

From: Joseph Schoppy *RS*
To: A. Randolph Blough; Eugene Cobey; Raymond Lorson; Scott Barber
Date: 10/14/04 12:33PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: PSEG Nuclear Safety Issues

Randy,

Since you asked ("do we know anything about the assertions that, had it not been at shift T/O, folks would have been injured or killed."), I will reply based on my observations and experience. I do not like being in a position where I feel as if I'm defending a licensee, especially PSEG, but I believe we should always speak to the facts at hand. (1) In general, there is no one permitted in the condenser bay at 100 percent power. (2) Although not personally observed, there were reports of steam/vapor filling elevation 137' of the turbine building. Time and visibility permitted workers to exit the area (I have heard no contrary reports or reports of heat stress cases). At least one equipment operator remained in the area from 5:39 PM until shortly have 6:00 PM as they attempted to identify the source of the steam leak. (3) Instead of trying to live with the leakage, operators reduced power then scrambled the plant when reports indicated that the condition was worsening. (4) Damage was very minimal in the immediate vicinity of the break (limited to the actual pipe break and insulation knocked off portions of the upstream piping). No evidence of steam cutting or any pipe whip. Damage to the pipe support (spring can) and insulation may have existed prior to the actual pipe break.

Although not in their charter, Steve's team should be sensitive to these OSHA-type issues as they move about the plant during their inspection activities. I believe that a first hand account from the involved turbine building equipment operator would help better characterize the actual environmental conditions leading up to and following the event.

Of course the jury is still out on PSEG's actions following the manual scram.

Joe

>>> A. Randolph Blough 10/14/04 10:16AM >>>

pls include in today's discussions.


do we know anything about the assertions that, had it not been at shift T/O, folks would have been injured or killed.

Also, we may want to at least think about advertising to workers that NRC is onsite and staff may request to speak with us, although it would be better if PSEG made that offer first to catch most respondents, then our offer would catch those reluctant to speak with PSEG's reviewers.

CC: David Vito; Mel Gray; Smp

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FOIA- 2005-194

T-224

From: A. Randolph Blough 
To: Barber, Scott; Cobey, Eugene; Lorson, Raymond
Date: 10/14/04 10:16AM
Subject: Fwd: PSEG Nuclear Safety Issues

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CC: Gray, Mel; Schoppy, Joseph; Vito, David

From: [REDACTED] 7C
To: <jill.lipoti@dep.state.nj.us>, <kent.tosch@dep.state.nj.us>, <ARB@nrc.gov>, <ewc@nrc.gov>
Date: 10/14/04 9:57AM
Subject: PSEG Nuclear Safety Issues

Jill, Kent, Randy, and Gene,

Last night I received several phone calls from workers at Hope Creek as did another former PSEG manager.

These workers are telling us the company, including [REDACTED] is "minimizing the seriousness" of the recent pipe break at HC. They are increasingly concerned about the nuclear safety of the plant. Given many of the safety systems did not work as designed, including HPCI and RCIC, and widespread concerns about reactor vessel water level being maintained during the event, SROs and others do not believe the plant should be restarted. One person called this a "near fuel exposure and quite scary." 7C

To peoples' disbelief, management has discussed restarting as early as Monday because of the need to burn the equivalent of 10 days of fuel before the refuel outage.

A Significance Level 2 notification, 20206978 (I believe that's the number), written by a courageous worker who is brave enough to put his nuclear safety concerns and organizational insights in writing, has reportedly been "buried" instead of the worker being heralded for speaking up and these issues receiving priority attention.

Workers who were "on duty" Sunday when this happened are anxious to be interviewed (in a "safe" setting) so they can tell what they saw and experienced. Had it not been turnover time, it is likely that GE and/or PSEG people would have been in the building preparing for the outage so serious injury—or fatalities—could have resulted. In addition, operators report there was no call for Accountability or even Assembly.

I firmly believe it is in the best interest of the employees, the public, the company and the industry to NOT allow Hope Creek to restart until these problems (and others) are fully rectified. To restart the reactor when Operators do not believe it is safe to do so would create an additional safety risk that we cannot afford to take.

Please call me to discuss.

Kymn

N. Kymn Harvin, Ph.D.
[REDACTED] 7C

CC: <DJV@nrc.gov>

From: A. Randolph Blough *es*
To: Cobey, Eugene; Lorson, Raymond; Passarelli, Anne; Vito, David
Date: 10/13/04 5:47PM
Subject: Fwd: Nuclear Safety Concerns at Salem/Hope Creek

need to get on this right away, to decide whether we have an allegation, or a list of stuff to the SIT to look at, or something else....gene/ray/dave, please get together on this asap.
randy

CC: Holian, Brian; Holody, Daniel; McGinty, Tim