



FEMA

NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

To Whom It May Concern:

Enclosed is one copy of the After Action (AAR) / Improvement Plan (IP) for the November 2, 2011, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise for the Clinton Power Station. The State of Illinois, DeWitt, Macon, McLean, and Piatt Counties, and the utility owner/operator, Exelon Nuclear, participated in this exercise.

The After Action (AAR) / Improvement Plan (IP) was prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) Region V, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program.

No Deficiencies were identified for any jurisdiction during this exercise.

There was one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified during this exercise for the State of Illinois. There were no ARCAs identified for DeWitt, Macon, Mclean or Piatt Counties.

The ARCA for the State of Illinois was identified under Criterion 1.c.1 – Key personnel with functional roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible, whereby the State of Illinois Response Center Manager, knowing that the Nuclear Accident Reporting System phones were not operational, did not determine an expedited method of informing DeWitt County of the changes in Emergency Classification Levels or issuance of any Protective Action Recommendations.

There was one ARCA from a previous exercise for the State of Illinois. Prior ARCA 09-11-2b2-A-01 – The SIRC Manager did not reconsider restricting air traffic after a change in radiological conditions, allowing aircraft to fly through the plume. During the November 2, 2011 CPS Exercise, the SIRC Manager directed a request to the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to restrict air space in the affected area surrounding CPS. This ARCA was successfully demonstrated, by the State of Illinois, during this exercise.

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There was one ARCA from the previous Clinton Power Station exercise for DeWitt County. Prior ARCA 13-09-1c1-A-01 – The Emergency Services and Disaster Coordinator left the Emergency Operations Center without delegating someone to provide direction and control. A State NARS message arrived stating a wind direction change had occurred and the State did not recommend Sub-area 2 be evacuated. No discussion concerning the wind direction change was identified or addressed as a concern. During the November 2, 2011 CPS Exercise, the evaluator observed mutual collaboration and support between DeWitt County's senior leaders allowing the command staff to maintain overall situational awareness and effectively manage the efforts of the DeWitt County EOC staff coordinating emergency response operations with the State and supporting counties. This ARCA was successfully demonstrated by the DeWitt County, during this exercise.

There was one Plan Issue identified during this exercise for DeWitt County. There were no Plan Issues identified for the State of Illinois, Macon, Mclean or Piatt Counties.

The Plan Issue for DeWitt County was identified under Criterion 1.a.1 – OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The Plan Issue was identified in DeWitt County Plan Annex 2G, Notification Lists, whereby the primary and alternate point of contact for Macon County are reversed.

There was one Plan Issue from a previous exercise for the State of Illinois, which remains unresolved under Criterion 5.b.1 – Information contained within the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) Volume I, Concept of Operations, and Radiological Task Force (RTF) Procedure RTF-POS-2 are not consistent in regards to the KI information that is provided to the public.

Based on the results of the November 2, 2011, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Illinois and affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Clinton Power Station can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Illinois site-specific to the Clinton Power Station, granted on January 12, 1987, remains in effect.


Copies of this Report were transmitted to the DHS/FEMA National Office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region III, and the State of Illinois.

If you have any questions, please contact William E. King, Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee, DHS/FEMA, Region V, at (312) 408-5575.

Sincerely,



Andrew Velasquez III
Regional Administrator



Clinton Power Station

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - November 02, 2011

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



FEMA

Published February 01, 2012

Clinton Power Station After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Published February 01, 2012

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 2, 2011, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was evaluated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Clinton Power Station (CPS). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the capabilities of the State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on November 18, 2009. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on January 13, 1987.

DHS/FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise. In the State of Illinois, the risk county of DeWitt and the support counties of Macon, McLean and Piatt participated along with State Government.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This Final After Action Report (AAR)/Improvement Plan (IP) contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence interviews and activities:

- Illinois State Police (ISP) District 10 Headquarters Dosimetry Control Officers (DCO) Briefing;
- ISP Traffic and Access Control Post (TACP) at the ISP District 10 Headquarters;
- Medical Services Transportation and Hospital (MS-1) evaluation at St Mary's Hospital;
- Protective Actions for Schools (EV-2) for the Clinton School District 15;
- Monitoring and Decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers;
- Monitoring and Decontamination of emergency worker's equipment;
- Public Registration and Congregate Care;
- Clinton Police Department DCO Briefing;
- Clinton Police Department TACP.

Except where noted in this report, the State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of and adequately implemented their emergency response plans and procedures.

INTRODUCTION - EXERCISE BASIS

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. The DHS/FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350 "Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness", 351 "Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness" and 352 "Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: Emergency Preparedness Planning" (Commonly referred to as 44 CFR 350 through 352). These regulations are a key element in the REP Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Regulation 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for DHS/FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.

DHS/FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993, (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
- Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological

emergency planning process:

- U.S. Department of Agriculture;
- U.S. Department of Commerce;
- U.S. Department of Energy;
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
- U.S. Department of the Interior;
- U.S. Department of Transportation;
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration; and
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS/FEMA Region V Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by DHS/FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the CPS to FEMA Region V by the State of Illinois and involved local jurisdictions occurred on March 31, 1981. Formal approval of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on June 4, 1982, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted on November 2, 2011, and evaluated by DHS/FEMA to assess the capabilities of State and local offsite emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the CPS. The purpose of this AAR/IP is to present the exercise results and findings based on the performance of the Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this AAR/IP are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the DHS/FEMA Region V RAC Chairperson, and approved by the DHS/FEMA Headquarters.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

- FEMA-REP-14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual," September 1991; and
- FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice" as published in the Federal Register Notice, Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002.

Section 1 of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents information pertaining to the team that planned and coordinated the exercise. This section also provides a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated.

Section 2 of this report, entitled "Exercise Design Summary," contains the purpose and design of the exercise and presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise scenario.

Section 3 of this report, entitled "Analysis of Capabilities," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs), and Plan Issues if any, assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions, if applicable, for each identified exercise issue; and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

Section 4 of this report, entitled "Conclusion," presents the DHS/FEMA summary of overall exercise conduct and results as evaluated against the requirements of 44 CFR 350.

EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EPZ) DESCRIPTION

The CPS is located approximately seven miles northeast of the City of Clinton in Harp Township, within DeWitt County, Illinois. DeWitt County is located near the geographical center of the State of Illinois. The topography of the area is predominantly rolling prairies.

The 10-mile EPZ contains a total population of 12,702 (2010 census) within the risk county of DeWitt, and the support counties of Macon, McLean and Piatt. Nearly two-thirds of the total 10-

mile EPZ population (8,576) resides in the communities of Clinton, Weldon, Wapella and DeWitt. The land use within the 10-mile EPZ is predominantly agricultural, with cash grain crops of corn and soybeans. The closest industries are located in the community of Clinton.

Recreational facilities outside the municipalities include the Clinton Lake State Recreation Area and the Weldon Springs State Park. The park encompasses approximately 370 acres and contains a 28-acre lake with camping, fishing, and picnicking facilities. Weldon Springs is one of the two sizeable lakes within 10 miles of the site. Clinton Lake is a 4,895 acre man-made cooling lake within the CPS property lines. Recreational facilities accommodate camping, boating, hunting, fishing and hiking.

The nearest major highways are State Highways 54, 10, and 48, all of which intersect the plant location. Other major thoroughfares are U.S. Highway 51, located about six miles west of the plant and Interstate Highway 74, located about 11 miles northeast of the plant. The nearest railroad is the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad (ICG), which crosses the site east to west and comes within about three-fourths of a mile to the north of the reactor centerline. Another ICG track is located approximately three and a half miles south of the CPS.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name

Clinton Power Station

Type of Exercise

Plume

Exercise Date

November 02, 2011

Program

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Program

Scenario Type

Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

William King

Exercise RAC Chairperson

DHS/FEMA

Radiological Assistance Committee, Chairman

536 South Clark Street

Chicago, Illinois, 60605

312-408-5575

William.King@dhs.gov

Dwaine Warren

Exercise Director

DHS/FEMA

Supervisory REP Team Leader

536 South Clark Street

Chicago, Illinois, 60605
312-408-5342
Dwayne.Warren@dhs.gov

Gary Naskrent
Alternate Exercise Director
DHS/FEMA
Supervisory REP Team Leader
536 South Clark Street
Chicago, Illinois, 60605
312-408-5214
Gary.Naskrent@dhs.gov

Todd Gemske
Clinton Site Specialist/Exercise Coordination
DHS/FEMA
Technical Hazards Program Specialist
536 South Clark Street
Chicago, Illinois, 60605
312-408-4443
Todd.Gemske@dhs.gov

William Conway
State Lead Controller
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Manager, REP Section
1035 Outer Park Drive (1st floor)
Springfield, Illinois, 62704
217-785-9886
William.Conway@Illinois.gov

Jerry DeYoung
Lead Offsite Controller

Exelon
Offsite Programs
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, Illinois, 60555
630-657-4666
gerald.deyoung@exeloncorp.com

Mike Muth
Lead Offsite Planner
Exelon
Offsite Programs
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, Illinois, 60555
630-657-4674
mike.muth@exeloncorp.com

Randy Mika
Lead Exercise Scenario Developer
Exelon
Corporate Drill and Exercise Coordinator
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, Illinois, 60555
630-657-4662
randy.mika@exeloncorp.com

1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Clinton Power Station exercise:

State Jurisdictions

Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS)
Illinois State Police
Illinois National Guard

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency

Illinois Emergency Management Agency

Illinois Department on Aging

Illinois Department of Transportation

Illinois Department of Public Health

Illinois Department of Natural Resources

Illinois Department of Agriculture

Illinois Central Management System

Exelon Nuclear

Risk Jurisdictions

American Red Cross

ARES/RACES Volunteer

Chief of Police

City of Decatur Mayor

Clinton Police Department

Decatur Fire Department

Decatur Medical Hospital

DeWitt - Piatt Bi-County Health Department

DeWitt County Coroner

DeWitt County Sheriff's Office Central Communications (CEN COM)

Exelon Nuclear

IEMA State Liaison

Regent Communications - Bloomington [WBNQ (101.5), WBWN (104.1), WJBC (1230)]

St. Mary's Hospital

Wapella Mayor

Weldon Mayor

Support Jurisdictions

Illinois Emergency Management Agency Liaisons

Macon County Board Chairperson

Macon County Highway

Macon County Mental Health

Macon County Public Health

Macon County Sheriff's Office

Macon County Sherriff's Telecommunications Specialist
McLean County Administrator
McLean County Emergency Management Agency
McLean County Health Department
McLean County METCOM
McLean County Sheriff's Office
Piatt County Commissioner
Piatt County Emergency Management Agency Coordinator
Piatt County EOC Administrative Staff
Piatt County Highway Engineer
Piatt County Public Information Officer
Piatt County Sheriff
Piatt County Sheriff's Deputy/Security and TACP

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

The DHS/FEMA Region V Office evaluated the CPS REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise conducted on November 2, 2011, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the CPS. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the OROs during a simulated radiological emergency.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

Exercise objectives and identified Capabilities/REP Criteria selected to be demonstrated are discussed in Appendix E "Exercise Plan."

