

## Transcript review considerations: Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issues

The following are general guidelines to be adhered to when reviewing/documenting reviews of Salem/HC SCWE transcripts: They are broken down into two major categories: SCWE and technical issues. The SCWE issues tend to relate to the willingness of an interviewee to raise potential safety issues to management. The technical issues relate primarily to performance of various structures, systems and components (SSCs). Our main focus in these reviews is ensuring that problems with safety-related SSCs are adequately addressed, however, we have listed some problems with balance of plant/secondary SSCs if they are indicative of management's willingness to address problems. Your analysis should be brief, reflect issues related to work environment or technical issues (in summary format), and include a reference page(s) in the transcript.

### SCWE Issues

Review each transcript and document your assessment to the listed questions.

- Subject will raise concerns and has done so
- Subject would raise concerns if necessary
- Subject raises concerns for others, why? (Union steward?)
- Subject won't raise concerns-why?
- Do others raise concerns
- Others don't or hesitate to raise concerns
- Someone has experienced retaliation for raising concerns (if yes, give brief summary of circumstances. Identify for self or others)

### Technical Issues

If problems with safety-related SSCs are mentioned, do they, because of their high safety significance, require immediate NRC action or follow up. If not of high safety significance, do problems with safety-related SSCs, appear to be adequately addressed based on the narrative. If so, document a one or two line description of the issue and why you feel it has been adequately addressed. If not, seek further NRC action through direct inspection or referral of the issue through the allegations office. If a violation exists, provide the regulatory reference including duration. If problems with balance of plant/secondary SSCs are mentioned and appeared to have not been corrected, list them and specific aspects (identification, evaluation, corrective action, management attention/priority) of the corrective action program or other explanation (unsafe acts (industrial), production over safety, schedule pressures, potential nonconservative decision making by management) that appears to be contributor(s) to the problem.

N-57

1

AP

98-2001

12-2001 / JAN 04

3 SROs, 3 Nop

NEOS

NCOS

prepare work week - equipment removal

Industrial safety issues -  
exhaust leaks - B diesel generator  
2001 → 2002

"Emotional"  
SMs drive the plates

overall more open -

late summer - early fall - KV switchyard

Confrontational type issues

re technical basis

impact on corrective maintenance

Have ever found -  
schedule pressures  
assessment of condition -

- "not overruled"

- SM meeting  
inoperability of 15 drops

off-gas - operating margin

7/2003

operability assessment -

disappointment period

different message - July 2003

feedwater vibration issue -

last repair outage - Turbine valves  
NEOS concerned - engineering saying OK per design base  
- Ouellet, H. Valdes -

proceeding in face of uncertainty -

✓ [redacted] - [redacted] - probably present

mgmt. not more conservative re operations  
operational  
decision  
making

2  
OI interview -

1 all 4 pump. - shutting down  
[redacted] - hold power - talking w/ NRC re NOED  
uncomfortable to get enforcement decision

March 2003 - shutdown

2 recirc pump seal replacement  
- IPTE to bring unit down (not to  
exceed cool  
down)

- shift had problems

- scrammed & all valves went close

word to [redacted]

✓ [redacted]

if someone is going to tell  
us we're not going to cold shutdown.

it would be best to

from [redacted] level

✓ never before happened

Interpreted he was  
getting some pressure

7C

7C

[REDACTED]

 $\wedge$ 

p. 8

Sr. mgmt. challenged rec. of direct reports?

(A) Normally, mgt. challenge is taking more conservative action over plant production.

Examples:

### Bypass valve incident -

valve open  $\rightarrow$  power reduction mode  $\rightarrow$  Valve closed  $\rightarrow$  ? up or shut down

~~Ch. 10. The plant is in a certain~~

AL

over 5?

Ⓐ operate when conditions not perfect - but in accordance with license

Some license holders may believe the decision is not

~ Ultimately Conservative

A. The plant could be operated in a more conservative fashion

71

① operating outside of license requirements, tech specs

② operating procedures (term?)

p.16 - check'n/Scott  
other situations apply

p.19 line 9 -

not perceived as mgt. team that always comes from safety

What contributes to the perception of the arg. that mgt.  
doesn't come from safety

p. 36 -  
line 13

CAN WE STAY AT POWER?

CLOUDS PEOPLE'S FOCUS ON IT?

MARCHING ORDERS TO SHUT THE PLANT DOWN - STARTED

TOLD - MAYBE HOLD FOR 3 HRS - TOLD TO COMMENCE

WILLING TO WAIT UNTIL DECISION MADE

UNUSUAL?

HAD THIS HAPPENED BEFORE - MARCHING ORDER - HOLD OFF  
WHILE DECISION MADE?

? WHOSE DECISION SHOULD IT HAVE BEEN?

March incident - discussion w/ [redacted] - how felt about it  
how felt about [redacted] reported incident -

7C  
interpreted pressure  
Production over safety?

? - train. interviewed

- chance to review - 9/03?

