

1D Negation Action Plan¹**1D.1 Introduction**

- (a) The following Negation Action Plan (the Plan) provides requirements and guidance to ensure negation of potential foreign ownership, control or domination (FOCD) over the South Texas Project, Units 3&4 (STP 3&4) licenses held by Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC (NINA), STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC), NINA Texas 3 LLC (NINA 3), NINA Texas 4 LLC (NINA 4), and the City of San Antonio, Texas, acting by and through the City Public Service Board (CPS Energy). This Plan implements measures to fully negate FOCD with respect to matters involving the nuclear safety, security, and reliability of STP 3&4 throughout the design, construction and operation of STP 3&4. The same measures negate potential foreign influence.
- (b) The Plan describes the controls implemented to assure that the governance of NINA and licensed activities undertaken by NINA, NINA 3, NINA 4, and STPNOC are not subject to FOCD within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Section 103.d of the Act).
- (c) STPNOC is responsible for the operation of STP 3&4. STPNOC is a not for profit Texas corporation that is controlled by a board of four directors, three members of which are appointed by the City of Austin (Austin), CPS Energy, and NRG South Texas LP, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of NRG Energy. These three directors choose the fourth director, who then also serves as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of STPNOC. Austin and CPS Energy are governmental organizations in the State of Texas that are controlled by city councils elected by the citizens of these U.S. cities. NRG Energy is a publicly traded, widely held U.S. corporation, and it is not under FOCD. STPNOC is subject to U.S. control, and it will exercise authority over nuclear safety, security and reliability matters free from any potential for foreign domination or control over its decision making in any area of concern to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act.
- (d) NINA owns and controls both NINA 3 and NINA 4; it also will exercise control over its other subsidiaries involved in the development of STP 3&4. NINA 3, NINA 4 and CPS Energy own STP 3&4, and these owners are responsible for providing the funding for construction, operation and decommissioning of STP 3&4. Pursuant to arrangements among the owners, the owners have allocated primary responsibility for funding construction activities to NINA 3 and NINA 4.

¹ This Negation Action Plan describes the measures to be implemented based upon the planned execution of the Fourth Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC, and the measures described are fully effective only upon such execution.

NINA is the lead applicant and lead licensee responsible for design and construction of each unit until the date on which the Commission makes a finding that acceptance criteria are met under 10 CFR 52.103(g) or allowing operation during an interim period under the combined license under 10 CFR 52.103(c), at which point STPNOC will be the lead licensee responsible for operations.

- (e) This Plan has been developed using the guidance provided by the NRC's "Final Standard Review Plan on Foreign Ownership, Control, or Domination," 64 FR 52355 (September 28, 1999) (FOCD SRP). Defense in depth is provided through a number of measures in order to ensure that there is U.S. control over matters relating to nuclear safety, security and reliability, including most significantly the NINA security programs and NINA safety programs, including Quality Assurance. These measures effectively negate the risk that NINA's foreign owned parent company or companies or foreign lenders might exercise control, domination, or influence over matters that are required to be under U.S. control pursuant to the terms of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act.
- (f) The negation measures are implemented primarily through the terms of the Fourth Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC (the NINA LLC Agreement). Additional requirements and further details regarding implementation of the negation measures are included in this Plan.
- (g) The terms of the NINA LLC Agreement provide that a Security Subcommittee of the NINA Board will be established not later than the first pouring of any safety related concrete for STP 3&4. The Security Subcommittee has the exclusive right to exercise the Board's authority over the matters that are required to be under U.S. control. The Security Subcommittee is made up of U.S. citizens, the majority of whom must be independent directors, who are not employed by NINA, its subsidiaries, its owners, or any of their affiliates. Until the Security Subcommittee is established, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of NINA will perform the functions of the Security Subcommittee, except the right to approve a new CEO.
- (h) The governance measures implemented for NINA flow through to the actions of NINA 3 and NINA 4, pursuant to requirements imposed through the governance arrangements for these entities and their parent companies. These entities have adopted provisions to assure that the NINA Security Subcommittee exercises ultimate control and direction over matters required to be under U.S. control.
- (i) In addition, NINA will also establish a Nuclear Advisory Committee (NAC), prior to pouring any safety related concrete for STP 3&4. The NAC is made up of a group of independent U.S. citizens who are

experienced in national security and nuclear safety matters, provide an oversight function to advise NINA regarding its ongoing compliance with the FOCD restrictions imposed by U.S. law and NRC regulation. If necessary, the NAC can alert the U.S. Government regarding issues involving potential non-compliance with the applicable requirements.

