

- [REDACTED] August 2000 ex 7c

- SMS meeting to discuss ODs -

- late 2001 loss of Station air

① ✓ - Salem startup in progress - generator complications causing a one week delay. Heat-up with goop in turbine seals. [REDACTED] wanted to perform physics testing

- Mgmt contact during 9/03 hurricane

- Service Water underground leak

- ~~Start~~ Startup from trip of current transformer.

- SV valve issue - Summer 2001

② ✓ - [REDACTED] Criticized SM for calling SW loop inop

7c

③ ✓ - Green - White

④ ✓ - Holding plant hostage

⑤ - Hurricane 9/03

Op - inop at end

[REDACTED]

ex 7c

(A.)

SEP 9

10:20 a.m.

- CHANGE MGMT FOR SAP
- MAR 1996 SAP IMPLEMENTATION
- ON LOAN FROM BUSINESS INTEGRATION IN NAWAC
- WORKED w/ BUSINESS PROCESS INTEGRATION TEAM

- x 7c • REPORTED TO [REDACTED] IN CORPORATE
- TRANSFERRED TO NUCLEAR BIC
- SAW A SITE w/ FEEL OF CATASTROPHIC - NOT CONSISTENT w/ PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE

[REDACTED] WAS TO FOCUS ON PEOPLE

- [REDACTED] HAD A VERY INTIMIDATING TYPE OF LEADERSHIP

- [REDACTED] RETIRED - OTHER PEOPLE BROUGHT IN WITH OTHER ETHICS OF LEADERSHIP

- WHEN DID JOB RESPONSIBILITY CHANGE?? ONGOING EVOLUTION - DON'T RECALL A SPECIFIC MOMENT IN TIME - EVOLUTION BEGAN THERE PUT IN MAR 1996 - FORWARD

①

ex 7c

Fall 1996 - [REDACTED] requested [REDACTED]  
to work on a Human Perf  
Agent w/ [REDACTED]

SHIFTED GEAR AFTER  
REORGANIZATION

[REDACTED] THEN SPONSORED HUMAN  
PERF INITIATIVE

★ ★

[REDACTED] ★ ★  
↳ external

she initially spoke w/ [REDACTED]  
about her concerns.

EXAMPLES OF FEAR & INTIMIDATION??

Ass CHOKING  
Ass KICKING  
HIGH level executives could see

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] - DIRECTOR

- DON'T RECALL SPECIFIC ISSUES.
- LOT OF CONTENTION BETWEEN UNION &  
Mgmt.

RECALL ANY SPECIFIC POTAT TYPE  
ISSUES??

(2)

ex 7c

- # of meetings led by [redacted] where about team where if answers were not collected - people were dressed down.

- How did human perf initiative do w/ [redacted]??

- TRAINED GROUP OF 40 PEOPLE - BLENKTHAN SPONSORS.

- How did improvement manifest itself??


- corporate surveys
- Reported GROUP UZ survey every year
- people issues were getting more and more ATTENTION
- UNION/MAINT issues being resolved

→ PEAKED IMPROVEMENT ETS IN MID 2002

- [redacted] DECLINE AFTER WANO EVALUATION IN SUMMER OF 2002


- L THINGS IN [redacted] WANO 3) VIEW NEW SPONSORS A STAFF DECLINE

et7c.




ATTITUDE ABOUT WORKERS SHIFTED  
TO NEGATIVE AFTER EDWARD ~~3~~

- Who was responsible for improvement  
in work environment??



PROGRESS IN  
SUMMER OF 2000 -  
STRONG COMMITMENT TO LONG-TERM  
PARTICIPATION - DEFENSE  
CONTRIBUTED TO PEOPLE BEING HEARD  
MORE.



HEAVY  
BRING  
ABOUT  
CULTURAL  
CHANGES  
THAT IMPROVED  
OUTCOMES.

- [X] role was to be  
A COACH TO THE LEADERSHIP  
TEAMS

- SIMILAR TYPE LEADERS ON  
SAME SIDE???
- SAME OTHER FALL OF 1999  
BEST OUTCOME EVER

4

PROBLEM WAS SO NEAR THAT  
QUESTIONABLE IF IT COULD BE ESTABLISHED  
PLANT PART - ACTUAL NUMBERS TAKEN  
CLOSE TO A 3

ex 7c

[REDACTED] BECAME JUST DISTANT, CONSIDER  
[REDACTED] & [REDACTED] WERE  
UNDER CONSIDERATION TO MAKE  
CHANGE HAPPEN -

• UNION BECAME DISHEARTENED AFTER NEGOTIATIONS  
TURNED AFTER [WATD 3] ~~ST~~

NOT AS MUCH CONTACT w/ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] WERE ALSO  
MORE VISIBLE.

→ [REDACTED] - [REDACTED] WERE AT  
ODDS -

WHO WAS MORE THE CHAMPION OF  
PLANT SAFETY??

