mail.house.gov); [Tyler.Owens@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Tyler.Owens@appro.senate.gov);  
[vance\\_serchuk@hsgac.senate.gov](mailto:vance_serchuk@hsgac.senate.gov); [vic.edgerton@mail.house.gov](mailto:vic.edgerton@mail.house.gov); [will.hupman@mail.house.gov](mailto:will.hupman@mail.house.gov);  
[wyndee.parker@mail.house.gov](mailto>wyndee.parker@mail.house.gov); [Mitchell.Vakerics@mail.house.gov](mailto:Mitchell.Vakerics@mail.house.gov); [christopher.king@mail.house.gov](mailto:christopher.king@mail.house.gov);  
[Alexander.McDonough@reid.senate.gov](mailto:Alexander.McDonough@reid.senate.gov); [Jaime.shimek@murray.senate.gov](mailto:Jaime.shimek@murray.senate.gov); [Brendon.Plack@rpc.senate.gov](mailto:Brendon.Plack@rpc.senate.gov);

Dan.Pearson@mail.house.gov; john.ohly@mail.house.gov; Erin.Alexander@mail.house.gov;  
keith.barnicle@mail.house.gov; Franzw@coons.senate.gov; erick\_lutt@benneison.senate.gov;  
Greg.Dotson@mail.house.gov; Alison.Cassady@mail.house.gov;

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 26, 2011 7:44 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Bradford, Anna  
**Subject:** Re: Materials

YM and spent fuel storage in general will come up at both approps hearing, most loudly at HAC. Recommend him reading over the talking points on CR decision, what authority does he have... Why no decision from Commission... etc.

Also, Rep. Olver could very well pick up the VY mantel a la a milder Sanders at the HAC hearing, so his VY prep will serve him well for that hearing as well.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**To:** Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Bradford, Anna  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 26 19:27:50 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Materials

Ok, let's work something up but we need to let State take the lead talking publicly about it. This is not an urgent trip based on any change in the status at the plant. It is quick because he needs to be back to testify and he's going to show our continuing support and solidarity with our Japanese colleagues, to touch base with our team, and to meet with the Ambassador Roos as well as Govt of Japan officials about the ongoing mitigation effort.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Brenner, Eliot  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela; Bradford, Anna  
**Sent:** Sat Mar 26 18:40:37 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Materials

At the risk of stating the obvious, at some point, as a hedge on this getting out which it will, we'll need a few bullets on what prompted this impromptu flight to Afghanistan, I mean Tokyo, what he's doing there, if he's meeting with NISA, JNES, going to near the plant, etc.

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Saturday, March 26, 2011 6:22 PM  
To: Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
Cc: Coggins, Angela; Bradford, Anna  
Subject: Re: Materials

Yes, it is low key. Up to embassy to decide on press.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Brenner, Eliot  
To: Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
Cc: Coggins, Angela; Bradford, Anna  
Sent: Sat Mar 26 17:17:29 2011  
Subject: Re: Materials

Seismic QA, anything that gives background on EP and 50 miles, I have latest on seismic and could forward in about an hour.

Is this trip on QT?

Eliot Brenner  
Director, Office of Public Affairs  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Protecting People and the Environment  
301 415 8200

C: (b)(6)

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua  
To: Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Brenner, Eliot  
Cc: Coggins, Angela; Bradford, Anna  
Sent: Sat Mar 26 17:11:28 2011  
Subject: Materials

It is possible that GBJ will be leaving tonight or tomorrow morning for Japan, returning Tuesday afternoon. What is the best thing for him to take to read in preparation for the hearing?

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 26, 2011 10:05 PM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** Fw: Follow up to today's NRC conference call

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** [michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov](mailto:michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov) <[michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov](mailto:michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov)>  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Shane, Raeann; Decker, David; Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 16:55:08 2011  
**Subject:** Follow up to today's NRC conference call

Michal,

Here is the response to your question today regarding the increased prioritization of Unit 1 at Fukushima Daiichi:

The main source of information for the prioritization table has not been updated, but the Assessment report and the analysis by the RST led to a decision to assign a revised priority to Units 1 through 4. Unit 1 became priority 1 based on the fact that primary containment integrity can still be preserved, if the responders take the correct actions to inject to the RPV and Primary containment. Unit 2 is priority 2 because of the apparent damage to primary containment and the other barriers to release, requiring continued attention to cool the core and provide water to the primary containment to minimize potential for release. Unit 3 is priority 3, because primary containment may be OK but continued attention is required to pursue core cooling and injection. Unit 4 is priority 4 because of progress in addressing the spent fuel pool heat removal requirements, and indicated SFP area temperatures of less than 100degrees C.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 7:34 AM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan; Bradford, Anna  
**Cc:** Brenner, Eliot; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Chairman Jaczko press statement

Susan, can we please add the fact that he just traveled there, as well as the points below, to his hearing statements?

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Chang, Benjamin <ChangBE@state.gov>  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Wall, Marc M <WallMM@state.gov>; Zumwalt, James P <ZumwaltJP@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Fuller, Matthew G <FullerMG@state.gov>; Brenner, Eliot; Phillips, Leslie M <PhillipsLM@state.gov>; Dorman, Dan; Foggie, Kirk; Webster, Jessica M (TDY/ECN) <TDYWebsterJM@state.gov>; Monninger, John  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 28 06:58:21 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Chairman Jaczko press statement

For D.C colleagues (and repeating for some in Tokyo):

Visit of NRC Chairman Jaczko: The Chairman met with GOJ officials from the Prime Minister's Office, NISA, and TEPCO. There was no press coverage – no camera sprays nor stakeouts (as low-key as it gets). The Embassy just issued the statement below. The GOJ will only reply if asked and will echo the same points.

The Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dr. Gregory Jaczko, traveled to Tokyo on March 28 to convey directly to his Japanese counterparts a message of support and cooperation, and to assess the current situation.

Following his meetings with senior Japanese government and TEPCO officials, Chairman Jaczko said, "Our nuclear experts are working closely with their Japanese counterparts, and we both continue to share expert analysis as we move forward to address this challenge. I reconfirmed in my meetings that we are prepared to provide any assistance we can in the days to come."

Chairman Jaczko further added, "The unprecedented challenge before us remains serious and our best experts remain fully engaged to help Japan address the situation."

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Chang, Benjamin  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 02:49 AM  
**To:** 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>; Wall, Marc M; Zumwalt, James P  
**Cc:** Fuller, Matthew G; 'Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov' <Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov>; Phillips, Leslie M; 'Dan.Dorman@nrc.gov' <Dan.Dorman@nrc.gov>; 'Kirk.Foggie@nrc.gov' <Kirk.Foggie@nrc.gov>; Webster, Jessica M (TDY/ECN); 'John.Monninger@nrc.gov' <John.Monninger@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Chairman Jaczko travel



The latest statement draft is below, tweaked a bit - this format, while different from our standard out of Washington, better feeds the Japanese press - they would report quotes directly as printed below for stories...  
The Ambassador and Chairman will review one more time after this afternoon's meetings.

---  
Embassy Tokyo Press Statement on the visit of NRC Chairman Jaczko to Tokyo

(b)(5)

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 07:53 PM  
To: Chang, Benjamin; Wall, Marc M; Zumwalt, James P  
Cc: Fuller, Matthew G; Brenner, Eliot <Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov>; Phillips, Leslie M; Dorman, Dan <Dan.Dorman@nrc.gov>; Foggie, Kirk <Kirk.Foggie@nrc.gov>; Webster, Jessica M (TDY/ECN); Monninger, John <John.Monninger@nrc.gov>  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

+John Monninger

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Chang, Benjamin <ChangBE@state.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua; Wall, Marc M <WallMM@state.gov>; Zumwalt, James P <ZumwaltJP@state.gov>  
Cc: Fuller, Matthew G <FullerMG@state.gov>; Brenner, Eliot; Phillips, Leslie M <PhillipsLM@state.gov>; Dorman, Dan; Foggie, Kirk; Webster, Jessica M (TDY/ECN) <TDYWebsterJM@state.gov>  
Sent: Sun Mar 27 19:50:35 2011  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

(Adding a few NRC folks to avoid multiple lists)

Do we have a latest schedule?

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 08:46 AM  
To: Chang, Benjamin; Wall, Marc M; Zumwalt, James P

Cc: Fuller, Matthew G; Brenner, Eliot <Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov>; Phillips, Leslie M  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

Ben - looks good from here. Thanks, Josh

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Chang, Benjamin <ChangBE@state.gov>  
To: Wall, Marc M <WallMM@state.gov>; Batkin, Joshua; Zumwalt, James P <ZumwaltJP@state.gov>  
Cc: Fuller, Matthew G <FullerMG@state.gov>; Brenner, Eliot; Phillips, Leslie M <PhillipsLM@state.gov>  
Sent: Sun Mar 27 04:26:51 2011  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

(+ Leslie, now in Tokyo)

A draft press plan - comments welcome:

Visit of NRC Chairman Jaczko 3-28-11

Press posture

Before arrival (note the Embassy has notified the Japanese government of his visit and is working on his schedule.):

- The NRC is not issuing any media advisory or announcement of the visit.
- If asked, they will confirm on background and refer inquiries for further details to the Embassy.
- If pressed on the short duration of the trip, they will point out that the Chairman is testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Wednesday.

Embassy is not issuing any announcement of his visit.

If asked, we will, on background:

- confirm his visit,
- note that he is visiting his team and Japanese officials to demonstrate at the highest level our continued support and close cooperation.

Monday's Schedule:

It is likely that the Chairman will encounter press (reporters & cameras) as he exits his meetings at either the NISA, TEPCO, the Prime Minister's Office, or the Cabinet.

There may also be a camera spray laid on at the top of one of the meetings [NRC/ECON – can you raise this question with our counterparts? We would not press for one but it is their prerogative.]

The Chairman would not speak to the press but rather the Embassy will release a statement in his name at the conclusion of his meetings [worth considering issuing that statement before the Cabinet meeting given the late hour].

Draft press statement elements:

- I traveled to Tokyo today to convey directly to our Japanese friends a message of support and cooperation, and to visit our team here to express my appreciation for all they are doing as we work together to resolve this crisis.
- Our nuclear experts are working side-by-side with their Japanese counterparts, and we continue to share scientific information as we move forward to resolve this challenge.
- We will continue to stand with the people of Japan as they overcome this tragedy, and we stand ready to continue to provide any assistance we can in the days to come.
- As President Obama said, we will stand with the people of Japan as they recover from this hardship and rebuild their great nation; the friendship and alliance between our two nations is unshakable.

----- Original Message -----

From: Chang, Benjamin  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 01:30 AM  
To: Wall, Marc M; 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>; Zumwalt, James P  
Cc: Fuller, Matthew G; 'Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov' <Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov>  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

Thank you.

All inquiries to the press section will come to me...

----- Original Message -----

From: Wall, Marc M  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 01:25 AM  
To: Chang, Benjamin; 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>; Zumwalt, James P  
Cc: Fuller, Matthew G; 'Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov' <Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov>  
Subject: RE: Chairman Jaczko travel

We've informed MOFA, the Kantei, NISA, and TEPCO.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Chang, Benjamin  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 12:44 PM  
To: 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov'; Zumwalt, James P  
Cc: Wall, Marc M; Fuller, Matthew G; 'Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov'  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

Thanks

NRC is not issuing any sort of media advisory on the visit.

Do we know when we are informing the Japanese of the visit?

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Saturday, March 26, 2011 11:29 PM  
To: Chang, Benjamin; Zumwalt, James P  
Cc: Wall, Marc M; Fuller, Matthew G; Brenner, Eliot <Eliot.Brenner@nrc.gov>  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

+Eliot Brenner, NRC public affairs director.

Ben, good to talk to you. Sounds like you have a good plan and if we're asked about the trip here, we'll simply confirm on background that he's coming out to meet with US and GOJ counterparts, refer folks to the embassy for further details, and be ready to correct any mistaken notions that it is some sort of urgent trip by pointing out it is short simply because of his full schedule midweek, including testifying before the Senate Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee on Wednesday morning.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Chang, Benjamin <ChangBE@state.gov>  
To: Zumwalt, James P <ZumwaltJP@state.gov>; Batkin, Joshua  
Cc: Wall, Marc M <WallMM@state.gov>; Fuller, Matthew G <FullerMG@state.gov>  
Sent: Sat Mar 26 22:44:51 2011  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

Hi, Joshua. We are primed here to be of support for the visit and the messaging.

(b)(5)

Ben

----- Original Message -----

From: Zumwalt, James P  
Sent: Saturday, March 26, 2011 10:33 PM  
To: 'Batkin, Joshua' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>; Chang, Benjamin  
Cc: Wall, Marc M; Fuller, Matthew G  
Subject: RE: Chairman Jaczko travel

Joshua --

(b)(5)

Ben Chang has been handling the public affairs aspects of this visit for the Embassy and I'll ask him to contact you directly to discuss.

Appreciate Ben if you could continue to cc this group on press issues.

Jim

James P. Zumwalt  
Deputy Chief of Mission  
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo  
1-10-5 Akasaka  
Minato ku Tokyo 107-8420  
(03) 3224-5550  
<http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/zblog/e/zblog-email.html>

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 11:31 AM  
To: Zumwalt, James P  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

Thank you. Please let the us know how public you'd like the visit to be. The Chairman's expectation is that it will be low-key but he's also comfortable doing press if you think it would be beneficial. If so, can we ask for the support of the press person at the embassy whom the WH speaks highly of? Thank you and your staff again for all the support - the Chairman's looking forward to the visit. Please let me know if you or the Ambassador have any questions prior to his arrival monday morning.

Thanks,  
Josh

(b)(6)

c

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Zumwalt, James P <ZumwaltJP@state.gov>  
To: JapanEmbassy, TaskForce <JapanEmbassyTaskForce@state.gov>; Batkin, Joshua  
Cc: Wert, Robert A <WertRA@state.gov>; Bare, Robert A <BareRA@state.gov>; Hardin, Alexander K <HardinAK2@state.gov>; Wall, Marc M <WallMM@state.gov>; Forbes, James A <ForbesJA@state.gov>; Howard, E. Bruce <HowardEB@state.gov>; Cherry, Ronald C <CherryRC@state.gov>; Duncan, Aleshia D <DuncanAD@state.gov>; Fuller, Matthew G <FullerMG@state.gov>; Angelov, Bonnie A <AngelovBA@state.gov>; Basalla, Suzanne I <BasallaSI@state.gov>; Deming, Rust M <DemingRM@state.gov>; Pace, Patti; Coggins, Angela; Foggie, Kirk; Bradford, Anna; Webster, Jessica M (Hanoi) <WebsterJM@state.gov>  
Sent: Sat Mar 26 22:13:40 2011  
Subject: RE: Chairman Jaczko travel

Looping in Jessica Webster who is also working with the NRC team on planning this visit.

James P. Zumwalt  
Deputy Chief of Mission  
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo  
1-10-5 Akasaka  
Minato ku Tokyo 107-8420  
(03) 3224-5550

<http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/zblog/e/zblog-email.html>

-----Original Message-----

From: JapanEmbassy, TaskForce

Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 9:56 AM

To: 'Batkin, Joshua'; JapanEmbassy, TaskForce

Cc: Wert, Robert A; Bare, Robert A; Hardin, Alexander K; Wall, Marc M; Forbes, James A; Howard, E. Bruce; Cherry, Ronald C; Duncan, Aleshia D; Zumwalt, James P; Fuller, Matthew G; Angelov, Bonnie A; Basalla, Suzanne I; Deming, Rust M; Pace, Patti; Coggins, Angela; Foggie, Kirk; Bradford, Anna

Subject: RE: Chairman Jaczko travel

Thanks Josh. I just spoke with Kirk Foggie and he will work directly with the Embassy's General Services Office (Robert Bare and Alex Hardin) on ground transportation and hotel reservations.

Cheers,  
Mike

This email is UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]

Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 9:43 AM

To: JapanEmbassy, TaskForce

Cc: Wert, Robert A; Bare, Robert A; Hardin, Alexander K; Wall, Marc M; Forbes, James A; Howard, E. Bruce; Cherry, Ronald C; Duncan, Aleshia D; Zumwalt, James P; Fuller, Matthew G; Angelov, Bonnie A; Basalla, Suzanne I; Deming, Rust M; Pace, Patti; Coggins, Angela; Foggie, Kirk; Bradford, Anna

Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

Travelers: NRC Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko traveling on a diplomatic passport and his Policy Director Angela B. Coggins traveling on an official passport. (Neither have visas). Can you please also help with in-country transportation and hotel reservations? Please let me know if you need additional information and thank you so much for your assistance on short notice.

Here is their flight information:

Travel to Japan:

Saturday March 26th

United 924

IAD – LHR

10:05PM – 10:15AM

Sunday March 27th

Virgin Atlantic 900

LHR – Narita (NRT)

1:45PM – 9:30AM (Monday March 28th)

Return Travel to US:

Tuesday March 29

United 9682

NRT – IAD

11:05AM – 10:40AM (Same day)

Sincerely,

Josh

(b)(6)

C

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: JapanEmbassy, TaskForce <JapanEmbassyTaskForce@state.gov>

To: Batkin, Joshua

Cc: Wert, Robert A <WertRA@state.gov>; Bare, Robert A <BareRA@state.gov>; Hardin, Alexander K <HardinAK2@state.gov>; Wall, Marc M <WallMM@state.gov>; Forbes, James A <ForbesJA@state.gov>; Howard, E. Bruce <HowardEB@state.gov>; Cherry, Ronald C <CherryRC@state.gov>; Duncan, Aleshia D <DuncanAD@state.gov>; Zumwalt, James P <ZumwaltJP@state.gov>; JapanEmbassy, TaskForce <JapanEmbassyTaskForce@state.gov>; Fuller, Matthew G <FullerMG@state.gov>; Angelov, Bonnie A <AngelovBA@state.gov>; Basalla, Suzanne I <BasallaSI@state.gov>; Deming, Rust M <DemingRM@state.gov>

Sent: Sat Mar 26 20:24:13 2011

Subject: RE: Chairman Jaczko travel

Josh,

Greetings from Tokyo. Could you please send us the flight information for the chairman and the names of the people in the traveling party?

Thanks,  
Mike Daschbach  
Embassy Japan Emergency Command Center

This email is UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Forbes, James A

Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 9:08 AM

To: Bare, Robert A; JapanEmbassy, TaskForce; Hardin, Alexander K

Cc: Wert, Robert A

Subject: RE: Chairman Jaczko travel

And the number of people accompanying the chairman?

This email is UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Bare, Robert A  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 9:07 AM  
To: JapanEmbassy, TaskForce; Hardin, Alexander K  
Cc: Forbes, James A; Wert, Robert A  
Subject: Re: Chairman Jaczko travel

Can the task force find out arrival details? Milair or commair?

Thanks,

Robert

----- Original Message -----

From: JapanEmbassy, TaskForce  
To: Hardin, Alexander K; Bare, Robert A  
Cc: Forbes, James A; Wert, Robert A  
Sent: Sat Mar 26 19:58:57 2011  
Subject: FW: Chairman Jaczko travel

This email is UNCLASSIFIED-----Original Message-----

From: Horowitz, Paul D  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 8:56 AM  
To: JapanEmbassy, TaskForce  
Subject: Fw: Chairman Jaczko travel

----- Original Message -----

From: Cherry, Ronald C  
To: Wall, Marc M; Horowitz, Paul D; Howard, E. Bruce; Duncan, Aleshia D  
Sent: Sat Mar 26 19:54:57 2011  
Subject: FW: Chairman Jaczko travel

Please note NRC Chairman visit -- could be tomorrow.

SBU

This email is UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: Russel, Daniel R. [mailto:Daniel\_R.\_Russel@nss.eop.gov]  
Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 8:06 AM  
To: Cherry, Ronald C; 'Steven.Aoki@nnsa.doe.gov'



Subject: FW: Chairman Jaczko travel

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: Russel, Daniel R.

Sent: Saturday, March 26, 2011 6:44 PM

To: 'Batkin, Joshua'; John V. Roos (roosj@state.gov); James Zumwalt (ZumwaltJP@state.gov); Matthew G Fuller (FullerMG@state.gov); Angelov, Bonnie A; Basalla, Suzanne I

Cc: Jaczko, Gregory; Bader, Jeffrey A.; Rust Deming (demingrm@state.gov); Donovan, Joseph R

Subject: RE: Chairman Jaczko travel

Josh - Adding Embassy Tokyo contacts who can work directly with you. Also adding State Department.

-----Original Message-----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]

Sent: Saturday, March 26, 2011 6:37 PM

To: Russel, Daniel R.; Bader, Jeffrey A.

Cc: Jaczko, Gregory

Subject: Chairman Jaczko travel

Gentleman - The Chairman is prepared to travel to Japan this weekend. The itinerary that works best is a departure later tonight, arrival in Tokyo in the morning on Monday (japan time) and a departure mid-day on Tuesday (japan time). Please confirm that works for the Embassy and we'll get him there. Thank you, Josh

Joshua C. Batkin

Chief of Staff

Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko

(301) 415-1820

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**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 8:43 AM  
**To:** RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC; Burnell, Scott; McIntyre, David  
**Cc:** LIA11 Hoc  
**Subject:** RE: Awareness: Marshall Shield to President Obama: I MUST BE SENT TO JAPAN TODAY!

**Sensitivity:** Confidential

**Categories:** FOIA

In my opinion, this requires no action from the NRC.

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**From:** RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC [mailto:RMTPACTSU\_ELNRC@ofda.gov]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 26, 2011 11:37 AM  
**To:** Harrington, Holly; Burnell, Scott; McIntyre, David  
**Cc:** LIA11 Hoc  
**Subject:** Awareness: Marshall Shield to President Obama: I MUST BE SENT TO JAPAN TODAY!  
**Sensitivity:** Confidential

Holly, Scott, David:

I'm sure that you are well aware of this individual and his messages. USAID has received over 50 messages in the last few days and has reported him to their Security Office. I would, however, like to draw your attention his latest e-mail which specifically names the NRC.

Thanks!  
Michael I. Dudek

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**From:** Marshall Shield [mailto:corp@myshield.us]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 9:07 PM  
**To:** RMTPACTSU\_ELC  
**Cc:** president@whitehouse.gov; The.Secretary@hq.doe.gov; 'Marshall Shield'  
**Subject:** President Obama: I MUST BE SENT TO JAPAN TODAY!  
**Importance:** High  
**Sensitivity:** Confidential

**March 25, 2011 6:00 PM PST USA**

To: President Obama  
Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki  
Secretary of Energy: Dr. Steven Chu: Japan - IAEA  
Corporate Executives: Tokyo Electric Power  
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
IEEE

From: Marshall Shield

Subject: Expertise to solve nuclear reactor problems: Second to NONE!

I spent a year in Japan and loved every second I was there, a wonderful country with wonderful persons....I am looking forward to working with the Nuclear problems has a GS-15, I know what to do and what equipment it will take to get all the reactors under control, plus I will stay until all reactors are stable!

I've sent my information to the above, as of today, many have responded: Marshall Shield is the BEST person to be sent to work with the Tokyo Electric Power personnel.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission agrees with me! I've sent my documents: World Disaster – Nuclear Plants Survival and a request for a Task Force to support/advise/consult all nuclear plant owners/operators/engineers around the world. I am writing/compiling a book in all languages' for the countries that have/will have nuclear power plants, which includes the procedures described here:

### ***World Disasters – Nuclear Plants survival***

- What the owners/operators/engineers must do to protect their nuclear plants, so they can survive a natural disaster
- Instant response team to support them, available 24/7, anywhere on Planet Earth
- Steps to recover: Power/Computers/Cooling
- Schedule/Steps to provide proper shut down to stable conditions
- Importance to have backup power/water pumps online: 24/7
- These back up units have to be protected, to preclude their destruction during a natural disaster
- Operations/turnover from disaster situation to shut down/standby
- Source for all hardware/software/systems to help any troubled reactor
- To provide instant support (During Disaster Support) via the fastest transportation available
- Training for Owners\*Operators\*Engineers\*Technicians to ensure a faster/proper recovery process

**I must be sent to help!**

**I know how to seal the radiation, to STOP it from getting into the atmosphere/environment!**

**What is the cost to send me? (Pennies)**

**Or**

The probable cost to Japan & the Environment if you don't? (Trillions)!

I am available to fly from SeaTac or US Air Force Base McCord  
or US Navy Base Whidbey Island Naval base within hours!

I am the best man to solve these critical problems and am  
available to go today!

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular:  (b)(6)

Email: [ceo@myshield.us](mailto:ceo@myshield.us)

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 10:56 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Joseph, Avenel; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Subject:** RE: [LIKELY\_SPAM]Daily Plant Status Report - 3/28/2011

Michal,  
I spoke briefly with Don Cool this morning about these questions and those from Saturday also about the presence of short-lived isotopes. He is not prepared to speculate about what the presence of these short-lived isotopes could indicate, because there have been reading errors, conflicted reports, and large chunks of unknowns. It's just too early to tell.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 9:45 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Joseph, Avenel; Fischhoff, Ilya; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: [LIKELY\_SPAM]Daily Plant Status Report - 3/28/2011

We have asked your first question and will forward your additional questions. Will get back as soon as we learn something. Thanks

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 9:13 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Joseph, Avenel; Fischhoff, Ilya; Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Re: [LIKELY\_SPAM]Daily Plant Status Report - 3/28/2011

Good morning

Just thought I would check in to see if you had any more clarity on whether it was possible for these short-lived isotopes to be coming from the spent fuel pool. Additionally, does the NRC have confidence that the initial unit 2 measurements were in fact in error? Finally, I understand they've started to test for plutonium - any results yet?

Thanks  
Michal  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>

**To:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>

**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>; Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Shane, Raeann <Raeann.Shane@nrc.gov>; Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>; Dacus, Eugene <Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov>; Decker, David <David.Decker@nrc.gov>; Weil, Jenny <Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov>

**Sent:** Mon Mar 28 05:13:42 2011

**Subject:** [LIKELY\_SPAM]Daily Plant Status Report - 3/28/2011

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 12:54 PM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Dacus, Eugene; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** RE: Japan Distribution 3/28/11 update

Tim has been keeping up with this. Keep in mind, this is for press releases and other publicly available distribution and not the daily plant status reports. Those reports, which I distribute every morning, only go to designated Oversight and Appropriations staff. Thanks

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 12:51 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** RE: Japan Distribution 3/28/11 update

Not sure who is the keeper of the list, now that we aren't in the EOC. Could we please add Diane Berry ([diane.berry@mail.house.gov](mailto:diane.berry@mail.house.gov)) from the House Homeland Security Committee to the list? I thought she was on there but don't see her name. Thank you!

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 6:01 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Decker, David; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Japan Distribution 3/25/11 update

[abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov](mailto:abigail.pinkele@mail.house.gov); [adam\\_christensen@feinstein.senate.gov](mailto:adam_christensen@feinstein.senate.gov); [Adam J. Arguelles@who.eop.gov](mailto:Adam.J.Arguelles@who.eop.gov);  
[ali\\_nouri@webb.senate.gov](mailto:ali_nouri@webb.senate.gov); [andrew.wallace@tomudall.senate.gov](mailto:andrew.wallace@tomudall.senate.gov); [Andy.Zach@mail.house.gov](mailto:Andy.Zach@mail.house.gov);  
[Annie Caputo@epw.senate.gov](mailto:Annie.Caputo@epw.senate.gov); [ashley.martin@mail.house.gov](mailto:ashley.martin@mail.house.gov); [avenel.joseph@mail.house.gov](mailto:avenel.joseph@mail.house.gov);  
[ben\\_dunham@lautenberg.senate.gov](mailto:ben_dunham@lautenberg.senate.gov); [Ben Rosenbaum@gillibrand.senate.gov](mailto:Ben.Rosenbaum@gillibrand.senate.gov); [Beth.Osborne@mail.house.gov](mailto:Beth.Osborne@mail.house.gov);  
[betsy.christian@mail.house.gov](mailto:betsy.christian@mail.house.gov); [Bettina Poirier@epw.senate.gov](mailto:Bettina.Poirier@epw.senate.gov); (b)(6)  
[Bob.Schwalbach@mail.house.gov](mailto:Bob.Schwalbach@mail.house.gov); [bob\\_simon@energy.senate.gov](mailto:bob_simon@energy.senate.gov); [brad.grantz@mail.house.gov](mailto:brad.grantz@mail.house.gov);  
[brian.skretny@mail.house.gov](mailto:brian.skretny@mail.house.gov); [Brian Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov](mailto:Brian.Clifford@barrasso.senate.gov); [bryan zumwalt@vitter.senate.gov](mailto:bryan_zumwalt@vitter.senate.gov);  
[Carrie Apostolou@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Carrie.Apostolou@appro.senate.gov); [Chris Carrillo@Feinstein.senate.gov](mailto:Chris.Carrillo@Feinstein.senate.gov); [chris\\_miller@reid.senate.gov](mailto:chris_miller@reid.senate.gov);  
(b)(6) [christopher\\_griffin@lieberman.senate.gov](mailto:christopher_griffin@lieberman.senate.gov);  
[conrad\\_schatte@alexander.senate.gov](mailto:conrad_schatte@alexander.senate.gov); [cory.hicks@mail.house.gov](mailto:cory.hicks@mail.house.gov); [Curtis Swager@alexander.senate.gov](mailto:Curtis.Swager@alexander.senate.gov);  
[darren\\_springer@sanders.senate.gov](mailto:darren_springer@sanders.senate.gov); [david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov](mailto:david.mccarthy@mail.house.gov); [Doug Clapp@appro.senate.gov](mailto:Doug.Clapp@appro.senate.gov);  
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[elizabeth\\_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov](mailto:elizabeth_craddock@landrieu.senate.gov); [eric.hultman@mail.house.gov](mailto:eric.hultman@mail.house.gov); [ethan.rosenkranz@mail.house.gov](mailto:ethan.rosenkranz@mail.house.gov);  
[gary.andres@mail.house.gov](mailto:gary.andres@mail.house.gov); [gary.kline@mail.house.gov](mailto:gary.kline@mail.house.gov); [greg.dotson@mail.house.gov](mailto:greg.dotson@mail.house.gov); [hill.thomas@mail.house.gov](mailto:hill.thomas@mail.house.gov);  
[ilya.fischhoff@mail.house.gov](mailto:ilya.fischhoff@mail.house.gov); [isaac\\_edwards@energy.senate.gov](mailto:isaac_edwards@energy.senate.gov); [james.decker@mail.house.gov](mailto:james.decker@mail.house.gov);  
[Jamie Long@whitehouse.senate.gov](mailto:Jamie.Long@whitehouse.senate.gov); [Janine.Benner@mail.house.gov](mailto:Janine.Benner@mail.house.gov); [Jared brown@hatch.senate.gov](mailto:Jared.brown@hatch.senate.gov);  
[jasmine\\_hunt@durbin.senate.gov](mailto:jasmine_hunt@durbin.senate.gov); [jay.cranford@mail.house.gov](mailto:jay.cranford@mail.house.gov); [jeanette\\_lyman@tomudall.senate.gov](mailto:jeanette_lyman@tomudall.senate.gov);  
[jeff.baran@mail.house.gov](mailto:jeff.baran@mail.house.gov); [jen.stewart@mail.house.gov](mailto:jen.stewart@mail.house.gov); [jeremiah\\_baumann@merckley.senate.gov](mailto:jeremiah_baumann@merckley.senate.gov);  
[jesse.lashbrook@mail.house.gov](mailto:jesse.lashbrook@mail.house.gov); [Jessica Smith@crapo.senate.gov](mailto:Jessica.Smith@crapo.senate.gov); [jetta.wong@mail.house.gov](mailto:jetta.wong@mail.house.gov);  
[jim.richardson@mail.house.gov](mailto:jim.richardson@mail.house.gov); [john.billings@mail.house.gov](mailto:john.billings@mail.house.gov); [john.rainbolt@mail.house.gov](mailto:john.rainbolt@mail.house.gov); [JohnM@mail.house.gov](mailto:JohnM@mail.house.gov);  
[jonathan.levenshus@mail.house.gov](mailto:jonathan.levenshus@mail.house.gov); [jonathan.phillips@mail.house.gov](mailto:jonathan.phillips@mail.house.gov); [Jonathan Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov](mailto:Jonathan.Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov);  
[jordan.downs@mail.house.gov](mailto:jordan.downs@mail.house.gov); [Joseph.Levin@mail.house.gov](mailto:Joseph.Levin@mail.house.gov); [jt.jezierski@mail.house.gov](mailto:jt.jezierski@mail.house.gov);  
[karen.wayland@mail.house.gov](mailto:karen.wayland@mail.house.gov); [karen\\_billups@energy.senate.gov](mailto:karen_billups@energy.senate.gov); [Katherine Field@Feinstein.senate.gov](mailto:Katherine.Field@Feinstein.senate.gov);  
[kathryn\\_isaacson@sessions.senate.gov](mailto:kathryn_isaacson@sessions.senate.gov); [Kathy.Dedrick@epw.senate.gov](mailto:Kathy.Dedrick@epw.senate.gov); [katie.murtha@mail.house.gov](mailto:katie.murtha@mail.house.gov);

katie.ott@mail.house.gov; kimberly.betz@mail.house.gov; kyle.victor@mail.house.gov;  
laura\_haynes@carper.senate.gov; laurel.angell@mail.house.gov; lee.lilley@mail.house.gov;  
lindsay.mosshart@mail.house.gov; lisa.wright@mail.house.gov; (b)(6)  
Marc.Rigas@mail.house.gov; mariah.sixkiller@mail.house.gov; marty.gelfand@mail.house.gov;  
mary.frances.repko@mail.house.gov; mary.neumayr@mail.house.gov; maryam.brown@mail.house.gov;  
marybeth\_schultz@hsgac.senate.gov; matthew.kaplan@mail.house.gov; megan.bel@mail.house.gov;  
michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov; michael.biagi@mail.house.gov; michael.weems@mail.house.gov;  
micah.freedhoff@mail.house.gov; mike\_burke@cardin.senate.gov; natalie.farr@mail.house.gov;  
nathan.rea@mail.house.gov; Neena.Imam@alexander.senate.gov; neil\_chatterjee@mccconnell.senate.gov;  
pablo.duran@mail.house.gov; Patrick\_Lehman@johanns.senate.gov; Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov;  
Philip\_Moore@boozman.senate.gov; Rob.Blair@mail.house.gov; ruth\_vanmark@epw.senate.gov;  
ryan.tracy@mail.house.gov; Sam\_Fowler@energy.senate.gov; Sandra\_Luff@sessions.senate.gov;  
sarah\_neimeyer@durbin.senate.gov; Scott.Tranter@mail.house.gov; shane.skelton@mail.house.gov;  
Shea\_Loper@barrasso.senate.gov; (b)(6) shimmy.stein@mail.house.gov;  
taunja.berquam@mail.house.gov; tuley.wright@mail.house.gov; Tyler\_Owens@appro.senate.gov;  
vance\_serchuk@hsgac.senate.gov; vic.edgerton@mail.house.gov; will.hupman@mail.house.gov;  
wyndee.parker@mail.house.gov; Mitchell.Vakerics@mail.house.gov; christopher.king@mail.house.gov;  
Alexander\_McDonough@reid.senate.gov; Jaime\_shimek@murray.senate.gov; Brendon\_Plack@rpc.senate.gov;  
Dan.Pearson@mail.house.gov; john.ohly@mail.house.gov; Erin.Alexander@mail.house.gov;  
keith.barnicle@mail.house.gov; Franzw@coons.senate.gov; erick\_lutt@bennelson.senate.gov;  
Greg.Dotson@mail.house.gov; Alison.Cassady@mail.house.gov;



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**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 2:19 PM  
**To:** Shields, Albert  
**Subject:** RE: Nuclear Safety Discussion

Albert,

Rep. Carney probably recommended me as a possible panel member because, as a congressional affairs officer here at the NRC, I often communicate with his office on matters concerning the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear plants. However, such a discussion as you describe, would be best left to staff of the Executive Director for Operations. I have passed your request on to the applicable staff for consideration. I will provide you with a point of contact as soon as I have that information.

Eugene Dacus  
Sr. Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office: 301-415-1697  
Fax: 301-415-8571  
E-mail: [eugene.dacus@nrc.gov](mailto:eugene.dacus@nrc.gov)

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**From:** Shields, Albert [mailto:[Albert.Shields@mail.house.gov](mailto:Albert.Shields@mail.house.gov)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 5:52 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** Nuclear Safety Discussion

Good afternoon Mr. Dacus,

Congressman Carney asked me to reach out to you as a representative of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Our office is thinking of putting together a panel discussion about the safety of nuclear power plants. We think that with the emergency occurring in Japan earlier this month, Delaware residents have legitimate questions about the safety of the Salem nuclear power plant just across the river from our state in Salem, NJ.

Right now, we're just starting to work out the details. However, we've envisioned an evening panel discussion with 3-4 participants and a moderator. Congressman Carney would introduce the event and then let the participants and moderator handle questions and the discussion. We would very much like to have you or a representative from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission participate as a panelist. We're also reaching out to representatives from PSE&G/Exelon, the owners of the plant, and state and local officials for their perspective.

Do you know if this would be something your office would be interested in? We don't have a specific date or location yet, but we're trying to schedule the event for mid-April.

Thank you for any assistance you can give me.

Sincerely,

Albert Shields

**Albert Shields**  
Office of Congressman John Carney  
Delaware Press & Policy Advisor  
201 N. Walnut St., Ste. 107  
302.428.1902 (phone)  
[REDACTED] (b)(6) (Mobile)  
[Albert.Shields@mail.house.gov](mailto:Albert.Shields@mail.house.gov)  
[www.johncarney.house.gov](http://www.johncarney.house.gov)

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**From:** Coons, Albert <albert.coons@dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 3:52 PM  
**To:** Gardner, Patricia; LIA05 Hoc  
**Cc:** Coons, Albert; DeFelice, Anthony C; Horton, Douglas A; Purvis, James  
**Subject:** RE: Dissemination of Plan for 0654 Implementation to the NRC

I have sent this e-mail to Jim for his information. He has looped in Harry Sherwood

Albert Coons  
Lead Program Specialist  
HQ/NPD-THD-REPP  
FEMA  
202-212-2318  
(b)(6) (cell)  
703-305-0837 (fax)  
E-mail: [albert.coons@dhs.gov](mailto:albert.coons@dhs.gov)

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**From:** Gardner, Patricia [mailto:Patricia.Gardner@dhs.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 3:50 PM  
**To:** LIA05.Hoc@nrc.gov; Gardner, Patricia  
**Cc:** Coons, Albert; DeFelice, Anthony C; Horton, Douglas A; Purvis, James  
**Subject:** Re: Dissemination of Plan for 0654 Implementation to the NRC

That was a management decision not mine.  
Patti  
FEMA REPP 202-329-7573

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Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

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**From:** prvs=0610c37e9=LIA05.Hoc@nrc.gov <prvs=0610c37e9=LIA05.Hoc@nrc.gov>  
**To:** patricia.gardner@dhs.gov <Patricia.Gardner@dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** Coons, Albert <albert.coons@dhs.gov>; DeFelice, Anthony <anthony.defelice@dhs.gov>; Horton, Douglas A <Douglas.Horton@dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 28 15:35:27 2011  
**Subject:** Dissemination of Plan for 0654 Implementation to the NRC

Ms. Gardner,

FYI,

(b)(5)

Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300  
FEMA REP Liaison  
NRC Operations Center  
(301) 816-5187

\*\*\*\*\*~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~\*\*\*\*\*

~~DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY~~

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 9:29 PM  
**To:** Loyd, Susan  
**Subject:** Re: Written Testimony for HOUSE Approps Energy and Water on Thurs

Let's talk in the am.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 28 20:42:51 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Written Testimony for HOUSE Approps Energy and Water on Thurs

The copy is the last version but I wanted you to check the highlighted areas for accuracy.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Susan Loyd

(b)(6)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Loyd, Susan; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 28 17:49:29 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Written Testimony for HOUSE Approps Energy and Water on Thurs

Susan –

Were any changes other than the yellow-highlighted areas?

Amy

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**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 5:27 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Written Testimony for HOUSE Approps Energy and Water on Thurs

Amy and Becky:

Please check the yellow highlighted lines. Again, I need to be sure I am addressing the leaders correctly. Also need to be sure that he has indeed met with several of the subcommittee members? This written testimony is


essentially all budget and pretty much as it was for the 16<sup>th</sup>, and the ORAL testimony will have Japan and then transition to budget.

I am working on the two oral testimonies, and will have those for you tomorrow. But, you can circulate the written testimony for the House Approps Subcomm as soon as you are able to do so. Thanks!  
S.

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director  
Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Loyd@nrc.gov)

STATEMENT  
BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES  
MARCH 31, 2011

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**From:** Gibson, Kathy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 2:08 PM  
**To:** Burnell, Scott; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Armstrong, Kenneth  
**Attachments:** Kathy Halvey Gibson.vcf; image001.jpg


Scott/Amy,

We (RES/DSA) are coordinating answers on the following questions related to the AP article at the request of Mike Weber for DEDO and Chairman hearings tomorrow. Responses are due to EDO by COB today. I was wondering whether OPA or OCA have similar Q's and A's we can draw from or at least need to be consistent with?

1. 93 of the U.S. plants only had a 4-hour coping capacity for SBO. The rest could cope for 8 hours. Is this valid? (NRR)
2. Does this taken into consideration the B5b mitigating measures? (NRR, NSIR)
3. What power is available for SFP cooling in US plants? (Diesels, batteries, etc?) (NRR)
4. SOARCA insights relevant to AP article. (Charlie)
5. Was SBO considered among the scenarios that resulted in the U.S. decision to establish the nominal exposure pathway EPZ at 10 miles?) (NSIR, Trish)
6. Do we need a bigger EPZ? (NSIR, Trish)

Ken Armstrong is our staff lead, please copy him on anything you send to me.

Thanks,  
Kathy



Attachment Kathy Halvey Gibson.vcf(5196 bytes ) cannot be converted to PDF format.

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 3:59 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Draft Interim Response to Rep Markey (and others)

I can probably read tomorrow from hard copy. I am not going to either hearing.

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 3:59 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Draft Interim Response to Rep Markey (and others)

Amy,  
Here's the "base" letter that Roger has prepared to respond to the many letters regarding the Fukushima events. I relayed to him that Thursday was the earliest you'd have a chance to see it and we couldn't give concurrence yet.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 28, 2011 10:19 AM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Draft Interim Response to Rep Markey (and others)

Roger,  
Only 3 or 4 minor changes. I'm working on an answer regarding the Boxer hearing; I'll have to get back to you soon on that.  
Tim

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 9:52 AM  
**To:** Biggins, James; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Draft Interim Response to Rep Markey (and others)

Based on a meeting with Rebecca Schmidt, it was decided that for all the letters coming in that generally ask about Japan and request a review of the safety of the current fleet, we would provide an interim response, with more

information to follow as the task force analyses are completed. We agreed that interim responses would go to Markey, Kucinich, Boxer/Carper, and Lowey. (Since then Blumenthal has come in, and I think the interim might also apply there; haven't really read it carefully yet.)

I've used the 3 letters from Markey as my straw man for this interim response. It also includes a Markey-specific paragraph responding to his specific request for sitreps for members of congress and the public.

Once I get your comments/okay, I can move out on the other interim responses.

**TIM:** Rebecca was going to pursue trying to respond to the Boxer/Feinstein letter with a briefing. Has she been able to make that happen?

**JIM:** Please share with others in OGC who you think need to look at this.

Let me know if you have any questions. (I've also attached the 3 Markey incoming letters.)

**Roger S. Rihm**

**Communications and Performance Improvement Staff**

**Office of the Executive Director for Operations**

**US NRC**

**301.415.1717**

**[roger.rihm@nrc.gov](mailto:roger.rihm@nrc.gov)**

The Honorable Edward J. Markey

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

Sincerely

GBJ

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 6:03 PM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** RE: Three mile

According to the info digest, 1 year, but that does not seem right. The remaining tmi unit began operating in 1974...

Let me check Sam's book. However at a glance, it was not that old.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 6:00 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Three mile

How old was the plant when the accident occurred?

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 30, 2011 9:48 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Marty (b)(6) until Sunday

Ok. Tell Eric. We should schedule something for Marty on Monday am

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 30 09:45:28 2011  
**Subject:** Marty (b)(6) until Sunday

Eric is acting for him, so I will talk with him. Eric will likely reach out to Marty while on vacation to sort this out.

AP

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 30, 2011 9:33 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: HEARING 4/6 - House Energy & Commerce, Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee

Chr and Bill said Marty with Eric as backup. Update Bill's testimony from yesterday

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Batkin, Joshua  
**Cc:** Coggins, Angela  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 30 09:29:36 2011  
**Subject:** HEARING 4/6 - House Energy & Commerce, Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee

Just heard back from House E&C, O&I subcommittee that they ARE going to hold a hearing 4/6 on "to update Committee on U.S. government response to Fukushima Daiichi power plant incident, including plans for review of safety at U.S. plants." They understand that Marty or Eric would be the NRC witness, given GBJ and Bill's obligations and travel to CNS.

The Committee wants to nail down our witness today. Who shall we tap?

On written testimony, suggest refresh on Bill's written statement prepared for Senate Energy's "briefing."

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**From:** Leeds, Eric  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 30, 2011 9:55 AM  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Cc:** Weber, Michael; Ash, Darren; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Important - Congressional Hearing

**Follow Up Flag:** Follow up  
**Flag Status:** Completed

Marty –

Sorry to bother you (b)(6), but we need to make a decision on who will support the House Energy & Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation Hearing next Wednesday, April 6 on the Fukushima Event. Its either you or me. I'm happy to do it, but it's your call.

OCA asked for an answer either today or early tomorrow. If I do NOT hear back from you, I will put in my name.

Eric J. Leeds, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1270

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**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:58 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Fw: Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and Deputy Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change Heather Zichal, 3/30/2011

Here are the parts on nuclear that I could see on BB:

Q Nuclear power, Mr. Secretary, which the President talked about again today as being a required component; you've talked about that. Three weeks after what happened in Japan, are you convinced that TEPCO has that situation under control? And looking at the lessons for America, are you convinced that investors in America will ever look on nuclear as safe enough to build new plants?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, first, let me talk about the American nuclear reactors. We believe they are safe. The President has ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Agency to go back and be doubly sure -- that INPO, a very strong safety group, industry group in the United States, is looking and seeing what we can do. Within the Department of Energy, we're also adding to that.

