

To: Leeds, NRR

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

CYS: EDO
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OGC
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Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager
In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

We wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

- The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.
- The plan in the event of a severe accident – which is to vent dangerous steam, gases and radiation into the Standby Gas Treatment System building which will blow off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level – poses severe risk to workers and the public.
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Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until Entergy Nuclear Operations publicly documents a post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick containment vent plan, and until the public is afforded hearings to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by FitzPatrick. I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. Jessica Azulay at the Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition.

Thank you,

Name (print): Rachel Rodriguez Signature [Signature]
Date 6/12/12 Email: fblog541341@gmail.com
Address: _____

Name (print): Eric Whitney Signature [Signature]
Date 6/12/12 Email: Reason-politics@gmail.com
Address: _____

Name (print): Conner Brady Signature [Signature]
Date 6/12/12 Email: thequitarplayer@hotmail.com
Address: 10720 Craig Rd. Trumbull City, N. Chicago

Name (print): Thomas Bain Signature [Signature]
Date 6/12/12 Email: +bain117@yahoo.com
Address: 145 Park Lane Rock N.Y 14625

Template: EDO-001

E-RIDS: EDO-01

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Thank you,

Name (print): Kim Little-Givens Signature Kim Little-Givens
Date 6/12/12 Email: _____
Address: 300 Malden Road Mattydale NY 13211
Name (print): Bryce Butler Signature Bryce Butler
Date 6/12/2012 Email: BBUTTER@MCLLSINCBOT.COM
Address: Congston NY-13032
Name (print): DAVE J RANDAU Signature DJ Randau
Date 6-12-12 Email: DAVEJRANDAU@AOL.COM
Address: 111 ROBBINS LN DEWITT NY 13214
Name (print): Bruce Kendall Signature Bruce Kendall
Date _____ Email: 61K-1@xatoo.com
Address: Dundee NY

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Name (print): Patti Bergeron Michael Signature: Patti B. Michael

Date: 6/12/12 Email: _____

Address: 4299 Elwood Rd Cincinnati NY 13040

Name (print): Scott A. Conrad Signature: Scott A. Conrad

Date: 6/12/12 Email: _____

Address: 331 Stone Jay Rd Dundee, NY 14837

Name (print): Cory Hall Signature: Cory Hall

Date: 6/12/12 Email: hallc1826@gmail.com

Address: 700 College Dr. Incline Village, NV 89452

Name (print): Mike Axelrod Signature: Mike Axelrod

Date: Jun 12/12 Email: _____

Address: 8 N. Howard Dr. Fairport NY 14450

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Name (print): Megan Henderson-Landt Signature: Megan Henderson-Landt
Date: 6/12/12 Email: llandt@9mail.com
Address: 135 Pond Rd. Honey Falls, NY 14472

Name (print): Leah R Haley Signature: Leah R Haley
Date: 6-12-12 Email: _____
Address: 156 Cottage Street Lockport NY 14094

Name (print): Ray Haley Signature: Ray Haley
Date: 6/12/12 Email: csn-flagdude@yahoo.com
Address: 144 Waterman St Lockport NY 14094

Name (print): GEO. PIDLISNY Signature: George Pidlisny
Date: 6-12-12 Email: _____
Address: 3509 SKYLINE DR. PENN YAN, N.Y. 14527

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Name (print): Michael Williams Signature [Signature]

Date 6/12/12 Email: Michael.williams14415@aol.com

Address: 2880 Williams Hill Road, Penn Yan, NY 14527

Name (print): MATT CONN Signature [Signature]

Date 6/12/12 Email: ~~acerj08@gmail.com~~

Address: _____

Name (print): ROBERT JELSON Signature [Signature]

Date 6/12/2012 Email: acerj08@gmail.com

Address: _____

Name (print): MARK P. ROBERTSON Signature [Signature]

Date 06-12-12 Email: Seubaman19722002@yahoo.com

Address: _____

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Name (print): Stefanie Sager Signature Stefanie Sager
Date 6/12/12 Email: rocketstef@rocketmail.com
Address: 8 Northwood Dr Fairport NY 14450

Name (print): Ann Rutland Signature Ann Rutland
Date _____ Email: _____
Address: Powell, OH