The Exercise Planning Team (EPT) selected objectives that focus on evaluating emergency response procedures, identifying areas for improvement, and fostering collaboration between the various OROs and stakeholders. This exercise focused on the following objectives:

- ORO demonstration of effective Emergency Operations Management;
- ORO demonstration of effective Protective Action Decision Making;
- ORO demonstration of effective Protective Action Implementation;
- ORO demonstration of effective Field Measurement and Analysis;
- ORO demonstration of effective Emergency Notification and Public Information;
- ORO demonstration of effective Support Operations and Facilities.

2.3 Scenario Summary

Appendix F "Scenario Details," contains a summary of the Exercise Scenario, a simulated sequence of events that was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs during the CPS REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise on November 2, 2011.

Results of a technical review of the scenario, submitted by the State of Illinois and Exelon Nuclear on September 1, 2011, indicated that the scenario was adequate to support demonstration of DHS/FEMA requirements, as well as criteria selected by the OROs provided in the State's September 17, 2011, extent-of-play submission. The DHS/FEMA Region V accepted this exercise scenario on September 29, 2011.

During the exercise, in addition to information and data provided through the CPS onsite scenario, controllers from the State of Illinois provided "inject messages" containing scenario events and/or relevant data to those persons or locations who would normally receive notification of such events. These inject messages were the method used for invoking additional specific response actions by OROs.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the November 2, 2011, REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise conducted to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the CPS.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreements used in this exercise are found in Appendix E "Exercise Plan" of this report.

Presented below are definitions of the terms used in this report relative to the criteria demonstration status:

- M – Met: The status of a REP exercise Evaluation Area Criterion indicating that the participating ORO demonstrated all demonstration criteria for the Evaluation Area Criterion to the level required in the extent-of-play agreement with no Deficiencies, ARCAs or Plan Issues assessed in the current exercise and no unresolved prior ARCAs.
- D – Deficiency: An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- A – Area Requiring Corrective Action – An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety. Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs was/were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of any ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
- P – Plan Issue – An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan or

implementing procedures, rather than in the ORO's performance.

- N – Not Demonstrated – Exercise criteria that were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason(s) they were not demonstrated.
- Prior ARCAs - Resolved – Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved and the corrective actions demonstrated, in this exercise.
- Prior ARCAs - Unresolved – Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next exercise.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 3.1, on the following pages, presents the status of all exercise criteria from Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. The criterion status box is blank if it was not scheduled for demonstration.

This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.

The DHS/FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues. This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among DHS/FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It also is used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number of Deficiencies, ARCAs, and Plan Issues includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-):

- Plant Site Identifier – A two-digit number, corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Code (13 for Clinton Power Station).
- Exercise Year – The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

-
- Criterion Number – An alpha and two-digit number corresponding to the criteria numbers in the six Exercise Evaluation Areas described in Federal Register Notice, Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which amends FEMA-REP 14, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual.
 - Issue Classification Identifier – (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA, P = Plan Issue).
 - Exercise Identification Number – A separate two or three-digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (4 pages)

DATE: 2011-11-02 SITE: Clinton Power Station, IL M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		IL - IWP	IL - SIRC	IL - PIPB Hotline	IL - REAC	IL - UAC	IL - EOF	IL - JIC	IL - RAFT	IL - JIC/MBC	IL - Mobile Lab	IL - FMT-1
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		M	M
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1		A		M	M	M	M	M			
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M		M	M		M	M		M	M
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1		M	M	M	M		M	M		M	M
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1		M		M							
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1		M		M							
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2		M		M	M						
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1		M		M							
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1											
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1								M		M	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1								M			M
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1											
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2											
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1					M						
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2					M						
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1											
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2											
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1											M
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2								M			
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3											M
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1											
Laboratory operations	4c1										M	
Emergency Notification and Public Info.												
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1		M									
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2											
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3											
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1		M	M	M	M		M		M		
Support Operations/Facilities												
Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1											
Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1											
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1											
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1											

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued, page 2/4)

DATE: 2011-11-02 SITE: Clinton Power Station, IL M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated			IL - FMT - 2	IL - EOC DEW - IL SRA	IL - EOC DEW - IL SL	IL - EOC MAC - IL SL	IL - EOC MCL - IL SL	IL - EOC PIA - IL SL	IL - ISP D10 HQ - DCO B	IL - ISP D10 HQ - TACP	IL - St Mary's Hosp - MSIT	IL - St Mary's Hosp - MSIF	IL - ISU - Horton FH - Mon
Emergency Operations Management													
Mobilization	1a1	M											
Facilities	1b1												
Direction and Control	1c1			M	M	M	M						
Communications Equipment	1d1	M							M	M	M	M	M
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1	M							M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making													
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1		M										
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1												
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2		M										
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1		M										
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1												
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1												
Protective Action Implementation													
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1	M	M						M	M		M	
Implementation of KI decision	3b1	M							M	M			
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1												
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2												
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1									M			
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2												
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1												
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2												
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1												
Field Measurement and Analysis													
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1	M											
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2												
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3	M											
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1												
Laboratory operations	4c1												
Emergency Notification and Public Info													
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1		M	M									
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2												
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3												
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1		M	M									
Support Operations/Facilities													
Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1												M
Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1												
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1												
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1										M	M	

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued, page 3/4)

DATE: 2011-11-02 SITE: Clinton Power Station, IL M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated			IL - ISU - Horton FH - Decon	IL - ISU - Horton FH	IL - ISU - Horton FH - EvR	IL - ISU - Horton FH - CCC	DEW - IWP	DEW - EOC	DEW - EOC - TACP	DEW - Clinton PD - TACP	DEW - Clinton PD - DCOB	DEW EAS
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1						P	M				
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1	M						M				
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1	M	M	M	M		M	M	M	M		
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1											
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1											
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2							M				
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1							M				
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1											
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1							M				
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1							M	M	M	M	
Implementation of KI decision	3b1							M	M	M	M	
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1							M				
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2							M				
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1							M	M	M		
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2							M				
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1											
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2											
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1							M				
Field Measurement and Analysis												
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1											
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2											
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3											
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1											
Laboratory operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1							M				M
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2											
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3											
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1							M				
Support Operations/Facilities												
Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1	M		M								
Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1		M									
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1				M							
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1											

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 4/4)

DATE: 2011-11-02 SITE: Clinton Power Station, IL M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		DEW - SD15 EV2	MAC - IWP	MAC - EOC	MAC - EOC - TACP	MCL - IWP	MCL - EOC	MCL - EOC - TACP	PIA - IWP	PIA - EOC	PIA - EOC - TACP
Emergency Operations Management											
Mobilization	1a1		M	M		M	M		M	M	
Facilities	1b1										
Direction and Control	1c1			M			M			M	
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1	M		M	M		M	M		M	M
Protective Action Decision Making											
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1										
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1										
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2										
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1										
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1										
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1										
Protective Action Implementation											
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1	M		M	M		M	M		M	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1	M		M	M		M	M		M	M
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1										
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2	M									
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1			M	M		M	M		M	M
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2			M			M			M	
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1										
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2										
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1										
Field Measurement and Analysis											
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1										
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2										
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3										
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1										
Laboratory operations	4c1										
Emergency Notification and Public Info											
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1										
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2										
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3										
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1										
Support Operations/Facilities											
Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1										
Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1										
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1										
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1										

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Illinois Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 State of Illinois - Initial Warning Point

The Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) Communications Center located within the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Springfield, Illinois, demonstrated the Target Capability of emergency Operations Center Management. The Communications Center used effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. Dispatchers were familiar with their nuclear incident notification procedures. There are redundant communication systems available at the Communications Center, and both primary and back-up systems were used effectively during this exercise. There was a system failure in the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) telephone line which caused the use of the commercial telephone lines to notify the Risk County of DeWitt.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.2 State of Illinois - State of Illinois Response Center

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management by activities including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) provided sufficient multi-agency coordination for an incident at the CPS by promptly activating and operating for the duration of the incident. The SIRC was managed efficiently and effectively completed a full activation, notification and staffed to an operational level. The SIRC Manager provided management, direction and control using briefings. This allowed the staff of the SIRC to maintain a common operating picture and overall response to the event. The SIRC Manager coordinated with other jurisdictions including the State to make

decisions and ensure that appropriate actions were taken to protect the health and safety of the public.

An area of concern was that when the NARS telephone line had continued difficulties which started at the notification of an Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL) in connecting with the primary Risk County of DeWitt, when the ECL of a General Emergency (GE) was communicated to the State, the delay and coordinated decision for more efficient method of rapid communication was not thoroughly discussed between the Communications Center Manager and the SIRC Manager.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1.c.1.

ISSUE NO.: 13-11-1c1-A-01

CRITERION: Key personnel with functional roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

CONDITION: The NARS in the SEOC incurred difficulties connecting with the primary risk county of DeWitt, from the initial notification of an ECL of an Alert at CPS. The secondary communication method of commercial telephone lines were used to contact DeWitt County and notify them of the Alert ECL. The same difficulties occurred at the Site Area Emergency (SAE) and GE ECLs in contacting DeWitt County. This delayed DeWitt County from receiving Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and being able to evaluate and determine Protective Action Decisions (PADs). The initial notification call from the Communications Center to affected entities regarding State NARS No. 3 started at 1119 hours, and it was known that DeWitt County EOC was not on the call. DeWitt County EOC received the PAR from the SIRC at 1129 hours. This was a delay of 10 minutes for critical information that the DeWitt County decision-makers required to protect the health and safety of the public.

The SIRC Manager was informed that the NARS was not functioning properly from the SEOC to DeWitt County and that commercial lines had to be used to relay

information which extended the time from a change in significant information to DeWitt County being made aware. Discussions between the Communications Center Director and the SIRC Manager did not result in an expedited method of informing DeWitt County of the changes in ECLs or issuance of any PARs. There seemed to be a lack of urgency on the part of SIRC Management that the NARS was not working and that on the CPS announcement that there was a release in progress with a six mile per hour wind.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Discussion between the Communications Center Director and the SIRC Manager did not include specific points of the NARS telephone system difficulties such as the DeWitt County being affected by a delayed notification of the ECL changes. There was no further consideration of expedited communications even after realizing that the NARS difficulties were continuing at the SAE ECL and the possibility of a GE ECL occurring. This would have allowed DeWitt County to be notified promptly for formulation of that County's response to a GE ECL and the State provided PARs.

SIRC Management must have or should have known that the NARS notification system wasn't operating the alternative process was taking an inordinate amount of time. SIRC Management should have directed the Communications Center to contact Dewitt County directly rather than using the roll call system. There seemed to be a lack of urgency on the part of SIRC Management that the NARS was not working and that on the CPS announcement that there was a release in progress with a six mile per hour wind.

REFERENCE: NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1: A.2

EFFECT: Protective Action Recommendations from the State were communicated 10 minutes later than they could have been. Protective Action Decisions by the county were directly affected by the delay in communication of the State PARs.

RECOMMENDATION: The Communications Center Manager needs to convey to the SIRC Manager if problems have occurred and/or continue to occur in regards to the communication systems and its operational capability. If there is a continued problem such as the NARS system not operating properly, determine a prompt and

efficient communication method to notify the risk county(ies) which may be outside the normal communication procedures. Ensure that relaying of significant information, especially PARs, is the overriding priority.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 2.b.2.

ISSUE NO.: 09-11-2b2-A-01

ISSUE: Neither the SIRC Manager, REAC Manager nor any other IEMA staff addressed the decision to restrict or allow aircraft to fly through the plume after radiological conditions changed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The SIRC Manager directed a request to the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) to restrict air space in the affected area surrounding CPS. At 1128 hours, a temporary flight restriction (TFR) was granted by the FAA for a 10-mile radius area five miles northeast of CPS for altitudes below 2,000 feet.

These actions adequately clear ARCA 09-11-2b2-A-01, which stated "Neither the SIRC Manager, REAC Manager nor any other IEMA staff addressed the decision to restrict or allow aircraft to fly through the plume after radiological conditions changed."

- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.3 State of Illinois - Public Inquiry Phone Bank

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.4 State of Illinois - Radiological Emergency Assessment Center

The Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) effectively demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management by promptly activating and providing multi-agency coordination throughout the REP Exercise at the CPS. The REAC Manager used a decision-making process that involved considerations of appropriate factors, including utility recommendations, plant status, release rate, dose projections, field measurements, weather conditions and knowledge of the area, and provided necessary coordination to make appropriate and timely PARs to the SIRC Manager which provided consistent PARs for the protection of the public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.5 State of Illinois - Unified Area Command

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of On-Site Incident Management by coordinating radiological sampling operations required to support Protective Action Decision-making throughout the REP Exercise at the CPS. The Unified Area Command (UAC) was well equipped with all necessary communications, equipment and supplies required for the capability of efficient communications with offsite organizations. A representative of the Illinois State Police (ISP) at the UAC activated the call-down procedures in advance of evacuation orders and stationed Troopers at appropriate Traffic and Access Control Posts. The coordination efforts between the ISP, Illinois Department of Transportation and County Sheriff's Departments allowed for the effective removal of traffic impediments that occurred during the evacuation process. Throughout the exercise, the Incident Commander (IC) had frequent briefings and

discussions to resolve issues as they occurred. The IC was able to pass command to the Deputy IC without any loss of continuity to the operation process. The UAC staff interacted and communicated with each other and respective agencies effectively.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.6 State of Illinois - Emergency Operations Facility

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.7 State of Illinois - Joint Information Center

The Joint Information Center (JIC) demonstrated the Target Capability of Providing Emergency Public

Information from the State through the County Public Information Officers (PIOs) at the JIC. Effective procedures were used to alert, notify, and mobilize personnel and activate the facility in a timely manner. Key personnel with leadership roles provided direction and control. Emergency information and instructions were presented to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.8 State of Illinois - Radiological Assessment Field Team

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of On-Site Incident Management by coordinating radiological sampling operations required to support Protective Action Decision-making throughout the REP Exercise at the CPS. The Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) was well equipped with all necessary communications, equipment and supplies required for the capability of efficient communications with offsite organizations. Throughout the exercise, the RAFT Commander had frequent briefings and discussions to resolve issues as they occurred. The RAFT staff interacted and communicated with each other and respective field monitoring teams effectively.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.2
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.9 State of Illinois - Joint Information Center/Media Briefing Center

The Joint Information Center (JIC)/Media Briefing Center (MBC) demonstrated the Target Capability of Providing Emergency Public Information from the State through the Public Information Officers at the JIC/MBC. Key personnel with leadership roles provided direction and control. Emergency information and instructions were presented to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.10 State of Illinois - Mobile Laboratory

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of On-Site Incident Management through the use of the Mobile Laboratory (Mobile Lab) throughout the REP Exercise at CPS. The laboratory analyzed samples and sample data in an appropriate manner maintaining sample integrity. The laboratory implements a quality assurance (QA) program to ensure the reliability of analytical results and counting system functionality. Provisions for analyzing samples with high radiation levels included: reducing counting times, increasing sample height or sending samples above the limit to the IEMA fixed laboratory facilities in Springfield, IL or West Chicago, IL. Federal Agencies, if involved in the response, could also provide additional analytical capabilities. Mobile Lab staff demonstrated when and how they would check for contamination during sample preparation and analysis for three simulated samples. Chain of custody forms were completed for sample transfer to individuals outside of the Mobile Lab staff. Sample integrity was maintained throughout the process by utilizing sample data forms.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.11 State of Illinois - Field Monitoring Team - 1

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of On-Site Incident Management through the use of Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) throughout the REP Exercise at CPS. The FMTs were equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud & ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. The FMTs also demonstrated they could take and record ambient radiation measurements at appropriate locations, and collected radioiodine and particulate samples.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.12 State of Illinois - Field Monitoring Team - 2

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of On-Site Incident Management through the use of Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) throughout the REP Exercise at CPS. The FMTs were equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud & ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. The FMTs also demonstrated they could take and record ambient radiation measurements at appropriate locations, and collected radioiodine and particulate samples.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.13 State of Illinois - Dewitt County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Radiological Advisor

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.14 State of Illinois - Dewitt County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.15 State of Illinois - Macon County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.16 State of Illinois.- McLean County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.17 State of Illinois - Piatt County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.18 State of Illinois - Illinois State Police District 10 Headquarters - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview of the Illinois State Police, District 10, which included the distribution of dosimetry and emergency worker radiological exposure management within the 10-mile EPZ. Appropriate dosimetry, record-keeping documents, and information on how to manage each emergency workers dose was discussed by the Dosimetry Control Officer (DCO). Equipment requiring calibration and testing was within proper dates. The DCO provided instructions on potassium iodide and instructions on when to ingest.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.19 State of Illinois - Illinois State Police District 10 Headquarters - Traffic and Access Control Post

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview with the Illinois State Police, District 10, which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile EPZ. During the interview, the Trooper demonstrated knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of the appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communication equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals. This included the provision of dosimetry and the ability to manage emergency worker radiological exposure including the decision to implement KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.20 State of Illinois - St. Mary's Hospital - Medical Service - Transportation

The State of Illinois and the Riverside Ambulance Service demonstrated the Target Capability that they have the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. Decatur Ambulance Service demonstrated the capability to transport and provide

initial medical care to a contaminated, injured individual.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.21 State of Illinois - St. Mary's Hospital - Medical Service - Facility

The State of Illinois (St. Mary's - Decatur) demonstrated the Target Capability that they have proper space, resources, and trained personnel to monitor decontaminate and provide medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.22 State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Evacuee/Emergency Worker Monitoring

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability for Evacuee and Emergency Worker Monitoring. The State established adequate facilities, resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring of evacuees and emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.a.1.

- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.23 State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Evacuee/Emergency Worker Decontamination

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability for Evacuee and Emergency Worker Decontamination. The State established adequate facilities, resources, and trained personnel to provide decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.24 State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination of Equipment

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability for Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination of Equipment and Vehicles. The State had adequate procedures and resources for accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None

- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.25 State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Evacuee Registration

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability for Evacuee Registration. The State had the capability to establish adequate facilities, resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring and registration of evacuees.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.26 State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Congregate Care Center

The State of Illinois demonstrated the Target Capability of Congregate Care Center (CCC) at the Illinois State University/Horton Field House. As part of the CPS REP Exercise, the American Red Cross (ARC) demonstrated the capability to provide resources and trained personnel to evacuees. The ARC successfully demonstrated that the CCC has the resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with ARC planning guidelines.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 6.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 DeWitt County - Initial Warning Point

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 13-11-1a1-P-02

CRITERION: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

CONDITION: The Primary and Alternate points of contact for Macon County are reversed in the DeWitt County Annex 2G Notification Lists.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Annex 2G lists the Primary point of contact for initial notification to Macon County as the Telecommunications Specialist in the Macon County EOC, and the Alternate point of contact as the 24-hour Sheriff's Dispatch Center. However, the EOC is not staffed on a 24 hours basis, and after-hours contact with Macon County can only be made through the 24-hour Dispatch Center. The call at 0923 hours from DeWitt CEN COM made to the Macon County EOC was taken by the Macon County Assistant Emergency Management Director. The Macon County EOC had not yet been activated and staffed, and the Initial Warning Point (Dispatch Center) was unaware of the initial notification of an Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL).

REFERENCE: Annex 2G of the DeWitt County Plan, dated 11/11

EFFECT: While the notification, as made, had no adverse effect on the response, the

Macon County EOC had not yet been activated and staffed, and the Initial Warning Point (Dispatch Center) was unaware of the initial notification.

RECOMMENDATION: The Primary and Alternate points of contact for Macon County should be reversed in the DeWitt County Annex 2G Notification Lists. Clarification should be provided to make the 24-hour station (Macon County's Dispatch Center) the Primary notification point for initial notification of an incident at the CPS, and the EOC the Alternate notification point until such time as the EOC is sufficiently staffed to function as the primary notification point.

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.2 Dewitt County - Emergency Operations Center

The DeWitt County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management by activities including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The focus always remained on the primary objective, which is protecting the public health and safety of those who live and work in local communities. The DeWitt County Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) Coordinator fully demonstrated the decision-making process involving appropriate factors and necessary coordination when making Protective Action Decisions. Direction and control for the overall response effort of the DeWitt County EOC was successfully demonstrated by the DeWitt County Board Chairperson (CBC) and the ESDA Director.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 2.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 3.f.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 1.c.1.

