Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
5000 Dominion Boulevard, Glen Allen, Virginia 23060
Web Address: www.dom.com

Dominion®

September 12, 2011

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 11-474
NSSL/WDC R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO RELOCATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCIES TO LICENSEE CONTROLLED PROGRAM

By letter dated July 5, 2011, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). The proposed amendment would relocate certain technical specification (TS) surveillance frequencies to a licensee controlled program by adopting Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-425, Revision 3, "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies of Licensee Control – Risk-Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative 5b." The proposed change would also add a new program, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, to the TSs, in accordance with TSTF-425. TSTF-425 is approved for use by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and was announced in the Federal Register on July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996).

In a letter dated August 22, 2011, the NRC provided DNC an opportunity to supplement the LAR identified above. This was based on the NRC staff's acceptance review which identified proposed changes that did not meet the specific relocation criteria delineated in TSTF-425 Rev. 3. Due to schedule impacts associated with Hurricane Irene, the due date for this response was extended from September 7, 2011 to September 12, 2011.

Attachment 1 provides DNC's response to NRC letter dated August 22, 2011.
New marked-up TS and TS Bases pages for the revised changes are provided in Attachments 2 and 4, respectively, to replace the corresponding pages submitted previously. A revised Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC) Determination is provided in Attachment 3. The revised changes proposed herein do not affect the conclusion of the revised SHC.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Wanda Craft at (804) 273-4687.

Sincerely,

J. Alan Price
Vice President – Nuclear Engineering

A001
NRR

Commitments made in this letter: None

Attachments:

1. Supplement to License Amendment Request To Relocate Technical Specification Surveillance Frequencies To Licensee Controlled Program
2. Supplemental Marked-Up TS Pages
3. Revised Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
4. Supplemental Marked-Up TS Bases Pages

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

C. J. Sanders
Project Manager - Millstone Power Station
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Mail Stop O8-B3
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

Director
Bureau of Air Management
Monitoring and Radiation Division
Department of Environmental Protection
79 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06106-5127

ATTACHMENT 1

Supplement to License Amendment Request To Relocate Technical Specification Surveillance Frequencies To Licensee Controlled Program

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3

Supplement to License Amendment Request To Relocate Technical Specification Surveillance Frequencies To Licensee Controlled Program

By letter dated July 5, 2011, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3). The proposed amendment would relocate certain technical specification (TS) surveillance frequencies to a licensee controlled program by adopting Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-425, Revision 3, "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies of Licensee Control – Risk-Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative 5b." The proposed change would also add a new program, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, to the TSs, in accordance with TSTF-425. TSTF-425 is approved for use by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and was announced in the Federal Register on July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996).

In a letter dated August 22, 2011, the NRC provided DNC an opportunity to supplement the LAR identified above. This was based on the NRC staff's acceptance review which identified proposed changes that did not meet the specific relocation criteria delineated in TSTF-425 Rev. 3. The proposed changes identified by the NRC that do not qualify for relocation are as follows:

Item 1

TS Table 4.3-3, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation for Plant Operations Surveillance Requirements," includes the MODES of applicability. Only surveillance frequencies meeting the requirements discussed above [exceptions listed in TSTF-425] may be relocated. Any unique information, such as the MODES of applicability, must be maintained in the MPS3 TSs. Currently the entire table is proposed to be removed.

DNC Response

The previously proposed changes to TS Table 4.3-3 have been revised to maintain TS Table 4.3-3 in TSs, including the MODES of applicability contained in the table. Only the surveillance frequencies specified in TS Table 4.3-3 will be relocated. The new marked TS page for Table 4.3-3 is provided in Attachment 2.

Item 2

TS Table 4.3-6, "Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," does not require a channel calibration of the Reactor Trip Breaker Indication instrument. The table also includes a note on Function No. 14, Source Range Count Rate, stating that the channel check is required below P-6 (intermediate range neutron flux interlock setpoint). Only surveillance frequencies meeting the requirements discussed above may be relocated. Any unique

information must be maintained in the MPS3 TSs. Currently DNC is proposing to remove the entire table.

DNC Response
The previously proposed changes to TS Table 4.3-6 have been revised to maintain TS Table 4.3-6 in TSs, including the unique information identified above. Only the surveillance frequencies specified in TS Table 4.3-6 will be relocated. The new marked TS page for Table 4.3-6 is provided in Attachment 2.

