

Sonny Dean
Plant General Manager

CENGSM

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edf

R.E. GINNA
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC
1503 Lake Road
Ontario, New York 14519-9364

585.771.5205
585.771.3943 Fax

sonny.dean@cengllc.com

July 26, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: **R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant**
Docket No. 50-244

**LER 2012-001, Automatic Start of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator
Caused by Loss of Offsite Circuit 767 Due to Wildlife**

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2012-001 is submitted under the provisions of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines. There are no new commitments contained in this submittal. Should you have any questions regarding the information in this letter, please contact Mr. Thomas Harding at (585) 771-5219.

Very truly yours,

Edwin D. Dean III

Attachments: (1) LER 2012-001

cc: W.M. Dean, NRC
M.C. Thadani, NRC
Resident Inspector, NRC (Ginna)

1 E22
NRR

WPL NRC-1002578

bcc: J. Pacher
S. Dean
T. Harding
J. Jackson
E. P. Perkins
C.W. Fleming

COMMITMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THIS CORRESPONDENCE:

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• None |
|--|

ATTACHMENT 1

LER 2012-001

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104		EXPIRES: 10/31/2013	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)							
1. FACILITY NAME R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant				2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000244		3. PAGE 1 OF 3	
4. TITLE: Automatic Start of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator Caused by Loss of Offsite Circuit 767 Due to Wildlife.							
5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY
06	03	2012	2012	001	0	07	26
			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED				
			FACILITY NAME				DOCKET NUMBER
							05000
			FACILITY NAME				DOCKET NUMBER
							05000
9. OPERATING MODE			11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)				
1			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10. POWER LEVEL			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
100%			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
							<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
							<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
							<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
							<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
							<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
							<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
							<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
							<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
							Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER							
FACILITY NAME: Thomas Harding, Licensing Director						TELEPHONE NUMBER: (Include Area Code) (585) 771-5219	
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED						15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO						MONTH DAY YEAR 	
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)							
<p>On Sunday, 06/03/2012 at approximately 0239, offsite power circuit 767 tripped offline resulting in a loss of Bus 12B. Upon investigation, the cause was determined to be a fault caused by a raccoon. With the electrical system in the normal 50%/50% alignment, the loss of circuit 767 caused the 480v safeguards buses 16 and 17 to momentarily lose power until the B emergency diesel generator automatically started and reenergized the safeguards buses as designed.</p> <p>The cause of the loss of power to Circuit 767 was determined to be a temporary fault caused by a raccoon, no damage to the plant equipment occurred. Additional Animal Deterrent Devices are being developed for installation.</p>							

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	05000244	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 3
		2012	001	0	

NARRATIVE

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:

- On June 03, 2012 the plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% reactor power. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure was 2235 psig and RCS temperature was 574F. The offsite electrical system was in the 50%/50% lineup, meaning that each offsite circuit was providing power to two (2) of the four (4) 480 Volt Safeguards Busses.

B. EVENT:

- On June 03, 2012 at approximately 0239, offsite power circuit 767 was lost due to a fault caused by a raccoon. This resulted in a momentary loss of safeguards busses 16 and 17. The B emergency diesel generator automatically started and supplied power to busses 16 and 17 as designed.
- Off site power circuit 7T remained operable during this event. The offsite power configuration was later changed to a 100%/0% lineup, with circuit 7T supplying offsite power requirements.
- The plant remained at approximately 100% power throughout the event.

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

- None.

D. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

- 06/03/2012, 0239 EST Event Date and Time, Loss of Off-site power circuit 767 and B Emergency Diesel Generator automatic start supplying power to busses 16 and 17
- 06/03/2012, 0318 EST Busses 16 and 17 returned to off-site power (Circuit 7T)
- 06/03/2012, 0448 EST B Emergency Diesel Generator shut down
- 06/03/2012, 0607 EST Notification of B Emergency Diesel Generator start, event # 47988 under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)

E. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

- None.

F. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

- Main Control Board Alarms associated with loss of offsite power and Emergency Diesel Generator start.

G. MAJOR OPERATOR ACTION:

- Operations responded to the loss of circuit 767 using abnormal operating procedure AP-ELEC.1 "Loss of 12A and/or 12B Busses"
- Offsite power was restored to bus 12 B using ER-ELEC.1 "Restoration of Off-site Power"
- Restored offsite power to pre-event lineup with O-6.9.2

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	05000 244	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	3 OF 3
		2012	001	0	

NARRATIVE:

H. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

- The B Emergency Diesel Generator operated properly and as expected.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT:

- The cause is raccoon interaction with power lines causing a temporary fault (CR-2012-003664). The raccoon caused a line to ground fault. Pilot wire differential and overcurrent relays operated, opening primary and secondary side transformer breakers for circuit 767.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT:

- This event is reportable as an LER under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to the automatic start of B Emergency Diesel Generator and loading onto its safeguards buses not being part of a pre-planned sequence during testing.
- There were no safety consequences as the redundant offsite circuit and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable and performed as designed.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS

- Offsite power configuration was changed to 100%/0% lineup with Circuit 7T supplying power to all four (4) safeguards buses. B Emergency Diesel Generator was later stopped and aligned for auto standby
- Control room personnel were contacted by RG&E stating that circuit 767 was available. They then returned offsite power to 50%/50% lineup power using procedure O-6.9.2.
- Inspection of equipment revealed no damage

B. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

- Development and installation of additional Animal Deterrent Devices is planned.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A. FAILED COMPONENT(S)

- None.

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS

- A review of recent Ginna events involving the start of B Emergency Diesel Generator revealed only one other event (LER 1997-002) that was caused by an animal, and all the events occurred external to Ginna and Station 13a:
 - LER 2005-002
 - LER 2005-003
 - LER 2003-006
 - LER 1997-002