



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 31, 2011

Mr. Mano Nazar
Executive Vice President, Nuclear and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS
REGARDING APPROVAL OF THE ST. LUCIE CYBER SECURITY PLAN
(TAC NOS. ME4582 AND ME4583)

Dear Mr. Nazar:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 211 and 160 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the licenses in response to your application dated August 2, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 17, 2010, and April 8 and June 22, 2011.

These amendments would modify the licenses to incorporate a license condition to maintain the NRC-approved St. Lucie Cyber Security Plan, including any changes made pursuant to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Sections 50.90 and 50.54(p).

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Tracy J. Orf", is written over a horizontal line.

Tracy J. Orf, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operator Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335
and 50-389

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 211 to DPR-67
2. Amendment No. 160 to NPF-16
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: Distribution via Listserv



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-335

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 211
Renewed License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated August 2, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 17, 2010, and April 8 and June 22, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by amending paragraphs 3.B and 3.F to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 211, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

F. Physical Protection

The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provision of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Florida Power and Light & FPL Energy Seabrook Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan - Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 18, 2006. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The St. Lucie CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 211.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including the key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee on April 8, 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Douglas A. Broadus, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License

Date of Issuance: August 31, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 211
TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67
DOCKET NO. 50-335

Replace Pages 3, 4, and 5 of Renewed Operating License DPR-67 with the attached Pages 3, 4, and 5.

applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

A. Maximum Power Level

FPL is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2700 megawatts (thermal).

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 211 are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. FPL shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

Appendix B, the Environmental Protection Plan (Non-Radiological), contains environmental conditions of the renewed license. If significant detrimental effects or evidence of irreversible damage are detected by the monitoring programs required by Appendix B of this license, FPL will provide the Commission with an analysis of the problem and plan of action to be taken subject to Commission approval to eliminate or significantly reduce the detrimental effects or damage.

C. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(d), as revised on March 28, 2003, describes certain future activities to be completed before the period of extended operation. FPL shall complete these activities no later than March 1, 2016, and shall notify the NRC in writing when implementation of these activities is complete and can be verified by NRC inspection.

The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement as revised on March 28, 2003, described above, shall be included in the next scheduled update to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report required by 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4), following issuance of this renewed license. Until that update is complete, FPL may make changes to the programs described in such supplement without prior Commission approval, provided that FPL evaluates each such change pursuant to the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59 and otherwise complies with the requirements in that section.

D. Sustained Core Uncovery Actions

Procedural guidance shall be in place to instruct operators to implement actions that are designed to mitigate a small-break loss-of-coolant accident prior to a calculated time of sustained core uncovery.

E. Fire Protection

FPL shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility (The fire protection program and features were originally described in FPL submittals L-83-514 dated October 7, 1983, L-83-227 dated April 12, 1983, L-83-261 dated April 25, 1983, L-83-453 dated August 24, 1983, L-83-488 dated September 16, 1983, L-83-588 dated December 14, 1983, L-84-346 dated November 28, 1984, L-84-390 dated December 31, 1984, and L-85-71 dated February 21, 1985) and as approved by NRC letter dated July 17, 1984, and supplemented by NRC letters dated February 21, 1985, March 5, 1987, and October 4, 1988, subject to the following provision:

FPL may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

F. Physical Protection

The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provision of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Florida Power and Light & FPL Energy Seabrook Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan - Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 18, 2006. St. Lucie shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). St. Lucie CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 211

G. Mitigation Strategy License Condition

Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

- (a) Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:
 - 1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance
 - 2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets
 - 3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials
 - 4. Command and control
 - 5. Training of response personnel
- (b) Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:
 - 1. Protection and use of personnel assets
 - 2. Communications
 - 3. Minimizing fire spread
 - 4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy
 - 5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment
 - 6. Training on integrated fire response strategy
 - 7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures

- (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:
 - 1. Water spray scrubbing
 - 2. Dose to onsite responders

H. Control Room Habitability

Upon implementation of Amendment No. 205, adopting TSTF-448, Revision 3, the determination of control room envelope (CRE) unfiltered air inleakage as required by SR 4.7.7.1.e, in accordance with TS 6.8.4.m, the assessment of CRE habitability as required by Specification 6.8.4.m.c. (ii), and the measurement of CRE pressure as required by Specification 6.8.4.m.d, shall be considered met. Following implementation:

- (a) The first performance of SR 4.7.7.1.e, in accordance with Specification 6.8.4.m.c(i), shall be within the specified Frequency of 6 years, plus the 18-month allowance of SR 4.0.2, as measured from September 2003, the date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in FPL letters to NRC dated December 9, 2003, and October 29, 2004, in response to Generic Letter 2003-01.
 - (b) The first performance of the periodic assessment of CRE habitability, Specification 6.8.4.m.c(ii), shall be within 3 years, plus the 9-month allowance of SR 4.0.2, as measured from September 2003, the date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in FPL letters to NRC dated December 9, 2003, and October 29, 2004, in response to Generic Letter 2003-01, or within the next 9 months if the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas test is greater than 3 years.
 - (c) The first performance of the periodic measurement of CRE pressure, Specification 6.8.4.c.d, shall be within 36 months in a staggered test basis, plus the 138 days allowed by SR 4.0.2, as measured from June 30, 2006, which is the date of the most recent successful pressure measurement test, or within 138 days if not performed previously.
4. This renewed license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on March 1, 2036.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
J. E. Dyer, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachments:

- 1. Appendix A, Technical Specifications
- 2. Appendix B, Environmental Protection Plan



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION OF

THE CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA

AND

FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY

DOCKET NO. 50-389

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 160
Renewed License No. NPF-16

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, et al. (the licensee), dated August 2, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 17, 2010, and April 8 and June 22, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by amending paragraphs 3.B and 3.F to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications


The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 160, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

F. Physical Protection

The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provision of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Florida Power and Light & FPL Energy Seabrook Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan - Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 18, 2006. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The St. Lucie CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 160.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including the key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee on April 8, 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Douglas A. Broadus, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License

Date of Issuance: August 31, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 160
TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16
DOCKET NO. 50-389

Replace Pages 3 and 5 of Renewed Operating License NPF-16 with the attached Pages 3 and 5.

neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required.

- D. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, FPL to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source, or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and
- E. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, FPL to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

- 3. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission's regulations: 10 CFR Part 20, Section 30.34 of 10 FR Part 30, Section 40.41 of 10 CFR Part 40, Section 50.54 and 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50, and Section 70.32 of 10 CFR Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:

A. Maximum Power Level

FPL is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2700 megawatts (thermal).

Commencing with the startup for Cycle 16 and until the Combustion Engineering Model 3410 Steam Generators are replaced, the maximum reactor core power shall not exceed 89 percent of 2700 megawatts (thermal) if:

- a. The Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate is less than 335,000 gpm but greater than or equal to 300,000 gpm, or
- b. The Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate is greater than or equal to 300,000 gpm AND the percentage of steam generator tubes plugged is greater than 30 percent (2520 tubes/SG) but less than or equal to 42 percent (3532 tubes/SG).

This restriction in maximum reactor core power is based on analyses provided by FPL in submittals dated October 21, 2005 and February 28, 2006, and approved by the NRC in Amendment No. 145, which limits the percent of steam generator tubes plugged to a maximum of 42 percent (3532 tubes) in either steam generator and limits the plugging asymmetry between steam generators to a maximum of 600 tubes.

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 160 are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. FPL shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

F. Physical Protection

The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provision of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Florida Power and Light & FPL Energy Seabrook Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan - Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 18, 2006. St. Lucie shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). St. Lucie CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 160.

- G.** Before engaging in additional construction or operational activities which may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement dated April 1982, FPL shall provide written notification to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

H. DELETED

- I.** FPL shall notify the Commission, as soon as possible but not later than one hour, of any accident at this facility which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation established by the Commission.

- J.** FPL shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.

- K.** The use of ZIRLO™ clad fuel at St. Lucie Unit 2 will be subject to the following restrictions:

FPL will limit the fuel duty for St. Lucie Unit 2 to a baseline modified Fuel Duty Index (mFDI) of 600 with a provision for adequate margin to account for variations in core design (e.g., cycle length, plant operating conditions, etc). This limit will be applicable until data is available demonstrating the performance of ZIRLO™ cladding at Combustion Engineering 16x16 plants.

FPL will restrict the mFDI of each ZIRLO™ clad fuel pin to 110 percent of the baseline mFDI of 600.

For a fraction of the fuel pins in a limited number of assemblies (8), FPL will restrict the fuel duty of ZIRLO™ clad fuel pins to 120 percent of the baseline mFDI of 600.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 211 AND 160

TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-67 AND NPF-16

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, ET AL.