Item 3
TS Table 4.3-7, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," contains two notes regarding the channel calibrations (not the frequency of the channel calibration). Only surveillance frequencies meeting the requirements discussed above may be relocated. Any unique information must be maintained in the MPS3 TSs. Currently DNC is proposing to remove the entire table.

DNC Response
The previously proposed changes to TS Table 4.3-7 have been revised to maintain TS Table 4.3-7 in TSs, including the unique information identified above. Only the surveillance frequencies specified in TS Table 4.3-7 will be relocated. The new marked TS pages for Table 4.3-7 are provided in Attachment 2.

Item 4
TS Table 4.7-1, "Secondary Coolant System Specific Activity Sample and Analysis Program," requires Isotopic Analysis for Dose Equivalent I-131 Concentration at varying frequencies dependent on the Gross Radioactivity Determination. The threshold cannot be relocated and must be retained in TSs. Currently DNC is proposing to remove the entire table.

DNC Response
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.7-1 have been revised to maintain TS Table 4.7-1 in TSs, including the concentration thresholds in the table. Only the surveillance frequencies specified in TS Table 4.7-1 will be relocated. The new marked TS page for Table 4.7-1 is provided in Attachment 2.

Item 5
TS SR [surveillance requirement] 4.1.1.1.2.1 (b), describes some of the requirements associated with an inoperable control rod(s). The SR is event-driven with a time component requiring that shutdown margin shall be determined acceptable, with increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s), with consideration for several factors every 24 hours. Currently DNC is proposing to relocate this event-driven SR.

DNC Response
In this case, the presence of the word "and" in the preceding SR (i.e., 4.1.1.1.2.1a) is not intended to be a logical connector which places the constraints of this event-driven surveillance on the remaining portion of the surveillance (i.e., 4.1.1.1.2.1b). Station procedures require SR 4.1.1.1.2.1b to be performed at the specified frequency while in Modes 3, 4 and 5 and is not event-driven; therefore, no change to the original markup is required.

This situation (where use of the words "and" and "or" are not intended to be used as logical connectors) also applies to the following SRs: 4.1.1.2.1, 4.1.3.5, 4.2.2.1.2d, 4.2.2.1.4d, 4.2.3.1.2, 4.2.3.1.3, 4.4.9.3.1a, 4.5.2g, 4.6.5.1.1. Accordingly, no changes to the previously submitted markups are required.

Item 6
In addition, DNC is proposing to make changes outside of the scope of the model submittal (74 FR 31996). These additional changes were not addressed in the Significant Hazards Consideration. Please submit a supplement to the Significant Hazards Consideration to address these additional changes.

DNC Response
A revised Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC) Determination is provided in Attachment 3. This revised SHC addresses the MPS3 specific surveillance frequencies that are outside of the scope of the model submittal (74 FR 31996).

Along with the corrections described above, additional replacement pages are included in Attachment 2 to correct or amend the TS markups previously submitted in the July 5, 2011 LAR. As a result of the changes proposed in this supplement, certain markups previously submitted are no longer necessary. These pages are provided in Attachment 2 and labeled "For Information Only" to identify the pages which can be removed from the July 5, 2011 submittal.

A summary of the changes provided in this supplement are identified below:

TS Page Number	Reason for Change
vi	Removed deletion of Tables 4.3-3, 4.3-6 and 4.3-7.
x	Removed deletion of Table 4.7-1.
1-8	Page added to provide the frequency notation for SFCP in TSs.
3/4 3-1	Table 4.3-1 in SR 4.3.1.1 was incorrectly deleted in previous submittal.

