



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 26, 2011

Mr. Jack M. Davis
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Detroit Edison Company
Fermi 2 - 210 NOC
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166

SUBJECT: FERMI 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
LEAKAGE (TAC NO. ME6015)

Dear Mr. Davis:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.186 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for the Fermi 2 facility. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated April 8, 2011.

The amendment revises Fermi 2 TS to define a new time limit for restoring inoperable reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation to operable status; establish alternate methods of monitoring RCS leakage when one or more required monitors are inoperable; and make TS Bases changes which reflect the proposed changes and more accurately reflect the contents of the facility design basis related to operability of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation. The request is submitted consistent with the guidance contained in NRC approved Technical Specifications Task Force traveler-514 (TSTF-514). This TS improvement was made available by the NRC on December 17, 2010 (75 FR 79048), as part of the consolidated line item improvement process.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mahesh L. Chawla", is positioned above the typed name.

Mahesh L. Chawla, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch III-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-341

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.186 to NPF-43
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-341

FERMI 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 186
License No. NPF-43

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by the Detroit Edison Company (DECo, the licensee) dated April 8, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.186, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. DECo shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert J. Pascarelli", is written over the typed name.

Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch III-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 26, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.186

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43

DOCKET NO. 50-341

Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Operating License

REMOVE

INSERT

License Page 3

License Page 3

Appendix A Technical Specifications

REMOVE

INSERT

Page 3.4-13

Page 3.4-13

Page 3.4-14

Page 3.4-14

Page 3.4-15

Page 3.4-15

- (4) DECo, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material such as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;
 - (5) DECo, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
 - (6) DECo, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
- C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level

DECo is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3430 megawatts thermal (100% power) in accordance with conditions specified herein and in Attachment 1 to this license. The items identified in Attachment 1 to this license shall be completed as specified. Attachment 1 is hereby incorporated into this license.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No.186 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. DECo shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) Antitrust Conditions

DECo shall abide by the agreements and interpretations between it and the Department of Justice relating to Article I, Paragraph 3 of the Electric Power Pool Agreement between Detroit Edison Company and

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
3.4.6

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

3.4.6 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

LCO 3.4.6 The following RCS leakage detection instrumentation shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system;
- b. The primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system; and
- c. Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system inoperable.	A.1 Restore drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system to OPERABLE status.	30 days
B. Required primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable.	B.1 Analyze grab samples of primary containment atmosphere.	Once per 24 hours
C. Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable.	C.1 -----NOTE----- Not applicable when primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable. ----- Perform SR 3.4.6.1.	Once per 8 hours

(continued)

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
3.4.6

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>----- NOTE ----- Only applicable when the primary containment atmosphere gaseous radiation monitor is the only OPERABLE monitor. -----</p> <p>D. Drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable.</p>	<p>D.1 Analyze grab samples of the primary containment atmosphere.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>D.2 Monitor RCS LEAKAGE by administrative means.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>D.3.1 Restore drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system to OPERABLE status.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>D.3.2 Restore drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system to OPERABLE status</p>	<p>Once per 12 hours</p> <p>Once per 12 hours</p> <p>7 days</p> <p>7 days</p>
<p>E. Primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system inoperable.</p>	<p>E.1 Restore primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system to OPERABLE status.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>E.2 Restore drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>30 days</p> <p>30 days</p>

(continued)

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
3.4.6

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
F. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met.	F.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> F.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours
G. All required leakage detection systems inoperable.	G.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.6.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of required primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system.	12 hours
SR 3.4.6.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of required leakage detection instrumentation.	31 days
SR 3.4.6.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation.	18 months



UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.186 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

FERMI 2

DOCKET NO. 50-341

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated April 8, 2011, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML111010105), to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) Detroit Edison Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Fermi 2. The proposed changes revise TS 3.4.6, "RCS [reactor coolant system] Leakage Detection Instrumentation," and include TS Bases changes that summarize and clarify the purpose of the TS and the specified safety function of the leakage detection monitors.