- complete?

- off the record discussion, specifically re by-pass  
valve incident

- do you recall what testimony was regarding  
Conservative dec. making -

discrepancy

10

Today's date is ~~3/14/04~~ and the time is \_\_\_\_\_. Speaking is S/A \_\_\_\_\_ with the NRC Office of Investigations, Region I. Also present from the same office is S/A \_\_\_\_\_.

What follows is an interview of \_\_\_\_\_, spelled \_\_\_\_\_, who is currently/formerly employed by PSEG. (Indicate if represented by counsel, \_\_\_\_\_, is also present and will describe the purpose of their appearance today shortly.) As agreed, this interview is being tape recorded (or transcribed by a court reporter, \_\_\_\_\_, for \_\_\_\_\_.) (This interview is being conducted pursuant to a subpoena received by \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.) The location of this interview is \_\_\_\_\_.

The subject matter of this interview concerns \_\_\_\_\_ (brief/general) \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ is being interviewed as a witness/subject in this investigation.

The allegations involve potential violation(s) of 10 CFR:

~~(reactor) 50.5-deliberate misconduct.  
(reactor) 50.7-employee protection.  
(materials) 30.7-employee protection.  
(materials) 30.10-deliberate misconduct.~~

~~Or \_\_\_\_\_~~

#### Oath

As explained prior to going on the record, the interview will be conducted under oath. Do you have any objection to providing information under oath/affirmation?

Would you please raise your right hand to be sworn in. "Do you swear (or affirm) that the testimony you are about to provide shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?"

~~\_\_\_\_\_, for the record, please state your full name and spell your last name.~~

#### Counsel

(Atty) \_\_\_\_\_ please describe the purpose of your appearance here today. (Who is attorney employed by and are they acting as the personal representative for interviewee in regard to this investigation?)

(Witness) Do you understand the purpose of this representative as described?

(Witness) Does your employer require you to have an attorney present when you are interviewed by NRC-OI?

Were you in any way threatened with any adverse action if you did not request corporate counsel?

Will the presence of \_\_\_\_\_ hinder your testimony in any way? If yes, how?

Do you understand that you have the right to a private interview with me at your convenience?

With that understanding, do you wish to continue with this interview with \_\_\_\_\_ as your representative at this time?

(Optional-discuss 18 USC 1001: If you knowingly and willfully makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations and provide false information you could be subject to prosecution under 18 USC 1001 which is a felony punishable by a sentence of up to 5 years confinement and a \$250,000 fine.)

### Background

Date of birth, address-by DL, if necessary (With subject interview and if necessary, more specific info: SSN, POB, home tel., business address, business tel.)

Background information re education and employment history.

Specifically when came to work for licensee, in what position(s)?

### Closing

Is there anything else you would like to add for the record?

\_\_\_\_\_, have I or any other NRC representative threatened you in any manner, or offered you any rewards, in return for this information?



Have you provided this information freely and voluntarily?

The time is now \_\_\_\_\_. This interview is concluded.



1L

2C



@ p. 28  
27 re off gas concern

(1) off-gas issue

1L

see



@ p. 15 +


"most stressed" row - needed to shut  
the plant down per procedure

situation where:

operated outside of design basis (75 scfm) ~~power~~


1C

Did




rely on

1L




to that decision




p. 2

(or TARP team)


(2)  @ p. 47 - 49 switchyard interlock bypass -

(3) Feed pump vibrations (recent)





on per

1C




@ p. 129  
128

(4)  elevated  
off gas flow  
March power excursion @ p. 48



off gas flow criticism of




"public forum"

@ p. 94 - 97 - 103 affect

pg 90 - start

pg 92 -



1L

1C

Today's date is February 20, 2004 and the time is <sup>off 10x.</sup> \_\_\_\_\_. Speaking is S/A \_\_\_\_\_ with the NRC Office of Investigations, Region I. Also present from RI is Sr. Project Engineer Scott Barber.

What follows is an interview of \_\_\_\_\_, spelled \_\_\_\_\_, who is currently employed by PSEG Nuclear as \_\_\_\_\_

(Indicate if represented by counsel, \_\_\_\_\_, is also present and will describe the purpose of their appearance today shortly.) As agreed, this interview is being tape recorded (or transcribed by a court reporter, \_\_\_\_\_, for \_\_\_\_\_.) ~~(This interview is being conducted pursuant to a subpoena received by \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.)~~ The location of this interview is the PSEG training center in Salem NJ.

The subject matter of this interview concerns the SCWE at Salem/Hope Creek. Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ has experience on Hope Creek (brief/general) \_\_\_\_\_ and it has been explained to Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ that he is being interviewed as a witness in this investigation-he is not the subject of an investigation and there is no potential violation associated with the SCWE.

As explained prior to going on the record, the interview will be conducted under oath. Do you have any objection to providing information under oath/affirmation? Explain information gathered.