[REDACTED] BY FAR

OUTLINE @ SALGM

ISSUE ON RESTART

PRO ON DUTY WERE TOLD TO  
W/A A LINE IN PROCEDURE -

(5)

etc

[REDACTED]

go N/A

DIRECTED  
STEP

THE ERO -

[REDACTED]

THOUGHT

SPECIFICS ABOUT STEP N/A  
UNIT DID START UP

⇒

TALK TO

[REDACTED]

DID LICENSEE CONDUCT INVESTIGATION  
OF THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE

→ SUPPORT A NOTIFICATION WAS WRITTEN

USED AS AN EXAMPLE FOR MOUNT  
NOT SUPPORTING THE RIGHT THINK.

- STAFF OPERATORS PERCEIVED IT AS A  
DIRECT ORDER.

6

IS THIS FIRST EXAMPLE OF PRODUCTION  
OVER SAFETY??  
ex 7c

THING ISSUE MINORS TO HEAD  
OF RIFTS

SRO's

Ops Supts - All From [redacted]


Source [KIMM] QUIT CONFIDED THAT DOES NOT TRUST [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] - ON DATE  
WHEN [redacted] CLOSED WORK

EMERY  
2002

[redacted]  
[redacted] - NOCED SPECIFIC  
SOURCES re RIFT


[redacted]



DEFINITELY


α 7c

7




ANOTHER OTHER INCIDENT BESIDES STEAM  
SUPPLY VALVE

"OTHER PEOPLE KEEPING NOTES"



e-MAILS - 12 FILES ATTACHED  
SAFETY CONCERNS NOT ADDRESS

NUCLEAR COPT OPERATOR



- EXTENSIVE FILES ON ISSUES  
WOULD SPEAK ONLY UNDER GOVERNMENT BLC  
SHE WAS AFRAID FOR HER JOB

TALK TO [REDACTED]

ONLY RECENTLY DID SHE HAVE FROM  
ITIE. SHIFT MANAGERS ABOUT  
DISTRUST TOWARDS LEADERSHIP.

(8)

ex 7c copy of e-mail was given to [REDACTED] - questions about RA inspectors not in field.

[REDACTED] response - "yeah I have heard this, nothing new here."

[REDACTED] response seemed to be NEO's are the problem.

speak to [REDACTED] re: e-mail from [REDACTED] investigated e-mail was from 9/25

[REDACTED] also believed Vane was unsafe to sheet manually.

IPR2 Vane incident [REDACTED] threatened media publicity if teens were not re-hired.  
issue was too severe discipline -

cc 7c

(9)

FIRING OF

[REDACTED]

regarding

[REDACTED]

↳

[REDACTED]

- stated

[REDACTED]

HOME.

ECP SURVEY -

FORWARDED TO

[REDACTED]

COMMENTS WERE

BY

NAMED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TAKE TO

[REDACTED]

SWITCHED

POSITIONS IN CY 2002

APRIL 2002

EXCUSE -

THESE

RESULTS

HAVE

NOT YET

BEEN

PUBLISHED.

SURVEY:

CIRCUMPLEX -

HUMAN

SYNERGISTICS

SECRET

[REDACTED]

⇒ PASS OFF

KICK DOWN CULTURE

WORTHY

NO RESPONSE

TO THIS

[REDACTED]

(10)

Ex 7c

• Hope creek ops was one of the  
hardest  
RP- [REDACTED] - Job involved

MOST VARIETY

- heavy ops
- wide maintenance
- chemistry
- engineering

[REDACTED] talked to  
[REDACTED] over nuclear  
CAPUTY 1970s

→ CHILLED ENVIRONMENT IN  
WAY [REDACTED] WAS HANDLED

→ [REDACTED] CONFIDED IN  
[REDACTED] REGARDING TOLLS

A PUBLIC FROWN OUT OF FAVOR

(11)

A Recent ~~example~~ OF RIFT  
RESULTS

#

H.C. GRO'S HAVE DIVIDED LOYALTIES  
- LICENSE  
- PRODUCTION

SEP 3-3

SK MGMT WENT - INFO ~~WENT~~ -  
S.M. BEHAVIOR HE DID NOT  
HAVE POWER OF AUTHORITY  
TO STOP EVEN THOUGH HE BEHAVIOR  
IT WAS ALL CONCEIVED.

WHO WERE INVOLVED: (SK MGMT)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

ABOUT HOW THIS WAS  
HANDLED

72 HR LCO A OR B EDGE

TOOK THE END OF LCO WINDOW [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] WANTED TO COMMENCE ETD.

[REDACTED] DID NOT.

[REDACTED] & [REDACTED] COMMENCED

ex 7-

(12)

1/10.