The licensee stated that the license amendment request is consistent with NRC-approved Revision 3 to Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification (STS) Change Traveler TSTF-514, "Revise BWR [boiling-reactor reactor] Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation." The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the *Federal Register* on December 17, 2010 (75 FR 79048), as part of the consolidated line item improvement process.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The NRC's regulatory requirements related to the content of the TS are contained in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Section 50.36. Paragraph (c)(2)(i) of 10 CFR 50.36 states that limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. Paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR 50.36 lists four criteria for determining whether particular items are required to be included in the TS LCOs. Criterion 1 applies to installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). As described in the *Federal Register* notice associated with this regulation (60 FR 36953, July 16, 1995), the scope of TS includes two general classes of technical matters: (1) those related to prevention of accidents, and (2) those related to mitigation of the consequences of accidents. Criterion 1 addresses systems and process variables that alert the operator to a situation when accident initiation is more likely, and supports the first of these two general classes of technical matters which are included in TS. As specified in Paragraph (c)(2)(i) of 10 CFR 50.36, when a LCO of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TSs until the condition can be met.

The NRC guidance for the format and content of BWR TS can be found in NUREG-1433, Revision 3.0, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Plants, BWR/4." STS 3.4.6, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation" in NUREG-1433 contains the guidance specific to the RCS leakage detection instrumentation for BWRs.

The Bases for STS 3.4.6 contained in NUREG-1433, Revision 3.0, provides background information, applicable safety analyses, description of the LCO, applicability for the RCS leakage detection instrumentation TS, and describes the Actions and Surveillance Requirements. The TS Bases provide the purpose or reason for the TS which are derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report, and for these Specifications, the RCS leakage detection instrumentation design assumptions and licensing basis for the plant.

As stated in NRC Information Notice (IN) 2005-24, "Nonconservatism in Leakage Detection Sensitivity," (ADAMS Accession No. ML051780073) the reactor coolant activity assumptions for primary containment/drywell atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors may be nonconservative. This means the monitors may not be able to detect a one gallon per minute (gpm) leak within one hour under all likely operating conditions.

The issue described in IN 2005-24 has raised questions regarding operability requirements for primary containment/drywell atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors. TSTF-514, Revision 3, revises the TS Bases to summarize the proposed TS changes and more accurately describe the contents of the facility design basis related to operability of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation. Part of the TS Bases changes revise the specified safety function of the RCS leakage detection monitors to specify the required instrument sensitivity level. In addition, TSTF-514, Revision 3, includes a new TS Condition for RCS leakage detection instrumentation to establish Required Actions for operation during conditions of reduced monitoring sensitivity because the gaseous radioactivity instrumentation is the only operable instrument.

The regulation at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 30, "Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS leakage. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.45, Revision 0, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973, describes acceptable methods of implementing the GDC 30 requirements with regard to the selection of leakage detection systems for the RCPB.

In RG 1.45, Revision 0, Regulatory Position C.2, it states: "Leakage to the primary reactor containment from unidentified sources should be collected and the flow rate monitored with an accuracy of one gallon per minute (gpm) or better."

In RG 1.45, Revision 0, Regulatory Position C.3, it states:

At least three separate detection methods should be employed and two of these methods should be (1) sump level and flow monitoring and (2) airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring. The third method may be selected from the following: (a) monitoring of condensate flow rate from air coolers [or]

(b) monitoring of airborne gaseous radioactivity. Humidity, temperature, or pressure monitoring of the containment atmosphere should be considered as alarms or indirect indication of leakage to the containment.

In RG 1.45, Revision 0, Regulatory Position C.5, it states, "The sensitivity and response time of each leakage detection system in regulatory position 3 above employed for unidentified leakage should be adequate to detect a leakage rate, or its equivalent, of one gpm in less than one hour." RG 1.45, Revision 0, states, "In analyzing the sensitivity of leak detection systems using airborne particulate or gaseous radioactivity, a realistic primary coolant radioactivity concentration assumption should be used. The expected values used in the plant environmental report would be acceptable." The appropriate sensitivity of a plant's primary containment/drywell atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors is dependent on the design assumptions and the plant-specific licensing basis as described in the plant's updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR). The NRC staff's approval of the use of expected primary coolant radioactivity concentration values used in the environmental report creates a potential licensing conflict when a licensee is able to achieve and maintain primary coolant radioactivity concentration values lower than the value assumed in the environmental report.