So this terrible tragedy that happened in Japan -- one of the -- the fourth-largest earthquake in recorded history, one of the largest tsunamis, I'm sure, in recorded history -- will teach us some lessons and we will use those lessons going forward to make the current fleet of nuclear reactors safer, and we will also use those lessons to make any future reactors far safer.

And so we do this all the time whenever there's an accident like this, whether it be an airplane, an oil rig fire, anything. We go back, we learn lessons, and we push forward and say, okay, we're going to make it much safer.

With regard to TEPCO, I think that this is a very trying circumstance where we stand by and we're working very hard with them in any way we can to lend assistance or technical advice. We're not there on the ground, but we do have conversations with them -- both the NRC, the Department of Energy and others -- daily. And we are working very hard with them to mitigate any future potential risks as best we can. And so I can't really be sure of anything since I'm here and they're there. But, again, with regard to American reactors, we believe they are safe and as a result of this tragedy they're going to be safer.

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Q My second question -- following up on what Mark was asking about the risk of new -- of creating new nuclear facilities in this country. With the new -- since we've seen what's happening in Japan, are there any concerns about any new buildings, any new construction for nuclear facilities that they are not located in populated areas? Is that a concern, as well, for this country?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think what has happened in the past is -- what the public doesn't fully appreciate is many of these reactors were built, let's say, 40, 45 years ago in places which were not so populated, and the population kind of grew up around them. And so as we go forward and site places, that will always be a consideration. But let me also say that the newer reactors -- first, going back -- if you look at the current fleet of reactors, they are constantly being upgraded. A team of scientists and I toured one of them because it was a Mark I GE, that was a sister reactor to the one in Japan, and since they've been decommissioned many years, we actually can walk inside and get a feel for what was going on so that we could actually help and get a better firsthand experience about what might be possible. Even when we were touring this decommissioned reactor, we got a good flavor for the constant upgrade of safety during the lifetime of that reactor. This will continue in all our current reactors, but in addition to that, the newer reactors that are now on the drawing boards and are being built are going to be far safer than the ones built 40 years ago. And so you -- it's just like today's automobiles and today's airplanes are safer.

Q Secretary Chu, while you're here -- I know you're not on the ground in Japan, but you testified on the issue a couple weeks ago. Could you give us your assessment of the current situation in Japan with the reactors, what you think is going to happen in the coming days?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think the most crucial thing -- first, there are three direct reactors under distress, and we're also worried about spent fuels in four -- spent fuels, especially the most recent one that has the hottest fuel. And so the first order of business -- and this appears to be at least now under control -- is that you keep the water in the spent fuel ponds and you keep cooling the reactors. There has been damage, we know, in the cores of three reactors, significant damage. And we're monitoring that situation. We're also worried about how to keep them cool and then, in the longer term, how do you get the salt water out of those reactors and resupply them with fresh water so that you can minimize any adverse effects --for example, corrosion. So these are the things that we're focusing on here in the United States -- is how do you go into a long-term stable position where you can keep cooling the reactors and make sure the spent fuel ponds remain covered with water.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

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**From:** White House Press Office <noreply@messages.whitehouse.gov>

**To:** Weil, Jenny

**Sent:** Wed Mar 30 16:36:04 2011

**Subject:** Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and Deputy Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change Heather Zichal, 3/30/2011

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

March 30, 2011

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY PRESS SECRETARY JAY CARNEY,  
SECRETARY OF ENERGY STEVEN CHU,  
AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE HEATHER ZICHAL

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

1:27 P.M. EDT

MR. CARNEY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Today I have with me two special guests, here to discuss the President's speech earlier today on America's energy security. I have Secretary of Energy Steven Chu; I also have Heather Zichal, who is the Deputy Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Policy.

Secretary Chu will open with a short statement, and then the two of them can take questions from you. And why don't we address the questions that you have for them at the top, we can let them go, and I'll remain to take questions on other issues after they leave. Thanks very much. And I'll call on people once they start.

SECRETARY CHU: Thank you and good afternoon. This morning we heard the President talk about a bold, but ambitious and achievable goal to reduce our oil imports by a third by 2025. And this is a goal, although ambitious, I believe is achievable. So instead of spending a billion dollars a day to import foreign oil, this is a goal where we believe we can be investing in money and creating wealth in the United States.

To achieve this goal will require two things. It's going to require increasing domestic production. It will also require decreasing our dependence on oil. And so, for that, let me at least tell you some of the things the administration has been doing over the past two years.

We've established an historic fuel economy standard for model years 2012-2016 for light-duty trucks and cars. And that's expected to save \$1.8 billion of oil per year -- barrels of oil per year.

We've made great strides in electric vehicles. In 2009, the United States produced less than 2 percent of the world's advanced batteries, but with the investments made, we expect that we'll have battery capacity of producing up to 500,000 batteries per year. This could be 40 percent of the advanced battery world market.

We've also made great strides in battery research. A lot of the battery technology -- the latest chargeable battery technology that is now being invented in the United States is being built in the United States, and there's going to be a huge market for these batteries.

We've made great strides in biofuels. Research being done only one or two years ago are now being designed in power plants today, and we expect this to continue. We also expect to be announcing groundbreaking plants for commercial scale -- cellulosic and advanced biorefinery plants -- in the next two years. And we've also assembled teams -- for example, at Cal Tech, there's an energy team, a hub that would create biofuels directly from sunlight. And this is an economic way of just bypassing plants or algae or other forms of energy. So these are things that we have been doing.

Natural gas. As you all know, natural gas is -- a growing amount of natural gas, the reserves, because of the ability to frack shale rock, has been increasing. We believe that it is possible to safely and responsibly extract natural gas, and the U.S. government remains committed to that.

Electricity, the President has spoken before about electricity. Today we have roughly 40 percent of our electricity is in clean energy, if you consider the nuclear, the wind, the solar -- natural gas counting half credit.

We've set as a goal, the President has announced in his State of the Union, by 2035 that we would expect 80 percent of our energy to come from clean sources. This is very important because what this goal means is it unleashes a lot of the capital sitting on the sidelines for the lack of

certainty that could be invested in America to create jobs, to create these new clean energies.

So these are many of the things that we're doing today. But as I said, the bottom line message is that we feel the pain that all Americans feel on the price of gasoline today. We see what it will lead to -- as the President stressed, it's not a short-term fix. We are going to be increasing the production of oil in the United States, but there is a global plan put forward that would say this will require a concentrated effort for years to come, but ultimately, what this is about is diversifying our supply of energy from oil into many other different sectors, and with that we can have the means to go forward.

And with that I'll turn it over to Heather.

MR. CARNEY: I'll go ahead and -- questions? Jim -- or Jake?

Q I'd defer to my colleague.

Q Mr. Secretary, one of the things that Republicans have seized on are comments that the President made when he was in Brasilia that the U.S. intended to become a major customer of Brazil's oil resources. And I'm wondering, given that comment and what his intentions are to reduce reliance by a third, how do you square those two?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think, first of all, the President was, in large part, talking about partnering with Brazil in the development of their oil resources. American companies have a lot of technical expertise in drilling oil, especially deepwater oil. And so I think part of it is that this allows American companies to partner with Brazil so they can develop those resources.

But it is by no means in contradiction to decreasing our reliance on foreign oil, because we also want to increase the production of domestic oil sources, both offshore and onshore. And so this is in no way contradictory to that.

MR. CARNEY: Jake.

Q Secretary Chu, do you think that the American people need to change their behavior at all in order to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, or is this really just something that's going to happen for us magically?

SECRETARY CHU: I think, given the statements over the last many, many decades, this is something that requires a concerted effort both in policy but I think in terms of the behavior. I mean, the price -- the oil shock that occurred in 2008 is something -- and now we're beginning to live this again -- through this again in 2011.

And I think what we want to do is to take stock of what's been happening since that time and say, look, let's look for a long-term path



on what we need to do. And again, go back to this -- increased efficiency in your personal vehicles; it means electrification, in many cases. Batteries we think -- if you asked me two years ago, could I say that there would be a mass-marketed car within the next five years where you can drive 300 miles in a car that, let's say, you can buy without spending less than \$30,000, I'd say I'm not so sure. Today, I think it's really within grasp. I really feel that one can do this. And there are many, many companies and countries that recognize that within a short period of time, these batteries and these vehicles will become a reality.

Q So beyond more fuel-efficient vehicles, though, purchasing those, you don't think there's anything the American people need to do in terms of changing our behavior?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think people will automatically have to adjust. I mean, the terrible thing about the high oil prices is it comes right out of your pocketbook every week. And this is something that the administration feels very deeply and we recognize that. And that automatically does things. But in the meantime, what we want to do is say we have a plan going forward to actually give America the real long-term solutions. So it's electric vehicles, it's biofuels, it's efficiency; natural gas can be a player in the transportation sector as well.

Q Is there ever any consideration given to trying to change the American -- Americans' behavior by raising taxes on fuel? I know that's a forbidden thing, but it seems to be the model in much of the rest of the world, and even some states do it more than others.

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think right now, I think the President's plan was outlined and we're going to stick to that plan. I think it's a solid plan going forward in the future.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you took this job, did you expect that you'd be overseeing a policy that was based on so much additional drilling, given what was released today, which seems to be a lot different than let's say the rhetoric that we heard even during the campaign and when you signed on?

SECRETARY CHU: No, I think the President has said many times that drilling -- development of the fossil fuel resources in the United States, as long as it's part of a comprehensive plan, was part of the package. And I think that's -- we still remain committed to that, the President remains committed to that vision.

MR. CARNEY: Chip.

Q The President said there are no quick fixes, and you've said that, too. But just so the American people understand this, is there anything in this whole spectrum of things that the administration is working on that would actually bring down the price of gas, or restrain the rise of the price of gas in the next year? And if not, when is the soonest any of these would have an effect on the price of gas?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, it's very hard to predict what anything that could predict how -- the short-term price of gasoline, the short-term price of oil, how it would affect it. Certainly if one says America is committed to further exploration, further drilling of gasoline, oil in the United States, that might have some effect, but it's very hard to really predict what's going on there. I think what you want to do is show that we have a plan going forward that diversifies the energy supply in transportation and give them that plan that diversifies that, so Americans have a choice. They can plug in their car to drive. They can use biofuels to drive. They can use more efficient cars, as well as oil and gas, which will be around for decades. When you have those choices, you're no longer subject to a single source, and that actually has a very calming factor in oil markets.

MR. CARNEY: Wendell.

Q Mr. Secretary, how can you convince Americans that Republicans are wrong when some of them say the President is actually cheering on \$4-a-gallon gasoline because it adds to the pressure to implement these clean energy policies?

SECRETARY CHU: I don't think anyone really would say -- look, the price of gas and oil today is so high that it's creating such hardship to the American public and to businesses, and the recovery is fragile. And so I don't think anyone seriously can consider that anyone in public office, especially the President, would consider cheering on. We want to give Americans solutions -- solutions that will work, begin to work today, but continue to work so that two years from today if something like this should happen again, we're not surprised. We'll be in a better position to absorb that given that we'll have a diversity of choices.

Q But it's still half what they're paying in Europe.

SECRETARY CHU: I think that may be so, but again, we've seen -- Americans are now flocking to automobiles with much higher gas mileage, and they're voting with their feet. And as we develop better and better, more fuel-efficient cars, plug-in hybrids, other hybrids, more efficient internal combustion cars -- the Americans will vote with their feet. They see in the long term what might be happening. And I think that's -- Americans will make the right choice.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President talked about incentives for gas and oil leases. What precisely are the incentives, and when will they come into effect?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, he spoke of spurring on gas and oil leases. I don't know what the exact fraction is, but maybe Heather can -- but right now, there's roughly 50 or over 50 percent of the leases that are now given out are not being explored -- maybe 70 percent of the offshore leases.

MS. ZICHAL: Through a Department of Interior report that was issued yesterday, what we learned is, for offshore leases about 70 percent, and about 50 percent onshore leases remain idle. And what we're focused on to address that domestic production component that the President spoke today about being so important is finding new incentives to develop those idle leases.

Q What are they?

MS. ZICHAL: And so -- one of the options that the Department of Interior is exploring is looking at the terms of the lease sales, so that when a company is going out proactively and developing aggressively on their leases, there are additional opportunities we have to extend those lease sales -- so more of a carrot approach.

Q And when will it take effect? When will you decide?

MS. ZICHAL: Well, on some instances for offshore leases, we're already implementing those. We're working with Congress to -- we need legislation in order to do that for onshore leases. Obviously, this is part of a broad array of initiatives that the President talked about today and part of what we think is an important component of a bipartisan bill and energy policy.

Q So there's really no date then?

MS. ZICHAL: Well, I think we're doing the offshore component and we're working with Congress on the onshore component.

Q Have you extended any offshore -- you said, I guess one of the incentives is extending the leases?

MS. ZICHAL: Correct. For companies that are doing due diligence to develop the leases that they currently have -- and again, this is all through the lens of, we want to make sure that when we're going out there and companies have access to significant amounts of oil and gas -- which the Department of Interior report pointed to yesterday -- that those resources are being developed in a timely manner. And for offshore leases, there are already some measures that we have taken to make sure that that's happening, to bring those oil and gas resources to the American people.

Q Nuclear power, Mr. Secretary, which the President talked about again today as being a required component; you've talked about that. Three weeks after what happened in Japan, are you convinced that TEPCO has that situation under control? And looking at the lessons for America, are you convinced that investors in America will ever look on nuclear as safe enough to build new plants?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, first, let me talk about the American nuclear reactors. We believe they are safe. The President has ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Agency to go back and be doubly sure -- that INPO, a

very strong safety group, industry group in the United States, is looking and seeing what we can do. Within the Department of Energy, we're also adding to that.

So this terrible tragedy that happened in Japan -- one of the -- the fourth-largest earthquake in recorded history, one of the largest tsunamis, I'm sure, in recorded history -- will teach us some lessons and we will use those lessons going forward to make the current fleet of nuclear reactors safer, and we will also use those lessons to make any future reactors far safer.

And so we do this all the time whenever there's an accident like this, whether it be an airplane, an oil rig fire, anything. We go back, we learn lessons, and we push forward and say, okay, we're going to make it much safer.

With regard to TEPCO, I think that this is a very trying circumstance where we stand by and we're working very hard with them in any way we can to lend assistance or technical advice. We're not there on the ground, but we do have conversations with them -- both the NRC, the Department of Energy and others -- daily. And we are working very hard with them to mitigate any future potential risks as best we can. And so I can't really be sure of anything since I'm here and they're there. But, again, with regard to American reactors, we believe they are safe and as a result of this tragedy they're going to be safer.

Q Can I follow up, Jay, on that?

MR. CARNEY: Let me get to April.

Q Secretary Chu, two issues. One, you're talking about you feel Americans' pain when they go to the pump. But at the same time, while you're feeling this pain and you're watching the pocketbook, what mechanisms are in place right now to make manufacturers not gouge a consumer when they go to buy that electric vehicle, when they go to buy that biofuel vehicle? Because at this point, those cars are much more expensive than the average-price car. So what mechanisms are in place?

SECRETARY CHU: Correct me to -- you're talking about the gouging of highly fuel-efficient cars, for example?

Q I'm talking about hybrid cars, yes. All -- those cars that help you ride better with gas and keep your mileage low, your gas mileage low.

MS. ZICHAL: Well, I think there's a couple of things. First and foremost, through strategic investments in both the Recovery Act and the budget, the President has made significant investments in the research and development for these new advanced technologies that we will bring cleaner, more efficient cars and trucks to American families.

And those technologies -- we're working every day -- Secretary Chu can talk to you about what we're doing to help bring the prices down for

these technologies and what we're doing as an administration across the board to look not only at cars and trucks, but biofuels, again, as a solution to bringing prices down.

SECRETARY CHU: But the answer to the specific question -- look, the allegations that price gouging among dealers or the allegations of price gouging at gasoline stations I think come up every now and then and we're not really -- I personally am not really sure to the extent it's happening. But in the end, this is very quickly self-correcting.

And let me do back to what's been happening. In the last couple of years, in the last two years, the American car companies are bouncing back. They are offering much more fuel-efficient cars. The Americans are recognizing that those are the cars to buy. The administration has been incredibly supportive and pushing into this direction. And so when you have that growing and that supply growing, that will naturally take care of itself.

Q My second question -- following up on what Mark was asking about the risk of new -- of creating new nuclear facilities in this country. With the new -- since we've seen what's happening in Japan, are there any concerns about any new buildings, any new construction for nuclear facilities that they are not located in populated areas? Is that a concern, as well, for this country?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think what has happened in the past is -- what the public doesn't fully appreciate is many of these reactors were built, let's say, 40, 45 years ago in places which were not so populated, and the population kind of grew up around them. And so as we go forward and site places, that will always be a consideration.

But let me also say that the newer reactors -- first, going back -- if you look at the current fleet of reactors, they are constantly being upgraded. A team of scientists and I toured one of them because it was a Mark I GE, that was a sister reactor to the one in Japan, and since they've been decommissioned many years, we actually can walk inside and get a feel for what was going on so that we could actually help and get a better firsthand experience about what might be possible.

Even when we were touring this decommissioned reactor, we got a good flavor for the constant upgrade of safety during the lifetime of that reactor. This will continue in all our current reactors, but in addition to that, the newer reactors that are now on the drawing boards and are being built are going to be far safer than the ones built 40 years ago. And so you -- it's just like today's automobiles and today's airplanes are safer.

Q Secretary Chu, while you're here -- I know you're not on the ground in Japan, but you testified on the issue a couple weeks ago. Could you give us your assessment of the current situation in Japan with the reactors, what you think is going to happen in the coming days?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think the most crucial thing -- first, there are three direct reactors under distress, and we're also worried about spent fuels in four -- spent fuels, especially the most recent one that has the hottest fuel. And so the first order of business -- and this appears to be at least now under control -- is that you keep the water in the spent fuel ponds and you keep cooling the reactors.

There has been damage, we know, in the cores of three reactors, significant damage. And we're monitoring that situation. We're also worried about how to keep them cool and then, in the longer term, how do you get the salt water out of those reactors and resupply them with fresh water so that you can minimize any adverse effects --for example, corrosion.

So these are the things that we're focusing on here in the United States -- is how do you go into a long-term stable position where you can keep cooling the reactors and make sure the spent fuel ponds remain covered with water.

MR. CARNEY: Let's just get two more for our visitors. Ann.

Q Mr. Secretary, at what point in the future would alternative fuels, biofuels surpass oil consumption in the U.S.? Would that ever happen?

SECRETARY CHU: Yes, it will. Well, actually, let me temper this with the following. Let me make it broader. It's not only the biofuels for transportation, but I would say renewable energy in general. I mean, what the Department of Energy is focused on is to develop those technologies where the cost of electricity from photovoltaics or wind would be equal or less than the cost of new fossil fuel, whether it's gas or coal or whatever. That again, this is something where -- the debate, for example, at the Department of Energy, we are confident the business plans of companies around the world that are solar, photovoltaic energy will drop by 50 percent before the end of this decade, we begin to look at whether it's possible to drop it by 75 percent by the end of this decade.

Seventy-five percent is a magic number in my mind -- 70-75 percent -- because that means the cost of electricity of photovoltaics is less than the cost of new fossil energy.

Fossil fuels, similarly -- we are trying to target fossil fuels and design so that you get fossil -- biomass to replace fossil fuel, but biomass based on, for example, woody materials, based on agricultural waste like wheat straw, corn cobs -- agricultural waste, lumber waste residues -- that's very inexpensive feedstock. We are working on ways to convert that feedstock in to drop in substantive fuels -- diesel gasoline, jet fuel. Already in the laboratory, this is being done. Now, the question is, can it be made commercially viable and when.

Okay, but when you make it commercially viable, then you're on to something very, very big because that means if it's commercially viable

without subsidy, it can begin to be a very significant part of it, because it doesn't compete directly with food crops.

Q So is there a time in the future where oil -- when fossil fuels are not the predominant source of energy?

SECRETARY CHU: Well, I think in the next couple of decades, oil -- fossil fuels like oil and gas will be a very big part of the mixture. But in these coming years -- I can't promise you that the transition will occur 10 years from today, 15 year from today, 20 years -- but something -- in this part of the century, I think for sure it's going to be price competitive, okay? But it also depends a lot on the biomass capability of the world, and so that's the other complication.

MS. ZICHAL: And I think just to build on that, the point that the President made today is that if we're serious about gas prices and we're serious about these challenges, then we need a serious plan in order to take our country there. And that's why through the speech today he put out a new goal for oil savings. Later this afternoon, we'll be releasing a blueprint that talks about what we need to do to diversify across the board our energy sources and how we're going to get from A to B.

MR. CARNEY: Okay, Mark.

Q Mr. Secretary, we've been hearing President's talk about reducing dependence on foreign oil for decades. Why will this -- President Obama's plan work when others haven't?

SECRETARY CHU: I think technologically we're much closer than we ever were. As I said before, I was on the scientific advisory board of a battery company before I took my present position, and if you asked me four or five years ago what's the prospect of having a fairly inexpensive battery where you can drive 300 miles on a single charge, I would have said I don't know.

Based on what I've seen just in the last two years, I'd say 50 percent chance we might be testing those batteries in cars, which means it will take three or four more years to get them on the road -- because there's a lot of safety things you have to do -- but a 50 percent probability that we'll be testing those batteries -- a battery one-third the cost, three times the range -- and at that point, that's mass market. It just flies off the shelf.

So it is really technology driven. If you asked me five years ago what's the prospect of having biofuels based on cellulosic materials that could be a direct drop in subsidies, I would have said I don't really know. But based on what's coming out of the labs and what is now being piloted today, I'd say, well, five or 10 years. I mean, that is a little bit longer time period, but I'd be surprised if in 15 years or 20 years it's not going to be a fraction of fuel in the United States. Why the United States? We have incredible agricultural resources in the U.S. So we're blessed with that.

MS. ZICHAL: And again, I think to just build on that for a moment, part of the answer is looking at the two years of the -- the first two years of our administration and the actions that we've taken. First and foremost, the Recovery Act, we had an historic investment in clean energy development and research. Second, one of the first actions that the President took was to set a goal of 1.5 million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. And we used our existing authorities in new and interesting ways through the Department of Transportation and EPA to establish the new efficiency standard that Secretary Chu was talking about. That's 1.8 billion barrels of oil savings over the life of the program.

And across the board, we are looking at -- think about energy policy -- not about what is the role of the Department of Energy, what is the role of EPA, but how are we going to across the board use our existing authorities to bring solutions to American families and work with the Congress to find some additional bipartisan solutions.

Q But you would agree that America is still addicted to oil? (Laughter.)

MS. ZICHAL: We would agree that America certainly needs to continue producing our oil supplies. In the short term, as the President said, we have some steps we need to take, and we are going to continue to build on to increase the use of our domestic oil and gas resources. But we need a long-term plan, because as long as we don't have a long-term plan that is legitimate to help us break our addiction, we are going to continue to be stuck to these -- in these oil price shocks.

Q Secretary Chu, do you still believe that we need European levels of gas prices, as you suggested to The Wall Street Journal in 2008?

SECRETARY CHU: No, I think there's enough incentive today. I think, again, no one is even considering that today, given where the price of gas is. I think given the long-term prospects, I think Americans realize and the world realizes, given the demand in China, especially, and followed by India, that most of the automobiles being sold in the world -- China is the biggest market -- that increased demand going into the coming decades, with the finite resources we have, we'll say, okay, this is the way the world is going to be.

You can't -- as the President said, you cannot predict what's going to happen a year from today, a month from today, in terms of prices. But he emphasized the prices are more likely to go up than go down. Given that, the handwriting is on the wall, so we're going to diversify our supply of transportation energy, we're going to make efficient vehicles, we become less dependent on oil for transportation. And that's where we get our transportation security. That's what makes it easier on the American pocketbook.

MR. CARNEY: Thank you, Secretary Chu. Thank you, Heather.



I'm here to take other questions on other issues if you have them. We can start back at the top here.

Jim.

Q Thanks, Jay. On Libya, yesterday the President said the question the administration wants to answer is whether the Qaddafi forces are sufficiently degraded so that opposition groups don't need to be armed. Judging from what's going on, on the ground today, those forces are pushing back the rebel forces. So I wonder what the White House assessment is right now, and what are the issues under consideration for not assisting the rebels with arms?

MR. CARNEY: I'm not sure I --

Q Well, if you're making a determination whether to supply them with arms or not, what are the arguments for not supplying them with arms?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I think the President said very clearly in one of his interviews yesterday evening that he's not taking anything off the table -- he's not ruling something in or ruling something out in terms of lethal assistance to the opposition.

With regard to the start of your question, we are very confident that the coalition that we are part of, that is responsible for both enforcing the no-fly zone and protecting Libyan civilians, will be capable of succeeding in its mission and pushing back Colonel Qaddafi's forces.

The broader question of assistance to the opposition is one that we're looking at very closely. We're coordinating with the opposition and exploring ways that we can assist them with non-lethal assistance, and we'll look at other possibilities of assistance as we move forward.

Working with our coalition partners in the Contact Group which was stood up in London yesterday with the Secretary of State, broad number of partners involved in that effort looking at the political future of Libya and working with the opposition. And we're examining all these issues as we work towards a Libya that has a government that answers to its people, that is chosen by its people, and is democratic and respects the rights of its citizens.

Q Given what is going on, on the ground, do you concede that he's to some degree reasserting his authority right now militarily?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I think there's a lot of ink that's been spilled on military operations in Libya, and the back-and-forth between Qaddafi's forces and the opposition. And all I can tell you is that we remain very confident in the capacity of the NATO coalition to push the Qaddafi forces back, to protect Libyan civilians, to fulfill its mission to enforce the no-fly zone.

And there are different developments each day, but the trend we think is clear and the pressure on Qaddafi will continue -- both on his forces through the military operation and all the ways that we've discussed, through the measures that the United States and its international partners have taken to isolate him, to put pressure on him, to pressure those around him to realize that their days are numbered, the days of this regime are numbered, and that they may want to reconsider where they stand.

Q Jay, we're hearing on the Hill, at least off the record, that things --

MR. CARNEY: Wait, you're reporting something off the record here at the briefing? (Laughter.)

Q -- that budget talks are ongoing and that they're making happier noises than they are at least behind the scenes. So I wanted to get the White House's assessment of where the budget negotiation process is now.

MR. CARNEY: Well, as we have said consistently through the various reports -- both on the record and off -- about the progress of negotiations, we are engaged in the negotiations. We believe that there is ample reason to be optimistic, that common ground can be found as long as all sides roll up their sleeves and get to work and realize that you're not going to get -- no side is going to get everything it wants.

And the American people expect us to compromise. We have a system of government in place precisely for this reason, that sides with opposing views come together, work out a compromise, pass legislation that the American people believe should be passed and support. We think we can do that. We think that completing the funding for fiscal year 2011, a fiscal year that's nearly half over, should be a relatively easy task, and that the differences that separate us are not so great that we cannot find the common ground in a way that each side can feel that it accomplished something in getting it done.

Q Are you -- that's what you've thought from the beginning. Do you have any sense -- are you getting any feeling that maybe there's a bit more movement and willingness for a compromise now than there has been?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I don't want to characterize it. Obviously, these are ongoing negotiations. And as I said in answer to a question about an entirely different subject, the dynamic changes sometimes hour by hour, day by day. But we believe that there are -- there is reason to be confident that if everyone agrees that this position won't succeed, and this position won't succeed, and therefore, we have to find some middle ground here, and the President has demonstrated his willingness -- put skin in the game to show that he's willing to come more than halfway, the Democrats have shown that we're willing to do more to cut more as long as priorities that the President believes are vital to ensuring economic growth in the future and job creation in the future are protected -- that

we can then get this done and move on to other big challenges that we face.

Q What about some of those other issues? I know the line has been drawn on health care reform, Planned Parenthood, greenhouse gas regulation. But what about things like the foreign service pay, an alternate F-35 jet engine? There's a lot of other things. Is the White House willing to move on those issues?

MR. CARNEY: Well, what we've said, Tricia, very clearly and our position has not changed, is that we believe that this is an appropriations process, a budget bill that's about cutting spending and funding the government, and that that should be the focus; and that this is not the place to wage sort of debates about ideological issues or politically charged issues; that that's a way to try to derail the process instead of trying to get the train into the station and get the work done.

I'm not going to negotiate line by line what's in that budget agreement, but our overall approach to this remains the same today as it was yesterday and last week.

Jake.

Q In terms of the question of whether or not the U.S. or the coalition should arm the rebels or more closely coordinate strikes with them, have military-to-military contact, such as their military is, could you walk us through what some of the considerations are, what the debate is playing out behind closed doors?

MR. CARNEY: Well, first of all, I would make clear that there is a kind of "what problem haven't you solved today" aspect to this, which is that in a remarkably short period of time -- as the President laid out in his speech and laid out in the interviews yesterday -- with American leadership, the international community acted, first to take dramatic, unprecedented measures through the United Nations and unilaterally in terms of non-lethal measures, sanctions to put pressure on the Qaddafi regime and isolate the Qaddafi regime, and then through U.N. Security Council 1973 to authorize all necessary means to protect the civilian population of Libya from Qaddafi's forces and to avert what was most likely an imminent humanitarian catastrophe.

We've had remarkable success in achieving the goals laid out. And so in terms of the assistance provided the opposition, obviously the measures we have taken has provided great assistance to the opposition. We prevented the invasion of and sacking of Benghazi and averted likely thousands of civilian deaths in the course --

Q But the President gave a much more positive assessment of what the condition was on the ground for the rebels on Monday than exists today because the situation on the ground has changed.

MR. CARNEY: And the situation -- as I said, we're not going to do a play-by-play of how does it look today, how does it look tomorrow. What I said in the beginning is --

Q -- going on behind closed doors, and in the name of having --

MR. CARNEY: Well, who said anything was going on behind closed doors?

Q In the name of the -- of candor and explaining to the American people what's going on, what we're talking about doing. You guys have been criticized for a lot of quick action that you had to take because of the immediacy of --

MR. CARNEY: After we were --

Q -- because of the immediacy --

MR. CARNEY: After we were criticized for moving too slowly -- but, yes.

Q You can -- if you'd like me to get a roomful of straw men, I can do that. But if we can have that conversation for a second, and that is, what are the -- what's the debate? What are the issues? I'm not saying that one side is right or one side is wrong. I'm just saying, can you explain to the American people what are some of the considerations you guys are weighing?

MR. CARNEY: In terms of what? Arming --

Q In terms of more closely working with the rebels, whether it's arming them, whether it's more closely coordinating military strikes with them, having direct conversations with them. What are some of the competing issues?

MR. CARNEY: We have said and we continue to say this, that obviously through this very brief window of time we have worked very quickly to try to assess who the opposition is. As the President I believe said in one of the interviews, that clearly not everyone in Libya who is opposed to Qaddafi is friendly to the United States. But we have been working with those leaders of the opposition who have demonstrated -- who have been vetted and who have demonstrated a commitment, at least initially, to the kinds of actions that we believe are essential, that adhere to the principles that we discussed that broadly apply as we look at the whole region and the unrest in the whole region, which is a commitment to the universal rights of their citizens, a commitment to free and fair elections, to a democratic transition, to tolerance and respect, like I said, for human rights.

So the Libyan National Council put out a statement yesterday from London, which we found to be encouraging in terms of their approach to

this. And we are dealing quite closely with that opposition leadership as we make an assessment about what measures we can take going forward.

But I remind you that we're not going to rush into anything here without carefully considering what the policy decision is, what the outcome we desire is, and how we can help most effectively. And that's the same approach we took in making decisions about kinetic military action and supporting an international coalition through the United Nations, with support from the Arab League and other nations, to launch a military action. And that's the approach we'll take going forward.

Q Wait, just to follow up. What -- are you -- what are the concerns? Given that you have vetted many members of the opposition and found them, at least initially, to be on the right side of these humanitarian ideals that the President espouses and the United States stands for, what are the concerns that exist beyond what the NATO commander yesterday referred to some "flickers" of al Qaeda and Hezbollah ties among some of the rebels? What's the worry? Is it that the U.S. then has more ownership, or NATO has more ownership of this military action? Is it just the law of unintended consequences? Is it what the U.S. went through in Afghanistan?

MR. CARNEY: Well, let me -- I mean, we could -- I don't want to bore everyone here with a conversation that you and I can have. But I think these are all good questions, and I think that in some ways your questions are answers in that we carefully consider all those issues in a situation like this. And we -- the President is committed not just to quick action that can be effective to avert humanitarian catastrophe, but making the right choices for the long term, to make sure that we -- his eye is constantly on the long game here in terms of what's in the best interest of the American people and U.S. national security interests as we move our way through this historic period of upheaval and change in the Middle East.

I mean, there is a lot to be optimistic about in terms of the change that we're seeing -- the commitment that we're seeing from the grassroots and on the ground to the kind of democratic ideals that we obviously hold dear and believe are universal. But we don't want to do anything -- we want to make sure that the policy decisions we make are targeted and have the best possible chance of achieving the goal that we seek.

Dan.

Q On this issue of vetting, is this process continuing so that the U.S. gets a better understanding of what the leadership structure is of the opposition, who exactly it is that you're dealing with?

MR. CARNEY: Yes.

Q Can you explain --

MR. CARNEY: The process is continuing. I mean, just as you would expect it to continue. We have contacts with the opposition. The Contact Group that was stood up will obviously play a role in that. And it's not just the United States. This is an international coalition -- that we are working together with our international partners on all facets of this. This is a -- but simply to say that, yes, we are continuing to discuss -- have conversations with the opposition and to evaluate the opposition and to assess what the makeup of it is there in Libya.

Q And is the administration finding anything more than just the flickers of al Qaeda or other --

MR. CARNEY: Well, I'll point you to what Ambassador Rice said, which is that that answer to that is no. And what's important to remember about what we're seeing in Libya, like what we saw in other countries, is that the motivation, the ideals, the aspirations that are expressed in these popular movements are antithetical in many ways to the -- in all ways, really -- to the purposes and ideals set forth by terrorist organizations who use violence against innocent civilians to achieve their goals are quite the contrary to the kind of protests we've seen in Egypt and Tunisia and other countries. In Libya we're very much driven by the kind of ideals that are, like I said, antithetical to those who support violence to achieve their goals.

Q On Syria, the President said that the considerations that went into the U.S. involvement, engagement in Libya would not necessarily apply to Syria. So is there a strategy right now that's being put together to address what may happen in Syria?

MR. CARNEY: Well, we are obviously very closely watching the situation in Syria. We condemn the violence that has occurred there. We condemn the arrest of human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and others. We call on the Syrian government to engage in the political dialogue that we have called on other governments in the region to engage in -- to refrain from violence, to begin a process of reform.

The Syrian President, as you know, gave a speech earlier today in which he talked about moving quickly on the very reforms that he promised in 2005. We urge him to do so. It's clearly what his people are demanding. But we're obviously paying very close attention to what's happening in Syria and all the things I just said about the violence and the actions taken by the government, and we urge political dialogue.

Q But is the administration putting together a series of considerations specific to Syria that if they aren't met the U.S. would be engaged, as they were in Libya?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I think what the President made clear last night was that he approaches these situations with a broad set of principles, but that he does not have a cookie-cutter approach to each country. Each country is different. What's happening in each country is different. The government -- governments can be different; the cultural situation can be

different. Our interests are at the forefront of his mind as he approaches all these problems. So we do not have a set of responses that apply in reaction to a set of actions.

Q Right, I understand that. So are you putting together a "designer," then, response for Syria at this point, depending on what may happen there?

MR. CARNEY: Well, obviously we -- I mean, I guess I could answer, yes, we have people watching Syria and analyzing what's happening and obviously advising the President on the policy positions we're taking, the things we're saying publicly to the Syrian government about what we believe they should do and the President should do and engage in the political dialogue, and that will be constantly -- that will evolve as the situation evolves.

Chip.

Q On Syria, are any military options on the table or being considered at this point? I mean, I know you plan for all contingencies, and all through Egypt and Libya, from very early stages, you said all options are on the table. Are all options on the table in Syria?

MR. CARNEY: Well, Chip, I think we're not in a situation that is analogous to what we had in Libya, which is in this region is the place where obviously we did make the decision -- the President did make the decision to take action militarily. And that was a set of circumstances that in many ways are likely to be unique to Libya: the broad international coalition, the request from the Libyan opposition, the support of the Arab League, the imminent humanitarian catastrophe large-scale, the demonstration by Colonel Qaddafi of his willingness to kill his own citizens on a large scale. All those factors came together to -- were weighed by the President as he made his decision, and they in many ways were unique to Libya.

Q So as far as you know with regard to Syria, there are no military options even in the early stages of consideration?

MR. CARNEY: That's certainly the case, yes. I'm not going to predict the future, and I think the President made clear that he's not in the business of predicting the future either, but he did make clear also last night that we do not have a singular approach to each situation.

Q Yes, in the CBS interview yesterday -- picking one at random -- the President used the expression "constant bombardment" at one point. He essentially argued that if Qaddafi wants the "constant bombardment" to stop, he'll have to step down. Isn't that crossing the line from using military action to protect civilians and using it to push him out?

MR. CARNEY: The constant bombardment is happening because of the threat of violence that Qaddafi's forces pose to the population of Libya. And as we've seen has been discussed about developments in the

last 24-36 hours that it's not like they're laying down their arms. It's not like Qaddafi has gone into -- circled the wagons and gone into retreat. He is clearly still trying to wreak havoc on his country and putting his own citizens in great danger.

And so the mission of the U.N. Security Council resolution is to protect the civilian population, and the constant bombardment will continue as long as that mission remains.

Q Any plans in the works, or any consideration being given to a broader kind of -- as some people have said, a Cairo II speech, to try to put all this in context? Or is that impossible given that every situation is --

MR. CARNEY: No, look, obviously, the President spoke pretty expansively just the night before last about Libya, but also within the context of how he makes decisions and in terms of use of force and why he made the decision he made, why America's interests were served by this action. And he also put it in the context of the Arab Awakening or Arab Spring that we've been witnessing the last several months.

I certainly would not rule out the possibility that he'll want to address this issue sometime again in the future. I don't have -- I'm not promising that, but I wouldn't rule it out.

Wendell.

Q Since the President, Jay, hasn't ruled out providing weapons to the Libyan opposition, does he believe he can do that without also providing U.S. trainers, or that providing U.S. trainers wouldn't break his promise not to put boots on the ground there?

MR. CARNEY: The President made very clear that there will not be U.S. troops -- no boots on the ground in Libya.

Q So he believes you could possibly provide weapons without sending U.S. trainers?

MR. CARNEY: I don't see why not.

Q And does he -- does he feel that he could provide U.S. weapons and make sure none of them fall into the hands of the flickers of al Qaeda that there may be?

MR. CARNEY: Well, Wendell, you're leading me down the road of things that may happen if a decision is made that hasn't been made.

Q What I'm actually trying to do is find out whether some things the President has said and some realities -- like weapons are stolen and sold -- actually preclude the U.S. providing --



MR. CARNEY: I would simply say that there are a lot of factors that go into a decision like that, and some of the factors would be probably related to the questions that you're asking. Obviously, we would not make a decision like that if we did not think that it was the smart way to go, and that the policy goals it would serve were achievable and outweighed the risks involved. That's how we approach all these issues.

Q For a couple of days, I've been asking you if we're at war in Libya, and I don't think I've gotten an answer yet. I'd like to try again. Is it a war?

MR. CARNEY: Look, it is a -- obviously, it's military action. Did we invade Libya? No. Are we -- do we have U.S. troops on the ground in Libya? No. You can call it -- it's been a false argument that some media outlets have tried to engage about the nomenclature here. It is the use of military force in concert with our allies. Military force is inherently a risky proposition, puts men and women in harm's way, and military -- but what it is not is in the context that we live in today, anything like a situation where you had I believe at one point 170,000-plus U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq; where you have 100,000 U.S. troops and 140,000 ISAF troops overall in Afghanistan in a prolonged engagement, a prolonged war. That is not what is happening in Libya.

The President made very clear how this is not at all like that. You can call it what you want, but it's not analogous.

Q Jay, following up on the question on the budget, is there still a veto threat? Will the President veto anything with a rider -- anything that comes to his desk with a rider on it? Because that was the position three weeks ago.

MR. CARNEY: No, the position -- let me be clear. The position was that we do not believe that this is the proper place to insert ideologically driven agenda items or politically driven agenda items, that those debates can happen outside this process. The appropriations process is a Byzantine and complex one. And I don't want to get into deciding what line can or cannot --

Q -- you didn't want riders, that was a veto, that you weren't going to accept anything with a rider.

MR. CARNEY: Again, you're trying to define -- a rider could be something that declares apple pie the favorite dessert in America. The issue here is the kind of politically charged, contentious issue that can derail this train that needs to get to the station so that the government is funded, people's priorities are met --

Q So there's a scenario where he signs something that has some riders in it as long as it's not NPR and Planned Parenthood?

MR. CARNEY: Look, I'm not going to negotiate the agenda items here. His position is clear about what shouldn't be in this. His

position is clear about his willingness to cut spending significantly and predict --

Q -- his veto position -- is there any veto position on that?

MR. CARNEY: The veto position the President issued was in the statement of administration policy related to HR1 and the President's priorities, and that stands. But I'm not going to get into negotiating specifics beyond telling you that the very issues that could derail this process are the ones that should not be in it.

Q How would you describe this compromise that has been written by Jack Lew, from what I understand, of the additional \$20 billion in cuts that's on the table for Republicans to accept? Is that a beginning? Is that take or leave it? Would you just -- this new plan --

MR. CARNEY: Well, I certainly don't think we're in the beginning of this process.

Q No, I understand that, but is that --

MR. CARNEY: And I would simply say without addressing speculation --

Q Is that simply a floor? That position, the \$20 billion?

MR. CARNEY: -- in the media about what proposals are out there and who authored them. I would say that negotiate --

Q There's not a Jack Lew written proposal --

MR. CARNEY: Again, I'm just not going to address -- I'm not going to address speculation about who's drafted proposals, what the numbers attached to them are, except that we believe there is an easily achievable compromise if both sides, all sides are willing --

Q -- that negotiating --

MR. CARNEY: Look, I think that we're negotiating, we're discussing with leaders on the Hill regularly what the contours of an agreement would look like. And I think -- I can tell you that as part of that engagement -- because there seems to be occasionally questions about how engaged we are -- the Vice President spoke with Speaker Boehner yesterday; he spoke with the Senate Majority Leader yesterday; and obviously senior White House staff have been engaged in negotiations.

But I'm not going to acknowledge -- I mean, part of getting a deal --

Q The plan exists or does not exist?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I think that there are ideas on the table about how we get from here to there, and that good-faith negotiations can get us from here to there.

Q You've said a couple of times today and in previous sessions that the Qaddafi regime's days are numbered. What evidence do we actually have that that is true?

MR. CARNEY: He's lost legitimacy to rule in the eyes of his people; that he controls only a relatively small portion of his country; that he obviously has lost a great deal of military capacity, which is one of the means by which he was able to rule as a dictator and autocrat for all these many decades. I think his days are numbered. And I think that the regime's days are numbered. And we are participating with our international partners in a number of measures designed to put pressure on Qaddafi that will hopefully convince him of what the rest of us know is true.

Q But isn't it a bit of an overstatement, considering the fact that we keep seeing this seesaw battle across the desert? It's clear that in certain places, Tripoli and Sirte, he has significant support not only from military elements but also from the civilian population. Isn't it overstating it to say that his days are numbered? Couldn't those days be quite a few?

MR. CARNEY: I think that, again, you can take a day-by-day breakdown and say he's up, he's down. The trend, we believe, since the coalition engaged militarily is clearly against him. And what is clear is that his days as leader of Libya are numbered and probably over, as Libya writ large. And we can't predict, we don't have a crystal ball, we don't know how long Qaddafi will hold on, but we believe we can work with our partners, consult with the opposition and give them the kind of advice and assistance, non-lethal or otherwise, that can help them move this process and create a situation where the Libyan people, after a very long winter, will have a chance to choose their own leaders and decide their own future.

Q But by saying "writ large," you do concede to some extent that he could control a substantial or reduced portion of territory --

MR. CARNEY: I concede that we cannot predict to you the day that Qaddafi will leave the country or leave power.

Ann.

Q Would the President seek an approval -- a resolution of approval from Congress if he decides to give any kind of armaments or military equipment to the opposition?

MR. CARNEY: That's a double hypothetical, so I can't -- I just don't know.

Q He himself said in three interviews yesterday that that kind of option is still on the table; he hasn't ruled it out. He did not go to Congress asking specific --

MR. CARNEY: And there's great historical precedent for not doing that.

Q I'm asking -- and maybe your answer is no -- he would not go to Congress --

MR. CARNEY: It's not. It's just a hypothetical that I can't entertain because the world as it is is vexing enough.

Q Does he believe he needs that authority? That's not a hypothetical?

MR. CARNEY: Again --

Q It's not a hypothetical.

MR. CARNEY: -- we don't even have the circumstance before us around which to answer that question. So I'm not going to answer it as a hypothetical.

Mark --

Q Can I ask a budget --

MR. CARNEY: Yes, I'll get to you, Jared.

Q General Electric made \$5 billion from its U.S. entities, \$14 billion worldwide; seems to have paid little or no U.S. corporate taxes, depending on who you believe. They're right now asking 15,000 unionized members of their workforce to accept significant cutbacks. They've cut their workforce in the U.S. by a fifth since 2002. Jeff Immelt is obviously the chairman -- or the head of the President's Council on Competitiveness and Jobs. Does the White House associate itself with that type of corporate stewardship in the sense that Immelt is its leading avatar or representative to the corporate world?

MR. CARNEY: Well, I would say that membership on the Jobs Council, as the President made clear, is not decided by agreement on every issue. It is not -- the whole point of the Jobs Council is to get outside advice, to help the President -- to generate ideas for the President to consider ways by which he can increase American competitiveness and create jobs.

In terms of the tax issue that you raised at the beginning, we had a long exchange about this the other day and I discussed at length and would ask you read that instead of having to hear me discuss it again about the President's commitment to corporate tax reform.