Would you please raise your right hand to be sworn in. "Do you swear (or affirm) that the testimony you are about to provide shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?"

\_\_\_\_\_, for the record, please state your full name and spell your last name.

#### Counsel

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(Witness) Do you understand the purpose of this representative as described?

(Witness) Does your employer require you to have an attorney present when you are interviewed by NRC-OI?

<sup>1st STATED</sup> HOW DID THAT CHANGE  
Were you in any way threatened with any adverse action if you did not request corporate counsel?

Will the presence of \_\_\_\_\_ hinder your testimony in any way? If yes, how?

Do you understand that you have the right to a private interview with me at your convenience?

With that understanding, do you wish to continue with this interview with \_\_\_\_\_ as your representative at this time?

(Optional-discuss 18 USC 1001: If you knowingly and willfully makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations and provide false information you could be subject to prosecution under 18 USC 1001 which is a felony punishable by a sentence of up to 5 years confinement and a \$250,000 fine.)

Background

Date of birth, SSN

Background information re education and employment history.

Specifically when came to work for licensee, in what position(s)?

Closing

Is there anything else you would like to add for the record?

\_\_\_\_\_, have I or any other NRC representative threatened you in any manner, or offered you any rewards, in return for this information?

Have you provided this information freely and voluntarily?

The time is now \_\_\_\_\_. This interview is concluded.

Chris Serata

open with strengths, weaknesses of SCWE

how does that relate to his testimony to W&S

open  
process

①

①

operator concern

loss of power indicator

2002

NCO did not agree

Level 2 - not fiction - Level unsure

CPS - constant be as sure

~~How did CPS~~

CPS - plant was stable

reactor power -

believed non-conservative - ?

[REDACTED]

1C

not on that specific decision -

initial - (CPS) ?

[REDACTED]

Maximize - output, no situation could think of crashing where  
he had reason to be at 99.5

operators - CPS

mgt. team recognized - compromise may help -

Compromise - min shift -

staffing

Can you think of any compromises that ~~the~~ took the plant 1C  
in a more conservative direction -

late 2003 steam leak -

less conservative  
management

[REDACTED]

(2)

Sms -


tech specs yes - because black + white

2000 -

Operations Management + Sr. Mgt. -

1

2000



affected his expectations about pricing concerns re equipment

Under this environment - did it affect your ability re operability, calls, decisions to move plant power

- emergency diesel generator jacket water leak - year ago

✓ ✓ diesel imp. - by SM

①

redback - fully large rest. of organization  
different message

had threshold some threshold, gain safety availability of system

Wb How did Sms react - supposed to affect

② at point on pod block monitor - unusual - conclusion OK  
questioned by [redacted] why not call it inoperable

1 Hr. - well not needed ...

71

Decisions re moving plant - Summer 2003

Could raise but feel on deaf ears -  
did -

500 KV breaker - operating regions re grid stability

11 [redacted] said another  
[redacted] stop moving the plant - going to have  
breaker back in 1 1/2 - TC

2nd  
example

tech spec. to shutdown 12 hr hot shutdown

2003 day -

Sr. license operator -

11 [redacted] W. persuading not to move - [redacted] drift  
[redacted] appropriate to move - TC

incident - (1) Khyon Harmin  
(2) suspect true

heard -




Reactivity event -

Off the record discussions about what


RF-11 - IPE 3 hrs - not ready at 11 -  
decision not supported -

(1) less than fully [redacted] to


(2) another incident - several outages ago -  
surprised  
within character


   1L

⊙ p. 32 last power indicators ✓

 1L

p. 60 re. reactivity event

 14



IRE timing in Accumulator


p. 44 ; p. 63 CS under pressure to come up w/ IRE that worked Sat midday

✓ p. 112 potential overpower event -

✓ 1<sup>st</sup> time it happened since cross flow rectification - probably added to concern of NO - had never been there before



p. 41 - used angry words to say "safely, Conservative decision making" lower power. Figure it out

p. 155 - 



2.114 →

Develop


- trying re participating in WTS
- residual effects of 3/17 issues - later (2 mos.) issue + others noted by him

Hamm

p. 81


p. 85

2 incidents



p. 100

Some people afraid to raise concerns Aug 03  
others apathetic

 7  
posite  
-10

(4)

Compare p.18 line 22 w/ summary of reprisal question

Potential to affect income, career choices



SCW - What is ~~the~~ assessment of  
the safety culture at Salem / Hope Creek?  
Are there <sup>particular</sup> strengths or weaknesses?

Insight/experience -

Consider: do people raise issues of a  
nuclear safety nature? How so and does  
this include both facilities?

are people comfortable in doing  
so without a fear of reprisals?

do you feel you <sup>personally</sup> could raise or push  
a safety concern without fear of retaliation?  
YES OR NO → EXAMPLES

has anyone said to you, or had you  
learned, that someone would not raise a  
safety issue to management for fear of  
negative personnel action

i) Fully <sup>issue</sup>, persons to speak with

did Sr. management have any concerns  
regarding the safety conscious work environment  
at either facility?

