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Title: SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION:

FAILURE OF A CONTRACT FIREWATCH EMPLOYEE TO CONDUCT
REQUIRED FIRE PROTECTION SURVEILLANCE

Licensee:

Case No.: 4-2007-016

Southern California Edison Co.
P. O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128

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Control Office: OI:RIV

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
Allegation No.: RIV-2007-A-0002

Reported by:

Reviewed and Approved by:

7c
(b)(7)(C)

Office of Investigations
Field Office, Region IV


[Darrell B. White, Director]
Office of Investigations
Field Office, Region IV

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~~SYNOPSIS~~

This investigation was initiated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region IV, on January 9, 2007, to determine whether a contract firewatch employee at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) willfully failed to conduct required fire protection surveillances and falsified firewatch logs.

Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, it was substantiated that the contract firewatch employee at SONGS deliberately failed to conduct required fire protection surveillances and falsified firewatch logs.

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Exhibit

(b)(7)(C) FREEMAN Alternative Resources,
Inc. (FREEMAN) 11

(b)(7)(C) FREEMAN 8, 9

(b)(7)(C) FREEMAN 12

SONGS 10

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DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

Applicable Regulations

10 CFR 50.5: Deliberate Misconduct (2006 Edition) (Allegation No. 1)

10 CFR 50.9: Completeness and Accuracy of Information (2006 Edition) (Allegation No. 1)

10 CFR 50.54: Conditions of Licenses (2006 Edition) (Allegation No. 1)

Purpose of Investigation

7c This investigation was initiated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (OI), Region IV (RIV), on January 9, 2007, to determine whether (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) FREEMAN Alternative Resources, Inc. (FREEMAN), a contractor at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), willfully failed to conduct required fire protection surveillances and falsified firewatch logs [Allegation No. RIV-2007-A-0002] (Exhibit 1).

Background

On December 29, 2006, (b)(7)(C) NRC, RIV, received information from (b)(7)(C) Southern California Edison (SCE), regarding the failure of a contract employee to perform required firewatch tours and the subsequent falsification of firewatch logs.

7c (b)(7)(C) advised that on December 28, 2006, (b)(7)(C) FREEMAN, reported that while conducting spot-checks of the firewatch tours at SONGS, it was identified (b)(7)(C) had failed to enter a room and scan the firewatch bar code as required. In addition, (b)(7)(C) falsified the firewatch logs by indicating she had conducted the appropriate tour.

7c (b)(7)(C) disclosed (b)(7)(C) had been a contract employee conducting firewatches at SONGS for approximately 20 years. He added that an interview of (b)(7)(C) failed to obtain additional information regarding the incident, but a licensee's investigation was being conducted to determine the extent of the violations.

7c On January 8, 2007, a RIV Allegation Review Board requested OI:RIV conduct an investigation to determine whether (b)(7)(C) willfully failed to conduct required fire protection surveillances and falsified firewatch logs.

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Allegation No. 1: Failure of a Contract Firewatch Employee to Conduct Required Fire Protection Surveillances and Falsified Firewatch Logs

Evidence

Document Review

During the course of this investigation, OI:RIV reviewed and evaluated documents provided by SONGS, FREEMAN, and/or NRC:RIV staff. The documents deemed pertinent to this investigation are delineated in this section.

SONGS' Response to NRC Allegation No. RIV-2006-0005, dated February 2007 (Exhibit 2)

7c This report details SONGS' findings of the allegation at hand, specifically that a contract firewatch falsified the watch documentation to indicate that the appropriate tours had been made. The report also concluded the allegation was substantiated and went on to state, "The data reviewed indicated (b)(7)(C) consistently falsified firewatch inspection records from May 2001 through December 2006" (Exhibit 2, p. 9).

Review of (b)(7)(C) Firewatch Inspection Certification Sheet Hourly Firewatch Post(s), April 2001 through December 2003 (Exhibit 3)

7c This chart depicts the results of analysis, as conducted by (b)(7)(C) of (b)(7)(C) firewatch inspection certification sheets and security gate log report data. The dates reflected on the chart were randomly selected; areas highlighted in red indicate dates where discrepancies were noted. Supporting documents for the dates listed on the chart are included in the package.

Review of FREEMAN Contract Employees Firewatch Inspection Certification Sheet Hourly Firewatch Post(s), January 2004 through December 2006 (Exhibit 4)

7c This chart depicts the results of analysis, as conducted by (b)(7)(C) of FREEMAN contract employees firewatch inspection certification sheets and security gate log report data. The dates reflected on the chart were randomly selected; areas highlighted in red indicate dates where discrepancies were noted. Supporting documents for the dates listed on the chart are included only when it related to (b)(7)(C) as the only discrepancies noted pertained solely to (b)(7)(C)

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(b)(7)(C) Firewatch Inspection Certification Sheet Hourly Firewatch Post(s), dated December 28, 2006 (Exhibit 5)

7c The enclosed firewatch inspection certification sheet hourly firewatch post(s) for December 28, 2006, reflects (b)(7)(C) made firewatch rounds at numerous plant locations from 0013 hours through 0716 hours on December 28, 2006. Review of the security gate log report data indicates (b)(7)(C) made a valid entry into the protected area at 2344 hours, December 27, 2006, and a valid exit from the protected area at 0754 on December 28, 2006. No other entry or exit data was reflected on the report.

7c (b)(7)(C) Personnel Access Data System (PADS) Report, undated (Exhibit 6)

This PADS printout indicates (b)(7)(C) was unfavorably terminated on (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

7c SONGS' Training Records Pertaining to (b)(7)(C) various dates (Exhibit 7)

7c This package includes a computerized history of training completed by (b)(7)(C) during her employment as a contractor at the site.

Testimony

Interview with (b)(7)(C) (Exhibits 8 and 9)

On February 14, 2007, (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at SONGS by OI:RIV and related the following information in substance:

7c (b)(7)(C) advised he had been employed as a (b)(7)(C) by FREEMAN for the past 18 months. (b)(7)(C) stated he reported to (b)(7)(C) SONGS, and (b)(7)(C) FREEMAN. (b)(7)(C) advised he acted as the (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) related he also performed other duties for the (b)(7)(C) at SONGS.

7c (b)(7)(C) stated that in mid-December 2006 he assumed the (b)(7)(C) duties from (b)(7)(C) SONGS], who left FREEMAN and was hired by SCE at SONGS. (b)(7)(C) stated that approximately 2 weeks later, on the Thursday between Christmas and New Year's Day [December 28, 2006], he came to work early so he could conduct a random observation on one of his employees (Exhibit 8, pp. 6-8).

7c (b)(7)(C) provided for informational purposes that they had three shifts during a 24-hour period staffed by two fire protection specialists on each shift. (b)(7)(C) added the two individuals

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7c conducted separate roves every hour of multiple areas (b)(7)(C) further explained these inspections begin at the top of every hour and continue throughout the 8-hour shift (Exhibit 8, pp. 8-9).

7c (b)(7)(C) stated that on Thursday morning [December 28, 2006] he waited at Control Room 112 where the rove was to end. (b)(7)(C) related that after waiting 35 minutes past the time when he expected the employee to show up for the 7 a.m. rove, he returned to the office in Building B-67. (b)(7)(C) advised he looked through the paperwork and learned (b)(7)(C) had the rove that ended at Control Room 112. (b)(7)(C) related that at the time he simply thought he may have missed seeing her when she came through the area conducting her rove (Exhibit 8, pp. 11-14).

7c (b)(7)(C) advised he checked to see whether (b)(7)(C) or (b)(7)(C) FREEMAN, the other employee on the graveyard shift, had utilized the PROTRAC device. (b)(7)(C) explained the device works similar to a bar code scanner and tracks the times each room was entered. (b)(7)(C) stated that after determining neither employee had utilized the device during the shift, he obtained a report from security using (b)(7)(C) badge number and access information for Room 112 between 0700 and 0800 hours [December 28, 2006] (Exhibit 8, pp. 15-16). (b)(7)(C) advised that after review of the security gate log report, he knew something was wrong because he should have seen several accesses to vital areas. According to (b)(7)(C) the security gate log report reflected (b)(7)(C) exited turnstile number five and no other information. (b)(7)(C) related turnstile number five allowed access to the protected area (Exhibit 8, p. 18). (C)

7c (b)(7)(C) stated he next obtained a similar report for the entire 8-hour shift for himself, (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) for comparison of entry data. (b)(7)(C) related the report reflected his own entry to Control Room 112 and also appropriately reflected (b)(7)(C) access and entries during the entire shift. (b)(7)(C) advised the report was devoid of any entries for (b)(7)(C) (Exhibit 8, pp. 19-20). (b)(7)(C) stated he obtained an additional security gate log report for the preceding 4-day period and "I basically got some card readers, but I could tell from my experience and seeing what I'm seeing that I'm not seeing what I should be seeing" (Exhibit 8, p. 21).