Q Jay, just two questions?

MR. CARNEY: Are you working for the Post now? I can't believe it. You moved up to the Washington Post.

Q Do we want to check everyone's seat?

MR. CARNEY: No, go ahead, Lester. (Laughter.)

Q Thank you.

MR. CARNEY: I'll take one.

Q I think you'll probably want to take the follow-up. The Democrat governor of the President's home state of Illinois, Pat Quinn, signed a bill abolishing the death penalty because, he said, "I am deeply concerned that an innocent may be executed." Does the President still disagree with this?

MR. CARNEY: Again, I haven't heard him discuss this. I would -- his position is what it is.

Q Page 57 of "The Audacity of Hope."

MR. CARNEY: I have no announcement to make about a change in any position of the President's on this issue.

Q All right, he has not changed. What is the President's opinion of the mayor-elect of Chicago's agreement with Governor Quinn and with previous governor Republican George Ryan, who commuted 167 death sentences in Illinois?

MR. CARNEY: I don't have an answer for you on that.

Q You just rather --

MR. CARNEY: I haven't discussed the President's opinion of the mayor-elect's opinion of a former governor's position --

Q Well, he likes the mayor-elect, doesn't he?

MR. CARNEY: He does, indeed, yes.

Q Jay, can you talk a little bit about --

MR. CARNEY: Sorry, Jared -- peripheral vision thing.

Q -- U.S. plans or plans with our allies in finding a place for Qaddafi if he decides -- if and when he decides to step down?

MR. CARNEY: I think we're getting ahead of ourselves. I believe the Secretary of State discussed this, maybe the President did as well in his interviews about -- some things that were -- indications we're hearing from around Qaddafi of interest being expressed through different channels

about what the future may hold, but we're a long way from engaging in that discussion. And it's probably not one we'd do in public from here.

Q We're tracking those, or chasing them down if we hear those reports, though. Is that a fair conclusion?

MR. CARNEY: I think it's a fair assumption.

Jared.

Q Two basic questions. One is, what is the White House stance on the Republican's government shutdown prevention act proposal?

MR. CARNEY: I don't have a detailed response except to say that we believe that instead of passing sort of nice-sounding legislation that doesn't accomplish what can be accomplished at the negotiating table, we ought to roll up our sleeves and accomplish what can be easily be done if each side is willing to move off its starting position, make a few compromises, accept the fact that they can't get everything they want, to reduce spending, protect but not do things that would harm our economic recovery, and then move on, get this done.

Q Thanks, Jay.

Q A quick follow-up is on -- sorry about that -- on Libya. Why don't we have a better understanding of the opposition? That's something I haven't understood is why.

MR. CARNEY: Well, I would simply say that this is a development that's barely a month old and it's not that we don't have -- we have an understanding of the opposition and we're deepening it and developing it further.

Thanks.

Q Thank you.

END

2:32 P.M. EDT

-----  
Unsubscribe

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 31, 2011 1:43 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: OEDO proposed "boiler plate" for Japan responses

fine

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 31, 2011 1:28 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** OEDO proposed "boiler plate" for Japan responses

Tim has worked on Roger on this. They are now looking for OCA's concurrence. Let's take a look.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 31 13:20:52 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Other Interim Responses

Amy,

I know you're super busy but could you give this interim response a quick read and let us know if you concur? We have a stack of letters that are dependent on this boilerplate language and we really need to get them off and running...

Thanks!  
Mindy

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 1:25 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: Other Interim Responses

Roger,  
Amy would like to review this before we give OCA concurrence –but she's swamped with testimony issues. Can we get it to you Thursday?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry [REDACTED] (b)(6)

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**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 29, 2011 10:59 AM  
**To:** Turk, Sherwin; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Other Interim Responses

So that I have a complete paper trail, please email me with your concurrence/NLO to my use of all or part of the approved Markey interim response for the following (attached) letters:

Boxer/Carper  
Kucinich  
Blumenthal

Thanks.



The Honorable Edward J. Markey

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Sincerely

GBJ

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 31, 2011 4:16 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Batkin, Joshua; Nieh, Ho; Bubar, Patrice; Sharkey, Jeffry  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Potential hearing

Commissioner Apostolakis is scheduled to be out of the country during that week.  
Thks,

Sent from an NRC Blackberry

Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Nieh, Ho; Bubar, Patrice; Sharkey, Jeffry; Sosa, Belkys  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thu Mar 31 14:30:16 2011  
**Subject:** Potential hearing

EPW is asking for the Commission's availability for a hearing the first week of May. According to the schedule, there is a quick look Japan Commission meeting scheduled for May 3. Would May 4 or 5 interfere with Commissioner travel plans?

---

**From:** Tracy, Glenn  
**Sent:** Friday, April 01, 2011 12:02 PM  
**To:** Salter, Susan; Khan, Charline; Powell, Dawn; Buchholz, Jeri; Cohen, Miriam; Brown, Milton; Burns, Stephen; Campbell, Andy; Carpenter, Cynthia; Dorman, Dan; Grobe, Jack; Hayden, Elizabeth; Holahan, Gary; Howard, Patrick; Krupnick, David; Moore, Scott; Pederson, Cynthia; Poole, Brooke; Powell, Amy; Schaeffer, James; Shay, Jason; Stewart, Sharon; Williams, Barbara; Hudson, Jody; Dapas, Marc; Howell, Art; Mamish, Nader; Wert, Leonard; Uhle, Jennifer; Somerville, Glenda; Lew, David; Ruland, William; Kokajko, Lawrence; Lewis, Robert; Flanders, Scott; Gusack, Barbara; Wert, Leonard; Muessle, Mary Davis, Kristin; Royal, Judith; Trent, Glenn; Rubic, Mark; Lopez, Joseph; Mark Rubic ([REDACTED]); Baker, Pamela; Larche, Linda; Walker, Tracy; Todd, Colleen; Ficks, Ben; Golder, Jennifer  
**Cc:**  
**Subject:** HCC Update

HCC Colleagues,

We recognize the significant demands on your time, especially given the ongoing response to the Japan crisis and a potential shutdown deadline on the horizon. As the EDO has pointed out in his updates, the important work of the agency needs to continue, and the HCC has several important matters to discuss. I request you review and comment upon the draft agenda for the April 11 meeting sent by Susan, and ask that you make every effort to attend this meeting. If you cannot attend, please send a senior representative from your office.

The HCC sub-group reviewing hiring requests has been significantly impacted as a result of several members directly working the Japan crisis. I request those acting for the impacted HCC/AG members (Bill Ruland, Lawrence Kokajko, and Scott Flanders) review any proposed Agency hiring requests above the threshold that are provided by the HR staff – thank you.

Below is a list of some key items that will be discussed at the upcoming meeting:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.

(b)(5)

As you can see we have some important topics and a few critical decisions amidst the uncertainty of the 2011 and 2012 budgets.

Thank you for your continued support. Please feel free to contact me with any questions and/or concerns. All  
the best, Glenn  
(301) 492-2076

**From:** Marshall Shield <corp@myshield.us>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 01, 2011 6:01 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** 'Marshall Shield'  
**Subject:** Nuclear Task Force Disaster Support  
  
**Importance:** High

2011 年 3 月 29 日

天皇 陛下に:

**CC: ジョン・ルース v. 駐日米国大使**

私は3月以来する 11<sup>番目</sup> 求めてきた !

日本: 福島第一原子力発電の植物原子炉

私はする必要があります送信、コンサルタント、アドバイザー、プログラム ディレクター/マネージャー GS-15-東京電力と私たち 'の専門家の仕事をしています !

申し訳ありませんが、3月以降 11<sup>番目</sup>の私は、重要な間違いをなされて別の後に1つ。  
私は3月12<sup>日</sup>、すべて、原子炉のシャットダウン・スタンバイ・で良好な状態で緑色のライト-と送られてきた場合は赤どこでもライト !

**ステージング領域・設備 & 5ヘリコプターが必要**

**24/7 監視会議室が必要**

電力を復元します。

復元を冷却します。

放射線漏れをシールします。

コンピューター・自動システム・ハードウェア・ソフトウェアを復元します。

冷却水を復元: マニュアルディーゼル水ポンプ原子炉入力破損してユニットを接続  
ビルド・構成キャップ・カバー済燃料プール容器を破壊'

次完全に復元されたことを確認するには !

- バックアップ電源
- バックアップの水
- 接地
- コンピューター

- ▶ センサー
- ▶ コントロール
- ▶ 配管

原子力発電所を保存を実現するものを知っています。

手遅れになる前に私はそこに送信！

私は原子力プラント・ユニットの保存に4他のボランティアで、移動するボランティアです。

米国・日本・世界の軍事必要があります、ディーゼルユニットの使用

我々5ヘリコプター2週間が必要になります

機器のステージング領域に持って来られるが、

私達に1を入力する準備をするだろうセント・2<sup>nd</sup>レベル、一度に1つの核ユニット

すべての機器が落ちている場合は、ヘリコプターを残すことがあります。

私たち電力・水を復元している場合、誰もが送信されます安全な場所には、水の完全100%復元中もアシスタントととどまる

私完全なプロジェクト・プラン・必要機器の準備ができています。

何が間違っているを見つけると彼らがどのような機器: 必要なものを知っているでしょう: 世界報道機関の前に、を行く: ので、要求された機器を送信する場所を知っているが、800の電話番号を与える、C-117をロードして、ステージング領域に転送します。

私は今日に送信する必要があります！

\*\*\*\*\*

分類: マーシャル シールドのみ

午前を送信します]をクリックし、決定するまでどのような機器が必要です！

東京電力フォアマン: リード・契約

エンジニア・技術者・製造・輸送をする専門家を要求します。

1タスクフォース #1、#2、#3の動作します。

核放射線プロジェクトをシールド

3つのタスクフォースを要求: マーシャル シールドを主導

プレゼンテーション: レイアウトすべて6炉

#5, #6, #1, #2, #3, #4

現時点では本当に間違ったものですか？

電源/冷却ポンプを必要なまだ行方不明・静止って？

合計:

16 ディーゼル発電機

## 10 のディーゼル水ポンプ

### 2 より各バックアップ

必要な電力と水のすべての接続を含む

世界のニュースの前に行く：即座に、今日を送信に必要な機器を要求！賃貸・リース・リース購入契約に：と日本。

必要なすべての機器の一覧：東京国際マッコード AFB タコマ、ワシントン州、アメリカ、環太平洋の国をステージング領域に空輸すべての機器を要求します。私たち C 117 のステージング領域に直接機器を供給する空軍を求めます。

攻撃のシーケンスを作成します。

1 まで 6 最も重要なシーケンス # 1、# 6 ~

何が問題なのですか。

を) 電源: Cpu、フル、なしの自動化

b) 冷却

c) 放射線漏れ

## 計画:

### 応答チーム:

マーシャル氏盾プロジェクト コントロール: GS 15 アドバイザー、コンサルタント、プロジェクトディレクター

核ユニットと済燃料プールで熱を下げるために水を供給する水の源に十分な。

我々、冷たい水で 10 %、15 分ごとに 10 % 以上、電源まで始めます

この場所中は：我々のチームはアシスタント間の休憩を取るし、すべての水・電力オンライン 100% になるまで自分の後ろに滞在

(第 1 作業部会) メンバー: 電気・給排水・メカニック・パイプフィッター

アップ・テスト・オンラインと準備ができて 2 ボランティア、ディーゼルエンジン発電機をセットアップするがそれらを得る

2 ボランティア ディーゼル水ポンプ核駅ユニットには、セットアップし、水をソースを接続します。

(第 2 作業部会) すべてのユニットが安定したら 24/7 のインスタントの応答の問題に立っています。メンバー: 電気・パイプの介助・溶接・メカニック・配管・不正を働く人

(第 3 作業部会) 演算子、コンピューター、自動制御: 復元ソフトウェア、作業のすべての自動コントロールを取得：# 1 タスクフォースの後適切な電力・水供給

(第 1 作業部会)



ディーゼル電源ユニットを供給する、開始します。

- 1.核ユニットに水を開始できるように電源
- 2.起動コンピューター自動コントロール
- 3.に 2<sup>nd</sup> がレベルでブレーク、、圧力をリリース
- 4.水行で実行
- 5.、熱を下げるために水を起動: 私割合電源制御・シーケンスで: 空気・蒸気の冷房設備配管の強制的に。
- 6.これは電力・水のある核単位ごと

短い休憩を取るし、同じ次の原子力発電ユニットの操作を行います  
私達が完了するまで

抗放射線プロジェクトをインストールするには。

シールするため金属プロジェクト: エンジニア・パイプ工・溶接・いる: 製造外部プールのサイズ

カバーするためにインストールが破損して-広場！

順序火災証明・放射証拠防水シート (4) 100' x 100' ネクタイ ダウンすべて 10'

3月8日「ナイロン 150'長いロープし、20 ラチェット セット結ぶの建物に対する放射線リークが発生することができないのでシール、防水シートを保持するためプール周りに移動します。

フェンシング・配線の防水シートのプールの上最初に維持する上での追加します。  
これは一時的です。

エンジニア、専門家、製造。

次: 永続的なカバー/キャップをインストールシ」より大きい直径が核の棒かもしれないので元の複雑で、シール・ロックの上を過ごしたより削除将来の。

操作を設定します。

防水シートを削除します。

プール コンテナの周りは 2' 広いシール 360 を追加します。

クレーンの下の新しいキャップ

4 人それぞれの側には、削減の制御、まっすぐ下向きのキャップにロープ

\*\*\*\*\*

新しい私の盾 Corp プロジェクト:

スタンバイ-バックアップディーゼル発電機の水ポンプを保護するためにプロジェクト

複雑なコンテナの周りをフローに洪水の水を強制的に構築

このユニットはシール 360、原子炉電力・水の入力に接続されます。

アクセス燃料・コネクタと従業員の作業: 監視・検査・PM の

\*\*\*\*\*

## 原子力の単位ごとに必要な機器:

### 3-ディーゼル発電機: 累計: 16 ディーゼル発電機

2: 電源ユニット

を)1 プライム パワー

b)バックアップ電源

電源ケーブル・コネクタ、ディーゼル電源に原子力の単位を接続する: 2-50/100/200' 長い

### 1: ディーゼル水ポンプ: 累計: 10 のディーゼル水ポンプ

8 「ハード ケース水ホース

2) 100' 長い

b) 2-50' 長い

各ホースへのコネクタそれぞれの他の拡張機能とディーゼル ポンプし核ユニットと入力原子炉水に接続することができますは、ホースの水ソースに接続するには

2 より各バックアップ: 場所のステージングで保存  
必要な電力と水のすべての接続を含む

各炉用: フルパワーで実行しているすべての3 のディーゼルは1 週間の十分なディーゼル燃料を保持するには、大規模な燃料容器・タンク

各ディーゼル容器・タンクを入力の燃料を提供することができます、燃料タンカー

2-200' クレーン すべての機器との反放射インストールまたは移動を支援するプロジェクト

4-150' リフトの男 労働者: 電力と放射プロジェクト反

デジタルカメラの: 衛星放送トランスミッタで24/7 を新しい監視場所-受信機・モニター

原子炉計電源・水性-cooling ・熱 24/7 を監視するには

通常反応を1

各破損したユニット3

電気の電源

4 100 ワット石英フラッド ライトの光の塔

原子炉のコンピューター・監視をすべてゲージ・プリンターに

24/7 に

電気コード

デジタルカメラ: 存在ゲージ・監視レベル(各炉)の写真を撮る、大規模で印刷し、テープはエンジニアは5分ごとに-チェック-ないことを確認各原子炉で冷暖房への変更は、適切なモニターにします。

(第2作業部会) 何かがうまくいかない場合: 問題領域に入力: 問題領域・設備冷却比率を下げると熱の原因との写真を撮影するには、問題の装置 ID 番号の写真を撮る、エンジニアと倉庫スタッフには、このバックアップを取る適切な ID 番号交換する器具を見つけます。

(#2 部隊) 新しい作品 get 再度流れる水を破損した機器を置き換えます。

核ユニットと済燃料プールで熱を下げるために水を供給する水の源に十分な。

この場所中は: 我々のチームはアシスタント間の休憩を取るし、すべての水・電力オンライン 100% になるまで自分の後ろに滞在

我々、冷たい水で 10 %、15 分ごとに 10 % 以上、電源まで始めます

\*\*\*\*\*

私の盾 Corp [www.myshield.us](http://www.myshield.us) する必要があります安全な資金調達を開始!

プロジェクト '自然と' するには

私たちは '自然' を停止することはできません知っています。

男は時間を始め、まだ学習していないので、これを行うしようとしてしました!

プロジェクト: 津波最大 30' 高、カテゴリー V ハリケーン・津波停止します。

フロント ライン '小屋' カテゴリー V まで耐えることができます家

これらの新しい '小屋' 私たちの保護カテゴリー V ハリケーンや津波に直面して、郡の一部です。

私たちを開始する我々の資金を確保するまではないはすぐに、これらのプロジェクトを開始できませんでした!

## マーシャル シールド

オフィス: 360-336-3057 秒 (pst) アメリカ

携帯: (b)(6)

E メール: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

March 29, 2011

**To: Emperor Akihito**

**CC: The United States Ambassador to Japan, John v. Roos**

I've been asking since March 11<sup>th</sup> to help!

Japan: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plants/Reactors

I must be sent has a Consultant/Advisor/Program Director/Manager GS-15 – work with Tokyo Electric Power & our 'Experts'!

I am sorry, but since March 11<sup>th</sup>, critical mistakes have been made one after another. If I had been sent on March 12<sup>th</sup>, all the reactors would be in shut-down/standby/in good condition with Green Lights – NO RED lights anywhere!

**Need Staging area/Equipments & 5 Helicopters'**

**Need Monitoring Conference room 24/7**

Help restore power

Help restore cooling

Seal Radiation Leaks

Restore computers/automated systems/hardware/software

Restore water for cooling: manual-diesel water pumps connected to reactor inputs in the damaged units

Build/construct Cap/cover destroyed spent fuel pools containers'

To ensure the following is completely restored!

- Backup power
- Backup water
- Grounding
- Computers
- Sensors
- Controls
- Plumbing

I know what has to be accomplished to save the Nuclear power plants

Send me over there before it's too late!

I am volunteering to go in with 4 other volunteers, to save the nuclear plants/units

The US/Japan/World-Military MUST have the Diesels units' available

We will require 5 helicopters for 2 weeks

As the equipment is being brought in to our staging area

We will be preparing to enter into the 1<sup>st</sup>/2<sup>nd</sup> level, one nuclear unit at a time

When all the equipment is dropped off, the helicopters may leave

When we have the Power/Water restored, everyone will be sent out to a safe location, an assistant and I will stay while the water is being restored to full 100%

My complete project/plans/equipment required is ready

Once I find out what is wrong, what equipment they do have: I will know what is required:  
Then go before the worlds News agencies: give them an 800 phone number to call, so they  
know where to send the requested equipments, to be loaded by a C-117 and transported to our  
'Staging Area'.

I must be sent TODAY!

\*\*\*\*\*

**Classified: For Marshall Shield ONLY**

**Until I am sent and decide what equipments are required!**

Tokyo Power Forman: Lead/Agreement

Request experts to work with engineers/technicians/manufacturing/transportation

1 for Task Force #1, #2, #3 work

1 for sealing Nuclear Radiation project

Request three task forces: Led by Marshall Shield

Presentation: layout all 6 reactors

#5, #6, #1, #2, #3, #4

What is REALLY wrong at this moment?

What is still missing/still required for power/cooling pumps?

Total of:

16 Diesel Generators

10 Diesel Water Pumps

2 more/each for backup

Including all required power/water connections

Go before world news: request required equipment to be sent instantly, TODAY! On Rent/Lease/Lease to

Purchase agreement: With Japan.

List all equipments required: Request all equipments transported by Air to McCord AFB Tacoma, Washington  
State, USA or Pacific Rim countries to Tokyo International to our staging area. Asking the US Air Force to  
supply a C-117 to transport the equipment directly to our staging area.

Create attack sequence:

1 thru 6 Most important sequence #1, thru #6

What is wrong?

a) Power: Cpu/full/NO Automation

b) Cooling to reactor and pool

c) Radiation leaks

**Plan:**

**Response Teams:**

**Mr. Marshall Shield Project control: GS-15 Advisor/Consultant/Project Director**

**A source of water**, enough to supply the water to lower the heat in the nuclear unit and spent  
fuel pools.

We will start the cold water at 10%, every 15 minutes, 10% more, until full power

While this is taking place: Our team will take a break, while an assistant and myself stay behind  
until all water & power are online 100%

**(#1 Task Force) Members:** Electrical/Plumbing/Mechanic/Pipe Fitter

2-Volunteers to setup the Diesels Generators, get them up/tested/online and ready

2-Volunteers setup Diesel Water Pumps into the nuclear station unit, and connect the water  
source.

**(#2 Task Force)** Stand by 24/7 for instant response to problems after all units are stable.

Members: Electrical/Pipe Fitters/Welders/Mechanics/Plumbing/Rigger

**(#3 Task Force)** Operator/Computer/Auto Control: Restore software, get all auto controls working: After #1 Task Force supplies proper Power/Water

**(#1 Task Force)**

Start up the Diesel power units, to supply

1. Electrical power so water can be started into the nuclear unit
2. To startup computers/auto controls
3. Break into the 2<sup>nd</sup> level, release the steam/pressure
4. Run in the water line
5. Start running water to lower the heat: at my controlled power/percentage sequence: To force Air/Steam out of the piping's/cooling equipments.
6. Do this for each nuclear unit that has no power/water

Take a short break, and then do the same for the next nuclear unit

Until we finish

**To install anti nuclear radiation projects:**

Order metal project to seal: Engineer/Pipe Fitter/Welder/Rigger: Manufacture to size of outer pool

Install to cover damaged – open areas!

Then:

**Order Fire Proof/Radiation proof Tarp (4)** 100' x 100' with tie downs every 10'

3/8" nylon ropes 150' long, and 20 sets of tie down ratchet sets to go around the pool to hold the tarp against the building to seal it, so radiation can't leak.

Add fencing/wiring over top to keep tarp above pool first

This is only temporary

**Engineers/Expert/Manufacturing:**

**Next: install permanent cover/cap** 1/4" larger diameter than original complex with a sealed/locked on the top, so spent nuclear rods maybe removed in future.

Setup Operation:

Remove tarp

Add Sealant 360 around pool container 2' wide

Lower new cap by crane

4 man lifts on each side, controlling lowering and ropes to guide the cap straight down

\*\*\*\*\*

New My Shield Corp Project:

Project to protect Standby – Backup Diesel Generators & Water Pumps

Constructed to force flood waters to flow around complex/container

This unit will be sealed 360, connected to the reactor power/water inputs

Access for fuel/connectors and for employee work: Monitoring/Testing/PM's

\*\*\*\*\*

**Equipment required for each nuclear unit:**

**3 – Diesel Generators': Total: 16 Diesel Generators**

**2: Power units**

- a) 1 Prime power
- b) 1 Backup power

Power cables/connectors to connect the Diesel to the power source for the nuclear unit: 2-50/100/200' long

**1: Diesel Water pump: Total: 10 Diesel Water Pumps**

**8" hard case water hoses**

- a) 2-100' long
- b) 2-50' long

Each hose connector to each other for extensions and to connect to the diesel pump, then the other end to the water source to the nuclear unit and a hose that can connect to the reactor water input

**2 more/each for backup:** Stored at staging location

Including all required power/water connections

For each reactor: **Large fuel vessel/tank** to hold enough diesel fuel for 1 week for all 3 Diesel running at full power

A **Fuel Tanker** that can provide the fuel weekly, filling up each diesel vessel/tank

**2-200' Cranes** to help install/move all equipments and our anti radiation projects

**4-150' Man Lifts** for workers: power and anti radiation projects

**Video Digital Camera's:** Satellite transmitter on 24/7 to new monitoring location-Receiver/Monitor

To monitor the reactor gauges/power/water-cooling/heat 24/7

1 for each 'normal' reactor

3 for each damaged unit

Electrical power/cords

**Light towers** with 4-100 watt Quartz Flood lights

To light up Reactor computer/monitoring all gauges/printer

On 24/7

Electrical cord

**Digital cameras:** Take pictures of (each reactor) present gauge/monitoring levels, print out in large and tape to the proper monitor, where engineers will every 5 minutes – check – verify NO changes to cooling/heating at EACH REACTOR.

**(#2 Task Force)** If something goes wrong: enter into the problem area: To take pictures of problem areas/equipment causing lower cooling percentages and higher heat levels, take picture of problem equipment ID Number, take this back to the engineers/warehouse staff; find the proper ID number/equipment to be replaced.

**(#2 Task Force)** replaces damaged equipment with new piece/get water flowing again.

**A source of water,** enough to supply the water to lower the heat in the nuclear unit and spent fuel pools.

While this is taking place: Our team will take a break, while an assistant and myself stay behind until all water & power are online 100%

We will start the cold water at 10%, every 15 minutes, 10% more, until full power

\*\*\*\*\*

My Shield Corp [www.myshield.us](http://www.myshield.us) MUST SECURE FUNDING TO START!

Our main projects are to work with 'Mother Nature'

I know we can't stop 'Mother Nature'

Man has attempted to do this since time started and still hasn't learned!

Tidal Wave Project: Stop up to 30' high, Category V Hurricane/Tsunami

Front line 'Huts' – homes that can withstand up to Category V

These new 'Huts' are part of our protection for any county facing Category V Hurricanes or Tsunamis

We could start these projects soon, but NOT until we secure our funding to start!

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)



---

**From:** Marshall Shield <corp@myshield.us>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 01, 2011 6:11 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** 'Marshall Shield'  
**Subject:** Nuclear Task Force Disaster Support  
  
**Importance:** High

2011 年 3 月 30 日 7時 30分 PM PST のアメリカ  
： 天皇 明仁

CC: ジョン ・ ルース v. 駐日米国大使  
マーシャル ・ f ・ シールドから:

天皇陛下  
スタッフ  
日本の市民

私は今日に送信する必要があります。  
私は、原子力災害を引き起こしているものを停止  
することを知っている !

誰も地球上何かを知っている !

私は 3 月 12 日送信されている必要があります番  
目 !

何を達成することができることを証明教えてください！

私は今日に送信する必要があります！

申し訳ありませんが、しかし、電力会社が完全に失敗しました！彼らは自分の原子炉・プールを制御する方法を知らなかったを取得しました！

問題ではない今、どのようなものである：私は間違っているの今日は何かを停止するに送信する必要があります！

私は3時間で準備することができます。  
軍事基地や SeaTac から飛ぶ

役立つしてください。私はすべて間違って3月11日以来停止した可能性がある番目！

心から、マーシャル ファビアンのシールド

オフィス: 360-336-3057 秒 (pst) アメリカ

携帯:

(b)(6)

電子メール: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

大統領オバマ：

大使一郎藤崎

エネルギー長官：博士の Steven Chu: 日本 - 国際原子力機関

企業の経営幹部：東京電力

米国原子力規制委員会

IEEE

：マーシャル シールド

私はする必要があります送信、コンサルタント、アドバイザー、プログラム ディレクター/マネージャー GS-15-東京電力と私たち'の専門家の仕事をしています！

申し訳ありませんが、3月以降 11<sup>th</sup>の私は、重要な間違いをなされて別の後に1つ。私は3月 12<sup>th</sup>、すべて、原子炉のシャットダウン・スタンバイ・で良好な状態で緑色のライト-と送られてきた場合は赤どこでもライト！

すべての私の人生 (3<sup>rd</sup> 等級以来) は '何が間違っている何を間違って何も解決する必要があるを参照してできた。

なぜか？

すべての私の人生私がした '赤いテープ' としているようだ 'ドアをロック' 発見者をカットする「目隠しを着てと 2 鼻を超えて「できません」. 彼らは何か悪いことに、彼らは恐れているので何かを失敗する知らない。原子力災害の原因は何を知っているし、日本では、問題の原因は知っています。

私も、核放射線を停止することを知ってください。

私も何が行われている必要がありますと hasn't を知っている：災害年 3月 11<sup>th</sup>翌日のすべての原子炉の制御を取る。

千倍以上を私の重大な状況を解決するために送られてきた: は決して失敗がある！

私は今日日本に送信する必要があります！

新しい血は、誰かがないが恐れて、何を行う必要があります知っている！

何がこの恐ろしい状況を解決することができます1つの人を送信するのは難しい、か。

マーシャル シールド

演奏楽器：歳~6-8-Violin\*8-15-Keyboards\*12-15-Tenor Sax. 卒業マウントバーノン高校 1970年

米軍 - 私たち海洋社 1970年に参加しました。海兵隊では8つのレコード、ブートキャンプで5人の設定がそれらの1つ私の人生を永遠に変更に近くなった。1マイルの世界記録 34. 2、私は 3. 44 海兵隊服で走っていた。基本ドリル役員は、オリンピックのグループのオレゴン州ユージン私を記録するには、グループを送信する要求;私は既に21マイルを実行し、1日の仕事の実行後6人は私をテストします。彼らは1マイルの海上ドリルの使用の講師を実行を置いた;彼らは、10フィート長すぎるとしました。彼ら私3の1マイル実行を実行します。

1<sup>st</sup> 3. 44

2<sup>nd</sup> 3. 45

3<sup>rd</sup> 3. 44

彼らはより速く実行できるかどうか尋ねた:「はい、しかし、どのくらい速さは、次の依存。

良い機器を実行する必要とし、最も重要なのは私の困難は海洋されないようにするのではなく成功するためにドライブに目標私渡します」。一般尋ねた私はユージンに戻る、米国海兵隊があるかどうか、基本私のスポンサー、彼は答えた」は、彼を選んだが、新しいトップ秘密システムを選んだ、66 (最高テストレベル -entrance 海兵隊に) の # 1 兵: C4ISR) 技術者・エンジニアとは変更することはできませんさらにベトナム戦争がフルタイムを実行している」。

1<sup>st</sup> 1 & 3 マイルの実行、最速まで (米国海兵隊) 記録

2<sup>nd</sup> M 14 が印象的

3<sup>rd</sup> 45 Cal. ピストル: 印象的な

4<sup>th</sup> メートル-16 ライフル: 印象的な

5<sup>th</sup> メートル-16 ライフル: 操作およびテストを完了するには、戻り値

新しいレコードとして記録されません。

1. 1 の<sup>2</sup> 週間、私たちの服を私たちの名前を適用するには、私は完璧だった、ドリルのインストラクターを停止するには、小隊。彼はセットアップ作業領域、私皆私たち名・インクの衣類を正しく適用する方法を訓練する注文。私はそれらをどのように一度を有した兵士をしていた彼は、次の兵士、ことを証明します。約半分の方法このプロセスを介して別の小隊監督がやって来て、何をしていた尋ねた。私は、会社のすべての兵士の訓練、次のいくつかの時間を過ごした。

2 Pugal スティック トレーニング: を使用して Pugal の棒、銃剣とライフル銃を持つような顔を戦闘中に殺すために方法を学習します。訓練教官、(Pugal を殺す) をテストするには 3 の兵士を選んだ。彼は私を歩いたし、取得する私に語った。彼は彼の Pugal の棒は私を与え、言った「私を交換する、あなた次兵士を選ぶ」。私と訓練教官に最初の 3 つ (死亡) は、彼は何をした後さらに私の弟は私に暴行を思い出した。私は最初の 3 マイナス完全小隊を介して行った。各攻撃とは、方法は彼の攻撃に対応するつもりだった、兵士知っているだろうと思った。彼ら didn't、ないそれらの 1 つ。私はので痛み & 私たちが終わったら疲れてはほとんど動くこと。

3. は、高速に実行できるので、彼らと述べた:」は、小隊指導者を作りたいを望むが、2 つの最強・最速ランナーの小隊道路走者に必要な。

6<sup>th</sup> 日に肉体直接戦争の外の誰よりも早く

7<sup>th</sup> 日に軍曹早く、直接戦争以外の他の誰か

8<sup>th</sup> したスタッフ軍曹早く、直接戦争以外の他の誰か

私は # 1 となった C4ISR 専門家、私たち海洋指揮記載全般、:「SSGT アンダーソンですに基づいて完全に 20-9 手のひらアメリカ軍事基地で」、米軍トップ秘密システムの訓練場所。

1973 年 7 月 2 日、最初の C4ISR システムの操作でサル山・ダナンベトナムで実行されました。墜落し、技術者・Univac エンジニア、システムの回復ができませんでした。私は、私は猿が問題を見つけるし、システムにおける操作に戻るに山に送信された通知されました。私の注文システムが修復された後、アメリカ 7 月 4 日<sup>2</sup> 1973 年、1 週間後で退職しました。私たちの家族には、マウイ島ハワイにマンションを所有している;私は何回もしながら育ってきた。私は何か間違ったことに気づいた、まもなく、私たちが去ったあと、液体、右の翼の流れていた、時間の経過とともに悪化、パイロットが戻ってくるし、これを見ると、彼は送信彼の副操縦士、どのように私は尋ねた、長い目で見るを取り、直接と私」言わない何も誰にも」

私たちはハワイに上陸したし、着陸時に消防車が待っていた、滑走路の最後に送信されました。6 時間後、別の 707 を拡大しました。パイロット、飛行機に PA を記載我々今 2 時間ダナンに上陸からしました。

「これを聞く必要がある」だけは、「いいえ個海兵隊をベトナムに行く」いつか後、声明アメリカの大統領は右折、3 時間後で横田日本に上陸しました。我々は、座ってに語った、ハンガーに撮影され、役員を来たあなたが述べたすべてのあなたの 1 つを除いて、米国に戻されています。彼は立ち上がる、ケロロ アンダーソン以外に命じた。別の場所に送信された、私は何をするかを決定しようとしていた中に言われました。軍曹が現われた私のアパートと私に言った私は 3 日間、数マイルの距離をされ、すべての朝・夕方にチェックしていた東京の日/夕方を過ごすことができます。私は 20 の人生大 time...the バンド・コンサート情報を発見歳・ショー・エンターテイメント。これは私私の 4<sup>th</sup> 日に将来の希望 (ファンタジア プロダクション) の始まり

だった;私は、私は岩国米軍に着陸、および操作のサイトを準備するには、基本のエンジニアとの仕事を基本送信された通知されました。戦争最後に永遠に、つもりではなかったもので、米軍のことを決めたと空気戦争岩国から実行できる、完全な C4ISR システムを選んだ、それ岩国にサル山から運ばれます。

私は約 10 分読み込まれた検索の問題は、30 分後と実行する理由が、セットアップ ユーティリティの完全なシステムの技術者・エンジニア・役員を得たし、操作を開始する準備ができて、それは私だった失敗を見つけるための責任だった。私は滞在 1 週間で、いいえを残していたとしている我々はこのシステムをご利用いただけます完全操作では、任意の問題もなく知っているまで私の役員を要求し、それを修正できるようにこのシステムベトナムからここに移転、ベトナムに送信することができなかったので、あなたどこつもりはない！

私は車を発見、それを登録し、すでに発見したパイロットをしなければならなかったのフライトについて・視察旅行の時間を維持するフライトと呼ばれる空気の操作。多くの週末に私はどちらか南日本または他の国の - の生活について学ぶ何の純粋な喜びの乗車のための仲間の兵士だった！

我々も列車の乗り物に広島を除く 8 月にかかります。私たちは別のバー、ダンス、エンターテイメント イベントに参加してすべてのおもちゃを構築会社 15 階をいた。各フロア各特殊なおもちゃの機器を販売していた。# 7 の空気ではフル サイズ空気ホッケーのテーブルが、私はすでに私は、非常に高速の目手の応答機能が約どのように楽しいをされる可能性を見つけることを知っていた。再生、失われた 1 つとしていくつかの日本の紳士は、次の人が勝者にかかるだりましょう。私の番が来た場合は、私はラインが私を打つが大好きだとの人々長いされた famous...the になった私は、ゲームを失った。他のみんなと表示し、押し寄せるに戻って頭には言う私は、ゲームを終了し、お礼を日本語で言うことを学んだ、次の週末を参照してください。次の年では、この場所に約 10 倍、たびに、同じことを起こった戻って！日本の市民と桜の花の素晴らしいお祭り、食品、イベントを楽しんで日本忘れられない！

私の教師と家族が判明した 3<sup>rd</sup> 等級での間、私は特別な異なる。2 つのレポートを書いた。

1. タイタニック号
2. 建物の海面下にニューオーリンズ

ゲーム-レジ係の開始;もう一度、誰が私を打ちます。

私は私の人生には、次の数百倍を要請してきた。

1. 魔法の杖を持っているか。
2. ビジョンがありませんか？
3. 水の上を歩くことができるか。
4. 大臣は？
5. あなたは医者ですか？

私は # 1 されている C4ISR のトップエンジニア・フィールド技術 \* 1974 年以來の米国でのテンペスト、通信、核、精製システム:私は決して、ミッションを失敗した！

マーシャル ファビアン シールド

March 30, 2011 7:30 PM PST USA

To: Emperor Akihito

CC: The United States Ambassador to Japan, John v. Roos

From: Marshall F. Shield

Emperor Akihito  
Staff  
Japan citizens

I MUST be SENT TODAY  
I know what to do to stop what is causing your nuclear  
disasters!

NO ONE else on Planet Earth knows what to do!

I should have been sent March 12<sup>th</sup>!

Let me prove what I can accomplish!

I must be sent TODAY!

I'm sorry, but your power company failed completely!  
They had NO idea how to control their own nuclear  
reactors/pools!

That doesn't matter right now, what does, is: I have to  
be sent to STOP what is WRONG TODAY!!!  
I can be ready in 3 hours  
Fly from military bases or SeaTac

Please help.... I could have stopped everything wrong since March 11<sup>th</sup>!

Sincerely, Marshall Fabian Shield

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: corp@myshield.us

To: President Obama  
Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki  
Secretary of Energy: Dr. Steven Chu: Japan - IAEA  
Corporate Executives: Tokyo Electric Power  
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
IEEE

From: Marshall Shield

I must be sent has a Consultant/Advisor/Program Director/Manager GS-15 – work with Tokyo Electric Power & our ‘Experts’!

I am sorry, but since March 11<sup>th</sup>, critical mistakes have been made one after another. If I had been sent on March 12<sup>th</sup>, all the reactors would be in shut-down/standby/in good condition with Green Lights – NO RED lights anywhere!

All my life, (since the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade) I’ve been able to ‘see’ what is wrong, what needs to be accomplished to resolve anything wrong.

Why...?

All my life I’ve had to cut thru ‘red tape’, and ‘locked doors’ finding persons that seem to be ‘wearing blinders and can’t see 2” beyond their nose’. They don’t know what to do or worse, fail to do anything because they are afraid. I know what caused the nuclear disasters, and I know what is causing the problems in Japan.

I also know what to do to stop the nuclear radiation

I also know what should have been done, and hasn’t: Take control of all the reactors that day after the disaster March 11<sup>th</sup>.

I’ve been sent over a thousand times to resolve critical situations: Have NEVER failed!

I need to be sent TODAY to Japan!

They need new blood, someone NOT afraid and know what needs to be done!

What is so hard, to send one person that can help resolve this horrible situation?

Marshall Shield

Musical Instruments played: Years old ~ 6-8-Violin\*8-15-Keyboards\*12-15-Tenor Sax. Graduated Mount Vernon High School 1970

US Military - joined the US Marine Corp 1970. While in the Marine Corp I set 8 records, 5 of them in Boot Camp, one of them came close to changing my life forever. The Worlds record in the 1-mile was 3.42, I was running at 3.44 in Marine Corp clothing. The Base Drill officers requested the Olympic group in Eugene Oregon to send down a group to record me; six of them tested me after I had already run 2 1 mile runs and a full day of work out. They laid out the 1 mile run the Marine Drill Instructors used; they found it was 10 feet too long. They ran me 3 1 mile runs:

1<sup>st</sup> 3.44

2<sup>nd</sup> 3.45

3<sup>rd</sup> 3.44

They asked if I could run any faster: "Yes, but how fast depends on the following:

I require better running equipment and most important – a goal to drive me harder to succeed instead of just ensuring NO marine passes me". The base General was asked if I could return to Eugene and have the US Marine Corp sponsor me, he responded "NO, he was picked has the #1 soldier of the 66 (highest test level –entrance to the Marine Corp) picked for the new Top Secret System: C4ISR) Technician/Engineer and that cannot be changed plus the Viet Nam War is running full time".

1<sup>st</sup> 1& 3 mile running, the fastest ever recorded (US Marine Corp)

2<sup>nd</sup> M-14 Striking

3<sup>rd</sup> 45 Cal. Pistol: Striking

4<sup>th</sup> M-16 Rifle: Striking

5<sup>th</sup> M-16 Rifle: Return to complete operation/testing

Not recorded as new Records:

1. 1<sup>st</sup> week, we had to apply our name to our clothing, mine was perfect, our Drill Instructor told the Platoon to stop. He setup a work area then ordered me to train everyone else how to properly apply our names/ink onto their clothing. I had to show them how once; the soldier had to prove he could do this, then the next soldier. About half way thru this process, another Platoon Director came by and asked what I was doing. I spent the next several hours, training all soldiers in the company.

2. Pupil Stick training: Using Pupil sticks (like having a rifle with a bayonet) to learn how to kill during face to face combat. The Drill Instructor picked 3 soldiers to test them, (Pupil Kill). Then he walked up to me and told me to get up. He gave me his Pupil Stick and said "You are replacing me, pick your next soldier". I did, and followed what the Drill Instructor had done to the first three that he (killed) plus I was remembering my brother beating on me. I went thru the complete Platoon minus the first 3. I thought that with each attack, the soldier would know how I was going to respond to his attack. They didn't, not one of them. I was so sore & tired I could barely move when we finished.

3. Because I could run so fast, they stated: "We would like to make you a Platoon leader, but we require the two fastest-strongest runners to be our Platoon road runners.

6<sup>th</sup> Made Corporal sooner than anyone else outside of direct War

7<sup>th</sup> Made Sergeant sooner anyone else outside of direct War

8<sup>th</sup> Made Staff Sergeant sooner anyone else outside of direct War

I became the #1 C4ISR Expert, the US Marine Commanding General, stated: "SSGT Anderson is based permanently at twenty-nine palms US Military base", the training location for US military on top secret systems.

On July 2, 1973, the first C4ISR system in operation was running on Monkey Mountain in Da-Nang Viet Nam. It had crashed and the technicians/Univac engineers couldn't recover the system. I was informed I was being sent to Monkey Mountain, to find the problem and get the system back into full operation. My orders were to leave the USA on July 4<sup>th</sup> 1973 and return 1 week later after the system was repaired. Our family owns a condo on Maui Hawaii; I've been there numerous times by then while growing up. I noticed something wrong, a liquid was flowing out of the right wing shortly after we had left, it got worse as time went on, I asked if the pilot could come back and see this, he sent his Co-Pilot, how took a long look and said directly to me "Don't say anything to anyone"

We landed in Hawaii and when we landed was sent to the end of the runway where fire engines were waiting. Six hours later, with another stretched 707. We were now 2 hours from landing in Da-Nang when the pilot stated on the plane PA:

"you need to hear this" The President of the USA, just made a statement, "NO more Marines are going to Viet Nam" Sometime later, we turned to the right and landed 3 hours later at Yokota Japan. We were taken to a hanger, told to sit down, and then an officer came in, stated you are all being returned to the USA, except for one of you. He ordered us to



stand up, except Sgt. Anderson. They were sent to another location, I was told to stand by while they were attempting to decide what to do. A Sergeant showed up later and took me to apartment and told me, I had 3 days and could spend the days/early evening in Tokyo which was several miles away and had to check in every morning/evening. I was 20 years old found about life big time...the bands/concerts/ shows/entertainment. This was the beginning of my future hopes (Fantasia Productions) on my 4<sup>th</sup> day; I was informed I was being sent to Iwakuni US Military base to work with the base engineers to prepare a landing, and operation site. The US Military decided since the War wasn't going to last forever, and they could run the air war from Iwakuni, they picked up the complete C4ISR system and transported it from Monkey Mountain to Iwakuni.

I was responsible for finding why the computer was failing, while the system technicians/engineers/officers got the complete system setup and ready to start operations, it took me about 10 minutes to find the problem, 30 minutes later it was loaded and running. I asked my officers if I was leaving in a week, "NO", you are staying until we know this system stays in full operation, without any problems and, we relocated this system from Viet Nam to here, so you could fix it, since you couldn't be sent to Viet Nam: You're NOT going anywhere!

I found a car, registered it, and had already found out about the flights the Pilots had to do/from Air operations – called Junket Flights to keep their hour up. On many weekends I either took fellow soldiers for rides around south Japan or to other countries – what a pure joy to learn about life!

We would also take train rides to Hiroshima except in August. We would attend different bars/dance/entertainment events and found a company 15 floor building that had all their toys. Each floor had each special type of toys equipment they sold. On #7 was Air, where I found a full sized air hockey table, I already knew I have an extremely fast eye/hand response capabilities, but was about to find out how fun that could be. There were several Japanese gents playing, as one lost, the next person would take on the winner. When my turn came, I became famous...the lines were long, with folks that would love to beat me...I NEVER lost a game. When the other guys would show up and say it's time to head back to base...I would end the game and learned to say Thank you in Japanese, see you next weekend. Over the next year, I returned to this location about 10 times, the same thing happened each time! Enjoyed the Japanese citizens and the wonderful Cherry Blossom Festivals, their food and events, I will never forget Japan!

My teachers/family found out while I was in the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade, that I was special- different. I wrote two reports:

1. The sinking of the Titanic
2. New Orleans building below sea level

The game – checkers started; once again, no one ever beat me.

I've been asked hundreds of times in my life, the following:

1. Do you have a magic wand?
2. Do you have a 'Vision'?
3. Can you walk on water?
4. Are you a Minister?
5. Are you a Doctor?

I've been the #1 Top Engineer/Field Tech for C4ISR\*Tempest/Telco/ Nuclear/ Refinery systems in the USA since 1974:

I've never failed a mission!

Marshall Fabian Shield

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 03, 2011 12:37 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fw: Testimony  
**Attachments:** Testimony\_April6\_2011\_Rev2 -DPR edits.docx

---

**From:** Marshall, Jane  
**To:** Rihm, Roger; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** McDermott, Brian  
**Sent:** Sun Apr 03 12:28:39 2011  
**Subject:** Testimony

Here is the testimony with additional information on the incident response program changes that resulted from the TMI experience. If you have any questions, please let me know.