- 1) specifically what
- 2) caused by or how noted
- 3) how addressed

"Production Over Safety" Concerns forwarded to the region - indicates some people believe a concern:

In your experience - was this a mindset or ~~part of the~~ <sup>part of the</sup> atmosphere that you witnessed?

If so, How so -

Did you experience <sup>or hear about or feel pressure or any directives</sup> any directives or pressure that placed production over safety at S/H/C? Where from?

~~Did you <sup>become aware of Production Over Safety concerns</sup> ~~perceive~~ that to be an issue <sup>at any time</sup> even if incorrectly perceived by someone?~~

Did you become aware - at any time - of production over safety concerns <sup>of others</sup> - even if in your opinion you thought it was an incorrect perception?

Did you <sup>even</sup> become aware that Newark management directed or supervised a decision at the site regarding safety and start up or shut down?

If no responses to above:

Do you have any information to offer that might help to explain where this "production over safety" concern stems from at the site?

OK

~~Check D. V. Fe. list & send~~

How did issue (e.g. steam valve handling) affect  
their raising concerns afterward?

Drop out # NEWS to approach

OK

10/26/03 — TIME — LOCATION — ID ALL

LDANORR

7C

7C [REDACTED] 7C [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -H

### ASSESSMENT

EXPLAIN SCENE - NOT SUBJECT / NO VIOLATION

H Concern Considered Misunderstood — How did it affect their raising concerns afterward?

Do you have any concerns regarding the safe operation of this site —  
Are you aware of anyone who has a concern re " "

What is your opinion of the safety culture — Consider

Do people raise issues of a nuclear safety nature?

Are people comfortable in doing so without fear

of retaliation? Aware of any events that would discourage

anyone from raising concerns? Do you know if anything that suggests employees may be

hesitant?

Do you feel you personally could raise or push a  
safety concern w/o fear of retaliation? Have done so?

EVER SAW, FELT OR HEARD ~~THE~~ <sup>PRESSURE OR</sup> ~~BE~~ <sup>THAT PLACES</sup> ~~DIRECTIVE~~ <sup>PRODUCTION OVER</sup> ~~SAFETY~~ (CONSIDER ALSO MCLEWATT MENTALITY — PUSHING THE LIMIT OF ~~CONSERVATIVE~~ CONSERVATIVE DECISION MAKING)

DID YOU BECOME AWARE AT ANY TIME OF PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY CONCERNS OF OTHERS EVEN IF YOU THOUGHT IT WAS AN INCORRECT PERCEPTION?

~~DID YOU EVER BECOME AWARE~~

DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION TO OFFER THAT MIGHT HELP TO EXPLAIN WHERE ~~ANY~~ "PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY" CONCERN STEMS FROM

Do people raise issues freely - without fear of reprisals

- specifically regarding nuclear safety

Personally raise issues w/o fear of repercussions? 1) <sup>potential</sup> ~~technical~~ <sup>potential</sup> ~~repercussions~~ 2) license renewal


Ever feel could not raise concern?

Ever Saw / felt learned of production over safety directive  
misquoting ~~order~~ <sup>order</sup>, pushing the limits of  
how far. when

\* How did response to concerns affect how they raised  
issues afterward?




8/2000




"You don't get it."

unresolved conflict

- after INPO report <sup>what messages were received</sup>  saying will have nuc. excellence. (not MW) Only meant safety. Pressure is for cost control.

Bizarre

- Letter after reac mgmt event on what nuc safety meant.

- Theory regarding  & reactivity mgmt event progression. Why senior BSE & mgmt didn't find out till later.

7C

PAGE

8 SAYS KH SPOKE TO SALEM OPERATORS BEING FRUSTRATED/ANGRY WITH SUPERVISION "WEREN'T BEING HEARD" SAYS SHE DID NOT RAISE NUKE SAFETY ISSUES

12 - [REDACTED] SAYS HE TOLD HER IT WAS HIS DECISION TO ELIMINATE HER JOB.

15 Q FOR [REDACTED] - IS AWARE OF [REDACTED] CONCERN ABOUT LACK OF DEFENSE IN DEPTH THINKING / Q - WHAT MEANT IN THAT???

16 - going over specific incidents -

40 - on 3/28/03 meeting with KH - Q [REDACTED] CALLS HIMSELF THE DEVIL

49 - ELIMINATION OF KH JOB - SAYS NEWARK ELIMINATED HER JOB - AND THAT HE TOLD HER IF HE DID SAME THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE FOR HER TO HAVE JOB. - SAYS DISCUSSED WITH HER ON SEVERAL TIMES NON-PERMANENT NATURE OF HER JOB. [REDACTED] NOT [REDACTED] \*\* SAYS [REDACTED] HAS SCHEDULE OF METING HE HAD WITH KH - IN RESPONSE TO HER ALLEGATION THAT AFTER 5/02 [REDACTED] DIDN'T HAVE 1ON1 WITH HER ANYMORE - SAYS HE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH [REDACTED] IN NEWARK AND TOLD HER HE WASN'T GOING TO KEEP KH - AND HE DID NOT TELL KH THIS - IN 4<sup>TH</sup> QUARTER OF 02' TO DOWNSIZE SAYS HE ASKED [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] - IMPACT OF NOT HAVING KH - THEY SAID NO Q FOR [REDACTED] T or F?? - ALL SAID IT WAS TIME FOR HER TO LEAVE MORE OF A HINDRANCE AND NOT A HELP IN TRANSFORMATION.

