



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

July 17, 2012

Mr. Preston Gillespie
Vice President, Oconee Site
Duke energy Carolinas, LLC
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - CLOSEOUT OF BULLETIN 2011-01, "MITIGATING STRATEGIES" (TAC NOS. ME6457, ME6458, AND ME6459)

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML111250360), to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The purpose of the bulletin was to obtain a comprehensive verification that licensees' mitigating strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel cooling, and containment following a large explosion or fire were compliant with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Section 50.54(hh)(2).

The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, provided its responses to the bulletin by letters dated June 9 and July 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML11161A168 and ML11193A261, respectively). By letter dated January 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A008), the NRC sent the licensee a request for additional information (RAI). The licensee responded to the RAI by letter dated February 16, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12052A006).

The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and concludes that its response to the bulletin is acceptable. As summarized in the enclosure, the NRC staff verified that the licensee provided the information requested in the bulletin. No further information or actions under the bulletin are requested.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John Boska", is positioned above the typed name and title.

John Boska, Senior Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287

Enclosure: Summary of NRC Bulletin 2011-01 Response Review

cc w/ encl: Distribution via Listserv

SUMMARY OF NRC BULLETIN 2011-01
"MITIGATING STRATEGIES" RESPONSE REVIEW
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies," (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML111250360) to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f). The first responses were due 30 days after issuance of the bulletin. By letter dated June 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11161A168), Oconee Nuclear Station (Oconee), Units 1, 2, and 3, provided its response to this first set of questions (first response). The second responses were due 60 days after issuance of the bulletin. By letter dated July 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11193A261), Oconee provided its response to this second set of questions (second response). By letter dated January 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A008), the NRC sent a request for additional information (RAI) on the second response. Oconee responded to the RAI by letter dated February 16, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12052A006). As summarized below, the NRC staff has verified that Oconee provided the information requested in the bulletin.

1.0 BACKGROUND

On February 25, 2002, the NRC issued EA-02-026, "Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures" (ICM Order). Section B.5.b of the ICM Order required licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire.

By letter dated August 16, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072260290), the NRC staff issued its Safety Evaluation (SE) to document the final disposition of information submitted by Oconee regarding Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. Along with the SE, the staff issued a conforming license condition to incorporate the B.5.b mitigating strategies into the licensing basis.

On March 27, 2009, the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) as a new rule, in order to capture the B.5.b mitigating strategies and related license conditions as regulatory requirements for both current and future licensees. At that time, licensee compliance with the conforming license conditions was sufficient to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) (74 FR 13926) so no further actions were required on the part of current licensees.

Enclosure

2.0 30-Day Request

In order to confirm continued compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), the bulletin requested that licensees address the following two questions within 30 days of issuing the bulletin:

1. Is the equipment necessary to execute the mitigating strategies, as described in your submittals to the NRC, available and capable of performing its intended function?
2. Are the guidance and strategies implemented capable of being executed considering the current configuration of your facility and current staffing and skill levels of the staff?

The NRC staff reviewed Oconee's first response to determine if it had adequately addressed these questions.

2.1 Question 1: Availability and Capability of Equipment

In its first response, Oconee confirmed that equipment it needs to execute the 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) mitigating strategies is available and capable of performing its intended function. The NRC staff verified that this confirmation covered equipment needed for each of the three phases of B.5.b mitigation strategies. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that Oconee has adequately responded to Question 1.

2.2 Question 2: Guidance and Strategies Can Be Executed

In its first response, Oconee confirmed that the guidance and strategies it has implemented for 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) are capable of being executed considering the current facility configuration, staffing levels, and staffs' skills. Since Oconee has considered its current facility configuration, staffing levels, and staff's skills, and confirmed that it can execute its implemented guidance and strategies, the NRC staff finds that Oconee has adequately responded to Question 2.

3.0 60-DAY REQUEST

The bulletin required a response to the following five questions within 60 days of issuing the bulletin:

1. Describe in detail the maintenance of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it is functional when needed.
2. Describe in detail the testing of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it will function when needed.
3. Describe in detail the controls for ensuring that the equipment is available when needed.
4. Describe in detail how configuration and guidance management is ensured so that strategies remain feasible.

5. Describe in detail how you ensure availability of offsite support.

The NRC staff reviewed Oconee's submittals to determine if it had adequately addressed these questions. This was accomplished by verifying that the submittals listed equipment, training, and offsite resources which were relied upon to make conclusions in the August 16, 2007, SE or are commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies.

3.1 Questions 1 and 2: Maintenance and Testing of Equipment

Questions 1 and 2 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail the maintenance and testing of equipment procured to support the strategies and guidance required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) in order to ensure that it is functional when needed. In its second response, Oconee listed the equipment used to support the 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) mitigating strategies which receives maintenance or testing. For each item, Oconee described the maintenance and testing performed, including the frequency and basis for the maintenance or testing activity.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee listed equipment that typically requires maintenance or testing which was relied upon to make conclusions in the SE or commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies. In its second response, Oconee stated that the portable pump, hoses, and satellite phones receive maintenance or testing. Oconee did not identify maintenance or testing of monitor nozzles, spray nozzles, or similar devices in its second response. In its RAI response, Oconee described how it ensures that its spray devices will be functional when needed. In its RAI response, Oconee also described the testing and inventory of radios and related communications equipment. The NRC staff noted that the fuel level for the portable pump is verified during maintenance. Oconee also identified other items that support the mitigating strategies that receive maintenance or testing.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee described the process used for corrective actions and listed the testing performed to ensure that the strategies were initially feasible. Oconee stated in its second response that its 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, corrective action program is used to document equipment failure, establish priorities, and perform trending.

Based upon the above information, the NRC staff finds that Oconee has provided the information requested by Questions 1 and 2.

3.2 Question 3: Controls on Equipment

Question 3 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail the controls on equipment, such as inventory requirements, to ensure that the equipment is available when needed. A list of inventory deficiencies and associated corrective actions to prevent loss was also requested.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee described its process for ensuring that B.5.b equipment will be available when needed. In its second response, Oconee identified equipment included in its inventory, the inventory frequency, storage requirements, and items verified. Items verified include proper quantity, location, and accessibility of equipment; compressed gas bottle pressures; calibrations; equipment shelf lives; and controls on storage locations. Oconee states that at the time of its second response there were no outstanding inventory deficiencies that would render the strategies not viable.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee inventoried equipment which was relied upon to make conclusions in the SE or commonly needed to implement the mitigating strategies. In its second response, Oconee stated that procured non-permanently installed B.5.b equipment is inventoried at least annually in accordance with station procedures. The second response specifically states that the following items are included in the inventory: portable pump; hoses; communications equipment; and Boggs box. The RAI response clarified that the Boggs box is the common name for the spent fuel pool spray device used at Oconee. In its RAI response, Oconee described how it ensures the availability of a vehicle to move the hose trailer if needed. In addition, the RAI response identified inventoried equipment stored in the EDM trailer which includes the equipment needed to implement the spent fuel pool spray strategy. Oconee also identified other items that support the mitigating strategies that are inventoried.

Based upon the above information, the NRC staff finds that Oconee has provided the information requested by Question 3.

3.3 Question 4: Configuration and Guidance Management

Question 4 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail how configuration and guidance management is assured so that the strategies remain feasible.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee described its measures to evaluate plant configuration changes for their effects on the mitigating strategies and to ensure its procedures are current. In its second response, Oconee states that the engineering change process requires a review of affected procedures. Personnel that review plant changes for impact to procedures are knowledgeable of the B.5.b mitigating strategies.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee described measures it has taken to validate the procedures or guidelines developed to support the mitigating strategies. In its second response, Oconee identified testing in response to Question 2 that demonstrated the ability to execute some strategies. Oconee also states that the "mitigating strategies were initially validated by walk downs, engineering evaluations and/or table top reviews" and they were similarly revalidated in 2011.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee described the training program implemented in support of the mitigating strategies and how its effectiveness is evaluated. In its second response, Oconee identified the training provided to its operations personnel; emergency response organization, including key decision makers; security personnel; and fire brigade. Oconee also identified the frequency with which each type of training is provided and the methods for training evaluating.

Based upon the above information, the NRC staff finds that Oconee has provided the information requested by Question 4.

3.4 Question 5: Offsite Support

Question 5 of the 60-day request required licensees to describe in detail how offsite support availability is assured.

The NRC staff verified that Oconee listed the offsite organizations it relies upon for emergency response, including a description of agreements and related training. The NRC staff compared

the list of offsite organizations that Oconee provided in its second response with the information relied upon to make conclusions in the SE. The NRC staff noted in its RAI that several offsite organizations listed in the SE were not included in the second response. In its RAI response, Oconee described its agreements with these other organizations. Oconee stated that it maintains letters of agreements with these offsite organizations, except for nearby airports. The second response stated that agreements listed are reviewed annually, and that the agreements were current at the time of its second response. Oconee also described the training and site familiarization it provides to these offsite organizations. Oconee stated that it reviewed its corrective action program back to 2008 and found no issues involving lapsed agreements related to offsite support for B.5.b events.

Based upon the above information, the NRC staff finds that Oconee has provided the information requested by Question 5.

4.0 CONCLUSION

As described above, the NRC staff has verified that Oconee has provided the information requested in Bulletin 2011-01. Specifically, Oconee responded to each of the questions in the bulletin as requested. The NRC staff concludes that Oconee has completed all of the requirements of the bulletin and no further information or actions under the bulletin are needed.

July 17, 2012

Mr. Preston Gillespie
Vice President, Oconee Site
Duke energy Carolinas, LLC
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - CLOSEOUT OF BULLETIN
2011-01, "MITIGATING STRATEGIES" (TAC NOS. ME6457, ME6458, AND
ME6459)

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

On May 11, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML111250360), to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operation and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The purpose of the bulletin was to obtain a comprehensive verification that licensees' mitigating strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel cooling, and containment following a large explosion or fire were compliant with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Section 50.54(hh)(2).

The bulletin required two sets of responses pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, provided its responses to the bulletin by letters dated June 9 and July 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML11161A168 and ML11193A261, respectively). By letter dated January 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A008), the NRC sent the licensee a request for additional information (RAI). The licensee responded to the RAI by letter dated February 16, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12052A006).

The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and concludes that its response to the bulletin is acceptable. As summarized in the enclosure, the NRC staff verified that the licensee provided the information requested in the bulletin. No further information or actions under the bulletin are requested.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John Boska, Senior Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287

Enclosure: Summary of NRC Bulletin 2011-01 Response Review

cc w/ encl: Distribution via Listserv

DISTRIBUTION:

Public
LPL2-1 R/F
RidsNrrLASFiguroa
RidsNrrDprPgcb

RidsOgcMailCenter
RidsRgn2MailCenter
RidsNrrDoriLpl2-2
RidsNrrDoriDpr

BPurnell, NRR
RidsNrrPMOconee
RidsAcraAcnw_MailCTR

ADAMS Accession No. ML12193A492

* By Memo Date

OFFICE	NRR/LPL2-1/PM	NRR/LPL2-1/PM	NRR/LPL2-1/LA	DPR/PGCB/BC(A)*	NRR/LPL2-1/BC	NRR/LPL2-1/PM
NAME	VSreenivas	JBoska	SFiguroa	KMogan-Butler	NSalgado	JBoska
DATE	07/11/12	07/17/12	07/12/12	06/28/12	07/12/12	07/17/12

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY