

1998

equipment
perf. issues - as best as can be

human perf. -

sequence of steps -

"hard capped" - real human needs

train people - to do on spot reviews
procedural compliance

operability calls

emphasis on production -

at least - recurring system operating issues -

information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information

Act, exemptions 7C
FOIA- 2005-194

4-53
N
7C

murders - outages - desecration
business decision - control rod drives

Ops - shut down

~~addressed crew~~

PSEG

↓ COG -

" having to apologize for failure to perform
- poor planning - see IPE

- normal for them to review perf. failure

option
- overall org. let sid. down
let them,

unduly held people to scrutiny
because not reported 'perf. event'

political

COG + Sr. mgt.



time frame - not known

Summary impression - event
not reported

Aware of any other instances where Ops Mgt. faced
pressure from senior mgt. w PSEG Power in regard
operational decisions? (akin to bypass
value issue)

Only mention of PSEG Power

off weighing in a operational decision -
are there others?

Example -
Ops Mgt.

Why wouldn't raise

Dr. Harvin investigation

10/14/03

(3) Still out for transcript review - from investigative file

*

now than April 03

- indicated he feels differently

Personnel file for Dr. Harvin - complete in terms of what collected, still researching corporate records - may be more to provide - file given 10/14 includes appraisals along with issues re expenses, vacation etc.

Law. file review -

Harvin approached [redacted] on 3/25 and alleged her termination of employment is retaliation for raising safety concerns for [redacted].

Also asserted that work environment among the leadership not open to raising concerns.

Duke Assign - [redacted] assigns 2/5
(emails) charges 3/5 -

(requested 4 - some 2 + 3p.)

Interview addendums - all

Misc. emails - 10/13/01 from [redacted]

re hiring of Harvin on his payroll for all of 2002.

"rotational" - no guarantees beyond that -

requested

her status to be discussed towards latter part of 2002 to determine where & how she would be used

requested PRK + 2000 → docs + app. original

Interviews of W.S. invest.

4/16

4/8

4/3 + 4/23

4/4 + 4/23

4/9 + 4/23

4/15

4/3 + 4/23

4/3

4/15

4/4

4/8

4/4

4/8

4/9

4/23

4/15

4/4

4/22

4/22

4/22

4/15

4/16

4/9

4/15

4/3

4/16

7C
A

4/23

Attempts to have ~~Dr. Harman~~ provide additional info
Unsuccessful per J. Keenan

JK

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1

The Region I Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an Assist to Staff on October 2, 2003, at the request of regional management, to evaluate information developed and/or reported to the Region indicating that the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) at the Public Service Electric & Gas (PSEG) nuclear generating stations, Salem and Hope Creek, was poor. Based upon the information known to the region in October 2003, the inquiry was planned to focus on the Operations aspects at both sites, and would include representatives from the operator levels, operations management and senior managers. Both former and current employees were interviewed at the management levels. The results of these interviews, arranged by station and working level, are outlined below.

Salem Operators

By interviewing the operators at Salem, OI and the staff sought to identify any SCWE related concerns they had, particularly involving a production over safety climate, and if so, what the basis for the concern was. In that the subject matter was broad, these interviews tended to develop a variety of issues, obviously depending on the interviewee's view of its effect on the SCWE. As delineated, some common themes developed throughout the interviews involving negative perceptions and some positive points emerged.

The positive impressions included: most believed that they and the majority of their co-workers had no problem in raising concerns and would not hesitate to do so, specifically in regard to nuclear safety issues. Further, most of the operators interviewed did not believe that anyone suffered retaliation for having raised concerns. Some operators had no concerns regarding nuclear safety and reported that the company took the appropriate action when necessary; and did not report any instances that left the impression of a production over safety atmosphere. The arrival of [REDACTED] was noted as a positive change and anticipated improvements in union/management relations, conservative decision making, and equipment repairs were cited based upon the prior association between [REDACTED] and the Salem operators.

Though not explored specifically, mixed reports were received about the effectiveness of the Employee Concerns Program. SCWE surveys were noted as negative in terms of distrust of the results published, the lack of corrective actions taken, and the burden due to the frequency of the surveys.

The negative impressions reported by the operators at Salem outweighed the positive both in number and in nature. Some indicated that the company does well when operating decisions are clear cut, but delays exist in the "greyer" areas. Said another way, this was described as they do not pose a safety threat to people or the environment, but come close to it by accepting risks. Numerous operators expressed concerns and frustrations regarding the way particular incidents were handled, as either an industrial or nuclear safety issue, and offered the incidents as evidence of the effect of decisions driven by production over safety, "megawatt mentality", non-conservative approaches and/or schedule pressure. The key examples leaving this impression are: the September 2002, Salem Unit 2-MS-42 valve steam leak involving the intervention by [REDACTED]; the October 2003 stuck 14 BF-19 feed regulator valve at Salem Unit 1; the grassing issues at both units in Spring 2003; a concern regarding the potential catastrophic failure of the SS-661 sampling valve (numerous notifications written related to repeated leaking) at Salem 2 in August 2003; the push to build scaffolding by flashlight and fix the leaking SS-661 valve by flashlight in the same incident

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2

(notification written); and the practice of starting complicated surveillance testing immediately prior to the end of the shift in order to gain credit for the work.

A significant area of concern involved PSEG's Corrective Action Program (CAP) and the amount of equipment that did not get repaired or repaired correctly. Additionally, parts availability was cited as a known "joke" on the island to the effect that if something was needed, it was being held as surplus by the warehouse to be sold at a sale. Also, the idea that the warehouse kept no spare parts in order to avoid paying taxes was conveyed. The work-week scheduling and constant re-prioritization of issues, coupled with the lack of appropriate resources, were seen as the primary precipitants for the problems with equipment repairs. The SAP software programs used to track notifications and for equipment tagging were seen as difficult and troublesome since initiated (around 2000) and challenging to use for trending and research purposes. The weaknesses in corrective actions were perceived as having an apathetic effect on some who would question the point of raising an issue. (This was a concern noted with respect to less significant issues.) Some operators feel they are only "white noise."

The problems with equipment repairs and parts availability has the additional adverse effect of leading to criticism of workers by management for "low wrench time," which adds to the anger, frustration and bad attitude on both sides. The union/management relationship is viewed as damaged in a manner that causes both the Shift Managers (SMs) and the Control Room Supervisors (CRSs) to be seen as in the middle and aggravated because morale is poor and the relationship has become "tit for tat over piddly stuff."

With respect to raising concerns, it was reported that some people prefer not to have their name associated with issues for differing reasons, including personality type, and some new workers would not raise a concern for fear of losing their job. The union stewards were viewed as compensating in this area and the impression became that issues would get ~~were~~ raised, particularly nuclear safety concerns, but possibly not by the initial observer. Others discussed their personal comfort level with raising concerns in relation to how valid it would be seen by management. Several interviewees reported their perception that union stewards who regularly front issues are viewed as a "hindrance" or "troublemaker" and treated adversely by the company. This was also the opinion of some in regard to a shift manager who pushed operator concerns to upper management in the 2002-2003 time frame.

Salem Operations Management

Positive

~~██████████~~ sees no weaknesses in the safety culture, no concern over operations he has been asked to perform, no unusual pressure recently, people can and do raise nuclear safety concerns and do so w/o fear of retaliation-includes self, some reluctance on the part of some due to an introverted personality issue, no personal experience in having operability decisions questioned by sr. mgt (however, offered only one instance as possibly feeding into rift Ol heard about between SM and sr mgt that in early 2003 related that in regard to grassing and circulators on Unit 2, sr management ~~██████████~~ had initially given one direction and after things did not improve re grassing, they changed their philosophy- ~~██████████~~ wanted 5 in accordance w/original criteria and ~~██████████~~ said 4 OK), believes culture is far more conservative now than 6 or 7 years ago and believes that's the case across the industry

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[redacted] no issues with people raising issues or ability to do so, offered an incident involving [redacted] yelling at operators (re isolating condensity) for being unsafe [redacted] shut down the job-never saw a "just do it anyway" attitude (re industrial safety issues) [redacted] people always able to raise concerns without repercussions, sees a change in senior mgt from [redacted] and [redacted] to current as positive in that people believe their concerns are more listened to and properly dealt with-there's more emphasis and a more engaged safety committee, never saw a hesitation to bring a nuclear concern up-both operators and peer level, under new management believes nuclear safety concerns will be discussed without AOM or OM trying to talk him out of it or minimize the concern, offered that the environment now is that sr mgt asks what's the conservative and right thing to do to give operators a comfort level (example given of # of circulators for startup spring 2002 or 2003) without the chance of down powers, perturbations or abnormal procedures. Added that was displayed between [redacted] when they declined to start up/heat up using MS-10s (coming out of 2R13 in November 2003) [redacted] feels more comfortable now raising concerns-less comfortable w [redacted]