[REDACTED] CONFIDED W

x [REDACTED] x

[REDACTED] provided direction - not  
an order

[REDACTED] acts concerned THAT  
production was occurring over  
SAPAT?

under consideration pressure [REDACTED]  
as a puppet of [REDACTED] &  
[REDACTED]

was any disciplinary action taken against  
[REDACTED] NOT aware

[REDACTED] told FLYNN THAT  
"we were DANGEROUS & IF we  
KNOW WHAT we're doing would  
TAKE Kats AWAY."

Revenues were ABOUT \$3M/DAY  
- A problem w/ a Bypass  
valve closing - should valve  
be Fixed or NOT??

(13)

reviewed UATV went closed?

→ Chris came in to [REDACTED] - to  
keep unit on line.

[REDACTED] made the call.

[REDACTED] retirement was approved  
[REDACTED] is now transferred to

4-6 hrs debate between

licensed operators & corporate  
about why not S/C unit.

From [REDACTED] & [REDACTED]

\$3M/DAY - debate was  
so intense.

[REDACTED] came to [Kym]

who are the players??

[REDACTED]

not [REDACTED] were on phone.

[REDACTED] probably

[REDACTED]

Highest of  
levels of  
organization  
were debating  
w/ 4/10/14

guys w/ licenses thought senior  
mgt was out to lunch

(14)

IN THE 4th OPERATORS WERE  
SATISFIED W/ DECISION THAT  
WAS MADE.  
LO 7c

2 DAYS AFTER THIS [REDACTED] SPACE  
3 OR 4 HOURS W/ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS PROVIDE HIMSELF W/  
PRESSURE HE RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED]  
W/ [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] HAD BEEN  
A COFIDANT BEFORE. [REDACTED]  
HAD NEVER HEARD THIS FROM [REDACTED]  
BEFORE.

OTHER EXAMPLES WHERE PRESSURE  
WAS EXERTED??

NO - B/C OF TIMELINE [REDACTED]  
WAS NOT YET IN POWER.

---

I WOULD NOT RAISE A STAFF ISSUE?

[REDACTED] MADE IT CLEAR  
TO [REDACTED] THAT HE WOULD NOT  
GO TO [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED]  
ON THE BRV ISSUE.

100% OF people from tech, operators  
etc, etc UP

(15)

IN GENERAL ITS THE PERSON w/ THE CONCERN HAS THE PROBLEM.

I NEVER SAW ANYTHING BE DONE w/ EEP RESULTS."

DO EMPLOYEES FEEL THAT EEP IS A LEGITIMATE VEHICLE TO ANSWER CONCERNS - NO??

W

7c  
ET

AFTER PEOPLE MEET w/ NRC/NPO/etc.  
REQUIRED TO DEBRIEF w/ PSEG MGMT.

TALK

TO [REDACTED]  
NOTIFICATION REVISION

[REDACTED]

CONVERSATION ON

MGMT IS INTO DATABASE CONTROL

# OF HOURS SPENT

SPECIFICALLY - DON'T FOCUS ON SK MGMT.

(16)

SAAM NEDLY are angry, frustrated,  
disbelieve. Their view is that  
management does not care.

Pleaded w/ them to do the right  
thing. → FV question.

CT 7c

Fear was more of a theme w/  
SRO's vs union.

How did ops manage receive message  
regarding NED discount  
"you bought their story?"



UNSAFE is BOTH INDUSTRIAL & NUCLEAR



@ SAAM concern is with the operators  
SRO/RO (union [redacted])  
was also out spoken

etc {



(17)

ex 7-

TRITIVM

It's way higher than we thought  
that would be - "THIS COULD  
DO US IN" -

EARLY APRIL TIME FRAME.

GLASSING

COMMITTED AS AN ORGANIZATION  
TO NOT HAVE HERCULEAN EFFORTS.  
DOWN TO PREVIOUS STANDARDS.

→ April 3, 2003. DUPLICATE  
OF April 7, 1994.

I DON'T HAVE THE CONFIDENCE  
THAT WE CAN AVERT A MAJOR  
SAFETY ISSUE.

GOOD TROOPER MENTALITY.

(1)

9P PSEB DESTROYS UNFAVOURABLE DOCUMENT ??

9P  
FOLLOWUP.

[REDACTED] - SPOKE @ LENGTH  
REGARDING THE SR MANAGEMENT  
EVENT "OFF THE RECORD."

(18)

NOT A GUNBOY UNION PERSON

INVESTIGATION IS A WHOLE LOT OF  
THE REAL WORK.

bx 7c

(2) [REDACTED] NOTIFICATION REVISION

(3) [REDACTED] HAS ATTACHED

[REDACTED]

GET IN SAT AS LITTLE AS  
POSSIBLE

"HE DOES NOT FEEL FOR SAFETY OF  
PLANT"

PLANT IS SO WELL DESIGNED IT CAN  
PROTECT ITSELF FROM US.

PLANT ITSELF IS THE FINAL EXECUTIVE.