The RG 1.45, Revision 1, "Guidance on Monitoring and Responding to Reactor Coolant System Leakage," was issued in May 2008. RG 1.45, Revision 1, describes methods for implementing the GDC 30 requirements that are different from those in RG 1.45, Revision 0, and was developed and issued to support new reactor licensing. Revision 1 allows that having two TS leakage detection methods capable of detecting a one gpm leak within one hour provides adequate leakage detection capability from a safety perspective. It recommends that other potential indicators (including the gaseous radiation monitors) be maintained even though they may not have the same detection capability. These indicators, in effect, provide additional defense-in-depth.

Fermi 2 UFSAR, Section 1.2.1, "General Design Criteria," states, "... for specific NRC General Design Criteria (GDC) conformance description, see Section 3.1." Specifically, Fermi's UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.4.1 provides a discussion of Fermi's design conformance to GDC 30 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. UFSAR Section 3.1.2.4.1 states:

Components which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary [RCPB] shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to the highest quality standards practical. Means shall be provided for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of reactor coolant leakage.

Criterion 30 Conformance - By using conservative design practices and detailed quality control procedures, the pressure-retaining components of the RCPB are designed and fabricated to retain their integrity during normal and postulated accident conditions. Accordingly, components that comprise the RCPB are designed, fabricated, erected, and tested in accordance with the recognized industry codes and standards listed in Sections 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5. Further, product and process quality planning is provided as described in Chapter 17 to ensure conformance with the applicable codes and standards and to retain appropriate documented evidence verifying compliance. Because the subject matter of this criterion deals with aspects of the RCPB, further discussion on this

subject is treated in the response to Criterion 14, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.

Means are provided for detecting reactor coolant leakage. The leak detection system consists of sensors and instruments to detect, annunciate, and in some cases, isolate the RCPB from potentially hazardous leaks before predetermined limits are exceeded. Small leaks are detected by temperature and pressure changes, increased condensate flow from the primary containment cooling system, increased frequency of sump pump operation, and measurement of fission product concentration. In addition to these, large leaks are detected by changes in flow rates in process lines and reactor water level. The allowable leakage rates are based on the predicted and experimentally determined behavior of cracks in pipes, the ability to make up coolant system leakage, the normally expected background leakage due to equipment design, and the detection capability of the various sensors and instruments. The total leakage rate limit is established so that, in the absence of normal ac power associated with a loss of feedwater supply, makeup capabilities are provided by the RCIC system. While the leak detection system provides protection from small leaks, the ECCS network provides protection for the complete range of discharges from ruptured pipes. Thus, protection is provided for the full spectrum of possible discharges. The RCPB and the leak detection system are designed to meet the requirements of Criterion 30.

Fermi's UFSAR Appendix A, Section A.1.45, "Regulatory Guide 1.45 (May 1973), Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," states:

... sources of leakage can be classified as identified and unidentified. Position 2 of this guide requires that unidentified sources be collected and monitored with a flow rate accuracy of 1 gpm. This sensitivity requirement is attained on the Fermi design by the drywell floor drain sump level rate-of-change monitor.

Regulatory Position 3 requires a minimum of three separate detection systems in the design. These sensing systems must include a sump level and flow monitor and an airborne particulate radioactivity monitor. In addition, either an air cooler condensate flow rate or airborne gaseous radioactivity monitoring system must be included in the design. All global (i.e., general area) systems must use humidity, temperature, or pressure conditions of the containment atmosphere as the alarm setpoint indicator. The Fermi 2 design conforms with these system requirements by providing monitoring of sump level and flow, airborne gaseous radioactivity, and a supplementary drywell floor level monitor. Specific monitored parameters are sump level, sump level flow, airborne particulate matter, airborne gaseous radioactivity, primary containment pressure and temperature, low reactor water level, high steam flow indications, and drywell local temperature...

The sensitivity and response time for each leakage detection system for unidentified leakage is required by Position 5 to match the 1 gpm-or-less standard of Position 3 in less than 1 hr after the onset of the leak. As stated

previously, the Fermi 2 designed detection system guarantees detection of flows with this precise accuracy limit...