heated arguments
confrontation →

Negative

[redacted] none apart from one incident described above, [redacted] a lot more issues with the plant are brought up now because they suffer from maintenance and the prioritization by work management-believes maybe the money is not being spent where it should be to see improved performance indicators, outage times, etc.-if it were up to him, he would only accept the plant at 100% in every issue, Salem Unit 2 spring 2003 grassing recalled issues but he was on shift and he was not pressured-not even though he was a SM for only several weeks when [redacted] pushed for minimum number [redacted] thought they could have waited a little bit longer to get the circulators back, then re-evaluated because they had a tide change and thought the screens could handle it-thought they could continue w/power ascension, felt some pressure from above to start the plant [redacted] never directed to do so by [redacted] some equipment operators feel treated wrongly for bringing up industrial safety issues, in spite of safety operator designation and the fact that the issues raised are resolved "all the time", believes union/management issues get emotional and create a lack of communication and animosity-some union members that send the feeling that management disagrees with their issues purely for production purposes-(not true), sms feel just as frustrated at times, especially w/ the amount of repeat work-sees part of problem with maintenance in that they do not have operational experience in supervision-schedule compliance not good, planning is questionable, mentioned parts availability problem, [redacted] the discovery phase was taking too long-wanted to wait longer on operability calls-sms had a meeting under [redacted] and pushed back [redacted] took the position that he wanted more people to weigh in before the call was made, Sms wanted to look at what they had at hand and make the call conservatively and follow the tech spec (meaning shut down), example of [redacted] coming into CR to push [redacted] into start up without proper surveillance of reactor head vents indicators, pressure to stay within the rules but work through and around issues like reactor head vent indicators, the number of telephone calls to the CR by [redacted] in which Sms "defended" their position-taking a conservative approach- led to discomfort in operating the plant for sms, example given of [redacted] and circulators (2003) position that procedure says you can move forward-do so in spite of SM comfort level-"have to manage a certain amount of risk", would try to avoid talking w [redacted] across the board w/SMS, [redacted] just a "messenger" for the [redacted], believes [redacted] left because he was micromanaged by [redacted] [redacted] had similar problem, believes K. Harvin had a negative affect on [redacted] dealing with Sms-improved after [redacted] regime over, explained that there are some personalities on the crew that observed the [redacted] handling of 22

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MS42 leak that don't like [redacted] and made this incident into the uproar it became because it was [redacted] actions, management process for repairing equipment is not effective and leads to use of temporary logs for excessive periods-this leads to operator mistakes (ex. Re rad monitors 12/03 time frame)-need to dedicate the resources; saw BF-19 incident delay caused by failure to get "right people in the room and finally coming up with solutions-eventually they found they had something stuck in the internals of the valve, but the process of ruling everything else out and getting the info from the "smart people" takes time", described the Sms as in the position to "buffer" the CRSs and operators from sr management in the "push" they would exhibit by calling into the CR "not uncommonly" to move a start up along [redacted] example of this as salting in switchyard in September 2003-SM described himself as feeling "uncomfortable" because he needed to shut down both units based upon what he viewed in the switchyard-arcng, presented facts to [redacted] including the [redacted] from the [redacted] plant who had "word for word" experienced the same problem 10 years earlier [redacted] in "disbelief" that's what was occurring, had to convince [redacted] that plant needed to be shut down-had to walk [redacted] to switchyard to show him (explained should have been a no brainer to shut down when arcng viewed) and still wasn't convinced until 500 KV breaker opened the [redacted] said, that's it I'm shutting down-the financial influences of who's going to make up for the lost generation, pay for switchyard repairs and who is accountable for this should not enter the control room decision making [redacted] did not come from proper perspective and it added "at least an hour" until [redacted] decision to shut down, offered as example of what he would experience with [redacted] in past-resistance to shut down/offered that his confidence level currently is higher that he won't be in the same position again-believes won't have that problem with [redacted] environment under [redacted] was such that you didn't want to work in it because of the constant coaching and ridicule-not conducive to making best effort, just doing what you had to to avoid coaching-nobody wanted to work for [redacted] and now improved as far as dealing with management-SMs had to fight [redacted] to not become "site managers" because of the issues that Salem would have regularly-needed to be in CR to be backup for CRS due to emerging issues-described as happening more than in other plants-became obvious that [redacted] did not understand what was going on in control-this affected their rapport; [redacted] union/management relationship deteriorating and worsened in last 6-8 months specifically between Eos and mgt (cited firing [redacted] then returning him to duty as "incendiary device"), cited animosity over perception by some in management that safety is being used as a weapon by operators-sees the "real organizational risk" as a supervisor may make a decision with that factored in-saying you're just beating me over the head w/safety and the supv. Makes the wrong choice-has not seen it happen, believes there's potential to happen and keeps on top of his supv to prevent it-offered examples of union using safety erroneously (over 3 yrs ago, hydrazone laden water 1st issue, left bad taste for him as SM; operators returned to shift from training-did not like-started raising confined space issues-summer 2003; re conservative decision making-spring 2003, wanted 4 circulators to bring the plant forward without the fear of having to back down, [redacted] pushed for minimum of 3, [redacted] "on the fence" and could go either way from the start-wanted defense in depth in spite of [redacted] persuasive argument that they were still in conservative space with the # (3) they had-did not like operating philosophy of [redacted] that sets the unit at a place that did not allow defense in depth-pointed out that [redacted] comfort zone was wider than his own with using 3 right from start, but believes he was persuaded by [redacted] another example late 2001 of his disagreement in conservative decision re SJ injection Valve w/significant leakage and needed to test to determine which one-he and [redacted] agreed and went to meeting to discuss [redacted] made decision not going to test for leakage, they would "engineer it away" (issue being paneled at ARB), when decision made to go [redacted] way, [redacted] made conscious decision not to "defy" [redacted] in

MAJOR CONCERNS
RE
POTENTIAL
CRS
TO MISTAKE
A CONCERN IN
VIEW OF WORK
MET. P. 100

holding
the plant
hostage
was
conveyed
most of
being
used

could have said
to [redacted] whose license
... fine here - who makes

public setting-just went along and met w/ [redacted] after to discuss [redacted] Offered engineering issue, [redacted] a rep. of his bosses, believes [redacted] just as taken back by reversal of [redacted] as he was: knows [redacted] steam leak situation raised as non-conservative decision making by [redacted] felt he could safely get to the valve-no indication that sr. mgt had part in [redacted] decision to isolate the leak. [redacted] summarized as did not think anybody was telling [redacted] to get up there and close leak, in spite of his differences w/mgt he would not believe that happened-had not seen that kind of behavior.