TS Page Number	Reason for Change
3/4 3-16	Removed deletion of Table 4.3-2 (with inserted text) in SR 4.3.2.1.
3/4 3-36	"SFCP" was truncated in insert box at top of page.
3/4 3-41	Added missing arrow to the 92-day surveillance frequency in Table Notation 2. As discussed with NRC on 8/30/11, added change to remove reference to the 18 month surveillance frequency in Table Notation 3. Also, removed deletion of "R" in Table Notation 4.
3/4 3-42	Removed deletion of Table 4.3-3 (with inserted text) in SR 4.3.3.1.
3/4 3-45	See DNC response to Item 1 above.
3/4 3-53	Removed deletion of Table 4.3-6 (with inserted text) in SR 4.3.3.5.1.
3/4 3-58	See DNC response to Item 2 above.
3/4 3-59a	Removed deletion of Table 4.3-7 (with inserted text) in SR 4.3.3.6.1.
3/4 3-62	See DNC response to Item 3 above.
3/4 3-63	See DNC response to Item 3 above.
3/4 4-21a	Removed deletion of Table 4.3-3 (with inserted text) in SR 4.4.6.1.
3/4 7-6	As discussed with the NRC on 8/30/11, added change to relocate surveillance frequency in SR 4.7.1.3.2.
3/4 7-7	Removed deletion of Table 4.7-1 (with inserted text) in SR 4.7.1.4.
3/4 7-8	See DNC response to Item 4 above.
3/4 7-13	As discussed with the NRC on 9/1/11, added change to relocate surveillance frequency in SR 4.7.5b
3/4 7-32	Removed proposed changes, however, TS 3.7.14 is being separately deleted from TSs in accordance with issuance of License Amendment 250.
3/4 8-12	As discussed with the NRC on 8/30/11, deleted reference to surveillance interval in second sentence of SR 4.8.2.1e for clarity. Also, removed proposed relocation of surveillance frequency in SR 4.8.2.1f.
3/4 10-4	Corrected numbering error in SR 4.10.3 (should read 4.10.3.3)

Consistent with the TS changes described above, revised TS Bases pages are provided in Attachment 4 for information only. Insert 2 for the TS Bases pages is provided in the July 5, 2011 submittal.

ATTACHMENT 2

Supplemental Marked-Up TS Pages

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3

For Information Only

January 29, 2001

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TABLE 1.1
FREQUENCY NOTATION

NOTATION	FREQUENCY
S	At least once per 12 hours.
D	At least once per 24 hours.
W	At least once per 7 days.
M	At least once per 31 days.
Q	At least once per 92 days.
SA	At least once per 184 days.
R	At least once per 18 months.
S/U	Prior to each reactor startup.
N.A.	Not applicable.
P	Completed prior to each release.
SFCP	At the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.2 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Reactor trip function shall be verified to be within its limit at ~~least once per 18 months~~. Neutron detectors and speed sensors are exempt from response time verification. ~~Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel (to include input relays to both trains) per function such that all channels are verified at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific Reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.~~

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME* of each ESFAS function shall be verified to be within the limit at ~~least once per 18 months. Each verification shall include at least one train such that both trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel (to include input relays to both trains) per function such that all channels are verified at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.~~

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

* The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for response time verification of steam line isolation for entry into MODE 4 and MODE 3 and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump for entry into MODE 3.

Replace each marked through surveillance frequency in the Check, Calibrate, and Test columns with "SFCP"

TABLE 4.3-2

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Building Isolation (Manual Initiation Only), Start Diesel Generators, and Service Water)								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	~~R~~	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	~~M(1)~~	~~M(1)~~	~~Q~~(4)	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Containment Pressure-High-1	~~S~~	~~R~~	~~Q~~	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	~~S~~	~~R~~	~~Q~~	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. Steam Line Pressure-Low	~~S~~	~~R~~	~~Q~~	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
2. Containment Spray								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	~~R~~	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	~~M(1)~~	~~M(1)~~	~~Q~~(4)	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Containment Pressure-High-3	~~S~~	~~R~~	~~Q~~	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

Deleted

1. ~~Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.~~

2. This surveillance may be performed continuously by the emergency generator load sequencer auto test system as long as the EGLS auto test system is demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST at ~~least once per 92 days.~~ At the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

3. ~~On a monthly basis,~~ a loss of voltage condition will be initiated at each undervoltage monitoring relay to verify individual relay operation. Setpoint verification and actuation of the associated logic and alarm relays will be performed as part of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION ~~required once per 18 months~~.

4. For Engineered Safety Features Actuation System functional units with only Potter & Brumfield MDR series relays used in a clean, environmentally controlled cabinet, as discussed in Westinghouse Owners Group Report WCAP- 13900, the surveillance interval for slave relay testing is R.