**TESTIMONY OF MARTIN VIRILIO**  
**DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS**  
**UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
**TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE**  
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS**  
**UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**APRIL 6, 2011**

(b)(5)


(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

44-38861-40



(b)(5)

44-38861-40



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 4:48 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; OCA Distribution  
**Subject:** Re: Dear Emperor Akihito: I MUST be sent to help! TODAY!

~~Sensitivity:~~ ~~Confidential~~

Yes

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**To:** OCA Distribution  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 01 18:02:48 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Dear Emperor Akihito: I MUST be sent to help! TODAY!

Are the rest of you getting these? I have gotten 4 so far.....

---

**From:** Marshall Shield [mailto:corp@myshield.us]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 01, 2011 4:08 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Dear Emperor Akihito: I MUST be sent to help! TODAY!  
**Importance:** High  
~~Sensitivity:~~ ~~Confidential~~

'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'; 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov'; 'spiros.droggitis@nrc.gov'; Marshall Shield;

'Kimberly.Sargent@nrc.gov"Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov"David.Decker@nrc.gov"Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov"Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov'

---

**From:** Marshall Shield [mailto:corp@myshield.us]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 31, 2011 6:09 PM  
**To:** 'information@kunaicho.go.jp'; 'Japan Ambassasdor '; 'naoko.kawaguchi@mofa.go.jp'; 'press@ws.mofa.go.jp'; 'jetprogram@ws.mofa.go.jp'  
**Cc:** 'Marshall Shield'  
**Subject:** Dear Emperor Akihito: I MUST be sent to help! TODAY!  
**Importance:** High  
~~Sensitivity:~~ ~~Confidential~~

**To: President Obama**  
**To: Honorable Emperor Akihito**  
**To: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**

## **To: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)**

1974 年以來、私は 1,000 回以上、世界中の場所に重大な状況を解決するのには送られてきた。質問は、なぜ、すべて、誰もが失敗したときに、私は送信されたです。米軍 C4ISR システム、空軍戦争岩国にベトナムを実行しているとき私の最初の特別プロジェクトは日本で行われました。私はこれを何度も送信しました！なぜ、米国防総省サル山、ダナンに岩国から極秘システムを輸送するか。だから私は CP-808 (コンピューターで問題を送信できませんでした！

これ以来起こっている！私は一度 2 万アメリカの航空会社の賞は、株式会社テレコム北の 120 + 週あたりの時間を働いていた私は、空気よりも、地面に 5 年間ようでした。信じられないほど重要な状況や、米国と世界全体の場所を取って問題。

私は決して、ミッションを失敗した！

私は何を停止この原子力災害を行うには、知っている！

私は多分、だけ地球上の人は何をすることを知っているしていないこの恐れて害の方法で支援する！

**大統領オバマ：**

名誉天皇陛下に:

国際原子力機関 (IAEA) :

: 米国 原子力規制委員会 (NRC)

60 年代以来-多くの原子力の重要な問題されている 19 (19)  
これらのすべての不当な理由によって引き起こされました。

➤ 男: 工学・製造

➤ 演算子: エラー-コントロールの手順・シーケンス

➤ エンジニア・技術者: インストール、バックアップ電源

➤ と

母なる自然災害

世界タスクフォースがある場合は、原子炉・プールがトラブルにしていらないように原子をサポートするために植物すべてを確認するためには、知ってください。

次の災害が起きたことはなかっただろう

遅いダウン・原子力災害停止する正しい手順には、操作に配置されている可能性があります。

たぶん私は一を台します。

私の資料とドキュメントの準備ができています。

それはすべての原子炉制御室にする必要があります。

すべての所有者・オペレーター・エンジニア・技術者

世界は、正式な訓練に行く必要があります！

世界原子力サポート

すべての原子炉の惑星地球には！

私も何が必要知っているこの地球上の唯一の  
人のようによろであります。  
原子力災害を停止するには！

日本はヘルプを必要としないか。  
私は3月11日送信されている必要があります  
番目ですか？  
はい！

チェルノブイリ災害 原子力事故に発生した1986年4月26日 ウクライナ共和国（現在ウクライナ）のチェルノブイリ原子力発電所 スリーマイル島事故 ユニット2（、加圧水型炉での部分的なコア核危機だった

事故4時、1979年3月28日障害、立ち往生オープンパイロット式リリーフ弁（PORV）大量のエスケープするには、原子炉の冷却を許可プライマリ・システムでは、後に非核セカンダリ・システムでは、始めた。

この日本での存在の原子力災害が含まれています: 3月2011年 - 福島は原子力事故、日本（現在のイベント）

深刻な事故を含めます。

- ・ 1959、1964年、1969年 - サンタ・スザンナ フィールド研究所、ロサンゼルス、カリフォルニア州。部分的な meltdowns。

- ・ 1957 年 9 月- チェリャビンスクで ウラル核惨事核廃棄物 ストレージタンク爆発します。200 プラス死者の見積もりと考え、;270,000 人は、危険な放射線レベルにさらされていた。30 以上の小さなコミュニティから削除されていたソ連 1958 年と 1991 年の間のマップします。<sup>[21]</sup> (イネス レベル 6)。<sup>[19]</sup>
- ・ 1957 年 10 月 - Windscale を起動します。
- ・ 1961 年 7 月- ソ連潜水艦 K 19 事故。8 つの死亡、30 人以上放射線に露出オーバーだった。<sup>[6]</sup>
- ・ 1962 年- 放射線事故メキシコシティで、4 つの死者。
- ・ 1969 年 1 月-スイスの 資源量推定原子炉 には洞窟の大量の放射能汚染をリード部分の芯メルトダウンを受けます。
- ・ 1979 - 教会岩ウラン工場をこぼす ニュー メキシコ州、アメリカ合衆国で。
- ・ 1984 年 3 月- 放射線事故モロッコで、8 の死者。<sup>[7]</sup>
- ・ 1985 年 8 月- ソ連潜水艦 K 431 事故。10 の死者と 49 の他の人は、放射線のけがを負った。<sup>[22]</sup>
- ・ 1987 年 9 月- ゴイアニア事故。4 死亡者、249 の他の人々は、深刻な放射線汚染を受け取った。<sup>[8]</sup>
- ・ 1990 年 12 月- サラゴサの放射線事故。11 の死者と 27 の他の患者が負傷しました。<sup>[6]</sup>
- ・ 1993 年 4 月-、 トムスク 7 再処理 硝酸 酸洗浄中タンクが爆発したとき複雑、事故。爆発は、放射性ガスの雲をリリースしました。(イネス レベル 4)。<sup>[19]</sup>
- ・ 1996 年- コスタリカ放射線事故。13 死者と 114 の他の患者は、放射の過剰摂取を受け取った。<sup>[5]</sup>
- ・ 放射線治療装置を解体するとき 2000 年 2 月 - 3 人死亡、10 負傷 サムット・サムットプラカーンの結果。<sup>[9]</sup>



- ・ 2010 年 4 月 - Mayapuri 放射線事故インド、1 つの死亡。<sup>[9]</sup>
- ・ 3 月 2011 年 - 福島は原子力事故、日本 (現在のイベント) 。

私は今日に送信する必要があります。  
す。  
今すぐ！  
自分自身を証明教えてください！

**To: President Obama**

**To: Honorable Emperor Akihito**

**To: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**

**To: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)**

**Since 1974, I've been sent over 1,000 times to locations around the world to resolve critical situations. The question is why, when everything and everyone is failing, I was sent. My first special project took place in Japan, when the US Military pulled the C4ISR system, running the air war over Viet Nam to Iwakuni. I've sent this to you numerous times! Why would the Pentagon transport a top secret system from Monkey Mountain, Da Nang to Iwakuni? So I could be sent to find the problem with the CP-808 Sperry Univac computer!**

**This has been happening ever since! I once had 2 million American Airlines Awards, working 120+ hours per week for Northern Telecom Inc. It seemed like I was in the air more than on the ground for 5 years.**

**Unbelievable critical situations/problems taking place across the USA and world.**

**I've never failed a mission!**

**I know what to do, to STOP THIS NUCLEAR DISASTER!**

**I maybe the only person on this planet that knows what to do and is NOT afraid to help in harm's way!**

**There have been numerous nuclear critical problems since the 60's – Nineteen (19)**

**All of these were caused by wrongful reasons:**

- **Man: Engineering/Manufacturing**
- **Operators: Failures – control, steps/sequences**
- **Engineers/Technicians: Installations, backup power**
- **And**  
**Mother Nature disasters**

**IF there were a world Task Force, to support Nuclear plants to ensure all knew what to do, so that the nuclear reactor/pools didn't get into trouble...**

**The following disasters would never have happened**

**The correct steps to slow down/stop the nuclear disaster could have been put into operation.**

**MAYBE I STAND ALONE....**

**MY HANDOUT/DOCUMENT IS READY**

**IT SHOULD BE IN ALL REACTOR CONTROL ROOMS**

**ALL OWNERS/OPERATORS/ENGINEERS/TECHNICIANS'  
WORLD-WIDE SHOULD GO THROUGH FORMAL TRAINING!**

**WORLD NUCLEAR SUPPORT  
FOR ALL REACTORS ON PLANET EARTH!**

**I also seem to be the only person on this planet  
that knows what needs to be done:  
To stop Nuclear Disasters!**

**Does Japan require help?  
Should I have been sent March 11<sup>th</sup>?  
YES!**

**Chernobyl disaster** was a nuclear accident that occurred on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)

**The Three Mile Island accident** was a partial core nuclear meltdown in Unit 2 (a pressurized water reactor

**The accident began at 4 a.m. on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, with failures in the non-nuclear secondary system, followed by a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) in the primary system, which allowed large amounts of nuclear reactor coolant to escape.**

# This includes the present nuclear disaster in Japan: March 2011- Fukushima I nuclear accidents, Japan (current event)

Serious radiation accidents include:

- 1959, 1964, 1969 - Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Partial meltdowns.
- September 1957 – Mayak nuclear waste storage tank explosion at Chelyabinsk. Two hundred plus fatalities, believed to be a conservative estimate; 270,000 people were exposed to dangerous radiation levels. Over thirty small communities had been removed from Soviet maps between 1958 and 1991.<sup>[21]</sup> (INES level 6).<sup>[19]</sup>
- October 1957 - Windscale fire.
- July 1961 – Soviet submarine K-19 accident. Eight fatalities and more than 30 people were over-exposed to radiation.<sup>[6]</sup>
- 1962 – Radiation accident in Mexico City, four fatalities.
- January 1969 – Lucens reactor in Switzerland undergoes partial core meltdown leading to massive radioactive contamination of a cavern.
- 1979 - Church Rock uranium mill spill in New Mexico, USA.
- March 1984 – Radiation accident in Morocco, eight fatalities.<sup>[7]</sup>
- August 1985 – Soviet submarine K-431 accident. Ten fatalities and 49 other people suffered radiation injuries.<sup>[22]</sup>
- September 1987 – Goiania accident. Four fatalities and 249 other people received serious radiation contamination.<sup>[8]</sup>
- December 1990 – Radiotherapy accident in Zaragoza. Eleven fatalities and 27 other patients were injured.<sup>[6]</sup>
- April 1993 - accident at the Toms-7 Reprocessing Complex, when a tank exploded while being cleaned with nitric acid. The explosion released a cloud of radioactive gas. (INES level 4).<sup>[19]</sup>
- 1996 – Radiotherapy accident in Costa Rica. Thirteen fatalities and 114 other patients received an overdose of radiation.<sup>[5]</sup>
- February 2000 - Three deaths and ten injuries resulted in Samut Prakarn when a radiation-therapy unit was dismantled.<sup>[9]</sup>
- April 2010 - Mayapuri radiological accident, India, one fatality.<sup>[9]</sup>
- March 2011- Fukushima I nuclear accidents, Japan (current event).

I must be sent TODAY  
RIGHT NOW!  
LET ME PROVE MYSELF!

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: corp@myshield.us

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 6:55 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** FYI re: exchange w/Mr. Markey's staff

Concerned about lack of "outside" members

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Sat Apr 02 14:59:05 2011  
**Subject:** Re: NRC task force

It said they WOULD be part of the team. As a friendly heads up, my boss will absolutely go nuts if the outside people have been removed. We may even have to talk about the Soviet Politburo again. :-) Please let me know as soon as possible.

Thanks

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 02, 2011 02:55 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: NRC task force

You're right.. It does say former NRC experts with relevant experience could be part of the team. I'm not sure if others will be added later. Will have to check.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
To: Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy; Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
Sent: Sat Apr 02 14:42:43 2011  
Subject: Re: NRC task force

That is not what the March 23 press release said. It said it would be current NRC managers and former NRC experts with relevant experience. Can you please confirm for me that you still plan to seek outside expertise and provide me with the timeframe in which that will occur?

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

----- Original Message -----

From: Weil, Jenny [mailto:Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Saturday, April 02, 2011 02:35 PM  
To: Freedhoff, Michal; Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
Subject: Re: NRC task force

Hi Michal,

I am going to try to find the original release on BB, but as I recall, the Task Force was to be composed of senior-level agency staff and consider stakeholder input, but be independent/separate from industry efforts.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
To: Powell, Amy; Weil, Jenny  
Sent: Sat Apr 02 14:19:20 2011  
Subject: NRC task force

Hi there

I see that the NRC announced the task force, but I only see the internal staff - the original announcement called for former NRC officials and outside experts as well. When do you expect the non-NRC members to be named?

Thanks!

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

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Sent using BlackBerry





# NRC NEWS

## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Office of Public Affairs

Telephone: 301/415-8200

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

E-mail: [opa.resource@nrc.gov](mailto:opa.resource@nrc.gov) Site: [www.nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov)

Blog: <http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov>

No. 11-062

April 1, 2011

### **NRC APPOINTS TASK FORCE MEMBERS AND APPROVES CHARTER FOR REVIEW OF AGENCY'S RESPONSE TO JAPAN NUCLEAR EVENT**

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has named six senior managers and staff to its task force for examining the agency's regulatory requirements, programs, processes, and implementation in light of information from the Fukushima Daiichi site in Japan, following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.

The task force will be led by Dr. Charles Miller, Director of the NRC's Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs. Other task force members are Daniel Dorman, Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS); Jack Grobe, Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR); Gary Holahan, Deputy Director of the Office of New Reactors (NRO); Nathan Sanfilippo, Executive Technical Assistant, Office of the Executive Director for Operations; and Amy Cubbage, Team Leader, NRO.

"The task force will talk to agency technical experts and gather information to conduct a comprehensive review of the information from the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex and make recommendations for any improvements needed to our regulatory system," Miller said. "We plan to provide our observations, conclusions and recommendations in a written report that will be made public approximately 90 days after we start our review."

According to the charter, the task force will conduct a near-term review and identify topics for assessment for a longer term review. Initially, the task force will identify potential near-term actions that affect U.S. power reactors, including their spent fuel pools. Areas to be reviewed include station blackout (loss of all A/C power for a reactor), external events that could lead to a prolonged loss of cooling, plant capabilities for preventing or dealing with such circumstances, and emergency preparedness. The task force will draw from ongoing NRC inspections to verify availability of plant equipment, procedures, and other resources currently required for dealing with such events. The task force will also gather information from domestic and international sources while remaining independent of any industry initiatives.

The task force expects to develop recommendations for Commission consideration on whether it should require immediate enhancements at U.S. reactors and any changes to NRC regulations, inspection procedures, and licensing processes.

On May 12 and June 16, the task force plans to brief the Commission in public meetings on the status of the review. Recommendations will be reported in a July 19 Commission meeting, which will be open to the public. The report will also be made available to the public. The task force charter, at the end of this release, will also be available through the NRC's ADAMS electronic document database by entering ML11089A045 under the "Simple Search" tab on this webpage: <http://wba.nrc.gov:8080/ves/>.

Biographical information for the task force members is provided below.

Charles L. Miller has worked at NRC since 1980, has served as the Director of the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs since 2006. He has held various management positions in offices dealing with safety of nuclear reactors, waste and materials, including nuclear medicine. Miller received a bachelor's degree in engineering from Widener University, a master's and doctorate in chemical engineering from the University of Maryland, and is a registered professional engineer licensed in the District of Columbia.

Daniel H. Dorman has 20 years of service with the NRC and has served as the Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. During his career at NRC, Dorman also worked in the offices of NRR, Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), and Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR). Prior to joining the NRC, Dorman served in the U.S. Navy's nuclear power program. He received a bachelor's degree in naval architecture and marine engineering from the Webb Institute of Naval Architecture.

Jack Grobe has worked for the NRC for over 30 years and has served as the Deputy Office Director for Engineering in NRR since 2007. He started as an inspector in the NRC regional office outside Chicago, Illinois, and moved up to chair a number of task force groups including the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel following discovery of the reactor vessel head corrosion and Nuclear Security Special Projects to enhance reactor capabilities to deal with fires or explosions caused by potential malevolent acts. Grobe has a master's degree in bionucleonics and a bachelor's degree in nuclear engineering, both from Purdue University.

Gary M. Holahan has 35 years of service with the NRC and has served as the Deputy Director for NRO since 2006. During his career at the NRC, Holahan has worked in a number of technical and management positions, including nine years as the Director of NRR's Division of Systems Safety and Analysis, and in the Chairman's office where he covered NRC reactor and research programs. Holahan's assignments have also included the Three Mile Island Lessons Learned Task Force, the post-9/11 development of security advisories and orders, and the U.S. - Canada Blackout Report. Mr. Holahan received a bachelor's degree in physics from Manhattan College and a master's degree in nuclear engineering from the Catholic University of America.

Nathan T. Sanfilippo has worked for the NRC for nine years and has served as an Executive Technical Assistant in the Office of the Executive Director for Operations since May 2010. Prior to his current position, he worked in NRR, NRO, and NSIR on nuclear power plants performance assessment, emergency preparedness inspections, new reactor licensing, and aircraft attack mitigation measures. Sanfilippo earned a bachelor's degree in materials science and

engineering and a minor in global business strategies from the Pennsylvania State University, as well as a certificate in legislative studies from the Government Affairs Institute at Georgetown University.

Amy E. Cubbage has worked at the NRC for 22 years and currently serves in NRO as a team leader. Cubbage has extensive experience working on boiling-water reactor system reviews and as the lead project manager for the Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) Design Certification. Cubbage received a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Virginia.

###

News releases are available through a free *listserv* subscription at the following Web address: <http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html>. The NRC homepage at [www.nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov) also offers a SUBSCRIBE link. E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are posted to NRC's website.

**CHARTER FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TASK FORCE  
TO CONDUCT A NEAR-TERM EVALUATION OF THE NEED FOR AGENCY ACTIONS  
FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN JAPAN**

Objective

The objective of this task force is to conduct a methodical and systematic review of relevant NRC regulatory requirements, programs, and processes, and their implementation, to recommend whether the agency should make near-term improvements to our regulatory system. This task force will also identify a framework and topics for review and assessment for the longer-term effort.

Scope

The task force review will include the following:

a. A near-term review to:

- Evaluate currently available technical and operational information from the events that have occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan to identify potential or preliminary near-term/immediate operational or regulatory actions affecting domestic reactors of all designs, including their spent fuel pools. The task force will evaluate, at a minimum, the following technical issues and determine priority for further examination and potential agency action:
  - External event issues (e.g. seismic, flooding, fires, severe weather)
  - Station blackout
  - Severe accident measures (e.g., combustible gas control, emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines)
  - 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(2) which states, "Each licensee shall develop and implement guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire, to include strategies in the following areas: (i) Fire fighting; (ii) Operations to mitigate fuel damage; and (iii) Actions to minimize radiological release." Also known as B.5.b.
  - Emergency preparedness (e.g., emergency communications, radiological protection, emergency planning zones, dose projections and modeling, protective actions)

Develop recommendations, as appropriate, for potential changes to NRC's regulatory requirements, programs, and processes, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory actions are needed.

- b. Recommendations for the content, structure, and estimated resource impact for the longer-term review.

## Coordination and Communications

The near-term task force will:

- Solicit stakeholder input as appropriate, but remain independent of industry efforts.
- Coordinate and cooperate where applicable with other domestic and international efforts reviewing the events in Japan for additional insights.
- Provide recommendations to the Commission for any immediate policy issues identified prior to completion of the near-term review.
- Provide recommendations to program offices for any immediate actions not involving policy issues, prior to completion of the near-term review.
- Identify resource implications of near-term actions.
- Consider information gained from Temporary Instruction 2515/183, "Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Events."
- Develop a communications plan.
- Update and brief internal stakeholders, as appropriate.

## Expected Product and Schedule

The task force will provide its observations, conclusions, and recommendations in the form of a written report to the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs at the completion of the 90-day near-term review.

During the development of its report, the task force will brief the Commission on the status of the review at approximately the 30- and 60-day points.

The report will be transmitted to the Commission via a SECY paper, and the task force will brief the Commission on the results of the near-term effort at approximately the 90-day point. The report will be released to the public via normal Commission processes.

The task force will recommend a framework for a longer-term review as a part of the near-term report. The longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan (with a goal of beginning by the end of the near-term review).

## Staffing

The task force will consist of the following members:

Leader	Charles Miller	FSME
Senior Managers	Daniel Dorman	NMSS
	Jack Grobe	NRR
	Gary Holahan	NRO
Senior Staff	Amy Cabbage	NRO
	Nathan Sanfilippo	OEDO
Administrative Assistant	Cynthia Davidson	OGC

Additional task force members will be added as needed. For the near-term review, other staff members may be consulted on a part-time basis.

### EDO Interface

The task force will keep agency leadership informed on the status of the effort and provide early identification of significant findings. The task force will report to Martin J. Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs. ~

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:17 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Thank you very much.  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 08:16 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Michal,  
You had asked if the core of Unit 2 had melted into the torus. Here is the view from the NRC Emergency Operations Center:

Based on radiation readings in the drywell and the torus (3340 rem/hour and 91 rem/hour, respectively), the NRC staff speculates that part of the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in the lower space of the drywell. Lower radiation readings in the torus suggest that there is not core material in the torus.

Please let me know if I can provide additional information,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:48 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Thanks again

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:48 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Part of the Unit 2 core may have melted into the drywell.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:35 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Also is the view that it melted into the drywell?  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
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**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Michal,  
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Please let me know if I can provide additional information,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 10:46 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Could that have occurred at unit 1 or 3 as well?

Thanks

Michal

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Michal Freedhoff  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2  
**Sent:** Apr 5, 2011 8:47 AM

Part of the Unit 2 core may have melted into the drywell.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov] **Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:35 AM **To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy **Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros **Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Also is the view that it melted into the drywell? Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D. Policy Director Office of Representative Edward J. Markey 2108 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 202-225-2836 ----- Sent using BlackBerry

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov] **Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 08:16 AM **To:** Freedhoff, Michal **Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov> **Subject:** NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2 Michal, You had asked if the core of Unit 2 had melted into the torus. Here is the view from the NRC Emergency Operations Center:

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Please let me know if I can provide additional information,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry: (b)(6)

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 6:26 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Saw that - "confidential assessment"...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 06:22:56 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Today's NYT.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 05 22:53:27 2011  
**Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Also - can I get a copy of the assessment document reported in the NYT? I am assuming that the daily plant statuses are part of this, but the description in the article seems to suggest additional detail.

Thanks

Michal

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Michal Freedhoff  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2  
**Sent:** Apr 5, 2011 8:47 AM

Part of the Unit 2 core may have melted into the drywell.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Congressional Affairs

Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry: (b)(6)

From: Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov] Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:35 AM To: Riley (OCA), Timothy Cc: Droggitis, Spiros Subject: Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Also is the view that it melted into the drywell? Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D. Policy Director Office of Representative Edward J. Markey 2108 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 202-225-2836 ----- Sent using BlackBerry

From: Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 08:16 AM To: Freedhoff, Michal Cc: Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov> Subject: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2 Michal, You had asked if the core of Unit 2 had melted into the torus. Here is the view from the NRC Emergency Operations Center:

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Please let me know if I can provide additional information,

Timothy Riley

Congressional Affairs Officer

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Congressional Affairs

Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry: (b)(6)

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 7:40 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Fw:

Don't know if this is the same

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 07:26:04 2011  
**Subject:** Fw:

...

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 06:41:52 2011  
**Subject:**

The new york times today has a report on japan prepared by nrc that sounds more like what we are looking for on the conditions and options. Please send that to us this am. Thanks josh.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 06:03 PM  
**To:** 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Can you call me on cell (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:25 PM  
**To:** 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Getting you something today

She is looking for options and plans to solve this. What it means for us, next steps.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:04 PM

To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Subject: Getting you something today

Might not be exactly on target but let us know

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 7:50 AM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Subject:** RE:

I'm at my desk if you can call.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 7:26 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Fw:

...

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 06:41:52 2011  
**Subject:**

The new york times today has a report on japan prepared by nrc that sounds more like what we are looking for on the conditions and options. Please send that to us this am. Thanks josh.

----- Original Message -----

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**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:25 PM  
**To:** 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Getting you something today

She is looking for options and plans to solve this. What it means for us, next steps.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:04 PM



To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Subject: Getting you something today

Might not be exactly on target but let us know

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:32 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: NRC believes Fukushima had hardened vents?

Barton wants the emails

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 10:31:08 2011  
**Subject:** FW: NRC believes Fukushima had hardened vents?

Just got this from OPA - we'll track down the exchange

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Burnell, Scott  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:29 AM  
**To:** Decker, David; Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Weil, Jenny  
**Cc:** Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** FW: NRC believes Fukushima had hardened vents?  
**Importance:** High

Do we know who briefed Markey?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Tracy, Tennille [mailto:Tennille.Tracy@dowjones.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:26 AM  
**To:** Burnell, Scott  
**Subject:** NRC believes Fukushima had hardened vents?

Scott - Ed Markey just said in a House hearing that the NRC told him yesterday that Fukushima plant had hardened vents and that they either did not use them or that the hardened vents did not work. Can you verify this?

Tennille Tracy  
Dow Jones Newswires / Wall Street Journal  
Office: 202.862.6619  
Cell: (b)(6)  
1025 Connecticut Ave., NW  
Washington D.C., 20036

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:33 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:44 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Thanks,

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:44 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Michal,  
It is our understanding that:  
Fukushima Daiichi reactors did have hardened vents.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:33 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Thanks. One more question - did the Fukushima reactors have hardened vents?  
Michal  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 08:16 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Michal,  
You had asked if the core of Unit 2 had melted into the torus. Here is the view from the NRC Emergency Operations Center:

Based on radiation readings in the drywell and the torus (3340 rem/hour and 91 rem/hour, respectively), the NRC staff speculates that part of the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in the lower space of the drywell. Lower radiation readings in the torus suggest that there is not core material in the torus.

Please let me know if I can provide additional information,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:00 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

These are the 2 questions that we answered yesterday. There were no other communications with Michal.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:48 AM  
**To:** 'Freedhoff, Michal'  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Part of the Unit 2 core may have melted into the drywell.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
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Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

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Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 08:16 AM

A0/188

**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Michal,  
You had asked if the core of Unit 2 had melted into the torus. Here is the view from the NRC Emergency Operations Center:

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Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:36 AM  
**To:** McIntyre, David; Burnell, Scott; Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

The three emails were between 8 and 9am yesterday.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** McIntyre, David  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:33 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Burnell, Scott; Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Tim – when did this exchange take place?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:22 AM  
**To:** Burnell, Scott; Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Based on an initial inquiry (In the NRC staff's opinion, has the core of unit 2 melted into the torus?), I relayed the following information received from the RST:

Based on radiation readings in the drywell and the torus (3340 rem/hour and 91 rem/hour, respectively), the NRC staff speculates that part of the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in the lower space of the drywell. Lower radiation readings in the torus suggest that there is not core material in the torus.

Based on follow on questions (Does the explanation provided suggest that Unit 2's core melted into the drywell? and Do we know if the Fukushima reactors had hardened vents?), I then forwarded the following two pieces of information from the RST:

Part of the Unit 2 core may have melted into the drywell.

It is our understanding that Fukushima Daiichi reactors did have hardened vents.

There were no other communications with the staffer from Rep. Markey's office; this is the entirety of what was relayed.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

---

**From:** Burnell, Scott  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:57 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing  
**Importance:** High

Another Markey item to track down ASAP. Thanks.

---

**From:** Lobsenz, George [mailto:George.Lobsenz@ihs.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:56 AM  
**To:** McIntyre, David; Burnell, Scott  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Hi guys--please see Markey statement below that he says he has been told by NRC that fuel has "probably" melted through reactor pressure vessel at Fukushima Unit 2. Can you confirm or deny this statement by Markey? Any comment on this would be welcome.

George

---

**From:** Barry, Giselle [mailto:Giselle.Barry@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:49 AM  
**To:** Barry, Giselle  
**Subject:** Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
April 6, 2011

Contact: Giselle Barry 202-225-2836, Eben Burnham-Snyder 202-225-6065

**Statement of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.)  
"The U.S. Government Response to the Nuclear Power Plant Incident in Japan"  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
April 6, 2011**

"On March 28, 1979, almost exactly 32 years ago, a partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant terrified the nation and caused a full-scale re-evaluation of the nuclear industry in our country.

"On April 26, 1986, almost exactly 25 years ago, the meltdown caused by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant spewed highly radioactive smoke all over Europe. Again, the world was appalled, and promised increased safety.



"Today, we see that we are just as helpless when faced with nuclear disaster as we were 25 and 32 years ago.

"The cores of at least two of the Japanese reactors are severely damaged. I have been informed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the core of Unit Two has gotten so hot that part of it has probably melted through the reactor pressure vessel.

"To bring the reactors and their spent fuel pools under control, the Japanese have had to resort to sending young workers in to risk their lives as they operate what amount to giant water guns.

"To assess and then sop up the radioactive water that has begun spewing into the ocean, they are relying on the use of bath salts and diapers.

"Just like the use of pantyhose and golf balls to stop last year's oil spill, the Japanese have been compelled to try a "nuclear junk shot" in desperate attempts to stop an environmental calamity.

"Yet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission insists that our systems are safe, even before beginning, let alone completing, its review of our reactors and spent fuel pools.

"It does so in the face of its own analysis showing that there is a higher risk of core damage from earthquakes that has not yet been incorporated into regulatory requirements.

"It does so in the face of backup electricity requirements that are generally less stringent than what the Fukushima reactors were equipped with.

"And it does so after removing the post-Three Mile Island requirement to include systems to prevent the explosions of hydrogen that occurred at Fukushima from its regulations.

"I have introduced legislation, the Nuclear Power Plant Safety Act of 2011, to impose a moratorium on all pending NRC licenses and re-licenses in light of the need to fully understand the safety risks and include remedies into our own regulations. Many other countries have announced similar measures. I look forward to today's testimony."

*Information on the latest status of the Fukushima reactors was gathered from communications between Congressman Markey's office and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).*

###

---

**From:** Spencer, Peter <Peter.Spencer@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:58 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Scanned image from MX-5001N  
**Attachments:** 2323.CERcopier@mail.house.gov\_20110406\_103614.pdf

What does this email say regarding markey assertion there was a meltdown

-----  
Sent from BlackBerry

----- Original Message -----

From: Christian, Karen  
To: Spencer, Peter  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 11:52:34 2011  
Subject: Fw: Scanned image from MX-5001N

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

----- Original Message -----

From: CERcopier  
To: Christian, Karen  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 11:36:14 2011  
Subject: Scanned image from MX-5001N

Reply to: [2323.CERcopier@mail.house.gov](mailto:2323.CERcopier@mail.house.gov) <[2323.CERcopier@mail.house.gov](mailto:2323.CERcopier@mail.house.gov)> Device Name: Not Set Device Model: MX-5001N

Location: Not Set

File Format: PDF MMR(G4)  
Resolution: 200dpi x 200dpi

Attached file is scanned image in PDF format.

Use Acrobat(R)Reader or Adobe(R)Reader(TM) of Adobe Systems Incorporated to view the document.

Acrobat(R)Reader or Adobe(R)Reader(TM) can be downloaded from the following URL:

Adobe, the Adobe logo, Acrobat, the Adobe PDF logo, and Reader are registered trademarks or trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated in the United States and other countries.

<http://www.adobe.com/>

**Subject:** Fw: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

**Date:** Wednesday, April 6, 2011 8:56:16 AM ET

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal

**To:** Barry, Giselle, Burnham-Snyder, Eben

See below for the hardened vents email.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy

**To:** Michal Freedhoff

**Subject:** RE: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

**Sent:** Apr 5, 2011 8:43 AM

Michal;

It is our understanding that:

Fukushima Daiichi reactors did have hardened vents.

Timothy Riley

Congressional Affairs Officer

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Congressional Affairs

Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry: (b)(6)

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [<mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>] **Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 8:33 AM **To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy **Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros **Subject:** Re: NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Thanks. One more question - did the Fukushima reactors have hardened vents? Michal Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D. Policy Director Office of Representative Edward J. Markey 2108 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 202-225-2836 ----- Sent using BlackBerry

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [<mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>] **Sent:** Tuesday, April 05, 2011 08:16 AM **To:** Freedhoff, Michal **Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <[Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov](mailto:Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov)> **Subject:** NRC: Question regarding Fukushima Unit 2

Michal,

You had asked if the core of Unit 2 had melted into the torus. Here is the view from the NRC Emergency Operations Center:

Based on radiation readings in the drywell and the torus (3340 rem/hour and 91 rem/hour, respectively), the NRC staff speculates that part of the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in the lower space of the drywell. Lower radiation readings in the torus suggest that there is not core material in the torus.

Please let me know if I can provide additional information,

Timothy Riley

Congressional Affairs Officer

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Congressional Affairs

Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry: (b)(6)

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:12 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** Marty to reporters

Becky – were you with Marty when he spoke to reporters? See Beth's e-mail below.

---

**From:** Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:56 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Burnell, Scott  
**Subject:** FW: Media -Did NRC tell Markey that Unit 2 core has melted through the reactor vessel?

Is this exactly what Marty said: Martin Virgilio told reporters after his testimony that information does not square with today's event report, and he has seen no info that there has been melt-thru at Unit 2.

Anyway we can get the transcript early or at least tell Wald exactly what Virgilio said?

Beth Hayden  
Senior Advisor  
Office of Public Affairs  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
— *Protecting People and the Environment*  
301-415-8202  
[elizabeth.hayden@nrc.gov](mailto:elizabeth.hayden@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Wald, Matthew [<mailto:mattwald@nytimes.com>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:52 AM  
**To:** Burnell, Scott  
**Cc:** Medina, Veronika; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** RE: Media -Did NRC tell Markey that Unit 2 core has melted through the reactor vessel?

Scott, I don't think there will be a transcript for some days to come. What did Virgilio say?

---

**From:** Burnell, Scott [<mailto:Scott.Burnell@nrc.gov>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:40 AM  
**To:** Wald, Matthew  
**Cc:** Medina, Veronika; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** RE: Media -Did NRC tell Markey that Unit 2 core has melted through the reactor vessel?

Hi Matt;

Please refer to the hearing transcript for Marty Virgilio's response to that statement. Thanks.

Scott

---

**From:** Wald, Matthew [mailto:mattwald@nytimes.com]

**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:12 AM

**To:** OPA Resource

**Subject:** Did NRC tell Markey that Unit 2 core has melted through the reactor vessel?

Reuters is reporting that Rep. Markey says NRC told him that the core of Fuku 2 has melted through the reactor vessel.

Can you call me on my cell? (b)(6) Thanks.

--- Matt

Matthew L. Wald  
The New York Times  
Washington Bureau  
1627 Eye Street NW  
Washington, DC 20006

202-862-0363

cell: (b)(6)

fax: 202-318-0057

<http://www.nytimes.com/info/nuclear-energy/>

twitter: mattwaldnyt

---

**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:33 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

They asked Markey at the hearing to provide it to them and he said he would. Marty and Don had no clue since there has never been anything even close to that on a sitrep. I'm suprised we have not gotten calls from 18 yet.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 12:29:24 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Peter has it because he just sent it to me and asked me what it means...

---

**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:21 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

I'm really not comfortable being the messenger on this since I have been out of the loop.

---

**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:31 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Fw: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Can you send to the committee counsel and peter?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 06 11:23:06 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

FYI re: Tim's exchange with Michal yesterday.

Is Marty's portion of the hearing over?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:22 AM  
**To:** Burnell, Scott; Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Based on an initial inquiry (In the NRC staff's opinion, has the core of unit 2 melted into the torus?), I relayed the following information received from the RST:

Based on radiation readings in the drywell and the torus (3340 rem/hour and 91 rem/hour, respectively), the NRC staff speculates that part of the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in the lower space of the drywell. Lower radiation readings in the torus suggest that there is not core material in the torus.

Based on follow on questions (Does the explanation provided suggest that Unit 2's core melted into the drywell? and Do we know if the Fukushima reactors had hardened vents?), I then forwarded the following two pieces of information from the RST:

Part of the Unit 2 core may have melted into the drywell.

It is our understanding that Fukushima Daiichi reactors did have hardened vents.

There were no other communications with the staffer from Rep. Markey's office; this is the entirety of what was relayed.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Burnell, Scott  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:57 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing  
**Importance:** High

Another Markey item to track down ASAP. Thanks.

---

**From:** Lobsenz, George [mailto:George.Lobsenz@ihs.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:56 AM  
**To:** McIntyre, David; Burnell, Scott  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Hi guys--please see Markey statement below that he says he has been told by NRC that fuel has "probably" melted through reactor pressure vessel at Fukushima Unit 2. Can you confirm or deny this statement by Markey? Any comment on this would be welcome.

George

---

**From:** Barry, Giselle [mailto:Giselle.Barry@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:49 AM  
**To:** Barry, Giselle  
**Subject:** Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 6, 2011



Contact: Giselle Barry 202-225-2836, Eben Burnham-Snyder 202-225-6065

**Statement of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.)**  
**“The U.S. Government Response to the Nuclear Power Plant Incident in Japan”**  
**Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**  
**April 6, 2011**

“On March 28, 1979, almost exactly 32 years ago, a partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant terrified the nation and caused a full-scale re-evaluation of the nuclear industry in our country.

“On April 26, 1986, almost exactly 25 years ago, the meltdown caused by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant spewed highly radioactive smoke all over Europe. Again, the world was appalled, and promised increased safety.

“Today, we see that we are just as helpless when faced with nuclear disaster as we were 25 and 32 years ago.

“The cores of at least two of the Japanese reactors are severely damaged. I have been informed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the core of Unit Two has gotten so hot that part of it has probably melted through the reactor pressure vessel.

“To bring the reactors and their spent fuel pools under control, the Japanese have had to resort to sending young workers in to risk their lives as they operate what amount to giant water guns.

“To assess and then sop up the radioactive water that has begun spewing into the ocean, they are relying on the use of bath salts and diapers.

“Just like the use of pantyhose and golf balls to stop last year’s oil spill, the Japanese have been compelled to try a “nuclear junk shot” in desperate attempts to stop an environmental calamity.

“Yet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission insists that our systems are safe, even before beginning, let alone completing, its review of our reactors and spent fuel pools.

“It does so in the face of its own analysis showing that there is a higher risk of core damage from earthquakes that has not yet been incorporated into regulatory requirements.

“It does so in the face of backup electricity requirements that are generally less stringent than what the Fukushima reactors were equipped with.

“And it does so after removing the post-Three Mile Island requirement to include systems to prevent the explosions of hydrogen that occurred at Fukushima from its regulations.

"I have introduced legislation, the Nuclear Power Plant Safety Act of 2011, to impose a moratorium on all pending NRC licenses and re-licenses in light of the need to fully understand the safety risks and include remedies into our own regulations. Many other countries have announced similar measures. I look forward to today's testimony."

*Information on the latest status of the Fukushima reactors was gathered from communications between Congressman Markey's office and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).*

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 8:54 AM  
**To:** Ordal, Paul (EPW)  
**Cc:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Pace, Patti  
**Subject:** RE: Re:

Please call 301-415-1820 to be connected to Josh's office - we'll be there.

Thanks,  
Amy

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ordal, Paul (EPW) [mailto:Paul\_Ordal@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 8:51 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Re:

Thanks. What number should they call at 1pm?

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 08:02 AM  
**To:** Ordal, Paul (EPW)  
**Cc:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); Batkin, Joshua <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>; Schmidt, Rebecca <Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Re:

1pm works for us.

Thanks Paul -

Amy

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ordal, Paul (EPW) [mailto:Paul\_Ordal@epw.senate.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 6:13 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)  
**Subject:** RE: Re:

Could we schedule a call tomorrow afternoon? Our staff have flexibility between 1-4pm.

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 1:58 PM  
**To:** Ordal, Paul (EPW)

Cc: Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
Subject: Re:

Looping in OCA to assist.

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Ordal, Paul (EPW) <Paul\_Ordal@epw.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 13:43:23 2011  
Subject: RE:

Would 10:00am or 10:30am work for you tomorrow?

-----Original Message-----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 1:03 PM  
To: 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov'  
Cc: Ordal, Paul (EPW)  
Subject: Re:

We should schedule time to go over answers to our questions asap, prob tomorrow. Looping in paul to assist.

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 12:37 PM  
To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Subject: Re:

Working on it..

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW) <Bettina\_Poirier@epw.senate.gov>  
To: Batkin, Joshua  
Sent: Wed Apr 06 06:41:52 2011  
Subject:

The new york times today has a report on japan prepared by nrc that sounds more like what we are looking for on the conditions and options. Please send that to us this am. Thanks josh.

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 06:03 PM

To: 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>  
Subject: Can you call me on cell (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:25 PM  
To: 'Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov' <Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov>  
Subject: Re: Getting you something today

She is looking for options and plans to solve this. What it means for us, next steps.

----- Original Message -----

From: Batkin, Joshua [mailto:Joshua.Batkin@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 05:04 PM  
To: Poirier, Bettina (EPW)  
Subject: Getting you something today

Might not be exactly on target but let us know

Joshua C. Batkin  
Chief of Staff  
Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko  
(301) 415-1820

---

**From:** Nieh, Ho  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 3:00 PM  
**To:** Crockett, Steven; Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Coggins, Angela; Sharkey, Jeffry; Sosa, Belkys; Bubar, Patrice  
**Subject:** RE: LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant #570200819#

Commissioner Ostendorff's office has no comments.

Thanks.

Ho

Ho Nieh  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William C. Ostendorff  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
(301) 415-1811 (office)  
(b)(6) (mobile)  
(301) 415-1757 (fax)  
[ho.nieh@nrc.gov](mailto:ho.nieh@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Crockett, Steven  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 2:05 PM  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Coggins, Angela; Sharkey, Jeffry; Nieh, Ho; Sosa, Belkys; Bubar, Patrice  
**Subject:** FW: LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant #570200819#  
**Importance:** High

Attached, FYI, is one of OMB's quick-turnaround requests for comments on a legislative matter. There is no time for the usual "LR". It is likely that the NRC staff will have no comment.

---

**From:** Fitter, E. Holly [mailto:[E.\\_Holly\\_Fitter@omb.eop.gov](mailto:E._Holly_Fitter@omb.eop.gov)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 12:21 PM  
**To:** Fonner, Susan; Rothschild, Trip; Vincent, Leslie; Crockett, Steven; Martin, Circe; Sanchez, Nicola; Hirsch, Patricia  
**Subject:** LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant #570200819#

**DEADLINE: 10:00 AM Friday, April 08, 2011**

**Please review the attached EPA statement on EPA's role in monitoring radiation associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and possible U.S. implications, to be given on 4/12 before SEPW and advise of any comments by 10:00 AM Friday 4/8. Thanks.**

---

LRM ID: EHF-112-55  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

Thursday, April 07, 2011

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer - See Distribution

FROM: Burnim, John (for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

SUBJECT: LRM [EHF-112-55] EPA Oversight Testimony on EPA's role in radiation monitoring associated with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

OMB CONTACT: Fitter, E

E-Mail: [E. Holly Fitter@omb.eop.gov](mailto:E.Holly.Fitter@omb.eop.gov)

PHONE: (202) 395-3233

FAX: (202) 395-5691

In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President. By the deadline above, please reply by e-mail or telephone, using the OMB Contact information above.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for the purposes of the Statutory Pay-as-You-Go Act of 2010.

Thank you.

**TESTIMONY OF  
LISA P. JACKSON  
ADMINISTRATOR  
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY**

**BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**April 12, 2011**

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:37 AM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: CONFUSED

Ok – I let Annette know about the old version and she is having her staff stop work on that.

How extensive are the last items to be ironed out? Making a lot of changes after Commission sees it does not go over well...

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 8:18 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: CONFUSED

They have the old carper response. The generic response. I am going to talk to my mailroom to pull. I assumed what I sent last night could go to secy while I ironed out last items. That might a couple of hours. I need to talk with reg 4. I'll come by after mtg I'm in.

Sent from an NRC BlackBerry  
Roger S. Rihm

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 08 08:11:21 2011  
**Subject:** CONFUSED

Roger – need to clarify something with you. I talked to SECY and they are ready to roll once they have the final e-version of the letters. Last night in the e-mail below, you say "transmit to SECY first thing in the morning." However in subsequent e-mail traffic, it sounds as though you still have questions/comments to disposition before these are ready to go to SECY and then up to the Commission. Further clouding things, Annette just called to say that they already have the Boxer-Carper letter! Can you clarify?

Thanks,  
Amy

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 10:03 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Turk, Sherwin; Rothschild, Trip; Landau, Mindy; Virgilio, Martin  
**Subject:** Two Boxer Letters with Enclosures  
**Importance:** High

Amy – Can't seem to reach you, so am sending along everything I have with the assumption you or Josh will transmit to SECY so they can deal with it first thing in the morning. I am also leaving a copy for Marty.

The two enclosures reflect a number of constructive edits from Shep Turk in OGC; he has no legal objection. There are a few places where he had questions that I could not answer, so I will have to work those out with appropriate staff in the morning.

I should be in shortly before 8AM.

My home phone is (b)(6) if you need to reach me before 11PM or so.

The Honorable Barbara Boxer  
Chairman, Committee on Environment  
and Public Works  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of March 17, 2011. In light of the recent events in Japan, you asked that we perform a thorough review of the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear power plants and posed a number of questions. Detailed responses to the questions contained in your letter are provided in the enclosure.

