

Greg Bowman notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (02-12-04)

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview 02-12-04. 7C

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	None
Raises concerns for others?	YES	None
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	None
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	NO	None

#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

- (p. 9 - 11, 15) Stated that he was not aware of any issues that, once raised to the management level, were not acted on. However, he did state that, in some cases, issues that were raised may not have been handled in a timely manner. In particular prior to 2001. In discussing one example of this, the interviewee stated, "... [the fact that he [REDACTED] kept after [the issue] tells me he felt comfortable coming forward. He just was not comfortable with the ... rate at which things were being performed ... at the time he was very emotional with regard to what he felt was a lack of concern with his issue."
- (p. 19 - 20) The interviewee stated that some of the former senior managers, [REDACTED] in particular, promoted an environment that discouraged people from raising concerns. "In the past, I've been in meetings where I felt some of my senior management team were out of line with regard to the way they spoke to individuals ... If an individual is [subjected to] a verbal attack like that, how often or how free does he feel going in there and telling this guy something is wrong because he knows that's not what he wants to hear."

#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 16) "I would say that when I became shift manager [in 2001] we were very [lethargic]. In other words, we allowed a lot of things not to be fixed. We accepted them ... Over the last 12 to 18 months, at least, specifically the last six months that mind set is rapidly becoming history with regard to fixing the plant, bringing up concerns, and those type of things."
- (p. 26 - 37) Discusses concerns that were raised during a startup at the end of RFO-11, where the #3 BPV oscillated. The operating crew had concerns with continuing the startup. "We called the [REDACTED] in and we were basically overruled. He said, "I want the unit synched ... I felt we proceeded without what I would consider good engineering justification ... the unit [was] synched properly [to the grid without incident] ... they gave us justification later but I found out it was [merely a] theory."
- (p. 66 - 68) The interviewee discussed an issue where off-gas flow rate increased above the licensee's administrative limits due to a leak, but the unit was not shutdown. "What I remember on my shift was [that] the NCOs were a little bit concerned. They didn't feel the [engineering] evaluation was complete ... they basically felt that we were keeping the unit online to make money."
- (p. 73 - 75) Discussed the licensee's actions related to increased drywell floor drain leakage. As with the off-gas flow increase, the licensee exceeded their administrative limit but rather than shut the unit down, they raised the limit. "We kept raising that value when we had [a know] issue with the Redrc [Pump] seal [leak]. We kept raising it and raising it when we might shut the unit down."
- (p. 108 - 109) "We're also in this competitive business to make money. If you owned this business, would you [require someone] to go in there twice a shift and monitor something or would you shut the unit off to fix it? The decision is sometimes based on economics, but if safety comes into play, the decision should always be conservative [including taking the] unit off line if you have to, to fix [the problem]."
- (p. 75 - 79) The interviewee stated that following identification of a 150 drop per minute jacket water leak from one of the EDGs, he declared the EDG inoperable (based on a past evaluation that gave a limit of 150 dpm for operability). He stated that his decision to declare the EDG inoperable was criticized by his management because he didn't get engineering involved to re-analyze the allowed leak rate. The interviewee used this as an example to show that engineering will at times generate any number you want to prevent the plant from having to be shutdown. This is also an example of where upper management's expectation is to assume a piece of equipment is operable until engineering comes in and proves that it's inoperable.
- (p. 118 - 119) The interviewee discusses problems with procurement of parts for work. The plant has a policy of not keeping spare parts (even critical parts) at the plant, and instead ordering them when they break. "I can take you in the

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control room right now and show you two extremely [important degraded pieces of equipment] that if we could get spare parts we could fix them but we don't have the parts yet. We had a battery room duct heater that burned up on us. We had to manufacture a brand new one. That's taken weeks and weeks and weeks."

#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

- (p. 63 - 65) During development of the procedure to shutdown the unit with a stuck open BPV, there was no separate verification/validation step for the procedure (as you would normally expect to see). Instead the crew that was going to be performing the evolution completed a combination practice run and verification/validation in the simulator.

#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

- (p. 56 - 58) Stated that the stuck open BPV power excursion that took place during the shutdown caused "a lot of damage [to union] - management relations when it was all said and done." He also stated that the RO who was on shift that night wasn't in the training for the shutdown, and was disqualified following the event. He implied that the whole evolution was not well planned or thought out ... "It was obvious to me at the time that there was a fundamental knowledge breakdown with regard to taking pressure down with the bypass valves."
- (p. 96 - 97) The interviewee mentioned some union concerns related to wearing SCBAs when running one of the EDGs due to exhaust leaks. "It was hard to convince various people within the bargaining unit that we were concerned about their safety. We were going to fix the diesel ... No, we didn't make them go in with SCBAs. Yes, site protection had data that supported that the environment wouldn't kill you, those type of things ... The outfall was [that] management doesn't care about personal safety ..." The interviewee stated that this issue caused a lot of concern among union membership and leadership.

#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- (p. 9, 100 - 101) The interviewee discusses an incident in early 2000 where a worker was almost killed in an accident. While moving a service water sluice gate with a large tool (and using a garbage can as a prop), the worker fell and the tool hit him in the head. The paging system in the service water structure had recently been fixed following a period where it had routinely failed to function. He was able to use the paging system to call for help, but if he hadn't, "everybody pretty much agrees he wouldn't have made it." According to the interviewee, "that made us understand that our safety, our personal safety was not where it needed to be so we took a giant step forward there with regard to individual personal safety on the job."
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OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

- (p. 45) The interviewee discusses changes in the management at the plant: "In the past I didn't see them [senior managers] that often. Now I see them all the time and I get daily coachings with regard to my leadership abilities. I was coached on my leadership abilities on leading the manager's meeting. Coached on plant startups. Constantly getting positive as well as constructive coaching and that was not part of the norm with the past regime."
- (p. 54) During the startup where a stuck open BPV was identified, the interviewee was frustrated at the lack of support from organizations outside of Ops. "If the plant scrams am I going to exceed a cool down [rate limit] or not. We had nothing. There was no other support. Ops grabbed the bull by the horns, developed the plan, executed the plan, and there was very little help from outside organizations."
- (p. 111 - 112) In discussing senior management involvement in day to day plant operations, the interviewee stated: "I have never seen him [one of the senior plant managers] in the control room. Never. That disturbs me. I put that on my synergy survey. It's hard for me to determine if we are leading the right way when I don't see my leaders in the control [room] environment."
- (p. 121 - 122) Discussed a concern he had with a self-assessment conducted by the QA department. An audit was conducted in the second quarter of 2003 that identified potential reactivity management/procedural problems. A follow-up audit was conducted in the fourth quarter, and a "scathing" letter was sent to the senior VP in January. The interviewee was concerned that if a serious issue was identified by QA in the second quarter it should have followed up much more promptly (he also strongly disagreed with their assessment). "What bothers me is I've got an organization that is supposed to be a watchdog and they [referring to QA] are not, in my opinion, reporting it in a timely and prompt manner and they give me no concrete examples to go back and recalibrate my performance ..."