7c (b)(7)(C) advised he later contacted (b)(7)(C) and without giving her a reason, requested she come in to work an hour early (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) related that when (b)(7)(C) arrived at work he asked her whether she had an explanation and she stated, "I have no explanation." (b)(7)(C) recalled asking (b)(7)(C) "If you weren't doing the inspections, what were you doing?" Reportedly, (b)(7)(C) did not provide an answer nor did she deny failing to conduct the required checks (Exhibit 8, pp. 21-22). (b)(7)(C) advised after trying to talk to (b)(7)(C) for about half an hour, he took her badge and pager. (b)(7)(C) related that in a later telephone call he told (b)(7)(C) her access had been pulled and that termination would be forthcoming.

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7c (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(7)(C) had a good reputation and worked the graveyard shift for at least the past 15 years. (b)(7)(C) added (b)(7)(C) was one of two employees qualified to (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) confirmed (b)(7)(C) was a (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) prior to 2001 when the change management process at SONGS occurred. According to (b)(7)(C) responsibility for field observations shifted from FREEMAN to SONGS' fire department personnel from that time forward. (b)(7)(C) advised (b)(7)(C) apparently stopped making her roves about one month later (Exhibit 8, pp. 27-29).

7c (b)(7)(C) informed the roves only took about 15 minutes, so he could not comprehend why (b)(7)(C) did not do the roves and why she would risk termination if discovered. (b)(7)(C) remarked (b)(7)(C) kept saying, "I don't have any excuses" (Exhibit 8, p. 30).

7c (b)(7)(C) related the contract [between SONGS and FREEMAN] stated FREEMAN was responsible for ensuring the employees adhered to procedures. (b)(7)(C) informed, however, the contract did not say how and by what method this was to be accomplished. (b)(7)(C) identified visual observations, the use of the PROTRAC device, and lastly, obtaining a security gate log report to check for vital area accesses as all methods to verify access (Exhibit 8, pp. 32-34).

7c When asked how (b)(7)(C) actions went undetected for so long, (b)(7)(C) attributed it to her graveyard shift and the lack of people around at that time of night. Specifically, the new hires that were typically placed on graves. (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(7)(C) was deceptive in that she would start her shift with the other person, giving them the impression she was conducting her rove, and then 2 hours later meet back up with them to switch roves (Exhibit 8, pp. 34-37).

7c (b)(7)(C) acknowledged no one reviewed (b)(7)(C) certification sheets and added she was essentially "making up times" (Exhibit 8, p. 40). In response to asking about verification of the information contained on the certification sheets (b)(7)(C) related field observations or the PROTRAC device could have been checked but there was a breakdown, adding, "We stopped checking it, basically" (Exhibit 8, p. 40).

7c (b)(7)(C) advised he performed the work on SONGS' self-assessment work by comparing the data on the security gate log reports with rove documentation and inspection certification sheets on a random sample basis for a 2-year period (Exhibit 8, pp. 42-44).

7c (b)(7)(C) spoke to (b)(7)(C) training by advising she completed compensatory firewatch training required under Procedure SO-123-XIII-7 (Exhibit 8, pp. 45-46). (b)(7)(C) affirmed (b)(7)(C) completed the required training necessary for the job and probably completed the training at least two times due to her long job tenure (Exhibit 8, p. 48).

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7c (b)(7) recalled that when talking to (b)(7)(C) she made the comment [referring to her relatives], "They don't realize I have a night job." (b)(7)(C) surmised (b)(7)(C) was trying to do everything during the day which left her no energy at night. (b)(7)(C) described (b)(7)(C) conduct of roves as "sporadic," stating sometimes she did her roves for 1 hour in an 8-hour shift, perhaps 3 of the 8 hours, or maybe none of the 8 hours (Exhibit 8, pp. 51-52).

7c (b)(7)(C) was recontacted on May 16, 2007, by OI:RIV and confirmed he did much of the analysis work associated with SONGS' self-assessment report. (b)(7)(C) advised that during the course of his analysis, he obtained (b)(7)(C) inspection certification sheets. (b)(7)(C) explained each sheet covered 2 hours of inspections, so there was a total of four sheets for every 8-hour shift. (b)(7)(C) stated he also obtained the security gate log report [for the corresponding dates] which reflected all the vital area accesses/entries (b)(7)(C) made during her 8-hour shift (Exhibit 9, pp. 3-7).

7c (b)(7)(C) detailed the normal routine for conducting the firewatch rounds (Exhibit 9, pp. 7-8). (b)(7)(C) advised the inspection certification sheets were obtained from the Nuclear Database Management System, and the Security Vital Area Reports [security gate log reports] were obtained from SONGS' security department (Exhibit 9, pp. 8-10). (b)(7)(C) stated his analysis essentially consisted of comparing both of the aforementioned reports to determine whether (b)(7)(C) entered the vital areas. (b)(7)(C) related that by examining each hour of her shift he was able to form an opinion as to whether (b)(7)(C) completed her rounds (Exhibit 9, pp. 10-11). (b)(7)(C) confirmed the Security Vital Area Reports were considered to be the most reliable records (Exhibit 9, p. 16).

Interview with (b)(7)(C) (Exhibit 10)

(b)(7)(C)
On March 21, 2007, (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at SONGS by OI:RIV and related the following information in substance.

7c (b)(7) advised he was employed for the past 23 years as a contractor at SONGS. Prior to

(b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C) is presently a (b)(7)(C)
and reports to (b)(7)(C) SONGS.

7c (b)(7) related that from 2001 to 2006 his responsibilities included oversight of the (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) stated he was also responsible to check employees for aberrant behavior on a monthly basis to ensure their access levels. (b)(7) advised that prior to April 2001, he was responsible for (b)(7)(C) informed that after that date, those responsibilities were transferred to SONGS' fire department personnel (Exhibit 10, pp. 7-11).

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(b)(7)(C) [redacted] spoke to the usage of the PROTRAC device, adding that its usage was removed from the procedure in March 2001. [redacted] related they relied upon the certification sheets (Exhibit 10, p. 13).

7c (b)(7)(C) [redacted] advised as part of the change management process, all six firewatch supervisory positions [to include (b)(7)(C) [redacted] and the firewatch positions were eliminated and a new fire protection specialist position was created. [redacted] affirmed it was essentially a merging of the inspection duties and rove duties. (b)(7)(C) [redacted] recalled three levels were established, and based on her prior background, [redacted] was rated at the (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Exhibit 10, pp. 14-16). [redacted] confirmed (b)(7)(C) [redacted] never voiced any displeasure with conducting the roves, adding that she has worked at SONGS since [redacted] (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

7c [redacted] related he never noticed a deterioration in [redacted] (b)(7)(C) [redacted] work performance even when her (b)(7)(C) [redacted] stated he had no reason to suspect [redacted] was not making her rounds. [redacted] added (b)(7)(C) [redacted] chose to work the graveyard shift (Exhibit 10, pp. 21-22).

(b)(7)(C) Interview with [redacted] (Exhibit 11)

(b)(7)(C) On March 21, 2007, [redacted] was interviewed at SONGS by OI:RIV and related the following information in substance.

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7) [redacted] advised he had been employed as a [redacted] (b)(7)(C) [redacted] by FREEMAN since February 2006. [redacted] confirmed his supervisor was [redacted]

7c (b)(7)(C) [redacted] stated his responsibilities included the (b)(7)(C) [redacted] (b)(7)(C) [redacted] advised his training consisted of several months of on-the-job training and the completion of various training courses provided by (b)(7)(C) [redacted] related he usually worked the grave shift, 11:30 p.m. to 8 a.m. (Exhibit 11, p. 5).

7c (b)(7)(C) [redacted] described the rove process, to include completion of the rove sheet (Exhibit 11, pp. 6-9). (b)(7)(C) [redacted] confirmed (b)(7)(C) [redacted] stood the grave shift since he was hired. [redacted] stated (b)(7)(C) [redacted] he observed (b)(7)(C) [redacted] perhaps three times per shift: at the beginning, when they swapped shifts, and at the end of their shift. (b)(7)(C) [redacted] acknowledged he did not actually see (b)(7)(C) [redacted] while she performed her rounds since he was in another location doing his rounds.

(b)(7)(C) When asked if he observed anything which led him to believe [redacted] failed to perform her rounds, [redacted] related there were times when he left the office on (b)(7)(C) [redacted] to make his rounds and upon his return, 40 minutes later, noticed [redacted] was still in the

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7c office. (b)(7)(C) stated he began getting suspicious about 3 months into his employment, so he looked to see which direction her clipboard and hard hat were facing [in the office]. (b)(7)(C) related when he returned to the office and saw the equipment facing a different direction, he assumed she was doing her roves. (b)(7)(C) confirmed he never observed (b)(7)(C) sleeping or hiding out on the job (Exhibit 11, pp. 11-12).

