

Peter Presby notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (02-02-04)

7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview held on 02-02-04.
This transcript review was completed on 03-11-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	(p. 87)
Raises concerns for others?	YES	(p. 107)
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	(p.10)
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	N/A	Not addressed in interview

Bins for Issues:

- #1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- #2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- #3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- #4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- #5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES

- Page 10 - "Workers that work for me generally will ... raise concerns, questions about ... industrial, radiological, and nuclear safety." [Bin 1]
- Page 35 - When asked whether [REDACTED] thought putting up with an exhaust leak on the emergency diesel for an entire operating cycle, including a 3 to 4 week refueling outage, was a case of production over safety, [REDACTED] stated, "No. No, I did not." [Bin 2 and Technical Issue - Why was outage duration estimate by work control wrong and not revisited during 18 month period?] 7C
- Page 35 - "But, the evolution of ultimately making the decision to run the [emergency diesel] engine, to declare it operable, with operators wearing self contained breathing apparatus, did cause some - some very, very significant rifts between different parts of the organization." [Bin 4 and Bin 5]
- Page 39 - "I have never been in a situation where I have recommended, for instance, that something should be declared inoperable, and I've had somebody above me override that decision." [Bin 1 and Bin 2]
- Page 45 - Apparent communication problem between management and labor - "So there's a frustration where somebody repeatedly tags the same piece of equipment [diesel jacket water pump] several times to fix what one would think would be an easy thing to fix." [Bin 4]
- Page 53 - "I can't think of any - any specific circumstance where the final decision was, in my opinion, the wrong decision." [Bin 2]
- Page 54 - "there are situations where operators ...[have to] babysit certain equipment because we have not been able to schedule a window to do the necessary repairs on it." [Bin 4]
- Page 56 - Speaking of the situation where operators have continually "managed" a problem with oil level fluctuations in a safety-related control room chiller for at least 18 months and repairs are scheduled for Oct 2004 (8 more months) - "...it has frustrated a lot of operators. Do I think the decision is the right decision to manage this equipment? Yes, I do." [Bin 2 and Technical Issue - Is there an effective operator work-around monitoring/management program?]
- Page 59 - Regarding the missed opportunity to effect CR A/C chiller repairs during an unplanned Dec 2003 outage, after 16 months into the management of known oil level fluctuations - "And, unfortunately, we did not physically have

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 7C
FOIA- 2005-194

7-60

Peter Presby notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (02-02-04)

7C

the equipment onsite to do the work. Had we had the equipment onsite, I have no doubt that chiller would have been repaired." [Technical Issue - Where is the forced outage advance planning?]

- Page 60 - "But I have never had the sense that it was production over – over repairs. I think there's an inefficiency in our ability to define and implement repairs." [Bin 3]
- Page 63 - Relaying second/third hand information that previous [REDACTED] promoted a non-conservative approach toward operability determinations - "Gee, I went to my interview with [REDACTED] and, boy, this is what he said about operability determinations. And that doesn't seem right to me." [Bin 2]
- Page 86 through 88 - Recounted how [REDACTED] relayed [REDACTED] operability determination philosophy at a Shift Manager's meeting - "it sounded to me as though we – the approach was one of ... justifying why something was operable versus determining that it is operable. And there's a big difference between those things." [Bin 2]
- Page 87 SM Meeting with [REDACTED] "I basically said, 'Bullshit. That's not the way you approach operability determinations.'" [Bin 1]
- Page 89 - Describing [REDACTED] "I have never had any reason to question his integrity. He was one of the most operational savvy people I have ever known. You know, he just had – he had a strong plant instinct." "He was very effective at getting things done, getting people to do things. But as far as understanding how to operate a power plant, he – he really did not have that operator – that instinct on how to safely operate a power plant." [Bin 2]
- Page 107 - Fall 2003, High vibration alarm on reactor feed pump, SM directed remaining at full power based on verbal input from engineering, in violation of alarm procedure - "I've got engineering, through several communications, saying we don't believe this pump is in jeopardy. Yet I still have a procedure that has these words in it, and this is presenting a challenge for the shift." [Bin 2 and Technical Issue - operator compliance with direct procedure requirements]
- Page 114, 122 - Crew choose to violate procedure. Did not take vibrating feed pump out of service, instead concluded that procedure was incorrect. Made one-time temporary procedure change - after the fact to cover this situation, but then rolled back to previous version of procedure. Procedure deficiency as perceived during this event still exists. [Technical Issue - effectiveness of problem reporting/corrective action program]
- Page 116 - "the point is that rather than ... doing the hit on the head, you know, you guys were bad and didn't follow procedure, the approach has been, what can we as operators do better, or do differently, to head off this type of situation through the way we monitor the equipment?" [Bin 2 and Technical Issue - management's commitment to operator adherence to procedures - they addressed the procedure challenge initiator without addressing need for procedure compliance]
- Page 138 - Discussing effects of deregulation on staff perceptions that market forces require quicker repairs - "it was a matter of getting folks educated and talking to the PJM. And all the right answers came back. You know, you guys, we're not in a grid emergency. Take the time that you need." [Bin 3]
- Page 145 through 148 - "change in structure is really allowing people in the organization to have a much more clear focus for what they're responsible for and who they're accountable to." "We are seeing improvements in the overall timeliness and extent of – as an example – corrective maintenance in the plant." "The focus is on clearly and accurately documented [operability] determinations..." [No particular bin - speaks to perception of improved culture at station under changed management]
- Page 149 through 150 - Related an instance where work sequence was appropriate but reasoning not communicated from outage management to workers - "I think there's [still] a gap between ... the union workers ... and management." [Bin 4]