

**Gil Johnson notes/comments on the [REDACTED] interview (01-16-04)** 7C

The following are my observations/questions of the [REDACTED] interview held on 01-16-04. This transcript review was completed on 03-12-04.

ASSESSMENT QUESTION	YES/NO	AMPLIFICATION (WHY, WHY NOT, ETC.)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?	YES	I've never had an issue with personally raising a safety concern (p 8)
Raises concerns for others?	N/A	Not discussed
Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?	YES	I don't know of any individuals myself that had issues or concerns like that (p 9)
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for raising concerns?	NO	Absolutely not (p 10)

**Bins for Issues:**

**#1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT**

- We always start off our shift meeting with a safety message.. It's always open for discussion (p 9)
- The industrial (safety) does weigh more heavily (than Nuclear safety) (p10)
- We'll try to minimize the people in the diesel room during a run (because of past CO problems) (P 13)
- Equipment Operators raised the safety issue associated with CO in the diesel room (p 16)

**#2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES**

- It's obvious to me that with these forced outages...is really upper management saying "Hey, let's get this stuff fixed. We're not going to settle for this stuff anymore" (p 19)
- We're fixing other things too... going to cold shutdown... going into the drywell (p 20)
- In the past you would fix something and it would show up a month or two later (p 28)
- Now the root causes... fix it... so it's not going to happen again ( p 28)
- We're fixing stuff and we are fixing it right (p 30)

Note: The following four items are discussions on shift related to backing down power due to some indications being lost

- They [REDACTED] wanted to come down and I was with them...talked about it with [REDACTED] decided not to do it (p 112)
- [REDACTED] felt we should have come back down power a little bit
- There is potential issues associated with moving the plant (down 2%)... may sound like a minor adjustment (p 11)
- [REDACTED] said "Hold off on that" (p 116)

Note: From my own personal BWR experience there is little impact from "backing down" a few percent. Did it weekly at VY.

- You're right it is a double standard (procedure compliance) "now you're telling us not to comply..." (P 122)
- We approached or exceeded a limit on vibration (feed pump) and it didn't come out right away (p 127)

**#3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES**

- Back in 2000 the work groups were jam packed with work...almost impossible to execute (p 24)
- Now the message is "If you can't do a procedure as written, then stop" (p 24)
- Reducing power to 60% was the right thing to do..that's where management was willing to go for safety (p 26)
- In the past we talked the talk but didn't walk the walk... so much emphasis on production (p 28)
- When we went through it (stuck B/P valve problem) I was very uncomfortable with it (p 42)

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Note the following comments relate to the forced outage in March 2003 requiring a IPTE to shutdown with stuck B/P valve

- Had not been done at Hope Creek before (reduce pressure while critical) (p 48)
- There was a lot of frustration in that training...in those couple of hours Saturday night (p 52)
- So there was a certain amount of time pressure to achieve this thing (fix B/P valve problem) Sunday night (p 55)
- It wasn't a validation and it should have been...still hashing things out...weren't sure which way we were to go (p 56)
- So the time pressure...was that we had to get through it...relieve the other crew at midnight (p 57)
- I said "Unless we can come to some consensus as to what we are doing...find someone else to take the watch" (p 60)
- I don't think that thing would happen again...had a plan not fully baked (p 64)
- We felt we had responded the way we were trained and we did a good job (p 79)
- I'm sure [REDACTED] felt the same...this thing was scheduled for Sunday...we needed to do what we could (p 84)
- I don't think it had anything to do with production, absolutely not (p 86)

**#4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES**

- It's easy for the union guys to say "Shut it down...this isn't right" without any thought on other impacts (p 33)
- They (union) may not have the full picture or be totally grounded in fact (p 135)
- I think everyone to a man (in the union) feels empowered to raise those type of (safety) issues (p 136)

**#5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES**

- Safety is the number one priority in the plant. I believe that (p 18)
- A building operator got hurt two years ago and the other operators said "We're not going to put up with this stuff" Since that time it has become a more safety conscious work environment (p22)

**OTHER- THINGS NOT GETTING FIXED QUICKLY**

- EHC filters frustrate us. Frequent changeout ... not fixing the reason for the filter clogging (P 38)
- The reliability of our boilers has been substandard...That has not been addressed adequately (p 38)
- It's not in-plant equipment...in the boiler house and it doesn't get the attention it needs (p 39)
- I don't know how you can expect a guy from Hope Creek to work on Salem when he never set foot in there (p 40)