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 2, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML102180183), supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 17, 2010, and April 8 and June 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML102720692, ML103220454, ML111020394, and ML111822734), Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) submitted a license amendment request. Included in that was a request for approval of the licensee's Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and Implementation Schedule for the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 as required by Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Section 73.54 (Reference 1). On April 8, 2011, the licensee supplemented their CSP (ADAMS Accession No. ML111020394) to address: (1) scope of systems in response to the October 21, 2010, Commission decision (Reference 5); (2) records retention; and (3) implementation schedule. The licensee submitted Revision 0 of the CSP incorporating all of the changes and/or additional information. Portions of the letters dated August 2, 2010, and April 8, 2011, and the entire letter dated November 17, 2010, contain sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (security-related) and, accordingly, are being withheld from public disclosure.

The supplements dated September 27 and November 17, 2010, and April 8 and June 22, 2011, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* on October 12, 2010 (75 FR 62600).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 General Requirements

Consistent with 10 CFR 73.54(a), the licensee must provide high assurance that digital computer and communication systems, and networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the design-basis threat (DBT), as described in 10 CFR 73.1. The licensee shall protect digital computer and communication systems and networks associated

ENCLOSURE

with: (i) safety-related and important-to-safety functions; (ii) security functions; (iii) emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and (iv) support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness (SSEP) functions. The rule specifies that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with these functions must be protected from cyber attacks that would adversely impact the integrity or confidentiality of data and software; deny access to systems, services, or data; or provide an adverse impact to the operations of systems, networks, and associated equipment.

In the October 21, 2010, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)-COMWCO-10-0001, the Commission stated that the NRC's cyber security rule at 10 CFR 73.54 should be interpreted to include structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in the balance of plant (BOP) that have a nexus to radiological health and safety. The staff determined that SSCs in the BOP that have a nexus to radiological health and safety are those that could directly or indirectly affect reactivity of a nuclear power plant (NPP), and are, therefore, within the scope of important-to-safety functions described in 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1).

2.2 Elements of a CSP

As stated in 10 CFR 73.54(e), the licensee must establish, implement, and maintain a CSP that implements the cyber security program requirements of that section. These requirements include that the CSP must describe how the licensee will implement the requirements of the regulation and must account for the site-specific conditions that affect implementation. Additionally, the CSP must include measures for incident response and recovery for cyber attacks. The CSP must describe how the licensee will:

- (i) Maintain the capability for timely detection and response to cyber attacks;
- (ii) Mitigate the consequences of cyber attacks;
- (iii) Correct exploited vulnerabilities; and
- (iv) Restore affected systems, networks, and/or equipment affected by cyber attacks.

One method of complying with this regulation is to describe within the CSP how the licensee will achieve high assurance that all SSEP functions are protected from cyber attacks.

2.3 Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71 and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6

RG 5.71, "Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities," (Reference 2) describes a regulatory position that promotes a defensive strategy consisting of a defensive architecture and a set of security controls based on standards provided in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, "Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations," dated August 2009, and NIST SP 800-82, "Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security," dated September 29, 2008. NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-82 are based on well-understood cyber threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, coupled with equally well-understood countermeasures and protective techniques. RG 5.71

divides the security controls described within it into three broad categories: technical, operational, and management.

RG 5.71 provides a framework to aid in the identification of those digital assets that licensees must protect from cyber attacks. These identified digital assets are referred to as "critical digital assets" (CDAs). When using RG 5.71, licensees should address the potential cyber security risks to CDAs by applying the defensive architecture and addressing the collection of security controls identified in RG 5.71. RG 5.71 includes a CSP template that provides one method for preparing an acceptable CSP.

The organization of RG 5.71 reflects the steps necessary to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. Section C.3 of RG 5.71 describes an acceptable method for implementing the security controls, as detailed in Appendix B, "Technical Controls," and Appendix C, "Operational and Management Controls." Section C.4 of RG 5.71 discusses the need to maintain the established cyber security program, including comprehensive monitoring of the CDAs and the effectiveness of their security protection measures, ensuring that changes to the CDAs or the environment are controlled, coordinated, and periodically reviewed for continued protection from cyber attacks. Section C.5 of RG 5.71 provides licensees and applicants with guidance for retaining records associated with their cyber security programs. Appendix A to RG 5.71 provides a template for a generic CSP that licensees may use to comply with the licensing requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. Appendices B and C provide an acceptable set of security controls, which are based on well-understood threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks, coupled with equally well-understood and vetted countermeasures and protective techniques.

NEI 08-09, Revision 6 closely maps with RG 5.71; Appendix A of NEI 08-09, Revision 6 contains a CSP template that is comparable to Appendix A of RG 5.71. Appendix D of NEI 08-09, Revision 6 contains technical cyber security controls that are comparable to Appendix B of RG 5.71. Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6 contains operational and management cyber security controls that are comparable to Appendix C of RG 5.71.

The NRC staff stated in a letter dated May 5, 2010 (Reference 4), that the licensee may use the template in NEI 08-09, Revision 6 (Reference 3), to prepare an acceptable CSP, with the exception of the definition of "cyber attack." The NRC staff subsequently reviewed and approved by letter dated June 7, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101550052), a definition for "cyber attack" to be used in submissions based on NEI 08-09, Revision 6 (Reference 4). The licensee submitted a CSP for the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 that was based on the template provided in NEI 08-09, Revision 6 and included a definition of cyber attack acceptable to the NRC staff in "NEI 08-09 Clarifications" portion of Section 3.0, "Technical Evaluation" of Enclosure 1 to the CSP, "Evaluation of Proposed Changes." Additionally, the licensee submitted a supplement to their CSP on April 8, 2011, to include information on SSCs in the BOP that, if compromised, could affect NPP reactivity.

RG 5.71 and NEI 08-09, Revision 6 are comparable documents; both are based on essentially the same general approach and same set of technical, operational, and management security controls. The submitted CSP was reviewed against the corresponding sections in RG 5.71.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff performed a technical evaluation of the licensee's submittal. The licensee's submittal, with the exception of deviations described in Section 4.0, generally conformed to the guidance in NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which was found to be acceptable by the NRC staff and comparable to RG 5.71 to satisfy the requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.54. The staff reviewed the licensee's submittal against the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 following the guidance contained in RG 5.71. The staff's evaluation of each section of their submittal is discussed below.

3.1 Scope and Purpose

The licensee's CSP establishes a means to achieve high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with the following functions are adequately protected against cyber attacks up to and including the DBT:

1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions;
2. Security functions;
3. Emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and
4. Support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact SSEP functions.

The submitted CSP describes achievement of high assurance of adequate protection of systems associated with the above functions from cyber attacks by:

- Implementing and documenting the "baseline" security controls as described in Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 described in RG 5.71; and
- Implementing and documenting a Cyber Security Program to maintain the established cyber security controls through a comprehensive life cycle approach as described in Section 4 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.2.1 of RG 5.71.

The staff notes that in a submittal dated April 8, 2011, the licensee indicated that the scope of systems includes those BOP SSCs that have an impact on NPP reactivity if compromised. This is in response to and consistent with SRM-COMWCO-10-0001 (Reference 5), in which the Commission stated that the NRC's cyber security rule at 10 CFR 73.54 should be interpreted to include SSCs in the BOP that have a nexus to radiological health and safety. The staff determined that those systems that have a nexus to radiological health and safety are those that could directly or indirectly affect reactivity of a NPP, and are therefore within the scope of important-to-safety functions described in 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1).

On June 22, 2011, the licensee withdrew clarification to NEI 08-09, Revision 6 regarding Emergency Preparedness functions within the scope of the CSP as provided in the

August 2, 2010, licensee amendment request, Enclosure 1, Section 3.0. As a result, the licensee has indicated that no clarifications or deviation from NEI 08-09, Revision 6 is required.

The NRC staff reviewed the above information and found no deviation from Regulatory Position C.3.3 in RG 5.71 and Appendix A, Section A.2.1 of RG 5.71. The NRC staff finds that the licensee established adequate measures to implement and document the Cyber Security Program, including baseline security controls.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately establishes the Cyber Security Program, including baseline security controls.

3.2 Analyzing Digital Computer Systems and Networks and Applying Cyber Security Controls

The licensee's CSP describes that the Cyber Security Program is established, implemented, and maintained as described in Section 3.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1 described in RG 5.71 to:

- Analyze digital computer and communications systems and networks; and
- Identify those assets that must be protected against cyber attacks to satisfy 10 CFR 73.54(a).

The submitted CSP describes how the cyber security controls in Appendices D and E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which are comparable to Appendices B and C in RG 5.71, are addressed to protect CDAs from cyber attacks.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately addresses security controls.

3.3 Cyber Security Assessment and Authorization

The licensee provided information addressing the creation of a formal, documented, cyber security assessment and authorization policy. This included a description concerning the creation of a formal, documented procedure comparable to Section 3.1.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6.

The NRC staff finds that the licensee established adequate measures to define and address the purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, and coordination, and facilitates the implementation of the cyber security assessment and authorization policy.

The NRC staff reviewed the above information and found no deviation from Section 3.1.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.1 and Appendix A, Section A.3.1.1 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately established controls to develop, disseminate, and periodically update the cyber security assessment and authorization policy and implementing procedure.

3.4 Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT)

The CSAT responsibilities include conducting the cyber security assessment, documenting key findings during the assessment, and evaluating assumptions and conclusions about cyber security threats. The submitted CSP outlines the requirements, roles and responsibilities of the CSAT comparable to Section 3.1.2 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. It also states that the CSAT has the authority to conduct an independent assessment.

The submitted CSP describes that the CSAT will consist of individuals with knowledge about information and digital systems technology; NPP operations, engineering, and plant technical specifications; and physical security and emergency preparedness systems and programs. The CSAT description in the CSP is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71.

The submitted CSP lists the roles and responsibilities for the CSAT that included performing and overseeing the cyber security assessment process; documenting key observations; evaluating information about cyber security threats and vulnerabilities; confirming information obtained during tabletop reviews, walk-downs, or electronic validation of CDAs; and identifying potential new cyber security controls.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately establishes the requirements, roles and responsibilities of the CSAT.

3.5 Identification of CDAs

The submitted CSP describes that the licensee will identify and document CDAs and critical systems (CSs), including a general description, the overall function, the overall consequences if a compromise were to occur, and the security functional requirements or specifications as described in Section 3.1.3 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.3 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the process to identify CDAs.

3.6 Examination of Cyber Security Practices

The submitted CSP describes how the CSAT will examine and document the existing cyber security policies, procedures, and practices; existing cyber security controls; detailed descriptions of network and communication architectures (or network/communication architecture drawings); information on security devices; and any other information that may be helpful during the cyber security assessment process as described in Section 3.1.4 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 of RG 5.71. The

examinations will include an analysis of the effectiveness of the existing Cyber Security Program and cyber security controls. The CSAT will document the collected cyber security information and the results of their examination of the collected information.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the examination of cyber security practices.

3.7 Tabletop Reviews and Validation Testing

The submitted CSP describes tabletop reviews and validation testing, which confirm the direct and indirect connectivity of each CDA and identify direct and indirect pathways to CDAs. The CSP states that validation testing will be performed electronically or by physical walkdowns. The licensee's plan for tabletop reviews and validation testing is comparable to Section 3.1.5 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.4 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes tabletop reviews and validation testing.

3.8 Mitigation of Vulnerabilities and Application of Cyber Security Controls

The submitted CSP describes the use of information collected during the cyber security assessment process (e.g., disposition of cyber security controls, defensive models, defensive strategy measures, site and corporate network architectures) to implement security controls in accordance with Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 and Appendix A.3.1.6 to RG 5.71. The CSP describes the process that will be applied in cases where security controls cannot be implemented.

The submitted CSP notes that before the licensee can implement security controls on a CDA, it will assess the potential for adverse impact in accordance with Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes mitigation of vulnerabilities and application of security controls.

3.9 Incorporating the Cyber Security Program into the Physical Protection Program

The submitted CSP states that the Cyber Security Program will be reviewed as a component of the Physical Security Program in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(m). This is comparable to Section 4.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.4 of RG 5.71.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.3.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes review of the CSP as a component of the physical security program.

3.10 Cyber Security Controls

The submitted CSP describes how the technical, operational and management cyber security controls contained in Appendices D and E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, that are comparable to Appendices B and C in RG 5.71, are evaluated and dispositioned based on site-specific conditions during all phases of the Cyber Security Program. The CSP describes that many security controls have actions that are required to be performed on specific frequencies and that the frequency of a security control is satisfied if the action is performed within 1.25 times the frequency specified in the control, as applied, and as measured from the previous performance of the action as described in Section 4.2 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.3.1.6 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes implementation of cyber security controls.

3.11 Defense-in-Depth Protective Strategies

The submitted CSP describes the implementation of defensive strategies that ensure the capability to detect, respond to, and recover from a cyber attack. The CSP specifies that the defensive strategies consist of security controls, defense-in-depth measures, and the defensive architecture. The submitted CSP notes that the defensive architecture establishes the logical and physical boundaries to control the data transfer between these boundaries.