ISSUE NO.: 13-09-1c1-A-01

ISSUE: At 1229 hours, the CBC, ESDA Coordinator, and two IEMA representatives departed the EOC to attend a media briefing located down the hall away from the EOC. There was no one delegated to provide direction and control during their absence, nor was anyone tasked with bringing important messages to them at the media briefing room if necessitated. At 1300 hours, the CBC, ESDA Coordinator, and two IEMA representatives returned to the EOC. During the time they were out of the EOC (31 minutes), State NARS Message No.4 arrived, stating that a wind direction change had occurred, and the State did not recommend that Sub-area 2 be evacuated. Since the decision-makers were out of the room when this message arrived, and no delegate was present, the message sat on the desk and not acknowledged. The Mayor of Clinton noticed the message approximately 10 minutes after the form arrived, and informed the Clinton Police Chief of the message, and that evacuation of Sub-area No.2 was not recommended. No other discussion concerning the wind direction change and its affect on Sub-area No.2 was identified or addressed as a concern, even when the decision-makers returned from the media briefing.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Despite total failure of the NARS phone system, various problems with facsimile machine connectivity and multiple, simultaneous controller inject messages, the mutual collaboration and support between DeWitt County's senior leaders allowed the command staff to maintain overall situational awareness, effectively manage the efforts of the DeWitt County EOC staff and coordinate emergency response operations with the State and supporting counties.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.3 Dewitt County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post

The DeWitt County EOC demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview with the DeWitt County Sheriff's Deputy, which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile EPZ. During the interview, the Deputy demonstrated knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency

Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of the appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communication equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals. This included the provision of dosimetry and the ability to manage emergency worker radiological exposure including the decision to implement KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.4 Dewitt County - Clinton Police Department - Traffic and Access Control Post

The Clinton Police Department demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview with the Clinton Police Department Officer, which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile EPZ. During the interview, the Officer demonstrated knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of the appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communication equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals. This included the provision of dosimetry and the ability to manage emergency worker radiological exposure including the decision to implement KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.5 Dewitt County - Clinton Police Department - Traffic and Access Control Post - Dosimetry Briefing

The Clinton Police Department demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview of the Clinton Police Department Officer, which included the distribution of dosimetry and emergency worker radiological exposure management within the 10-mile EPZ. Appropriate dosimetry, record-keeping documents, and information on how to manage each emergency worker's dose was discussed by the Dosimetry Control Officer (DCO). Equipment requiring calibration and testing was within proper dates. The DCO provided instructions on potassium iodide (KI) and instructions on when to ingest KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.6 Dewitt County - EAS WJBC (1230), WBNQ (101.5), WBWN (104.1)

DeWitt County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Information and Warning associated with primary alerting and notification of the public was completed in a timely manner. Following the decision by County emergency management officials to notify the public of an emergency situation at the CPS, Radio Stations WBNQ (105.0 FM), WBWN (104.1 FM) and WJBC (1230 AM) personnel demonstrated a thorough understanding of their equipment, the EAS process and executed their duties in a timely and professional manner.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.7 DeWitt County - Clinton School District 15 - Evacuation School

DeWitt County demonstrated the Target Capability of Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place for school children. The Clinton Community Unit School District #15 representative described plans and procedures to safely evacuate students from the CPS EPS and reunite them with their families. The school district demonstrated sufficient personnel, current contact information, emergency worker dosimetry, and communications capabilities to notify families and guardians regarding how to reunite with evacuated students.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.8 Macon County - Initial Warning Point

Macon County demonstrated the Target Capability of an Initial Warning Point (IWP) including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. Dispatchers were familiar with their nuclear incident notification procedures. There are redundant communication systems available at the IWP, and both primary and back-up systems were used effectively during this exercise.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.9 Macon County - Emergency Operations Center

The Macon County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. Macon County provided sufficient multi-agency coordination for an incident at the CPS by promptly activating and operating for the duration of the incident. The EOC was managed efficiently and effectively. The EOC completed all notifications and was staffed to an operational level. The EOC manager provided solid management, direction and control using briefings. This allowed the staff of the EOC to maintain a common operating picture and overall response to the event. The EOC manager coordinated with DeWitt County to make decisions and ensure that appropriate actions were taken to protect the health and safety of the public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.10 Macon County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post

Macon County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. During the interview, the Deputy demonstrated thorough knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communications equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.11 McLean County - Initial Warning Point

McLean County demonstrated the Target Capability of an Initial Warning Point (IWP) including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. Dispatchers were familiar with their nuclear incident notification procedures. There are redundant communication systems available at the IWP, and both primary and back-up systems were used effectively during this exercise.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.12 McLean County - Emergency Operations Center

The McLean County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. McLean County provided sufficient multi-agency coordination for an incident at the CPS by promptly activating and operating for the duration of the incident. The EOC was managed efficiently and effectively. The EOC completed all notifications and was staffed to an operational level. The EOC manager provided solid management, direction and control using briefings. This allowed

the staff of the EOC to maintain a common operating picture and overall response to the event. The EOC manager coordinated with DeWitt County to make decisions and ensure that appropriate actions were taken to protect the health and safety of the public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.13 McLean County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post

McLean County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. During the interview, the Deputy demonstrated thorough knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communications equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.14 Piatt County - Initial Warning Point

Piatt County demonstrated the Target Capability of an Initial Warning Point (IWP) including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. Dispatchers were familiar with their nuclear incident notification procedures. There are redundant communication systems available at the IWP, and both primary and back-up systems were used effectively during this exercise.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.15 Piatt County - Emergency Operations Center

The Piatt County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. Piatt County provided sufficient multi-agency coordination for an incident at the CPS by promptly activating and operating for the duration of the incident. The EOC was managed efficiently and effectively. The EOC completed all notifications and was staffed to an operational level. The EOC manager provided solid management, direction and control using briefings. This allowed the staff of the EOC to maintain a common operating picture and overall response to the event. The EOC manager coordinated with DeWitt County to make decisions and ensure that appropriate actions were taken to protect the health and safety of the public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.16 Piatt County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post

Piatt County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. During the interview, the Deputy demonstrated thorough knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communications equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

No Deficiencies were identified for any jurisdiction during this exercise.

There was one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified during this exercise for the State of Illinois. There were no ARCAs identified for DeWitt, Macon, Mclean or Piatt Counties.

The ARCA for the State of Illinois was identified under Criterion 1.c.1 – Key personnel with functional roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible, whereby the State of Illinois Response Center Manager, knowing that the Nuclear Accident Reporting System phones were not operational, did not determine an expedited method of informing DeWitt County of the changes in Emergency Classification Levels or issuance of any Protective Action Recommendations.

There was one ARCA from previous exercises for the State of Illinois. Prior ARCA 09-11-2b2-A-01 – A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make Protective Action Decisions for the general public, was resolved by the State of Illinois.

There was one ARCA from the previous Clinton Power Station exercise for DeWitt County. Prior ARCA 13-09-1c1-A-01 – Key personnel with functional roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible, was resolved by DeWitt County.

There was one Plan Issue identified during this exercise for DeWitt County. There were no Plan Issues identified for the State of Illinois, Macon, Mclean or Piatt Counties.

The Plan Issue for DeWitt County was identified under Criterion 1.a.1 – OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The Plan Issue was identified in DeWitt County Plan Annex 2G, Notification Lists, whereby the primary and alternate point of contact for Macon County are reversed.

There was one Plan Issue from a previous exercise for the State of Illinois, which remains unresolved under Criterion 5.b.1 – Information contained within the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) Volume I, Concept of Operations, and Radiological Task Force

(RTF) Procedure RTF-POS-2 are not consistent in regards to the KI information that is provided to the public.

Based on the results of the November 2, 2011, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Illinois and affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to the Clinton Power Station, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Illinois site-specific to the Clinton Power Station, granted on December 4, 1980, remain in effect.

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Issue Number: 13-11-1a1-P-02		Criterion: 1a1
<p>ISSUE: The Primary and Alternate points of contact for Macon County are reversed in the DeWitt County Annex 2G Notification Lists.</p>		
<p>RECOMMENDATION: The Primary and Alternate points of contact for Macon County should be reversed in the DeWitt County Annex 2G Notification Lists. Clarification should be provided to make the 24-hour station (Macon County's Dispatch Center) the Primary notification point for initial notification of an incident at the CPS, and the EOC the Alternate notification point until such time as the EOC is sufficiently staffed to function as the primary notification point.</p>		
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</p>		
CAPABILITY:	PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:	
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

Issue Number: 13-11-1c1-A-01		Criterion: 1c1
<p>ISSUE: The NARS in the SEOC incurred difficulties connecting with the primary risk county of DeWitt, from the initial notification of an ECL of an Alert at CPS. The secondary communication method of commercial telephone lines were used to contact DeWitt County and notify them of the Alert ECL. The same difficulties occurred at the Site Area Emergency (SAE) and GE ECLs in contacting DeWitt County. This delayed DeWitt County from receiving Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and being able to evaluate and determine Protective Action Decisions (PADs). The initial notification call from the Communications Center to affected entities regarding State NARS No. 3 started at 1119 hours, and it was known that DeWitt County EOC was not on the call. DeWitt County EOC received the PAR from the SIRC at 1129 hours. This was a delay of 10 minutes for critical information that the DeWitt County decision-makers required to protect the health and safety of the public.</p>		
<p>The SIRC Manager was informed that the NARS was not functioning properly from the SEOC to DeWitt County and that commercial lines had to be used to relay information which extended the time from a change in significant information to DeWitt County being made aware. Discussions between the Communications Center Director and the SIRC Manager did not result in an expedited method of informing DeWitt County of the changes in ECLs or issuance of any PARs. There seemed to be a lack of urgency on the part of SIRC Management that the NARS was not working and that on the CPS announcement that there was a release in progress with a six mile per hour wind.</p>		
<p>RECOMMENDATION: The Communications Center Manager needs to convey to the SIRC Manager if problems have occurred and/or continue to occur in regards to the communication systems and its operational capability. If there is a continued problem such as the NARS system not operating properly, determine a prompt and efficient communication method to notify the risk county(ies) which may be outside the normal communication procedures. Ensure that relaying of significant information, especially PARs, is the overriding priority.</p>		
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</p>		
CAPABILITY:	PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:	
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Table 1, on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the Clinton Power Station REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise conducted on November 2, 2011. Also included are times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2011-11-02, SITE: Clinton Power Station, IL

