John D. O'Toole
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003
Telephone (212) 460-2533

May 22, 1981

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER-81-011/~~03L~~01T-0

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER-81-011/~~03L~~01T-0 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.7. This event is of the type described in Technical Specification 6.9.1.7.1.i.

Three copies of this letter and the attachment are enclosed as required.

Very truly yours,

John D. O'Toole

attach.
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (30 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
c/o Distribution Services Branch, DDC, ADM
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. T. Rebelowski, Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. O. Box 38
Buchanan, N. Y. 10511

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE A[illegible] REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | N Y I P S 2 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | | (5)
LICENSEE CODE (9–14) · LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) · LICENSE TYPE (26–30) · CAT (57–58)

CON'T
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7 (7) | 0 5 0 8 8 1 (8) | 0 5 2 2 8 1 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER (61–68) · EVENT DATE (69–74) · REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During inspection of service water pump discharge piping,pits were
0 3 | observed on the exterior surface. Non-destructive examination of the
0 4 | pits indicated that the pipe wall thickness under four small pits was
0 5 | less than the minimum wall thickness required to meet seismic design
0 6 | criteria, (0.135 inches). Possible consequences could have been the
0 7 | eventual development of small pinhole leaks with no degradation in the
0 8 | operability of the service water system.

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	W A (11)	E (12)	D (13)	F I P E X X (14)	D (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 1	—	0 1 1	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
B (18)	C (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0	X (23)	N (24)	A (25)	X 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | External corrosicn caused four pits to be formed in the service water
1 1 | pumps discharge piping which resulted in local areas below minimum wall
1 2 | thickness. The areas were sand blasted, a patch was welded over each
1 3 | pitted area and the entire surfaces of the pipes repainted to prevent
1 4 | further corrosion.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: D (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): N/A | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Special test of depth of pits

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
1 7 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES
1 8 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
1 9 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: N/A

PUBLICITY
2 0 | ISSUED: Z (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): N/A

NRC USE ONLY

8106180251

NAME OF PREPARER ____________ PHONE: ____________

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT 1

Docket No. 05000247

LER 81-011/03L-0

Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc.

Indian Point Unit No. 2

While in cold shutdown the service water piping in the pump pit was sand blasted to remove surface corrosion. Visual inspection of the cleaned pipe showed a total of seven (7) pits had formed on three of six service water pump discharge lines. The depth of the pits and surrounding wall thickness were measured using a pipe pit gage and an ultrasonic meter respectively. The remaining wall thickness under each pit was then calculated using the measured values.

Using an allowable wall thickness of 0.135 inches, which was based on seismic considerations, it was found that there were four pits which were below the value. These wall thicknesses were: Line No. 23, 0.060 inches; Line No. 24, 0.060, 0.105 and 0.125 inches.

The cause of the pitting is believed to have been external corrosion resulting from the damp conditions found in the pump pit. A patch was welded over each pitted area and the entire surfaces of the pipes repainted to prevent further corrosion.

The size and small number of pits did not reduce the ability of the piping to withstand a design basis seismic event. Had one or more pits developed into through holes, the result would have been "pinhole" leaks which would not have significantly degraded the operability of the system.