- (j) NINA's security programs, including its Safeguards Information Program, assure that only authorized persons are provided access to security related information in accordance with applicable program requirements, and this Plan provides measures to assure that interpretation and implementation of those program requirements are administered under U.S. control. NINA does not possess or control access to restricted data or classified national security information. NINA is not aware of any personnel assigned to NINA (contract personnel, including employees loaned from STPNOC) that are currently maintaining security clearances that would authorize access to restricted data or classified national security information. To the extent that any NINA contract personnel may obtain security clearances in the future or that NINA may hire contract employees that maintain security clearances, such personnel would do so subject to the requirements of security programs controlled by their employer companies and not controlled by NINA. NINA will not interfere with the administration of such programs by other companies, and NINA will require that its personnel comply with all applicable requirements relating to such information.
- (k) Upon acceptance of this Plan, changes to this Plan may only be made upon the recommendation of NINA's CEO or upon the recommendation of STPNOC's CEO, and approval of the NINA Security Subcommittee. However, any proposed change that would result in a decrease in the effectiveness of this Plan will not be implemented without the prior approval of the NRC. This Plan also will be subject to the reporting requirements applicable to the FSAR.
- (l) Certain FOCD negation measures described in this Plan have been implemented in the NINA LLC Agreement, because it provides for the governance of NINA. NINA will provide NRC with 30 days prior written notice before implementing any material changes to the FOCD negation measures in the NINA LLC Agreement.

1D.2 Governance of Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC

- (a) NINA is a Delaware limited liability company. NINA is currently owned approximately 89.5% by NRG Energy and 10.5% by Toshiba America Nuclear Energy Corporation (Toshiba America Nuclear), a Delaware corporation. Toshiba America Nuclear is a wholly owned subsidiary of Toshiba America, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Toshiba Corporation, a Japanese corporation (together, with its U.S. subsidiaries, referred to as the Toshiba Companies).

Stone & Webster Inc. (S&W), a Louisiana corporation, has the right to acquire an ownership interest in NINA from NRG Energy, which would reduce NRG Energy's interest in NINA. S&W is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Shaw Group Inc., a Louisiana corporation, which is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

- (b) The ownership percentages of the owners can change over time based upon S&W exercising their options to acquire ownership interests or based upon equity contributions by the members being made to fund NINA activities in amounts that are disproportionate to the ownership interests of the members. If this occurs, the interests of one or more members may be reduced through dilution, whereas the interests of one or more other members may be increased through accretion. In addition, one or more of the owners may extend credit or otherwise make loans to NINA. However, such arrangements would not affect ownership percentages or voting rights under the terms of the NINA LLC Agreement.
- (c) To allow for flexibility regarding NINA's ownership structure, this plan assumes that the NINA ownership structure could include having a foreign owner or combination of foreign owners with ownership shares that are substantially greater than 50%, but NINA will assure that U.S. owners at all times hold at least 10% of the equity of NINA. NINA will provide prior notice to the NRC regarding any material changes in NINA's ownership or the ownership of NINA 3 or NINA 4. In any event, the negation measures of this Plan will nevertheless assure U.S. control over matters that are required to be under U.S. control. This will negate the risk of the STP 3&4 licenses being subject to potential FOCD within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act.

1D.2.1 NINA Board of Directors

- (a) The business and affairs of NINA are and will be managed under the direction of a Board of Directors (Board), consisting of member appointed directors (Member Directors) including a director to act as Chairman, and two independent directors, who are selected and appointed by the Member Directors. The Chairman is selected by the Member Directors from among their number. The Chairman presides over the meetings of the Board, and otherwise fulfills the functions of the Chairman. The Chairman, and anyone acting for the Chairman, must be a U.S. citizen.
- (b) The NINA LLC Agreement provides that two independent directors, who must be U.S. citizens, are selected and appointed by the Member Directors. The independent directors are appointed for a one year term, ending January 31 of each calendar year. However, independent directors may be reappointed year after year. These directors are independent because they may not be officers or employees of NINA, any of its subsidiaries, any of its owners, or any of their affiliated

companies. The independent directors and their immediate family members may not have a material relationship with NINA, its subsidiaries, or its parent companies, or their affiliates, such as by being an executive officer or employee, by receiving pension benefits or other compensation for prior service, or by being an executive officer of another company that receives significant revenue from NINA or its affiliates. In accordance with generally accepted practices, the independent directors may receive compensation from NINA for their services as directors.

