



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 15, 2012

LICENSEE: Entergy Operations, Inc.

FACILITY: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON MAY 23, 2012,
BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ENTERGY
OPERATIONS, INC., CONCERNING REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION,
LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION (TAC. NO. ME7493)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Entergy Operations, Inc., (Entergy) held a telephone conference call on May 23, 2012, to discuss and clarify the staff's requests for additional information (RAIs) concerning the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, license renewal application. The telephone conference call was useful in clarifying the intent of the staff's RAIs.

Enclosure 1 provides a listing of the participants and Enclosure 2 contains a listing of the RAIs discussed with the applicant, including a brief description on the status of the items.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "NFB", is positioned above the name Nathaniel Ferrer.

Nathaniel Ferrer, Project Manager
Projects Branch 1
Division of License Renewal
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-416

Enclosures:
As stated

cc w/encls: Listserv

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION
LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
May 23, 2012

PARTICIPANTS

AFFILIATIONS

Nate Ferrer	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Bill Rogers	NRC
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Bill Holston	NRC
Bart Fu	NRC
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REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (SETS 20 AND 21)

LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

May 23, 2012

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Entergy Operations, Inc., held a telephone conference call on May 23, 2012, to discuss and clarify the following requests for additional information (RAIs) concerning the license renewal application (LRA).

Draft RAI 2.1-1

Background. 10 CFR 54.4, "Scope," states, in part:

(a) Plant systems, structures and components [SSCs] within the scope of this part are –

(1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions –

- (i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
- (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or
- (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2), or 10 CFR 100.11, as applicable.

LRA Section 2.1.1.1, "Application of Safety-Related Scoping Criteria," states, in part, relative to the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)(iii), "[t]he capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.67, or 10 CFR 100.11, as applicable."

Issue. During the on-site scoping and screening methodology audit, the staff reviewed the definitions of the term safety-related contained in fleet procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the license renewal application (LRA), used to identify SSCs within the scope of license renewal. The staff determined that the applicability of 10 CFR 50.67 to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was not specifically addressed in the definitions of the term safety-related in the fleet procedures, the UFSAR or the LRA.

Request. The staff requests that the applicant confirm the definition of the term safety-related used in the development of the LRA and address the applicability of 10 CFR 50.67 to GGNS, as it relates to identifying SSCs within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)(iii). The staff requests that the applicant perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which aging management reviews were

performed, and any additional information related to material and environment combinations. For each structure and component for which aging management reviews were performed, describe the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the request section of this question is unclear because the request for additional information related to material and environment combinations was not specific. The staff is requesting the results of the applicants additional aging management reviews (AMRs) and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Request. Confirm the definition of the term safety-related used in the development of the LRA and address the applicability of 10 CFR 50.67 to GGNS, as it relates to identifying SSCs within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)(iii). Perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which aging management reviews (AMR) were performed, and the results of the AMR. For each structure and component for which AMRs were performed, identify the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

Draft RAI 2.1-2

Background. 10 CFR 54.4, "Scope," states, in part:

(a) Plant systems, structures and components [SSCs] within the scope of this part are –

(1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions –

- (i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
- (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or
- (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2), or 10 CFR 100.11, as applicable.

Issue. During the on-site scoping and screening methodology audit the staff determined that certain SSCs identified as safety-related in the plant equipment database were not included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1).

Request. The staff requests that the applicant provide the bases for not including any SSCs, identified as safety-related in the plant equipment database, within the scope of license renewal

in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The staff requests that the applicant perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which aging management reviews were performed, and any additional information related to material and environment combinations. For each structure and component for which aging management reviews were performed, describe the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the request section of this question is unclear because the request for additional information related to material and environment combinations was not specific. The staff is requesting the results of the applicants additional AMRs and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Request. Provide the bases for not including any SSCs, identified as safety-related in the plant equipment database, within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which AMR were performed, and the results of the AMR. For each structure and component for which AMRs were performed, identify the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

Draft RAI 2.1-3

Background. 10 CFR 54.4, "Scope," states, in part:

(a) Plant systems, structures and components [SSCs] within the scope of this part are –

(1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions –

- (i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
- (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or
- (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2), or 10 CFR 100.11, as applicable.

- (2) All nonsafety-related systems, structures and components whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in (a)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.

Issue. During the on-site scoping and screening methodology audit the staff reviewed the license renewal application, the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) implementing documents and license renewal drawings, and also performed plant walkdowns. The staff determined through the audit activities and discussion with the applicant that equipment that was no longer required had been placed in an abandoned state.

Request. The staff requests that the applicant provide details on the activities performed to confirm that all abandoned equipment, that at any time contained fluids and is in the proximity of safety-related SSCs, has been verified to be drained or included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). If abandoned equipment has not been verified to be drained or is not included within the scope of license renewal, provide a technical basis for not including the abandoned equipment within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The staff requests that the applicant perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which aging management reviews were performed, and any additional information related to material and environment combinations. For each structure and component for which aging management reviews were performed, describe the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the request section of this question is unclear because the request for additional information related to material and environment combinations was not specific. The staff is requesting the results of the applicants additional AMRs and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Request. Provide details on the activities performed to confirm that all abandoned equipment, that at any time contained fluids and is in the proximity of safety-related SSCs, has been verified to be drained or included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). If abandoned equipment has not been verified to be drained and is not included within the scope of license renewal, provide a technical basis for not including the abandoned equipment within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which AMRs were performed, and the results of the AMRs. For each structure and component for which AMRs were performed, identify the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

Additionally, the applicant stated that the phrase “placed in an abandoned state” within the issue section was unclear. The staff was referring to the “abandoned in place” and will reword the issue section accordingly. The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

Draft RAI 2.1-4

Background. 10 CFR 54.4, “Scope,” states, in part:

- (a) Plant systems, structures and components [SSCs] within the scope of this part are –
 - (1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions –
 - (i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
 - (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or
 - (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2), or 10 CFR 100.11, as applicable.
 - (2) All nonsafety-related systems, structures and components whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in (a)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.

Issue. During the on-site scoping and screening methodology audit the staff reviewed the license renewal application, license renewal implementing documents, current licensing basis documentation and performed walkdowns of the incomplete and abandoned Unit 2 turbine building and other adjacent structures.

The staff determined that the Unit 2 turbine building, which is adjacent to the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) turbine building and control building, both of which are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), is not included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). In addition, the staff noted that the radioactive waste building, which is also adjacent to the GGNS turbine building (but not the control building), is included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) for an intended function that includes, “Maintain structural integrity of non-safety related components such that safety functions are not affected and no impact on in-scope structures.”

During the audit the applicant indicated that the basis for not including the incomplete and abandoned Unit 2 turbine building within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) was an analysis that demonstrated that the Unit 2 turbine building would not move in a way that impacts adjacent buildings following flooding and earthquake events. However, the applicant did not provide information that demonstrated that the Unit 2 turbine building would not be subject to the effects of aging similar to other buildings of the same construction that the applicant had included within the scope of license renewal and made subject to an aging management program.

Request. The staff requests that the applicant provide a technical basis for not including the incomplete and abandoned Unit 2 turbine building, located adjacent to the GGNS turbine building and the control building, within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). If an analysis is cited as the technical basis for not including the Unit 2 turbine building within the scope of license renewal, demonstrate how the analysis considers the effects of aging relative to other buildings of similar construction that are included within the scope of license renewal. The staff requests that the applicant perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which aging management reviews were performed, and any additional information related to material and environment combinations. For each structure and component for which aging management reviews were performed, describe the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the request section of this question is unclear because the request for additional information related to material and environment combinations was not specific. The staff is requesting the results of the applicants additional AMRs and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Request. Provide a technical basis for not including the incomplete and abandoned Unit 2 turbine building, located adjacent to the GGNS turbine building and the control building, within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). If an analysis is cited as the technical basis for not including the Unit 2 turbine building within the scope of license renewal, demonstrate how the analysis considers the effects of aging relative to other buildings of similar construction that are included within the scope of license renewal. Perform a review of this issue and indicate if the review concludes that use of the scoping methodology precluded the identification of SSCs that should have been included within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Describe any additional scoping evaluations performed to address the 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria. List any additional SSCs included within the scope of license renewal as a result of the review, structures and components for which aging management reviews were performed, and the results of the AMR. For each structure and component for which aging management reviews were performed, identify the aging management programs, as applicable, to be credited for managing the identified aging effects.

The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

Draft RAI 3.1.2.1-1

Background. SRP-LR Section A.1.2.1, item 7, states that applicable aging effects to be considered for license renewal include those that could result from normal plant operation, including plant/system operating transients and plant shutdown.

In LRA Tables 3.1.2-1 and 3.1.2-3, the applicant stated that the carbon steel low alloy steel components including nozzles, nozzle safe ends and extensions, nozzle flanges, reactor vessel upper head, piping, flow elements, thermal sleeves, and valve bodies exposed to air – indoor

(external) do not require any aging effect to be managed. The related AMR items cite generic note G, indicating this environment is not in the GALL Report for the aging effects of this component and material combination. Also, the associated plant-specific note, 102, states that high component surface temperature precludes moisture accumulation that could result in corrosion.

Issue. In its review, the staff found that identical material and environment combinations were found in the GALL report, albeit not in the reactor coolant system. The staff noted that the applicant's basis for not managing the aging effect is that the temperature of the components under consideration is above the dew point. The GALL Report states that the aging effect of loss of material due to exposure of steel surfaces to indoor air, which can result in condensation but only rarely, should be considered. The staff also noted that during refueling outages, these components will be at ambient temperatures for prolonged periods of time, which may or may not be above the dew point.

Request. Provide the technical basis to justify why aging management is not necessary for the subject components given that, during normal plant events such as refueling outages, these components will be at or near ambient temperatures.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the request section of this question is unclear based on what was being asked to be justified. The staff is referencing the aging effects requiring management for the subject components and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Request. Provide the technical basis to justify why there are no aging effects requiring management for the subject components given that, during normal plant events such as refueling outages, these components will be at or near ambient temperatures.

The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

Draft RAI 3.3.1.82-1

Background. LRA Item 3.3.1-82, associated with elastomer seals and components exposed to air – indoor, uncontrolled (external) being managed for loss of material due to wear, was not used. The justification for not using the item is, “[w]ear of elastomer components is considered an event driven condition rather than an aging effect. If the elastomer component is properly designed, installed and maintained, contact with other surfaces leading to wear will not occur.” Likewise, LRA Item 3.3.1-96, elastomers seals and components exposed to air – indoor, uncontrolled (internal) being managed for loss of material due to wear, was not used. GALL Report Section IX.F defines wear “as the removal of surface layers due to relative motion between two surfaces or under the influence of hard, abrasive particles. Wear occurs in parts that experience intermittent relative motion, frequent manipulation, or in clamped joints where relative motion is not intended, but may occur due to a loss of the clamping force.”

Issue. The conclusion that properly designed, installed, and maintained components will not experience wear is not consistent with the GALL Report definition of wear. Within the definition of the term “wear” in GALL Report Section IX.F, there are three factors to consider that could cause age-related wear due to the design of the joint, including (a) relative motion between two surfaces under the influence of hard abrasive particles, (b) frequent manipulation, or (c) in

clamped joints where relative motion is not intended but may occur due to a loss of the clamping force. It is unclear to the staff whether there are any in-scope components that are designed in such a way that they could be impacted by the three age-related factors considered in the definition of wear.

Request.

- a. State whether any in-scope elastomeric components which are designed with relative motion are exposed to an internal or external environment that includes hard abrasive particles.
- b. State whether there are any in-scope elastomeric components that are susceptible to wear that over time, due to their frequent manipulation, could challenge the CLB function(s) of the component.
- c. State whether there are any in-scope elastomeric components designed with clamped joints where relative motion is not intended; however, they are susceptible to wear over time due to a loss of the clamping force and could wear and challenge the CLB function(s) of the component.
- d. If an AERM is applicable based on the configurations or aging mechanisms described in items (1) through (3), discuss how the AERM will be managed.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the LRA item references in the background section of this question were unclear. The staff is referencing LRA Table 3.3.1, items 82 and 96 and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Background. LRA Table 3.3.1, items 82 and 96, associated with elastomer seals and components, was not used. The justification for not using the item is, "[w]ear of elastomer components is considered an event driven condition rather than an aging effect. If the elastomer component is properly designed, installed and maintained, contact with other surfaces leading to wear will not occur."

GALL Report Section IX.F defines wear "as the removal of surface layers due to relative motion between two surfaces or under the influence of hard, abrasive particles. Wear occurs in parts that experience intermittent relative motion, frequent manipulation, or in clamped joints where relative motion is not intended, but may occur due to a loss of the clamping force."

The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

Draft RAI 3.3.1.76-1

Background. LRA Item 3.3.1-76, associated with elastomeric duct flexible connection exposed to interior indoor air states that hardening and loss of strength due to elastomer degradation should be managed with the External Surfaces Monitoring program. LRA Table 3.3.2-17, Control Room Ventilation System, lists an item for elastomeric duct flexible connections exposed to internal indoor air which cites item 3.3.1-76, generic note I and plant-specific note 306. This item states that there are no AERM and proposed AMP. Plant-specific note 306 states, "Changes of material properties and cracking in elastomers are results of exposure to ultra-violet light or elevated temperatures (> 95°F). The interior surfaces of these components are not exposed to ultra-violet light and are part of the control room HVAC system that is not exposed to elevated temperatures."

GALL Report Section IX.C states, “[h]ardening and loss of strength of elastomers can be induced by elevated temperature (over about 95°F or 35°C), and additional aging factors (e.g., exposure to ozone, oxidation, and radiation).”

Issue. The staff could not confirm that there are no aging effects for this component, material and environment combination because 95°F is a general guideline and does not necessarily apply to all elastomeric material types.

Request. State the specific material type for these elastomeric duct flexible connections and state the basis why there are no AERM and no proposed AMP. If the specific elastomeric material type does age despite being in an environment below 95°F, state how the item will be managed for aging.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the items being referenced in the request section of this question were unclear. The staff is referencing the effects of aging for the component and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Request. State the specific material type for these elastomeric duct flexible connections and state the basis why there are no AERM and no proposed AMP. If the specific elastomeric material type does age despite being in an environment below 95°F, state how the effects of aging will be managed.

The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

Draft RAI 3.3.2.19-3

Background. LRA Table 3.3.2-19-8 states that for Teflon flexible connections exposed to treated water (internal), there is no aging effect and no AMP is proposed.

Issue. While Teflon is resistant to temperatures higher than that encountered in spent fuel cooling systems, there are studies which demonstrate that certain grades of Teflon degrade when exposed to radiation.

Request. State the specific Teflon material type for these flexible connections and state the basis why there are no AERM and no proposed AMP. If the specific Teflon material type does age, state how the item will be managed for aging.

Discussion: The applicant stated that the items being referenced in the request section of this question were unclear. The staff is referencing the effects of aging for the component and will reword the request section of this question as follows:

Request. State the specific Teflon material type for these flexible connections and state the basis for why there are no AERM and, therefore, no proposed AMP. If the specific Teflon material type does age, state how the effects of aging will be managed.

The staff will issue the revised question as a formal RAI.

RAI 3.4.2.2.8-1

Background. The staff reviewed a sample of 35 components, material and environment combinations, selected from the license renewal application (LRA) during the aging management program (AMP) audit conducted January 22, 2012. These components were randomly selected for the staff to verify the accuracy of the information provided in the aging management review (AMR). The staff also performed walkdowns during the audit to determine whether the selected components material and environment combinations, as listed in the LRA were consistent with the descriptions in the LRA.

Issue. A stainless steel flexible connection in the lube oil system, LRA (Table 3.4.2-2-8), is listed as stainless steel, however, the staff could not verify this material as a stainless steel flexible connection during the audit, either by walkdown or subsequent review of documentation provided by the applicant.

Request. The staff requests that the applicant verify the material composition of the component described above and, if necessary provide the results of an updated aging management review, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Discussion: The applicant stated that the updated aging management review was submitted by letter dated May 1, 2012, based on discussion during the onsite audit. The staff has verified the update and will not issue this RAI.

August 15, 2012

LICENSEE: Entergy Operations, Inc.

FACILITY: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON MAY 23, 2012, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC., CONCERNING REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION (TAC. NO. ME7493)

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Enclosure 1 provides a listing of the participants and Enclosure 2 contains a listing of the RAIs discussed with the applicant, including a brief description on the status of the items.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

/RA/

Nathaniel Ferrer, Project Manager
Projects Branch 1
Division of License Renewal
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-416

Enclosures:
As stated

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Memorandum to Entergy Operations, Inc. from Nathaniel Ferrer dated August 15, 2012

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON MAY 23, 2012,
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