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**NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY**

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55401

July 25, 1980

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Director, Region III  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT  
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

The following information is submitted in response to IE Bulletin No. 80-14:

With respect to Item 1, the maintenance and calibration records for all the scram discharge volume level switches were reviewed. No instances of degradation of the level switches were identified which may have been caused by a damaged or bent float assembly.

With respect to Item 2, there have been no instances of degradation of SDV vent and drain valve operability indicated in the plant records. General Electric Company has specified a closure time of  $\leq 30$  seconds for these valves. The purpose of these valves is to limit the quantity of reactor water discharged after a scram. If the reactor is left in a scram condition reactor water will continue to leak past CRD seals indefinitely. Leakage does not begin until after the scram stroke is complete; therefore, there is no need for fast closure of these valves. Valve closure times are checked during quarterly surveillance test. However, the manually initiated closure during the test utilizes a solenoid which is independent and upstream of the two RPS solenoids which close the valve during a scram. This test therefore does not result in the rapid valve closure which occurs during an actual scram. Valve closure times will be obtained as part of the scram test for IE Bulletin 80-17.

With respect to Item 3, a surveillance test which demonstrates CRD scram discharge control valve operability is performed quarterly. Instructions have been given to operating personnel informing them that the SDV vent and drain valves should be normally open and if these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours.

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With respect to Item 4, no instances in which water hammer or damage which may have been caused by water hammer in the SDV related piping have occurred.

With respect to Item 5, the surveillance procedure for the scram discharge volume level switches has been revised to insure that degradation of any SDV level switch due to a damaged float or other cause would be detected. The procedure has also been revised to require consideration of the technical specification reporting requirements for any level switch inoperability.

With respect to Item 6, a functional test of all level switches was completed within the last three months. No degradation of any level switch was observed.

If additional information is required, please communicate directly with plant management.

Yours truly,



D. E. Gilberts  
Vice President  
Power Production

cc: Mr. G. Charnoff  
NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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