

June 11, 2012

MEMORANDUM TO: Matthew A. Mitchell, Chief
Policy and Support Branch
Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: John V. Kauffman, Senior Project Manager /RA/
Policy and Support Branch
Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MAY 14, 2012, PUBLIC MEETING ON
PRELIMINARY PLANS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TIER 3
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA
DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff held a public meeting on May 14, 2012. The purposes of this meeting were to brief stakeholders on the staff's preliminary plans for implementation of the Tier 3 recommendations, provide an opportunity for stakeholders and the NRC staff to exchange information on the Tier 3 recommendations, afford stakeholders an opportunity to ask the NRC staff clarifying and amplifying questions on the plans, and provide input for consideration before the plans are finalized.

The meeting was the last in a series of three focused specifically on the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Tier 3 recommendations. The staff presented preliminary plans for addressing Tier 3 recommendations, including Recommendation 5.2, "Hardened Vents for Other Containment Designs," Recommendation 6, "Hydrogen Control and Mitigation Inside Containment or in Other Buildings," and an Additional Recommendation, "Transfer of Spent Fuel to Dry Cask Storage." The staff also gave a presentation on information gathered for Fukushima NTTF Tier 1 Recommendation 5.1, "Reliable Hardened Vents for Mark I and II Containments." The public had an opportunity to comment and discuss the recommendation following each individual staff presentation. The working groups will consider the public comments in developing the final plans for the addressing the recommendations. The draft project plans for comment and public meeting presentations are included in the meeting package. In addition, the meeting package contains written comments submitted by the public.

Public Participation:

There was lively discussion on each topic except Recommendation 5.2. The staff is deferring planning for Recommendation 5.2 until receipt of management direction on the related Tier 1 Recommendation 5.1.

Some audience and teleconference members supported the expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry casks. The main reasons given were that current spent fuel storage is not safe in that spent fuel pools were not originally designed to store the quantities of fuel that are being now stored; and reducing the fuel stored and associated heat load would allow more time before a pool could overheat and reduce the radioactive material inventory that could be released. Some audience members supported the status quo, asserting that current storage practices are safe, and that Fukushima Tier 1 fixes, e.g. FLEX and associated procedures, and improved spent fuel pool level instrumentation, would further enhance spent fuel storage safety.

Some audience and teleconference members supported action or study to minimize the likelihood or extent of damage caused by hydrogen explosions or deflagrations. In particular, the staff was urged to consider that previous hydrogen generation rates considered may have been non-conservative, and that large amounts of hydrogen could be generated very rapidly during a severe accident. The staff was also urged to consider these high generation rates and their effect on containments under Recommendation 5. Other members of the audience cautioned the staff to proceed cautiously and to be mindful of unintended consequences, wherein a change could lead to new failure modes or event sequences.

Some audience and teleconference members felt very strongly about Mark I and II containments, urging the staff to permanently shutdown of boiling-water reactors with Mark I and II containments. Another audience member encouraged that staff to think beyond the hardened filtered vent systems that some European nations had installed in the 1980s. An industry representative indicated that hardened, filtered ventilation was a complex topic, and that it was more important to do it right, rather than quickly. Accordingly, the Nuclear Energy Institute would be sending a letter to the Commission requesting that staff perform a more comprehensive analysis that considers other alternatives for precluding and mitigating potential releases from core damage events, and credits safety improvements being installed under Tier 1, e.g. FLEX equipment and procedures.

Enclosure:
List of Attendees

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LIST OF ATTENDEES
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
MAY 7, 2012, PUBLIC MEETING ON PRELIMINARY PLANS
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TIER 3 RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED
TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT

Name	Organization
John Monninger	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Steve Jones	NRC
Kevin Witt	NRC
Richard Dudley	NRC
Jessica Kratchman	NRC
John Kauffman	NRC
Bill Ruland	NRC
Richard Lee	NRC
Pat Castleman	NRC
Katie Wagner	NRC
John Parillo	NRC
David Brown	NRC
Antonio Diaz	NRC
Tim Collins	NRC
Gordon Curran	NRC
Sud Basu	NRC
Nageswara Karipineni	NRC
Andrew Barto	NRC
Allen Notafranceso	NRC
Jerome Bettie	NRC
Steven Kraft	Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Adrian Heymer	NEI
Herschel Specter	RBR Consultants, Inc.
Paul Bemis	DCPP
Greg Krueger	Exelon
Masrur Khan	Bechtel
Thomas Hafera	Worley Parsons
Pete Cochran	Morgan Lewis
Gary Pavis	Constellation Energy Nuclear Group
Adam Levin	Exelon
Terry Grebel	PG&E
Jearl Strickland	PG&E
Roy Brosi	FENOC
Hidehiko Yamachika	JNES
Jana Bergman	Sciencetech/CWFC
Randy Bunt	SNC
Jim Riccio	Greenpeace

In addition, more than 20 individuals participated via webinar and teleconference.

Enclosure