Regarding a review of the California facilities, I, with the full support of the Commission, directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives. We will keep you and our other stakeholders informed as we proceed.

While the NRC provides assistance to the Japanese people, I want to assure you that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. With our near-term evaluation of the relevance of recent events to the U.S. fleet underway, we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American public.

Sincerely,

GBJ

Enclosure (as stated)

Identical letter to Senator Tom Carper

**Responses to Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer and Senator Tom Carper  
Letter of March 17, 2011**

**1. Please identify all U.S. nuclear facilities subject to significant seismic activity and/or tsunamis.**

Although we often think of the US as having "active " and non-active" earthquake zones, earthquakes can actually happen almost anywhere. Seismologists typically separate the US into low, moderate and high seismicity zones. The NRC requires that every nuclear plant be designed for site-specific ground motions that may be expected at their locations. In addition, the NRC has specified a minimum ground motion level to which all nuclear plants must be designed. The designation of the general type of seismic zone that may apply at any specific site is subject to interpretation but a conservative interpretation – meaning a larger zone—might include the following plants, based upon a preliminary estimate:

High Seismicity – Diablo Canyon, SONGS

Moderate Seismicity – Brunswick, Robinson, Summer, Vogtle, Hatch, Clinton, Watts Bar, Sequoya, North Anna

Low Seismicity – all other plants

**2. U.S. nuclear power plants are designed to be safe based on historical data of the area's maximum credible threat (including earthquakes and tsunamis). What extra safety features does the NRC currently require for facilities that have a credible threat of an earthquake or tsunami? In light of the recent events in Japan, we would also like the NRC to re-examine the assumptions used to determine the maximum credible threat and suggest additional options that could provide a greater margin for safety at plants nationwide that might be subject to challenges similar to this currently being seen in Japan following the earthquake and tsunami.**

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. This includes a number of new regulatory requirements imposed by the NRC that have enhanced the domestic reactor fleet's preparedness for some of the problems we are seeing in Japan.

The "station blackout" (SBO) rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the core. The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated in the event of a severe accident and core damage.



With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s, which has required installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

Additionally, following the 9/11 events, reactor licensees have been required to develop strategies to maintain and restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. Licensees are required to develop strategies for fire fighting, operations to mitigate fuel damage, and actions to minimize radiological release.

As a result of the events in Japan, the Chairman, with the full support of the Commission, has directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives.

For the near term effort, we have begun a 90-day review. This review will evaluate all of the available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include the ability to protect against natural disasters, response to station blackouts, severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression, radiological consequence analysis, and severe accident management issues. Over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed.

The task force's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has obtained sufficient technical information concerning the events in Japan. The longer term review will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to those events to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the NRC. We will also evaluate interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available.

**3. Which U.S. nuclear power plants share similar design features with the affected Japanese reactor facilities? Do these facilities have design vulnerabilities that should be addressed to ensure their cooling systems do not fail when confronted by stresses including those similar to what we have seen in Japan following the earthquake and tsunami?**

Thirty-five of the 104 operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. are BWRs, as are the reactors at Fukushima. Twenty-three of the U.S. BWRs have the same Mark I containment as the Fukushima reactors. Four of the U.S. BWRs are early designs which are similar to Fukushima Unit 1. Nineteen U.S. BWRs are similar to Fukushima Unit 3.

BWR Mark I containments have relatively small volumes in comparison with pressurized water reactor (PWR) containments. This makes the BWR Mark I containment relatively more susceptible to containment failure given a core meltdown severe enough to cause the reactor vessel to fail and to breach the containment boundary. On the positive side, BWRs have more ways of adding water to the core than PWRs. This includes the provision of two water injection sources which do not rely on AC electric power. These systems include Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and High pressure coolant injection (HPCI).

As discussed in response #2 above, the NRC task force will be looking at a range of issues, including potential vulnerabilities of BWRs.

**4. How comprehensive is the radiation monitoring system in Japan? Would the U.S. take a similar monitoring approach if a serious accident were to occur here? What increased risk is associated with exposure to mixed oxide fuel?**

The NRC does not currently have sufficient information to describe in detail the radiation monitoring system in Japan. In addition to the radiation monitoring that is required to be performed by all U.S. reactor licensees, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency conducts environmental monitoring of radiation. Questions concerning the EPA's monitoring systems and actions should be directed to the EPA.

Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel involves the use of plutonium as a fuel, in addition to enriched uranium. Plutonium is a long-lived alpha emitter, which presents different risks than those presented by uranium fission products. Regarding exposure to mixed oxide fuel, in Japan, prompt evacuation has minimized radiation exposure to the public, so long-term public health consequences from radiation exposure resulting from the events, whether due to MOX or uranium fuel, are expected to be small. Also, given the small number of MOX fuel assemblies at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 at the time of the event, coupled with the short time of irradiation of the MOX fuel, it is likely that the MOX fuel has had and will have no perceptible impact on any consequences from the event.

**5. Given what has happened at the Japanese facilities, please describe how the NRC currently ensures the safety of spent fuel pools at U.S. facilities and identify additional steps the NRC could take to better address the vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools at plants in the U.S.**

Information concerning the circumstances and specific sequence of events at the Fukushima plants is incomplete at this time, and the lessons to be learned from those events remain to be

determined. The NRC's regulatory focus is to ensure that cooling capability, both for reactors and for spent fuel pools, is maintained in order to prevent fuel damage. This has been accomplished at U.S. plants by redundant and/or diverse capabilities to provide forced cooling and water addition

As discussed in response #2 above, the NRC task force will be looking at a range of issues, and will critically assess potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools.

**6. Has the NRC modeled what could happen if the U.S. had multiple nuclear accidents simultaneously? If so, how would the NRC respond to such a disaster?**

All U.S. nuclear power plant licensees are required to develop plans to deal with emergencies at their facilities, including the loss of offsite power, and to have in place plans. In addition, site-specific offsite emergency preparedness plans are required to be developed and exercised on a regular basis, to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. While these capabilities and plans are site-specific, they would apply as well in the event of a broader emergency involving multiple sites. The occurrence of an event involving a significant release of radiation is not expected at any site, much less at multiple sites simultaneously. The NRC has not modeled what would happen in the event of a simultaneous occurrence of nuclear accidents at multiple sites.

**Responses to Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer and Senator Dianne Feinstein  
Letter of March 16, 2011**

**Plant Design and Operations**

- 1. What changes to the design or operation of these facilities have improved safety at the plants since they began operating in the mid-1980s?**

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including, most significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures for licensees, and made substantive improvements in NRC's incident response capabilities. We also addressed many human factors issues regarding control room indicators and layouts, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves.

Two significant changes after Three Mile Island (TMI) were the expansion of the Resident Inspector Program and the incident response program. Today, there are at least two Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. The inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities, and serve as NRC's eyes and ears at the power plant. The NRC headquarters Operations Center and regional incident response centers are prepared to respond to all emergencies, including any resulting from operational events, security events, or natural phenomena. Multidisciplinary teams in these centers have access to detailed information regarding licensee facilities, and access to plant status information through telephonic links with the Resident Inspectors, an automated emergency response data system, and directly from the licensee through the emergency notification system. The NRC's response would include the dispatch of a site team to augment the Resident Inspectors on site, and integration with the licensee's emergency response organization at its Emergency Offsite Facility. The program is designed to provide an independent assessment of events, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the events, and to ensure that State officials have the information they would need to make decisions regarding protective actions.

Further, a number of new regulatory requirements were imposed by the NRC following the TMI accident, which enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness to cope with some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. For example, the "station blackout" rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the core.

Another post-TMI requirement, the hydrogen rule, requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. In addition, there are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see in a beyond-design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s, which has required installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

Emergency planning and preparedness was also augmented substantially following the TMI accident, with the adoption of additional regulatory requirements and the conduct of mandatory offsite exercises on a biennial basis, including participation by state and local government officials. The NRC's emergency preparedness and planning requirements provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are coordinated with state and local officials and are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a plant, we want licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe situation.

Specific changes in design or operation at Diablo Canyon have included the following:

- Added sixth on-site emergency diesel generator
- Increased volume of diesel generator fuel oil tanks to supply 7 days of fuel
- Added capacitor banks to the 230 kV offsite power source to improve reliability of offsite power source
- Replaced 500 kV offsite power source circuit breakers with new design that has increased earthquake resistance
- Replaced offsite power source transformers
- Replaced the reactor heads for the reactor vessels with a new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Replaced steam generators with new design that has improved resistance to corrosion
- Increased the capacity of the 4 kilovolt system circuit breakers
- Replaced plant process computer
- Replaced low pressure turbine rotors with a new design that is more resistant to turbine blade failure
- Replaced the water cooled positive displacement pumps for core injection with air cooled centrifugal charging pumps

- Replaced main feedwater pump control system to digital based control system
- Upgraded residual heat removal system piping to reduce potential flow induced erosion following an accident
- Replaced emergency core cooling system flow orifices to reduce potential potential flow blockage following an accident
- Replaced the containment sump strainer with a new design that is five times larger to minimize susceptibility to clogging
- Removed material from inside containment that could become a potential debris source following a loss of coolant accident
- Developed additional procedures to address potential natural and manmade disasters
- Implemented significant site changes to improve plant security
- Implemented procedures and training to improve human performance and reduce errors
- Implemented procedures and training to increase use of industry nuclear plant operating experience to improve plant safety

Changes in design or operation at San Onofre (SONGS) have included the following:

- Replaced steam generators with new design that has improved resistant to corrosion
- Developed additional procedures to address potential natural and manmade disasters
- Replaced the containment sump strainer with a new design that is five times larger to minimize susceptibility to clogging
- Removed material from inside containment that could become a potential debris source following a loss of coolant accident
- Implemented significant site changes to improve plant security
- Implemented procedures and training to improve human performance and reduce errors
- Implemented procedures and training to increase use of industry nuclear plant operating experience to improve plant safety
- Replaced all Emergency Planning Zone alert notification sirens in 2005 and 2006, and added paging capability.
- Replaced plant process computer
- Replaced low pressure turbine rotors with new design that is more resistant to turbine blade failure and stress corrosion cracking
- Replaced main feedwater pump control system to digital based control system
- Replaced service air compressors with modern model, and add cross-tie to instrument air
- Added vent to HPSI line to ensure ECCS system free of gas
- Increased safety related battery capacity (1200-1800 amp hours)
- Added degraded grid undervoltage relays to 1E 4KV buses

- Added a portable generator for SGWL indication in order to facilitate steam driven pump manual operation during beyond design basis blackout scenarios

**2. What emergency notification systems have been installed at California nuclear power plants? Has there ever been a lapse of these systems during previous earthquakes or emergencies?**

An Early Warning System (EWS) is installed to provide prompt alerting of the public in the event of an emergency at both Diablo Canyon and SONGS. The EWS consists of 131 sirens spanning 18 to 22 miles from the plant at Diablo Canyon, and 50 sirens spanning 10 miles at SONGS. The EWS is used in conjunction with radio and TV broadcasts, and allows instructions, information, and necessary actions to be immediately communicated to the public. The sirens are equipped with battery or solar-powered back-up capability. This redundancy in power source was upgraded in the 2005-2006 timeframe. The sirens are tested daily, bi-weekly, quarterly and annually. The sirens are monitored 24/7 with alarms for system failures. Currently, Diablo Canyon's and SONGS's siren system are nuclear industry top performers in reliability.

For Diablo Canyon, prior to installing the power-back up capability, some sirens lost power during the December 2003 San Simeon earthquake. The sirens were not used during that earthquake but back-up route alerting was set-up if the need for public alerting warranted. The SONGS EWS sirens have not been affected by past seismic activity.

**3. What safety measures are in place to ensure continued power to California reactors in the event of an extended power failure?**

U.S. plants are required to meet 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 17, "Electric Power System." Reactor units must have two physically independent offsite power supplies capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition. Additionally, all plants are required to have on-site power supplies that are also independent and capable of placing the units in a safe shutdown condition assuming a worst case single failure. All U.S. plants (except Oconee) have emergency diesel generators and battery backup systems. Most U.S. plants with diesels have two diesels per unit (Diablo Canyon has 3). The regulations do not specify the length of time that the diesels and batteries must be able to operate following a loss of offsite power (most sites plan to run the diesels for multiple days and have battery backup capability for 8 hours). Instead, the required amount of time is dependent on the plant's site recovery strategy and is based on providing sufficient capacity to assure that the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

If **Diablo Canyon** experiences a loss of power from the 500 kV and 230 kV offsite power switchyards, three emergency diesel generators (EDGs) are available to supply onsite power in each of the units. A unit can be safely shutdown utilizing any single EDG. There are two-50,000 gallon diesel fuel oil tanks, sufficient to operate an EDG for seven days. The EDGs are located at an elevation of 85 feet, well above the maximum expected tsunami elevation.

In addition, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are in place that include procedures to cope with the loss of all vital AC power. For example, there are Casualty Procedures in place that have pre-planned actions in the event of earthquakes, tsunami warnings and fires. There are Severe Accident Management Guidelines in place that contain actions to take in extreme conditions that require coolant injection to the reactor core, mitigation of hydrogen flammability in containment, and coolant to flood-up containment and cover the reactor core. There are Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) in place that postulate extensive plant damage due to a natural disaster or terrorist event. The EDMGs are invoked when the control of the plant cannot be established from the Main Control Room or there is no communication with the Main Control Room. The Extreme Damage event is assumed to disable all electric power. The EDMGs provide a procedure to perform multiple actions (if needed) to continue to cool the reactor core, cool the spent fuel pool, and minimize radiation release.

**SONGS** is similar to Diablo Canyon with 2 EDGs per unit and the EDGs are located 30 feet above sea level. SONGS also has a physical cross-tie ability such that the EDGs on one unit can be used to safely shutdown the other unit in the event that either unit loses both of its EDGs. The comments provided above concerning emergency procedure improvements at Diablo Canyon (i.e. EOPs, Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines, and EDMGs) apply as well to SONGS.

### **Type of Reactor**

- 1. What are the differences and similarities between the reactors being used in California (pressurized water reactors) and those in Japan (boiling water reactors), as well as the facilities used to house the reactors, including the standards to which they were built and their ability to withstand natural and manmade disasters?**

The two types of light-water reactors in operation in the United States are pressurized (PWR) and boiling (BWR) water reactors. The PWRs use a two-stage system where the water in the reactor is maintained at a high pressure, and an additional coolant loop is used to transfer heat from that system to produce steam to drive the turbines, while BWRs use a single-stage system that allows water in the reactor to boil to produce steam to drive the turbines directly. The NRC is not yet fully aware of all of the attributes of the specific BWR reactors in question in Japan and how they are different from or similar to BWRs or other reactors in operation in the U.S. Many changes have been made over the years in the design and operation of U.S. nuclear power plants through our program of continuous



improvement (as described in our response to Question #1 above), which may or may not have been made to reactors operating in Japan.

We have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, operation, and oversight, and does not rely on any single layer for protection of public health and safety. We begin with designs for every individual reactor that take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for any credible natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site. There are multiple physical barriers to the release of radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and are frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario.

Looking at basic design differences between the Japanese BWRs and the California plants, the following can be noted:

- The Japanese reactors have containments that are part of the reactor design and the buildings in which they are placed are not containment structures. By contrast, the California reactors have significantly larger volume containment buildings that house the reactors. This significantly reduces the chance of exceeding the containment design pressure or having a hydrogen explosion inside containment following a natural or manmade disaster that can result in a release of radioactive material to the environment.
- In the event of the loss of power at a U.S. PWR, the reactor core can be cooled using natural circulation of water (without pumps) in the primary coolant loop to transfer heat from the reactor core to the secondary loop. The secondary loop in a PWR can be used to remove the primary loop heat (without power) by pumping non-radioactive water in the secondary loop into heat exchangers (steam generators) with a steam driven pump and releasing non-radioactive steam to the atmosphere via manually operated valves or spring operated safety relief valves. By contrast, venting steam from the Japanese BWRs resulted in a release of radiation to the reactor building from which it escaped to the environment. In addition, there are multiple other pre-planned methods available to provide on-site stored water to the reactor core and to the steam generators to ensure continued core cooling after a disaster.
- The spent fuel pool at a U.S. PWR is contained in a separate building, instead of being contained above the primary containment structure as in a Japanese BWR. The spent fuel pool location at a PWR minimizes the chance of loss of spent fuel pool leakage being caused by explosions in the containment structure.
- There are multiple on-site stored water sources and pre-planned measures in place to provide water to the spent fuel pools.

### **Earthquakes and Tsunamis**

- 1. We have been told that both Diablo Canyon and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station are designed to withstand the maximum credible threat at both plants, which we understand to be much less than the 9.0 earthquake that hit Japan. What assumptions have you made about the ability of both plants to withstand an earthquake or tsunami? Given the disaster in Japan, what are our options to provide these plants with a greater margin for safety?**

All U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand external hazards, including earthquakes, flooding, and tsunamis, as appropriate. Regarding earthquakes, nuclear plants, and in fact all engineered structures, are designed based on ground motion levels, not earthquake magnitudes. Ground motion is a function of both the magnitude of an earthquake and the distance from the fault to the site. The existing nuclear plants in the U.S. were designed based on a "deterministic" or "scenario earthquake" basis that accounted for the largest earthquakes expected in the area around the plant. A margin is further added to the predicted ground motions to provide added robustness. The NRC's Generic Issue 199 (GI-199) project is using the latest probabilistic techniques used for new nuclear plants to review the safety of existing plants.

Both Diablo Canyon and SONGS, are known to have a tsunami hazard. As such, they are designed to withstand the maximum predicted tsunami with coincident wave action.

It is too early to tell what the lessons from this earthquake are. The NRC will look closely at all aspects of response of the plants to the earthquake and tsunami to determine if any actions need to be taken in U.S. nuclear plants and if any changes are necessary to NRC regulations

- 2. Have new faults been discovered near Diablo Canyon or San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station since those plants began operations? If so, how have the plants been modified to account for the increased risk of an earthquake? How will the NRC consider information on ways to address risks posed by faults near these plants that is produced pursuant to state law or recommendations by state agencies during the NRC relicensing process?**

A new Shoreline fault zone near Diablo Canyon was discovered in late 2008. In 2009 and 2010 Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) acquired, analyzed, and interpreted new data to better assess the seismic hazard from the Shoreline fault zone. PG&E submitted the final Shoreline fault zone report to the NRC on January 7, 2011. PG&E has concluded that maximum ground motions at the site from local faults are bounded by ground motions for which the plant had been previously evaluated. PG&E has also stated that the tsunami hazard threat from the Shoreline fault zone is relatively small since it is a strike-slip fault rather than a reverse fault and, therefore, the tsunami hazard is not expected to exceed the plant's design-basis tsunami characteristics.

The NRC staff is evaluating the tsunami hazard and is conducting an independent deterministic seismic hazard analysis of the Shoreline fault based on the information provided by the licensee to confirm the licensee's conclusions regarding the safe operation of the plant. In this regard, the staff has reviewed interim seismic studies related to the Shoreline fault zone. The staff is also in the process of reviewing PG&E's final Shoreline fault zone report to determine what the appropriate characterization and impact of the fault may be and whether any licensee or regulatory action may be needed. In addition to these specific efforts, the staff plans to continue discussions with PG&E on a possible license amendment to codify a Long Term Seismic Program methodology for the management of new geotechnical seismic information.

For SONGS, no new active faults have been discovered.

With regard to studies performed by other entities, such as the State of California, the NRC reviews each study's results for any new information and design challenges. The State of California is funding a new seismic study that is currently in the planning and draft phase. Licensees are required through their Technical Specifications to notify the NRC at any time during a review or study should evidence of a design challenge be identified.

The NRC considers seismic hazards to be an ongoing regulatory concern; therefore, we address seismic hazards as part of our reactor oversight process for operating reactors whenever a significant change is recognized. As a result, the NRC does not separately re-analyze seismic hazards for the license renewal process. The license renewal review is focused on managing the effects of aging and not a re-review of the current licensing basis.

**3. What are the evacuation plans for both plants in the event of an emergency? We understand that Highway 1 is the main route out of San Luis Obispo, what is the plan for evacuation of the nearby population if an earthquake takes out portions of the highway and a nuclear emergency occurs simultaneously?**

Each U.S. nuclear power plant has an emergency plan for ensuring the health and safety of member of the public who live within the emergency planning zone. Emergency plans contain contingencies for alternate evacuation routes, alternate means of notification, and other backup plans in the event of a natural disaster that damages the surrounding infrastructure.

FEMA reviews off-site emergency plans formally every 2 years during a biennial emergency preparedness exercise. The NRC evaluates on-site emergency plans during the same exercise, as well as on an annual basis. Population studies are conducted every 10 years, and evacuation time estimates are re-evaluated at that time. FEMA reviews the offsite emergency plans and evacuation time estimates, and determines whether there is a "reasonable assurance" that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at a nuclear power plant.

Evacuation of members of the general public is the responsibility of San Luis Obispo County for Diablo Canyon and San Diego County for SONGS, working in conjunction with the State of California, and would be carried out in accordance with their prearranged plans. The areas to be evacuated and specific evacuation routes would depend on the meteorological conditions and route viability at the time of the accident. PG&E and Southern California Edison (SCE) would act in an advisory capacity, giving technical assessments of the conditions at the plants and the probabilities for a potential off-site release as well as other pertinent information. This information, along with the licensee's recommended protective actions, would be assessed by responsible county and state officials in determining appropriate actions to be taken.

For Incidents of National Significance where the critical infrastructure is severely damaged, DHS has a lead role as a coordinating agency to orchestrate Federal, State, and local assets. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework provides for the NRC to be a coordinating agency for incidents involving NRC licensed materials.

The main route out of San Luis Obispo is Highway 101. The main route for SONGS is Highway 5. For both sites, evacuation studies are conducted by demography specialists and provide information on various evacuation scenarios that could take place. The studies' results consider normal road conditions, time of day, degraded weather/visibility, and road destruction.

**4. What is the NRC's role in monitoring radiation in the event of a nuclear accident both here and abroad? What is the role of EPA and other federal agencies?**

A number of U.S. agencies are involved in monitoring and assessing radiation, including the EPA, Department of Energy, and NRC. NRC regulations require nuclear power plants to report any radiation doses detected at the plant that could be harmful to the public. This would include doses that are generated by the plant or by an external source. EPA and DOE are responsible for more comprehensive domestic radiation monitoring.

The EPA utilizes its existing nationwide radiation monitoring system, RadNet, to monitor continuously the nation's air, and it regularly monitors drinking water, milk, and precipitation for environmental radiation.

**5. What monitoring systems currently are in place to track potential impacts on the U.S., including California, associated with the events in Japan?**

See response to Question #4 above. All U.S. plants are required to have a Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) in the surrounding communities that are read at specific intervals and analyzed in a laboratory as part of a normal offsite monitoring and sampling program.

In addition, both of these facilities have near-site radiation monitoring systems in place utilizing pressurized ion chambers (radiation detectors). The facilities' pressurized ion chambers are owned and operated by the EPA and are a part of the RadNet system. The EPA monitors the real-time data from these monitors on a continuous basis and uses the data as one of many inputs in response when protecting the public during an emergency. The EPA is able share their data with other agencies during emergency situations. Questions regarding the details of specific monitoring systems of EPA and other federal agencies should be directed to those agencies.

**6. Which federal agency is leading the monitoring effort and which agencies have responsibility for assessing human health impacts? What impacts have occurred to date on the health or environment of the U.S. or are currently projected or modeled in connection with the events in Japan?**

See response to Question #4 above. The EPA, working with the NRC, DOE and others, has the lead for radiation monitoring activities and regularly samples air, water, and milk. An interagency advisory team that includes the NRC, The Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and others, has been established under EPA's leadership and is regularly evaluating potential health and environmental impacts from events in Japan.

Only trace amounts of radioactive isotopes consistent with the Japanese nuclear incident have been identified through U.S. monitoring; those trace amounts are far below levels of natural background radiation and are not of public health concern. Although monitoring will continue, protective measures are not recommended at this time within the United States. The NRC does not expect any U.S. states or territories to experience harmful levels of radioactivity as a result of the events in Japan.

**7. What contingency plans are in place to ensure that the American public is notified in the event that hazardous materials associated with the events in Japan pose an imminent threat to the U.S.?**

Under The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework, the US EPA is the federal lead for plumes that come across our borders. In such situations, EPA would proceed in accordance with its established processes and procedures to work with state and local governments to protect public health and safety.

If an event requiring protective measures were to occur, U.S. residents would be advised to listen to their state and county authorities who are responsible for making protective action decisions for public health and safety. If necessary and, as appropriate, protective action decisions could include: preventing contaminated food from reaching the marketplace, recommending that all local produce be thoroughly rinsed prior to consumption, or sheltering or evacuating affected citizens. The NRC will continue to work with its local, state, and federal partners to ensure that appropriate emergency response procedures are prepared, reviewed, and exercised in accordance with NRC regulations.

The Honorable Barbara Boxer  
Chairman, Committee on Environment  
and Public Works  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairman:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of March 16, 2011. In light of the recent events in Japan, you asked that we perform a thorough review of the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear power plants and posed a number of questions. Detailed responses to the questions contained in your letter are provided in the enclosure.

Regarding a review of the California facilities, I, with the full support of the Commission, directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives. We will keep you and our other stakeholders informed as we proceed.

While the NRC provides assistance to the Japanese people, I want to assure you that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. With our near-term evaluation of the relevance of recent events to the U.S. fleet underway, we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American public.

Sincerely,

GBJ

Enclosure (as stated)

Identical letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein

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**From:** Marshall Shield <corp@myshield.us>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 9:29 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** 'Marshall Shield'  
**Subject:** I give up  
  
**Importance:** High

I must join membership, please contact me

Written March 12, 2011:

**What is still Missing\*Still required for computer/auto-control/power/cooling pumps?**

Tokyo Power Forman: Lead/Agreement

Request experts to work with

engineers/technicians/manufacturing/transportation

1 for Task Force #1, #2, #3 work

1 for sealing Nuclear Radiation project

Request three task forces: Led by Marshall Shield

Presentation: layout all 6 reactors

#5, #6, #1, #2, #3, #4

What is REALLY wrong at this moment?

What is still missing/still required for power/cooling pumps?

Total of:

16 Diesel Generators

10 Diesel Water Pumps

2 more/each for backup

Including all required power/water connections

Go before world news: request required equipment to be sent

instantly, TODAY! On Rent/Lease/Lease to Purchase agreement:

With Japan.

List all equipments required: Request all equipments transported by Air to McCord AFB Tacoma, Washington State, USA or Pacific Rim countries to Tokyo International to our staging area. Asking the US Air Force to supply a C-117 to transport the equipment directly to our staging area.

Create attack sequence:

1 thru 6 Most important sequence #1, thru #6

What is wrong?

a) Power: Cpu/full/NO Automation

b) Cooling to reactor and pool

c) Radiation leaks

\*\*\*\*\*

Go before world news: request required equipment to be sent instantly, TODAY!

Rent/Lease/Lease to Purchase agreement: With Japan/Tokyo Power Company: Tepco

**List all equipments required:** Request all equipments transported by Air to McCord AFB Tacoma, Washington State, USA or Pacific Rim countries to Tokyo International to our staging area. Asking the US Air Force to supply a C-117 to transport the equipment directly to our staging area.

Total of: Require (xx)

(16) Diesel Generators: Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
100V 50 hertz

(10) Diesel Water Pumps: Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
100V 50 hertz

(2) more/each for backup: Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
Including all required power/water connections  
100V 50 hertz

**Large fuel vessel/tank: (6) For each reactor:**

Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_

To hold enough diesel fuel for 1 week for all 3 Diesel running at full power



**Semi Fuel-Tanker: (1)** Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
That can provide the fuel weekly, filling up each diesel vessel/tank

**2-200' Cranes: (2)** Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
To help install/move all equipments and our anti radiation projects

**4-150' Man Lifts: (4)** Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
For workers: power and anti radiation projects

**Video Digital Camera's: (14)** Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
Satellite transmitter on 24/7 to new monitoring location-Receiver/Monitor  
To monitor the reactor gauges/power/water-cooling/heat 24/7  
1 for each 'normal' reactor  
3 for each damaged units  
Electrical power/cords

**Light towers: (14)** Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
**4-6' tall\*with 4-100 watt Quartz Flood lights each**  
To light up Reactor computer/monitoring all gauges/printer  
On 24/7  
Electrical cords

**Digital cameras: (4)** Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
Take pictures of (each reactor) present gauge/monitoring levels, print out in large and tape to the proper monitor, where engineers will every 5 minutes – check – verify NO changes to cooling/heating of EACH REACTOR.

**Order Fire Proof/Radiation proof Tarps: (4)** 100' x 100' with tie downs every 10', tied to 3/8" nylon ropes 150' long, and 20 sets of tie down ratchet sets long enough to surround pool  
To seal new temporary cover over damaged pool until permanent cover can be manufactured and installed

**Sealant: (8) 5 gallon containers:** Must not turn hard, constant seal so Radiation & Water can't leak 24/7 for years! Between original cement & new cement cover

**Paint rollers: (12)**

**John Deere Gators: (8)** Have: \_\_\_\_\_ Need: \_\_\_\_\_  
**6-8 wheeled with cargo box** to haul equipment to/from between each reactor

March 26, 2011  
I've been asking since March 11<sup>th</sup> to help!

Japan: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plants/Reactors

I must be sent has a Consultant/Advisor/Program Director/Manager GS-15 – work with Tokyo Electric Power & our 'Experts'!

I am sorry, but since March 11<sup>th</sup>, critical mistakes have been made one after another. If I had been sent on March 12<sup>th</sup>, all the reactors would be in shut-down/standby/in good condition with Green Lights – NO RED lights anywhere!

**Need Staging area/Equipments & 5 Helicopters'**

**Need Monitoring Conference room 24/7**

Help restore power

Help restore cooling

Seal Radiation Leaks

Restore computers/automated systems/hardware/software

Restore water for cooling: manual-diesel water pumps connected to reactor inputs in the damaged units

Build/construct Cap/cover destroyed spent fuel pools containers'

To ensure the following is completely restored!

- Backup power
- Backup water
- Grounding
- Computers
- Sensors
- Controls
- Plumbing

I know what has to be accomplished to save the Nuclear power plants

Send me over there before it's too late!

I am volunteering to go in with 4 other volunteers, to save the nuclear plants/units

The US/Japan/World-Military MUST have the Diesels units' available

We will require 5 helicopters for 2 weeks

As the equipment is being brought in to our staging area

We will be preparing to enter into the 1<sup>st</sup>/2<sup>nd</sup> level, one nuclear unit at a time

When all the equipment is dropped off, the helicopters may leave

When we have the Power/Water restored, everyone will be sent out to a safe location, an assistant and I will stay while the water is being restored to full 100%

My complete project/plans/equipment required is ready

Once I find out what is wrong, what equipment they do have: I will know what is required:

Then go before the worlds News agencies: give them an 800 phone number to call, so they know where to send the requested equipments, to be loaded by a C-117 and transported to our 'Staging Area'.

I must be sent TODAY!

## **Plan:**

### **Response Teams:**

**Mr. Marshall Shield Project control: GS-15 Advisor/Consultant/Project Director**

**A source of water**, enough to supply the water to lower the heat in the nuclear unit and spent fuel pools.

We will start the cold water at 10%, every 15 minutes, 10% more, until full power

While this is taking place: Our team will take a break, while an assistant and myself stay behind until all water & power are online 100%

**(#1 Task Force) Members:** Electrical/Plumbing/Mechanic/Pipe Fitter

2-Volunteers to setup the Diesels Generators, get them up/tested/online and ready

2-Volunteers setup Diesel Water Pumps into the nuclear station unit, and connect the water source.

**(#2 Task Force) Stand by 24/7 for instant response to problems after all units are stable.**

**Members:** Electrical/Pipe Fitters/Welders/Mechanics/Plumbing/Rigger

**(#3 Task Force) Operator/Computer/Auto Control:** Restore software, get all auto controls working: After #1 Task Force supplies proper Power/Water

\*\*\*\*\*

**(#1 Task Force)**

Start up the Diesel power units, to supply

1. Electrical power so water can be started into the nuclear unit
2. To startup computers/auto controls
3. Break into the 2<sup>nd</sup> level, release the steam/pressure
4. Run in the water line
5. Start running water to lower the heat: at my controlled power/percentage sequence: To force Air/Steam out of the piping's/cooling equipments.
6. Do this for each nuclear unit that has no power/water

Take a short break, and then do the same for the next nuclear unit

Until we finish

**To install anti nuclear radiation projects:**

Order metal project to seal: Engineer/Pipe Fitter/Welder/Rigger: Manufacture to size of outer pool

Install to cover damaged – open areas!

Then:

**Order Fire Proof/Radiation proof Tarp (4) 100' x 100' with tie downs every 10'**

**3/8" nylon ropes 150' long**, and 20 sets of tie down ratchet sets to go around the pool to hold the tarp against the building to seal it, so radiation can't leak.

Add fencing/wiring over top to keep tarp above pool first  
This is only temporary

**Engineers/Expert/Manufacturing:**

**Next: install permanent cover/cap** ¼" larger diameter than original complex with a sealed/locked on the top, so spent nuclear rods maybe removed in future.

Setup Operation:

Remove tarp

Add Sealant 360 around pool container 2' wide

Lower new cap by crane

4 man lifts on each side, controlling lowering and ropes to guide the cap straight down

\*\*\*\*\*

New My Shield Corp Project:

Project to protect Standby – Backup Diesel Generators & Water Pumps

Constructed to force flood waters to flow around complex/container

This unit will be sealed 360, connected to the reactor power/water inputs

Access for fuel/connectors and for employee work: Monitoring/Testing/PM's

\*\*\*\*\*

**Equipment required for each nuclear unit:**

**3 – Diesel Generators': Total: 16 Diesel Generators**

**2: Power units**

**a) 1 Prime power**

**b) 1 Backup power**

Power cables/connectors to connect the Diesel to the power source for the nuclear unit: 2-50/100/200' long

**1: Diesel Water pump: Total: 10 Diesel Water Pumps**

**8" hard case water hoses**

**a) 2-100' long**

**b) 2-50' long**

Each hose connector to each other for extensions and to connect to the diesel pump, then the other end to the water source to the nuclear unit and a hose that can connect to the reactor water input

**2 more/each for backup: Stored at staging location**

Including all required power/water connections

For each reactor: **Large fuel vessel/tank** to hold enough diesel fuel for 1 week for all 3 Diesel running at full power

**A Fuel Tanker** that can provide the fuel weekly, filling up each diesel vessel/tank

**2-200' Cranes** to help install/move all equipments and our anti radiation projects  
**4-150' Man Lifts** for workers: power and anti radiation projects

**Video Digital Camera's:** Satellite transmitter on 24/7 to new monitoring location-  
Receiver/Monitor

To monitor the reactor gauges/power/water-cooling/heat 24/7

1 for each 'normal' reactor

3 for each damaged unit

Electrical power/cords

**Light towers** with 4-100 watt Quartz Flood lights

To light up Reactor computer/monitoring all gauges/printer

On 24/7

Electrical cord

**Digital cameras:** Take pictures of (each reactor) present gauge/monitoring levels, print out in large and tape to the proper monitor, where engineers will every 5 minutes – check – verify NO changes to cooling/heating at EACH REACTOR.

**(#2 Task Force)** If something goes wrong: enter into the problem area: To take pictures of problem areas/equipment causing lower cooling percentages and higher heat levels, take picture of problem equipment ID Number, take this back to the engineers/warehouse staff; find the proper ID number/equipment to be replaced.

**(#2 Task Force)** replaces damaged equipment with new piece/get water flowing again.

**A source of water**, enough to supply the water to lower the heat in the nuclear unit and spent fuel pools.

While this is taking place: Our team will take a break, while an assistant and myself stay behind until all water & power are online 100%

We will start the cold water at 10%, every 15 minutes, 10% more, until full power

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 1:30 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

I was missing a few syllables...

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 2:43 PM  
**To:** Burnell, Scott  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Scott,  
If you're interested, I googled: "NRC confidential assessment March 26 fukushima" and found that Idaho Samizdat has posted the report reference in the NYTimes and is claiming that he obtained it from a non-government source. Not sure if he is *the* source, but other links point back to his site.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

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**From:** Burnell, Scott  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:26 AM  
**To:** McIntyre, David; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Fine by me.

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**From:** McIntyre, David  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:24 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Burnell, Scott; Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Based on a Reuters report that just ran: <http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFWNA555120110406>

Marty might be contradicting this; I suggest we let him speak to George's question.

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 11:22 AM  
**To:** Burnell, Scott; Powell, Amy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David  
**Subject:** RE: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Based on an initial inquiry (In the NRC staff's opinion, has the core of unit 2 melted into the torus?), I relayed the following information received from the RST:

A0/197

Based on radiation readings in the drywell and the torus (3340 rem/hour and 91 rem/hour, respectively), the NRC staff speculates that part of the Unit 2 core may be out of the reactor pressure vessel and may be in the lower space of the drywell. Lower radiation readings in the torus suggest that there is not core material in the torus.

Based on follow on questions (Does the explanation provided suggest that Unit 2's core melted into the drywell? and Do we know if the Fukushima reactors had hardened vents?) , I then forwarded the following two pieces of information from the RST:

Part of the Unit 2 core may have melted into the drywell.

It is our understanding that Fukushima Daiichi reactors did have hardened vents.

There were no other communications with the staffer from Rep. Markey's office; this is the entirety of what was relayed.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

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**From:** Burnell, Scott  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:57 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Decker, David  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing  
**Importance:** High

Another Markey item to track down ASAP. Thanks.

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**From:** Lobsenz, George [mailto:George.Lobsenz@ihs.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:56 AM  
**To:** McIntyre, David; Burnell, Scott  
**Subject:** FW: Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

Hi guys--please see Markey statement below that he says he has been told by NRC that fuel has "probably" melted through reactor pressure vessel at Fukushima Unit 2. Can you confirm or deny this statement by Markey? Any comment on this would be welcome.

George

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**From:** Barry, Giselle [mailto:Giselle.Barry@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 06, 2011 10:49 AM  
**To:** Barry, Giselle  
**Subject:** Markey statement at today's nuclear hearing

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
April 6, 2011

Contact: Giselle Barry 202-225-2836, Eben Burnham-Snyder 202-225-6065

**Statement of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.)**  
**“The U.S. Government Response to the Nuclear Power Plant Incident in Japan”**  
**Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations**  
**April 6, 2011**

“On March 28, 1979, almost exactly 32 years ago, a partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant terrified the nation and caused a full-scale re-evaluation of the nuclear industry in our country.

“On April 26, 1986, almost exactly 25 years ago, the meltdown caused by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant spewed highly radioactive smoke all over Europe. Again, the world was appalled, and promised increased safety.

“Today, we see that we are just as helpless when faced with nuclear disaster as we were 25 and 32 years ago.

“The cores of at least two of the Japanese reactors are severely damaged. I have been informed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the core of Unit Two has gotten so hot that part of it has probably melted through the reactor pressure vessel.

“To bring the reactors and their spent fuel pools under control, the Japanese have had to resort to sending young workers in to risk their lives as they operate what amount to giant water guns.

“To assess and then sop up the radioactive water that has begun spewing into the ocean, they are relying on the use of bath salts and diapers.

“Just like the use of pantyhose and golf balls to stop last year’s oil spill, the Japanese have been compelled to try a “nuclear junk shot” in desperate attempts to stop an environmental calamity.

“Yet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission insists that our systems are safe, even before beginning, let alone completing, its review of our reactors and spent fuel pools.

“It does so in the face of its own analysis showing that there is a higher risk of core damage from earthquakes that has not yet been incorporated into regulatory requirements.

“It does so in the face of backup electricity requirements that are generally less stringent than what the Fukushima reactors were equipped with.

“And it does so after removing the post-Three Mile Island requirement to include systems to prevent the explosions of hydrogen that occurred at Fukushima from its regulations.



"I have introduced legislation, the Nuclear Power Plant Safety Act of 2011, to impose a moratorium on all pending NRC licenses and re-licenses in light of the need to fully understand the safety risks and include remedies into our own regulations. Many other countries have announced similar measures. I look forward to today's testimony."

*Information on the latest status of the Fukushima reactors was gathered from communications between Congressman Markey's office and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).*

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 1:38 PM  
**To:** Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); 'Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov'; grant\_cope@epw.senate.gov; Haynes, Laura (Carper); brian\_clifford@barrasso.senate.gov  
**Subject:** NRC phone briefing DELAYED until 3:15pm  
**Importance:** High

I hate to do this, but we need to delay today's phone briefing until **3:15pm**. Dial in and passcode remain the same as stated below. Sorry for the change...

Amy

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 1:17 PM  
**To:** 'Dedrick, Kathy (EPW)'; 'Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov'; 'brian\_clifford@barrasso.senate.gov'; 'Haynes, Laura (Carper)'; 'grant\_cope@epw.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** REMINDER: Phone briefing from NRC re: events in Japan, NRC response

Hi again – in case this e-mail with dial-in, passcode for today's call got buried in your e-mail, I am resending for easy access. Talk with you soon.

Amy

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 07, 2011 5:45 PM  
**To:** 'Haynes, Laura (Carper)'; 'brian\_clifford@barrasso.senate.gov'; Dedrick, Kathy (EPW); 'Annie\_Caputo@epw.senate.gov'; 'grant\_cope@epw.senate.gov'  
**Subject:** Phone briefing from NRC re: events in Japan, NRC response

Hi all –

We've set up a phone briefing for **Friday at 3pm** to update you on events in Japan and NRC's response, as well as field questions you may have. Here is the dial-in information for the call:

**Dial-in:** 1-888-390-0954

**Passcode:** (b)(6)

Marty Virgilio, NRC's Deputy Executive Director for Operations for Reactor and Preparedness Programs, will be on the line with me. I hope that this will be helpful as you prepare for Tuesday's hearing.

Thanks,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

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**Subject:** EPW Committee Meeting - Japan Events  
**Location:** O-17H10 (Conference Call)

**Start:** Fri 4/8/2011 3:00 PM  
**End:** Fri 4/8/2011 4:00 PM  
**Show Time As:** Tentative

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Meeting Status:** Not yet responded

**Organizer:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Required Attendees:** Powell, Amy

1-888-390-0954

Passcode: (b)(6)

**When:** Friday, April 08, 2011 3:00 PM-4:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).  
**Where:** O-17H10 (Conference Call)

**Note:** The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*



4/7/11

**Sandy Cianci**

Administrative Assistant to Marty Virgilio, DEDR  
Office of the Executive Director for Operations  
O-17 H13  
301-415-1714  
[sandra.cianci@nrc.gov](mailto:sandra.cianci@nrc.gov)

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**From:** Marshall Shield <corp@myshield.us>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 9:24 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** I give up  
  
**Importance:** High

Hello Mike: Update

When President Reagan created SDI, his meetings with the US Air Force/NORAD helped them with the same type of problem

NORAD had been updated twice, costing the US Air Force Billions

They were attempting to upgrade NORAD again, when the President said NO

Falcon AS was created and is known as 'The Earth Base Control Station For STAR WARS'

I've been sent there numerous times to resolve critical system problems, then because of what Northern Telecom, Inc attempted to get away with, that cost them dearly: \$26 Billion and black listed.....

This base is considered one of the top T.S. bases on Planet Earth. It is a fully R&B complex.

It's too bad about the problems taking place in Japan

No one can cause such a problem with a country disaster

But someone can allow reactors to NOT be recovered, so they fail

This is my only answer that could have caused such a horrible nuclear disaster!

Marshall

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: corp@myshield.us

**From:** Marshall Shield [mailto:corp@myshield.us]

**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 2:47 PM

**To:** 'Michael.Kane@hq.doe.gov'

**Subject:** Mike update

**Importance:** High

~~**Sensitivity:** Confidential~~

Hello Mike

I believe I've figured out why Tepco doesn't want help, with someone like myself

Of course, I can't prove the following:

Tepco executives had decided to shut down the reactors in the future because:

They are:

- Aged
- Antiquated
- Out of Date
- Too old

This disaster provided them an open door to ensure they are shut down permanently

That is the only excuse I can think of, because of what happened since March 11<sup>th</sup>.

They never attempted to restore the control room power

They never reloaded the cpu's

They never got the auto controls working

Which means: No water – cooling

If I had been sent late on March 11<sup>th</sup> like I asked, by the 14<sup>th</sup>, all 6 reactors would have been in a safe – protected state.

I knew what equipment was required; I could have asked the world to send the equipment over night!

**Because they failed to take control of all 6 reactors, they are all failing**

There is only one good reason for this

The owners didn't want them to be saved!

I've sent numerous times my concerns about nothing been done

The fact that they don't know what to do

or

How to recover the reactors

That scares me...the owners could have shut them down, got them under control, then removed the nuclear rods, then enclosed the reactor for life.

That would have been far safer

They would NOT have had the problems, releasing radiation into the air/water.

Going to send you my 1<sup>st</sup> meeting questions to the Forman/Engineers/Operators/Experts

That should have taken place March 12<sup>th</sup>

**I know you will not send me, now that I understand why**

Too bad.....Marshall

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

**From:** Marshall Shield [<mailto:corp@myshield.us>]

**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 12:40 PM

**To:** 'Michael.Kane@hq.doe.gov'

**Subject:** Mike

**Importance:** High

~~**Sensitivity:** Confidential~~

Mike

I've run into several persons today, they all know me and are wondering why I haven't been sent to Japan to help!

All my working life, certainly after what happened in Japan during the Viet Nam War, I've been resolving critical problems

I know where I'm being sent

I know what is wrong

When I show up, meet with the controllers/owners/operators/engineers/technicians they find out instantly what I can accomplish!

That is why I've been sent to over 1,000 locations including US Gov./Military bases they deny existing to resolve what for some reason, no one else can.

I have everything ready to start 3 Task Forces

And

A Anti-Nuclear Radiation team to stop the radiation leaks!

I must be sent!

And NOT by a civil airlines

**GS-15 Project Director**

Marshall Shield

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

---

**From:** Marshall Shield <corp@myshield.us>  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 09, 2011 3:50 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Nuclear Task Force Disaster Support  
**Attachments:** Nuclear Task Force Disaster Support.docx

April 9, 2011  
Nuclear Disasters

One must wonder why a special Task Force was not put into operation in the 50's or since. There has been nineteen nuclear accidents since 1961. What has just taken place in Japan never should have. Within three days, I could have directed/controlled the complete take-over of all six reactor units. By March 14<sup>th</sup>, all six reactor units should have been under complete control.

I'm concerned about what took place; a world nuclear task force group should have been present on March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2011!

March 11-13, 2011 - INES Level 3, Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - Overheating, radioactivity emergency

I've requested a special Task Force Group be started; I should be the Director and could manage/supervise a group of four persons, full time, preparing a complete support operation, respond 24/7 to nuclear disasters, work with the world's nuclear owner/operators and ensure they agree with our plans.

We will have direct access for all parts/equipment that can be sent instantly to a location in trouble. Emergency backup power generators/water pumps standing by in a staging location, which can be sent instantly to anywhere, in the world to ensure the nuclear disaster units:

- Can have their power restored
- The computers reloaded
- The Auto Controls started
- Cooling online

This did NOT take place at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant!

We will also support/help:  
Prepare training in all languages  
Ensure complete back up capabilities are in full operation

This would include travel to each nuclear plant:

- Showing them our PowerPoint presentations
- Handing out our Task Force Group Contact information
- Meetings/Training for: Operators/Engineers/Technicians

I've been the #1 expert on C4ISR\*Tempest\*Telco\*Defense\*Nuclear systems since 1974. I've never failed a mission; have exactly fifty diplomas/certificates including FEMA Disaster courses.

Have been a member of Intelligence/US Military groups since the 80's

**Please contact me**

**I can move to anywhere in the world  
And can support – direct this group for 10+ more years  
I've worked three jobs in my life: 120+ hours per week, one for 5+ years  
I once had two million American Airlines Advantage Awards**

**This extremely important group must be started soon**

Sincerely, Marshall Shield  
Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA  
Cellular: (b)(6) PST USA  
Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 8:15 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Michal questions

Laura Haynes indicated that periodic calls may be helpful, but largely wanted an update call before today's hearing (we did this with Marty on Friday 4/8). Other than that, I have not heard feedback on lack of calls.

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 8:12 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** FW: Michal questions

FYI – what do you think? I have not sensed a outcry from others. Should we just set up a call or briefing for Rep. Markey's staff?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 8:01 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Michal questions

Spiros,

I'm out most of this morning, so I'm wondering if I can get your help in tracking down explanations for Michal. She would like to know what the pressure and radiation readings are for Units 1 and 3 at Fukushima, and what can be inferred from those readings vis the readings at Unit 2.

This came up during an unrelated call yesterday afternoon. I got the impression she'd prefer to speak with somebody in addition to getting the written answer, if that's possible.  
Rep. Markey's staff also voiced their desire for more of the daily calls.  
Thank you for any help,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 9:01 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Michal questions

I think we still route the question to RST but that it gets farmed out to offices outside of the EOC.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.

Tim Riley

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 08:58:05 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Michal questions

Who are we now going to for these questions? Has anything changed as a result of the changes announced yesterday?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 8:01 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Michal questions

Spiros,  
I'm out most of this morning, so I'm wondering if I can get your help in tracking down explanations for Michal. She would like to know what the pressure and radiation readings are for Units 1 and 3 at Fukushima, and what can be inferred from those readings vis the readings at Unit 2.

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Thank you for any help,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:29 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** FW: Unit 1 questions

FYI

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:29 PM  
**To:** 'Freedhoff, Michal'; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Michal,  
I apologize for not letting you know that I am trying to get you information on this issue. We are working with the Reactor Safety Team in the Emergency Operations Center to get a response to your questions and I will get this information to you as soon as I can.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:23 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Unit 1 questions

All

I have asked numerous times for followup information on Unit 1. I have asked by email. I have asked by phone. I keep either getting no response, or being told that someone will be back in touch. My patience is running thin. Please let me know when I can expect to receive the information I've requested by COB today.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

A0/2024

2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:36 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

When do you anticipate having the information?  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:29 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Michal,  
I apologize for not letting you know that I am trying to get you information on this issue. We are working with the Reactor Safety Team in the Emergency Operations Center to get a response to your questions and I will get this information to you as soon as I can.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:23 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Unit 1 questions

All

I have asked numerous times for followup information on Unit 1. I have asked by email. I have asked by phone. I keep either getting no response, or being told that someone will be back in touch. My patience is running thin. Please let me know when I can expect to receive the information I've requested by COB today.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

A0/205

Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 3:37 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Background  
**Attachments:** Fukushima Daiichi Information as of 0700 EDT April 12 for Markey.doc

This prompted my question about having a call...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** RST01 Hoc  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 15:31:32 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

RST,

As I discussed over the phone with Mike Brown, OCA would like to provide the attached matrix of pressure and radiation readings from Fukushima to the staffer for Rep. Markey. However, OCA would also like to accompany the data with a statement explaining that the data does not lend itself readily to interpretation; that we cannot offer a comparison of Unit 1 to Unit 2 without relying overly on speculation. So that I can send the data to Congressman Markey, can you provide me with approved language explaining this?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** RST09 Hoc  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 1:46 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** RST01 Hoc  
**Subject:** FW: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

Spiros,

Attached are the pressure and radiation readings for Units 1, 2 and 3 as requested.

Ben Beasley  
RST Accident Analyst

---

**From:** RST01 Hoc  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 10:49 AM  
**To:** RST09 Hoc; RST08 Hoc  
**Subject:** FW: Question from Congressman Markey's staff

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 10:41 AM  
**To:** RST01 Hoc  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Question from Congressman Markey's staff

A staffer from Congressman Markey's office has the following question:

She would like to know what the pressure and radiation readings are for Units 1 and 3 at Fukushima, and what can be inferred from those readings vis the readings at Unit 2.

Thanks



Official Use Only

**Fukushima Daiichi Information as of 0700 EDT 04/12/2011**

	Reactor Vessel Pressure		Containment Status	Drywell Pressure (TEPCO 04/12/2011)	Drywell Radiation (TEPCO 04/12/2011)	Torus Pressure (TEPCO 04/12/2011)	Torus Radiation (TEPCO 04/12/2011)
	Channel A (TEPCO 04/12/2011)	Channel B (TEPCO 04/12/2011)					
Unit 1	60.3 psig	131.7 psig	Damage suspected, slow leakage, N <sub>2</sub> injection	12.9 psig	Uncertain	9.2 psig	1080 rem/hr
Unit 2	-3.3 psig	-3.6 psig	Damage suspected	-1.6 psig	2810 rem/hr	Uncertain	68.1 rem/hr
Unit 3	-2.8 psig	-11.5 psig	Damage suspected, N <sub>2</sub> injection planned	0.6 psig	1740 rem/hr	9.8 psig	67.1 rem/hr

Official Use Only

7

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:07 PM  
**To:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Response to Rep. Markey's staffer  
**Attachments:** Fukushima Daiichi Information as of 0700 EDT April 12 for Markey.doc

Marty,

We're trying to provide a response to Rep. Markey's staffer, who earlier had a question about radiation/pressure readings at Unit 1 and what can be inferred from them. OCA understands that the answers we provide should not be speculative, hence we would only provide the attached data.

We'd also like set up a call for tomorrow, to address the staffer's questions and her request for a briefing.

Would you be available?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:07 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Michal

Becky did not, that is what we are hoping.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:06 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Re: Michal

Ok - hopefully Becky chatted with him on the way out. Worst case, he is in a car heading to Rockville and on his Bberry.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 17:04:36 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Michal

No, Tim is following up with Marty. He will cc us all. We want clearance to send the readings and hopefully a willingness on Marty's part to talk to her tomorrow about it.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:03 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Michal

I'm staying for panel 2 which promises to be decidedly not in our favor. Becky left in a group that included Marty - have you heard from her or him?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy

**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 16:59:55 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Any word?

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:29 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Michal,  
I apologize for not letting you know that I am trying to get you information on this issue. We are working with the Reactor Safety Team in the Emergency Operations Center to get a response to your questions and I will get this information to you as soon as I can.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:23 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Unit 1 questions

All

I have asked numerous times for followup information on Unit 1. I have asked by email. I have asked by phone. I keep either getting no response, or being told that someone will be back in touch. My patience is running thin. Please let me know when I can expect to receive the information I've requested by COB today.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 6:13 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

Ilya will join. Thanks!  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 06:02 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

I have coordinated for a 0915 briefing (daily coordination calls with Japan prevent anything earlier).  
Will there be anyone else on the call with you, Michal? I'll send dial-in info shortly.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 17:52:39 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

I have a markup at 10 but am available before that. Would that work?  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

AO/209

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 05:49 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Michal,  
Would you be available for a telephone briefing tomorrow morning so that we can walk through the plant status readings and then answer your questions directly?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:00 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Any word?

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:29 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Michal,  
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Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:23 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Unit 1 questions

All

I have asked numerous times for followup information on Unit 1. I have asked by email. I have asked by phone. I keep either getting no response, or being told that someone will be back in touch. My patience is running thin. Please let me know when I can expect to receive the information I've requested by COB today.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 6:40 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

She seems happy with this arrangement.

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 18:15:22 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

No, he wanted to only send the daily report. Since she already receives it, I just went straight to the offering of a briefing.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.

Tim Riley

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 18:10:56 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

Did Marty clear sending the data?

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** 'michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov' <michal.freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 18:02:04 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

I have coordinated for a 0915 briefing (daily coordination calls with Japan prevent anything earlier).  
Will there be anyone else on the call with you, Michal? I'll send dial-in info shortly.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.

Tim Riley

(b)(6)

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
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**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 12 17:52:39 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Unit 1 questions

I have a markup at 10 but am available before that. Would that work?  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.



Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 05:49 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>; Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Michal,  
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Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
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**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Any word?

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:29 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Shane, Raeann; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Unit 1 questions

Michal,  
I apologize for not letting you know that I am trying to get you information on this issue. We are working with the Reactor Safety Team in the Emergency Operations Center to get a response to your questions and I will get this information to you as soon as I can.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Congressional Affairs

Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 12, 2011 2:23 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Weil, Jenny; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** Unit 1 questions

All

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Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:20 AM  
**To:** Fischhoff, Ilya; Freedhoff, Michal; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

By the way, he's at the Operations Center trying to sort it out for you.

---

**From:** Fischhoff, Ilya [mailto:Ilya.Fischhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:17 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

Same here.

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:16 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

I'm getting a busy signal when I dial the 1800 number

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 7:57 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

For this morning's conference call, please dial (b)(6) Follow the prompts and use security code (b)(6) followed by the # sign.  
We look forward to talking with you shortly,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:20 AM  
**To:** Fischhoff, Ilya; Freedhoff, Michal; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

Tim had a problem as well. He's trying to sort it out for you.

---

**From:** Fischhoff, Ilya [mailto:Ilya.Fischhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:17 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

Same here.

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:16 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

I'm getting a busy signal when I dial the 1800 number

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 7:57 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** 4/13/11 0915 Briefing on Fukushima

For this morning's conference call, please dial (b)(6) Follow the prompts and use security code (b)(6) followed by the # sign.

We look forward to talking with you shortly.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 4:00 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Congressional News You Can Use, Week of 4/11/2011  
**Attachments:** CNYCU - Week of 04-11-11.pdf

Please see attached

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 7:14 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Congressional News You Can Use, Week of 4/11/2011

Any follow up req'd on this?

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

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**From:** Wiggins, Jim  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 14 06:21:06 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Congressional News You Can Use, Week of 4/11/2011

Re:

April 6, 2011 – The **House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations** held a hearing entitled “The U.S. Government Response to the Nuclear Power Plant Incident in Japan.” Martin Virgilio, DEDO for Reactor and Preparedness Programs and Don Cool of FSME served as NRC witnesses and provided detailed summaries of the current status of reactors and radiation emissions. **Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-FL)** called for study and reflection on the events in Japan so that the U.S. nuclear industry and the NRC may gain understanding and bolster their respective efforts, but he cautioned that, because we have only a limited understanding of the events, it is too early to say what needs to be done. **Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO)** and **Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA)** discussed the NRC’s State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequences Analysis (SOARCA), raising concerns about details contained within the simulations and from NRC internal emails which discussed it. **Rep. Gene Green (D-TX)** questioned whether spent fuel was safe in cooling pools or whether dry cask storage was more appropriate. Marty Virgilio explained that no rule makings were under current consideration, but that this topic would be included in the short and long term analyses the NRC is undertaking in response to the events in Japan. **Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA)** presented an analysis speculating that the Unit 2 core may have melted through its containment vessel and questioning the utility of hardened vents on this design on the assumption that the Fukushima reactor had hardened vents but that they did not prevent hydrogen explosions. Marty Virgilio replied that the NRC’s understanding is that Unit 2’s core had not penetrated through the vessel.

April 7, 2011 – The **House Science, Space and Technology – Subcommittee**

We’ve been thru the ex-vessel issue, now saying that it might have occurred on 2 of the units.

Re: SFP Rulemaking – though there are no “safety” rulemaking u/w, we have continuing work on SFP “security” that’s directed by SRMs. We’re at the Tech Bases phase, trying to resolve comments on the Tech Bases and doing further analyses on sequences of interests and resulting consequences.

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 4:00 PM

**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Congressional News You Can Use, Week of 4/11/2011

Please see attached

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Bavol, Bruce  
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2011 11:22 AM  
To: LIA08 Hoc; Powell, Amy  
Cc: Cruz, Jeffrey  
Subject: FW: Hon US Rep. Edward Markey's Letter dated March 13, 2011

Ms Thomas from DOE (see email below) is requesting information on the NRC's input to Hon US Rep. Edward Markey's Letter dated March 13, 2011.

Regards,

Bruce M. Bavol

NRO/DNRL  
Project Manager  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Work Phone: (301) 415-6715  
Email: Bruce.Bavol@nrc.gov

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas, Lori [mailto:Lori.Thomas@nnsa.doe.gov]  
Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2011 11:07 AM  
To: 'Tupin.Edward@epamail.epa.gov'; Bavol, Bruce; 'Quinn, Vanessa';  
'craig.conklin@dhs.gov'  
Cc: Fairobent, Jim; Froh, William  
Subject: Hon US Rep. Edward Markey's Letter dated March 13, 2011

Could you please identify a contact in your agency that is working on the response to Hon Rep Edward Markey's letter to President Obama on March 13, 2011 requesting information on how the US might respond to a nuclear disaster such as the crisis at reactors in Japan following an earthquake and tsunami? The DOE Office of General Counsel would like to work with representatives from your agencies to coordinate the response to Rep Markey. Please forward me the contact information to me at your earliest convenience.

Thank you,

Lori A. Thomas, MS  
Senior Health Physicist  
Office of Emergency Management & Policy  
US Dept of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration  
1000 Independence Ave, SW  
NA-41, Room GH-060  
Washington, DC 20585  
(o) 202-586-5170; (cell) (b)(6); (e) Lori.Thomas@HQ.DOE.GOV



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 5:08 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Fw: press at watts bar

FYI  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Brenner, Eliot  
**To:** Hannah, Roger; Nieh, Ho; jim\_jeffries@alexander.sen.gov <jim\_jeffries@alexander.sen.gov>  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy; Batkin, Joshua  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 14 17:00:48 2011  
**Subject:** press at watts bar

I just spoke with Jim Jeffries, press secretary to Alexander. The press side of the event will start with a minute or two from Alexander about the tour, about nuclear being safe, but we need to learn any lesson we can from Fukushima. Ostendorff can do a very short riff about – good tour, plant appears to be in good shape, well run (orrwhatever, and from the NRC perspective we are taking a two-pronged look at what we can learn and perhaps apply to US plants from the tragedy in Japan. We have one job and that is safety.

Jim will act as MC and cut things off when they need to be terminated.

Roger, meet Jim, who has your cell. Jim's cell is (b)(6).

I will look at the Alexander media advisory in a few minutes.

Eliot

Eliot Brenner  
Director, Office of Public Affairs  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Rockville, Md.  
O: 301-415-8200  
C: (b)(6)

A0/215

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 5:17 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Absolutely more to come... And it will take a car and Comm staff helping us!!

Thanks

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 14 17:11:51 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Yes, Gene won the coin toss, so he took them downtown. Apparently this was the first load (fit within in briefcase). We're told there's likely much more to come...

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 5:11 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Thanks - did you all end up getting any docs from OGC to deliver?

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**To:** Powell, Amy

**Sent:** Thu Apr 14 16:50:25 2011

**Subject:** FW: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Amy,

Just to fill you in, the document I provided to Michal was drafted by the RST, then cleared by Bruce Boger before being released to me.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]

**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:47 PM

**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya

**Cc:** Drogitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy

**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Thank you. We will almost certainly be back in touch, I appreciate the followup.  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]

**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:44 PM

**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya

**Cc:** Drogitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy

**Subject:** Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal and Ilya,

Attached are the answers we owed you for questions from yesterday's phone conference.

On a separate note: Ilya, you had asked for additional information about the radiation incident that occurred at Cooper Station, NE. Here is the latest update I have:

- Special Inspection Team's onsite work is to be completed 4/15/11.
- NRC review and analysis of the facts will follow.
- An inspection report (findings and, if appropriate, a recommended NRC response) will follow within 45 days.

Please let me know if you have additional questions,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry:

(b)(6)

Answers to Michal Freedhoff's questions 4/13/11

Questions:

1. What plants have isolation condensers?
  - a. The United States BWRs that have isolation condensers are Oyster Creek in New Jersey, Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 in Illinois and Nine Mile Point Unit 1 in upstate New York.
2. What is the melting temperature of the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) seals and also what is the melting temperature of the vessel?
  - a. The CRD graphite seals are not used for the reactor pressure boundary, so the absence of the seals in the CRD will not cause leaking and the drainage of the reactor vessel. In the event of a CRD withdraw line failure, the flow restrictions in the CRD (two of the three flow paths include the graphite seals) will limit the leakage rate out of the reactor vessel. Although the graphite seals will lose some strength and durability at ~500 deg. F (the normal reactor water temperature), the seals will not melt. Fabrication of the seals includes baking at temperatures above 1000 deg. F.
  - b. The reactor vessel is made of steel and thus the melting temperature is in excess of 2000 deg. F.
3. Why are radiation levels on Unit 1 increasing and why is pressure on Unit 1 increasing?
  - a. The drywell (DW) radiation detector monitoring unit 1 radiation is believed to have failed after the earthquake on April 7<sup>th</sup>. Therefore any data from this radiation monitor would be suspect.
  - b. The secondary containment (S/C) radiation monitor on Unit 1 has been dropping since April 7<sup>th</sup>. (Indicating radiation conditions are improving)
    - i. On April 7<sup>th</sup> the detector was reading 12.9 Si/hr (1290 rem/hr)
    - ii. On April 14<sup>th</sup> the detector was reading 10.4 Si/hr (1040 rem/hr)
  - c. Pressure on Unit 1 has been relatively stable for several days. This would indicate that condition of the Unit 1 reactor has not changed for several days.
4. What cools the Recirc pump seals?
  - a. Recirc pump seal cooling is from both Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) cooling water and CRD seal purge.
5. What are the results of the GE-Hitachi (GEH) analysis (once the results become known) on whether or not there was a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) breach on Unit 2?
  - a. This information will not be available until either late Friday or early next week.

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 1:02 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Thanks. That is certainly Becky's position.

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 12:58 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I'll call this afternoon and ask if he can continue receiving it from Michal, as we discussed yesterday.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

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**From:** Fischhoff, Ilya <Ilya.Fischhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Fri Apr 15 12:51:43 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Hi,  
Could you please add me to the daily plant status reports distro? Thanks!  
Ilya

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 11:54 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Here are a few follow-up questions embedded in your document. Thanks.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

AO/217

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:44 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal and Ilya,  
Attached are the answers we owed you for questions from yesterday's phone conference.

On a separate note: Ilya, you had asked for additional information about the radiation incident that occurred at Cooper Station, NE. Here is the latest update I have:

- Special Inspection Team's onsite work is to be completed 4/15/11.
- NRC review and analysis of the facts will follow.
- An inspection report (findings and, if appropriate, a recommended NRC response) will follow within 45 days.

Please let me know if you have additional questions,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

---

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 16, 2011 9:40 PM  
**To:** Luehman, James  
**Cc:** Combs, Thomas; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Markey request for data

Hi Jim,  
Thanks for the update. Hopefully we'll be able to sort out whether Markey'sd office has reached out to states, and which ones.

Sent via BlackBerry  
Jenny Weil  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
(b)(6)

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**From:** Luehman, James  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Thu Apr 14 09:11:08 2011  
**Subject:** Markey request for data

Jenny,

We have sent the request to the states for them to review the documents requested by Congressman Markey's staff.

In the meantime we have learned from the State of Washington they have been contacted by the Congressman's staff directly. At this point we are unsure if that contact is about the data requested through the NRC or on some other data. In either case, this is going to get complicated real fast if they are going to us and then the states directly. If they are asking for the same data then we have a lot of potential duplication of effort. If they are asking for different/additional data NRC is going to be out of the loop and cannot be responsible for what they may or may not get.

Jim



---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 1:33 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Markey's latest letter

All incomings should go to Billie Champ and Sheila McKelvin in SECY. Becky may have done it, but let's risk a double-dip versus a zero...

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 12:57 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Markey's latest letter

Who do I send it to?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 12:32 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Markey's latest letter

Did this go to SECY on Friday? I have not seen it in a Reader yet...

Amy

COMMITTEES

NATURAL RESOURCES  
RANKING DEMOCRAT  
ENERGY AND COMMERCE

EDWARD J. MARKEY  
7TH DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-2107**

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FRAMINGHAM, MA 01702  
(508) 875-2900

<http://markey.house.gov>

April 15, 2011

The Honorable Greg Jaczko  
Chairman  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

I write to express my concern regarding the post-Fukushima meltdown inspections currently being conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) personnel at U.S. nuclear power plants. According to reports I have received, the NRC has decided to keep the results of most of these investigations secret, and their scope and depth may be severely constrained. As such, they may not provide the sort of information needed to adequately assess, let alone remedy, the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities.

As you know, on March 23 the Commission voted to require a multi-phase review<sup>1</sup> of U.S. nuclear reactor safety in the wake of the Japanese meltdown. The near-term review portion of these efforts called for the establishment of a task force to:

"Evaluate currently available technical and operational information from the events that have occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan to identify potential or preliminary near term/immediate operational or regulatory issues affecting domestic operating reactors of all designs, including their spent fuel pools, in areas such as protection against earthquake, tsunami, flooding, hurricanes; station blackout and a degraded ability to restore power; severe accident mitigation; emergency preparedness; and combustible gas control."

The task force was additionally directed to develop near-term recommendations for regulatory and other changes, and is also required to inform its efforts using stakeholder input. The longer (90 day) review is supposed to include more extensive stakeholder input, and the task force was directed in this phase to "evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be conducted by NRC." All of the results of these efforts were supposed to be made public.

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<sup>1</sup> Tasking Memorandum - COMBJ-11-0002 - NRC Actions Following The Events In Japan

I have recently learned that the NRC has initiated inspections at operating nuclear power plants for purposes of assessing the operational or regulatory issues that may have arisen as a result of the Fukushima meltdown, and that the results of these inspections, which are intended to inform the 90 day review, must be completed by April 29. I have also learned of the following constraints that have been placed on these inspections:

- The NRC is only allowing its inspectors 40 hours in which to perform each inspection for nuclear power plants that contain one nuclear reactor. For nuclear power plants with more than one unit, inspectors are being provided with only 50-60 hours total in which to complete their work.
- The NRC inspectors were initially told to limit their inspections to the adequacy of safety measures needed to respond to Design Basis Events. This meant that inspectors would be assessing licensees' ability to withstand and respond only to events that have already been contemplated and analyzed by the NRC and for which regulatory requirements have been implemented, but not events such as the ones that occurred in Japan, which were previously believed to be impossible.
- After several NRC inspectors complained that it made no sense to limit the scope of the inspections to Design Basis Events, the guidance was changed to enable inspectors to look beyond them; however, they were explicitly told not to record any of their beyond Design Basis observations or findings in documents that would be made public as part of the Commission's review or public report(s). Instead, these findings would be entered into a private NRC database and kept secret.

These limitations, if true, severely undermines my confidence in the Commission's interests in conducting a full and transparent assessment of the ability of U.S. nuclear power plants to be kept safe in the event of an incident that exceeds the current design basis assumptions regarding earthquakes or electricity outages -- such as the ones that occurred in Japan. This also seems entirely at odds with the Commission-approved direction to study the implications of the Fukushima meltdown on U.S. facilities and report publicly on the findings of the study. This is unacceptable, and must immediately be remedied. We should stand prepared to learn from the catastrophe in Japan and plan ahead to address what was unforeseen but occurred anyway, rather than attempting to hide our vulnerabilities from public view and, potentially, use the fact that the information will be kept secret to avoid taking all necessary regulatory action. In order to better understand what the NRC is doing here, I request that you please respond to the following questions and requests for information:

1. Who at the Commission made the decisions to a) initially direct its inspectors to limit the scope of the inspections to Design Basis Events and b) subsequently direct its inspectors not to record findings or observations of any beyond Design Basis Events in a manner that would result in the public disclosure of any identified vulnerabilities? Please provide me with a copy of all documents (including reports, emails, correspondence, memos, phone or meeting minutes or other materials) related to both the

decisions regarding the scope of the inspections as well as the manner in which inspection findings and observations would be recorded and reported.

2. Will you immediately reverse the current direction to NRC inspectors to keep all findings and observations of vulnerabilities of U.S. reactors to beyond Design Basis events secret and excluded from all public reports on the Commission's Fukushima review? If not, why not?
3. The NRC review is supposed to evaluate the currently available information from the events that occurred in Japan to identify changes that might be needed at U.S. nuclear power plants of all designs. For each of the following events that are known to have occurred in Japan, please indicate a) whether the event in question is considered to be a "design-basis event" by the NRC, b) whether NRC inspectors will be required to evaluate whether the U.S. nuclear power plants they are inspecting are capable of preventing or mitigating such an event, c) if not, why not, since the Commission clearly stated that all such events were supposed to be analyzed, d) if not, how regulatory or other recommendations will be developed that ensure that U.S. nuclear power plants are capable of preventing or mitigating such an event, e) whether the findings and observations associated with the inspections designed to evaluate U.S. ability to prevent or mitigate such an event will be made public as part of the NRC's 30, 60 and 90 day reports (and if not, why not), and f) whether the NRC intends to address U.S. vulnerability to the event at all through regulatory or other requirements.
  - i) An earthquake that is more severe than the one the nuclear power plant was designed to withstand.
  - ii) For coastally-located nuclear power plants, a tsunami that is more severe than the one the nuclear power plant was designed to withstand.
  - iii) A loss of operating power that is longer than current regulations are required to address.
  - iv) A total station blackout (i.e. loss of operating power and failure of emergency diesel generators) that is longer than current regulations are required to address.
  - v) A hydrogen explosion that occurs due to the buildup of hydrogen in the core or other areas of a nuclear reactor due to the failure of mitigation technologies such as hardened vents or hydrogen re-combiners, and the causes of such failures.
  - vi) A hydrogen explosion that occurs due to the buildup of hydrogen in the spent fuel storage area of a nuclear reactor due to the absence of mitigation technologies such as hardened vents or hydrogen re-combiners.


- vii) A breach in the containment vessel of a nuclear reactor core caused by a hydrogen explosion.
- viii) A breach in the structure of a spent nuclear fuel storage area due to an earthquake or hydrogen explosion.
- ix) The failure of the recirculation pump seals within the reactor pressure vessel which may prevent cooling water from fully filling the pressure vessel and thus covering and cooling the nuclear fuel rods contained therein.
- x) The failure of one or more safety relief valves within the primary containment area that could enable the transfer of radioactive core material between the drywell and the torus.
- xi) The potential melting of core material through the pressure vessel and into the drywell or torus of the nuclear reactor.
- xii) The failure of the isolation condenser and/or reactor core isolation cooling systems and subsequent inability to provide cooling function to the nuclear reactor cores.
- xiii) The failure of the primary containment vessel spray cooling and core spray systems.
- xiv) The failure of systems used to cool spent nuclear fuel storage areas, including areas that contain varying amounts of spent nuclear fuel of varying ages.
- xv) The failure of diagnostic equipment to accurately monitor temperature, water levels, hydrogen/oxygen concentrations, pressures and radiation onsite, both during a total station blackout and after basic electricity function is restored (such as if the devices have been damaged by water, radiation or other events).
- xvi) The absence of a source of fresh cooling water with which to cool the reactor core and spent nuclear fuel storage areas.
- xvii) The absence of a means by which to store large quantities of highly radioactive water that has leaked or spilled after being used to cool the core and spent nuclear fuel storage areas.
- xviii) Repeated earthquake aftershocks that further threaten the integrity of the already-compromised reactor core, spent nuclear fuel storage areas, and emergency operations.
- xix) The ability to manually repair or restore function associated with any of the above failures or events when faced with extremely high levels of radiation that may threaten the health and safety of those both on and offsite.

4. The Commission directed its staff to obtain external stakeholder input as part of both its near-term and longer-term work. Please fully describe all plans to solicit such input. Specifically, will any licensee or other nuclear industry personnel be accompanying inspectors during these inspections at nuclear power plants? If so, will NRC also ensure that appropriate non-industry individuals that possess the appropriate expertise and security clearances are also provided such an opportunity?

5. Why have inspectors only been provided with 40 hours (or 50-60, in the case of a multi-unit nuclear power plant) with which to complete their work? Why does the Commission have confidence that the necessary knowledge with which to inform our own safety efforts can be obtained in such a short period of time?

Thank you very much for your attention to this important matter. Please provide your response no later than Friday April 29, 2011. If you have any questions or concerns, please have your staff contact Dr. Michal Freedhoff of my staff at 202-225-2836.

Sincerely,



Edward J. Markey

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 7:49 AM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Subject:** RE: Query: markey letter on ap1000

And he has written so much...

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 7:07 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Vietti-Cook, Annette  
**Subject:** Re: Query: markey letter on ap1000

Thks I forgot about that, its been so long...

Sent from an NRC Blackberry  
Belkys Sosa

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Vietti-Cook, Annette  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 18 18:17:35 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Query: markey letter on ap1000

Mr. Markey did send a March 7, 2011 letter about the AP1000 design, citing safety concerns, including but not limited to the NRC staff nonconcurrence.

Amy

---

**From:** Sosa, Belkys  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 6:11 PM  
**To:** Vietti-Cook, Annette; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Query: markey letter on ap1000

Amy, is there another letter from Markey on AP1000 or is the Chairman referring to the 4/15 letter regarding the post-Fukushima meltdown inspections currently being conducted by NRC personnel at U.S. nuclear power plants?

Thanks,  
Belkys

---

**From:** Apostolakis, George  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 5:48 PM  
**To:** Sosa, Belkys; Davis, Roger  
**Subject:** FW: markey letter on ap1000

???

---

**From:** Jaczko, Gregory  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 5:47 PM

**To:** Ostendorff, William; Svinicki, Kristine; Magwood, William; Apostolakis, George  
**Subject:** markey letter on ap1000

I was going to hold off on weighing in on the markey letter based on information that I received today from mike Johnson. I asked for a briefing this week on the issue and would welcome any of your staff to that briefing (or one of you)



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**From:** Randall, Bob  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 10:05 AM  
**To:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Cc:** Williams, Michael; Droggitis, Spiros; Paradiso, Karen; Nichols, Russell; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: FOIA Requests in OCA

Nancy –

Please give me a call and I can fill you in on what we have been doing for other offices and what our current capabilities are.

Thanks!

Bob Randall  
IT Specialist  
Network Integration Team  
OIS/ICOD/DDB  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[Bob.Randall@nrc.gov](mailto:Bob.Randall@nrc.gov)  
Desk 301.415.6242  
Cell (b)(6)

---

**From:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 18, 2011 9:27 AM  
**To:** Randall, Bob  
**Cc:** ICOD Support (FOIA); Williams, Michael; Droggitis, Spiros; Paradiso, Karen; Nichols, Russell; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** RE: FOIA Requests in OCA

Hi Bob,

OCA does need help in retrieving the information for these FOIA requests. Please let me know what we need to do.

Thank you,

*Nancy Belmore*  
*Office of Congressional Affairs*  
*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*  
[nancy.belmore@nrc.gov](mailto:nancy.belmore@nrc.gov)  
301-415-1776

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**From:** Randall, Bob  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 11:01 AM  
**To:** Belmore, Nancy  
**Cc:** ICOD Support (FOIA); Williams, Michael; Droggitis, Spiros; Paradiso, Karen; Nichols, Russell  
**Subject:** RE: FOIA Requests in OCA

Nancy –

I just spoke with Spiros Droggitis in your office about the FOIA requests that he is trying to gather information on for your office. In light of the scope of this task we have asked that each office's FOIA coordinator speak with the staff in their respective offices to coordinate the request for information to be pulled from the email system to make managing the requests easier. I have heard that there are other people in your office that may need help as well and it is easier to track the requests when they come from one location in each office. I am sure that makes it easier for you to track the work that has been done as well.

Please contact me when you are in the office so we can discuss this and I can use my resources to help you gather the information required.

Thanks!

Bob Randall  
IT Specialist  
Network Integration Team  
OIS/ICOD/DDB  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[Bob.Randall@nrc.gov](mailto:Bob.Randall@nrc.gov)  
Desk 301.415.6242  
Cell (b)(6)

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 7:26 AM  
**To:** ICOD Support (FOIA); Williams, Michael; Randall, Bob  
**Subject:** RE: I need help

Bob: I'm at 415-1777. Why don't you give me a call when you get a chance to sort through this? Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** ICOD Support (FOIA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 4:58 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Williams, Michael; Randall, Bob  
**Subject:** RE: I need help

Spiros –

We can help pull email data based on specific date ranges, but we are unable to do the searches based on specific terms in the email, etc .... I would be glad to help you with bulk email from specific users mailboxes but I need the details on what you are looking for.

Bob

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 13, 2011 11:35 AM  
**To:** ICOD Support (FOIA)  
**Subject:** I need help

In responding to these various FOIA requests. Thanks

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 10:13 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** FW: Weekly Call with USAID  
**Attachments:** Recurring Daily Actions and Calls Rev 31.docx

Spiros,  
We'll have a call this afternoon at 2pm, if we can get an NRC representative. Thoughts?

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** LIA08 Hoc  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 16, 2011 5:27 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Johnson, Michael  
**Subject:** Weekly Call with USAID

Hey guys,  
The EOC Liaison Team (LT) has participated in USAID calls since the Operations Center was stood up on March 11. When we had a fully staffed LT, a Federal Liaison and representative from OCA would typically participate in the call. As of this past week, LT staffing is reduced to one person per shift. The current list of recurring calls indicates that OCA continues to participate in that call. I do not perceive an LT role in the call at this point and would like to update the list to reflect that only OCA will participate. I have attached the latest list of recurring calls for your review. Please inform LIA08 if you believe the LT **does** still have a role in this call.

Thanks,  
Rani Franovich  
Liaison Team Coordinator  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
email: [lia08.hoc@nrc.gov](mailto:lia08.hoc@nrc.gov)  
Desk Ph: 301-816-5185

A0/222

## Recurring Daily Actions and Calls

(Information Rolled into Recurring Daily Actions and Calls on WebEOC under ET Misc. Document Collection)

-Time (EDT)	Description	Lead Team	Action/Purpose of the Call
0300	RST/PMT call with Japan Team	RST/PMT (arranged by HOO's (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(7)(F))	Daily update for Site Team and HQ (convenient time for Site Team)
0600	One Pager ( <i>end of shift</i> )	ET, Response Advisor	Provide input to EST Support
0600	Congressional Update		Taken From Status Update (Confirm w/ OCA)
0830	Daily call with Chuck Casto/Site Team	ET	Update chairman and staff during turnover
0845	Chairman Joins the Daily Call	ET	
	Deputy Secretaries (as scheduled)	ET	White House lead ( <b>-Chairman participates</b> ) -Interagency discussion
0930	UK/Canada/France Call	RST/PMT (arranged by HOO) Bridge (b)(6)	Information Exchange. Focused on Operational issues (Combining PMT call from 1400 for Dose issues. Starting 3/28)
1000	Input due to for Daily SITREP	All	Inputs due to LT Coordinator for Status Update
1000	TAs & CAs briefing	ET (arranged by HOO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(F)	ET Director lead -briefed Commission TAs and Ods (Tuesday and Thursday ONLY)
1100	ESF8 (Public Health & Medical Services)	LT (Conference number provided by HHS)	HHS Secretary's Operations Center lead <del>Interagency discussion NOTE call will be held on Tuesdays only.</del>
1100	Technical Coordination with Industry Consortium	RST (arranged by HOO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(F)	Technical discussion
1100	Info Exchange: US Environmental Monitoring Data	Arranged by NEI	"Radiological Status & Implications" call between NRC, NEI, EPA, DOE and OSTP. NEI or OSTP will set up the bridge line. (weekly after 4/5; next call to be April 12 at 11:00)
1230	NTAG teleconference (chaired by NSS)	PMT Director to lead	Nuclear Technical Advisory Group –email sent out daily with phone # and pass code
1400	USAID Starting 4/5 call will be on Tuesdays only 877.334.8037 Password (b)(6)	LT/OCA	USAID lead -Interagency discussion: Federal pre-coordination takes place at 1:45 and then the 2pm call with Congressional staff. (Tuesday Only)
1400	Advisory Team (A-Team)	White House/PMT	Call with the White House. <del>These calls are now on Tuesdays and Thursdays only.</del> Call: (b)(6); Pin: (b)(6)

April 15, 2011 1900 hrs

Recurring Daily Actions and Calls Rev 31

CURRENT VERSION: See WebEOC, ET Misc. Document Collection)

## Recurring Daily Actions and Calls

(Information Rolled into Recurring Daily Actions and Calls on WebEOC under ET Misc. Document Collection)

			202-395-6392 Pin #: 1495542#
1500	One Pager <i>(end of shift)</i>	ET, Response Advisor	Provide Input to EST Support
1500	Congressional call	OCA & NRC Go-To Team (Leeds, M. Johnson, Sherron, B. Boger, etc) 800-593-7189 (b)(6)	OCA lead -Audience is Congressional staff who have or are near a plant; Oversight committees; House & Senate leadership
1700	PACOM J2 call	RST/PMT	Occurs in SGT Room on <b>Mon, Wed, Fri.</b> PACOM will dial into 301-415-5393.
1700	HHS call with 50 states and federal partners	LT/State Liaison FSME (Rich Turtill)	Meeting occurs each <b>Tuesday and Thursday</b> evening, as organized by HHS (N. Natarajan). HHS provides bridge line day of call
1700	DOE Science Panel	RES	Brian Sherron and Richard Lee, out of the box solutions.
1700	RST/PMT call with Japan Team	RST/PMT (arranged by the HOO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(F)	Daily update for Site Team and HQ (convenient time for the Site Team)
1900	Call with Vince Holahan PACCOM	PMT	Status of Radiological Conditions Vince Direct Line – 808.477.9536, if no answer 808.477.9286 or SWO 808.477.8173 Cell (b)(6)
2000	HHS Call with Pacific	HHS	Meeting occurs each <b>Wed. evening.</b> Call in 888-455-7847, (b)(6) is the passcode. PMT to participate
2000	Call with Industry Consortium (Next call 4/18 and every Monday and Wednesday at 2000 thereafter)	ET (arranged by HOO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(F)	ET Led High-level discussions with industry and NRC Site Team (Call covers "Nuclear Team Asks and Offers Tracker XX-XX-2011.xlsx" spreadsheet of major items).
2130	PMT call with Japan Team	PMT (arranged by the HOO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(F)	Daily update for Site Team and HQ (convenient time for the Site Team)
2200	One Pager <i>(end of shift)</i>	ET, Response Advisor	Provide Input to EST Support
2200	One pager	EST	Update chairman via email using one-pager

April 15, 2011 1900 hrs

Recurring Daily Actions and Calls Rev 31

CURRENT VERSION: See WebEOC, ET Misc. Document Collection)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 10:58 AM  
**To:** 'Nuku.Ofori@mail.house.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: 11am-"ish"

LOL - heading there now...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

----- Original Message -----

From: Ofori, Nuku <Nuku.Ofori@mail.house.gov>  
To: Powell, Amy  
Sent: Tue Apr 19 10:19:26 2011  
Subject: RE: 11am-"ish"

Hey Amy -- Heads up, our meeting may be interrupted by an evacuation drill in the Rayburn building. If we have to scramble and we don't see each other, you can call my cell at (b)(6)

Thanks!

Nuku

-----Original Message-----

From: Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 9:35 AM  
To: Ofori, Nuku  
Subject: 11am-"ish"

Good morning - FYI, I've got a 10am in Ford, so I'll be trucking from there. I may be a few minutes late to Rayburn caf but I'll be there!

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 3:37 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: G20110278

Sure.

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 3:36 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: G20110278

Have a meeting that starts in 10 minutes on 17... that I called. Is 430ish ok?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 3:35 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: ACTION: G20110278  
**Importance:** High

Coming to your office to discuss, if your available

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2011 3:33 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Cc:** Landau, Mindy  
**Subject:** FW: ACTION: G20110278  
**Importance:** High

AO/224

Tim, so SECY has assigned the Markey letter to accommodate his requested due date. Clearly this can't happen unless we drop everything else (and I'm not even sure OEDO should be in charge of this letter (OGC?).) Please advise on what OCA can do about revising to a more realistic due date. There are lots of other MOCs with letters in line before Mr. Markey!

-----Original Message-----

From: Clayton, Kathleen

Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 3:23 PM

To: Rihm, Roger

Subject: FW: ACTION: G20110278

Just a heads up. This ticket is due on 04/21/11 to EDO and 04/22/11 to SECY.

-----Original Message-----

From: Clayton, Kathleen

Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2011 3:23 PM

To: Rihm, Roger

Cc: RidsNrrMailCenter Resource; RidsOgcMailCenter Resource; RidsOcaMailCenter Resource

Subject: ACTION: G20110278

Attached is an action green ticket for EDO. The ADAMS version will be sent after DPC processes.



EDO Principal Correspondence Control

FROM: DUE: 04/21/11

EDO CONTROL: G20110278

DOC DT: 04/15/11

FINAL REPLY:

Senator Edward J. Markey

TO:

Chairman Jaczko

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

\*\* PRI \*\*

CRC NO: 11-0232

Chairman Jaczko

DESC:

Post-Fukushima Meltdown Inspections Conducted by  
NRC at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants  
(EDATS: SECY-2011-0239)

ROUTING:

Borchardt  
Weber  
Virgilio  
Ash  
Muessle  
OCG/GC  
Leeds, NRR  
Burns, OGC  
Schmidt, OCA

DATE: 04/19/11

ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

EDO

Rihm

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

Please prepare response in accordance with OEDO  
Notice 2009-0441-02 (ML093290179). NRR to provide  
input to Roger Rihm, OEDO, if required. Roger will  
coordinate with OGC and OCA.

**EDATS Number:** SECY-2011-0239**Source:** SECY**General Information****Assigned To:** OEDO**OEDO Due Date:** 4/21/2011 11:00 PM**Other Assignees:****SECY Due Date:** 4/22/2011 11:00 PM**Subject:** Post-Fukushima Meltdown Inspections Conducted by NRC at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants**Description:****CC Routing:** NRR; OGC; OCA**ADAMS Accession Numbers - Incoming:** NONE**Response/Package:** NONE**Other Information****Cross Reference Number:** G20110278, LTR-11-0232**Staff Initiated:** NO**Related Task:****Recurring Item:** NO**File Routing:** EDATS**Agency Lesson Learned:** NO**OEDO Monthly Report Item:** NO**Process Information****Action Type:** Letter**Priority:** Medium**Sensitivity:** None**Signature Level:** Chairman Jaczko**Urgency:** NO**Approval Level:** No Approval Required**OEDO Concurrence:** YES**OCM Concurrence:** NO**OCA Concurrence:** NO**Special Instructions:** Please prepare response in accordance with OEDO Notice 2009-0441-02 (ML093290179). NRR to provide input to Roger Rihm, OEDO, if required. Roger will coordinate response with OGC and OCA.**Document Information****Originator Name:** Edward J. Markey**Date of Incoming:** 4/15/2011**Originating Organization:** Congress**Document Received by SECY Date:** 4/19/2011**Addressee:** Chairman Jaczko**Date Response Requested by Originator:** NONE**Incoming Task Received:** Letter

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET

Date Printed: Apr 19, 2011 14:31

PAPER NUMBER: LTR-11-0232      LOGGING DATE: 04/19/2011  
ACTION OFFICE: EDO  
  
AUTHOR: REP Edward Markey  
AFFILIATION: CONG  
ADDRESSEE: Gregory Jackzo  
SUBJECT: Express concern regarding the post-Fukushima meltdown inspections currently being conducted by NRC personnel at U.S. nuclear power plants  
  
ACTION: Signature of Chairman  
DISTRIBUTION: RF, OGC, OCA to Ack  
  
LETTER DATE: 04/15/2011  
ACKNOWLEDGED: No  
SPECIAL HANDLING:  
  
NOTES: Response requested NLT, Friday, April 29, 2011  
  
FILE LOCATION: ADAMS  
  
DATE DUE: 04/22/2011      DATE SIGNED:

EDO --G20110278

**Congress of the United States****House of Representatives****Washington, DC 20515-2107****April 15, 2011**

**The Honorable Greg Jaczko**  
**Chairman**  
**Nuclear Regulatory Commission**  
**11555 Rockville Pike**  
**Rockville, MD 20852**

**Dear Chairman Jaczko:**

I write to express my concern regarding the post-Fukushima meltdown inspections currently being conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) personnel at U.S. nuclear power plants. According to reports I have received, the NRC has decided to keep the results of most of these investigations secret, and their scope and depth may be severely constrained. As such, they may not provide the sort of information needed to adequately assess, let alone remedy, the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities.