(19)

" HE IS THE WHINER & ONE OF  
OUR WEAKER OS'S."

100% [REDACTED] DECISION -

STRICTLY B/C OF #'S &

- KNOCK DOWN - DRAG OUT w/ UNION
- & EVEN A DETRIMENT TO
- UNION

[REDACTED]

POINT SYSTEM - FOR REORG

[REDACTED]

CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT FOR  
DISCRIMINATORY FIRING



9/9/03 - Int. w/ PSEG Ind.

Chung & Meant

→ Salem Sept 2002 Event

H/C Forced Outage (HCEOG 51b)

ex 7c

→ [redacted]

→ [redacted] reported to [redacted]

→ expectation on site: integrate SAP system

→ worked w/ Business Process Team

R SEWE issues (in 96) → fear, intimidation, feelings of

→ use SAP to work on workplace issues

→ (How being treated was inconsistent w/ Excellence)

→ [redacted] Brought in 96?

→ 96 → reasons for environment Salem coming out of  
restart [redacted] lead team

→ 15<sup>3</sup> couple of years made slides [redacted] retired

→ evolved in job functions

→ 96 worked w/ [redacted] → HPI; 1996  
shifted years after [redacted] resigned

→ 96' environment → fear & intimidation → being in meetings  
what was said; nuclear is a 'hell-hole';

→ Shared concerns w/ [redacted]; m 96; no one  
ear; concerns previously documented; accepted report  
to be there full time

ex 7c

→ Ex of fear + intimidation (96)

- people yell + curse at various people in meetings

[redacted] →  
Director

plant perf. letting "union  
issues"; run show"

96 metrics

→ [redacted] Mtgs w/ MGMT Team (tech issues  
discussed + it wrong ans addressed down)

→ Public humiliation → no specifics  
minutes for monthly leadership mtgs

[96 Work Environment Toxic; moved up to  
destructive] → middle stage / made progress  
since 96'

↑ last summer WAWO audit  
2002

→ How was improvement measured!!?

→ Employee Surveys; Gallup Q12 Survey (people  
satisfaction getting better)

→ [redacted] peaked in mid-2002 (as good as it  
get.)

→ WARD gave B & 3 → dramatic negative  
shift in leadership, culture

→ [redacted] 'got dangerous'  
this year; around time of  
3 → [redacted] seems  
better

→ WE got better  
(helped by [redacted] ✓  
outages engaging workers; spirited teamwork)

Cultural step changes during outages (Coach to  
leadership team)

IRIS outage at the Salem (building workplace  
fall 97 or 98  
99)

~~3 losses~~

→ INPO Sustainable Perf. Concern

→ actual plant perf. closer to a 3

→ [redacted] team distinct in 2002 after [Invo 3] EX 4  
[redacted]  
[redacted] pressured to make change happen  
do what it  
took to get results ← results and  
plant perf

ex 7c

cc. 7c

→ need union guys to set INPO work then "put screens to the Union"

→ [redacted] because distant;

→ [redacted] not visible

→ [redacted] made dramatic/negative changes

Support about tech issues / infighting between  
leadership issues → ops mentality

[redacted] was more champion of Plant Safety

↳ outage [redacted] in C&O Salem  
issue over starting up plant

Why didn't  
trust senior  
mgt

S&O told to NIA a lie in procedure  
[redacted] went Baltimore

2002

prayer  
heard that  
was wrong

thought  
[redacted] was in mgt

not to  
be perceived  
as going  
orders

would be  
possible to find

Notified  
written

[redacted]  
talk to about NIA  
of steps

ex 7c

# Big rift between Solar Operators & Senior Mgmt

gives distinct  
→ report feeling pressured to make non-conservative decisions  
views operators as the problem  
→ + vice versa

shift potentially dangerous

→ Talk w/ Shift Manager

Don't trust  
Senior mgmt  
decision making

Each one can  
tell you what its  
like


meets when  
early in  
2002

does not trust [redacted] not to safety

[redacted] closed w/ to isolate steam leak

[redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted]  
concerns about rift  
assigned  
candidate  
w/ Melissa

ex 7c



SM's @ HC reg / distrust of decision making

took email to [redacted]

should take care  
of it; bring in employee concerns  
to investigate

interviewed  
peo's on  
[redacted] shift  
all safety concerns  
expressed & other  
than [redacted]  
shifts

why unsafe to close; (individual safety)  
shut plant down to isolate leak [redacted] plant side

[redacted] shifted to thinking union was the problem

- Paz-VW incident → tech performed work improperly  
techs fired; brought back; media publicity pretty  
→ against [redacted] though was spying  
→ workers made a mistake discipline too severe  
→ supervisor fired

Firings of [redacted]

↳ no gain for a FED call; attention  
a meeting in day off

↳ nominated

w/ [redacted]

stuff to  
conflict

selected  
randomly

[redacted] → Survey Results → [redacted]

[redacted] → 22 yrs no longer has  
a job; → concerns brought  
to him

→ other Survey Gallup Q12

extended Survey → [Kick Up - Kick Down Culture]  
↑ to boss ↓ to subordinates

summary "Destruction Culture" → ACT like this [redacted] wouldn't  
act like this.

