



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

July 23, 2012

Mr. James Molden
Site Vice President
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2,
TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2012008);
05000306/2012008(DRS)

Dear Mr. Molden:

On June 22, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 22, 2012, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA by A. Dahbur for/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-282, 50-306 and 72-010
License Nos. DPR-42, DPR-60 and SNM-2506

Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000282/2012008; 05000306/2012008(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-282; 50-306; 72-010
License Nos: DPR-42; DPR-60; SNM-2506

Report Nos: 05000282/2012008; 05000306/2012008(DRS)

Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Welch, MN

Dates: May 22 – 25, June 4 – 8, and June 18 – 22, 2012

Inspectors: Robert Winter, Reactor Inspector, Lead
Benny Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
Alan Dahbur, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000282/2012008; 05000306/2012008(DRS); 05/22/2012 – 05/25/2012, 06/04/2012 – 06/08/2012, and 06/18/2012 – 06/22/2012; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2; Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

No findings were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05T)

The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensee's fire protection program's defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:

- preventing fires from starting;
- rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur;
- providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and
- taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.

The inspectors' evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant's fire protection program, post-fire safe shutdown systems and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that: (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured; (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensee's problem identification and resolution program.

In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50.54(hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The fire areas selected for review are listed below and those B.5.b mitigating strategies reviewed are listed in Section 1R05.13. The fire areas selected constitute four inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constitute three inspection samples respectively as defined by Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T.

Fire Area	Description
18	Relay and Cable Spreading Room, Unit 1 and Unit 2
20	Unit 1 Safeguards Switchgear 4.16 kV (Bus 16)
32	"B" Train Hot Shutdown Panel and Air Compressor/ Auxiliary Feedwater Room
69	Turbine Building Ground and Mezzanine Floor, Unit 1

.1 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

The inspectors ensured that applicable separation requirements of Section III.G of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and the licensee's design and licensing bases were maintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supporting power, control, and instrumentation cables. This review included an assessment of the adequacy of the selected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety evaluation reports (SERs), and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC SERs, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training, as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee performed a post-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected fire areas and the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems, and components important to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee's analysis ensured that necessary electrical circuits were properly protected and that circuits that could adversely impact safe shutdown due to hot shorts, shorts to ground, or other failures were identified, evaluated, and dispositioned to ensure spurious actuations would not prevent safe shutdown.

The inspectors' review considered fire and cable attributes, potential undesirable consequences, and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific items included the credibility of the fire threat, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, and actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.

The inspectors also reviewed cable raceway drawings for a sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables were routed as described in the cable routing matrices.

The inspectors reviewed circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed to conduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lack of coordination. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records to verify that circuit breakers for components required for post-fire safe shutdown were properly maintained in accordance with procedural requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdown, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.9 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review on the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed changes to the approved fire protection program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.12 Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.13 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:

- procedures were being maintained and adequate;
- equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested;
- station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and
- additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and evaluated the selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections. The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review are listed below. The offsite and onsite communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation, initial operational response actions, and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3-1 of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06-12, "B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance," Revision 2 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies' scenario selected.

NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section	Licensee Strategy Table
2.3.1	SFP [Spent Fuel Pool] Makeup – External Strategy (Table A.2-2)
2.3.2	SFP Spray – External Strategy (Table A.2-3)
3.4.4	Manually Depressurize SGs [Steam Generators] and Use Portable Pump (Table A.4-4)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Molden and to other members of the licensee staff on June 22, 2012. The licensee acknowledged the inspection results presented.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

J. Molden, Site Vice President
P. Huffman, Site Engineering Director
K. Davison, Site Operations Director, Plant Manager (Acting)
J. Anderson, Regulatory Affairs Manager
J. Ruttar, Operations Manager
T. Holt, Operations Support Manager
C. Lane, Engineering Programs Manager
J. Kopitz, Reliability Standards Manager
M. Kelly, Fleet Program Engineering Supervisor
K. Vincent, Regulatory Program Engineering Supervisor
K. Balakrishanan, Fire Protection Program Engineer
G. Kvamme, Appendix R Program Engineer
D. Hazard, Electrical/Appendix R Engineer
F. Sperlak, Fire Protection Coordinator, Operations
S. DiPasquale, Regulatory Affairs

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

K. Stoedter, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Zurawski, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

ASSESSMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01252350	2011 Fire Protection Triennial Focused Self-Assessment	October 28, 2011

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
30-762 SH Ex3	Hydraulic Calculation for Screenhouse Below Elevation 695'0"	0
ENG-ME-349	Aux Feedwater Pump Room Sprinkler System WSP-10	0
ENG-ME-586	Effects of Flooding in the AFW Pump Room From Postulated Pipe Rupture	0
GEN-PI-026	Safe Shutdown Analysis for Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Section 3G	6

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (A/Rs) ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
01338709	2 Storage Cabinets for Scrubs have Broken Handles	05/22/2012
01338879	Ladders Improperly Stored	05/23/2012
01338882	Barrel not Labeled in Aux Bldg	05/23/2012
01338847	NRC Inspector questioned Thermometer in Bus 16 Room	05/24/2012
01338994	Observations from NRC Discussion/Walkdown of EDMGs	05/24/2012
01340442	Error in Revision 4 of EDMG-1	06/05/2012
01340994	NRC-Identified Combustible Material in U1 TB w/o permit	06/07/2012
01342155	Telephone Wire not Labeled as Abandoned	06/07/2012
01342159	T-Conduit Fitting Missing Plug	06/19/2012
01342190	Questions regarding Security's Role during a B.5.b Event	06/19/2012
01342179	Unsecured Tool Cart found in Aux Bldg by NRC	06/19/2012
01342198	Valve Label Tag found in Aux Bldg by NRC	06/19/2012
01342202	NRC Questioned Small Unsecured Metal Cabinet in Aux Bldg	06/19/2012
01342251	6" x 8" Cardboard lodged between Equipment in Relay Room	06/19/2012
01342362	Plastic Sheet on FOST Controls without CCP	06/20/2012
01342457	Question with F5 App B and Multiple Spurious Operations	06/21/2012