The licensee established defense-in-depth strategies by: implementing and documenting a defensive architecture as described in Section 4.3 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.2 in RG 5.71; a physical security program, including physical barriers; the operational and management controls described in Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C to RG 5.71; and the technical controls described in Appendix D of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix B to RG 5.71.

The licensee stated in the CSP that the boundary between Level 3 and Level 4 is implemented by one or more deterministic devices, while information flows between Level 3 and Level 2 are restricted through the use of a firewall and network-based intrusion detection system and/or prevention system. The NRC staff finds this defense-in-depth protective strategy to be acceptable based on the statement in the CSP that the firewall will implement the Information Flow Enforcement cyber security control in NEI 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D, Section 1.4 and the rule set characteristics for non-deterministic information flow enforcement described in the Defense-in-Depth cyber security control in NEI 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix E, Section 6.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.2 and Appendix A, Section A.3.1.5 in RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes implementation of defense-in-depth protective strategies.

3.12 Ongoing Monitoring and Assessment

The submitted CSP describes how ongoing monitoring of cyber security controls to support CDAs is implemented comparable to Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Positions C.4.1 and C.4.2 of RG 5.71. The ongoing monitoring program includes configuration management and change control; cyber security impact analysis of changes and changed environments; ongoing assessments of cyber security controls; effectiveness analysis (to monitor and confirm that the cyber security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and achieving the desired outcome) and vulnerability scans to identify new vulnerabilities that could affect the security posture of CDAs.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Positions C.4.1 and C.4.2 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes ongoing monitoring and assessment.

3.13 Modification of Digital Assets

The submitted CSP describes how cyber security controls are established, implemented, and maintained to protect CDAs. These security controls ensure that modifications to CDAs are evaluated before implementation that the cyber security performance objectives are maintained, and that acquired CDAs have cyber security requirements in place to achieve the site's Cyber Security Program objectives. This is comparable to Section 4.5 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendices A.4.2.5 and A.4.2.6 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes modification of digital assets.

3.14 Attack Mitigation and Incident Response

The submitted CSP describes the process to ensure that SSEP functions are not adversely impacted due to cyber attacks in accordance with Section 4.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.8 of RG 5.71. The CSP includes a discussion about creating incident response policy and procedures, and addresses training, testing and drills, incident handling, incident monitoring, and incident response assistance. It also describes identification, detection, response, containment, eradication, and recovery activities comparable to Section 4.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.8 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes attack mitigation and incident response.

3.15 Cyber Security Contingency Plan

The submitted CSP describes creation of a Cyber Security Contingency Plan and policy that protects CDAs from the adverse impacts of a cyber attack described in Section 4.7 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.7 and Appendix C.9 of RG 5.71. The licensee describes the Cyber Security Contingency Plan that would include the response to events. The plan includes procedures for operating CDAs in a contingency, roles and responsibilities of responders, processes and procedures for backup and storage of information, logical diagrams of network connectivity, current configuration information, and personnel lists for authorized access to CDAs.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.7 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the cyber security contingency plan.

3.16 Cyber Security Training and Awareness

The submitted CSP describes a program that establishes the training requirements necessary for the licensee's personnel and contractors to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in implementing the Cyber Security Program in accordance with Section 4.8 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.8 of RG 5.71.

The CSP states that individuals will be trained with a level of cyber security knowledge commensurate with their assigned responsibilities in order to provide high assurance that individuals are able to perform their job functions in accordance with Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.8 of RG 5.71 and describes three levels of training: awareness training, technical training, and specialized cyber security training.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the cyber security training and awareness.

3.17 Evaluate and Manage Cyber Risk

The submitted CSP describes how cyber risk is evaluated and managed utilizing site programs and procedures comparable to Section 4.9 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4 and Appendix C, Section C.13 of RG 5.71. The CSP describes the Threat and Vulnerability Management Program, Risk Mitigation, Operational Experience Program; and the Corrective Action Program and how each will be used to evaluate and manage risk.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4 and Appendix C, Section C.13 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes evaluation and management of cyber risk.

3.18 Policies and Implementing Procedures

The CSP describes development and implementation of policies and procedures to meet security control objectives in accordance with Section 4.10 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.5 and Appendix A, Section A.3.3 of RG 5.71. This includes the process to document, review, approve, issue, use, and revise policies and procedures.