↳ HC ops healthiest → worked hard on W/E issues

[redacted] Had a strong culture

↳ Job eliminated

Bad Sales ops MGR revolving door;  
culture → Sales ops; Maint, Chemist;

ex 7c

→ inner circle  
@ fossil.

[redacted] → reportedly went to [redacted] & was  
devoted; left to work at fossil; killed work  
environment; don't know issue; 2001 timeframe  
told that by [redacted]  
→ [redacted]

Could have been possible - devisiveness had  
→ LO's honor license responsibility, or  
follow senior mgmt; second guess  
themselves;  
→ guess on front lines to be fully engaged  
w/o attention on "heart"; divided loyalties.  
→ cite recent ex @ Hope Creek

Hope Creek → [redacted] 21C mgmt event; did not have power  
or authority to stop evolution; violated  
[redacted] → [redacted] [redacted]

→ another incident @ HC → 7.2 hr LCO A & B  
EDG failed water leak @ end of window;  
wished to commence a s/p. → direction not to -  
not a direct order

## H.C. S/D Event

→ Putting licensed operators where have to  
defy. upper mgmt to do right thing

→ Direction not to initiate S/D. per LCO  
Statement; [redacted]; production over  
Safety; [redacted]

Y → Don't know of any adverse action

→ Forced outage @ H.C. (mid March 2003)

↳ Bypass VW → we were dangerous &

NRC would take keys away

[redacted] <sup>bad</sup>  
we are  
dangerous

↓  
do action  
should take  
keys  
away

Planned outage → forced outage (~3/1/day)

Bypass Valve Problem as it closing;  
concern about what to do after outage  
or fix valve; VW went closed

calls to [redacted]; keep int online  
to fix VW [redacted]

→ Power Shift to [redacted] instead of [redacted]

↓ get into but  
up running

4-6 hrs  
debate between  
operators  
[redacted]

bvs-upgrade

## Players in Debate:

WH went about

4-6 hr debate → over the phone

↳ Actions of [redacted] scared daylight out of  
People → [redacted]

in the end the plant was SID and valve  
was fixed.

reference → 3-4 hr chat w/ [redacted]

↳ beside himself about what to

do w/ Pressure from [redacted]

→ what to do for

Level of Pressure as a week later

[redacted] reports to [redacted] vs [redacted]

Nonagen

by [redacted] for [redacted]

ex 7c

ex 7c

— Positions could not get filled;


→ rapid fire power change

→ [redacted] made it clear that would not go to  
[redacted] about incidents

→ Hundreds of people in 6 years (to [redacted])

feels powerless  
to raise concerns

↳ "Perception is the person or concern is the  
problem"



Affected to raise concerns.

— Union says

Nuclear safety Events probable →

→ don't be afraid to speak up.

→ [redacted] change's not [redacted]; his

→ Employee concerns → reports to [redacted]

↳ Poor track record of resolving concerns

ex 7c

Debrief People = ~~not~~ by night,

↳ thought that

↳ Don't tell us

Differences

1. ~~██████████~~ - write a notification

↑ asked to write his notification

↳ brother after we left

3<sup>rd</sup> of April

Practice of de-briefing → no complaints → normal practice

↳ standards  
↳ intensity

Focus of inspection

↳ What can we do  
to manage events to avoid  
H&P issues.

ex 7c

Meet w/ Crew w/o SM

SALEM

↳ Union → anger, disbelief - to lack of attention (MGMT DOES NOT CARE)

- Pleading not to do anything unsafe
- Pay attention
- reported to OPS MGMT → they played you
- Plea help us occur as something other than white noise; NEO's in [redacted]

Salon NEO's

- asked to do anything unsafe.
- → [redacted] → NUMBER OF RISKS → [redacted]

SPRO's → [redacted]

- Concern about speaking out includes SM's
- [redacted] → [redacted] risk to speak up about safety issues

ex 7c

Asked to leave Mtg

↳ Spring of 2001

→ spoke w/ [REDACTED]

→

Tritium - higher than expected; - could do us in

→ (April 2003 - [REDACTED])

Grassing Event - called to go to mtg. To have  
3 techs @ intake structure. (April 3, 2003)

Good Trooper Mentality

→ Notifications not written

→ Stem VW Claim →

(Could not find  
any notifications.)

→ List of safety issues

→ Behaves reverting back → asking us if fearful

ex 7c

→ Dot of last fall.

→ [redacted] → rtr notification

→ Winston / Starn brought into interview  
long portions were "off the record"

off the record

→ no interviewees  
Felt free to come  
w/ expts

→ No known people interviewed

→ Give answer looking for

↔ Consider invest. to be a whitewash

→ [redacted]

(last fall) - things have a  
way it disappears → reason's why (cited  
two examples)

← [redacted] →

[redacted]

as an interviewee

→ get in say little & get  
out as soon as possible

didn't occur in a safe environment

not conducive to speaking or speaking out

Thorough



ex 7c

Crisis Issue

↳ [redacted] speaking up agents

→ Why are we doing




[redacted] easy to build a case; "prime plants  
so well designed can protect us from ourselves"

→ May 2002 Mtg. [redacted]


↳ then for several mos. not monthly  
meetings

Sept 24; Salen NEO's hot bed.





of

Point System



→ Close  
action lane

① Overall, a very strong case for SO.7 violation. This would allow us to put on docket under SCWE. We've long suspected a common-theme in this cross-cutting area but have not been able to build the case. This would be one huge datapoint!

② This sounds like  issue that he believes was one of the big straws (haystacks) that broke the camel's back. End result:  saw PSEG nuclear management as they really were, had a hard time living with himself because of what management did or failed to do, and also was retaliation against for speaking out.


③ I'm not sure what this list of notifications represents. Yes, we acknowledge that PSEG employees enter issues with potential safety significance into their corrective action process. However, if this is a list of "stuffs" that Management directed closed without action taken to address concerns, then we have reason to be concerned for these technical issues and must thoroughly scrub the list. A more damning list would be a list of those safety concerns that are not in the corrective action system but should be

(4) Sounds familiar. I believe I was on military leave at the time. ~~XXXXXX~~ would have more details. This concern for a lengthy delay in deciding what to do for a BPV problem is troubling in that #3 BPV problems contributed to a huge reactivity manipulation event during this forced outage shutdown just days before. I recall that Senior Management severely chastised the operating shift for their slight hesitation in tripping the unit when power went from ~6% → 13% due to a BPV glitch.

(5) See (3) above


⑥ Not sure why this was included in package. You could read between the lines and see "management is more focused on production / schedule than safety (personal & nuclear). It looks like notifications were written to document conditions adverse to quality. I recall that the NRCs blamed management because the same outage issues recurred and management did not seem actively engaged.

2+ 7c


⑦ You can always count on  to tell it like it is.

⑧ sounds like the fall of 1991 and the high pressure turbine blade (turbine came apart during over speed test) = HIT.

(7) Hope Creek B EDG exhaust  
leaks. First manifested itself  
~ July 2002. Operators needed to  
wear SCBA's during Monthly ST.  
PSEG finally addresses in  
March 03 forced outage. (HUB  
is well aware of this "Success" story.)

(10) You gotta leave  et al.

(11) the devil is in the details!

(12) Worth sharing this  gem  
with HUB.

(13) Sounds like how our STCP  
process used to work. Sometimes  
there is not better indication  
than the "gut feeling" from  
those experienced folks at the top.

(14) Dated into (1991) hard to see the yet

- (15) Connection? Is this a process improvement recommended by Atteger, that is still in draft? ~~7c~~
- (16) Looks like typical ~~See~~ jargon. unless you read real fine between the lines, I don't see "Produce electricity no matter how unsafe"
- (17) Related to (4) above. BPV issue.
- (18) Can't share concerns with Management → Sounds like a chilling effect has indeed set in → actually it sounds like winter at the North pole!
- (19) Seems to confirm or support Sci.7
- (20) Recommended reading for this

DETAILS REGARDING [REDACTED] 7C  
1) DID [REDACTED] DIRECTION  
[REDACTED] AGREE w/ IT?

ANY EXAMPLES WHERE PEOPLE HAVE NOT  
SPOKEN UP?

WHO WAS SAID OF'S SPT THAT WAS  
INFORMED ABOUT BRASSING STRATEGY??  
WHO RESPONDED "IT DOESN'T  
MATTER."

DETAILS ON EMPLOYEE VOICED SAFETY  
ISSUES IC OFFGAS TROUBLESHOOTING  
WHAT WERE THE?  
WHO WOULD KNOW??

SEP 24TH INCIDENT -

WHAT IS REACT @ 1530Z?  
FACT THAT ALLIED IS DRAWN  
INTO SINKING w/ UNION??

He  
3/17 RESTART - PRESSURED FOR RESTART  
AGAINST ALL ODDS???

6/17 HE EDG SOCKET WATER ISSUE,  
WAS [REDACTED] ON BOARD EDG ONLY  
FOLLOWING ORDERS???  
- WHAT WAS  
AND SAID THAT INSTRUCTIONS

- EVIDENCE THAT TERMINATION DATE WAS  
MOVED UP ???

- EXAMPLES / EVIDENCE OF DESTROYED  
DOCUMENTS ??? SPECIFICS ..