- (c) If any independent director acquires any material ownership or other economic interest in NINA, its subsidiaries, its owners, or any of their affiliated companies, this will be reported to NINA and to the NRC. It is possible that the independent directors may have investment holdings such as in mutual funds or other similar types of pooled investments that themselves may make a wide range of investments that could include investments in issuances of NINA, its subsidiaries, its owners, or their affiliated companies. Given the impracticality of monitoring and/or limiting such investments, it is NINA's intention that such investments would not be considered "material." Direct holdings in securities, bonds or other issuances of NINA, its subsidiaries, its owners, or their affiliated companies would be considered material and reportable.
- (d) Significantly, the Chairman and the two independent U.S. citizen directors serve on a Security Subcommittee, which has been assigned "exclusive authority" to vote upon and decide for the Board all matters coming before the Board that relate to nuclear safety, security or reliability. In addition, any matter that must be decided under U.S. control can be elevated to the Security Subcommittee, and mechanisms have been established to provide for such matters to be elevated to the Security Subcommittee when necessary. The details of this authority are described further below in Section 2.2 of this Plan.
- (e) The Board as a whole has been delegated authority to decide various matters, notwithstanding any delegations of authority to the CEO and other officers. Ordinarily, the Board as a whole would decide these matters which are listed in Section 5.1(a) of the NINA LLC Agreement. However, this reserved authority is itself subject and subordinate to the exclusive authority of the Security Subcommittee. Thus, if U.S. control must be exercised over a Section 5.1(a) matter, such matter would be decided by the Security Subcommittee.
- (f) The Board may delegate authority to the CEO and other executive personnel of the company. It also benefits from the advice and oversight of the members of the Nuclear Advisory Committee, who have substantial expertise in national security and nuclear safety

matters, the details of which are described further below in Section 2.4 of this Plan.

1D.2.2 Security Subcommittee

- (a) The NINA LLC Agreement provides for a broad delegation of exclusive authority to the Security Subcommittee, in order to assure that the U.S. citizen directors, including the Security Subcommittee's majority of independent directors, have the ultimate authority to make the corporate decisions for NINA regarding: (1) any matter that is to be brought before the Board, where U.S. legal and regulatory requirements direct that the matter must be decided under U.S. control; or (2) any matter that ordinarily might be decided by corporate officers, but where there is a concern that decision making regarding the matter may be subject to foreign control or influence, and U.S. legal and regulatory requirements direct that the matter must be decided under U.S. control. The Board and Security Subcommittee delegate authority over the day to day management of the affairs of NINA to its executive personnel. However, as discussed further below, the NINA governance is structured to ensure that the required U.S. control over matters of safety, security and reliability is not circumvented by having such issues decided without consultation with and oversight by the Security Subcommittee, whenever necessary.
- (b) Section 5.1(e) of the NINA LLC Agreement provides that the Security Subcommittee has and shall exercise the exclusive authority of the Board to vote and decide the following matters:
 - (A) Any matter that, in view of U.S. laws or regulations, requires or makes it reasonably necessary to assure U.S. control;
 - (B) Any matter relating to nuclear safety, security or reliability, including, but not limited to, the following matters:
 - (1) Implementation or compliance with any NRC generic letter, bulletin, order, confirmatory order or similar requirement issued by the NRC;
 - (2) Prevention or mitigation of a nuclear event or incident or the unauthorized release of radioactive material;
 - (3) Placement or restoration of the plant in a safe condition following any nuclear event or incident;
 - (4) Compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as in effect from time to time), the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (as in effect from time to time), or any NRC rule;

- (5) The obtaining of, or compliance with, a specific license issued by the NRC and its technical specifications;
 - (6) Conformance with a specific Final Safety Analysis Report, or other licensing basis document; and
 - (7) Implementation of security plans and procedures, control of security information, control of special nuclear material, administration of access to controlled security information, and compliance with government clearance requirements regarding access to restricted data;
- (C) Any other issue reasonably determined by a majority of the members of the Security Subcommittee in office, in their prudent exercise of discretion, to be an exigent nuclear safety, security or reliability issue; and
- (D) Appointment of any successor CEO of the Company and, if one is appointed, Chief Nuclear Officer of the Company, in each case as nominated by the Board.
- (c) The provisions of Section 5.1(e)(ii)(C) make clear that this broad authority includes the authority for the Security Subcommittee to decide that a matter involves an issue that must be decided under U.S. control and therefore must be brought before and decided by the Security Subcommittee.
- (d) In order to assure that control would be exercised by U.S. citizens who are independent from any foreign entities, Section 5.1(e)(iii) of the NINA LLC Agreement provides that the attendance and participation of the two independent U.S. citizen directors is required to constitute the required quorum for the Security Subcommittee to conduct business.
- (e) The ordinary affairs of NINA are managed day to day by the company's executive personnel and managers and supervisors. The Board and the Security Subcommittee have delegated authority to the company's executive personnel, but such delegation is subject to limitations including the ultimate authority of the Board and the Security Subcommittee to make decisions for NINA when necessary. In order to assure that such day to day issues do not fall subject to FOCD in a way that would circumvent the intended U.S. control and authority of the Security Subcommittee, the NINA LLC Agreement provides for a variety of mechanisms by which such issues could be raised and put before the Security Subcommittee, if necessary. Section 5.1(e)(iv) of the NINA LLC Agreement provides that a Special Meeting of the Security Subcommittee shall be conducted where a request is made that a matter be considered by the Security Subcommittee. Such a request (requiring a Special Meeting for consideration of the matter) may be