Spring 2001 starting up w/ vacuum - achieved by packing material under shaft, - worked fine - compared w/ going upfront mtd. loops at beginning of outages, never done 3-4 yrs ago - now industry does these things - called "in" maybe that's the insidious creep of non-conservation - stuck [redacted] not powers for him at all, seen as -

Negative (see remainder in Positive)

[redacted] perceived restart pressure resulted in push to fix a valve by flashlight rather than waiting to fix lights (resolved w/temp lighting); [redacted] perception that co. takes easiest/cheapest way out examples given: chronic problems with boron leakage and charging pump cooler cleaning during grassing season, perception of surveys is management does them to get numbers to justify whatever they want, no corrections come from the surveys; [redacted] identified industrial safety concerns of scaffolding by flashlight, failure of SS-661 valve, no one from management or union wants to be the one to say they held a job up; [redacted] ECP ineffective, perception that it takes too long to fix some things that union believes should be done immediately, expressed concerns of self and others that tagging is complicated and not well enough known to the people hanging them, surveys are not useful because they get too many to pay attention to, results not well published, regularly hear about missing parts because the warehouse sold them, known as a "general joke" that a needed part was in the warehouse as surplus to be sold at a sale; [redacted] some people just do not have the personality to raise an issue no matter where they work; [redacted] believes the environment intentionally cumbersome to discourage or has effect of discouraging complaints, surveys can be interpreted any way and did not believe management listened to what was said, industrial safety issues overlooked to get the job done, first line supervisors push production over safety because their pay structure rewards that-could not attach any nuclear safety issues to this though, industrial safety; corrective actions are less than adequate and that's because they do not conduct post job briefs for the lessons learned (1 in 100 would be a lot); company and union battle too much where they should not have to, hopes [redacted] will help this, expects so; [redacted] industrial safety issues (equipment and personnel safety related) need some work re backlog of notifications in CAP, perception that EDG at HC was [redacted] concerned w/tech specs, not OSHA requirements-caused a problem for operators by term insubordinate, ECP thorough, but did not roll out findings clearly; [redacted] does not see production over safety yet, but does not like the trend that he sees as sitting and waiting before making a call-believes the push to not be the person to bring a unit down could affect decisions-offered BF 19 controls vs. mechanically stuck issue and it took too long to call it mechanically stuck, [redacted] perception that declaring the BF19 valve mechanically stuck avoided because it would have led to a 1-hour shutdown (production push-error), sees production push in issues like BF19, and the handling of two issues

(6)

developed under hurricane startup in Sept 03-, re main steam isolation valves and steam dump valves-seen as examples of pushing the envelope of conservative decision making to keep units on line, I'd three incidents involving [redacted] that sent a message to operators indicating no regard for personal safety and believes it sent message ok to take short cuts because it happened w/ another supervisor, different situation; [redacted] stuck BF19 troubleshooting allowed them to generate more megawatts, then continued w/shutdown, cites problem with work week scheduling and bumping of one issue as another one becomes immediate or next priority-effect is to just keep postponing an issue-example given CR indicators-keep sliding and don't get addressed, seemed

Negative (continued)

resources and or time not applied, this works the same way w/CAP, notification system cumbersome to use, sees difference in CR staff in deregulated environment in a swing in emphasis on production, maintain fine line between what is acceptable risk and what is not, concerned re push to move to four man crews (from five) and potential effect on safe ops; [redacted] concern is that people are not heard when they raise concerns-most NEOs feel they are "white noise" and some people (but not pervasive through group) don't want their names tied to a concern so the union stewards raise it for them, CRSs are caught between battle of union and management and are aggravated by both parties, it's become "tit for tat on piddly stuff", work management process is "horrendous" and the workers have been telling management that since 2000 with nothing done about it-in part does not work because they don't have the parts to complete the work with-leads to criticism of workers for "low wrench time" and gets everybody pissed off causing bad attitudes, can't seem to get a handle on the SAP work clearance modules for tags and work clearance documents, why aren't we fixing more stuff in the primary plant?-raises issue that it seems that only goal is to say we had a 28 day outage as opposed to 38 or 42 and really get things fixed, saw [redacted] act at MS42 valve as production over safety, unsafe and exhibiting megawatt mentality, Salem 2 bolting issue (summer 2001 or 02) deferred repair because they did not want to extend the refuel outage, grassing issues did the right thing but [redacted] looked uncomfortable having to take unit off line-however, did receive "attaboy" from [redacted] to [redacted] and crew for having done so; [redacted] SAP difficult to research previous deficiencies, broken equipment tends to go on forever-cited long term plant deficiencies as primary issue, believes "new guys" would not raise a concern of a nuclear safety nature for fear of losing job, gave five examples of schedule pressure, production over safety issues including a stuck fed reg valve where the unit should have tripped, criticized the Oss for starting surveillances just before the end of the shift to get credit, grading by "beans"-led to stress on individuals working the surveillance and those taking over from oncoming shift, [redacted] saw as starting in late 2001 a major problem with culture that allows equipment that needs repair to languish-don't want to spend the money, raised same issue as [redacted] re turbine header testing not handled properly and equipment released, people may not report smaller issues out of the belief that nothing would be done (like small oil leaks), 14 BF 19 issue as example of non conservative approach to operation, MS 42 and [redacted] issue seen as sr mgt preaching conservatism not taken to heart, indicative of non conservative and megawatt mentality, very weak in carrying out corrective actions, [redacted] operators will say why should I bring that up if they're not going to do anything about it? People will