The CSP also describes the licensee's procedures to establish specific responsibilities for positions described in Section 4.11 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.5, Appendix A, Section A.3.3, and Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes cyber security policies and implementing procedures.

3.19 Roles and Responsibilities

The submitted CSP describes the roles and responsibilities for the qualified and experienced personnel, including the Cyber Security Program Sponsor, the Cyber Security Program Manager, Cyber Security Specialists, the Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), and other positions as needed. The CSIRT initiates in accordance with the Incident Response Plan and initiates emergency action when required to safeguard CDAs from cyber security compromise and to assist with the eventual recovery of compromised systems. Implementing procedures establish roles and responsibilities for each of the cyber security roles in accordance with Section 4.11 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2, Appendix A, Section A.3.1.2, and Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes cyber security roles and responsibilities.

3.20 Cyber Security Program Review

The submitted CSP describes how the Cyber Security Program establishes the necessary procedures to implement reviews of applicable program elements in accordance with Section 4.12 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4.3 and Appendix A, Section A.4.3 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes Cyber Security Program review.

3.21 Document Control and Records Retention and Handling

The submitted CSP describes that the licensee has established the necessary measures and governing procedures to ensure that sufficient records of items and activities affecting cyber

security are developed, reviewed, approved, issued, used, and revised to reflect completed work. The CSP described that superseded portions of certain records will be retained for at least 3 years after the record is superseded, while audit records will be retained for no less than 12 months in accordance with Section 4.13 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. However, this guidance provided by industry to licensees did not fully comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54.

In a letter dated February 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600204), NEI sent to the NRC proposed language for licensees' use to respond to the generic records retention issue, to which the NRC had no technical objection (Reference: Letter from NRC dated March 1, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML110490337). The proposed language clarified the requirement by providing examples (without providing an all-inclusive list) of the records and supporting technical documentation that are needed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. All records will be retained until the Commission terminates the license, and the licensee shall maintain superseded portions of these records for at least 3 years after the record is superseded, unless otherwise specified by the Commission. By retaining accurate and complete records and technical documentation until the license is terminated, inspectors, auditors, or assessors will have the ability to evaluate incidents, events, and other activities that are related to any of the cyber security elements described, referenced, and contained within the licensee's NRC-approved CSP. It will also allow the licensee to maintain the ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks in a timely manner, in the case of an event. In a letter dated April 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111020394), the licensee responded to the records retention issue using the language proposed by NEI in its letter dated February 28, 2011.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the language the licensee proposes to adopt provides for adequate records retention and will support the licensee's ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks. The NRC staff further finds that this section is comparable to Regulatory Position C.5 and Appendix A, Section A.5 of RG 5.71 without deviation. Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's CSP adequately describes cyber security document control and records retention and handling.

3.22 Implementation Schedule

The submitted CSP provides a proposed implementation schedule for the Cyber Security Program. In a letter dated February 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600206), NEI sent to the NRC a template for licensees to use to submit their CSP implementation schedules, to which the NRC had no technical objection (Reference: Letter from NRC dated March 1, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML110070348). These key milestones include:

- Establish the CSAT;
- Identify CSs and CDAs;
- Install a deterministic one-way device between lower level devices and higher level devices;
- Implement the security control "Access Control For Portable And Mobile Devices";

- Implement observation and identification of obvious cyber related tampering to existing insider mitigation rounds by incorporating the appropriate elements;
- Identify, document, and implement cyber security controls as per "Mitigation of Vulnerabilities and Application of Cyber Security Controls" for CDAs that could adversely impact the design function of physical security target set equipment; and
- Commence ongoing monitoring and assessment activities for those target set CDAs whose security controls have been implemented.

In a letter dated April 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111020394), the licensee provided a revised implementation schedule using the NEI template. The NRC staff considers this April 8, 2011, supplement the approved schedule as required by 10 CFR 73.54. The NRC staff acknowledges that, in its submittal dated August 2, 2010, and supplemented on April 8, 2011, the licensee proposed several CSP milestone implementation dates as regulatory commitments. The NRC staff does not regard the CSP milestone implementation dates as regulatory commitments that can be changed unilaterally by the licensee, particularly in light of the regulatory requirement at 10 CFR 73.54, that "[i]mplementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be consistent with the approved schedule." As the NRC staff explained in its letter to all operating reactor licensees dated May 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980538), the implementation of the plan, including the key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee and approved by the NRC. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule, thus, will require prior NRC approval pursuant in 10 CFR 50.90.