made by: (A) the CEO; (B) any member of the Security Subcommittee; (C) the NAC; or (D) the Board.

- (f) Thus, if a circumstance were to arise where an officer or manager had questions about potential foreign control, domination or influence over a matter, the issue could simply be raised within the NINA organization for further review and consideration. Ultimately, the CEO would be in a position to assess whether the matter was being properly decided free from any inappropriate foreign control, domination or influence, or if the concern should be referred so that the matter would be brought before the Security Subcommittee. The CEO's role in this regard is described further below in Section 2.3.
- (g) In order to underscore the special role undertaken by the Security Subcommittee, the NINA LLC Agreement provides that each member execute a certificate acknowledging the protective measures undertaken by NINA, as reflected in this Plan. The certificate provides as follows:

By execution of this Certificate, I acknowledge the protective measures that have been taken by Nuclear Innovation North America LLC ("NINA") through adoption and implementation of the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of its Fourth Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement ("Agreement"), in order to protect against and negate the potential of any foreign ownership, control or domination of NINA within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

I further acknowledge that the United States Government has placed its reliance on me as a United States citizen to exercise all of the responsibilities provided for in Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement; to assure that members of the NINA Board of Directors, the officers of NINA, and the employees of NINA comply with the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement; and to assure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is advised of any violation of, attempt to violate, or attempt to circumvent any of the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement, of which I am aware.

- (h) In order to underscore the special role of the CEO in assisting the Security Subcommittee, the NINA LLC Agreement provides that the CEO execute a certificate acknowledging the protective measures undertaken by NINA, as reflected in this Plan. The certificate provides as follows:

By execution of this Certificate, I acknowledge the protective measures that have been taken by Nuclear Innovation North America LLC ("NINA") through adoption and implementation of the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of its Fourth Amended and Restated Limited Liability

Company Agreement ("Agreement"), in order to protect against and negate the potential of any foreign ownership, control or domination of NINA within the meaning of Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

I further acknowledge that I have a special role to assist in assuring that the Security Subcommittee is able to fulfill its responsibilities in accordance with Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement, and acknowledge that the United States Government has placed its reliance on me as a United States citizen to exercise my best efforts to refer matters for consideration by the Security Subcommittee, as necessary and appropriate, so that the Security Subcommittee can exercise all of the responsibilities provided for in Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement; to assure that members of the NINA Board of Directors, the officers of NINA, and the employees of NINA comply with the provisions of the Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement; and to assure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is advised of any violation of, attempt to violate, or attempt to circumvent any of the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement, of which I am aware.

- (i) Until the Security Subcommittee is established, the CEO will perform the functions of the Security Subcommittee, except the authority to approve a new CEO. In order to underscore the interim role of the CEO in performing the functions of the Security Subcommittee, the NINA LLC Agreement provides that the CEO execute a certificate acknowledging the protective measures undertaken by NINA, as reflected in this Plan. The certificate provides as follows:

By execution of this Certificate, I acknowledge the protective measures that have been taken by Nuclear Innovation North America LLCC (NINA) through adoption and implementation of the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of its Fourth Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement ("Agreement"), in order to protect against and negate the potential of any foreign ownership, control or domination of NINA within the meaning of Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In particular, until the two (2) independent Directors are appointed to form the Security Subcommittee, the Chief Executive shall exercise the authority of the Security Subcommittee, except for the authority provided for in Section 5.1(d)(ii)(D) which shall be exercised by the Chairman.

I further acknowledge that the United States Government has placed its reliance on me as a United States citizen to exercise all of the responsibilities provided for in Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement; to assure that members of the NINA Board of Directors, the officers of NINA, and the employees of NINA comply with the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement; and to assure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is advised of any violation of, attempt to

violate, or attempt to circumvent any of the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of the Agreement, of which I am aware.

