

-Meeting Agenda-

US-APWR MHI/NRC Weekly

DCD Chapter 7 Conference Call

September 8, 2011 7:30 – 9:00 am EDT

Room T10-C2

Bridge Line information:

Domestic: 888-455-8930

International: 1-210-839-8710

Pass Code: 87052

Topics for Discussion

Feedback from NRC

1. RAIs:

a. Official Responses

i. RAI 07.09-24 (AIL#42)

1. Staff is reviewing, will provide status.

b. Drafts

i. RAI 07.01-37, 38 and 39 (AIL#12)

1. 3rd revised response received on 9/7 is being reviewed.

ii. RAI 07.08-23 and 24 (AIL#24)

1. Draft RAI response received on 9/2.

iii. MHI answer to NRC question on Section 7.6 (AIL#47)

1. The CCW Header Tie Isolation interlock provides (1) isolation between safety and non-safety loop and (2) independence between safety trains. The newly-added isolation valves (AOV-057A/B, AOV-058A/B) only provides isolation between safety and non-safety loop. Manually closing the header tie isolation valves does not meet the automatic interlock requirement to ensure independence between safety trains. MHI response therefore is not acceptable. [Note: MHI may want to refer back to Chapter 9 discussions of the 4/27/11 draft response to RAI question 9.2.2-58.]

iv. MHI answer to NRC questions on ISG-04 Conformance Analysis (AIL #46)

1. Staff review is complete with no further questions. Item is closed.

2. New Questions

- a. The staff is asking for clarifications on how the DAS is adequately independent from the PSMS since the DAS signals go through the PIF module and how a failure of the PSMS system itself doesn't affect the DAS availability. The staff understands that the DAS signals enter the PIF module (see discussion in Section 3.0 of MUAP-07005 under item 6, 10 CFR 50.62 ATWS Rule), but the staff is concerned that during a CCF that affects the

PSMS (losing parts of PSMS or the system entirely), how is the PIF module not affected by a CCF so that DAS can complete its intended functions?

- b. BTP 7-19 Revision 5, on page 7-19-7, specifically states that "...displays and controls should be sufficient for the operator to monitor and control the following critical safety functions: reactivity level, core heat removal, reactor coolant inventory, containment isolation, and containment integrity." DCD Chapter 7.8, Table 7.8-2, shows the variables monitored by the DAS, but these variables don't specifically address how the DAS monitors the containment isolation function. As seen on Table 7.8-2, reactivity control, core heat removal, reactor coolant inventory and containment integrity are monitored as part of the DAS variables on the DHP. For control of these functions, the DAS has various manual conventional actuation switches in the DHP, including a manual containment isolation switch which closes all major containment isolation valves at once, as mentioned on page 3-4 of MUAP-07014 Revision 3. The staff is asking for clarification on how the DAS specifically monitors the containment isolation function on the DHP?

3. Inspections & Audits – Path forward

- a. I&C staff continues have internal meetings with Quality and Vendor Branch
- b. The intent is to coordinate audits and inspections

Feedback from MHI

1. Discussion of Action Items List (Revision 19), as necessary
2. Discussion on future MHI submittals, as necessary

Future calls and meetings:

- The next conference call will be September 15.

Opportunity for Public Comment

Adjourn