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (A/Rs) REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
01156774	App R Equipment Selection Referenced in a Calculation not up to date	October 24, 2008
01180475	Classification of BM Appendix R Fan Questioned at T-8 Meeting	May 01, 2009
01188531	Degraded Floor Penetration PENF 2750	July 08, 2009
01191772	Door 224 threshold crushed and multiple issues exist	July 31, 2009
01202193	Several bags of oil rags found in trash cart on 735' U1 Turbine Bldg.	October 12, 2009
01231017	Evaluate OE 31069 limits for combustible controls exceeded	May 04, 2010
01270625	Ball drip drain valve on d5 deluge valve failed	February 12, 2011
01270796	Drain funnel for new Admin Bldg FP deluge piping overflowing	February 14, 2011
01271658	FP-39-1, 11 Hydrogen seal oil sprinkler DA leaks by	February 18, 2011
01272690	FP piping leaking outside of cold lab	February 26, 2011
01273868	122 Diesel fire pump major coolant leak	March 05, 2011
01278522	GEN-PI-054 – Overly Conservative Time Constraint for Appendix R Response and System Time Constraints	April 01, 2011
01310366	2011 FP FSA: No Checks and Balances for Hourly Fire Watch	October 28, 2011

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
NE-40008	Schematic Drawing – 11 TD Aux. FW to 11 Steam Generator	BS
NF-40903-1	Wiring Diagram Units 1 & 2 Train A Hot Shutdown Panel	U
NF-40904-1	Wiring Diagram Units 1 & 2 Train B Hot Shutdown Panel	U
NF-40191-1	Wiring Diagram Bus-1 Motor Control Center 1A	W
NF-40224-2	External Connections Motor Control Center 1A	K
NF-120713-7	External Wiring Diagram 480V Switchgear Bus 212	C
NF-39228-1	Flow Diagram – Fire Protection and Screen Wash System	81
NF-39337-1	Aux Building Unit 1 & 2 Floor Drain Piping EL. 695'0"	W
NF-38221-3	Turbine Room Concrete Equipment Plan Unit 1 EL. 695'0"	S
Sheet 21	Valve MV-32238	

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
PINGP 1676	Fire Drill Critique Report	1
SP 1664	Monthly Fire Fighting Equipment Check	33
SP 1673	Quarterly Communication Test	64

2010-04-019	NOS Observation Report Fire Protection	December 3, 2010
2012-01-013	NOS Observation Report Fire Protection (FP)	February 8, 2012
2177-3104-001	Attachment 2 – Expert Panel Scenario Review	Revision C
D C 00FP04	Add Fusible Link to Door #62	September 7, 2000
PREOP 15	Fire Protection System, Addendum 2, CARDOX System for Computer & Relay Rooms,	September 27, 1974
Printout Log	Fire Watch log Sheet	June 2012

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
5AWI 3.13.0	Fire Protection Program	21
5AWI 3.13.2	Fire Prevention	20
5AWI 3.13.3	Hot Work	3
C47022	Alarm Response Procedure	50
D80	Scaffolding, Ladders and Cable Trays Platforms	25
EDMG-1	Guideline Response to a Loss of Normal Plant Command and Control	4
EDMG-2	Guideline for Damage Mitigating Strategies	8
F5 Appendix A	Fire Detection Zones	27
F5 Appendix B	Control Room Evacuation	45
F5 Appendix D	Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room	30
F5 Appendix F	Fire Hazards Analysis	25
F5 Appendix K	Fire Protection System Operability Requirements	14
F5 Appendix K	Fire Protection System Functional Requirements	15
F3-5	Emergency Notifications	30
H62	Site Doors	2
ICPM 0-003	Relay and Computer Room CARDOX F.P. Temp Switches	8
SP 1208	Fire Pump and Hose Flow 3 Year Test	12

VENDOR DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
Section J	Automatic Model 38B Sprinklers	October 1964

WORK ORDERS (WOs)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
00433442 01	SP 1328 Diesel Driven Fire Pump “A” Battery QTRLY	June 19, 2012
00433443 01	SP 1328 Diesel Driven Fire Pump “B” Battery QTRLY	June 19, 2012

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
ACE	Apparent Cause Evaluation
AOP	Alarm Operating Procedure
AR	Action Request
ATTN	Attention
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
DBA	Design Basis Accident
DC	Direct Current
DRP	Division of Reactor Project
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EFR	Effectiveness Reviews
EIR	Equipment Improvement Request
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
IR	Inspection Report
KV	KiloVolt
NCR	Non-Conformance Report
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG	NRC Technical Report Designation
OA	Other Activities
OBD	Operable But Degraded
OBN	Operable But Nonconforming
OE	Operating Experience
OWA	Operator Workaround
PARS	Public Available Records System
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RCE	Root Cause Evaluation
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
ROP	Reactor Oversight Process
SCAQ	Significant Condition Adverse to Quality
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SER	safety evaluation report
SFP	Spent Fuel Pool
SG	Steam Generator
SP	Surveillance Procedure
TS	Technical Specification
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report
WO	Work Order

Mr. James Molden
Site Vice President
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Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
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