9/2001 → POINT BLANK STATED CONCERN  
IN SUBSEQUENT ONE ON ONE MEETING

INTERVIEW WITH RELATED TO ORIENTATION  
FROM MORALE & LACK OF EMPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT SATEL NED'S .. / Frustration  
AND EXAMPLES ???

E-MAIL MESSAGES FROM SATEL  
EMPLOYEES -

w/o

3/17 ⇒ NUMANOS Head

UL MGMT STAKE

CONCERN → WHO WAS IN

CHARGE - HOW THE DECISION

WERE MADE

⇒ "EXPRESSED FEAR ABOUT  
DOING SO"

# Salem/HC SCWE Issues Timeline

97/98

Concerns an work environment began when entire senior leadership team was changed out. Previous questioning of operators on "safety and how to run a power (properly)" were changed and refocused on to "Is there a way around this requirement"? a shocking change [REDACTED]

x 7c

July 5, 1999

[REDACTED] starts at PSEG as [REDACTED]  
Late 2000/Early 2001 - picked up maint responsibilities. In November 2002 named [REDACTED], which included, Ops, Maint & Work Mgmt.

8/20/99

1999  
Aug 2000

[REDACTED] told a large group of Salem/HC SROs that they needed his permission to raise power. Later, this was interpreted as needing sr mgmt approval to lower power [REDACTED]

2001/2002

Salem  
SS Value issue - needed to run leak testing to identify which set of SS values were leaking during startup from a refueling outage [REDACTED] was trying to figure out a way to NOT do the testing. Some suspicion that [REDACTED] was behind the issue. Another example where [REDACTED] represented Sr mgmt [REDACTED]

Late 2001

Salem  
Severe degradation of station air. Two of Three compressors initially OOS. The third trips. Started diesel backup compressors [REDACTED] (weekend sr mgmt contact) berates TARP team leader and says "get some \$%#! air compressors on-site and keep the unit on-line" Caused a chilling effect to all those that [REDACTED]

## Salem/Hc SCWE Issue Timeline

Salem k-2

Started up w/ 4 instead of 6

2002  
or 7c

CW Grassing Issues - Heated debate about how many circ pumps (circulators) needed for startup. [redacted] argued with [redacted] that a minimum of four was needed to startup safely. [redacted] said OK to startup with less than 4. - holding plant hostage. [redacted] walked out of discussion pod. [redacted] later started up with 3 circ pumps [redacted]

Summer  
Sept 2002

Salem

Met Tower lost power - Temporary EDG transported to the site to restore power. Big push to do it in a hurry to avoid NRC reporting. Did not follow temp mod procedure. Did paperwork after the fact [redacted]

Sept 2002

Salem FW Steam Leak - Steam leak on inlet to Main FW Pump Turbine (MS42). [redacted] was alleged to have isolated the leak w/out permission of the [redacted]. Some discussion with senior mgmt prior to actions being taken [redacted]

2002/2003

Hc Prevention of Overpower event - Hc control room lost cross flow indication (computer) of reactor power. Ops (ROS & CKS) wanted to lower power below 3293 MWth (old 100% power value) because operation up to 3339 MWth (new 100% power value) was deemed non-conservative. [redacted] (sm) constrained before power decrease could be affected.

## Salem/Hc SCWE Issues Timeline

March 2003 <sup>HE</sup> TBV Issue - (3/12 or 3/13) Hc began forced outage to repair/address 3 issues - 'B' EDG exhaust leak, 'M' SKV tailpipe leakage, and ~~the~~ 'B' reactor recirc seal leak. Jobs went well. During startup, after gen synched to grid, #2 TBV would not go closed (~48% open). Operators said valve not operable, and discussed with [REDACTED] on Friday night (3/15). Planned testing with GE on Saturday (3/16) to see if problem was electrical/hydraulic. [REDACTED] discussed how to stop unit w/o a fast cooldown with [REDACTED] & maybe 10 other people. [REDACTED] wanted to change procedure & train on change, <sup>simulated</sup> and he'd need 24 hrs to implement in a planned fashion. Completed procedure & training (some crew members not happy). Did evolution on Sunday night (3/17). Two overpower events initiated. The first was minor, about 1%. The second almost caused a scram from 6-7% to 13-14%. Scram at 15%. Central problem attributed to using the TBV bypass jack (man control). Later, when unit was ~~scrammed~~ #2 TBV went shut. Big discussion (& very long) on why Hc needed to go cold since problem apparently fixed itself. Big debate between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said if you see unit it will be w/o him as [REDACTED] put job on the line for safety. [REDACTED]

March 2003 Hc Reactivity Mgmt - (3/17) Overpower event not discussed with SR mgmt because of [REDACTED] gulling [REDACTED] on #2 TBV on morning of 3/18 (Mon). [REDACTED] discovered during a Wed SRC mtg (3/18). Reported to [REDACTED] and INO. [REDACTED] condemned operator actions and made all Hc operators (~~the~~ 150) justify why they should be allowed to continue to operate. [REDACTED]