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

* MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels for plant operations shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints within the specified limits.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-6.

ACTION:

a. With a radiation monitoring channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint for plant operations exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-6, adjust the Setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours or declare the channel inoperable.

b. With one or more radiation monitoring channels for plant operations inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

required

4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for plant operations shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.

Replace each marked through surveillance frequency in the Check, Calibrate, and Test columns with "SFCP"

TABLE 4.3-3

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Containment				
a. Deleted				
b. RCS Leakage Detection				
1) Particulate Radioactivity	~~S~~	~~R~~	~~Q~~	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Deleted				
2. Fuel Storage Pool Area Monitors				
a. Radiation Level	~~S~~	~~R~~	~~Q~~	*

TABLE NOTATIONS

* With fuel in the fuel storage pool area.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3

3/4 3-45

~~Amendment~~ No. ~~45, 65, 79, 100, 129, 244~~

~~September 30, 2008~~

INSTRUMENTATION

REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.5 The Remote Shutdown Instrumentation transfer switches, power, controls and monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-9 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE as required by Table 3.3-9, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With one or more Remote Shutdown Instrumentation transfer switches, power, or control circuits inoperable, restore the inoperable switch(s)/circuit(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours.

c. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

required

4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6.

4.3.3.5.2 Each Remote Shutdown Instrumentation transfer switch, power and control circuit including the actuated components, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at ~~least once per 18 months~~.

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

Replace each marked through surveillance frequency in the Check and Calibrate columns with "SFCP"

TABLE 4.3-6
REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

	INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	
1.	Reactor Trip Breaker Indication	~~M~~	N.A.	
2.	Pressurizer Pressure	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
3.	Pressurizer Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
4.	Steam Generator Pressure	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
5.	Steam Generator Water Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
6.	Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
7.	Loop Hot Leg Temperature	~~M~~	~~R~~	
8.	Loop Cold Leg Temperature	~~M~~	~~R~~	
9.	Reactor Coolant System Pressure (Wide Range)	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
10.	DWST Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	
11.	RWST Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	
12.	Containment Pressure	~~M~~	~~R~~	
13.	Emergency Bus Voltmeters	~~M~~	~~R~~	
14.	Source Range Count Rate	~~M~~*	~~R~~	
15.	Intermediate Range Amps	~~M~~	~~R~~	
16.	Boric Acid Tank Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	+

* When below P-6 (intermediate range neutron flux interlock setpoint).

action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the channel to OPERABLE status.

f. With the number of OPERABLE channels for the reactor vessel water level monitor less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:

1. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory;

2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status; and

3. Restore the channel(s) to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.

g. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

required

4.3.3.6.1 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

4.3.3.6.2 Deleted

Replace each marked through surveillance frequency in the Check and Calibrate columns with "SFCP"

TABLE 4.3-7

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	
1. Containment Pressure			
a. Normal Range	~~M~~	~~R~~	
b. Extended Range	~~M~~	~~R~~	
2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - T_{HOT} (Wide Range)	~~M~~	~~R~~	
3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - T_{COLD} (Wide Range)	~~M~~	~~R~~	
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
5. Pressurizer Water Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
6. Steam Line Pressure	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
8. Steam Generator Water Level - Wide Range	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	
10. Demineralized Water Storage Tank Water Level	~~M~~	~~R~~	
11. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
12. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
13. Containment Water Level (Wide Range)	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
14. Core Exit Thermocouples	~~M~~	~~R~~	+
15. DELETED			

Replace each marked through surveillance frequency in the Check and Calibrate columns with "SFCP"

TABLE 4.3-7 (Continued)
ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT		CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
16.	Containment Area - High Range Radiation Monitor	~~M~~	~~R*~~
17.	Reactor Vessel Water Level	~~M~~	~~R**~~
18.	Deleted		
19.	Neutron Flux	~~M~~	~~R~~

* CHANNEL CALIBRATION may consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/h with an installed or portable gamma source.