7c (b)(7)(C) advised he was trained by both (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) on how to complete the rove sheets (Exhibit 11, p. 19). (b)(7)(C) related his first month on shift was spent with (b)(7)(C) who showed him how to perform the rounds. (b)(7)(C) added (b)(7)(C) slowly allowed him to perform the rounds by himself. (b)(7)(C) related he was unaware of what (b)(7)(C) may have been doing when he performed his rounds (Exhibit 11, pp. 21-23).

Interview with (b)(7)(C) (Exhibit 12)

On May 16, 2007, (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at SONGS by OI:RIV and related the following information in substance.

7c (b)(7)(C) advised she was initially hired by (b)(7)(C) and became an employee of FREEMAN in (b)(7)(C) when FREEMAN obtained the contract for firewatch services at SONGS. (b)(7)(C) related she has been on-site at SONGS since (b)(7)(C) (Exhibit 12, pp. 4-5). (b)(7)(C) stated she was trained to inspect specific areas for smoke, fire, and unusual conditions. (b)(7)(C) related that as time progressed her position advanced. (b)(7)(C) related her positions included (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) all while (b)(7)(C) held the contract (Exhibit 12, pp. 5-6).

7c (b)(7)(C) described the normal routine of a shift. (b)(7)(C) related that during the first half hour of the shift, there was a pass-down procedure with the fire department to learn of any changes or safety hazards to be aware of, then they would obtain the pass-down information from the outgoing shift employee. (b)(7)(C) advised the actual inspections would start at the top of the hour. (b)(7)(C) stated she was assigned the night shift for years and confirmed the shift was her choice (Exhibit 12, pp. 11-15).

7c (b)(7)(C) declined to answer any additional questions posed by OI:RIV (Exhibit 12, pp. 16-20).

Agent's Analysis

7c Review of the SONGS' response to the NRC Allegation No. RIV-2006-0005 (Exhibit 2) disclosed (b)(7)(C) failed to perform her required hourly firewatch rounds as required in Procedure SO123-XIII-7, Firewatch, and had falsified Firewatch Inspection Certification sheets. The data reviewed indicated (b)(7)(C) consistently falsified firewatch inspection records from May 2001 through December 2006.

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7c OI:RIV interviewed (b)(7)(C) who detailed his analysis of the records. (b)(7)(C) testified that while performing a visual observation of a FREEMAN contract employee on December 28, 2006, he noted the employee was not where he/she should have been at the completion of the firewatch rounds. (b)(7)(C) related that through follow-on efforts, he determined the employee on shift was (b)(7)(C). (b)(7)(C) testified his initial inquiries led him to obtain the security gate log reports. (b)(7)(C) related that by comparing those records to (b)(7)(C) inspection certification sheets, he determined she failed to fully complete her rounds. (b)(7)(C) advised that when later questioned, (b)(7)(C) stated she had no excuses (Exhibit 8, p. 30).

7c OI:RIV reviewed (b)(7)(C) analysis of the pertinent records (Exhibit 3). Depicted on the cover chart are dates, one per month, when (b)(7)(C) performed firewatch duties. (b)(7)(C) related the actual dates were randomly selected by SONGS' personnel, that is they selected the week of the month to be examined while he determined which shift (b)(7)(C) stood closest to the selected week. The analysis work summarized on the chart encompassed the period April 2001 through December 2003. Further review indicated (b)(7)(C) determined (b)(7)(C) correctly performed her firewatch rounds on 11 dates within the 33-month period. (b)(7)(C) determined (b)(7)(C) failed to make the required rounds the remaining 22 dates within the 33-month period.

7c OI:RIV reviewed (b)(7)(C) summarization charts included in Exhibit 2 and incorporated with supporting documentation (Exhibit 4). The period of time reflected on the chart included January 2004 through December 2006. (b)(7)(C) testified he used the same method of analysis as described above with the exception being this latter time period included a review of many FREEMAN firewatch employees. Further review by OI:RIV disclosed (b)(7)(C) was the only FREEMAN employee found to have discrepancies in the performance of firewatch rounds during this period of time. Discrepancies were detected in 32 months between January 2004 and December 2006.