7c

raise concerns if issue is major, examples of production over safety: [redacted] mS42, BF19 valve-mentality was to stall and not shut down, ms28S BYPASS VALVE on main steam line stuck, so struck w/hammers to grassing issues-guys who keep it running on one circulator get pats on the back, management picks "low hanging fruit" to fix, things that don't cost a lot of money-overall they don't pose a safety threat to people or environment, but we try to see how close we can come to that-meant accepting risks, believes [redacted] and [redacted] have been beaten down -not the same as when they started their positions, after trying to do the right things (taking time and money) and they have changed, no cooperation from [redacted] level up with union which leads to morale problem, SAP is "piece of crap" because concerns cannot be located/researched and screens are

Negative (continued)

difficult to work with, he believes the practice of starting surveillances at the close of shift are error traps to avoid but the push is to get "the bean" to make the shift look better, example of diesel maintenance -starting complicated procedures at shift change can be detriment to nuc safety

others: no retal known

[redacted] believes "labeled" for trying to do the right thing, seen as a problem, believes Ford received poor rating for voicing concerns

[redacted] believes [redacted] and [redacted] harassed for their positions-do it by the book believes two outspoken [redacted] are adversely treated because they raise issues- has not stopped them from raising concerns:

[redacted] believes made an example of re comments repeated to him by Harvin re [redacted]

[redacted] perception that [redacted] pulled off shift for a couple of weeks and "reprogrammed" for backing his people up-got him in trouble, sees [redacted] as come down on hard for raising concerns,

[redacted] seen as a hindrance, knows the procedures and holds mgt "to the letter"

Positive

[redacted] no problem raising concerns, good relationship as far as radiological safety, did not see push for production over nuclear safety, sees more support and enforcement of the industrial safety culture under [redacted] no nuclear safety issues, will raise concerns and limits dealings to immediate supervisor, believes responsibility taken away from supervision and lower managers; [redacted] will raise concerns and others will too;

[redacted] raises concerns and does for others, experience to support retaliation raise concern. [redacted] nuclear safety issues would be addressed, [redacted] does a good, thorough job and people have confidence in him to not use their name, [redacted] seen as having strong operator background and pushing for conservative decision making and nuclear safety, [redacted] influence has changed the way issues are addressed, they won't languish any longer; [redacted] return "great", thinks will help return to old way (after 1996 startup of getting it done) where union/management worked together;

[redacted] no issues w/nuclear safety; [redacted] no retaliation seen for raising concerns (discussion around his own termination did not evoke discrim. complaint, others will raise concerns and confident that nuclear safety issues are raised, [redacted] concerns are raised, people jump over mgt if they have to to get something addressed

nc

8

and has never seen an issue where he questioned the co attitude toward nuclear safety, offered that operator decisions to trip unit have been backed up by ops mgt and offered two examples. [REDACTED] thinks co does good job of protecting health and safety of public, big safety issues and primary plant issues are looked at in depth, everyone would report a concern of importance, sees improvement recently in procedures that required a fix either get a notification or more resources applied in the procedure group have resulted in more refined procedures w/not many major errors or problems any longer, typically only sees small issues now with procedures, majority will raise issues if they have a concern, for self, is comfortable in raising concerns that mgt believes are valid-made distinction in discussing [REDACTED] issues (neg), impressed by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] expects positive changes

7C

NEGATIVE (CONTINUED)

[REDACTED] BF-19 time to call in op. absorbed by 50.59 ^(connotation: complicated "trunkhook")
- Thought 2-3 hrs less would have been better
Process look at more - analyze more
else: then expedite

no examples of si might going to more conservative direction - seemed "I usually
fight harder in the other direction"

X HARVIN SEEN AS THREAT BY MERS - DID NOT WANT TO SAY WRONG THING
AROUND HER OR WOULD LOSE POSITION - COACHING IN TERMS OF LEADERSHIP -
OR "THINK LIKE US" OR WE'LL REPLACE YOU

HEARD [REDACTED] REMINDS PEOPLE "THE KLOT ACT" FOR WRITING NOTIFICATIONS
1 SOURCE, ONLY "RUMOR"