** Electronic calibration from the ICC cabinets only.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION: (Continued)

2. Appropriate grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed for particulate radioactivity within 6 hours and at least once per 6 hours thereafter, and

3. A Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance is performed within 6 hours and at least once per 6 hours thereafter.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.6.1 The Leakage Detection Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Containment Atmosphere Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System-performance of CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies specified in Table 4.3-3, and

b. Containment Drain Sump Monitoring System-performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at ~~least once per 24 months~~ the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

PLANT SYSTEMS

DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.3 The demineralized water storage tank (DWST) shall be OPERABLE with a water volume of at least 334,000 gallons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With the DWST inoperable, within 4 hours either:

a. Restore the DWST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, or

b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank (CST) as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and restore the DWST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.3.1 The DWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at ~~least once per 12 hours~~ by verifying the water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

4.7.1.3.2 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at ~~least once per 12 hours~~ by verifying that the combined volume of both the DWST and CST is at least 384,000 gallons of water whenever the CST and DWST are the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

PLANT SYSTEMS

SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be less than or equal to 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System greater than 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be determined to be within the limit by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.7-1.

TABLE 4.7-1
SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY
SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

	TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS	SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY
1.	Gross Radioactivity Determination	~~At least once per 72 hours~~.
2.	Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	a) ~~Once per 31 days~~, whenever the gross radioactivity determination indicates concentrations greater than 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines. b) ~~Once per 6 months~~, whenever the gross radioactivity determination indicates concentrations less than or equal to 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines.

At the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink (UHS) shall be OPERABLE with an average water temperature of less than or equal to 75°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

If the UHS temperature is above 75°F, monitor the UHS temperature once per hour for 12 hours. If the UHS temperature does not drop below 75°F during this period, place the plant in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. During this period, if the UHS temperature increases above 77°F, place the plant in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.5 The UHS shall be determined OPERABLE:

a. At ~~least once per 24 hours~~ by verifying the average water temperature to be within limits.

b. At ~~least once per 6 hours~~ by verifying the average water temperature to be within limits when the average water temperature exceeds 70°F.

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.14 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.14 The temperature limit of each area shown in Table 3.7-6 shall not be exceeded.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-6:

a. By less than 20°F and for less than 8 hours, record the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature in the affected area(s) exceeded the limit(s).

b. By less than 20°F and for greater than or equal to 8 hours, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that provides a record of the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature in the affected area(s) exceeded the limit(s) and an analysis to demonstrate the continued OPERABILITY of the affected equipment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

c. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-6 by greater than or equal to 20°F, prepare and submit a Special Report as required by ACTION b. above and within 4 hours either restore the area(s) to within the temperature limit(s) or declare the equipment in the affected area(s) inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.14 The temperature in each of the areas shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be determined to be within its limits:

a. At least once per seven days when the alarm is OPERABLE, and;

b. At least once per 12 hours when the alarm is inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At ~~least once per 92 days~~ and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 110 volts, or battery overcharge with battery terminal voltage above 150 volts, by verifying that:

1) The parameters in Table 4.8-2a meet the Category B limits,

2) There is no visible corrosion at either terminals or connectors, or the connection resistance of these items is less than 150 x 10^{-6} ohm, and

3) The average electrolyte temperature of six connected cells is above 60°F.

c. At ~~least once per 18 months~~ by verifying that:

1) The cells, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration,

2) The cell-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, and coated with anticorrosion material,

3) The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection is less than or equal to 150 x 10^{-6} ohm, and

4) Each battery charger will supply at least the amperage indicated in Table 4.8-2b at greater than or equal to 132 volts for at least 24 hours.

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

d. At ~~least once per 18 months~~, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual or simulated emergency loads for the design duty cycle when the battery is subjected to a battery service test;

e. At ~~least once per 60 months~~, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. ~~Once per 60-month interval~~ this performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test required by Specification 4.8.2.1d.; and

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by giving performance discharge tests of battery capacity to any battery that shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the application. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops more than 10% of rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the manufacturer's rating.

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.3 The limitations of Specifications 3.1.1.3, 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, and 3.1.3.6 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,

b. The Reactor Trip Setpoints on the OPERABLE Intermediate and Power Range channels are set at less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

c. The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) is greater than or equal to 541°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a. With the THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

b. With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) less than 541°F, restore T_{avg} to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at ~~least once per hour~~ during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel shall be subjected to an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS.

