

From: [JLD_Public Resource](#)
To: [Monninger, John](#); [Kauffman, John](#)
Subject: FW: Meeting to DISCUSS NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE TIER 3 RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT
Date: Monday, May 07, 2012 4:20:01 PM

Comments from the public to consider. No written disposition is needed back to Mr. Leuer, unless you feel it's warranted.

From: Leuer, Kevin (DPS) [mailto:kevin.leuer@state.mn.us]
Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 1:12 PM
To: JLD_Public Resource
Cc: Leuer, Kevin (DPS); King, William; Logaras, Harral; Sullivan, Randy
Subject: Meeting to DISCUSS NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE TIER 3 RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT

I would like to submit the following in regards to this public meeting.

I think it is important to formally reevaluate the current regulations in regards to the Emergency Planning Zones and the Ingestion Planning Zones and the use of KI as a secondary protective measure. Based on the data and sampling analysis from the real event in Japan and the recently updated State of the Art Reactor Consequence Analysis conducted by the NRC it is prudent to review and evaluate the current Emergency Planning Zone and Ingestion Planning Zones.

The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) should be sized to include all areas where emergency evacuations may be needed based on actual events and projected severe reactor incidents whatever that distance is. The EPZ should not be expanded to include all areas where relocation PAGs may be exceeded because relocation is very different than evacuation.

There may be a gap in preparedness for relocation of the population because it appears that relocation PAGs may be exceeded beyond the current EPZ distance based on the event in Japan. Relocation is very different than evacuation and if relocation PAGs may be exceeded outside the current EPZ jurisdictions there may be a gap in planning and training for relocation in those areas.

Before the EPZ is expanded an evaluation needs to be done to determine the distance that Evacuation PAGs may be exceeded based on the event in Japan and the recent study that was done. The evaluation should consider the difference between Evacuation and Relocation PAGs.

Consideration should be given to establishing a Relocation Planning Zone that has different requirements than those of the current EPZ because emergency evacuations are very different than relocations. Specific planning, training and exercising may be needed for areas at risk of exceeding relocation PAGs if they are outside of the current or future EPZ jurisdictions.

The size of the Ingestion Pathway Zone should be sized to include all areas where DIL for food products may be exceeded based on actual events and projected severe reactor incidents whatever that distance is.

The recent reactor accident in Japan has real world data that will either reinforce that our current

preparedness methodologies are sound or define that enhancements may be needed in order to be better prepared to ensure the protection of the population and the food supply. A formal public process and evaluation will only enhance the safety of the public.

Thanks for your consideration,

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