[REDACTED] INEFFECTIVENESS OF CAP - INEFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE
TO PERCEPTION THAT PLANT NOT OPERATED SAFELY, - LOSE CONTINUITY &
FOCUS w/ CHANGING IN SIGHT

LATE 2001 WATER BUSCHING OFF NUCLEAR HEADER - PRIMARY HEAT SINK FOR PLANT
OPPOSED TO MESSAGE & TALK OF SAFETY OVER PRODUCTION SENT MESSAGE FROM SR. MGT

RECURRING GRASSING PROBLEMS - QUESTIONS ^{DEMANDS} ABILITY TO OPERATE
PLANT

[REDACTED] CRITICIZED HM FOR OPERABILITY CALL LEADING TO 72 LCO -
WANTED MORE PEOPLE ON BOARD BY DEC. MADE [REDACTED] MATHS
NOT THE WAY IT WORKS FOR LICENSED OPERATORS - LED TO
MEETING (COUPLED W/ OTHER ISSUES NOT RECALLED) [REDACTED] REBUT
SPRING 2002

p. 14 - reduction in margin of safety came from above them - could not
judge new or not at time of action to go on to test

pressure valve had negative pressure - not personally involved

MS42 leak - Atom issue because [REDACTED] (see notes)

- Kill Ya lot of survey - w/ no results

(POSITIVE (CONTINUED))


Union doesn't hesitate to raise concerns to him,
no knowledge of retal. for raising concerns - pointed out [redacted] 7c
believes so but [redacted] disagrees.

union/mgt relationship needs improvement to be good SCWE,
"has a ways to go yet"

WILL RAISE CONCERNS -- NO RELUCTANCE, NO RETAL. - FOR
SELF MAY HAVE AFFECTED EVAL & RAISE DUE

SUPPORTED TAKING PLANT OFF-LINE ON 2 OCCASIONS - TYPICAL
FOR [redacted] (CIRCULATORS SPRING 02? - MS 42 (re L)) - OTHER [redacted] NON-CONSER

7c



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EDG - control for issues

1/2 w/ allegor

USA finding - He not safe to operate
8 people

[REDACTED] 7C

"no co. in this Country would operate this plant"

(h) [REDACTED]

SAP "wig" - can come up w/ lot

[REDACTED] 3/8/04

forwarded to
allegor his
notification re
concerns id. re
notifications - sending
via Kot not to id
from [REDACTED]

Small ant
3/8/04 pm

* Lockhart accept 3/8/04
Comparison of 5:48P
Davis Dese survey

Survey

[REDACTED] response -
incomplete

South Texas
Diablo Canyon

BE6 worse than
any -

Survey
Delivery
& results
attached
letter
to WRC
also →

7C

on disk
100-200
pages
wants
- NRC to have
time to prepare

of record of
batch sent

3/16/04

Kym H. —
return

— Supriya team 87 slide
presentation for BEE mgs 3/17
Still seem well-connected there?


People who she remains close
with give her info because they
want to see it get better



car

Don't use her name -

left message 2/2 5:15P



nothing imminent

20

relay

2

of

re email from Randy
Concerns

2/3 PM.




20

alleges
Lockman

near term
safety urgency

res. or call in



2/3 15P call in response
NRE (4) to page
little to [redacted] feel
chilling effect - the person
no longer coming (using person)
try to step up -

2. why stick. as if they're walking
reached out a line" - re scheduling
at this point issues and decisions
w/ others to be made w/o

no imminent issues - will go
to resident with that -
anything that

group has established
procedures
T-code - w/o procedural
compliance as lack of
concern - law is
bent as far as it can go -

question effect has on work
environment -

lot of pressure
hostile environment

wants to get it out + deal with

Ryan Harvin

1/23/04

- Originals would like
back


2/18 -

no interrogatories

Friday -



Salem -



going public - people ⁽²⁾
at plant

Came up w/ idea -

going Tues - technical
& work environment

Let me tell you

① Hookham called
Merrifield

had out conversations
expecting NRC to act

② Tues. - KH called Dave

③ impression is Regan I
can't agree on what to do

[redacted]
Keenan gives flavor
of interview & responses
to Corp counsel
6 hrs. prep. -
M-W-Th. 1 1/2

[redacted]
no coaching given -

instructions from Keenan
to be honest
concern re [redacted]

sense that people have been
told to call Keenan when
contacted for interview

6P K. Harvin inside
+ outside ACS

Continue to get calls
& reports re safety issues

2026 P ACS

- does not ask for a shutdown
does credit R1 re: action
ind. team
R1 lack of alignment / such as
milestone
6 mos.
sub. progress
no discrimination

expect National Media to
give attention
NRC for positive light

[REDACTED]

1/27/04

Knows spoke w/ [REDACTED] yesterday
believes his issues are
2 technical smoking guns
he info not presented to
NRC by licensee accurately
- wants to know that [REDACTED]
won't "slip through cracks" -
assured her were aware of
him & her refusal to his issues

Kyma Hestia
[REDACTED]

current issues & directives

X Lockbaum go between
Facilitator

Friends Meeting House

Gr. size - 4 (maybe 1 or 2 more)

Wami doesn't know either
told don't have to give names

1/30/64 w/k HARVIN

MAINT. SURV.

