

From: David Vito *ef*  
To: A. Randolph Blough; Daniel Holody; Eugene Cobey; Jeffrey Teator; Karl Farrar;  
Leanne Harrison; Raymond Lorson  
Date: 10/15/04 9:51AM  
Subject: ARB form from 10/14/04 discussion re: HC SCWE issues following 10/10 event

- SENSITIVE ALLEGATION INFORMATION -  
PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -

See attached final ARB sheet for RI-2003-A-0110.

Information in this record was deleted  
in accordance with the Freedom of Information  
Act, exemptions 7C  
FOIA- 2005-194

*T-225*

## ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DISPOSITION RECORD

Allegation No.: RI-2003-A-0110  
Site/Facility: Salem/Hope Creek  
ARB Date: 10/14/2004

Branch Chief (AOC): Cobey  
Acknowledged: Yes  
Confidentiality Granted: No

Issue discussed: Comments from allegor (and others) with regard to continuing SCWE problems evidenced in aftermath of 10/10/04 Hope Creek steam leak. See NOTES section for detail regarding comments provided.

Allegor contacted prior to referral to licensee? No

### ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS

Attendees: Chair - Blough Branch Chief (AOC) - Cobey SAC - Vito, Harrison OI Rep. - Teator RI Counsel - Farrar Others - Holody, Lorson, HQ - Collins, Miller, Persensky, Jarriel, Goodman

### DISPOSITION ACTIONS:

- 1) Status letter to allegor. Technical issues referenced in Notifications related to the event are issues that are to be assessed by the Special Inspection Team - issues will be discussed with involved personnel. Regarding the "Soft"/SCWE issues, reaffirm NRC's 7/30/04 conclusions that there are problems in this area, highlighted by work management problems. NRC acknowledges that progress in this area will be slow and deliberate, and that it is not uncommon for there to be continuing SCWE-related issues and continued skepticism in this area, at this early stage. Make reference to [redacted] phone call to [redacted] (see Action #2 below). 76

Regarding assertions that others want to talk to NRC or that others may feel harassed and intimidated, inform allegor that it is our preference that they contact us directly.

Status letter to respond to questions from allegor regarding comparison of HPCI complications from the recent HC event, to past HPCI/SSDI findings. DRS (Lorson) to provide responses to questions (see Action #3 below).

OI investigations for allegor's H&I and [redacted] are still ongoing.

Responsible Person: SAC  
Closure Documentation: \_\_\_\_\_

ECD: 11/12/04  
Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

- 2) R. Blough to contact [redacted] by phone. To discuss fact that aftermath of HC event likely has and will present challenges in the SCWE area and that this will be an opportunity for the licensee to show how they take SCWE into account in response to such an event. R. Blough to summarize results of phone call (e-mail) for inclusion in allegation file. 76

Responsible Person: Blough  
Closure Documentation: \_\_\_\_\_

ECD: 10/18/04  
Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

- 3) DRS to provide input to status letter regarding comparison of HPCI complications from the recent HC event, to past HPCI/SSDI findings.

ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB

Responsible Person: Lorson  
 Closure Documentation: \_\_\_\_\_

ECD: 11/5/2004  
 Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

**SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT:** Continuing SCWE issues

**NOTES:** Time line of recent info received in response to HC event on 10/10/04:

- 10/12/04 - Allegor e-mail to R. Blough (Warning sign) - concerned about ongoing problems @ PSEG as a result of HC pipe break. A "concerned employee" informed allegor that they question PSEG's efforts to get at extent-of-condition. A Notification was written 3-weeks earlier about the same problem. NRC shouldn't let PSEG restart plant. JK
- 10/13/04 - R. Blough e-mail response to allegor. NRC has been following event since 2:35 p.m. occurrence. Inspection team being formed - focus on event review, operational performance, extent-of-condition. Safety systems worked - line that failed was at a lower energy than line in the Japanese event.
- 10/13/04 - Allegor e-mail to R. Blough - attached text of Notification 20206978. Added 4:47 p.m. personal comments, i.e., a number of workers feel plant isn't being operated safely, person who wrote Notification does so fearing his own career, NRC should immediately interview this person.
- 10/13/04 - Anonymous call to HQ Ops Officer. NRC should look at Notification 20206978. 8:42 p.m. Caller fears that person who wrote Notification could lose their job. Caller will call the NRC if that happens.
- 10/14/04 - Allegor e-mail to R. Blough, G. Cobey, NJDEP. Allegor has received several 9:57 a.m. phone calls from workers about aftermath of HC event. Asserted comments: PSEG is minimizing seriousness of event; many systems didn't work as designed - HPCI, RCIC, RV level control; "near fuel exposure and quite scary"; worker who wrote 20206978 has been "buried"; workers "on duty" (for event) are anxious to be interviewed, event could have cause serious injury or fatality, plant should not be restarted. JK
- 10/14/04 - J. Schoppy NRC internal e-mail. Responds to allegor's e-mail comment re: threat of personal injury
- 10/14/04 - Allegor provided G. Cobey copy of 20206978 w/intial PSEG management ??? p.m. assessment. Cover sheet w/questions:
- Was a thorough PMT done of HPCI following change in orifice and setpoint data?
  - Was a 50.59 evaluation done?
  - If all this was done during the LCO window that existed on 7/29/04, why didn't HPCI operate as designed on 10/10/04?
  - If this wasn't done, had HPCI been operable since 7/29/04?

**Distribution:** Panel Attendees, Regional Counsel, OI, Responsible Individuals (original to SAC)

**ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB**