

Steve Pindale notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (02-17-04)

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The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview 02-17-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	None
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not specifically addressed during interview
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	NO	One example to the contrary (See #1 Below)
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	N/A	Not specifically addressed during interview

Bins for Issues:

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

- (p. 15) Regarding maintenance associated with a 500 kV breaker/disconnect [January 2003] ... "I heard that ... the guy ... said he was forced by a supervisor to write a notification [saying the disconnect] was okay [when] it was not."

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 20) "... I would say that there has been schedule pressure, time pressure to get the plant on-line that has been disconcerting and disheartening and emotional"
- (p. 29 - 40) Regarding a diesel generator jacket water leak [Summer 2003]; (p. 35) "... I remember being at a shift manager meeting [early in 2003] where the individuals, who made the call of inoperability 158 drops per minute, [were] challenged and I would say that I felt like others in the room ... 'when do you say when?' Because that seemed ... to go out of bounds." (p. 38 - 40) "... [In the summer of 2003] we were told that it was inappropriate to declare the diesel inoperable at 158 drops a minute although that was the original stance ... why is it incremental ... why isn't the answer final?" (p. 36) ... the discussions related to this issue were conducted with the operations manager, [REDACTED]
- (p. 43 - 54) Bypass valves were oscillating ($\leq 2\%$ of meter indication) prior to grid synch during plant startup [March 2003]. (p. 46) "I said some people think we're proceeding in the face of uncertainty with this condition. I understand the engineering position. Do you [REDACTED] want me to sync to the grid with this uncertainty that's out there. He [REDACTED] said absolutely sync the generator to the grid."
- (p. 63 - 66) Regarding examples where interviewee was uncomfortable with the direction received for decision making [December 2002]: (p. 65 - 66) "... I got a call from my boss who was [REDACTED] saying to hold power where it was and that we were talking with the Regulatory Commission about an NOED and I wasn't very comfortable with that ... We will comply with the [Technical Specification] to take the unit to hot shutdown in the required time and we'll scram the unit if we need to ... is technically do-able until ... the NOED was obtained."
- (p. 66 - 114) Non-conservative decision making/senior management questioning SRO and operations management decision to shut plant down [March 2003]. (p. 66) "... the shift had some problems with [bringing the plant down to about 700# with the intent to transition from the steam jet air ejectors to the mechanical vacuum pump ... the reactivity event] which resulted in the 'proceeding in face of uncertainty' letter ... they scrambled the reactor and all bypass valves went closed and word came to my boss that why are you going to proceed all the way to cold shutdown if your bypass valves are working now?" (p. 68) "... we're getting word from PSE&G Power the capacity's level that they want us to hold and assess this condition before we go to cold shutdown ..." (p. 92) Regarding the motivation for not going to cold shutdown: "I would see that as production. If it's coming from PSE&G ... PSE&G Power, yes."

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 58 - 60) "The shaft on the bravo recirc pump is either out of round, bent, whatever you want to call it and it results in degradation of a seal over a period of time which can fluctuate and I think it's probably been about two or three years. But, we're not spending the money to replace the shaft."

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#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. 7) "... We've come off of some challenging union/management issues regarding exhaust leaks on bravo diesel generator [2001 - 2002] and I think the situation that transpired from that . . . in my opinion was timely corrective maintenance of that situation and probably poor communications across the board . . ."

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 7 - 13) Regarding 'B' diesel generator exhaust issues [late 2001/early 2002]: (p. 11) "... the exhaust lead that occurred that individuals were made sick over?"
- (p. 13) "Another individual wrote up another notification and ... used some pretty strong words in there. I won't say they're incorrect or correct, but ... it's very difficult to operate and if things degraded or [if] there was a catastrophic failure with the operation, someone could have been hurt or killed." [January 2002]

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 109) Regarding PSEG's internal investigation and some apparent conflicting information between that transcript and answers provided during this interview, and whether the PSE&G Investigators gave the interviewee the sense that they wanted to hear what the concerns were, if any? "No, because the - - - the battery of questions were [very limited in scope]."