64 - says there was Saturday a.m. meeting at his house to discuss KH and others and since others were downsizing he felt he had to also - led him to decision to eliminate KH job - feedback he got from his direct reports was ti could be eliminated entirely - says she did jobs outside of her resp - which was specifically OPS leadership - not maintenance i.e. [REDACTED]

69 1/03 meeting with [REDACTED] - KH no longer needed and told [REDACTED] late 02 or early 03 that he wanted to eliminate her job -

81 - on concerns KH told him during 2/26 or 2/28 meetings - says were on leadership attributes, communications

83 - on acceleration of her departure - NO CONFLICT WITH [REDACTED] SAYS IT WAS [REDACTED] DECISION TO MOVER UP HER LEAVING - AND HE OKed IT. SAYS HE TOLD HER NO - THAT AFTER RUMORS OUT THAT [REDACTED] RETIRING KH WANTED TO GO WORK FOR [REDACTED] NOT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TOLD HER NO IN JANUARY 03' TIMER

PERIOD - SAYS I.T AND ADMIN SUPPORT STAFF WERE ALSO DOWNSIZED - GET  
DOCS TO SUPPORT IT.

92 - [REDACTED] says KH did not raise any specific safety concerns to him or of others

AL

7C



3/24/04

~~W/ [REDACTED]~~ LC

7/99 -

Culture of population  
management leadership - 1785  
augmented leadership

- efforts -

8/9-99 VP Plant Support

Wm - FP - Bus. Plan. -

99 -

outage improvement -

length - \$ spent

2001

alignment & synergy

S/AC 50+ days for outage (off  
standard)

30 day mark taken

evaluate

2000 - BWWE initiative / ~~[REDACTED]~~

function

other initiatives Dr. H.

Providing facilitation —

Outage - Comments re Salem I

- Comments re Facilitating Communication  
as facilitator - not accountable for  
experiences - overstepped his bounds

feedback given to Dr. H — yet  
How went —

several times —

BWWE?

cannot recall feedback  
felt she was  
disruptive — Low

undermining his authority —  
Told to Dr. H — no force  
that help. —

all  
7C

2002 - apply collective focus

HC operations leadership

10 [redacted] - more engaged  
feedback  
+

Later 2002 - Ops involvement w/  
people she got to know

14 [redacted]  
Requested to provide -

14 [redacted] EO involvement - brought something  
to [redacted] fresh rooms,  
miscellaneous items (work environment)

effectiveness at Task Sites - yes  
saw it at Task -

14 [redacted] reviewed once a year to see

all  
70

if she would be retained  
prior to 2002 she directly reported to Corp.

[redacted] - 1C

now directly for [redacted]  
feedback on her performance -  
December timeframe -  
VAs + any other direct reports to [redacted]

[redacted] feedback -

1C Don't believe in 2002 she met  
expectations - looks right in many things  
including time mgt -

Jan. 2013 Review of Mgrs. on site

[redacted]

1C Strongest negative was [redacted]



7C

Why rate the employees this way?

When / St learned -

has set  
or needs  
improvement

K. Hahn -

Conversations - w/    
Feb / March 2003

24 hr notice -

INFO report - address mgt. issues

OP Leadership

Relationship Union / Mgt.

Mgmt. - horizontal align. relationship

Outlets w/ staff - # people involved

7L IT staff  
support staff  
by end of March - April timeframe


June - July - August -  
realigned to unified approach  
- more people left -

2003 - Gap also discontinued  
did not see point in pushing  
that -

negative

-

+



7L

neither here as there

ALC

7C

N

Position Elimination -

decision - approval or concurrence  
asked for - severance package

yearly job -

job was over -

~~was~~ ~~OK~~ KH aware that her  
job was seen as temporary.

~~the~~ 3rd tape OK

ISSU

What is this message about?