7c Review and comparison of (b)(7)(C) inspection certification sheets and corresponding security gate log data for December 28, 2006 (Exhibit 5), by OI:RIV reflected while (b)(7)(C) made time entries every hour between 0013 hours and 0716 hours, December 28, 2006, security gate log data indicated her only actual entries to be at 2344 hours, December 27, 2006, and 0754 hours, December 28, 2006.

7c Testimony from both (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) revealed there were no outward indications (b)(7)(C) had failed to perform her required firewatch rounds since May 2001. (b)(7)(C) testified he began to get suspicious when he noticed (b)(7)(C) remained in the office while he conducted his own rounds. (b)(7)(C) related further efforts on his part failed to detect any wrongdoing by (b)(7)(C) (Exhibit 11, p. 12).

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7c OI:RIV reviewed FREEMAN's training records (Exhibit 7). Evidence suggests (b)(7)(C) received the same training as other FREEMAN employees. Based upon the testimony from both (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) and the results of the analysis conducted by (b)(7)(C) [detailed in Exhibit 5], OI:RIV concluded (b)(7)(C) actions were not as a result of inadequate training. (b)(7)(C) testified (b)(7)(C) was rated at the highest level (b)(7)(C) on account of her prior background at SONGS [referring to her longevity at the site] and her work performance (Exhibit 10, pp. 16-17). The fact (b)(7)(C) was tasked to provide on-the-job training to (b)(7)(C) a new hire, was further evidence of her competencies and reflected the trust placed in her by her own management. In addition, (b)(7)(C) analysis revealed (b)(7)(C) correctly made the required firewatch rounds in April, July, and August 2001, and later in January, February, March, and June through October 2002. These facts clearly indicated that (b)(7)(C) had demonstrated the ability to properly conduct firewatch inspections both in the past and occasionally during the time when she violated the procedure.

7c When provided the opportunity by OI:RIV, (b)(7)(C) offered no explanations for her actions. (b)(7)(C) did not raise issues such as a lack of training or lack of plant familiarity. The egregious number of incompleting rounds, 55 in total between the dates of April 2001 and December 2006 (Exhibits 3, 4, and 5), indicated her deliberate failure to perform required firewatch surveillances.

Failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC

7c OI:RIV concluded (b)(7)(C) deliberately failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC when she submitted the inspection certification sheets. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that a higher standard of responsibility exists when one submits a signed document indicating that one has performed certain required duties. OI:RIV also offers that the certification sheet should have prompted (b)(7)(C) as to the locations of the posts. For her to perpetuate her failure to complete the rounds by signing and submitting the certification sheets caused her action to be viewed as deliberate. OI:RIV noted (b)(7)(C) was terminated by FREEMAN on (b)(7)(C) as reflected in the PADS system (Exhibit 6).

Conclusions

Based on the evidence developed during the course of this investigation, it was substantiated that (b)(7)(C) deliberately failed to conduct required fire protection surveillances and falsified firewatch logs.

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~~SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION~~

7c On March 30, 2007, Barbara Corprew, Associate Deputy Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, was apprised of the results of the investigation and recommended OI:RIV contact the appropriate United States Attorney's Office to determine prosecutive interest.

7c On June 28, 2007, OI:RIV briefed Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Ali Serano, assigned to the United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of California. AUSA Serano declined prosecutive action.

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LIST OF EXHIBITS

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	Investigation Status Record, dated January 9, 2007 (1 page).
2	SONGS' Response to NRC Allegation No. RIV-2006-0005, dated February 2007 (21 pages).
3	Review of (b)(7)(C) Firewatch Inspection Certification Sheet Hourly Firewatch Post(s), April 2001 through December 2003 (186 pages).
4	Review of FREEMAN Contract Employees Firewatch Inspection Certification Sheet Hourly Firewatch Post(s), January 2004 through December 2006 (164 pages).
5	(b)(7)(C) Firewatch Inspection Certification Sheet Hourly Firewatch Post(s), dated December 28, 2006 (5 pages).
6	(b)(7)(C) PADS Report, undated (1 page).
7	SONG' Training Records Pertaining to (b)(7)(C) various dates (23 pages).
8	Interview with [REDACTED] February 14, 2007 (56 pages).
9	Interview with [REDACTED] May 16, 2007 (27 pages).
10	Interview with (b)(7)(C) March 21, 2007 (32 pages).
11	Interview with [REDACTED] March 21, 2007 (25 pages).
12	Interview with [REDACTED] May 16, 2007 (22 pages).

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