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

In adopting the changes to TS included in TSTF-514, Revision 3, the licensee proposed to revise TS 3.4.6, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation" Conditions and Required Actions. The licensee proposed adding new Condition D to TS 3.4.6. New Condition D would be applicable when the primary containment atmosphere gaseous radiation monitor is the only operable RCS leakage detection monitor. This new Condition is necessary because improved fuel integrity and the resulting lower primary coolant radioactivity concentration affect the response of a plant's primary containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor to a greater extent than the response of other RCS leakage detection monitors to leakage radioactivity. The proposed Required Actions for new Condition D require the licensee to analyze grab samples of the primary containment atmosphere once per 12 hours, restore either the drywell floor drain sump level monitoring system or the drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system to operable status within seven days, and monitor RCS leakage by administrative means once per 12 hours.

Administrative means of monitoring RCS leakage include trending parameters that may indicate an increase in RCS leakage. There are diverse alternative methods from which appropriate indicators for identifying RCS leakage may be selected based on plant conditions. Detroit Edison Company will utilize the following methods considering the current plant conditions and historical or expected sources of unidentified leakage, as their TS administrative means: primary containment pressure, primary containment temperature, equipment drain and floor drain sump pump activity, drywell floor drain sump level, cooling water differential temperature of the closed cooling water system, reactor water level, and containment atmosphere radioactivity.

The NRC staff determined that the proposed Condition D is more restrictive than the current requirement, because there is no current TS Condition for the plant condition of the primary containment atmosphere gaseous radiation monitor being the only operable RCS leakage detection monitor. The associated proposed Actions and Completion Times are adequate because monitoring the RCS by administrative means, coupled with primary containment atmospheric grab samples, are sufficient to alert the operating staff to an unexpected increase in unidentified leakage. The primary containment atmospheric grab samples provide a method of detecting particulate and gaseous radioactive material in the primary containment atmosphere. However, taking frequent grab samples will ensure there is no significant loss of monitoring capability during the Required Action Completion Time. The 12-hour interval is reasonable given the availability of the primary containment atmosphere gaseous radiation monitor. Allowing seven days to restore another RCS leakage monitor to operable status is reasonable given the diverse methods employed in the Required Actions to detect an RCS leak and the low probability of a large RCS leak during this period. Proposed Condition D is conservative relative to the STS, sufficiently alerts the operating staff, provides a comparable ability to detect RCS leakage, and provides time intervals that are reasonable. Therefore, the NRC staff determined that proposed Condition D provides an adequate assurance of safety when judged against current regulatory standards.

The licensee proposes minor changes to ensure continuity of the TS format. These changes re-letter current Condition D, which applies when the drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system is the only operable RCS leakage detection instrument, to Condition E, current Condition E, which applies when the required action and the associated Completion Time are not satisfied to Condition F and current Condition F, which applies when all required leakage detection systems are inoperable, to Condition G. Similar changes were made to the associated Required Actions. The NRC staff determines that these changes are editorial, and therefore acceptable.

In adopting TSTF-514, Revision 3, the licensee proposed changes that would revise the Bases for TS 3.4.6 to reflect the proposed TS changes and more accurately describe the contents of the facility design basis related to operability of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation and reflect the proposed TS changes. The regulation at 10 CFR 50.36(a)(1) requires a summary statement of the TS Bases or reasons for such specifications be included with the application. The proposed TS Bases changes related to operability of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation are acceptable because they are consistent with the design basis of the facility and provides background information, applicable safety analyses, a description of the LCO, and the applicability for the RCS leakage detection instrumentation TS. These instruments satisfy Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) in that they are installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the RCPB.

The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's proposed changes against the applicable regulatory requirements listed in Section 2 of this safety evaluation. The NRC staff also compared the proposed changes to the changes made to STS by TSTF-514, Revision 3. The NRC staff determined that all the proposed changes afford adequate assurance of safety when judged against current regulatory standards. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or change the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding on May 31, 2011 (76 FR 31372). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: K. Bucholtz

Date of issuance: August 26, 2011

Mr. Jack M. Davis
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Detroit Edison Company
Fermi 2 - 210 NOC
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166

August 26, 2011

SUBJECT: FERM2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
LEAKAGE (TAC NO. ME6015)

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A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,
/RA/
Mahesh L. Chawla, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch III-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-341

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.186 to NPF-43
2. Safety Evaluation

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DATE	08/15/11	08/11/11	08/15/11	08/24/11	08/26/11

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