3

4.10.3 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 541°F at ~~least once per 30 minutes~~ during PHYSICS TESTS.

the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ATTACHMENT 3

Revised Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3

REVISED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Description of Amendment Request:

This amendment request involves the adoption of approved changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors (NUREG-1431), to allow relocation of specific technical specification (TS) surveillance frequencies to a licensee controlled program. The proposed changes are described in Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-425, Revision 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090850642), "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative 5b" and are described in the Notice of Availability published in the Federal Register on July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996).

The proposed changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry/TSTF Traveler, TSTF-425, Revision 3, "Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control-RITSTF Initiative 5b." For MPS3 plant-specific surveillances not included in the NUREG-1431 mark-ups provided in TSTF-425 (identified in Attachment 4), DNC has determined that since these surveillances involve fixed periodic frequencies, relocation of these frequencies is consistent with TSTF-425, Rev. 3, and with the NRC's model safety evaluation dated July 6, 2009 (74 FR 31996), including the scope exclusions identified in Section 1.0, "Introduction," of the model safety evaluation.

The proposed changes relocate surveillance frequencies to a licensee controlled program, the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP). The changes are applicable to licensees using probabilistic risk guidelines contained in NRC-approved NEI 04-10, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies," (ADAMS Accession No. 071360456). In addition, administrative/editorial deviations of the TSTF-425 inserts and the existing TS wording are being proposed to fit the custom TS format.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration: As required by 10 CFR 50.91 (a), the Dominion analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes relocate the specified frequencies for periodic surveillance requirements to licensee control under a new Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Surveillance frequencies are not an initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The systems and components required by the TSs for which the surveillance frequencies are relocated are still required to be operable, meet the acceptance criteria for the surveillance requirements, and be capable of performing any mitigation function assumed in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

Response: No.

No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?

Response: No.

The design, operation, testing methods, and acceptance criteria for systems, structures, and components (SSCs), specified in applicable codes and standards (or alternatives approved for use by the NRC) will continue to be met as described in the plant licensing basis (including the final safety analysis report and bases to TS), since these are not affected by changes to the surveillance frequencies. Similarly, there is no impact to safety analysis acceptance criteria as described in the plant licensing basis. To evaluate a change in the relocated surveillance frequency, Dominion will perform a probabilistic risk evaluation using the guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, in accordance with the TS SFCP. NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, methodology provides reasonable acceptance guidelines and methods for evaluating the risk increase of proposed changes to surveillance frequencies consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.177.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the reasoning presented above, Dominion concludes that the requested changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), Issuance of Amendment.

ATTACHMENT 4

Supplemental Marked-Up TS Bases Pages

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (Continued)

(2) APL^{ND} (for base load operation). Penalty deviation minutes for base load operation are not accumulated based on the short period of time during which operation outside of the target band is allowed.

3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

The limits on heat flux hot channel factor, RCS flow rate, and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensure that: (1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and (2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200°F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.

Each of these is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the limits are maintained provided:

a. Control rods in a single group move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than ±12 steps, indicated, from the group demand position;

b. Control rod groups are sequenced with overlapping groups as described in Specification 3.1.3.6;

c. The control rod insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are maintained; and

d. The axial power distribution, expressed in terms of AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE, is maintained within the limits.

$F^N_{\Delta H}$ will be maintained within its limits provided Conditions a. through d. above are maintained. The relaxation of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ as a function of THERMAL POWER allows changes in the radial power shape for all permissible rod insertion limits.

The $F^N_{\Delta H}$ as calculated in Specification 3.2.3.1 is used in the various accident analyses where $F^N_{\Delta H}$ influences parameters other than DNBR, e.g., peak clad temperature, and thus is the maximum "as measured" value allowed.

The RCS total flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ are specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) to provide operating and analysis flexibility from cycle to cycle. However, the minimum RCS flow rate, that is based on 10% steam generator tube plugging, is retained in the Technical Specifications.

in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

Margin is maintained between the safety analysis limit DNBR and the design limit DNBR. This margin is more than sufficient to offset the effect of rod bow and any other DNB penalties that may occur. The remaining margin is available for plant design flexibility.

When an F_Q measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be made. An allowance of 5% is appropriate for a full core map taken with the incore detector flux mapping system and a 3% allowance is appropriate for manufacturing tolerance.