Name (print): Richard Guzak Signature Richard Guzak
Date 6-12-12 Email: rguz@verizon.net
Address: Auburn NY 13021

Name (print): Christine Newman Signature Christine Newman
Date 6/12/12 Email: _____
Address: 4526 Maiden Lane Cdga 14424

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
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
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
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
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Name (print): Doug Muxworthy Signature 
Date 6/12/12 Email: dmuxy@yahoo.com
Address: 4520 MAIDEN LN COEN, N.Y. 14424

Name (print): Martin C McMillan Signature 
Date 6-12-12 Email: MARTYANDJAYNE@FRONTIERNET.NET
Address: 6625 ROSSIER RD CANADARUA

Name (print): TERRI DAILEY Signature 
Date 6/12/12 Email: tdailey53@live.com
Address: 831 VICTOR RD. MACEDON, N.Y. 14502

Name (print): Jill Parham Signature 
Date 6-12-12 Email: jill-parham.pittsford.monroe.edu
Address: _____

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Name (print): C. SEMRAU Signature C. Semrau
Date 6/11/12 Email: _____

Address: 217 Renouf Dr 14624

Name (print): M. Semrau Signature [Signature]
Date 6/11/12 Email: _____

Address: 217 Renouf Dr 14624

Name (print): Mary Kuhn Signature Mary Kuhn
Date 6/12/12 Email: kuhn@geneseo.edu

Address: 8513 Kuhn Rd. Dansville, NY 14437

Name (print): Thomas Petrick Signature [Signature]
Date 6/12/12 Email: TallKadmarly@gmail.com

Address: _____

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Name (print): Jason R. Gallagher Signature: Jason R. Gallagher
Date: 6/6/12 Email: heartofjas@gmail.com
Address: 404 Nichols Ave, Syr. NY 13206

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Thank you,

Name (print):

Kathryn Davis

Signature

Kathryn Davis

Date

6/5/2012

Email:

Address:

111 Parsons Rd Camillus 13031

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
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Name (print):

Susan Kline

Signature



Date

6/5/12

Email:

Address:

404 Nichols Ave. Syracuse, NY 13206

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The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

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2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.


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I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you,

Name (print): KENEL ANTOINE

Signature



Date 6/4/12

Email: kantoine@twcny.rr.com

Address: 98 CRAWFORD AVE, SYRACUSE, NY 13224

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

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Thank you,

Name (print):

Kent L. Howland

Signature



Date

4 June 2012

Email:

kenleehow@ yahoo.com

Address:

215 E Lake Rd Port Byron NY 13140

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

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Thank you,

Name (print): Charles G. Hannah

Signature

Charles G. Hannah

Date 4 June 2012

Email: _____

Address: _____

217 Genesee Park Dr., Syracuse, NY 13224

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager
In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York


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
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- The plan in the event of a severe accident – which is to vent dangerous steam, gases and radiation into the Standby Gas Treatment System building which will blow off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level – poses severe risk to workers and the public.
- The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers posed by the current FitzPatrick venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

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Thank you,

Name (print): TAMARA STOPINSKI Signature: 
Date: 6/12/12 Email: _____

Address: _____

Name (print): JAMES J. STOPINSKI Signature: 
Date: _____ Email: _____

Address: _____

Name (print): _____ Signature: _____

Date: _____ Email: _____

Address: _____

Name (print): _____ Signature: _____

Date: _____ Email: _____

Address: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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Thank you,

Name (print): DAVID PRAEFKE Signature David Praefke
Date 6/12/2012 Email: DPRAEFKE1@YAHOO.COM
Address: 31 WEST MAIN ST, APT 1 HONEOYE FALLS NY 14472

Name (print): _____ Signature _____

Date _____ Email: _____

Address: _____

Name (print): _____ Signature _____

Date _____ Email: _____

Address: _____

Name (print): _____ Signature _____

Date _____ Email: _____

Address: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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Thank you,

Marea Gordett

Signature

June 2, 2012

Date

Name (print): MAREA GORDETT

Address: 1 HUNTER'S RUN BLVD

City/State/ Zip COHAES, NY 12047

Email: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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Thank you,