1D.2.3 Executive Personnel of NINA

- (a) The CEO of NINA is nominated by the Board, but both the CEO and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) of NINA, if one is appointed, must be approved by the Security Subcommittee in accordance Section 5.1(f) of the NINA LLC Agreement. The NINA CEO, and anyone acting for the NINA CEO, must be a U.S. citizen. The NINA CNO, if one is appointed, also must be a U.S. citizen.
- (b) Section 5.2 of the NINA LLC Agreement provides that, subject to the control of the Board, the CEO and other Executive Personnel shall "have such authority and perform such duties as the Board may delegate to them." To the extent authority regarding the affairs of NINA is further delegated by the Board to the CEO and other executive personnel, the CEO assures that U.S. control is maintained over nuclear safety, security and reliability issues.
- (c) NINA programs governing security issues, safeguards information, or access to security information are overseen by U.S. citizen managers who report to the CEO. Access and participation in these programs by foreign persons would be permitted only in full compliance with all program requirements. Oversight of these programs and determinations regarding such requirements are and will be subject to U.S. authority and control, because the CEO exercises management authority over such programs, subject only to the ultimate authority of the Security Subcommittee.
- (d) In addition, the Vice President, Oversight and Regulatory Affairs (VP Oversight) ensures U.S. control and oversight of nuclear safety issues through control of the Quality Assurance (QA) Program. The VP Oversight reports directly to and is responsible to the CEO. Through QA audits NINA assures that contractors and subcontractors to it and its subsidiaries conduct nuclear safety related activities in accordance with the QA Program, without regard to whether such activities are undertaken by U.S. citizens or by foreign persons, and without regard to whether such activities are performed within the United States or in another country. The requirements of the QA Program assure that all activities are performed consistent with U.S. requirements imposed upon a licensee or applicant for a license. The QA Program also governs activities internal to NINA and its subsidiaries or affiliates. As such, overall control of the QA Program and imposition of QA Program requirements as required by U.S. law and regulation assures that ultimate U.S. control over nuclear safety is maintained without regard to where activities are performed or who performs them.

- (e) In the event that any foreign control, domination or influence may be exercised with the potential to disrupt this U.S. control over nuclear safety, security and reliability issues, the NINA CEO would assure U.S. control by taking one or more of the following actions: (1) raising the U.S. control issue with the foreign persons involved and resolving the matter to the satisfaction of the CEO; (2) consulting with the NAC to obtain advice regarding whether or not U.S. control is required and, if so, regarding the appropriate options to consider for resolving the matter consistent with the requirements of the U.S. government; and (3) referring the matter for resolution by the Security Subcommittee. If a matter is referred to the Security Subcommittee by the NAC or the CEO, Section 5.1(e)(iv) of the NINA LLC Agreement requires that the Security Subcommittee conduct a special meeting to consider the matter. It is expected that the Security Subcommittee would first decide whether or not the matter is one that must be decided under U.S. control and, if so, the Security Subcommittee would vote and decide the matter for the NINA Board.
- (f) NINA is not aware of any NINA personnel who currently maintain security clearances with the U.S. government, authorizing their access to classified national security information. It is possible that, in the future, NINA may retain services from contract personnel who obtain or maintain security clearances. However, any such security clearances would be maintained through other companies, which maintain and control their programs to assure compliance with applicable U.S. security requirements and restrict access to such information to only those persons who have been specifically cleared by the U.S. government. The actions of the personnel involved and possession and control of such classified information would be controlled by such other companies and their applicable programs. These programs would not be controlled by NINA, but rather the companies that control these programs would be subject to ongoing oversight by the U.S. government regarding control of these programs free from foreign control, domination or influence. NINA will assure that its personnel comply with all applicable requirements, and it will not provide any direction to its personnel that conflict with their applicable obligations to other companies and their programs regarding such classified information.
- (g) In the future, if it becomes necessary or desirable for NINA to maintain its own independent Facility Security Clearance for purposes of governing security clearances to be issued to NINA personnel, NINA would undergo appropriate security reviews prior to being given control (as a corporation) over restricted data or classified national security information. NINA would comply with the requirements of the National Industrial Security Operating Manual, DoD 5220.22-M (February 28, 2006), including the specific applicable requirements relating to foreign ownership, control and influence (FOCI) and submission of the required

"Certificate Regarding Foreign Interests" using Standard Form 328 (SF 328). Currently, however, NINA does not exercise any control over access to restricted data or classified national security information.