1st line

[REDACTED] - "So far, he would quit. If he
could" re. with environment short cuts
directed

[REDACTED] - don't let him hang on -
never talked to [REDACTED] though [REDACTED] info -
Thought asking WTS questions - of some people

[REDACTED] - off the record discussion of most inflammatory
expect 100+ lay-offs from next - some union positions
as well - next few months

2/2 received - message

Copy of prelim. data re survey -

group 5-7 Mgt. & union, now believes some may back out (1/2)

Co. atty. delriefs individuals ~~afterwards~~ afterwards

expect Wall St. Journal tomorrow

- Lock Brown sent letter of apology
to NRC - also in press - letter in press

[REDACTED] off the record
kept copy of transcript

2/3

~~_____~~
1/2 day people - Things getting worse since last week
Anderson letter - people interpretation NRC got it wrong
- on top of issues, -

~~_____~~ 20 years + compulsive pack rat, documentation
- corrective actions - re notifications

Level 1 root cause report re diesel dismissed w/ ~~_____~~
- technically + SCW could round out

environmental for Jim Chilled perspective -
focus on proving NRC wrong - Anderson's letter

off-site meeting


has root cause reports that
were ignored

- sense of urgency re NRC interviews

~~_____~~ did not get back to D. Lock brown - date
vague - ^{can't be} not at site during day -

Thursday night - 2/5
or Mon / Tues 2/9-10

pending ~~_____~~



2/3
5:30 KIT called to say sorry - believes possible
Dore Vito may have told [redacted] of her lawsuit/locat.
she is trying not to publicly associate her complaint w/ site issues at this time
alleged hearing that [redacted] is "chemistry" of
people at PSC & possibility exists that he could
advise them of those involved in plotting off site
meeting. ~~if~~ doesn't want that, if thinks so, will
tell people not to meet w/ NRC due to their
concerns re job security

called to vent - could not reach DV -

advised would handle relay, w/ 2 concerns

7C

10/24/03

training facil. for SORC members

Scheduling pressure

Someone in outag group made decision

prog. talk to

(Salem w/ two weeks)

(no response)

7C

work order - missing info
Safety related tech spec piece -

Who else should we talk to?
"For the record, no"

off the record - attempt again

advised he provided names to talk to to K. Harwin
agreed - would provide names Wed. 11/19, wanted to talk with them
- names involve those w/ concerns + fear for their jobs

7C

11/12/03

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]) 7C

[REDACTED]

3yrs. 8yrs

1976 - machinst/electrician

work week met. -

planning -

97% Salem

Field Supervisors - 5yr met. plan

1st line - mechanical, electrical, etc

5yrs exp. had problem w/ [REDACTED] as mgr - directed
to do approval SRO - attempted
to fire

Problem - Stabilizing Work Mgt. schedule
wanted to be work mgt. mgr. - did not get

Davis-Besse compares mentality to PSEG

surveillance testing - he is in charge of


INPO - WANO -

7C

doc #5

General letter 5372, 5311 - Commitment Work Order
Excel report -

Per Disc. w/ D.V. to 12/9 - go over adverse act(s)
expectation of handling - can say may not be PF -
part in process?



What would
be available
for review for
how to get?

reviewed trans.

clarification re his discussion
w/ OI, DRP on 11/6 -

anything to add - anything changed?

Returned
call
12/9 6:30p

PA - not one specific incident -
multiple due to his position re
policy compliance -
Adverse Acts -

expectation that allegation
be processed by NRC at 50.7?

Nothing changed since last NRC allegation
Cannot back away from terms & conditions
of employment as negative charge
justifies letter for being reported it - No alleg.
to process

10/3

Kym Harn

Re microcassette recording

originals


all microcassettes?

1/15

will check and -

11/3 8:30P

message for



~~Res-off~~ Fri 5A

Thurs 5A Res. Off.

Friday 7A

Thurs 10A - Holden Heights

7C

1/2/2

met w/ Scott re transcripts, received 13
and does take from all the notes/docs

12/2 intro

12/3 doca # Rick Wilson AM 10/14 memo

12/4 discussion w/ Scott re proceeding w/ interview

" " Mark Terdes re poster of SM, Feb. 75 + 8 shifts needed -

Salem planned first to HC, will provide
M. Terdes to review [redacted] + relevant transcripts of 6/03, 3/03 reports
at HC for decisions / timing / sequence of events for questions at SM level

12/4 [redacted] believed [redacted] early August 2003

prior to [redacted] arrival
(she was still at Duke) did not know he was pushed aside for [redacted] then

[redacted] said he T.O.
needed to polished
going to INPO - didn't look
or Act like CWO -

Called because she is
- Antsy - wanted update -
only told aplan + moving in
direction we think necessary -
understand nothing further to offer -

asked about potential for
Civil suit action affecting WCC investigation
- advised [redacted] which reports re 50.7 [redacted] will be issued [redacted]
civil case [redacted] does not affect decision - leads
developed by OI - 50.7 will be separate