PR2 valve problems -

terminations - re not putting valve  
back together properly

To: KH  
found ~~met~~

clearing the air + America's soul

When did the idea originate  
to

Plot + not critical

Outing Control Center - not expected

730




9:30A  
10:15

call from



"heated"

meeting - talk through



45 minutes

ALC  
7C

Shift called it impossible -



16  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ - going into shutdown  
- could not tell

- Production over Safety -  
could take

Anything said by you <sup>during meeting</sup> - that would  
indicate you were considering how  
~~to~~ Did you guys change the  
indications ~~to~~ to assign  
~~to~~ you were  
under pressure

Stayed down 1 1/2 days to fix seal purge  
Tues or Wed

Commitments -

Adverse act - not able to pursue  
employment -

p. 5 -

p. 6 10-14

p. 7 -

p. 11 - no more heard than you  
are

p. 11 19-21 retaliation re

OK

3/25/04

Sat eve - how to shut down - simulator  
ITE  
instruction "hold on" - why - purpose

By position did he have affect on  
charging [redacted] mind?  
7C

Expected plant online on weekend -  
~~Chickie~~  
when known Sat. problem serious w/ bypass valve  
[redacted] - checked on other piece of equip  
if how you doing  
7C

---

KH did not raise nuclear safety  
concern to him -

Salem circulators




7C

7C

4 circulators - met 6

SRC -




7C

wanted hall pts -

4 to 40, then 5 to 7 40 7.

then 6 -


any  
call



7C

7C

called



not comfortable w/ things -

- overall reliability of circ water

2 gone - have to scram



7C

7C

position changed in December 2003 to

fuel time

7C

p. 17 line 20-21 (Circ. incident w/ [redacted] and bypass valve  
w/ [redacted] - contradiction re debate &  
category what input [redacted] had)  
7C

p. 13-14 (Circ. inc. safety)

p. 20 - derog. affect on decision making

p. 29 - no debate re shutting down

p. 30 [redacted] (doesn't rec. debate about starting up - w/ bypass valve closed)

p. 31 - "not a discussion to shut the plant down" denial

p. 32 [redacted] interaction

p. 33 (line 15-20) If that's the case why debate for such a long time?  
p. 36 line 25 - relies on ap

p. 43 - line 18-21 - Contradicts [redacted] power statements  
7C

p. 47 - didn't factor in 45 day outage to fix the bypass val  
line 1

p. 64 - pressure, decision making - doesn't have any influence  
- from guys above me -

(don't interfere)  
left up to T.O. 100 percent - [redacted] has all the power  
pressure comments 7C

Probing  
Soft spots  
in ice

A-2 7C

re [redacted] 7C  
Review of W&S interview dated April 3, 2003/as compared to KH conversation 3/27

[redacted] since December 20, 2002.

Letter mentioned to [redacted] and allegations are raised (KH known to him in questioning)

p. 6 Has not heard KH say increased risk of nuclear safety errors Compare to trans (p. 5 re "bullshit")

p. 14-15 [redacted] is appealed to by W&S for any specific instance or concern that KH had in order to help with their investigation (specifically p. 15 line 24 to p. 16 line 1) [redacted] denies that she had a nuclear safety concern re the management of the facility (she and he discussed and agreed on her concern in 3/27 conversation re who is running the site) - non-nuclear people (deregulation comment) 7C

✓ p. 18-19 splitting hairs w/ [redacted] - qualifying "not nuclear safety" - check tape -

✓ p. 19-20 KH tell TO exactly what her concerns were - [redacted] he denies -

✓ p. 21 [redacted] - Salem II shut down - offered by [redacted] as example of safety 1st -

p. 22 Contradicts bypass valve incident + tape re [redacted] comment + dereg. + who's running? concerns

✓ p. 38-39 [redacted] production oriented - "pressure only going to get worse from tape"

p. 40 "that was the extent of conversation" -

\* ~~at~~ p. 40-41 In [redacted] or others mentioned by KH to [redacted] as having concerns -

✓ p. 41 What about [redacted] "out of hand"

- KH tells TO twice (3/27) that [redacted] escalated her date after she raised a concern

ALL 7C

①



use notifications system

impersonal, cold

goes to box


no supervisory review -

causes disengagement

between idlers & people that should be taking action

- no feedback

- Communication link not reinforced



2000


2nd party -

3 day goal

5 people dedicated people

- ① incoming screening group
- ② worked w/ priority of orders
- ③

7C



background

stream - priority & put through  
couple hundred

not stopped



How reacted to that? Raise concern?

backlog

- ① not seen
- ② or need resolution -

→ would go back to indiv. w/ concern

1 Work that prod.



- needed SROs  
work in buckets

never got HC SRO -  
"didn't have SRO support."

7C

ALL 7C

2

participated that was communicated -

tech spec. non-conservative

gap in reasoning

early 2000 - to present - don't see as many tech spec issues  
large turnover of exp. people - knowledge  
operations - SKOs

Aware of any instances - design basis & operability calls  
from FSAR or tech spec

chiller

north plant bend - did not do appropriate re-test  
procedures

Sept. -



Seasmel experience - procedures don't need to be so beefy

registered w/ you

told OCC crew of issue

- SRM imp. - force

is no fix



reluctant to plot up N/A probable detector

ALL TC





Passed Maint Optimization

PMO - Bring over certain # of orders w/ PMO, unless they showed caregiver <sup>(prompted more)</sup>

7L ( [redacted] ) to ( [redacted] ) - 2002 did not see support from


[redacted] Trust

as Dir. Work Mgt.

[redacted] - Why not support by 3 mos

- due to:
- 1) wanted to please everyone
  - 2) abilities
  - 3) did not like confrontation

Fear



depending, found in result, 7L, wanted to th

early 2002 3 1/2

- Difference was [redacted] front end -  
Org in right direction

- under ( [redacted] ) - Monday  
morning quarterback

#2 Bypass valve - IPE how do you control Cool down



[redacted] went after Ops 7-8-9% excursion - "fig deal"  
non-conservative decision - reactivity management

just named  
VPOps

7L

meeting in morning -  
OCC

7C

(5)

Certain part of maint -  
doesn't like doing big jobs

- fear of failure

Earlier on -

reactor water cleanup flange -

it would make it to keep outage

Instrum Bldg. - valve packings

diesel exhaust -

meeting -

2:15

1/27/04

2:25

time-date -

telephone -

location - present

at tel

SCWE - speaking on Jan 26 w/o present - technical issues presented that were explored further today -

Establish -

as

7C

WORK PACKAGES CLOSED OUT w/o WORK

afraid fudging issues -

7C

New Mech Maint Mgmt

Early 2003

April 03

14

Outage

8/2001 -

3 units

T duties segregated to HC

reorganization - position - not selected -


people call him to relay what's going on - developed rapport

while on site - any considerations given to going to QA, E&S and

7C


8/1 - closed out work - TCode - package technically correct + closed - could not be closed w/o work being completed

12



packages missing steps + sign-offs,

defined doing right - took pressure  
peak count pressures -  
trict templates - pre-testing on spares




— Systems coming in high or low

turbine valve

shut plant down due to unknown drywell leakage -  
corrected chilled water line - went into recirc. pump  
+ intercepted by turbine bypass valve -

turbine

persons of knowledge



notification - per

- trouble shooting plan - not a specific

12

ALL 7C

76 [redacted] - asked for everything CC had, got no response  
[redacted] - response was  
plant was designed to handle

Questions Pump shaft heating up & wearing - direct response  
to seal - stuffing box temps -  
degrading

Catastrophically lose mechanical seal - is it a LOCA  
loss of coolant accident

Seal face notification -  
pump engineers answered it - as seal purge

~~that~~ troubleshooting plan -  
March 2003 - what was put out was not shut down  
because of the pump or bypass valve -

discussed w/ [redacted] -  
[redacted] - troubleshooting 76  
[redacted]  
talked w/ [redacted] + determined it was a chilled water  
line problem

Why no notification - still an open notification on seal failure

Engineering Record explanation

ALL 76

7C attributed Ontario to a killed water line -

no one responded - to [redacted] saying anyone who  
disagreed would have to take it to [redacted] -

Flow Serve Rep. - written

7C [redacted] finish 1/29/04

1/29/04

Scott question re receive pump issue -

agreed to ID tagging issues human performance  
issues - Examples - [redacted]

alliger handling - [redacted] 7C

Orth

Level 1 root cause initiated & completed

3/2003

rec. - go internal & resolve Erg. - Flow Serve - [redacted]

organizationally - [redacted] asked - if the money was budgeted  
? how safety issue was tied to budget

all 7C

Safety related service water valves - 6 1/2 - 7 days in 7 days  
(Salem) - valve needed

Level 1 - drive org. to buy right valves + spare  
3 mid-bladed 2001  
7C [redacted] - asked how it cost  
Supt. + Mgr.

14-18 hrs -

Worked well - after struggle ex. "mindset"

3/11/03 not revised,

HC + Salem diesels

Supt. + Mgr. <sup>PM</sup> deposits -  
1- 1 1/2 yrs. ago - opt storage or not deferring  
Salem side - Safety related  
HC diesels

Plant Ops - more sensitive to Safety / Equip Mgr. + Supt.

All Ops wanted was good equip. -

Buying parts - biggest fiddle - on safety related critical / Equip -  
diesel - P&G mindset - not shutting plant down - it's a business decision

7C [redacted] - Requests 50+

Didn't write summary until 1 1/2 yrs - annoyed w/ attitudes  
DA (17)



7C  
"WMAPI" -

OK mention

name

ask about the process, what considered "main" -

alignment - what got addressed + what didn't  
reason

3rd Level 2 1/2 in one calendar year

told CC was vindictive

who said it was false

Work Mgt. -

speed Level 1 + need to

be fixed - just July/Aug

1st floor - groups of people in warehouse  
Planning ->

by 8/01 - significant reduction in valve parts, servocylinders,  
HC diesels, etc.

given parts' numbers + min req. to Keenan,

- 7C

1 work order - 33 open notifications - (deficiencies)  
Spring 2003 - 7C

7C [redacted] HC - (demoted) - [redacted]  
[redacted] now holds CC position

Writing Level 1 - pushing back on recirc pump -  
contributed to his leaving - not a "team player"

QA dept. - "position himself for a lawsuit" -

7C


7C

① Considering discrimination allegation - will decide + notify En —


② Allegs category for handling technical issues

1. B receive pump
2. work orders
3. work order - not just in - planning process
4. Corrective actions

- rather than give examples



- 1) whether or not the work packages were tied to tagging - configuration issues
- 2) if we bring it up ~~we~~ <sup>someone will</sup> get in trouble, but it won't get fixed



ALL  
7C

①

10/23/62  
ed. -

7C

Nuc. -

7C

18 mos.

QA

4/95

- 3 1/2 X

- letter - equipment problems - industrial safety  
Synergy surveys -

Salem Unit II ( [redacted] ) 7C

\* heavy grass loading

March particularly bad - Unit II offline

TARP rec. - SORC (response to, fix -)

agreed to parameters - 5 circ. pumps (of 6) 3 or 4 OK

who agreed - [redacted] 7C

may have been chair

down few days - equip. fix - 7C

middle of night

(4 minimum)

[redacted]

7C

see  
SORC  
meeting

Challenges to think through all aspects -  
- asks from safety aspects

Dom-3m - how viewed - VP - doesn't know why  
[redacted] 7C

Challenge - [redacted] 7C  
action already taken - Come back down in power

Refuel outage - outstanding items -  
fall 2002 - after the fact

[redacted] 7C  
Salem  
noteworthy

meeting -

"holding the plant hostage"  
for next use -

expressive debate  
fall 2003 14BFA - foreign material stuck  
1 Hr LCO

fixing equipment  
Babcock -

ALI  
7C

[redacted]

7C

27-MS42

people involved

[redacted]

7C

[redacted]

7C

9/21/02 informed of plant shutdown -  
able to isolate leak -

[redacted]

unusual vt  
breakdown - did not know -

[redacted]

doesn't recall  
thought "assess" -  
not

AB can isolate the leak

① safe for [redacted] safe for someone else

② breakdown in communications -

③ [redacted] did not solicit input re planning maneuver

[redacted]

- did not occur to him that potential violation  
tell residents? - thought so

- any further incidents of this nature / 1st lesson of miscommunication

phone call -

- perf. appraisal

all  
7C

76

iv

1-2003051F

~~[redacted]~~ was contacted regarding his knowledge of potential problems with the Safety Con. Wgt. at Hope Creek. ~~[redacted]~~ last working at there is ~~[redacted]~~, and a former ~~[redacted]~~ requested that he be warned.

Heckfuss


2007

He reported that he worked closely with Dr. Kymn Haroin in the last six months he was there. He has had recent contact with him. In his knowledge, Dr. Haroin has the most concerns with respect to safety. [redacted] was asked if he talked with anyone else in operations at Hape Creek with related concerns. He responded that [redacted] does not have the same level of concern "safety-wise" as Dr. Haroin, but felt negative toward the way the place was set up and run and the way senior management worked. He did not believe [redacted] had any nuclear safety related issues. [redacted] also offered that from the [redacted] [redacted] would be able to offer "the real picture story with [redacted]". He trusted both men a lot. [redacted] believed [redacted] had concerns regarding the management of the place, but not to the same depth as [redacted]. Further, [redacted] would prohibit himself as readily improving. He was not aware of any specific nuclear safety concerns of [redacted].

stated that he trusts Dr. Harwin as well and does not know anybody else at the site with nuclear safety concerns. He is aware of her concerns, <sup>and has heard</sup> ~~but~~ her descriptions and knows she believes there is a safety issue at the plant. However, at his "secondary" is that ~~the~~ others onsite, more technically oriented than Dr. Harwin, don't share the same belief.

14 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ believes that the Ops Supt to give a true report of what is going on and suggested that if anyone will say.

how it's and how a crew, these people need:



ACE7C

10/23/03

1-2003051F

K. Harvin worked closely with in last 6 months he was there -

Harvin has the most concerns with respect to safety

Operations - [REDACTED] 7C - does not have same level of concern safety wise as Harvin -

- way place was being run

believes management alignment - felt negative toward way set up & he org. worked - no nuclear safety type issues

Former [REDACTED] 7C - trusts a lot -

[REDACTED] looking for real picture - [REDACTED] good for concern over mgt. from front line - not sure if


same level & depth as [REDACTED] he mgt. - got sense he got concerned w/ mgt. of place, would include himself as needing improvement - not aware of any specific nuclear concerns

[REDACTED] trusts K. Harvin - does not know any body else with nuclear safety concerns - knowing her concerns but hearing

her description - she believes there is a safety issue at plant - however "genuinely" technique oriented than Dr. H - they ~~do~~ don't have the same belief

Trusts Opr. Superintendents to give a true picture of what's going on

7C



If anyone will say how it is & raise a concern these people will

ALL 7C