1D.2.4 Nuclear Advisory Committee

- (a) NINA has provided for a Nuclear Advisory Committee ("NAC") pursuant to Section 5.1(f) of the NINA LLC Agreement. The NAC will be established prior to any pouring of safety related concrete for STP 3 & 4. The NAC members serve in a non voting capacity to provide transparency to the NRC and other U.S. governmental authorities regarding FOCD matters impacting NINA. The NAC members serve two year terms and may be reappointed by the Board. In addition to routine advice, the NAC members prepare an annual report to the Board advising on whether NINA is subject to FOCD and whether the Security Subcommittee has been able to exercise its decision-making authority. The NAC also advises whether additional measures should be taken to ensure that NINA and its subsidiaries are in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations regarding FOCD. These reports are available for inspection by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- (b) NINA will adopt a Charter for the NAC, and the Charter itself will be reviewed from time to time to include revisions and improvements upon the advice of the NAC. The principal purposes of the NAC are to:
 - Provide transparency to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other U.S. government authorities regarding the implementation of the provisions of Section 5.1(e) of the NINA LLC Agreement providing for authority of the Security Subcommittee over certain matters in order to protect against and negate the potential for any foreign ownership, control or domination of NINA within the within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act. This includes not only NINA's activities as the licensee responsible for construction, but also the activities of NINA 3 and NINA 4 as owner licensees, including the role of NINA 3 and NINA 4 with respect to the activities of STPNOC as the operating licensee.
 - Advise and make recommendations to the Board whether measures additional to those already in place should be taken to ensure that: (i) NINA is in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations regarding foreign ownership, control, domination or influence including those related to non-proliferation and fuel cycle matters, and (ii) action by a foreign government or foreign corporation could not adversely affect or interfere with the reliable and safe operations of the nuclear assets of NINA, its subsidiaries, and affiliates ("(i)" and "(ii)" collectively, the "FOCD Matters"), and to provide reports and supporting documentation to the Board relating to such FOCD Matters on at least an annual

basis, no later than November 30 of each year. A copy of this report is also provided to the CEO of STPNOC.

- (c) The NAC provides ongoing independent assessment of FOCD matters and provides advice to the CEO and the Board regarding FOCD matters. The NAC is available for consultations with the CEO or Security Subcommittee members at any time. However, the NAC also conducts regularly scheduled meetings not less frequently than quarterly.
- (d) The NAC members will be selected based upon their having substantial expertise in security and nuclear safety matters and ability to serve as a valuable resource to NINA and its senior management in assuring compliance with FOCD requirements.

1D.2.5 NINA's Role as Licensee Responsible for Design and Construction

- (a) NINA will be the licensee responsible for the design and construction of STP 3 & 4, which will be owned by CPS, NINA 3, and NINA 4. NINA 3 and NINA 4 are entities that are and will be owned and controlled by NINA through its intermediary holding company subsidiaries.
- (b) NINA will perform its role pursuant to a licensing, design and construction services agreement with NINA 3 and NINA 4. The licensing, design and construction services agreement will clearly delineate NINA's authority with respect to design and construction, the authority of NINA 3 and NINA 4 with respect to financial decisions, and the obligation of NINA 3 and NINA 4 to pay for the costs of construction. Significantly, these terms will make clear that NINA, as the licensee responsible for design and construction, will have sole authority to make all decisions and to take all actions necessary or useful, with respect to, *inter alia*, the following:

Any matter relating to nuclear safety, security or reliability, including, but not limited to, the following matters:

- (i) Implementation or compliance with any NRC generic letter, bulletin, order, confirmatory order or similar requirement issued by the NRC;
- (ii) Prevention or mitigation of a nuclear event or incident or the unauthorized release of radioactive material;
- (iii) Placement or restoration of the plant in a safe condition following any nuclear event or incident;
- (iv) Compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as in effect from time to time), the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (as in effect from time to time), or any NRC rule;

- (v) The obtaining of, or compliance with, a specific license issued by the NRC and its technical specifications;
 - (vi) Conformance with a specific Final Safety Analysis Report, or other licensing basis document; and
 - (vii) Implementation of security plans and procedures, control of security information, control of special nuclear material, administration of access to controlled security information, and compliance with government clearance requirements regarding access to Restricted Data.
- (c) The above list of matters over which NINA will have sole authority has been formulated in the context of operating reactors, and therefore, some of the above matters may not have full applicability to the construction of STP 3&4. However, the full range of matters is included so as to assure clarity as to NINA's authority as the licensee organization singularly responsible for direction of the design and construction of the proposed plant until such authority is transitioned to STPNOC.