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	IL - SIRC	IL - REAC	IL - UAC	IL - JIC	DEW - EOC	MAC - EOC
Unusual Event	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Alert	0822	0846	0850	0850	NA	0913	0929
Site Area Emergency	0940	0948	0948	0950	0955	1006	1037
General Emergency	1105	1111	1111	1120	1121	1132	1148
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1056	1059	1056	1120	1121	1132	1148
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Facility Declared Operational		0900	0900	0914	0955	1002	0955
Declaration of State of Emergency		1053	NA	NA	1058	NA	NA
Exercise Terminated		1240	1240	1239	1234	1235	1237
Early Precautionary Action: State issued a Livestock Advisory: All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ		0958	0958	1031	0958	NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State restricted waterway traffic within 10 miles of CPS		0936	NA	NA0957	NA	NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State restricted rail traffic within 10 miles of CPS		0953	NA	0957	NA	NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State issued an order to evacuate state parks and hunting areas		1113	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State restricted air traffic within 10 miles of CPS		1128	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: DeWitt County Board Chairman ordered evacuation of schools and special populations		NA	NA	NA	NA	1107	NA
General Information Message: Public advised of incident at CPS		NA	NA	NA	1030	1022	NA
General Information Siren Activation		NA	NA	NA	NA	1030	NA
General Information EAS Message		NA	NA	NA	NA	1034	NA
Protective Action Recommendation: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1 and 3		1111	1108	NA	NA	NA	NA
Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1 and 3		NA	NA	NA	NA	1139	NA
Siren Activation		NA	NA	NA	NA	1147	NA
Protective Action Decision EAS Message		NA	NA	NA	NA	1154	NA
KI Administration Decision:		NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2011-11-02, SITE: Clinton Power Station, IL

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	MCL - EOC	PIA - EOC
Unusual Event	NA	NA	NA
Alert	0822	0932	0936
Site Area Emergency	0940	1038	1042
General Emergency	1105	1144	1142
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1056	1144	1142
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	NA	NA	NA
Facility Declared Operational		0945	0945
Declaration of State of Emergency		NA	NA
Exercise Terminated		1237	1237
Early Precautionary Action: State issued a Livestock Advisory: All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ.		NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State restricted waterway traffic within 10 miles of CPS		NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State restricted rail traffic within 10 miles of CPS		NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State issued an order to evacuate state parks and hunting areas		NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: State restricted air traffic within 10 miles of CPS		NA	NA
Early Precautionary Action: DeWitt County Board Chairman ordered evacuation of schools and special populations		NA	NA
General Informaion Message: Public advised of incident at CPS		NA	NA
General Information Siren Activation		NA	NA
General Information EAS Message		NA	NA
Protective Action Recommendation: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1 and 3		NA	NA
Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1 and 3		NA	NA
Siren Activation		NA	NA
Protective Action Decision EAS Message		NA	NA
KI Administration Decision:		NA	NA

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is a list of the personnel that evaluated the Clinton Power Station REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise on November 2, 2011. The list includes the evaluation team leadership and all evaluators. The organization each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

DHS/FEMA Dept of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency

ICF Consulting

Title	Name	Organization
Radiological Assistance Committee, Chairman	William E. King	DHS/FEMA
Exercise Director	Dwayne Warren	DHS/FEMA
Alternate Exercise Director	Gary Naskrent	DHS/FEMA
Site Specialist	Todd M. Gemske	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - Illinois	Deborah Fulk	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - DeWitt County	Darren Bates	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - Macon County	Ed Golinski	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - McLean County	Dave Ortman	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - Piatt County	Clint Crackel	DHS/FEMA

DATE: 2011-11-02, SITE: Clinton Power Station, IL

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
State of Illinois - Initial Warning Point	Robert Swartz	FEMA RI
State of Illinois - State of Illinois Response Center	Christopher Bellone Robert Swartz	FEMA RV FEMA RI
State of Illinois - Public Inquiry Phone Bank	Christopher Bellone	FEMA RV
State of Illinois - Radiological Emergency Assessment Center	Michael Howe Bart Ray	FEMA HQ ICFI
State of Illinois - Unified Area Command	Don Carlton Richard McPeak	FEMA RI ICFI
State of Illinois - Emergency Operations Facility	John Simpson	FEMA RV
State of Illinois - Joint Information Center	Michael Meshenberg John Simpson	ICFI FEMA RV
State of Illinois - Radiological Assessment Field Team	Paul Ward	FEMA HQ
State of Illinois - Joint Information Center/Media Briefing Center	Michael Meshenberg	ICFI
State of Illinois - Mobile Laboratory	David Jacobson	ICFI
State of Illinois - Field Monitoring Team - 1	David Stuenkel	ICFI
State of Illinois - Field Monitoring Team - 2	Richard Watts	ICF
State of Illinois - Dewitt County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Radiological Advisor	Karl Rabenhorst	FEMA RV
State of Illinois - Dewitt County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison	John Arszulowicz	FEMA HQ
State of Illinois - Macon County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison	Carolyn Sturghill	FEMA RV
State of Illinois - McLean County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison	Delwyn Kinsley	FEMA RV
State of Illinois - Piatt County Emergency Operations Center - Illinois State Liaison	Edward Diaz	FEMA RV
State of Illinois - Illinois State Police District 10 Headquarters - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Richard Grundstrom	ICFI
State of Illinois - Illinois State Police District 10 Headquarters - Traffic and Access Control Post	Don Carlton	FEMA RI
State of Illinois - St. Mary's Hospital - Medical Service - Transportation	Richard McPeak	ICFI
State of Illinois - St. Mary's Hospital - Medical Service - Facility	Michael Howe	FEMA HQ
State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Evacuee/Emergency Worker Monitoring	David Jacobson	ICFI
State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Evacuee/Emergency Worker Decontamination	David Jacobson John Simpson	ICFI FEMA RV
State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination of Equipment	David Jacobson	ICFI
State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Evacuee Registration	Michael Meshenberg	ICFI
State of Illinois - Illinois State University/Horton Field House - Congregate Care Center	Michael Meshenberg	ICFI
Dewitt County - Initial Warning Point	Carl Bebrich	FEMA
Dewitt County - Emergency Operations Center	John Arszulowicz Todd Genskie Richard Grundstrom Mark Ludeking Karl Rabenhorst	FEMA HQ FEMA ICFI FEMA RV FEMA RV

Dewitt County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post	Mark Ludeking	FEMA RV
Dewitt County - Clinton Police Department - Traffic and Access Control Post	Carl Bebrich	FEMA
Dewitt County - Clinton Police Department - Traffic and Access Control Post - Dosimetry Briefing	David Stuenkel	ICFI
Dewitt County - EAS WJBC (1230), WBNQ (101.5), WBWN (104.1)	Carl Bebrich	FEMA
Dewitt County - Clinton School District 15 - Evacuation School	Richard Watts	ICF
Macon County - Initial Warning Point	Carolyn Sturghill	FEMA RV
Macon County - Emergency Operations Center	*Edward Golinski Carolyn Sturghill	FEMA RV FEMA RV
Macon County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post	Carolyn Sturghill	FEMA RV
McLean County - Initial Warning Point	Delwyn Kinsley	FEMA RV
McLean County - Emergency Operations Center	Delwyn Kinsley *David Ortman	FEMA RV FEMA RV
McLean County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post	Delwyn Kinsley	FEMA RV
Piatt County - Initial Warning Point	Edward Diaz	FEMA RV
Piatt County - Emergency Operations Center	*Clinton Crackel Edward Diaz	FEMA RV FEMA RV
Piatt County - Emergency Operations Center - Traffic and Access Control Post	Edward Diaz	FEMA RV
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX D: EXERCISE PLAN

This appendix lists the exercise criteria, which were scheduled for demonstration in the Clinton Power Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise on November 18, 2009, and the offsite extent-of-play agreement accepted by DHS/FEMA Region V on October 21, 2009. The exercise criteria, contained in the FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice," as published in the Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, dated April 25, 2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980. Because the exercise criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the State and accepted by DHS/FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the criteria.

Exercise Criteria

Listed on the following pages are the specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENTS

CLINTON POWER STATION (CPS) REP EXERCISE

Week of November 2, 2011

STATE OF ILLINOIS EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), which houses the IEMA Communications Center (Initial Warning Point), the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC), will be activated. The IEMA Emergency Response Telecommunicator will implement procedures for notification of IEMA staff as defined in IEMA SOPs. The SIRC will be fully activated with a variety of State agencies and personnel. REAC will be fully activated. Rosters will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the SIRC and REAC. The roster will be available for review; however, it will not be removed from the EOC.

The Unified Area Command (UAC) will be activated with State district and regional personnel at the Central Illinois Regional Airport in Bloomington. Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) and mobile lab will be activated. IEMA personnel will be prepositioned in the local area and dispatched to the County EOCs, UAC, EOF, Technical Support Center (TSC) and the JIC. FEMA will not evaluate the TSC.

An actual phone call will be made to the FEMA duty officer advising them of the situation at Clinton Station. Follow up calls to FEMA will be simulated.

The prepositioned State staff will begin exercise play no earlier than the Alert.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

The ability to direct and control emergency response activities will be demonstrated at the SIRC, REAC, the UAC and the JIC. Coordination will be demonstrated between the SIRC, the REAC, the UAC, the JIC, the EOF and the county EOCs.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

IEMA will use a variety of communication systems [Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), telefax, commercial telephone, cellular phone, radio] to communicate with other organizations and locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

The State of Illinois will demonstrate the use of equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations. Dosimetry Control Officer (DCO) logs will be available from an IEMA Radiological Advisor in each County EOC.

A DCO briefing/Traffic and Access Control (TAC) interview will be conducted by the Illinois State Police on November 1, 9 a.m. at the ISP District 10 Headquarters in Pesotum. During this event, the availability of dosimetry will be demonstrated. No more than 10% of the ISP District 10 dosimetry kits will be inspected during the interview to confirm serial numbers.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers will be demonstrated in REAC.

A message will be injected to the IEMA Radiological Advisor in the DeWitt County EOC to drive the decision to authorize exposure in excess of administrative limits.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

The REAC will evaluate the licensee information and complete independent dose projections based on that information and simulated field monitoring data. REAC will make an evaluation of the data and make a protective action recommendation to the SIRC.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

The coordination to determine protective action recommendations (PARs) based upon available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors will be demonstrated between the SIRC and REAC. The State PAR will be transmitted to DeWitt County via NARS.

The capability to determine which centers should be activated for monitoring, decontamination, registration reception and congregate care will be demonstrated at UAC, with input from the SIRC and REAC.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

The coordination to determine protective action recommendations (PARs) based upon available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors will be demonstrated between the SIRC and REAC. The State PAR will be transmitted to DeWitt County via NARS.

