

CONTROL NO: 2376

FROM: Northern States Power Co. Minneapolis, Minn. 55401 L.O. Mayer	DATE OF DOC: 4-25-72	DATE REC'D 5-2-72	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: Dr. Peter A. Morris	ORIG 1 signed	CC 39	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SENT LOCAL PDR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
CLASS: <u>(U)</u> PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 40	DOCKET NO: 50-263			

DESCRIPTION: Ltr rpt three occurrences which occurred at the Monticello Plant involving the improper functioning of RHR service water regulating valve control on 3-28-72, the malfunction of containment isolation valve on 4-3-72 & the HPCI steamline-high area temperature switch...

ENCLOSURES:

**DO NOT REMOVE
ACKNOWLEDGED**

FOR ACTION DL 5-2-72

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
April 25, 1972

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Morris:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Reporting of Occurrences



Three conditions have occurred recently at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant which we are reporting to your office in accordance with Section 6.6.C of the Technical Specifications. The Region III Compliance Office has been notified of these occurrences.

1. Improper Functioning of RHR Service Water Regulating Valve Control

On March 28, 1972, the B Loop of the RHR Service Water System was started for a test. The service water regulating valve (CV-1729) was observed to be fully open while the shell to tube differential pressure controller was calling for the valve to be fully closed. This valve and control system is designed to maintain the service water pressure in the heat exchanger tubes above the pressure of the water in the shell of the heat exchanger. This differential prevents primary water from leaking into the service water in the event of a tube leak. The electronic to pneumatic transducer (E/P) was found to have been recalibrated on March 18, 1972, as a direct instead of a reverse acting instrument. Administrative procedures which require functional testing of systems or components prior to their return to service after maintenance were not followed. The cause of the miscalibration was traced to incorrect calibration records which indicated that the E/P was a direct acting instrument.

It should be noted that the ability of the B Loop of the RHR system to perform its required containment cooling function was not affected by the error.

The following corrective action has been taken:

- a) The E/P was recalibrated and proper performance was verified by a functional test.

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b) The requirements for functional testing following maintenance work have been reviewed with the appropriate personnel. Also, a memo has been issued to remind them of the necessity for, and means for implementing these requirements.

c) The calibration records have been corrected.

2. Malfunction of Containment Isolation Valve

While conducting a routine surveillance test on April 3, 1972, it was found that the High Pressure Coolant Injection System outboard steam isolation valve, MO-2035, would not close. The motor was operating, but, the gears were not engaged. The last time the valve had been opened was on March 18, 1972. At that time it had been manually backseated to prevent steam leakage. Manual operation of the valve operator will disengage the motor gears, however, the motor gears should automatically engage when the motor is energized. An operator was sent to the valve and manually initiated its closure using the local handwheel. As the valve started to close the motor gears engaged and the valve could then be operated fully open and closed in normal fashion.

During a convenient plant outage the valve operator will be tested to see if the malfunction can be duplicated and the operating mechanism will be inspected. Instructions have been issued to prohibit manual backseating.

3. HPCI Steamline - High Area Temperature Switch


On April 3, 1972, the setpoints of sixteen temperature switches used in the HPCI Steam Line-High Area Temperature Isolation logic were tested prior to installation. One temperature switch did not trip with temperature raised to the boiling point of water. The Technical Specifications require that they be set to trip at $\leq 200^{\circ}$ F. The switch setpoint was adjusted and it then repeatably tripped at the desired setting, however, it was decided to install a spare switch.

To allow temperature switch testing to be carefully performed in the shop, rather than in-place, and to minimize the time that the HPCI steam line is isolated while calibration test work is in progress, two sets of 16 temperature switches are used. Every three months, when calibration is due, a set of switches is calibrated, installed as replacements, and functionally tested. The switches removed from service are stored until the next calibration is due, at which time they are calibrated, installed as replacements, and functionally tested. Because of this procedure it is not possible to determine for certain if the switch was actually out of calibration during the time it was in service, or whether it became out of calibration as a result of handling and storage. It should be noted that the failure of a single temperature switch would not defeat the high temperature isolation function since the redundant switch in the (1 of 2) twice logic would be available. The 16 switches removed from service on April 3rd were shop tested and all were found to trip within the allowable limit.

The temperature switch test procedures have been revised to include an "as found" calibration check immediately upon removal from service. The nominal switch setpoints will be reduced to the range of 185-190° F to accomodate possible setpoint drift. The switch which originally failed to trip on April 3rd has been returned to the factory for analysis.

Significant Operating Event Reports for these occurrences will be available at the plant for review by the Region III Compliance Inspector.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "L. O. Mayer".

L. O. Mayer
Director of Nuclear Support Services

LOM/MHC/kik

cc: B H Grier