1D.3 Governance of STP Nuclear Operating Company

1D.3.1 STPNOC Board of Directors

- (a) STPNOC is a not for profit Texas corporation that is controlled by a board of four directors, three members of which are appointed by the Austin, CPS Energy, and NRG South Texas LP, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of NRG Energy. These three directors choose the fourth director, who then also serves as the CEO of STPNOC. Austin and CPS Energy are governmental organizations in the State of Texas that are controlled by city councils elected by the citizens of these U.S. cities. NRG Energy is a publicly traded, widely held U.S. corporation, and it is not under FOCD.
- (b) Pursuant to Article VI of STPNOC's Restated Articles of Incorporation, Austin, CPS Energy and NRG South Texas LP appoint the three "Participant Directors" of STPNOC. Notably, NRG South Texas LP is the successor to "Texas Genco LP," which is the entity named in the Restated Articles of Incorporation dated April 27, 2005. The three Participant Directors elect a fourth CEO/Director by a unanimous vote of all three. As such, all of the STPNOC directors currently are U.S. citizens appointed by organizations that are under U.S. control. The STPNOC directors control STPNOC pursuant to Article V of the Restated Articles of Incorporation, which provides that STPNOC "is to

have no members," i.e., it has no owners, but rather "its affairs are managed by a Board of Directors."

- (c) STPNOC is subject to U.S. control, and it will exercise authority over nuclear safety and security matters free from any potential for foreign domination or control over its decision making in any area of concern to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act. In particular, STPNOC is and will remain free from any foreign control or domination with regard to security matters, and STPNOC is subject to ongoing U.S. government oversight regarding foreign ownership, control or influence.
- (d) STPNOC maintains a Facility Security Clearance, and it has individual employees who maintain U.S. government security clearances. In connection with ongoing oversight of these security clearances, STPNOC periodically updates a "Certificate Regarding Foreign Interests" using Standard Form 328 (SF 328), which provides for disclosures regarding potential foreign ownership, control or influence.
- (e) The SF 328 includes various questions regarding a range of potential areas of foreign influence, including debt, foreign source income, foreign directors and executive personnel, contracts and agreements with foreigners, etc. Material changes to answers to any questions in the SF 328 are reported to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 95.17(a)(1). Submittals to U.S. government security officials include the Department of Energy's forms identifying owners, officers, directors and executive personnel (OODEPs), and their citizenship. These OODEPs are submitted and periodically updated for STPNOC, as well as Austin, CPS Energy and the NRG Energy entities in the chain of control of NRG South Texas LP. Austin, CPS Energy and NRG South Texas LP do not "own" STPNOC, but they are treated like owners in connection with the government's security reviews, because they have the right to appoint the STPNOC Participant Directors.
- (f) Notably, neither NINA 3 nor NINA 4 has any rights regarding the appointment of the directors of STPNOC. If NINA 3 and/or NINA 4 acquired rights regarding appointment of directors in connection with their ownership interest in STP 3&4, any such rights would be subject to NRC notice and review requirements, e.g., RIS 2000-01. Moreover, to the extent that NINA, NINA 3 and/or NINA 4 might be in a position to control or influence the STPNOC Board, their role with respect to nuclear safety, security or reliability matters is circumscribed by the negation measures described in Section 2.0 of this Plan, including the authority of the Security Subcommittee and the oversight of the Nuclear Advisory Committee to assure that potential FOCD is negated.

1D.3.2 South Texas Project Owners Committee and Operating Agreement

- (a) The owner licensees for STP 3&4 (CPS Energy, NINA 3, and NINA 4) are members of the South Texas Project Owners Committee, and they have certain rights and decision making authority regarding financial and other matters pursuant to the terms of the Amended and Restated Participation Agreement effective November 17, 1997 (the "Participation Agreement"). As owners of South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP 1&2), Austin and NRG South Texas LP are also members of the Owners Committee. Austin and NRG South Texas LP have certain rights and decision making authority as part of the Owners Committee regarding both STP 1&2 matters and matters common to STP 1&2 and STP 3&4.
- (b) The matters to be addressed by the Owners Committee are specified in Section 9.3 of the Participation Agreement, which provides for certain administrative oversight of the South Texas Project by the Owners Committee. To the extent that NINA, NINA 3 and/or NINA 4 may be in a position to indirectly control or influence STPNOC through the participation of NINA 3 and/or NINA 4 in the Owners' Committee, their role with respect to nuclear safety, security or reliability matters is circumscribed by the negation measures described in Section 2.0 of this Plan, including the authority of the Security Subcommittee and the oversight of the NAC to assure that potential FOCD is negated. Thus, if the Owners Committee were to make decisions influencing or implicating nuclear safety, security or reliability issues, then the rights of NINA 3 and/or NINA 4 as part of the Owners Committee would be exercised under U.S. control as provided for in Section 2.0 of this Plan. Moreover, under the terms of the Operating Agreement described further below, STPNOC itself has specific authority that would negate such influence.
- (c) Significantly, STPNOC is to be the licensee responsible for operation pursuant to the STP 3&4 licenses. STPNOC has entered into the South Texas Project Operating Agreement dated effective November 17, 1997 (the "Operating Agreement"), and this Operating Agreement governs the terms of its operation of all nuclear generating units at the South Texas Project. Pursuant to the terms of Section 2.1 of the Operating Agreement, STPNOC is granted all requisite authority to exercise its responsibilities as the operating licensee, including having "sole authority" in order "to make all decisions to protect public health and safety as required by the Operating Licenses and applicable laws and regulations and as are necessary to comply with applicable laws and regulations." These provisions assure STPNOC control, and therefore "U.S. control," over nuclear safety, security and reliability matters within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act.