The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to institutionalized persons will be demonstrated in REAC.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

This will be demonstrated during the ISP DCO briefing/TAC interview will be conducted on November 1, 9 a.m., at the ISP District 10 Headquarters in Pesotum. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the field team staging area.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

This will be demonstrated during the ISP DCO briefing/TAC interview will be conducted on November 1, 9 a.m., at the ISP District 10 Headquarters in Pesotum. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the field team staging area.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

This will be demonstrated by the State through coordination between the UAC and the County EOCs, in accordance with the Clinton Station EPZ Traffic and Access Control procedures. The staffing of the State posts will be simulated during the exercise.

A TAC demonstration will be conducted in conjunction with the DCO briefing on November 1, 9 a.m., at the ISP District 10 Headquarters in Pesotum.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

This will be demonstrated through discussions at the UAC between the Illinois State Police and Illinois Department of Transportation. A message will be injected at the UAC that will drive this demonstration. State personnel will deal with the impediment by discussing the need for equipment, and its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

This criterion will be demonstrated at RAFT with field teams performing radiation measurements with various monitoring equipment. Air samples will be taken with charcoal cartridges and the availability of silver zeolite cartridges will be indicated. Two field teams will be evaluated.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at RAFT.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

This criterion will be demonstrated by the field teams and information will be coordinated with RAFT. Two field teams will be evaluated. Each team will take an air sample with particulate filters.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

This criterion will be demonstrated during this exercise at the RAFT Mobile Lab at the RAFT Staging Area.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current DHS-REP guidance.

The State's role in demonstrating this criterion is limited to transmitting the State's protective action recommendation (PAR) to the counties and monitoring the instructional messages provided to the public by the counties. This monitoring will be accomplished by IEMA representatives in the DeWitt County EOC.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with DHS approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

This will be demonstrated at the JIC in coordination with the SIRC, REAC, UAC and the DeWitt County EOC. IEMA personnel will be present at the JIC to coordinate with the Exelon staff. Media briefings will be conducted at the JIC. A livestock advisory will be issued to the media from the JIC or the SIRC when appropriate.

A rumor control phone bank for public inquiries will be operated by the State during the exercise in a room adjacent to the SIRC.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

This criterion will be demonstrated at Horton Fieldhouse at Illinois State University in Normal, IL will be conducted on November 1, with set up beginning at 11 a.m. Two portal monitors will be set up during the demonstration. Evacuee and emergency worker monitoring and decontamination will be demonstrated. The appropriate number of evacuees will be processed to meet 20% in 12 hours requirement.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

This criterion will be demonstrated at Horton Fieldhouse at Illinois State University in Normal, IL during an out of sequence demonstration conducted on November 1, with set up beginning at 11:00 a.m. An emergency worker vehicle will be monitored and decontaminated by field team staff.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

Horton Fieldhouse at Illinois State University in Normal, IL during an out of sequence demonstration conducted on November 1, with set up beginning at 11:00 a.m. Local organizations responsible for operating a reception and congregate care center will be present to demonstrate this criterion.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

This criterion will be demonstrated during an out of sequence drill conducted at St. Mary's Hospital in Decatur on November 1, 10:00 a.m. (confirmed).

DEWITT COUNTY EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

DeWitt County intends to fully activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Clinton, Illinois. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Clinton. Representatives from the EPZ municipalities, IEMA and Exelon will staff the County EOC but will not be pre-positioned in the EOC. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.

An evaluator will be positioned at the County Sheriff's Communications Center (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Decision making will be demonstrated at the DeWitt County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between DeWitt County, the SIRC, UAC and the JIC, and between the County and municipalities within the EPZ. Coordination between DeWitt County and the support counties will be demonstrated.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available; at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

DeWitt County will use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

DeWitt County will demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. DCO logs will be available from the IEMA Radiological Advisor in the DeWitt County EOC. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration and the school interview. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the DeWitt County EOC.

The DCO briefing for the Clinton Police officer demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the Clinton Police Department on October 31, at 1:00 pm.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

This criterion does not apply to DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

This criterion does not apply to DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

The State of Illinois will provide protective action recommendations to DeWitt County officials in the County EOC. The DeWitt County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended to the public.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

The State of Illinois will provide protective action recommendations to DeWitt County officials in the County EOC. The DeWitt County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended for special population groups.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria.

This criterion does not apply to DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

The DeWitt County EOC staff will demonstrate this criterion through discussions within the DeWitt County EOC and with REAC and UAC as appropriate. The controller will provide break messages which will contain the predesignated State recommendation regarding relocation, re-entry and return. The DeWitt County staff will discuss the State's recommendation and determine whether to follow that recommendation or another of the County's choosing. The State will participate to the extent necessary to support DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

DeWitt County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with the IEMA Radiological Advisor and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network. Exercise messages will be injected which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion in the County EOC.

This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstrations and the school interview. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the DeWitt County EOC. The DCO briefing for the Clinton Police officer demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the Clinton Police Department on October 31, at 1 p.m. (tentative).

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, DeWitt County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure, and will notify the municipalities of the State's recommendation.

This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic control demonstrations and the school interview. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the DeWitt County EOC. The DCO briefing for the Clinton Police officer demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the Clinton Police Department.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This will be demonstrated by DeWitt County through the simulated implementation of the appropriate procedures. The appropriate officials will coordinate transportation and receiving facilities for special populations. One of each type of special facility will be contacted during the exercise. One of each type of transportation provider (ambulance/bus) will be contacted during the exercise. The public will not be involved in the demonstration.

The Mobility Impaired List will be available for inspection in the County EOC during the exercise. The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the list from the EOC.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

DeWitt County officials will demonstrate this capability through the simulated implementation of the appropriate procedures in the county EOC. The EPZ schools and transportation providers will be contacted during the exercise.

A school interview will be conducted with the Clinton School District #15 on October 31, at 3 p.m., in the District Office. The District Superintendent, a Principal, a Teacher, the transportation coordinator (DCO), the maintenance supervisor and a bus driver will be present at the interview.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Coordination between DeWitt County agencies designated to provide traffic and access control will be exhibited in the County EOC. A Sheriff's deputy will be available during the exercise to demonstrate the staffing of one post. The post for the demonstration will be selected by DeWitt County during the exercise based on exercise play. The deputy will drive to the selected post location for the demonstration. The staffing of the remaining posts will be simulated.

A Traffic & Access control interview and demonstration (and dosimetry control briefing) will take place at the Clinton Police Department on October 31, at 1:00 pm. A Clinton Police officer will be available to demonstrate the actual or simulated staffing of one post.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

The DeWitt County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the Controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to DeWitt County.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion does not apply to DeWitt County.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion will be demonstrated through discussions in the DeWitt County EOC. DeWitt County EOC staff will coordinate with REAC, UAC and the JIC as appropriate. The State will participate to the extent necessary to support DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

This evaluation area does not apply to DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

DeWitt County will demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message to populated areas throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ in a timely manner after their decision to activate the alert and notification system to implement protective action recommendations (PAR).

This capability will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Clinton Station EPZ Siren Warning System as defined in IPRA-Clinton. The Siren Warning System (outdoor warning sirens) will not be activated during the exercise.

The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local radio station (WBNQ/WBWN/WJBC). The local radio station will be contacted during the first, and possibly the second, alert and notification sequence. An evaluator and a controller will be positioned at the radio station during the exercise to monitor for a message containing a PAR. If the initial message does not contain a PAR, the evaluator and controller will stay at the radio station for the second message.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to DeWitt County.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

DeWitt County will demonstrate this criterion by using pre-scripted messages as indicated in IPRA-Clinton. Contact with the radio station will be simulated for each alert and notification sequence following the sequence issuing the initial PAR.

The ability to provide information to the media will be demonstrated by DeWitt County through briefings held at the DeWitt County media briefing location. If real media are not present for the briefings, the controller and observers will serve as mock media. Evaluators will not serve as mock media.

The ability to deal with rumors will be demonstrated by DeWitt County through coordination between the County EOC and the JIC. The DeWitt County EOC controller will inject exercise messages that will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion. County officials will investigate and address "rumors." If appropriate, the "rumors" will be coordinated between State and County officials in the County EOC and the JIC.

County emergency broadcast messages and news releases, if issued, will be faxed to the JIC.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

This evaluation area does not apply to DeWitt County.

MACON COUNTY EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Macon County intends to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Decatur, Illinois, to the appropriate level. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Clinton. The EOC will be staffed with representatives from the County Board, EMA, and the Sheriff's Department. If the scenario does not drive protective actions in Macon County, the County may decide to down staff the EOC to minimum staffing. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour County staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.

An evaluator will be positioned at the County Sheriff's Communications Center (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Macon County and DeWitt County.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Macon County will use commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Macon County will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

This criterion does not apply to Macon County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Macon County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with IEMA and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network.

This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The Sheriff's deputy will obtain dosimetry from the DCO in the County EOC. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, Macon County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure. This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Coordination between Macon County and DeWitt County will be demonstrated. A Sheriff's deputy will be available during the exercise to demonstrate the staffing of one post. The post for the demonstration will be selected by Macon County during the exercise based on exercise play if the scenario causes Macon County to staff posts. If it does not, the post will be selected by the evaluator. The deputy may be asked to drive to the selected post location for the demonstration. The staffing of the remaining posts will be simulated.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

The Macon County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the Controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

This evaluation area does not apply to Macon County.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

This criterion does not apply to Macon County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

This evaluation area does not apply to Macon County.

MCLEAN COUNTY EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

McLean County intends to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Bloomington, Illinois, to the appropriate level. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Clinton. The EOC will be staffed with representatives from the County Administrator's Office, EMA, and the Sheriff's Department. If the scenario does not drive protective actions in McLean County, the County may decide to down staff the EOC to minimum staffing. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour County staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.

An evaluator will be positioned at the County Sheriff's Communications Center (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between McLean County and DeWitt County.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

McLean County will use commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

McLean County will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

This criterion does not apply to McLean County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

McLean County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with IEMA and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network.

This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The Sheriff's deputy will obtain dosimetry from the DCO in the County EOC. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, McLean County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure. This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Coordination between McLean County and DeWitt County will be demonstrated. A Sheriff's deputy will be available during the exercise to demonstrate the staffing of one post. The post for the demonstration will be selected by McLean County during the exercise based on exercise play if the scenario causes McLean County to staff posts. If it does not, the post will be selected by the evaluator. The deputy may be asked to drive to the selected post location for the demonstration. The staffing of the remaining posts will be simulated.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

The McLean County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the Controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

This evaluation area does not apply to McLean County.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

This criterion does not apply to McLean County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

This evaluation area does not apply to McLean County.