The heat flux hot channel factor, $F_Q(Z)$, is measured periodically using the incore detector system. These measurements are generally taken with the core at or near steady state conditions. Using the measured three dimensional power distributions, it is possible to derive $F_Q^M(Z)$, a computed value of $F_Q(Z)$. However, because this value represents a steady state condition, it does not include the variations in the value of $F_Q(Z)$ that are present during nonequilibrium situations.

To account for these possible variations, the steady state limit of $F_Q(Z)$ is adjusted by an elevation dependent factor appropriate to either RAOC or base load operation, $W(Z)$ or $W(Z)_{BL}$, that accounts for the calculated worst case transient conditions. The $W(Z)$ and $W(Z)_{BL}$, factors described above for normal operation are specified in the COLR per Specification 6.9.1.6. Core monitoring and control under nonsteady state conditions are accomplished by operating the core within the limits of the appropriate LCOs, including the limits on AFD, QPTR, and control rod insertion. Evaluation of the steady state $F_Q(Z)$ limit is performed in Specification 4.2.2.1.2.b and 4.2.2.1.4.b while evaluation nonequilibrium limits are performed in Specification 4.2.2.1.2.c and 4.2.2.1.4.c.

When RCS flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ are measured, no additional allowances are necessary prior to comparison with the limits of the Limiting Condition for Operation. Measurement errors for RCS total flow rate and for $F^N_{\Delta H}$ have been taken into account in determination of the design DNBR value.

The measurement error for RCS total flow rate is based upon performing a precision heat balance and using the result to calibrate the RCS flow rate indicators. To perform the precision heat balance, the instrumentation used for determination of steam pressure, feedwater pressure, feedwater temperature, and feedwater venturi ΔP in the calorimetric calculations shall be calibrated ~~at least once per 18 months~~. Potential fouling of the feedwater venturi which might not be detected could bias the result from the precision heat balance in a non-conservative manner. Any fouling which might bias the RCS flow rate measurement can be detected by monitoring and trending various plant performance parameters. If detected, action shall be taken before performing subsequent precision heat balance measurements, i.e., either the effect of the fouling shall be quantified and compensated for in the RCS flow rate measurement or the venturi shall be cleaned to eliminate the fouling.

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

For slave relays, or any auxiliary relays in ESFAS circuits that are of the type Potter & Brumfield MDR series relays, the SLAVE RELAY TEST is performed at an "R" frequency (at least once every 18 months) provided the relays meet the reliability assessment criteria presented in WCAP-13878, "Reliability Assessment of Potter and Brumfield MDR series relays," and WCAP-13900, "Extension of Slave Relay Surveillance Test Intervals." The reliability assessments performed as part of the aforementioned WCAPs are relay specific and apply only to Potter and Brumfield MDR series relays. Note that for normally energized applications, the relays may have to be replaced periodically in accordance with the guidance given in WCAP-13878 for MDR relays.

REACTOR TRIP BREAKER

This trip function applies to the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) exclusive of individual trip mechanisms. The LCO requires two OPERABLE trains of trip breakers. A trip breaker train consists of all trip breakers associated with a single RTS logic train that are racked in, closed, and capable of supplying power to the control rod drive (CRD) system. Thus, the train may consist of the main breaker, bypass breaker, or main breaker and bypass breaker, depending upon the system configuration. Two OPERABLE trains ensure no single random failure can disable the RTS trip capability.

These trip functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, these RTS trip functions must be OPERABLE when the RTBs or associated bypass breakers are closed, and the CRD system is capable of rod withdrawal.

BYPASSED CHANNEL* - Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 often allow the bypassing of instrument channels in the case of an inoperable instrument or for surveillance testing.

A BYPASSED CHANNEL shall be a channel which is:

- Required to be in its accident or tripped condition, but is not presently in its accident or tripped condition using a method described below; or
- Prevented from tripping.

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

flush upon heat exchanger return to service and procedural compliance is relied upon to ensure that gas is not present within the heat exchanger u-tubes.

Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.C.2 requires that the visual inspection of the containment be performed at least once daily if the containment has been entered that day and when the final containment entry is made. This will reduce the number of unnecessary inspections and also reduce personnel exposure.