- (d) As such, throughout the operation of STP 3&4, STPNOC will have sole responsibility with respect to matters involving nuclear safety, security or reliability, including compliance with all NRC nuclear safety and security requirements (STPNOC's "Sole Authority"). This includes denying unauthorized persons access to security information and assuring compliance with U.S. government requirements governing access to restricted data.

1D.4 Summary

- (a) This Plan includes a robust set of mechanisms that provide defense in depth to assure that NINA and its licensee subsidiaries, as well as STPNOC, are governed through U.S. control over nuclear safety, security and reliability matters, so that no such entity either is or is expected in the future to be under FOCD within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act. Under the terms of the NINA LLC Agreement, the ultimate decision making authority of NINA regarding nuclear safety, security and reliability matters has been delegated to the Security Subcommittee, which itself is controlled by independent U.S. citizen directors.
- (b) STP 3&4 will be operated by STPNOC, a company that is under U.S. control. In addition, STP 3&4 will be owned 7.625% by CPS Energy, and NINA will assure that it is at all times at least 10% owned by U.S. owners. As such, indirect foreign ownership of STP 3&4 will at all times be less than 85%.
- (c) Recognizing that day to day decision making is delegated to executive personnel, the Plan contemplates that a U.S. citizen CEO of NINA will assure U.S. control over matters that require U.S. control. The Plan includes a requirement that the CEO acknowledge a special duty to the U.S. government. In addition, the appointment of any successor CEO must be approved by the Security Subcommittee, which provides additional assurance that the CEO will function as part of the team of U.S. citizens exercising a special duty to the U.S. government to assure compliance with respect to FOCD matters. Significantly, the CEO has access to the expert advice and resources of the NAC and has been given specific authority to refer a matter to the Security Subcommittee, requiring that the Security Subcommittee consider the matter in a Special Meeting. This assures that even though matters may be delegated to executive personnel, influence over delegated matters cannot be used to circumvent the requirement for U.S. control and the ultimate authority of the Security Subcommittee.
- (d) In addition, STPNOC will be the licensee responsible for the operation of STP 3&4. STPNOC is a U.S. company that is under U.S. control. Operation of STP 3&4 is subject to the Sole Authority of STPNOC, as necessary to assure that such operation is not subject to FOCD within the meaning of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act. To the

extent that NINA, NINA 3 and/or NINA 4 might be able to exercise control or influence over STPNOC, the potential for foreign control, domination or influence over STPNOC regarding nuclear safety, security or reliability matters is mitigated by the negation measures described in Section 2.0 of this Plan.

- (e) Notably, Section 3.2(2) of the Standard Review Plan on Foreign, Ownership, Control and Domination specifically provides that further consideration is to be given to "whether the applicant is seeking authority to operate the reactor." STPNOC is the entity to be licensed as the operator, and its role as a U.S. controlled entity that will be responsible for nuclear safety and security throughout the operating life of STP 3&4 should be given great weight in evaluating FOCD issues.
- (f) Finally, the NAC will perform an ongoing monitoring function to assess FOCD issues and surface any potential concerns regarding FOCD matters. In addition, the expert resources of the NAC provide a pathway for continuous enhancement and improvement of the mechanisms to assure that any potential inappropriate FOCD is negated. This ongoing role provides further assurance that the required U.S. control of NINA and of the NRC licenses is maintained consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.38 and Section 103.d of the Act.

1D.5 Implementing Documents

1D.5.1 South Texas Project, Unit 3&4, Negation Action Plan, Rev. 0, dated June 2011.

1D.5.2 South Texas Project, Units 3&4, COLA Part 1, Section 1.5

1D.5.3 Fourth Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC

1D.5.4 Certificates of Independent Directors and CEO