PIATT COUNTY EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Piatt County intends to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Monticello, Illinois, to the appropriate level. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Clinton. The EOC will be staffed with representatives from the County Board, EMA and the Sheriff's Department. If the scenario does not drive protective actions in Piatt County, the County may decide to down staff the EOC to minimum staffing. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour County staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.

An evaluator will be positioned at the County Sheriff's Communications Center (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Piatt County and DeWitt County.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Piatt County will use commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Piatt County will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Piatt County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with IEMA and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network.

This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The Sheriff's deputy will obtain dosimetry from the DCO in the County EOC. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, Piatt County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure. This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the County EOC.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Coordination between Piatt County and DeWitt County will be demonstrated. A Sheriff's deputy will be available during the exercise to demonstrate the staffing of one post. The post for the demonstration will be selected by Piatt County during the exercise based on exercise play if the scenario causes Piatt County to staff posts. If it does not, the post will be selected by the evaluator. The deputy may be asked to drive to the selected post location for the demonstration. The staffing of the remaining posts will be simulated.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

The Piatt County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the Controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

This evaluation area does not apply to Piatt County.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

This criterion does not apply to Piatt County. This function is the responsibility of DeWitt County.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

This evaluation area does not apply to Piatt County.

ENCLOSURE 7 EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENTS

CLINTON POWER STATION (CPS) REP EXERCISE Week of November 2, 2011

7F MS-1 OFFSITE MEDICAL DRILL EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: For Transportation: 1.d.1, 3.a.1 and 6.d.1; for the Hospital, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria may be re-demonstrated, as agreed by the Lead Controller and FEMA Evaluators.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Decatur Ambulance will use 2-way radios to communicate with St. Mary's Hospital. Other communication systems that can be used include commercial telephone or cell phones.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

St. Mary's Hospital will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations, with adequate resources. The availability of dosimetry and KI for hospital personnel will not be demonstrated during this exercise, however IEMA staff will be issued dosimetry and KI as field team members.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

The use of dosimetry and KI will not be demonstrated by hospital staff. IEMA staff will demonstrate appropriate use of dosimetry and KI.

Nasal swabs will be taken to ensure inhalation and/or ingestion exposure pathways are not a concern. For the purposes of this drill if there is no medical need for equipment or supplies to be brought in/out of the controlled area these swabs can be used to demonstrate the movement of equipment and supplies across the buffer zone.

EVALUATION AREA 6.d - TRANSPORTATION AND TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED INJURED INDIVIDUALS

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

Decatur Ambulance will demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated, injured individuals to St. Mary's Hospital. The ambulance crew will pick up a contaminated injured patient near the grounds of St. Mary's Hospital. The ambulance crew will be aware that a release has occurred from Clinton plant but not able to determine if the patient is contaminated.

Decatur Ambulance will utilize universal precautions and good housekeeping practices to minimize the spread of contamination, and will focus on treating the patient's medical condition.

Decatur Ambulance will call in the information regarding the patient to St. Mary's Hospital in Decatur so they can prepare for receipt of a potentially contaminated patient. St. Mary's Hospital will implement their plan for receipt, isolation and treatment of an injured contaminated patient. Medical personnel will utilize universal precautions and good housekeeping practices to minimize the spread of contamination, and will focus on treating the patient's medical condition. Simple decontamination efforts will be demonstrated after the patient has been medically stabilized. The hospital will demonstrate procedures for limiting exposure to hospital staff, decontaminating a patient, and restricting access to the area where the patient is being treated and monitored. Hospital personnel will demonstrate their knowledge of who to call beyond IEMA for assistance in Radiological Accidents, e.g. REAC/TS.

For purposes of this exercise, an IEMA staff member will be dispatched to St. Mary's Hospital with radiation detection and measurement equipment to survey out ambulance staff. The purpose of having an IEMA MRT available is to facilitate monitoring the ambulance and ambulance personnel so they are not kept out of service for an extended period of time.

The drill will conclude with the hospital representative supervising the removal of protective clothing and surveying of the emergency room and hospital personnel. IEMA will also advise on the proper procedure for release or disposal of contaminated material.

Following the conclusion of the drill, a short critique will be held.

APPENDIX E: SCENARIO DETAILS

SCENARIO INFORMATION

- ❖ **Exercise Time Line**
- ❖ **Narrative Summary**
- ❖ **Summary of Expected EALs and PARs**
- ❖ **Meteorology**
- ❖ **Release Information**

EXERCISE TIME LINE (November 2, 2011)

Initial Conditions	
The plant is at full power on a 270 day run. On-Line Risk Level is Green. A' RHR on suppression pool circulation in preparation for the RCIC surveillance.	
0750 (0)	Start Scenario – Crew Assumes Shift
0805 (15)	ALERT – HA5.5 - Natural and destructive phenomena affecting plant in the Vital Area Flooding of 'A' RHR pump room (H2 area) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Damage to 'A' RHR pump suction- Suppression Pool Leak into aux building • MCB Annunciator 5013-5D – "Hi Hi RF RHR A Room" – Sump level increasing in RHR A Room • (~5 minutes later) MCB Annunciator 5056-5G "Secondary Cont. Area Max Safe Operating Water Level" (>8" water level) • 'A' RHR pump trips due water intrusion (~1 Minute after sump leak alarm) • A leak will be discovered on the 'A' RHR pump suction (Control Message CM-2 – Suction line break, spraying on motor, and water level rising in room – electrical hazard?) • Suction MOV – E12F004B will not close – shows open on indicator lights (thermals tripped – control message) • Manual Isolation valve – can be closed with MM assistance (if room entry permitted – control message) • Due to a decrease in suppression pool level, the CR team will line up normal make-up to the suppression pool • Ops Crew responds per EOP-8 and Flooding Off-Normal procedures
0900 (70)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (0900) A APRM failed High – Fail max scale (panel in back – Mock Up? – [IM task] – Tech Spec – Crew will bypass per 3305.01 response • (0905) ERAT SVC (Static VAR Compensator) Annunciator 5011-8E "ERAT SVC Trip" – (look at #9 or #10 in procedure 5011.08 – Harmonic Filters or cooling skid issue
0925 (95)	Loss Of Coolant Accident to the Containment LOCA- Loss of RCS – Drywell press >1.68 psig due to RCS leakage (RC3) or DW Rad >100 R/hr with RCS leakage (RC5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recirc break results in LOCA • Group 1 Isolation (spurious) due to high steam flow and Reactor SCRAM • DW/Cont Rads rise, resulting in Loss of RCS- DW Rad >100 R/hr/Cont Rad >33 R/hr with RCS leakage (RC5) • SGTS starts • Ops Crew responds per Procedure 4304.01 • Concurrent FA1
0930 (100)	1A DG trips due to overspeed (past OE) – (can be repaired per control message) – MM and EM task
0935 (105) [ALERT+90]	SITE AREA EMERGENCY – FS1 - DW/Cont Rads exceed fuel barrier limit Damage to Fuel continues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Containment Radiation >41.3 R/Hr and Drywell Radiation >260 R/Hr • DW- CAM Monitor goes to high Alarm Loss of Fuel; DW Rad >260 R/hr (FC5) with previous Loss of RCS (RC3/RC5) results in SITE AREA EMERGENCY – FS1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assembly/Accountability (simulated) – Initial Conditions (Exempt In-Processing Personnel outside fence from Assembly actions or contingencies)
1055 (185) [SAE+80]	GENERAL EMERGENCY – FG1 – RWCU isolation failure w/break <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Group 4 failure MCB Annunciator 5000-4A (Max Safe Temps >200°- RWCU fails to isolate on RT Equip room high temps (186.5°F) due to break in RWCU pump room in Aux Bld. • Loss of Containment (CT6.1/CT6.3) – RWCU isolation failure with break at RWCU pump room in Aux Bld (RT Equip room) and path to the environment (Release Path 'M'). RWCU pump room Max Safe area temps and rads. • Containment Radiation levels out at ~60 R/Hr, Drywell Radiation reaches ~300 R/Hr Loss of Containment (CT6.1/CT6.3) with previous Loss of RCS (RC3/RC5) and Loss of Fuel Clad (FC5) results in GENERAL EMERGENCY – FG1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAX PARS (Wind Direction from 240°, Wind Speed 6.0 mph, Stability Class E) - Subareas 1&3 • Release in progress (Release from Containment to Aux Building to SGTS) – SGTS monitor increasing
1130 (220) [SAE+80]	RG1- TEDE limits >1R/hr – Peak Release at 1130 (3.80E+08 µCi/sec)
1230 (280)	Exercise Termination

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

NORMAL OPERATIONS

0750 – 0804

The Operating Crew will take the shift at 0750 with the unit operating at full power.

Expected Actions

The Operating Crew is expected to maintain current power operations.

ALERT – Onsite Events

0805 – 0934

The crew will receive a MCB Annunciator 5013-5D – “Hi Hi RF RHR A Room” – due to sump level increasing in RHR A Room. This Annunciator will be followed by the tripping of the ‘A’ RHR Pump.

The local operator for the RCIC surveillance will report (via a control message) that a leak has been discovered on the ‘A’ RHR pump suction (Control Message CM-2) - Suction line break, water is spraying on the ‘A’ RHR pump motor, and water level rising in the room representing an electrical hazard.

Onsite Expected Actions

The Operating Crew should respond to/contact local operator due to the pump trip. Actions should be initiated to address the flooding issue per EOP-8 and Flooding Off-Normal procedures. The Emergency Director should declare an ALERT based on HA5.5 - Natural and destructive phenomena affecting plant in the Vital Area. [T₀=call to CR on electrical hazard with water leak spraying on ‘A’ RHR pump motor].

State notification should be completed via the NARS. The ENS notification should be made.

Unit should remain on-line during this evolution. Actions taken to manually isolate the ‘A’ RHR Pump suction will result in isolating the leak.