As you know, on March 23 the Commission voted to require a multi-phase review<sup>1</sup> of U.S. nuclear reactor safety in the wake of the Japanese meltdown. The near-term review portion of these efforts called for the establishment of a task force to:

**"Evaluate currently available technical and operational information from the events that have occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan to identify potential or preliminary near term/immediate operational or regulatory issues affecting domestic operating reactors of all designs, including their spent fuel pools, in areas such as protection against earthquake, tsunami, flooding, hurricanes; station blackout and a degraded ability to restore power; severe accident mitigation; emergency preparedness; and combustible gas control."**

The task force was additionally directed to develop near-term recommendations for regulatory and other changes, and is also required to inform its efforts using stakeholder input. The longer (90 day) review is supposed to include more extensive stakeholder input, and the task force was directed in this phase to "evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be conducted by NRC." All of the results of these efforts were supposed to be made public.

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<sup>1</sup> Tasking Memorandum - COMBJ-11-0002 - NRC Actions Following The Events In Japan

I have recently learned that the NRC has initiated inspections at operating nuclear power plants for purposes of assessing the operational or regulatory issues that may have arisen as a result of the Fukushima meltdown, and that the results of these inspections, which are intended to inform the 90 day review, must be completed by April 29. I have also learned of the following constraints that have been placed on these inspections:

- The NRC is only allowing its inspectors 40 hours in which to perform each inspection for nuclear power plants that contain one nuclear reactor. For nuclear power plants with more than one unit, inspectors are being provided with only 50-60 hours total in which to complete their work.
- The NRC inspectors were initially told to limit their inspections to the adequacy of safety measures needed to respond to Design Basis Events. This meant that inspectors would be assessing licensees' ability to withstand and respond only to events that have already been contemplated and analyzed by the NRC and for which regulatory requirements have been implemented, but not events such as the ones that occurred in Japan, which were previously believed to be impossible.
- After several NRC inspectors complained that it made no sense to limit the scope of the inspections to Design Basis Events, the guidance was changed to enable inspectors to look beyond them; however, they were explicitly told not to record any of their beyond Design Basis observations or findings in documents that would be made public as part of the Commission's review or public report(s). Instead, these findings would be entered into a private NRC database and kept secret.

These limitations, if true, severely undermines my confidence in the Commission's interests in conducting a full and transparent assessment of the ability of U.S. nuclear power plants to be kept safe in the event of an incident that exceeds the current design basis assumptions regarding earthquakes or electricity outages -- such as the ones that occurred in Japan. This also seems entirely at odds with the Commission-approved direction to study the implications of the Fukushima meltdown on U.S. facilities and report publicly on the findings of the study. This is unacceptable, and must immediately be remedied. We should stand prepared to learn from the catastrophe in Japan and plan ahead to address what was unforeseen but occurred anyway, rather than attempting to hide our vulnerabilities from public view and, potentially, use the fact that the information will be kept secret to avoid taking all necessary regulatory action. In order to better understand what the NRC is doing here, I request that you please respond to the following questions and requests for information:

1. Who at the Commission made the decisions to a) initially direct its inspectors to limit the scope of the inspections to Design Basis Events and b) subsequently direct its inspectors not to record findings or observations of any beyond Design Basis Events in a manner that would result in the public disclosure of any identified vulnerabilities? Please provide me with a copy of all documents (including reports, emails, correspondence, memos, phone or meeting minutes or other materials) related to both the

decisions regarding the scope of the inspections as well as the manner in which inspection findings and observations would be recorded and reported.


2. Will you immediately reverse the current direction to NRC inspectors to keep all findings and observations of vulnerabilities of U.S. reactors to beyond Design Basis events secret and excluded from all public reports on the Commission's Fukushima review? If not, why not?
3. The NRC review is supposed to evaluate the currently available information from the events that occurred in Japan to identify changes that might be needed at U.S. nuclear power plants of all designs. For each of the following events that are known to have occurred in Japan, please indicate a) whether the event in question is considered to be a "design-basis event" by the NRC, b) whether NRC inspectors will be required to evaluate whether the U.S. nuclear power plants they are inspecting are capable of preventing or mitigating such an event, c) if not, why not, since the Commission clearly stated that all such events were supposed to be analyzed, d) if not, how regulatory or other recommendations will be developed that ensure that U.S. nuclear power plants are capable of preventing or mitigating such an event, e) whether the findings and observations associated with the inspections designed to evaluate U.S. ability to prevent or mitigate such an event will be made public as part of the NRC's 30, 60 and 90 day reports (and if not, why not), and f) whether the NRC intends to address U.S. vulnerability to the event at all through regulatory or other requirements.
  - i) An earthquake that is more severe than the one the nuclear power plant was designed to withstand.
  - ii) For coastally-located nuclear power plants, a tsunami that is more severe than the one the nuclear power plant was designed to withstand.
  - iii) A loss of operating power that is longer than current regulations are required to address.
  - iv) A total station blackout (i.e. loss of operating power and failure of emergency diesel generators) that is longer than current regulations are required to address.
  - v) A hydrogen explosion that occurs due to the buildup of hydrogen in the core or other areas of a nuclear reactor due to the failure of mitigation technologies such as hardened vents or hydrogen re-combiners, and the causes of such failures.
  - vi) A hydrogen explosion that occurs due to the buildup of hydrogen in the spent fuel storage area of a nuclear reactor due to the absence of mitigation technologies such as hardened vents or hydrogen re-combiners.

- vii) A breach in the containment vessel of a nuclear reactor core caused by a hydrogen explosion.
  - viii) A breach in the structure of a spent nuclear fuel storage area due to an earthquake or hydrogen explosion.
  - ix) The failure of the recirculation pump seals within the reactor pressure vessel which may prevent cooling water from fully filling the pressure vessel and thus covering and cooling the nuclear fuel rods contained therein.
  - x) The failure of one or more safety relief valves within the primary containment area that could enable the transfer of radioactive core material between the drywell and the torus.
  - xi) The potential melting of core material through the pressure vessel and into the drywell or torus of the nuclear reactor.
  - xii) The failure of the isolation condenser and/or reactor core isolation cooling systems and subsequent inability to provide cooling function to the nuclear reactor cores.
  - xiii) The failure of the primary containment vessel spray cooling and core spray systems.
  - xiv) The failure of systems used to cool spent nuclear fuel storage areas, including areas that contain varying amounts of spent nuclear fuel of varying ages.
  - xv) The failure of diagnostic equipment to accurately monitor temperature, water levels, hydrogen/oxygen concentrations, pressures and radiation onsite, both during a total station blackout and after basic electricity function is restored (such as if the devices have been damaged by water, radiation or other events).
  - xvi) The absence of a source of fresh cooling water with which to cool the reactor core and spent nuclear fuel storage areas.
  - xvii) The absence of a means by which to store large quantities of highly radioactive water that has leaked or spilled after being used to cool the core and spent nuclear fuel storage areas.
  - xviii) Repeated earthquake aftershocks that further threaten the integrity of the already-compromised reactor core, spent nuclear fuel storage areas, and emergency operations.
  - xix) The ability to manually repair or restore function associated with any of the above failures or events when faced with extremely high levels of radiation that may threaten the health and safety of those both on and offsite.
4. The Commission directed its staff to obtain external stakeholder input as part of both its near-term and longer-term work. Please fully describe all plans to solicit such input. Specifically, will any licensee or other nuclear industry personnel be accompanying inspectors during these inspections at nuclear power plants? If so, will NRC also ensure that appropriate non-industry individuals that possess the appropriate expertise and security clearances are also provided such an opportunity?

5. Why have inspectors only been provided with 40 hours (or 50-60, in the case of a multi-unit nuclear power plant) with which to complete their work? Why does the Commission have confidence that the necessary knowledge with which to inform our own safety efforts can be obtained in such a short period of time?

Thank you very much for your attention to this important matter. Please provide your response no later than Friday April 29, 2011. If you have any questions or concerns, please have your staff contact Dr. Michal Freedhoff of my staff at 202-225-2836.

Sincerely,

  
Edward J. Markey



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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 10:32 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Thanks very much.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Representative Edward J. Markey

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 10:10 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>; Powell, Amy <Amy.Powell@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal,

Here are our responses to follow-on questions you had last week. In the attached document, your questions are in red and our responses are in blue.

Thank you for your patience,

Timothy Riley

Congressional Affairs Officer

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Congressional Affairs

Phone: 301-415-8492

Blackberry (b)(6)

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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 11:54 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Here are a few follow-up questions embedded in your document. Thanks.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

A0/225

2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:44 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal and Ilya,  
Attached are the answers we owed you for questions from yesterday's phone conference.

On a separate note: Ilya, you had asked for additional information about the radiation incident that occurred at Cooper Station, NE. Here is the latest update I have:

- Special Inspection Team's onsite work is to be completed 4/15/11.
- NRC review and analysis of the facts will follow.
- An inspection report (findings and, if appropriate, a recommended NRC response) will follow within 45 days.

Please let me know if you have additional questions,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry (b)(6)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 12:11 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez

Thanks for letting me know these were stuck – we have a number of folks out (including Tim) so that was helpful.

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 11:50 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez

You're smokin' today!

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 11:48 AM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** FW: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez  
**Importance:** High

For Sen. Menendez...

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 11:47 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez  
**Importance:** High

Amy,  
Here's his revised version which incorporates NJ-specific info. I read through and had no suggestions.

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**To:** Turk, Sherwin; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Wed Apr 20 11:08:14 2011  
**Subject:** ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez

NR and Region I are reviewing this, but decided I might as well also send along to you at this point. I'd like to wrap up by end of the week. Thx.

Letter to The Honorable Robert Menendez

Dear Senator Menendez:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of March 16, 2011, which raised several concerns regarding commercial nuclear power plants in New Jersey and surrounding states.

The NRC has well established design criteria and standards that are used as the basis for construction of all commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. These include ensuring the ability to withstand environmental hazards, such as earthquakes and flooding, without loss of capacity to perform their safety functions. Specifically, the NRC requires that safety-related structures, systems, and components be designed to take into account the most severe natural phenomena historically reported for the site and surrounding area.

With regard to earthquakes in particular, U.S. nuclear power plants are designed and built to withstand the ground-shaking level that is appropriate for its location, given the possible earthquake sources that may affect the site and its tectonic environment. NRC regulations refer to this as the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), which is generally defined as the maximum ground motion seismic response that the plant must be able to withstand and safely shut down and be maintained in a safely shut down condition. Comparable to seismic analysis, nuclear power plant flood protection design also extends to all systems, structures, and components, and focuses on any failure that could prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in an uncontrolled release of significant radioactivity.

The Oyster Creek site, is located well inland from the ocean, behind a barrier island, and the property in the immediate vicinity of the plant is approximately 23 feet above sea level. The Salem and Hope Creek sites are constructed on an artificial island roughly 40 miles from the mouth of the Delaware Bay and located 11-13 feet above sea level, with flood protection features designed to protect against flooding surges up to 31 feet above sea level.

As you noted in your letter, the Japanese boiling water reactors (BWR) are similar in design to some U.S. facilities, including those in New Jersey. However, beginning in the late 1980s, the NRC initiated a BWR Mark I containment improvement program to mitigate the small containment volume of the design. In addition, a number of other fleet-wide enhancements have been made that further distinguish U.S. nuclear reactors from those in Japan. This includes a requirement of NRC regulations that emergency diesel generator fuel oil tanks be sheltered in safety-related structure or underground in order to withstand an earthquake and flooding events. NRC regulations also require all U.S. nuclear power plants to cope with a loss of all alternating current (AC) power (i.e., station blackout) in the event of a loss of station on-site and normal off-site power sources. NRC regulations do not specify the length of time that a plant needs to have backup battery power following a station blackout (most sites plan to have battery backup capability for 8 hours). Instead, the amount of time is dependent on the site recovery strategy and is based on providing sufficient capacity to assure that the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained. In addition, U.S. facilities are required to have alternate AC sources from grid systems separate from the normal off-site power supply and additional equipment and measures to mitigate damage stemming from large fires and explosions from a beyond-design-basis event.

The Salem facility has three emergency diesel generators for each unit, as well as access to a pre-existing onsite gas turbine generator of significant size, while Hope Creek has four diesel generators and access to this same large gas turbine generator. In the case of Oyster Creek, it has two onsite diesel generators; two gas turbines were later installed on the property across the intake canal to provide electricity in the event of a station blackout.

While the NRC provides assistance to the Japanese people, I want to assure you that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority. With our near-term evaluation of the relevance of recent Japanese events to the U.S. fleet underway, we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American public.

Sincerely,

GBJ

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 12:11 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez

Nope – Tim indicated that your revision addressed OCA concerns by getting NJ specific info included.

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 11:51 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez

Just to be certain, the version you sent me has no OCA edits in it.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 11:48 AM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** FW: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez  
**Importance:** High

For Sen. Menendez...

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**Sent:** Friday, April 22, 2011 11:47 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez  
**Importance:** High

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Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

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**Sent:** Wed Apr 20 11:08:14 2011  
**Subject:** ACTION: Response to Senator Menendez

NRR and Region I are reviewing this, but decided I might as well also send along to you at this point. I'd like to wrap up by end of the week. Thx.

A0/227

---

**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:49 AM  
**To:** Andersen, James; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kotzalas, Margie; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

This probably stemmed from the FAQ site that has been set up on the public web. The Qs and As really should be funneled to OPA. Confusion reigns!

Amy, please ask the OCA staff to provide OPA with any final Qs and As they prepare for Congressional briefings in the event they may be appropriate to use on the public site database.

Thanks!  
Mindy

---

**From:** Andersen, James  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:44 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kotzalas, Margie; Landau, Mindy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Amy, I am not aware of a change to send questions on Japan to OEDO. I think questions should go through the operations center, and if they need assistance, they reach out to the program offices.

Jim A.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:38 PM  
**To:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Andersen, James  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Margie, I just can't keep up with you!!!

Jim, let us know who we should bother now (I'll still bother Margie, just generally ☺)... Thanks!

Amy

---

**From:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:37 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Andersen, James  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Amy, I'm in NMSS again so I can't help you guys with this request. I'm sorry ☺. I forwarded Spiros' email to Jim Andersen and cc'd him on this email.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:35 PM  
**To:** Drogitis, Spiros; Kotzalas, Margie

**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy

**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I had a chance to talk with Marty about all but fact-checking the RCIC "67 hours" portion. Tim, if I recall, Mike Brown was on this call with you, correct? Just trying to give Margie a starting point. The ET chronology on the RCIC does not bear out the 67 hours at a glance, but that was from a cursory look...

Thanks Margie,  
Amy

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros

**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:11 PM

**To:** Kotzalas, Margie

**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy

**Subject:** FW: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Margie: Here are some follow on questions from information we provided Congressman Markey's staff. I understand we are supposed to feed such questions through the EDO staff. Let me know if you have any questions. Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]

**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 3:33 PM

**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya

**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Freedhoff, Michal

**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Does NRC staff still believe pressure in unit 1 is stable? I think it is still rising. Also, anything new re analysis of whether there has been a melt-thru in unit 2 or a breach in unit 1? Has the GEH report come out yet? Finally, on our call, you all said that batteries ran the RCICs on units 2/3 for 67 hours - are you sure of that? We heard from someone (not in response to your theory but just generally) that RCICs wouldn't really be able to keep running on batteries and would be severely compromised as things heated up, well before 67 hours.

Thanks  
michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]

**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 10:10 AM

**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya

**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy

**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal,  
Here are our responses to follow-on questions you had last week. In the attached document, your questions are in red and our responses are in blue.  
Thank you for your patience,



Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 11:54 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Drogitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Here are a few follow-up questions embedded in your document. Thanks.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:44 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Drogitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal and Ilya,  
Attached are the answers we owed you for questions from yesterday's phone conference.

On a separate note: Ilya, you had asked for additional information about the radiation incident that occurred at Cooper Station, NE. Here is the latest update I have:

- Special Inspection Team's onsite work is to be completed 4/15/11.
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Please let me know if you have additional questions,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 2:58 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Any Path Forward Yet on Latest Markey Letter? EOM

Amy,  
I didn't speak with Michal last week; can you?  
Thabk you,  
Tim

Sent from an NRC Blackberry.  
Tim Riley

(b)(6)

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**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 25 09:36:47 2011  
**Subject:** Any Path Forward Yet on Latest Markey Letter? EOM

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:42 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Margie is no longer the OEDO point – she forwarded our info to Jim Andersen who will get us to the right POC (it was Brian Wittick but he's East of here).

I can call Michal on everything but the RCIC portion; as I recall in the ET, RCIC shut down 3/12 so the math does not seem right...

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:39 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I can try to find the answers to which these follow on.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 25 17:35:20 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I had a chance to talk with Marty about all but fact-checking the RCIC "67 hours" portion. Tim, if I recall, Mike Brown was on this call with you, correct? Just trying to give Margie a starting point. The ET chronology on the RCIC does not bear out the 67 hours at a glance, but that was from a cursory look...

Thanks Margie,  
Amy

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:11 PM  
**To:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

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**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 3:33 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Freedhoff, Michal  
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Does NRC staff still believe pressure in unit 1 is stable? I think it is still rising. Also, anything new re analysis of whether there has been a melt-thru in unit 2 or a breach in unit 1? Has the GEH report come out yet? Finally, on our call, you all said that batteries ran the RCICs on units 2/3 for 67 hours - are you sure of that? We heard from someone (not in response to your theory but just generally) that RCICs wouldn't really be able to keep running on batteries and would be severely compromised as things heated up, well before 67 hours.

Thanks  
Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 10:10 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal,  
Here are our responses to follow-on questions you had last week. In the attached document, your questions are in red and our responses are in blue.  
Thank you for your patience,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Phone: 301-415-8492  
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**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 11:54 AM  
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**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Here are a few follow-up questions embedded in your document. Thanks.

Michal

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**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:44 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

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Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal <Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 6:31 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I can call you at 8 or so. We need to also talk letters. :-)

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

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**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 06:21 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Wednesday works – I'm generally in by 745am, so let me know what works. Maybe we can talk about the 5/4 hearing during the same chat?

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 6:11 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** Re: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I'm not in tomorrow - wednesday?  
Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

-----  
Sent using BlackBerry

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 06:07 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros <Spiros.Droggitis@nrc.gov>; Riley (OCA), Timothy <Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal – we've got folks fact-checking the RCIC #s. When is a good time to call you in the morning?

Thanks,  
Amy

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 3:33 PM  
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**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Freedhoff, Michal  
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michal

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**Cc:** Drogitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
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## Answers to Michal Freedhoff's questions 4/21/11

### Questions:

1. What plants have isolation condensers?
  - a. The United States BWRs that have isolation condensers are Oyster Creek in New Jersey, Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 in Illinois and Nine Mile Point Unit 1 in upstate New York.
2. What is the melting temperature of the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) seals and also what is the melting temperature of the vessel?
  - a. The CRD graphite seals are not used for the reactor pressure boundary, so the absence of the seals in the CRD will not cause leaking and the drainage of the reactor vessel. In the event of a CRD withdraw line failure, the flow restrictions in the CRD (two of the three flow paths include the graphite seals) will limit the leakage rate out of the reactor vessel. Although the graphite seals will lose some strength and durability at ~500 deg. F (the normal reactor water temperature), the seals will not melt. Fabrication of the seals includes baking at temperatures above 1000 deg. F.
  - b. The reactor vessel is made of steel and thus the melting temperature is in excess of 2000 deg. F.

Question: doesn't zircalloy melt at about 1800 C and uranium oxide at about 2800 C? And since many sources have indicated that the fuel in all 3 units has melted, what relevance do the 1000 and 2000 degree thresholds you cite have? Why wouldn't the seals melt if the fuel does? If they did, would all leaks still be precluded or would they just be limited by other barriers?

There are four sub-questions regarding Question 2b. The following presents these four sub-questions and the staff's response to them.

#### Q2b(1) Doesn't zircalloy melt at about 1800 C and uranium oxide at about 2800 C?

Answer: Yes, but with the following clarification:

- (1) Melting point of Uranium Oxide fuel is dependent on burnup:

Fresh UO<sub>2</sub> Melting point (MP) is 4980 degrees F (2750 degree C).

After a spike in the MP during initial burnup (less than 5 GWd/MT) of up to about 5170 degrees F, the MP decreases, namely,

At a burnup of 27 GWd/MT the MP is 5070 degrees F (2800 degrees C)

At a burnup of 50 GWd/MT the MP is 5030 degrees F (2776 degrees C)

- (2) Melting point of Zircaloy: 3320 degrees F (1827 degrees C)

Reference: "Thermal Analysis of Pressurized Water Reactors", Third Edition, L. S. Tong and Joel Weisman, American Nuclear Society, 1996.

#### Q2b(2) And since many sources have indicated that the fuel in all 3 units has melted, what relevance do the 1000 and 2000 degree thresholds you cite have?

Answer: For the Japan's case, since the theory of fuel melting was not verified by direct examination, the staff does not know whether fuel was actually melted or what happened after that. Even if the fuel melted, there could be different scenarios and impacts on the reactor pressure vessel. For example, in the Three Mile Island Accident, the fuel melted, but the reactor pressure vessel was not breached, indicating the melted mixture was not hot enough to melt a hole in the reactor pressure vessel bottom with a melting point around 2000 degree F.

Q2b(3) Why wouldn't the seals melt if the fuel does?

Answer: Due to the design (e.g., geometric location and the distance between the control rod drive seals and the postulated molten mixture location), there is not a direct link between fuel melting and seal failure.

Q2b(4) If they did, would all leaks still be precluded or would they just be limited by other barriers?

Answer: If the control rod drive seals broke down, it will not cause leaking of the reactor vessel because the seals are not part of the pressure boundary.

3. Why are radiation levels on Unit 1 increasing and why is pressure on Unit 1 increasing?

- a. The drywell (DW) radiation detector monitoring unit 1 radiation is believed to have failed after the earthquake on April 7<sup>th</sup>. Therefore any data from this radiation monitor would be suspect.
- b. The secondary containment (S/C) radiation monitor on Unit 1 has been dropping since April 7<sup>th</sup>. (Indicating radiation conditions are improving)
  - i. On April 7<sup>th</sup> the detector was reading 12.9 Si/hr (1290 rem/hr)
  - ii. On April 14<sup>th</sup> the detector was reading 10.4 Si/hr (1040 rem/hr)  
Could you send me all the readings you have for this monitor? It doesn't seem to be included in your daily plant status reports (or, if it is, I couldn't find it so perhaps you could direct me).

The NISA webpage contains information on plant parameters  
[http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/itiran/new\\_genshi\\_index.html](http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/itiran/new_genshi_index.html)

- c. Pressure on Unit 1 has been relatively stable for several days. This would indicate that condition of the Unit 1 reactor has not changed for several days. This is not what I see for the past few days. I've seen a slow increase – however, this has been attributable in your plant status reports to N2 injections rather than anything else. However, JAIF has also reported that the N2 injections have not led to the expected pressure increase and that a leak in primary containment is suspected. I am confused by this conflict – on the one hand, your reports say that the pressure increase in the daily reports is due to N2 and not H2. In this document, you're saying the pressure is stable. JAIF is saying pressure is increasing but not by enough – got any clarity?

Unit 1 pressure indication is stable as of 4/20/2011.

4. What cools the Recirc pump seals?

- a. Recirc pump seal cooling is from both Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) cooling water and CRD seal purge.

5. What are the results of the GE-Hitachi (GEH) analysis (once the results become known) on whether or not there was a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) breach on Unit 2?
- a. This information will not be available until either late Friday or early next week. Is this available yet? I saw that Japan had released something that speculated the fuel had melted into pellets but I didn't see anything about breaches.

This information is not final. The data to support further more accurate analysis of this phenomenon is held by TEPCO and is not available to the NRC. Therefore any determination of Vessel Breach would be premature at this time.

---

**From:** Andersen, James  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:44 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kotzalas, Margie; Landau, Mindy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Amy, I am not aware of a change to send questions on Japan to OEDO. I think questions should go through the operations center, and if they need assistance, they reach out to the program offices.

Jim A.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:38 PM  
**To:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Andersen, James  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Margie, I just can't keep up with you!!!

Jim, let us know who we should bother now (I'll still bother Margie, just generally ☺)... Thanks!

Amy

---

**From:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:37 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Andersen, James  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Amy, I'm in NMSS again so I can't help you guys with this request. I'm sorry ☹. I forwarded Spiros' email to Jim Andersen and cc'd him on this email.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:35 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I had a chance to talk with Marty about all but fact-checking the RCIC "67 hours" portion. Tim, if I recall, Mike Brown was on this call with you, correct? Just trying to give Margie a starting point. The ET chronology on the RCIC does not bear out the 67 hours at a glance, but that was from a cursory look...

Thanks Margie,  
Amy

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:11 PM  
**To:** Kotzalas, Margie  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Margie: Here are some follow on questions from information we provided Congressman Markey's staff. I understand we are supposed to feed such questions through the EDO staff. Let me know if you have any questions. Thanks, Spiros

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 3:33 PM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Freedhoff, Michal  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Does NRC staff still believe pressure in unit 1 is stable? I think it is still rising. Also, anything new re analysis of whether there has been a melt-thru in unit 2 or a breach in unit 1? Has the GEH report come out yet? Finally, on our call, you all said that batteries ran the RCICs on units 2/3 for 67 hours - are you sure of that? We heard from someone (not in response to your theory but just generally) that RCICs wouldn't really be able to keep running on batteries and would be severely compromised as things heated up, well before 67 hours.

Thanks  
michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 10:10 AM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal,  
Here are our responses to follow-on questions you had last week. In the attached document, your questions are in red and our responses are in blue.  
Thank you for your patience,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Freedhoff, Michal [mailto:Michal.Freedhoff@mail.house.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 11:54 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Here are a few follow-up questions embedded in your document. Thanks.

Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:44 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal and Ilya,  
Attached are the answers we owed you for questions from yesterday's phone conference.

On a separate note: Ilya, you had asked for additional information about the radiation incident that occurred at Cooper Station, NE. Here is the latest update I have:

- Special Inspection Team's onsite work is to be completed 4/15/11.
- NRC review and analysis of the facts will follow.
- An inspection report (findings and, if appropriate, a recommended NRC response) will follow within 45 days.

Please let me know if you have additional questions,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:49 AM  
**To:** Andersen, James; Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Kotzalas, Margie; Hayden, Elizabeth  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

This probably stemmed from the FAQ site that has been set up on the public web. The Qs and As really should be funneled to OPA. Confusion reigns!

Amy, please ask the OCA staff to provide OPA with any final Qs and As they prepare for Congressional briefings in the event they may be appropriate to use on the public site database.

Thanks!  
Mindy

---

**From:** Andersen, James  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 7:44 AM  
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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 25, 2011 5:35 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Kotzalas, Margie

A0/233

**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy

**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

I had a chance to talk with Marty about all but fact-checking the RCIC "67 hours" portion. Tim, if I recall, Mike Brown was on this call with you, correct? Just trying to give Margie a starting point. The ET chronology on the RCIC does not bear out the 67 hours at a glance, but that was from a cursory look...

Thanks Margie,  
Amy

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**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, Amy

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michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.

Policy Director

Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

2108 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202-225-2836

---

**From:** Riley (OCA), Timothy [mailto:Timothy.RileyOCA@nrc.gov]

**Sent:** Thursday, April 21, 2011 10:10 AM

**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya

**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy

**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

Michal,

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Thank you for your patience,



Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**Sent:** Friday, April 15, 2011 11:54 AM  
**To:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Additional information from 4/13/11 call on Fukushima plant status

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Michal

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.  
Policy Director  
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)  
2108 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
202-225-2836

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**Sent:** Thursday, April 14, 2011 4:44 PM  
**To:** Freedhoff, Michal; Fischhoff, Ilya  
**Cc:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy  
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Michal and Ilya,  
Attached are the answers we owed you for questions from yesterday's phone conference.

On a separate note: Ilya, you had asked for additional information about the radiation incident that occurred at Cooper Station, NE. Here is the latest update I have:

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Please let me know if you have additional questions,

Timothy Riley  
Congressional Affairs Officer  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-8492  
Blackberry: (b)(6)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 11:13 AM  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** No Gov?

Licensee did not mention anything about the Gov on Fri?

---

**From:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 11:13 AM  
**To:** 'Dana.Miller@mail.house.gov'; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: response from NRC

When I mentioned to the licensee that the Congresswoman and the Chairman were working to finalize their visit as 10 May, I didn't get any indication that the date was contrary to information they'd been given.

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

Eugene Dacus

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Miller, Dana <Dana.Miller@mail.house.gov>  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Sent:** Tue Apr 26 10:55:06 2011  
**Subject:** RE: response from NRC

Amy and Gene,

Thank you for the letter and for all of your help. I sincerely appreciate it.

I look forward to speaking with Gene this week about an Indian Point data.

Sincerely,

Dana Miller  
Legislative Assistant  
Office of Congresswoman Nita Lowey  
2365 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
(202) 225-6506

Please sign up to receive [News From Nita](#), Congresswoman Lowey's weekly electronic newsletter.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy [mailto:Amy.Powell@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 26, 2011 10:40 AM  
**To:** Miller, Dana

A0/234

**Cc:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Subject:** response from NRC

Hi Dana –

Thanks for your call earlier today. Per our chat, the Chairman's office is still working to make May 10<sup>th</sup> work. Gene is due back in the office tomorrow and will follow up with you.

FYI, attached is the NRC's response to Rep. Lowey's March 15<sup>th</sup> letter. Hard copy is en route.

Thanks again,  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673



CHAIRMAN

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 21, 2011

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Lowey:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of March 15, 2011, which raised concerns regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3 in light of recent events in Japan and their implications for ensuring the continued safety of nuclear power plants in the United States.

We continue to collect information regarding the events in Japan. The Commission directed the staff to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make improvements to our regulatory system. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term components.

For the near-term effort, the task force has begun a 90-day review. This review will evaluate all of the currently available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include the ability to protect against natural disasters, response to station blackouts, severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression, radiological consequence analysis, and severe accident management issues and emergency preparedness. Over this 90-day period, the NRC staff will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and will recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed. This 90-day effort will include a briefing of the Commission after approximately 30 days to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the condition of the U.S. reactor fleet based on information available at that time.

The task force's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC staff has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan, with a goal of commencing no later than the completion of the 90-day near-term report. The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the events to identify any additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and modifications to the regulatory framework that should be considered by the NRC. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within six months after the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available in accordance with normal Commission processes.

With those plans in place and underway, we also are currently pursuing prudent actions, even though we do not yet have all the details we need to fully assess the implications of the Japanese events for the U.S. reactor fleet. Specifically, we have begun inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the resident inspectors and the region-based inspectors in our four Regional offices, to look at licensees' readiness to deal with both design basis accidents and beyond-design basis accidents. We have also issued an information notice to our licensees to make them aware of the events in Japan. Nuclear power plant licensees are voluntarily verifying that their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and operational. The NRC will take additional immediate actions that we believe to be appropriate as our understanding of the events in Japan becomes clearer.

I am glad that I had the opportunity to speak with you directly on March 25<sup>th</sup> regarding your specific concerns. The NRC staff also agreed that during the forthcoming review of seismic issues at U.S. commercial nuclear facilities, top priority will be given to reviewing the Indian Point data. As I mentioned during our call, I have committed to personally visit the Indian Point facility in the coming weeks. I hope that you will be able to join me.

Let me assure you that our ongoing monitoring of events in Japan and our review of all available information leads us to conclude that U.S. plants continue to operate safely. I want to reiterate that we continue to view our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees as our top priority and that U.S. nuclear plants continue to operate safely. I look forward to being able to provide you with additional information as it becomes available. If you have any additional questions, please contact me or Ms. Rebecca Schmidt, Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, at (301) 415-1776.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Greg B. Jaczko', written over a horizontal line.

Gregory B. Jaczko

---

**From:** Nieh, Ho  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 10:09 AM  
**To:** Baval, Rochelle; Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Reddick, Darani; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** RE: Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO

Mike Franovich and Ho Nieh will attend.

Ho Nieh  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William C. Ostendorff  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
(301) 415-1811 (office)  
(b)(6) (mobile)  
(301) 415-1757 (fax)  
[ho.nieh@nrc.gov](mailto:ho.nieh@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Baval, Rochelle  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 27, 2011 8:18 AM  
**To:** Adler, James; Bates, Andrew; Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Bupp, Margaret; Chairman Temp; Clark, Lisa; Coggins, Angela; Davis, Roger; Dhir, Neha; Hart, Ken; Laufer, Richard; Loyd, Susan; Monninger, John; Nieh, Ho; Reddick, Darani; Baval, Rochelle; Rothschild, Trip; Joosten, Sandy; Sharkey, Jeffry; Shea, Pamela; Sosa, Belkys; Burns, Stephen; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Warren, Roberta; Zorn, Jason; Baggett, Steven; Baval, Rochelle; Bradford, Anna; Castleman, Patrick; Kock, Andrea; Tadesse, Rebecca; Thoma, John; Franovich, Mike; Hipschman, Thomas; Batkin, Joshua; Marshall, Michael; Orders, William; Snodderly, Michael; Warnick, Greg  
**Cc:** Serepca, Beth; Brenner, Eliot; Clayton, Kathleen; Jaegers, Cathy; Wallace, Denise; Bowman, Gregory; Andersen, James; Blake, Kathleen; Boyer, Rachel; Bozin, Sunny; Cianci, Sandra; Crawford, Carrie; Gibbs, Catina; Harves, Carolyn; Hasan, Nasreen; Jimenez, Patricia; KLS Temp; Landau, Mindy; Lepre, Janet; Lewis, Antoinette; Herr, Linda; Lisann, Elizabeth; Muessle, Mary; Pace, Patti; Pulley, Deborah; Savoy, Carmel; Speiser, Herald; Taylor, Renee; Temp, GEA; Temp, WCO; Temp, WDM; Wright, Darlene; Burns, Stephen; Doane, Margaret; Droggitis, Spiros; EDO\_ETAs; Fopma, Melody; Greathead, Nancy; Hayden, Elizabeth; Henderson, Karen; Herr, Linda; Hudson, Sharon; Joosten, Sandy; Kreuter, Jane; Montes, David; Moore, Scott; Olive, Karen; Pearson, Laura; Poole, Brooke; Svinicki, Kristine  
**Subject:** Request for Attendees (by 2:00pm Today 4/27): Tomorrow's Closed Session of the Briefing on Japan and SBO  
**Importance:** High

**Response is requested by 2:00pm Today.**

**Please provide the names of persons in your office who will attend the following briefing:**

**Topic: Part 2 - Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout - Security Issues (Closed Ex. 3)**

**Date: Thursday, April 28, 2011**

**Time: 11:30 am – 12:00 pm**

**Place: Commissioners' Executive Conference Room, 18<sup>th</sup> floor OWFN**

**Level: Safeguards Information and Security Related Information**

This will be a closed session after the public session of the Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout for the Commission to ask questions mainly on B.5.b that cannot be asked in the public session.

**Attendees from OEDO offices should coordinate a list through Denise Wallace, OEDO.**

**All attendees should have appropriate clearance and need to know.**

Thank you,  
*Rochelle*

---

**From:** Marshall Shield <corp@myshield.us>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 11:12 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Cc:** 'Marshall Shield'  
**Subject:** Nuclear Task Force Disaster Support  
  
**Importance:** High

I've sent my Nuclear Task Force document to all nuclear disaster groups/agencies around the world. Demanding a Nuclear Task Force to be started: I should be the Program Director! Have been asking since March 11th to be sent!

From: Marshall Shield  
[mailto:corp@myshield.us]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:48 PM  
To: 'Yuki@japaneseinterpretation.com'  
Cc: 'president@whitehouse.gov: President Obama  
'information@kunaicho.go.jp': Emperor of Japan  
Subject: RE: Japan: So you didn't need help!  
Importance: High



From: Marshall Shield  
[mailto:corp@myshield.us]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2011 9:49 PM  
To: 'TOBE JOHN';  
'btakeda@usjapancouncil.org'; 'YAMAGO  
TAKAHIRO'; 'j\_usyak@la-cgjapan.org'  
Cc: 'president@whitehouse.gov';  
'information@kunaicho.go.jp'  
Subject: RE: Japan: So you didn't need help!  
Importance: High

Also sent to all DOE Directors

Congratulations Japan!

Way to go!

You stated you didn't need any help!

I hope you enjoy the troubles you're going to  
have for 300 years!

It's too bad about the problems taking place in  
Japan

No one can cause such a problem with a  
country disaster

But someone can allow reactors to NOT be recovered, so they fail

This is my only answer that could have caused such a horrible nuclear disaster!

I believe I've figured out why Tepco doesn't want help, with someone like myself

Of course, I can't prove the following:

Tepco executives had decided to shut down the reactor in the future because:

They are:

Aged

Antiquated

Out of Date

Too old

This disaster provided them an open door to ensure they are shut down permanently

That is the only excuse I can think of, because of what happened since March 11th.

They never attempted to restore the control room power

They never reloaded the cpu's

They never got the auto controls working

Which means: No water – cooling

If I had been sent late on March 11th like I asked, by the 14th, all 6 reactors would have been in a safe – protected state.

I knew what equipment was required; I could have asked the world to send the equipment over night!

Because they failed to take control of all 6 reactors, they are all failing

There is only one good reason for this

The owners didn't want them to be saved!

I've sent numerous times my concerns about nothing being done

The fact that they don't know what to do or

How to recover the reactors

That scares me...the owners could have shut them down, got them under control, then removed the nuclear rods, then enclosed the reactor for life.

That would have been far safer  
They would NOT have had the problems,  
releasing radiation into the air/water.

Going to send you my 1st meeting questions to  
the Forman/Engineers/Operators/Experts  
That should have taken place March 12th  
I know you will not send me, now that I  
understand why  
Too bad.....Marshall

I've run into several persons today, they all  
know me and are wondering why I haven't  
been sent to Japan to help!

All my working life, certainly after what  
happened in Japan during the Viet Nam War,  
I've been resolving critical problems  
I know where I'm being sent  
I know what is wrong  
When I show up, meet with the  
controllers/owners/operators/engineers/technici

ans they find out instantly what I can accomplish!

That is why I've been sent to over 1,000 locations including US Gov./Military bases they deny existing to resolve what for some reason, no one else can.

I have everything ready to start 3 Task Forces  
And

A Anti-Nuclear Radiation team to stop the radiation leaks!

I must be sent!

And NOT by a civil airlines

GS-15 Project Director

Marshall Shield

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: 360-661-7041

Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

Request a copy of my Nuclear Task Force document: send an email to [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

I will return it to you as an attachment.

Marshall

Send an email to receive my Nuclear Task Force Group plans  
[corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us), it will be sent to you as an attachment

Send request for documents: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

*Marshall Shield*

Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA

Cellular: (b)(6)

Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

---

**From:** Marshall Shield [mailto:[corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)]

**Sent:** Saturday, April 09, 2011 12:50 PM

**To:** 'spiros.droggitis@nrc.gov'; 'Amy.Powell@nrc.gov'; 'Rebecca.Schmidt@nrc.gov'

**Subject:** Nuclear Task Force Disaster Support

April 9, 2011

Nuclear Disasters

One must wonder why a special Task Force was not put into operation in the 50's or since. There has been nineteen nuclear accidents since 1961. What has just taken place in Japan never should have. Within three days, I could have directed/controlled the complete take-over of all six reactor units. By March 14<sup>th</sup>, all six reactor units should have been under complete control.

I'm concerned about what took place; a world nuclear task force group should have been present on March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2011!

March 11-13, 2011 - INES Level 3, Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - Overheating, radioactivity emergency

I've requested a special Task Force Group be started; I should be the Director and could manage/supervise a group of four persons, full time, preparing a complete support operation, respond 24/7 to nuclear disasters, work with the world's nuclear owner/operators and ensure they agree with our plans.

We will have direct access for all parts/equipment that can be sent instantly to a location in trouble. Emergency backup power generators/water pumps standing by in a staging location, which can be sent instantly to anywhere, in the world to ensure the nuclear disaster units:

- Can have their power restored
- The computers reloaded
- The Auto Controls started
- Cooling online

This did NOT take place at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant!

We will also support/help:

Prepare training in all languages  
Ensure complete back up capabilities are in full operation

This would include travel to each nuclear plant:

- Showing them our PowerPoint presentations
- Handing out our Task Force Group Contact information
- Meetings/Training for: Operators/Engineers/Technicians

I've been the #1 expert on C4ISR\*Tempest\*Telco\*Defense\*Nuclear systems since 1974. I've never failed a mission; have exactly fifty diplomas/certificates including FEMA Disaster courses.

Have been a member of Intelligence/US Military groups since the 80's

**Please contact me**

**I can move to anywhere in the world**

**And can support – direct this group for 10+ more years**

**I've worked three jobs in my life: 120+ hours per week, one for 5+ years**

**I once had two million American Airlines Advantage Awards**

**This extremely important group must be started soon**

Sincerely, Marshall Shield  
Office: 360-336-3057 PST USA  
Cellular: (b)(6) PST USA  
Email: [corp@myshield.us](mailto:corp@myshield.us)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 28, 2011 5:26 PM  
**To:** Sheron, Brian  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** House Science May 13th hearing

Hi Brian -

If your ears were burning earlier today, we were the cause... House Science Committee is planning a joint subcommittee hearing on reactors, risk assesment, and research priorities in light of Japan. They are seeking an NRC witness to discuss role of research in our work, informing regs, review, etc., how we do risk assessments, current priorities. You of course naturally came to mind. The hearing is planned for May 13th (yes, it is a Friday...). Could you be available that day? Committee is still sorting out witnesses and will confirm with us early next week.

Thanks  
Amy  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry



---

**From:** Virgilio, Martin  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 30, 2011 1:16 PM  
**To:** Casto, Chuck; Jaczko, Gregory; Borchardt, Bill  
**Cc:** Evans, Michele; Wiggins, Jim; Skeen, David; Powell, Amy; Miller, Charles; Sanfilippo, Nathan; Cabbage, Amy  
**Subject:** Monitoring Core Coverage at Fukushima Daiichi

All

Interesting insights from Gil Zigler on conditions at the facility. The unreliable information underscores the need to be cautious even today when speaking about the conditions at the facility.

Marty

-----Original Message-----

From: Zigler, Gilbert [mailto:gzigler@alionscience.com]  
Sent: Friday, April 29, 2011 2:58 AM  
To: Virgilio, Martin  
Subject: Monitoring Core Coverage at Fukushima Daiichi

Marty:

Tomorrow (Saturday in Tokyo) I will return home after spending a week with TEPCO working to implement a core coverage monitoring system at the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3. I received a call from IMPO last week referencing my e-mails to you concerning acoustical monitoring and instrument degradation monitoring. Last Friday IMPO hosted a teleconference with TEPCO concerning methods to ascertain whether the cores at the 3 damaged reactors at Fukushima Daiichi were covered with water. After the teleconference TEPCO called me and asked if I could come to Japan to discuss my concepts of core condition monitoring and instrument degradation monitoring. I worked this week "pro bono" with TEPCO and it now appears that TEPCO will implement core coverage detection on all three damaged reactors. Given the inaccessibility of appropriate locations to monitor for instrument degradation TEPCO cannot implement an instrument degradation monitoring program at the Fukushima Daiichi plants.

I worked this week shoulder to shoulder with some of the best engineers I have encountered. The leader of what became called the "boiling detection team", Mr. Hironubu Sonoda, surrounded himself with 8 to 12 engineers with diverse experience encompassing I&C, structural, fluid, and a Unit 1 operator. In addition he was able to call in experts from the TEPCO R&D centers. We had multiple brain storming meetings on instrumentation, accessible mounting locations at Unit 1, how to extract the data from the site, etc. On Wednesday the core team, myself included, conducted a proof of principle tests at the Hamaoka Unit 1, a decommissioned BWR. Chubu Electric provided excellent support to the TEPCO team and I was able to clearly demonstrate to the TEPCO team that acoustical stress waves readily propagate from inside the drywell to the turbine control valves over the piping system. Upon our return to Tokyo on Thursday, Sonoda-san re-convened the entire boiling detection team and proceeded to implement parallel efforts ranging from how to expeditiously implement acoustical monitors at Fukushima to developing a boiling simulator at one of the R&D centers to establish acoustic boiling characteristics for use to interpret the signals from the plant. I have recommended to TEPCO that the technical lead Loose Parts Monitoring at AREVA Lynchburg come

to Tokyo to assist TEPCO during my absence while I attend the OECD/NEA sump clogging task force meeting.

Sonoda-san started each meeting with the latest status of Unit 1. For me it was unbelievable that water levels in both the reactor vessels and containments (drywells) are "guesses" at best based on inferring conditions from failed instruments strings to one apparently still working pressure gauge (a suppression pool pressure gauge). The current plan for Unit 1 is to fill the reactor vessel and drywell to a level that ensures that the core is covered. There are significant concerns as to the structural mechanical response of an essentially filled drywell and reactor vessel to both the hydrostatic loads and seismically induced loads due to aftershocks. TEPCO wants to install acoustical monitors on all three plants so that there would be at least some way to figure out if further core damage has occurred in the event of a strong after-shock.

32 years have passed since I was at TMI rendering the same support I have rendered to TEPCO this week. The accidents at both the Fukushima Daiichi and TMI plants resulted in a condition that core coverage could not be ascertained due to severely damaged instrumentation. In both cases instrumentation degradation resulted in significant uncertainties of critical parameters. We all need to make sure that we are better prepared to ascertain whether or not the core of a severely damaged reactor is covered and that we are able to monitor the degradation of critical plant parameters following a severe accident.

Cordially,

Gilbert Zigler  
Senior Scientist/Engineer  
Alion Science and Technology  
6200 Uptown Blvd NE, Suite 120  
Albuquerque, NM 87110

Phone:  
Albuquerque: (505) 872-1089 ext 126  
Colorado: (970) 882-8066  
Mobile: (b)(6)

---

**From:** Blake, Kathleen  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 3:11 PM  
**To:** Vietti-Cook, Annette; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Sosa, Belkys; Batkin, Joshua; Sharkey, Jeffry; Nieh, Ho; Bubar, Patrice; Davis, Roger  
**Subject:** Draft Testimony for the Hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce  
**Attachments:** [Untitled].pdf

Commissioner Apostolakis' office suggests the attached edits.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 4, 2011

Commissioner Apostolakis' office  
suggests the attached edits.

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Jaczko  
Commissioner Svinicki  
Commissioner Apostolakis  
Commissioner Magwood  
Commissioner Ostendorff

  
Belkys Sosa 4/4/11

FROM: Rebecca L. Schmidt, Director *RLS*  
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: DRAFT TESTIMONY FOR THE HEARING ON THE NRC RESPONSE TO  
RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN BEFORE THE HOUSE  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Attached for your review and comment is the subject testimony that will be presented to the House  
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Investigations, on Wednesday, April 6,  
2011. Please return your comments to the Office of Congressional Affairs by 3:00 p.m, Monday,  
April 4, 2011.

Attachment:  
As stated

cc: SECY  
OGC  
OGC/Burns  
EDO  
OIP  
OCAA  
OPA  
OIG  
CFO

CONTACT: Raeann Shane, 415-1699

**TESTIMONY OF MARTIN VIRILIO  
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**APRIL 6, 2011**

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COMMISSIONER REC'D

2011 APR -4 AM 11:26

(b)(5)

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**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 4:41 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Sosa, Belkys; Nieh, Ho; Sharkey, Jeffry; Reddick, Darani; Bupp, Margaret  
**Subject:** Commissioner Magwood office comments on Testimony  
**Attachments:** [Untitled].pdf

Attached are comments from Commissioner Magwood's office on the draft testimony to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

Thank you.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

WDM office  
edits  
4/4/11

April 4, 2011

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Jaczko  
Commissioner Svinicki  
Commissioner Apostolakis  
Commissioner Magwood  
Commissioner Ostendorff

FROM: Rebecca L. Schmidt, Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs

R8

SUBJECT: DRAFT TESTIMONY FOR THE HEARING ON THE NRC RESPONSE TO  
RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN BEFORE THE HOUSE  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
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2011. Please return your comments to the Office of Congressional Affairs by 3:00 p.m, Monday,  
April 4, 2011.

Attachment:  
As stated

cc: SECY  
OGC  
OGC/Burns  
EDO  
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OCAA  
OPA  
OIG  
CFO

CONTACT: Raeann Shane, 415-1699



**TESTIMONY OF MARTIN VIRILIO  
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**APRIL 6, 2011**

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 5:04 PM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** RE: Commissioner Svinicki's Comments on Draft Testimony for April 6  
**Attachments:** image001.png

Thanks – all in, including what you took by phone from Josh, right?

I'll go through KLS and WDM (already asked Belkys some Qs on her boss's feedback, as I could not read them clearly) to see if there is anything that needs tracking down.

AP

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**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 4:46 PM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: Commissioner Svinicki's Comments on Draft Testimony for April 6

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**From:** Decker, David  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Mon Apr 04 16:23:58 2011  
**Subject:** FW: Commissioner Svinicki's Comments on Draft Testimony for April 6

Raeann,  
Here's Commissioner Svinicki's comments they just provided.

---

**From:** Lepre, Janet  
**Sent:** Monday, April 04, 2011 4:20 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Bubar, Patrice; Nieh, Ho; Sosa, Belkys; 'Powell, David J.'; Reddick, Darani; Davis, Roger; Sharkey, Jeffry  
**Subject:** Commissioner Svinicki's Comments on Draft Testimony for April 6

Commissioner Svinicki's comments are attached for the Hearing on Wednesday, April 6, 2001 to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Investigations.

Janet

Janet L. Lepre, Administrative Assistant  
Office of Commissioner Svinicki  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
MS O-16G4  
Washington, DC 20555  
Phone: 301-415-1855  
[Janet.Lepre@nrc.gov](mailto:Janet.Lepre@nrc.gov)





UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 4, 2011

Commissioner Svinicki's  
Comments attached.  
*[Signature]*  
4-4-11

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Jaczko  
Commissioner Svinicki  
Commissioner Apostolakis  
Commissioner Magwood  
Commissioner Ostendorff

FROM: Rebecca L. Schmidt, Director *RLS*  
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: DRAFT TESTIMONY FOR THE HEARING ON THE NRC RESPONSE TO  
RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN BEFORE THE HOUSE  
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Attached for your review and comment is the subject testimony that will be presented to the House  
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Investigations, on Wednesday, April 6,  
2011. Please return your comments to the Office of Congressional Affairs by **3:00 p.m, Monday,**  
**April 4, 2011.**

Attachment:  
As stated

cc: SECY  
OGC  
OGC/Burns  
EDO  
OIP  
OCAA  
OPA  
OIG  
CFO

CONTACT: Raeann Shane, 415-1699

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**Discussion of the MARCH 16, 2011 PRESS RELEASE DOSE ASSESSMENT  
ASSUMPTIONS**

(b)(5)

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**TESTIMONY OF MARTIN VIRILIO  
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**APRIL 6, 2011**

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(b)(5)

2011 APR -5 AM 10:28

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**From:** Nieh, Ho  
**Sent:** Friday, April 08, 2011 11:08 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Sharkey, Jeffry; Sosa, Belkys; Bubar, Patrice; Pace, Patti; Lepre, Janet; Blake, Kathleen; Crawford, Carrie  
**Subject:** Commissioner Ostendorff's comments on draft testimony for the Senate EPW hearing on April 12  
**Attachments:** WCO comments April 12 Testimony.docx

Dear all,

Comments attached.

Revised text is suggested (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

Ho

Ho Nieh  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William C. Ostendorff  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
(301) 415-1811 (office)  
(b)(6) (mobile)  
(301) 415-1757 (fax)  
[ho.nieh@nrc.gov](mailto:ho.nieh@nrc.gov)



WRITTEN STATEMENT

BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

TO THE

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE

AND THE

CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY SUBCOMMITTEE

UNITED STATES SENATE

APRIL 12, 2011

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**From:** Bubar, Patrice  
**Sent:** Friday, April 29, 2011 3:10 PM  
**To:** Decker, David  
**Cc:** Batkin, Joshua; Nieh, Ho; Sosa, Belkys; Powell, Amy; Reddick, Darani; Davis, Roger; Sharkey, Jeffry; Bupp, Margaret; Tadesse, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Commissioner Magwood's comments on the Chairman's Draft Testimony - May 4th Hearing  
**Attachments:** Chairman draft testimony May 4th hearing.docx

Commissioner Magwood's comments on the draft testimony for the Chairman to the Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power and Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, House Committee on Energy and Commerce are attached.

Thank you.

Patty Bubar  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Commissioner William D. Magwood  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
301-415-1895

STATEMENT WDM Comments 4/29/11  
BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEES ON ENERGY AND POWER, ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY  
MAY 4, 2011

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 5:41 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

Josh also wants WH leg affairs to see it. I still think we should sent it to Committee with the budget testimony. I just think they'll be ticked if we send down something silent on Japan, since they prep from the submitted testimony.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 20:33:01 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

Sure

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Mon Mar 14 20:12:49 2011  
**Subject:** Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

Josh just called with changes/feedback on the oral statement. He had some specific wording changes that I inserted and/or suggested on the attached. Also, more broadly, he would like the following:

(b)(5)

AP

A0/2428

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:43 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Janbergs, Holly  
**Cc:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

Beth—I think we are ok for right now. I will let you know after the Chr sees it

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:40 AM  
**To:** Janbergs, Holly  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

Beth: I suggested some words. Why don't you get the latest version from Amy and see if it needs any more. May want to use some words from the Chairman's just released note.

**From:** Janbergs, Holly  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 9:38 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** RE: Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

I'm working a staggered schedule, so I just got in. I will take a look at the proposed edits and get on that.

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 7:23 AM  
**To:** Janbergs, Holly  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** FW: Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

Beth: I'm at the Ops Center and its difficult to work on this. Could you please take a shot? Please coordinate with Becky and Amy. Thanks, Spiros

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 8:13 PM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Oral statement - JCB edits.docx

Josh just called with changes/feedback on the oral statement. He had some specific wording changes that I inserted and/or suggested on the attached. Also, more broadly, he would like the following:

(b)(5)

AP

3

STATEMENT  
BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEES ON ENERGY AND POWER, ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY  
MARCH 16, 2011

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:10 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** KI

(b)(5)

THANKS!  
Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**To:** Weil, Jenny; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 18:39:56 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/15/2011

Thanks Jenny, this is great.

Becky: With all the talk of KI, do you think it's worth raising the idea of an NRC statement telling people in the US they do not need to take their KI? I know it sounds stupid, but I could see people in California doing it, if they have it. Just food for thought.

**From:** Weil, Jenny  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 6:07 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Shane, Raeann; Riley (OCA), Timothy  
**Subject:** FYI: Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/15/2011

Questions from the WH press corps on Japan. I cut out non-earthquake/tsunami-related questions.

**From:** White House Press Office  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 4:54 PM  
**To:** Weil, Jenny  
**Subject:** Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 3/15/2011

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 15, 2011

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY PRESS SECRETARY JAY CARNEY

A012416



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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:18 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

(b)(5)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:11:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Yes, I noticed that we time traveled a bit...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:07:25 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

This is great, except for the error in the first line - the date.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 06:06:40 2011  
**Subject:** Q&As re: Japan

Attached is a document of Q&A responses prepared by OPA and technical experts in the Ops Ctr. We CANNOT send this document in its entirety down to the Hill as is, but we can use it to respond to individual questions. I know that we "owe" answers to questions to a number of staffers. Please read through here and see if answers are provided to questions that

came into you and get back to the requesting staff. This may also help those of you in the Ops Ctr with calls.

Questions that speculate about what could happen, compare Japan regs with US, and other speculative Qs are NOT included here. Just not the focus now.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Coggins, Angela; Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 21:51:03 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela, Amy, Becki – These are fully approved by relevant folks in the Op Center. For your use. I have not added to WebEOC yet as it's not clear these should also be used by others . . .

**From:** Coggins, Angela  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:36 PM  
**To:** Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Thanks so much!! I appreciate all the effort!  
Angela Coggins  
Policy Director  
Office of Chairman Gregory B Jaczko  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[angela.coggins@nrc.gov/301-415-1828](mailto:angela.coggins@nrc.gov/301-415-1828)

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**From:** Taylor, Robert  
**To:** Coggins, Angela  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 20:29:17 2011  
**Subject:** Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela,

We have done our best to incorporate your questions into the Chairman's Q&As that were developed earlier today and provided to OCA. The updated set of Q&As is undergoing ET review and we will hopefully have it to you in the near future. The attached provides a roadmap of where we believe the responses can be found. A few questions fell into the broader "After this event is over, we will determine what changes need to be made in the US" message. I did not directly incorporate them, but you can see a draft response in the attached.

Regarding the third question about past events, I did not try to evaluate all of the events you listed. I would propose sticking to the party line, in that, "The NRC routinely reassess its regulatory requirements in light of new operating experience and plant events."

Regards,  
Rob

## Questions and Answers for Chairman Jaczko

Japan Earthquake/Tsunami Aftermath  
As of 10 p.m. 3/15/2011

### Current Status of Events in Japan

#### **1. What damage was caused by the earthquake and/or tsunami at each of the Japanese plants?**

On March 31<sup>st</sup> at approximately 2:46pm local time, a magnitude 8.9 earthquake occurred off the coast of Honshu, Japan. The earthquake knocked out offsite power to the three operating Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants (Units 1, 2 and 3). As designed, the nuclear reactors shutdown and on-site emergency diesel generators started up to power emergency safety systems that cool the reactor fuel. Subsequently, at approximately 3:41pm, a tsunami, resulting from the underwater earthquake, struck the site knocking out the emergency diesel generators. After depleting its battery power, the nuclear power plants lost the ability to provide cooling water to the reactor fuel. The best information currently available indicates that fuel damage has occurred Units 1, 2, and 3 but that the primary containment structures have remained intact and only limited releases of radiation have occurred.

#### **2. What's going to happen following the hydrogen explosions everyone's seen from the video footage?**

The NRC is monitoring the Japanese efforts to stabilize conditions at the affected reactors, and those actions are in line with what would be done in the United States. The NRC continues to monitor information on the status of the reactor core, the reactor vessel and the containment structure – all three areas are important to controlling the situation and protecting the public.

#### Additional technical information:

The explosions affected the secondary containment buildings for Units 1 and 3 of the reactor plant. The primary containment was unaffected by the explosion. This does expose the spent fuel pools to atmosphere but should not affect the integrity of the spent fuel pool. With the integrity of the Secondary Containment breached it is more essential to maintain Primary Containment intact.

To provide additional protection to Primary Containment, US reactors of the containment type similar to Fukushima Unit 1 installed a hardened vent line from primary containment directly to the vent stack. A hardened vent provides a release path which would prevent an overpressurization of containment as experienced at Fukushima Unit One. Venting from the hardened vent is typically a manual operation that is controlled by the Emergency Operating Procedures as a last resort to protect the containment from failure. This vent path can be directly from the upper containment or from the torus (the preferred vent path due to scrubbing effect of the torus water).

#### **3. What happens when/if a plant "melts down"?**

In short, nuclear power plants are designed to be safe. To prevent the release of radioactive material, there are multiple barriers between the radioactive material and the environment, including the fuel cladding, the heavy steel reactor vessel itself and the containment building, usually a heavily reinforced structure of concrete and steel several feet thick.

#### Additional technical information:

The melted core may melt through the bottom of the vessel and flow onto the concrete containment floor. The core may melt through the containment liner and release radioactive material to the environment.

**4. What should the American public know about the incident in Japan?**

The events unfolding in Japan are the result of a catastrophic series of natural disasters. These include the fifth largest earthquake in recorded history and the resulting devastating tsunami. Despite these unique circumstances, the Japanese appear to have taken reasonable actions to mitigate the event and protect the surrounding population. Since the beginning of the event, the NRC has continuously manned its Operations Center in Rockville, MD in order to gather and examine all available information as part of the effort to analyze the event and understand its implications both for Japan and the United States.

**5. What happens next in Japan? How long will it take to assess the damage to the reactors?**

The current focus is ensuring that adequate cooling of the reactor fuel at each of the affected Japanese reactors is established and maintained. In the days, weeks, and months that follow, there will be adequate time to assess the damage and determine next steps.

**6. Why did the seawater fail to cool the reactor?**

Based on information available to the NRC, it appears that the seawater has been effective at providing some cooling for the reactor. While it appears that some fuel damage has occurred, there will be plenty of time once this crisis is resolved to determine the effectiveness of the measures taken in response to this event.

**7. If Chernobyl was a 7 and Three Mile Island was a 5, when does this event move from the 4 level?**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rates nuclear events in accordance with its International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES). IAEA has assigned the events in Japan an INES rating of 4, "Accident with Local Consequences." This rating is subject to change as events unfold and additional information becomes available. INES classifies nuclear accidents based on the radiological effects on people and the environment and the status of barriers to the release of radiation. IAEA determinations regarding the INES rating of events are made independently.

Three Mile Island was assigned an INES rating of 5, "Accident with Wider Consequences," due to the severe damage to the reactor core.

**8. What is the worst case scenario for the plant?**

In a nuclear emergency, the most important action is to ensure the core is covered with water to provide cooling to remove any heat from the fuel rods. Without adequate cooling, the fuel rods will melt. Should the final containment structure fail, radiation from these melting fuel rods would be released to the atmosphere and additional protective measures may be necessary, depending on factors such as prevailing wind patterns.

**9. As time goes on, does the chance for a meltdown increase?**

Not necessarily. Each passing hour the fuel rods will become cooler. If adequate cooling can be established and maintained, the risk of a meltdown will be mitigated.

**NRC Support/Response to the Events in Japan**

**10. What is the NRC doing about the emergencies at the nuclear power plants in Japan? Are you sending staff over there?**

We are closely following events in Japan, working with other agencies of the federal government, and have been in direct contact with our counterparts in that country. We have sent a total of 11 staff to Tokyo

in response to the Japanese government's request for assistance. Two of those NRC staff members, knowledgeable about boiling water reactors, are already in Japan participating in the USAID team.

Additional technical information:

We are taking the knowledge that the staff has about the design of the US nuclear plants and we are applying this knowledge to the Japan situation. For example, this includes calculations of severe accident mitigation that have been performed. Tony Ulses and Jim Trapp are in-country. Team led by Chuck Casto is enroute from various locations.

**11. What resources are the Japanese asking for?**

The Japanese have formally requested equipment needed to cool the reactor fuel. This includes such things as pumps, fire hoses, portable generators, and diesel fuel. The NRC is coordinating with General Electric, which has plant design specifications, to ensure any equipment provided will be capable of meeting the needs of the Japanese.

**12. Are we providing additional KI to the Japanese?**

The Japanese government has requested KI from the United States. The NRC is working with our federal partners to support any requests of assistance.

Similarities/Impact on U.S. Nuclear Power Plants

**13. Can this happen here, i.e. an earthquake that significantly damages a nuclear power plant?  
Are the Japanese plants similar to U.S. plants?**

All U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis. Even those plants that are located in areas with low and moderate seismic activity are designed for safety in the event of such a natural disaster. The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems, and components be designed to take into account even very rare and extreme seismic and tsunami events.

The Japanese facilities are similar in design to several US facilities.

Additional technical information:

Currently, operating reactors were designed using a "deterministic" or "maximum credible earthquake" approach. Seismic hazard for the new plants is determined using a much more robust probabilistic seismic hazard assessment approach that explicitly addresses uncertainty and very rare events, as described in RG1.208. The NRC requires that adequate margin beyond the design basis ground shaking levels is assured. The NRC further enhances seismic safety for beyond-design-basis events through the use of a defense-in-depth approach.

In addition, the NRC periodically reviews the seismic risk at operating reactors when information may have changed. Over the last few years the NRC has undertaken a program called Generic Issue 199, which is focused on assessing hazard for plants in the central and eastern US using the latest techniques (developed in part during reviews of Western U.S. plants) and determining the possible risk implications of any increase in the anticipated ground shaking levels. This program will help us assure that the plants are safe under exceptionally rare and extreme ground motions that represent beyond-design-basis events.

#### **14. What would U.S. plants do in this situation?**

The NRC requires plant designs to include multiple and diverse safety systems, and plants must test their emergency preparedness capabilities on a regular basis. Plant operators are very capable of responding to significant events. In addition, NRC regulations require plants to have plans in place that would allow them to mitigate even "worst case scenarios".

Since 9/11, we have implemented requirements for licensees to have additional response capabilities for extreme situations.

##### Additional technical information:

U.S. nuclear plants have procedures in place to address a variety of accident scenarios, including abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines and emergency plans. Additionally, the NRC activates Incident Response centers in Headquarters and individual Regions as necessary for the event to provide technical monitoring and support.

The NRC is capable of providing access to many external agencies (i.e., FEMA, Homeland Security, Military, etc.) to provide any additional help that individual plant sites may need. Additionally, the NRC has access to real-time plant information through the ERDS System for each site in the US and can monitor the status anytime.

#### **15. Are U.S. power plants designed to withstand tsunamis?**

Yes. Plants are built to withstand a variety of environmental hazards. Those plants that might face a threat from tsunami are required to withstand large waves and the maximum and minimum wave heights at the intake structure (which varies by plant.)

##### Additional technical information:

Tsunami have been considered in the design of US nuclear plants since the publication of Regulatory Guide 1.59 in 1977, although the approaches that were used for design of the existing plants varied significantly. Nuclear plants are designed to withstand flooding from not only tsunami, but also hurricane and storm surge; therefore there is often significant margin against tsunami flooding. However, it should be noted that Japanese experience has shown that drawdown can be a significant problem. Drawdown was not generally analyzed in the past.

Currently the US NRC has a tsunami research program that is focused on developing modern hazard assessment techniques and additional guidance through cooperation with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the United States Geological Survey. This has already lead to several technical reports and an update to NUREG 0-800. The NOAA and USGS contractors are also assisting with NRO reviews of tsunami hazard. A new regulatory guide on tsunami hazard assessment is currently planned in the office of research, although it is not expected to be available in draft form until 2012.

#### **16. Was there any damage to U.S. reactors from either the earthquake or the resulting tsunami?**

No.

##### Additional technical information:

Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 were the only US plants to declare any type of an emergency classification. The site entered an "unusual event" based on a tsunami warning from the State, NOAA, NWS, Coast

Guard or System Dispatcher following the Japanese earthquake. They have since exited the "unusual event" declaration, based on a downgrade to a tsunami advisory.

**17. What magnitude earthquake are US plants designed to?**

Each plant is designed to a ground-shaking level that is appropriate for its location, given the possible earthquake sources that may affect the site and its tectonic environment. Ground shaking is a function of both the magnitude of the earthquake and the distance from the fault plane to the site. The probabilistic approaches currently used by the NRC account for a large number of different magnitudes.

Additional technical information:

In the past, "deterministic" or "scenario based" analyses were used to determine ground shaking (seismic hazard) levels. Now a probabilistic method is used that accounts for all possible earthquakes coming from all possible sources (including background seismicity) and the likelihood that each particular hypothetical earthquake occurs.

**18. How many US reactors are located in active earthquake zones (and which reactors)?**

Although we often think of the US as having "active" and "non-active" earthquake zones, earthquakes can actually happen almost anywhere. Seismologists typically separate the US into low, moderate, and high seismicity zones. The NRC requires that every plant is designed for site-specific ground motions that are appropriate for their location. In addition, the NRC has specified a minimum ground shaking level to which the plants must be designed.

**19. How many reactors are along coastal areas that could be affected by a tsunami (and which ones)?**

Many plants are located in coastal areas that could theoretically be affected by tsunami. Two plants, Diablo Canyon and San Onofre, are on the Pacific Coast, which is known to have a tsunami hazard. There are also two plants on the Gulf Coast, South Texas and Crystal River. There are many plants on the Atlantic Coast or on rivers that may be affected by a tidal bore. These include St. Lucie, Turkey Point, Brunswick, Oyster Creek, Millstone, Pilgrim, Seabrook, Calvert Cliffs, Salem/Hope Creek, and Surry. Tsunami on the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts occur, but are very rare. Generally the flooding anticipated from hurricane storm surge exceeds the flooding expected from a tsunami for plants on the Atlantic and Gulf Coast.

**20. How many U.S. plants have designs similar to the affected Japanese reactors (and which ones)?**

Thirty-five of the 104 operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. are boiling water reactors (BWRs), as are the reactors at Fukushima. Twenty-three of the U.S. BWRs have the same Mark I containment as the Fukushima reactors.

Four of the U.S. BWRs are early designs which are similar to Fukushima Unit 1.

Nineteen U.S. BWRs are similar to Fukushima Unit 3.

Additional technical information:

Fukushima Unit 1 is a BWR-3 with a Mark 1 containment similar to Oyster Creek, Nine Mile Point Unit 1, and Dresden Units 2 and 3.



Fukushima Unit 3 is a BWR-4 with a Mark 1 containment and a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. The remaining 31 U.S. BWRs use a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system instead of an isolation condenser. Nineteen of those 31 reactors have a Mark 1 containment, while the remainder are more recent designs.

**21. What could you say about the dangers to the American public from our nuclear plants?**

As the events in Japan continue to unfold, the NRC is focused on supporting the Japanese government and people in bringing this crisis to closure in the safest manner possible. The NRC remains convinced that U.S. nuclear power plants are designed and operated in a manner that protects public health and safety. The time will come, after this crisis is behind us, to evaluate what, if any, changes are needed at U.S. nuclear power plants. We will assess all the available information and, as we have done with previous natural disasters, such as the 2007 earthquake in the Sea of Japan and the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, evaluate whether enhancements to U.S. nuclear power plants are warranted.

**22. Compare this incident to the Three Mile Island. What are the similarities?**

The events at Three Mile Island in 1979 were the result of an equipment malfunction that resulted in the loss of cooling water to the reactor fuel. Subsequent operator actions compounded the malfunction ultimately resulting in the partial core meltdown. While details are still developing, the events in Japan appear to be the result of an earthquake and subsequent tsunami that knocked out electrical power to emergency safety systems designed to cool the reactor fuel. In both events the final safety barrier, the containment building, contained the majority of the radioactivity preventing its release to the environment.

**23. Is our battery backup power less effective than the Japanese?**

We currently do not have sufficient information to compare the differences in design requirements and performance characteristics of nuclear-grade batteries in the U.S. and Japanese nuclear power plants. However, in the U.S., nuclear power plants utilize redundant nuclear-grade (i.e., Class 1E, safety-related) batteries that are designed and constructed using rigorous standards and are routinely tested in accordance to ensure adequate capacity and capability exists to perform their intended safety functions. These batteries are located in structures that can withstand natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunami, and floods in accordance with NRC regulations. For U.S. nuclear power plants, the typical design duty cycles for safety grade batteries range from 1-8 hrs.

**24. What are US plants required to have for backup power? More than what the Japanese reactors did?**

The NRC requires U.S. nuclear power plants need to have 2 independent power supplies. All US (except Oconee) plants have diesels and battery backup systems. Most of the U.S. plants with diesels have two diesels per unit and those that have only one dedicated diesel have a swing diesel available. The regulations do not specify the length of time that you need to have the diesels and batteries operate following a loss of offsite power (most sites plan to run the diesels for multiple days and have battery backup capability for 8 hours). Instead the amount of time is dependent on the site recovery strategy and is based on providing sufficient capacity to assure that the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

**25. Some in the media and in Hill briefings are suggesting that Mark I containment is flawed. What are the concerns about this type of containment? Are the US plants with this safe?**

The NRC considers BWRs with Mark I containment designs to be safe. BWR Mark I containments have smaller volumes than PWR containments. This makes the BWR Mark I containment more susceptible to containment failure given a core meltdown severe enough to (1) fail the reactor vessel and also (2) severe enough so that the core melt reaches the containment boundary. However, BWRs have more

ways of adding water to the core than PWRs. This includes 2 water injection sources which do not rely on AC electric power. These systems include Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and High pressure coolant injection (HPCI).

**26. Any quick-hit info about how the Southeast Reactors performed during Katrina? What damage did the flood water do? Any power loss?**

The reactors performed as designed.

Additional technical information:

Waterford 3 (near New Orleans, LA) did not have damage to any safety equipment during, or shortly after Katrina. They shut down on August 28, 2005, in advance of the hurricane strike. The flooding did affect local infrastructure, including communications and power distribution. However, the plant successfully used their emergency diesel generators to furnish plant power. Access was maintained to the plant throughout the event. On September 9, 2005, after a comprehensive review by FEMA and the NRC, the plant was authorized to restart.

River Bend Station (30 miles north of Baton Rouge, LA) did not experience damage to any safety related equipment and only minimal damage to emergency planning equipment (one siren) during and after Hurricane Katrina. The station reduced power to 70 percent core thermal power on August 28, 2005, due to reduced electrical grid loads. Access was maintained to the plant throughout the event. On September 2, 2005, the plant returned to 100% power.

Also, in 1992 the eye of Hurricane Andrew, a category 5 hurricane, passed directly over the Turkey Point nuclear plant. The plant was shut down prior to the hurricane making landfall and an assessment of the plant following the hurricane demonstrated that the plant sustained very little damage and all of the safety equipment was intact. (Most of the damage was to the security fences being blown down).

Protecting U.S. Citizens

**27. What should be done to protect people in Alaska, Hawaii and the West Coast from radioactive fallout?**

The NRC continues to believe that the type and design of the Japanese reactors, combined with how events have unfolded, will prevent radiation at harmful levels from reaching U.S. territory.

Additional technical information:

NRC is working with DHS, EPA and other federal partners to ensure monitoring equipment for confirmatory readings is properly positioned, based on meteorological and other relevant information.

**28. Why is KI administered during nuclear emergencies?**

KI – potassium iodide – is one of the protective measures that might be taken in a radiological emergency in this country. A KI tablet will saturate the thyroid with non-radioactive iodine and prevent the absorption of radioactive iodine that could be part of the radioactive material mix of radionuclides in a release. KI does not prevent exposure from other radionuclides.

Additional technical information:

There are a range of protective measures that we use ... the most effective is evacuation. Local government officials are responsible for determining the best means to protect their public. KI is another means for protection but evacuation and sheltering are the primary means that are used.

**29. Are any Americans in danger – armed forces, citizens in Tokyo?**

The NRC, in consultation with the White House and U.S. Embassy, has advised United States citizens in Japan to follow the protective measures recommended by the Japanese government. These measures appear to be consistent with steps the United States would take. The Department of Defense has personnel trained in radiation protective measures and is responsible for providing guidance to U.S. armed forces. Inquiries regarding U.S. citizens in Japan should be directed to the State Department, Consular Services at 202-647-7004.

**30. Has the government set up radiation monitoring stations to track the release?**

The NRC understands that EPA is utilizing its existing nationwide radiation monitoring system, RadNet, to monitor continuously the nation's air and regularly monitors drinking water, milk and precipitation for environmental radiation. EPA has publicly stated its agreement with the NRC's assessment that we do not expect to see radiation at harmful levels reaching the U.S. from damaged Japanese nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, EPA has stated that it plans to work with its federal partners to deploy additional monitoring capabilities to parts of the western U.S. and U.S. territories.

**31. It has been reported that the Japanese have expanded their protective actions out to 30km (~19 miles). Does the Japanese decision to expand their protective actions call into question NRC requirements for Emergency Planning Zones out to 10 miles?**

The NRC remains confident that the EPZs around U.S. nuclear reactor plants are adequate to protect public health and safety during a nuclear accident. Nevertheless, the NRC will certainly be looking closely at this incident and the effects on the Japanese nuclear power plant in the future to see if any changes are necessary to NRC regulations.

**Future NRC Actions/Evaluations**

**32. Has this incident changed the NRC perception about earthquake risk?**

There has been no change in the NRC's perception of earthquake hazard (i.e. ground shaking levels) for U.S. nuclear power plants. As is prudent, the NRC will certainly be looking closely at this incident and the effects on the Japanese nuclear power plant in the future to see if any changes are necessary to NRC regulations.

**Additional technical information:**

We expect that there would be lessons learned, etc. It appears that the sites did not have any critical damage due to the earthquake from the fact that the emergency diesel generators initially responded to provide power to the site. The tsunami and consequential site flooding was responsible for the complete loss of power to the site, including the diesel generators which resulted in a Station Blackout.

**33. Will this incident affect new reactor licensing?**

It is not appropriate to hypothesize on such a future scenario at this point.

**Additional technical information:**

This event could potentially call into question the NRC's seismic requirements which could require the staff to re-evaluate the staff's approval of the AP1000 and ESBWR design and certifications.

**34. How will the events in Japan impact ongoing NRC licensing actions such as power uprates and license renewals and NRC inspections at operating reactors?**

The NRC remains committed to its mission to protect public health and safety. The NRC staff is dedicated to that mission and applies a strong safety and security focus to each of our licensing action reviews. The time will come, after this crisis is behind us, to evaluate what, if any, changes are needed. We will assess all the available information from this event and, as we have done with previous natural disasters, such as the 2007 earthquake in the Sea of Japan and the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, evaluate whether enhancements to our licensing processes or U.S. nuclear power plants are warranted. In the meantime, we will continue to implement our rigorous inspection and oversight activities at operating U.S. nuclear power plants. It would be premature to speculate about any potential changes to our inspection, licensing or oversight activities.

**35. With NRC moving to design certification, at what point is seismic capability tested – during design or modified to be site-specific? If in design, what strength seismic event must these be built to withstand?**

The regulations related to seismic requirements are contained in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A criterion 2.

During design certification, vendors propose a seismic design in terms of a ground motion spectrum for their nuclear facility. This spectrum is called a standard design response spectrum and is developed so that the proposed nuclear facility can be sited at most locations in the central and eastern United States. The vendors show that this design ground motion is suitable for a variety of different subsurface conditions such as hard rock, deep soil, or shallow soil over rock. Combined License and Early Site Permits applicants are required to develop a site specific ground motion response spectrum that takes into account all of the earthquakes in the region surrounding their site as well as the local site geologic conditions. Applicants estimate the ground motion from these postulated earthquakes to develop seismic hazard curves. These seismic hazard curves are then used to determine a site specific ground motion response spectrum that has a maximum annual likelihood of  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  of being exceeded. This can be thought of as a ground motion with a 10,000 year return period. This site specific ground motion response spectrum is then compared to the standard design response spectrum for the proposed design. If the standard design ground motion spectrum envelopes the site specific ground motion spectrum then the site is considered to be suitable for the proposed design. If the standard design spectrum does not completely envelope the site specific ground motion spectrum, then the COL applicant must do further detailed structural analysis to show that the design capacity is adequate. Margin beyond the standard design and site specific ground motions must also be demonstrated before fuel loading can begin.

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:25 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

(b)(5)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:11:36 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Yes, I noticed that we time traveled a bit...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:07:25 2011  
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This is great, except for the error in the first line - the date.

---

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:12 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

Yes, I noticed that we time traveled a bit...

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 07:07:25 2011  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

This is great, except for the error in the first line - the date.

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Wed Mar 16 06:06:40 2011  
**Subject:** Q&As re: Japan

Attached is a document of Q&A responses prepared by OPA and technical experts in the Ops Ctr. We CANNOT send this document in its entirety down to the Hill as is, but we can use it to respond to individual questions. I know that we "owe" answers to questions to a number of staffers. Please read through here and see if answers are provided to questions that came into you and get back to the requesting staff. This may also help those of you in the Ops Ctr with calls.

Questions that speculate about what could happen, compare Japan regs with US, and other speculative Qs are NOT included here. Just not the focus now.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Harrington, Holly  
**To:** Coggins, Angela; Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 21:51:03 2011  
**Subject:** RE: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela, Amy, Becki – These are fully approved by relevant folks in the Op Center. For your use. I have not added to WebEOC yet as it's not clear these should also be used by others . . .

**From:** Coggins, Angela  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 15, 2011 8:36 PM  
**To:** Taylor, Robert  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Thanks so much!! I appreciate all the effort!  
Angela Coggins  
Policy Director  
Office of Chairman Gregory B Jaczko  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[angela.coggins@nrc.gov](mailto:angela.coggins@nrc.gov)/301-415-1828

---

**From:** Taylor, Robert  
**To:** Coggins, Angela  
**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 20:29:17 2011  
**Subject:** Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela,

We have done our best to incorporate your questions into the Chairman's Q&As that were developed earlier today and provided to OCA. The updated set of Q&As is undergoing ET review and we will hopefully have it to you in the near future. The attached provides a roadmap of where we believe the responses can be found. A few questions fell into the broader "After this event is over, we will determine what changes need to be made in the US" message. I did not directly incorporate them, but you can see a draft response in the attached.

Regarding the third question about past events, I did not try to evaluate all of the events you listed. I would propose sticking to the party line, in that, "The NRC routinely reassess its regulatory requirements in light of new operating experience and plant events."

Regards,  
Rob



---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 9:34 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** RE: Q&As re: Japan

Thanks

**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 9:33 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: Q&As re: Japan

Ok.

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 9:33 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** RE: Q&As re: Japan

(b)(5)

**From:** Shane, Raeann  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 9:12 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** RE: Q&As re: Japan

I'm on it. Let me know if you need help down there and I will come right down. Unbelievable.

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 8:09 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** FW: Q&As re: Japan

Raeann: Maybe you could answer Laura's questions from this. I will also send you the latest sitrep which I understand you can speak from. If you saw my earlier emails, you see that things could get busy here. Thanks, Spiros

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:12 AM  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros; Dacus, Eugene; Decker, David; Weil, Jenny; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Shane, Raeann  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Re: Q&As re: Japan

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Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

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Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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**Cc:** McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
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**Subject:** Re: Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

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Angela Coggins  
Policy Director

Office of Chairman Gregory B Jaczko  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
[angela.coggins@nrc.gov](mailto:angela.coggins@nrc.gov)/301-415-1828

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**From:** Taylor, Robert  
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**Cc:** Harrington, Holly; McIntyre, David; Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Tue Mar 15 20:29:17 2011  
**Subject:** Japanese-Rx-Incident addtl questions - March-14-2011 doc.docx

Angela,

We have done our best to incorporate your questions into the Chairman's Q&As that were developed earlier today and provided to OCA. The updated set of Q&As is undergoing ET review and we will hopefully have it to you in the near future. The attached provides a roadmap of where we believe the responses can be found. A few questions fell into the broader "After this event is over, we will determine what changes need to be made in the US" message. I did not directly incorporate them, but you can see a draft response in the attached.

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Regards,  
Rob

---

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 9:11 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Fw: \* \* \* AREVA; Re: ANALYSIS/SUMMARY OF FUKUSHIMA, DAIICHI \* \* \*  
**Attachments:** Fukuchima\_eng\_20110320.pps

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**From:** Trojanowski, Robert  
**To:** McCree, Victor; Wert, Leonard; Croteau, Rick; Jones, William; Munday, Joel; Hopper, George; Bernhard, Rudolph; Hannah, Roger; Ledford, Joey; Christensen, Harold; Gody, Tony; Cobey, Eugene; Piccone, Josephine; Turtill, Richard; Virgilio, Rosetta; Ryan, Michelle; McGrady-Finneran, Patricia; Droggitis, Spiros; Hunter, James; Lankford, Jeffrey  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 07:30:39 2011  
**Subject:** \* \* \* AREVA; Re: ANALYSIS/SUMMARY OF FUKUSHIMA, DAIICHI \* \* \*

FYI-----AREVA analysis / summary of Fukushima, Daiichi site, dated 3/25/2011

AO/251



Areva  
Nuclear  
Energy  
Group

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(b)(4),(b)(5)

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---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 9:33 AM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Landau, Mindy; Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Re: EPP Testimony for Weds

Thanks Roger - I've cc'ed Raeann Shane who is working with me on this today.

On the 3/29 Senate Energy statement, we will send you what circulates to the Commission, which I hope will be later this am.

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

---

**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Riley (OCA), Timothy; Landau, Mindy  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 09:29:01 2011  
**Subject:** EPP Testimony for Weds

(b)(5)

Trish Milligan from NSIR is prepared/planning to accompany Mike on Weds. Is that consistent with your views?

[note: there is something odd going on with the formatting of the attached when you make edits that is beyond my technical capabilities to fix permanently]

On the 3/29 testimony, do you have a revision I can use to continue to craft the oral statement to be sure I capture your changes?

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 9:34 AM  
**To:** Shane, Raeann  
**Subject:** Fw: EPP Testimony for Weds  
**Attachments:** Testimony\_EPP\_March 30 2011.docx  
  
**Importance:** High

This is for House T&I subcommittee on 3/30. Sounds like there are still holes, but would you take a look at what's here?

Thanks

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

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**From:** Rihm, Roger  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
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(b)(5)

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[note: there is something odd going on with the formatting of the attached when you make edits that is beyond my technical capabilities to fix permanently]

On the 3/29 testimony, do you have a revision I can use to continue to craft the oral statement to be sure I capture your changes?

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to discuss our emergency planning and preparedness programs at nuclear power facilities in the United States, and to discuss the protective action guidance recently issued by the NRC to American citizens in Japan in response to the events at the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant site.

NRC's primary mission is to regulate nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities in a manner that protects the health and safety of the public and promotes the common defense and security. Emergency preparedness is a key element of the "defense in depth" safety philosophy we employ for nuclear power plants. This philosophy ensures high quality in design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants; requires redundant safety systems that reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents; and recognizes that in spite of all these precautions, accidents could occur. Through emergency planning and preparedness, mechanisms are in place to protect the public in the unlikely event that these barriers were to fail.

For planning purposes, we define two planning zones around nuclear power plant sites. The planning zones are based on a study of accidents, known as the WASH 1400 report, that examined a range of events from design basis accidents to catastrophic severe accidents. The study made a number of very conservative assumptions regarding the performance of safety equipment, the radionuclides in the core that could be released, and the timing of the release. The first zone is an area covering about 10 miles in all directions around nuclear power plants where the greatest potential for radiological effects from a release exists. Planning for this area is comprehensive and includes such protective actions as evacuation, sheltering, and potassium iodide, as appropriate, for members of the public. Consideration of these protective actions is prompted at very low projected dose levels. A second extended planning zone of about 50 miles is also established around each



plant to deal with potential lower-level, long-term risks primarily due to exposure from consumption of contaminated food, milk, and water. This comprehensive planning within the 10 and 50 mile EPZ provides a substantial basis for expansion of response efforts in the event that this is necessary. [OCA: we've asked NSIR to add a bit here about drills, etc. to "round out" the discussion of EPP program. Will pass along as soon as we get it.]

Let me now address the NRC's recent protective action recommendation for U.S citizens in Japan to evacuate out to 50 miles from the Fukushima Daiichi site. That decision was based on best information available at that time. The information flow from the Fukushima site was often confusing and conflicting. The NRC was receiving much of its information from the same open sources available to everyone; such as CNN. We based our assessment on the conditions as we understood them. Units 1, 2, and 3 appeared to have suffered significant damage as a result of reported hydrogen explosions; Unit 4 was in a refueling outage and its entire core had been transferred to the spent fuel pool a little more than 3 months earlier so there was fresh fuel in the spent fuel pool that was in danger of overheating if the water level dropped, and there were indications that was happening. Additionally, there were some radiation monitors that were showing very high levels of radiation on the plant site, which would pose challenges to plant crew attempting to stabilize the reactors, and there were some offsite readings indicating that fuel damage had occurred. This situation was unprecedented. This is a 6 unit site and 4 of the units were facing extraordinary challenges. The staff performed a series of calculations to assess possible offsite consequences. We understood that some of our assumptions were conservative. However, we were unable to discuss or verify our assumptions with the licensee or our Japanese counterparts. In the United States, the NRC has resident inspector staff at the plants that can report back to the Region and Headquarters on conditions as they are evolving, we are able to readily access "live-time" plant parameters and radiation monitors, as well as talk directly to plant staff and emergency management

officials which enabled us to refine our understanding and consequence assessments. With the Fukushima event we had to make our best decision with what we had available. The Emergency Preparedness framework provides for the expansion of the emergency planning zones as conditions require. Acting in accordance with this framework and with the best information available at the time, the NRC determined that evacuation out to 50 miles for U.S. Citizens was an appropriate course of action.

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**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 10:55 AM  
**To:** Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: USNRC Daily status report - Japan Nuclear Plant

(b)(5)

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**To:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 10:37:40 2011  
**Subject:** RE: USNRC Daily status report - Japan Nuclear Plant

(b)(5)

**From:** Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 10:37 AM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Powell, Amy  
**Subject:** Re: USNRC Daily status report - Japan Nuclear Plant

(b)(5)

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**From:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**To:** Powell, Amy; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 10:28:52 2011  
**Subject:** Fw: USNRC Daily status report - Japan Nuclear Plant

(b)(5)

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**From:** Epstein, Jonathan (Bingaman) <Jonathan\_Epstein@bingaman.senate.gov>  
**To:** Dacus, Eugene  
**Cc:** Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 10:22:46 2011  
**Subject:** RE: USNRC Daily status report - Japan Nuclear Plant

Eugene thanks, can you please ensure these come out daily, they are very helpful to me as I brief Jeff.

**From:** Dacus, Eugene [mailto:Eugene.Dacus@nrc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 8:13 AM  
**Subject:** USNRC Daily status report - Japan Nuclear Plant

Attached is the 3/25/11 NRC Japan Plant Condition Update.

Eugene Dacus  
Sr. Congressional Affairs Officer  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office: 301-415-1697

Fax: 301-415-8571

E-mail: [eugene.dacus@nrc.gov](mailto:eugene.dacus@nrc.gov)

---

**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 12:29 PM  
**To:** Rihm, Roger  
**Cc:** Riley (OCA), Timothy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Subject:** Senate Energy draft statement to Commission  
**Attachments:** Draft for Comm circulation - March 29 Senate Energy testimony.docx

Roger –

Attached is the version of Bill's draft statement for the Senate Energy briefing on 3/29 that went up for Commission review and comment.

Thanks  
Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
Phone: 301-415-1673

**STATEMENT OF R. WILLIAM BORCHARDT  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

(b)(5)

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**MARCH 29, 2011**

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 25, 2011

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Jaczko  
Commissioner Svinicki  
Commissioner Apostolakis  
Commissioner Magwood  
Commissioner Ostendorff

FROM: Rebecca L. Schmidt, Director *RLS*  
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: DRAFT WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR SENATE ENERGY AND  
NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE BRIEFING

Attached for your review and comment is a draft written statement that will be presented to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on Tuesday, March 29, 2011. Please return your comments to the Office of Congressional Affairs by **close of business, Friday, March 25, 2011.**

Attachment:  
As stated

cc: SECY  
OGC  
OGC/Burns  
EDO  
OIP  
OCAA  
OPA  
OIG  
CFO

CONTACT: Tim Riley, 415-8492/Amy Powell, 415-1673

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**From:** Powell, Amy  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 27, 2011 3:57 PM  
**To:** Schmidt, Rebecca; Droggitis, Spiros  
**Subject:** Fw: Testimony for March 30 and 31  
**Attachments:** ORAL Testimony for HOUSE Approps Energy and Wtr.3.31.11.DRAFT.docx; WRITTEN Testimony for 03.31.11HOUSE Approps Hrg.DRAFT.docx; WRITTEN Testimony.SENATE Approps Energy and Wtr.3.30.11 DRAFT.docx

Per my last email, Susan's drafts for HAC and SAC.

Amy

Amy Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Phone: 301-415-1673

Sent from my Blackberry

**From:** Loyd, Susan  
**To:** Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, Angela; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca  
**Sent:** Fri Mar 25 09:59:57 2011  
**Subject:** Testimony for March 30 and 31

Hi:

- I have drafts ready for both the Oral and Written testimony for the March 31 House Approp's Hearing on Budget.
- I have a Written Testimony draft ready for the March 30 Senate Approp's Hearing on Japan.
- I need for you to read the testimonies and let me know ASAP if you see problems or if I have missed anything important. Jim Dyer said he prefers to handle the request for Japan-related funds in the Q&A at the House hearing, and not have it inserted into the prepared testimony.
- As soon as I get your feedback on the Senate Written Testimony, I will prepare an Oral Testimony for that hearing. Am not going to spend much time on that until I get your initial feedback on the Written Testimony draft, to make sure I am on track.
- Amy is on point to circulate all of these to the other Commission offices, so we are on a tight timeframe. Please get back to me ASAP. They all should be circulated on Monday.
- Also, Amy needs immediate feedback on the draft testimony for Mike Weber to use on Weds. She sent this to you yesterday.

Thanks!  
Susan

Susan K. Loyd  
Communications Director

Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Tele: 301-415-1838  
[Susan.Lovd@nrc.gov](mailto:Susan.Lovd@nrc.gov)

STATEMENT  
BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES  
MARCH 31, 2011

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STATEMENT  
BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
TO THE  
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER  
MARCH 30, 2011

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ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES  
MARCH 31, 2011

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