## Salem/Hc SCWE Issue, Timeline

June 2003 Hc EDG Intercooler Leak - Leak discovered on Hc EDG from intercooler pump. Repair attempts failed and a shutdown was commenced after leakage could not be stopped. Shutdown was aborted at 42% power when engineering changed design basis of system to allow ~~the~~ coping time of 1 day instead of 7 days which increased the allowed leakage by a factor of 7. [REDACTED] called this an abysmal failure of engineering to understand the design basis of the system. The [REDACTED] felt [REDACTED] was unduly influencing the time to begin the shutdown. He was viewed as acting as [REDACTED] agent. [REDACTED]

### Other General Concerns

- General intimidating approach in dealing with people by yelling and screaming at them may have caused others to fear raising issues, i.e. "a chilling effect"

2+ 7C

DETAILS REGARDING [REDACTED] DIRECTION  
1) DID [REDACTED] AGREE w/ IT?

ANY EXAMPLES WHERE PEOPLE HAVE NOT  
SPOKEN UP?

WHO WAS GIVEN OPS SFT THAT WAS  
INFORMED ABOUT BYPASSING STRATEGY??  
WHO RESPONDED "IT DOESN'T  
MATTER."

DETAILS ON EMPLOYEE VOICED SAFETY  
ISSUES /C/ OFFICER TROUBLESHOOTING??  
WHAT WERE THE?  
WHO WOULD KNOW??

SEP 24th INCIDENT -

WHAT IS REACT @ 1990E?

FACT THAT ALLIEDER IS DRAWN  
INTO SAVING w/ UNION??

He  
3/17 RESTART - PRESSURED FOR RESTART  
AGAINST ALL ODDS???

6/17 He EDG JACKET WATER ISSUE,  
WAS [REDACTED] ON BOARD FOR ONLY  
FOLLOWING ORDERS???

2 WHO WAS 2ND S/O THAT INSTRUCTED

- EVIDENCE THAT TERMINATION DATE WAS  
MOVED UP???

- EXAMPLES/ EVIDENCE OF DESTROYED  
DOCUMENTS??? SPECIFICS...

9/2001 → JOINT BLANK STATED CONCERN  
IN SUBSEQUENT ONE ON ONE MEETING

INCLUDING RISK RELATED TO AVIATION,  
JOHN MORAN W. LACK OF EMPLOYMENT

SPECIFICALLY SALEM NEO'S / Frustration  
AND EXAMPLES ???

EMAIL MESSAGES FROM SALEM  
EMPLOYEES -

w/o

3/17 → NUMEROUS HIGH

LEVEL MGMT SPEECH

CONCERN → WHO WAS IN

CHARGE - HOW ARE DECISIONS  
BEING MADE

⇒ "EXPRESSED FEAR ABOUT  
DOING SO"

Issue - Do these 4 men explicitly say production overrides safety

Hub - wants the question posed:

Was there corporate pressure that caused the plant to be run in order to increase productivity at the cost of ignoring safety?

Who -



- causing all the trouble

ex 7c

[Kym Harvey (KH)] [Mgr Cultural Transformation] Fired [3/28/04]

Fossil - to run like the fossil companies, only based on profit + money, numbers

Search - "production over safety"

- "pressure"

- "corporate pressure"

- "safety"

- "production"

- "productivity"

- "chain of command"

Find Questions!



"Enterprise"  
"Corporate"

asked the question:



\* look for the question, too.

look for the date and  
Oct. 2003 w/ TO  
around 44-48  
turbine bypass valve

Hope Creek 100% PSEG  
Salem 50% PSEG  
50% Exelon  
more level in 40-

③ too many grey  
haired peo around  
here

① appealed perf ratings  
no response

④ indiv's whose  
leadership  
was challenged ~~Root 8/2~~

② sent another letter -  
didn't respond in  
timeframes specified

⑤ imposed  
bunch of bunk

→ none of this adds up

⑥ his email gets auto-archived

by-pass valve

~~expenses~~ - position  
expenses when in travel  
interview expenses  
expenses from SC

signing  
relocation  
cell phone  
car  
expense acct.  
conferences

\$111,000 base

Dir. Lynn Harvin  
title + address

exact title

I would have resigned -  
What really bothered me SE  
Officers, Steward of Industry, asked  
the  
Valve mech board unit  
would not close. VS  
had Rx next event CD had  
Scanned the unit want  
Find out what happened to  
by pass valve. Use  
(non SRel component)

Budgeted [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] in an it  
Berating

Didn't know where it direction  
from

Lots of hidden ~~the~~ jewels  
Only takes someone to take charge

line of ?ing totally  
out of line

Hydro w  
cut head

It is not the  
appropriate f-  
safe things  
to do