(Reference ‘A’ RHR Pump and Room pictures Section 6)

Approx.
Time

Event/Anticipated ORO Response to Alert NARS

0750	Initial conditions/weather forecast message to players.
0805	An Alert is declared at Clinton Station.
0820	Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the ALERT via NARS. IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message. An IEMA Duty Officer contacts the Clinton Station Shift Engineer. IEMA Telecommunicator notifies IEMA personnel of the ALERT per SOP. IEMA may activate the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC), if appropriate. IEMA may dispatch liaisons to the County EOCs, Unified Area Command (UAC), Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT), Joint Information Center (JIC), Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), if appropriate. IEMA notifies Governor's Office of the ALERT. (Simulated) IEMA Telecommunicator notifies appropriate State agencies of the ALERT. IEMA notifies FEMA of the ALERT. (Simulated)
0835	IEMA Telecommunicator notifies DeWitt County of the ALERT via NARS. DeWitt County telecommunicator completes and verifies the NARS message. DeWitt County telecommunicator notifies County officials, support counties and municipalities of the ALERT per SOP. Support county and municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message. Support county and municipal telecommunicators notify officials of the ALERT per SOP. Counties may activate the EOC, if appropriate.

0925

At 0925, a Recirc line break results in a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Increasing Drywell Pressure due to RCS leakage (RC3) AND Increasing Drywell and Containment radiation results in the Loss of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) fission product barrier (RC5). A spurious Group 1 Isolation occurs due to high steam flow and the Reactor SCRAMs. The Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) starts.

Onsite Expected Actions

The Operating Crew should respond per Procedure 4304.01. A Concurrent ALERT - FA1 should be identified.

1A DG Trips due to Overspeed

0930

Main Control room will receive indications and annunciators for the tripping of 1A DG. Local investigation will indicate that the Diesel generator tripped due to Overspeed.

Onsite Expected Actions

The Operating Crew should respond per Procedure. TSC/OSC should prioritize equipment investigation and restoration as appropriate.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) – Onsite Events

0935 – 1044

Loss Of Coolant Accident

FS-1 - Loss or Potential Loss of Two Fission Product Barriers

Drywell and Containment Radiation Increases to Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier

0935

Fuel clad damage has continued to escalate as indications of fuel damage show rising Drywell and Containment radiation levels. Drywell Radiation increases to >260 R/Hr AND Containment Radiation >41.3 R/Hr. **[T=0 for SAE]**

The Drywell CAM Monitor goes into high Alarm.

The Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier – Drywell Radiation >260 R/hr OR Containment Radiation >41.3 R/Hr (FC5) with previously identified Loss of RCS Barrier (RC3/RC5) results in a **SITE AREA EMERGENCY – FS1**

Onsite Expected Actions

Operations crew /TSC / EOF ERO should identify the Loss of the Fuel Clad fission product barrier – FC5. The TSC should declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY – FS1 due to the Loss of two Fission Product barriers. State notifications should be completed via the NARS.

There is no path to the environment and no release is in progress.

Actions should be taken for site Assembly / Accountability (simulated). Following completion of the Assembly/Accountability (simulated), the TSC should initiate an evacuation of non-essential personnel if the conditions warrant it (simulated).

<u>Approx. Time</u>	<u>Event/Anticipated ORO Response to SAE NARS</u>
0935	A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared at Clinton Station.
0950	Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY via NARS. IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message. REAC contacts the Clinton Station Shift Engineer. SIRC is activated if not previously activated. SIRC notifies the Governor's Office and requests that a representative report to the State EOC. (Simulated) State dispatches liaisons to the County EOCs, UAC, RAFT, JIC, TSC and EOF, if not previously dispatched. SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. IEMA notifies State agencies (Simulated): <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Illinois State Police- IDOT/Division of Highways- IDOT/Division of Aeronautics- IDNR- Illinois National Guard- ICC- American Red Cross- IDPH- IEPA- IDOC- IDHS- IDOA- Office of the State Fire Marshal- others as appropriate REAC contacts Federal agencies: (Simulated) REAC provides an update to the SIRC and County EOC Liaisons. REAC provides an update to the JIC.
1005	IEMA notifies DeWitt County of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY via NARS. DeWitt County telecommunicator completes and verifies the NARS message.

Approx.

Time

Event/Anticipated ORO Response to SAE NARS (continued)

1005

DeWitt County telecommunicator notifies County officials, support counties and municipalities of the SAE per SOP.

DeWitt County implements public notification procedures, if appropriate. (Simulated)

Support county and municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

Support county and municipal telecommunicators notify officials per SOP.

County EOCs are activated if not previously activated.

Dosimetry is issued to emergency personnel, EOC staff and exposure records are completed.

GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) Onsite Events – Maximum PARs

1055 - End

RWCU Isolation Failure with Break in Aux Building

Group 4 failure Main Control Board Annunciator 5000-4A (Max Safe Temps >200°- Reactor Water Cleanup System fails to isolate on Rx Trip Equip room high temps (186.5°F) due to break in RWCU pump room in Aux Building.

Containment Radiation increases to ~60 R/Hr and Drywell Radiation reaches ~300 R/Hr.

Standby Gas Treatment System Effluent Monitor shows a release in progress.

GENERAL EMERGENCY – FG1 – due to the Loss of ALL three Fission Product Barriers

- Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier– **FC5**

AND

- Loss of RCS Barrier- **RC3 OR RC5**

AND

- Loss of Containment Barrier– **CT6.1/CT6.3** - RWCU isolation failure with break at RWCU pump room in Aux Building (RT Equip room) and a pathway exists to the environment. RWCU pump room exceeds Maximum Safe area temperatures and radiation.

[CT6.1a Failure of all isolation valves in any one line to close. AND CT.6.1.b Downstream pathway to the environment exists.] OR [CT6.3 UNISOLABLE primary system leakage outside primary containment resulting in Secondary Containment area temperatures or radiation levels > EOP-8, Maximum Safe operating levels.]

Onsite Expected Actions

The Station Emergency Director should classify a GENERAL EMERGENCY, based on EAL FG1. All appropriate notifications should be made.

A release is occurring due to the RWCU isolation failure with break at RWCU pump room in Aux Building (RT Equip room) and a pathway to the environment exists (Release Path 'M').

Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the public should be developed to evacuate a five-mile radius and downwind Subareas to ten miles (Maximum PARs).

For the current wind direction (from 240°, wind speed 6.0 mph, stability class E) the evacuation of Subareas 1&3 should be recommended. Peak release occurs at 1130.

Approx.

Time

Event/Anticipated ORO Response to GE NARS

1055

A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared at Clinton Station.

1110

Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the GENERAL EMERGENCY via NARS. Protective actions are recommended.

IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message.

SIRC and REAC evaluate the protective action recommendation.

A recommendation is made to the Governor. The Governor recommends that protective actions be implemented.

SIRC staff is advised of the situation.

SIRC advises UAC, the County EOC liaisons and JIC staff of the situation.

SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. (Simulated)

REAC provides an update to the SIRC and County EOC liaisons.

REAC provides an update to the JIC.

1125

SIRC notifies DeWitt County of the GENERAL EMERGENCY and the recommended protective actions via NARS.

DeWitt County telecommunicator completes and verifies the NARS message.

DeWitt County telecommunicator notifies County officials, support counties and municipalities per SOP.

DeWitt County implements public notification procedures and traffic and access control per SOPs, as applicable.

Support county and municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

Support county and municipal telecommunicators notify EOC staff.

EXERCISE TERMINATION

~1230

The Clinton NRC Graded Exercise will terminate after concurrence from the State of Illinois has been received. All facilities will terminate exercise participation and conduct self-critiques of their performance.

SUMMARY OF EXPECTED EALs and PARs

EALs:

Time	EAL #	Description
0805	HA5	Flooding of 'A' RHR Pump Room ALERT – HA5.5 – Natural and destructive phenomena affecting plant in the Vital Area. Flooding of 'A' RHR pump room (H2' area).
0935 (ALERT+90)	FS1	Loss or Potential Loss of ANY two barriers SITE AREA EMERGENCY – FS1 - Loss Of Coolant Accident. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of Fuel Clad – FC5 Drywell/Cnmt radiation monitor reading > Fuel Cladding Loss Threshold, Drywell Rad > 2.60E+02 R/hr and Cnmt Rad >4.13E+01 R/hr. AND <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of RCS – RC3 Drywell Pressure > 1.68 psig AND Drywell Pressure rise due to RCS leakage OR <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of RCS – RC5 [Drywell Radiation monitor reading > 100 R/hr OR Containment Radiation reading > 33 R/hr] AND Indications of RCS leakage into the Drywell
1055 (SAE+80)	FG1	Loss of ANY two barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier GENERAL EMERGENCY – FG1 - RWCU isolation failure w/break <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of Fuel Clad – FC5 AND <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of RCS - RC3 OR RC5 AND <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of Containment – CT6.1/CT6.3 - RWCU isolation failure with break at RWCU pump room in Aux Building (RT Equip room) and a pathway to the environment. RWCU pump room exceeds Maximum Safe area temperatures and radiation.
1230		Anticipated Termination

PARs: Wind from 240° (into 060°)

Time	Event	Release	Sub-Area Recommendations (Bold – "Added" Subareas)
0810	HA5 – ALERT	None	None
0935 (ALERT+90)	FS1 – SITE AREA EMERGENCY	None	None
1055 (SAE+80)	FG1 – GENERAL EMERGENCY - Maximum PARs	Gaseous	IL 1 (DeWitt) IL 3 (DeWitt/McLean/Piatt)

METEOROLOGY

The meteorology parameters are:

Wind from	240°
Wind speed	6.0 mph
Stability Class	E
Air temperature	44°F
Precipitation	None

RELEASE INFORMATION

Release Path is a monitored release from the RCS to the Auxiliary building via a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) isolation failure with a break at RWCU pump room in Aux Building. The release is through the SGTS system, which is considered a ground level release. All Dose-Based PARs bounded by Plant-Based PARs.

The peak release occurs at approximately 1130. Dose projections for the release were developed using the DAPAR program.

Release Path (M) is from the RCS to the Aux Building to SGTS to the Environment via a failed containment penetration isolation. 38% clad damage from Containment radiation (based on Cont Sprays ON), 9% from DW radiation using CDAM. 38% clad damage was used for DAPAR calculations. Process Reduction factor is 0.004 when the release starts.

DOSE PROJECTIONS

The following peak dose projections are based on the data from the 1130-1144 dose kernel found in Section 8:

Release Path:	<RCS> <CONT> <AuxBld> <STACK> <ENV>
Core Damage:	38% Clad Damage
PRF:	.004 when release starts
Time After Shutdown:	2.05
Release Duration:	3.10 (Weekday, Day Time)

Distance	TEDE (Rem)	CDE (Rem)
SB	1.41E+01	1.91E+02
2 Miles	2.29E+00	2.28E+01
5 Miles	8.15E-01	6.66E+00
10 Miles	3.08E-01	2.52E+00

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