Deborah R.
Signature

02-June-12
Date

Name (print): DEBORAH L. ROSS

Address: 114 MARIE DR

City/State/ Zip Fonda NY 12068-5130

Email: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

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Thank you,


Signature

6/2/12
Date

Name (print): DENISE GRAMINSKI

Address: 22 CONVER DR

City/State/ Zip SARATOGA SPRINGS NY

Email: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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Thank you,



Signature

6/2/12
Date

Name (print): Sylvia Mlynarska

Address: 424 Sand Creek Rd Apt 416

City/State/ Zip Albany NY 12205

Email: msylvia16@yahoo.com

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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Thank you,

Peter Jellet 6/2/12
Signature Date
Name (print): Peter Jellet
Address: 424 Sand Creek
City/State/ Zip Albany, NY 12205
Email: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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- 1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.
- 2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

- The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the preexisting containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.
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I/We wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy (Citizens' Environmental Coalition is a founding member of the Alliance) will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you,

Raymond W Perry
Signature

6/2/12
Date

Name (print): RAYMOND W PERRY

Address: 140 BIRCH LANE

City/State/ Zip GLENVIEW, NY 12302

Email: raywperry@gmail.com

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I/ We wish to co-petition with Citizens' Environmental Coalition, the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear in their March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

- Nuclear Reactors of the GE Mark I design have very small containment structures, and as a result cannot contain radiation in the event of a severe accident. Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors demonstrated this problem in 2011.
- The NRC requested that all Mark I reactors install hardened vents to allow the release of gases and pressure build up, in order to prevent an explosion.
- The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "preexisting" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.
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- The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.
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
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
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Thank you,


Signature


Date

Name (print): STEVEN MOSKOWITZ

Address: 8 Tenn Ct.

City/State/ Zip Beauford NY

Email: SMOSKOWITZ@CAP.RR.COM

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I/ We wish to co-petition with Citizens' Environmental Coalition, the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear in their March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

- Nuclear Reactors of the GE Mark I design have very small containment structures, and as a result cannot contain radiation in the event of a severe accident. Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors demonstrated this problem in 2011.
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Thank you,

James Travers
Signature

June 2, 2012
Date

Name (print): JAMES TRAVERS

Address: 587 A Blodgett Hill Road

City/State/ Zip RAVENA NY 12143

Email: JATRAV@YAHOO.COM

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

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Thank you,

Rebecca Burk
Signature

6/6/12
Date

Name (print): Rebecca Burk

Address: 1330320

City/State/ Zip San Luis 74

Email: robrara@aol.com

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

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Thank you,

Jessica D. Dowsett
Signature

6.2.2012
Date

Name (print): Jessica D. Dowsett

Address: 23 Delaware Terrace

City/State/ Zip Albany, NY 12203

Email: jessica.dowsett@gmail.com

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

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Thank you,

Marcia E. Pennock
Signature

6/2/12
Date

Name (print): MARCIA E. PENNOCK

Address: 75 Louist Park

City/State/ Zip Albany NY 12205

Email: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

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
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Thank you,


Signature

6/2/2012
Date

Name (print): Leslie Coffaro

Address: 6 Alden Ave

City/State/ Zip Albany NY 12209

Email: _____

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

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Thank you,

Linda S. Ochs
Signature

6/4/12
Date

Name (print): Linda S. Ochs

Address: 2400 Homestead Drive

City/State/ Zip Waterloo, NY 13165

Email: _____

JUNE 2, 2012

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

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Thank you,



Signature

JUNE 2, 2012

Date

Name (print):

THOMAS ELLIS

Address:

43 N. PINE AVE.

City/State/ Zip

ALBANY, NY 12203

Email:

tomellis309@yahoo.com

Mr. James Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager

In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

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
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- 2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

- The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the preexisting containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.
- It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I/We wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy (Citizens' Environmental Coalition is a founding member of the Alliance) will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you,


Signature

03 June 2012
Date

Name (print): L.E. Ismay

Address: c/o Drawer 460


City/State/ Zip Altamont New York (12009)

Email: — — —

ACKEE

2013 E. Gen

Syracuse, NY 13210



Mr. James Borchardt

Executive Director of Operations

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001