

EDO Principal Correspondence Control

FROM: DUE: 08/10/12

EDO CONTROL: G20120519

DOC DT: 07/10/12

FINAL REPLY:

Tom Gurdziel
Citizen

TO:

Chairman Macfarlane

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

** GRN **

CRC NO: 12-0338

DESC:

Fukushima-Related Comments for July 10, 2012 -
16-Month Status (EDATS: SECY-2012-0367)

ROUTING:

Borchardt
Weber
Johnson
Ash
Mamish
OGC/GC
Merzke, OEDO

DATE: 07/18/12

ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

NRR

Leeds


SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

TEMPLATE: SECY-017

ERLOS
SECY01
ERLOS: 1130-01

EDATS

Electronic Document and Action Tracking System



EDATS Number: SECY-2012-0367

Source: SECY

General Information

Assigned To: NRR

OEDO Due Date: 8/10/2012 11:00 PM

Other Assignees:

SECY Due Date: NONE

Subject: Fukushima-Related Comments for July 10, 2012 - 16 Month Status

Description:

CC Routing: NONE

ADAMS Accession Numbers - Incoming: NONE

Response/Package: NONE

Other Information

Cross Reference Number: G20120519, LTR-12-0338

Staff Initiated: NO

Related Task:

Recurring Item: NO

File Routing: EDATS

Agency Lesson Learned: NO

OEDO Monthly Report Item: NO

Process Information

Action Type: E-mail

Priority: Medium

Signature Level: No Signature Required

Sensitivity: None

Urgency: NO

Approval Level: No Approval Required

OEDO Concurrence: NO

OCM Concurrence: NO

OCA Concurrence: NO

Special Instructions:

Document Information

Originator Name: Tom Gurdziel

Date of Incoming: 7/10/2012

Originating Organization: Citizens

Document Received by SECY Date: 7/17/2012

Addressee: Chairman Macfarlane

Date Response Requested by Originator: NONE

Incoming Task Received: E-mail

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET

Date Printed: Jul 17, 2012 09:32

PAPER NUMBER: LTR-12-0338

LOGGING DATE: 07/17/2012

ACTION OFFICE: EDO

AUTHOR: Tom Gurdziel

AFFILIATION:

ADDRESSEE: Chairman resource

SUBJECT: Fukushima-related comments for 7-10-2012 - 16 month status

ACTION: Appropriate

DISTRIBUTION:

LETTER DATE: 07/10/2012

ACKNOWLEDGED No

SPECIAL HANDLING:

NOTES:

FILE LOCATION: ADAMS

DATE DUE:

DATE SIGNED:

EDO --G20120519

Wright, Darlene

From: Tom Gurdziel [tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 10:11 PM
To: CHAIRMAN Resource
Cc: hillsc@INPO.org; Bridget.Frymire@dps.ny.gov; 'Vanags, Uldis'; Screnci, Diane; P.Kaiser@iaea.org; jicc@ws.mofa.go.jp; JLD_Public Resource; 'Newal Agnihotri'; 'Tom Henry'; ESTRONSKI@aol.com; 'Holden, Tammy'; 'Lyon, Jill'; Fukushima@bas.edu; barclaw@assembly.state.ny.us; rich@oswegocounty.com; dbenyak@firstenergycorp.com; senator_leahy@leahy.senate.gov; 'Turkal, Mark'; Michael.GaffneySr@pseg.com
Subject: Fukushima-related Comments for 7-10-2012 16 Month Status

Good morning,

(U.S.) Regional Centers for Rapid Dispatch of Emergency Material

No Regional Center is in operation.

Locations for the Regional Centers have not been publically announced.

Lists of equipment and supplies to (eventually) be purchased for the Regional Centers have not been made public.

Adequacy of (U.S.) Multi-plant-site Offsite AC Power

Such studies have not been done.

Adequacy of (U.S.) Single-plant-site Offsite AC Power

Such studies have not been done.

Use of (U.S.) Common Facilities during Emergencies

Noting that a common control room was used at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 and 2 and noting further that both reactor cores there have melted, has the use of a common control room at multiple plant sites during emergencies involving all plants on site been studied?

Such studies have not been done.

Noting that vent ductwork connections to a common stack appear to have enabled the destruction of the (non-operating) Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4 from the explosive gases of Unit 3, has the use of connected vent pathways been studied to determine previously unanticipated risk?

Unknown

Command & Control

Given that no direct chain of command appears to exist between shift supervision and any auxiliary operator at Fukushima-Daiichi Units 1 – 4 as shown on the page 62 chart of INPO Report 11-005, has the organizational structure of U.S. nuclear plants been reviewed for adequacy during multi-plant accidents?

Unknown

Workforce Size

Noting that the March 11, 2011 accident occurred on a weekday during ordinary working hours when a maximum of people were available on site, has the workforce size necessary for (U.S.) multi-plant accidents been compared with that

Hardened Vents

Given that it appears hardened vents were installed at the Fukushima Daiichi BWR Mk I plants but they were unable to reduce primary containment pressure sufficiently and quickly enough to save any reactor core, has a study been done to determine the likelihood of similar failure of U.S. BWR Mk I hardened vents to work as needed to prevent core melt?

No public report of such a study.

Earthquake, (U.S.)

Proposed efforts under discussion.

Flood, (U.S.)

Proposed efforts under discussion (but may overlook flood-water-carried debris impact.)

Final Disposal of Large Amounts of Spent Nuclear Fuel in (U.S.) BWR Elevated Pools

Proposed efforts under discussion are limited to pool instrumentation enhancements only.

Thank you,

Thomas Gurdziel
Member, ASME

Do you think the informed public would be comfortable with our progress to date?