Insert 2

Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.d.2 addresses periodic inspection of the containment sump to ensure that it is unrestricted and stays in proper operating condition. ~~The 24 month frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during an outage, and the need to have access to the location. This frequency is sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and is confirmed by operating experience.~~

The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) has several piping cross connection points for use during the post-LOCA recirculation phase of operation. These cross-connection points allow the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) to supply water from the containment sump to the safety injection and charging pumps. The RSS has the capability to supply both Train A and B safety injection pumps and both Train A and B charging pumps. Operator action is required to position valves to establish flow from the containment sump through the RSS subsystems to the safety injection and charging pumps since the valves are not automatically repositioned. The quarterly stroke testing (Technical Specification 4.0.5) of the ECC/RSS recirculation flowpath valves discussed below will not result in subsystem inoperability (except due to other equipment manipulations to support valve testing) since these valves are manually aligned in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to establish the recirculation flowpaths. It is expected the valves will be returned to the normal pre-test position following termination of the surveillance testing in response to the accident. Failure to restore any valve to the normal pre-test position will be indicated to the Control Room Operators when the ESF status panels are checked, as directed by the EOPs. The EOPs direct the Control Room Operators to check the ESF status panels early in the event to ensure proper equipment alignment. Sufficient time before the recirculation flowpath is required is expected to be available for operator action to position any valves that have not been restored to the pretest position, including local manual valve operation. Even if the valves are not restored to the pre-test position, sufficient capability will remain to meet ECCS post-LOCA recirculation requirements. As a result, stroke testing of the ECCS recirculation valves discussed below will not result in a loss of system independence or redundancy, and both ECCS subsystems will remain OPERABLE.

When performing the quarterly stroke test of 3SIH*MV8923A, the control switch for safety injection pump 3SIH*P1A is placed in the pull-to-lock position to prevent an automatic pump start with the suction valve closed. With the control switch for 3SIH*P1A in pull-to-lock, the Train A ECCS subsystem is inoperable and Technical Specification 3.5.2, ACTION a., applies. This ACTION statement is sufficient to administratively control the plant configuration with the automatic start of 3SIH*P1A defeated to allow stroke testing of 3SIH*MV8923A. In addition, the EOPs and the ESF status panels will identify this abnormal plant configuration, if not corrected following the termination of the surveillance testing, to the plant operators to allow restoration of the normal post-LOCA recirculation flowpath. Even if system restoration is not accomplished, sufficient equipment will be available to perform all ECCS and RSS injection and recirculation functions, provided no additional ECCS or RSS equipment is inoperable, and an additional single failure does not occur (an acceptable assumption since the Technical Specification ACTION statement limits the plant configuration time such that no additional equipment failure need be postulated). During the injection phase the redundant subsystem (Train B) is fully functional, as is a significant portion of the Train A subsystem. During the recirculation phase, the Train A RSS subsystem can supply water from the containment sump to the Train A

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

For the surveillance requirements, the UHS temperature is measured at the locations described in the LCO write-up provided in this section.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.5.a verifies that the UHS is capable of providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature. ~~The 24-hour frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.~~ This surveillance requirement verifies that the average water temperature of the UHS is less than or equal to 75°F.

Insert 2

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.5.b requires that the UHS temperature be monitored on an increased frequency whenever the UHS temperature is greater than 70°F during the applicable MODES. The intent of this Surveillance Requirement is to increase the awareness of plant personnel regarding UHS temperature trends above 70°F. ~~The frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.~~

3/4.7.6 DELETED

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

BACKGROUND

The control room emergency ventilation system provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. Additionally, the system provides temperature control for the control room envelope (CRE) during normal and post-accident operations.

The control room emergency ventilation system is comprised of the CRE emergency air filtration system and a temperature control system.

The control room emergency air filtration system consists of two redundant systems that recirculate and filter the air in the CRE and a CRE boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air. Each control room emergency air filtration system consists of a moisture separator, electric heater, prefilter, upstream high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, charcoal adsorber, downstream HEPA filter, and fan. Additionally, ductwork, valves or dampers, and instrumentation form part of the system.

The CRE is the area within the confines of the CRE boundary that contains the spaces that control room occupants inhabit to control the unit during normal and accident conditions. This area encompasses the control room, and other non-critical areas including adjacent support offices,