Based on the provided schedule ensuring timely implementation of those protective measures that provide a higher degree of protection against radiological sabotage, the NRC staff finds the Cyber Security Program implementation schedule is satisfactory.

4.0 DIFFERENCES FROM NEI 08-09, REVISION 6

In addition to Section 3.0, "NEI 08-09 Clarifications" found in Enclosure 1 to the CSP, the NRC staff notes the following additional differences between the licensee's submission and NEI 08-09, Revision 6:

- In Section 3.1, "Scope and Purpose," the licensee clarified the definition of important-to-safety functions, consistent with SRM-COMWCO-10-0001. The licensee amendment request letter included a clarification to the NEI 08-09, Revision 6 that narrowed the scope of Emergency Preparedness systems within the scope of the Rule; after discussions with NRC staff, the licensee retracted this clarification.
- In Section 3.21, "Document Control and Records Retention and Handling," the licensee clarified the definition of records and supporting documentation that will be retained to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54.

- In Section 3.22, "Implementation Schedule," the licensee submitted a revised implementation schedule, specifying the interim milestones and the final implementation date, including supporting rationale.

The NRC staff finds all of these deviations to be acceptable as discussed in the respective sections.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon a letter dated May 2, 2003, from Michael N. Stephens of the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, to Brenda L. Mozafari, Senior Project Manager, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the State of Florida does not desire notification of issuance of license amendments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (75 FR 62600, dated October 12, 2010). Also, these amendments relate to safeguards matters and do not involve any significant construction impacts, and relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), (10), and (12). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff's review and evaluation of the licensee's CSP was conducted using the staff positions established in the relevant sections of RG 5.71. Based on the NRC staff's review, the NRC finds that the licensee addressed the relevant information necessary to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54, 10 CFR 73.55(a)(1), 10 CFR 73.55(b)(8), and 10 CFR 73.55(m), as applicable and that the licensee's Cyber Security Program provides high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the DBT as described in 10 CFR 73.1. This includes protecting digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with: (i) safety-related and important-to-safety functions; (ii) security functions; (iii) emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and (iv) support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact SSEP functions.

Therefore, the NRC staff finds the information contained in this CSP to be acceptable and upon successful implementation of this program, operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

8.0 REFERENCES

1. Section 73.54 of 10 CFR, "Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, March 27, 2009.
2. RG 5.71, "Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, January 2010. (ADAMS Accession No. ML090340159)
3. Letter from Jack Roe, Nuclear Energy Institute, to Scott Morris, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NEI 08-09, Revision 6, 'Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors; April 2010,'" April 28, 2010. (ADAMS Accession No. ML101180434)
4. Letter from Richard Correia, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Jack Roe, Nuclear Energy Institute, "Nuclear Energy Institute 08-09, 'Cyber Security Plan Template, Revision 6,'" May 5, 2010. (ADAMS Accession No. ML101190371)
5. SRM-COMWCO-10-0001, "Regulation of Cyber Security at Nuclear Power Plants," October 21, 2010. (ADAMS Accession No. ML102940009)

Principal Contributor: Monika Coflin, NSIR

Date: August 31, 2011

August 31, 2011

Mr. Mano Nazar
Executive Vice President, Nuclear and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Florida Power and Light Company
P.O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS
REGARDING APPROVAL OF THE ST. LUCIE CYBER SECURITY PLAN
(TAC NOS. ME4582 AND ME4583)

Dear Mr. Nazar:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 211 and 160 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the licenses in response to your application dated August 2, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 17, 2010, and April 8 and June 22, 2011.

These amendments would modify the licenses to incorporate a license condition to maintain the NRC-approved St. Lucie Cyber Security Plan, including any changes made pursuant to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Sections 50.90 and 50.54(p).

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Tracy J. Orf, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-2
Division of Operator Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-335
and 50-389

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 211 to DPR-67
2. Amendment No. 160 to NPF-16
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: Distribution via Listserv

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M. Coffin, NSiR

ADAMS Accession No.: ML11196A079

* by memo

OFFICE	LPL2-2/PM	LPL2-2/LA	NSIR/DSP/CSIRB/BC	OGC NLO	LPL2-2/BC	LPL2-2/PM
NAME	TOrf	BClayton	CErlanger *	LSubin	DBroaddus	TOrf
DATE	07/19/11	07/19/11	07/06/11	08/24/11	08/31/11	08/31/11

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