7C

11/24 Anniversary -

1/26 delivered ARB paper. 1. New plans w/ fence in → Envision
SM: proposed to be 1. completed all

11/26

27/28 Holiday

12/1 ARB

meeting concluded - day

received 3-hour meeting for 1st review for J. Kline

12/2 request to Rich V. & Scott H. [REDACTED]
Continue with [REDACTED]

12/2

[REDACTED] person

12/4 alleged Hc

76

10/31 [redacted] Wants to be re-interviewed -
not comfortable w/ admin rep. present

11/3 - [redacted] scheduled for re-interview

- prep. to alleged message on 10/31 -

- follow up w/ [redacted]

- 11/3 J/P w/ Al Ron Tape Enhancements

11/3 H/c w/ alleged

- questioned re ability to find [redacted] told he could not help other
asked about timing - advised priority assign. - had to be worked
in a certain way -> could not offer any EDC

- [redacted] tape transcript - advised not yet - called alleged
& said OI played tape for him. Said he thought about the
tape & ^{understand} agreed with him that for his level of protection to
have "dangerous" & not want to go forward & not right.

- She has had diminished contact w/ people as OI investigation progress

- [redacted] hotel uninvolved during while a Solen outage

Major assignment recently

Pm - Schedule [redacted]

11/4 NTW w/ [redacted]

Three [redacted] - no answer

11/5 Tapes out for trans.

[redacted] interview prep

Activities 11/6-7

11/12-13

11/14 See note

11/17 ARD Status - Scoping doc. to OI, Sbarbaro, DeVito

11/18 Loe Smt

11/19 Meet w/ Rick re info provided -
missing docs

11/20 R.R. on tapes Status

11/20 Jeff K. re missing docs

11/20-21 Tapes received - MA [redacted] 13 Nov

TC

10/7/03

Concerns raised at Salem in 2002 - ~~heard about~~
~~manipulating steam leak~~ - trying to look into the
concerns he was hearing about

Shift ⁱⁿ but Other Concerns w/ other shifts

9/24/02 Email from ~~to~~ Dr. KH -
issue affecting safe operation of Nuc. station

9/25/02 2nd email - 2nd thoughts - I don't think this
will be a fletive - ? statements re work environment
even if ~~met~~ ^{openly} gives a little in the area of safety to gain monetary
What meant - explained could have been upset - did not want
to leave - ^{as overall} did not pose ^{safety issues} threat to environment a people -
try to see how close they could come to that thought.

Met: picks low-hanging fruit - big issues that cost are how to get
corrected.

Explained this letter (1st one) looks like he's going to take
an active part. Going to jump in and help her:

After 4-5 hours - decides to be there if KH wants info -
not going to be active because he might get in trouble &
it probably isn't going anywhere.

Fear of raising concern - No. Has had an AS ~~stand~~
call him a name at a meeting. If people you work for don't like

[redacted] when asked
Based on raising a concern to CS- asked for it -
agrees it's a concern. Two months later claims he hadn't
heard about it. Then [redacted] presented him with notes &
challenged his bluff.

[redacted] tried to do things in the beginning. He's in
trouble - now just


Believes lost temper because not put him in middle &
said they were fixing when not. ^{1st} He baring the diesel -
using wrenches not designed for the task & they kick up.
~~Someone~~ Someone got hurt. Someone else took it to [redacted] who
reprimanded him for not telling him about it then later said
conflicting statement above - "hadn't heard" - Why [redacted] mad.

Does this affect people in raising future concerns? Some
people - not [redacted] May say why bring something up if
they're not going to do anything about it.

Indicated he could have better prepared for this interview.

[redacted] Not affected - will raise concerns.
Asked why he needed to "bow out" of KH issues 9/2? -
Will not put himself in immediate danger. Didn't know of
anyone who would.

Willingness to raise nuclear safety? ^{Example:} Yes. Offered diesel generator
24 hr. run - wrote tech specs. - then do major maintenance
When - ~~Comp~~ When questioned wgt. as a safety concern -
What does it prove? ^{reminds people how} Answer is that's
the way the industry is going now - got to



7/1/94

Comments re deregulation affecting O's - "lenient"

1st comes in tries to do things the money + time - gets shut down
now finds out what right wants + has to operate
between the lines

SW 17.5 Servicewater 405 P - valve leak - no way to measure flow
Calc. assumed flow leaving to header - no comparison of
two headers though -

(wanted to find a little re this)
Feet dabbled in preconditioning.
Showered this as safety issue but ignored - only big guys were
which 7.
For years.

Bellevue people at the plant operate safely -
incidents re pressure + direction production over safety

- steam leak involving [redacted]
- other incidents mentioned during interview -

BF 19^{asked} - how long does it take to figure out
a valve's stuck? They had "pledge hammers out
there - waiting on this thing." Mentality is
don't shut down - stall do whatever you can
to fix it w/o shutting down. Later called "dead

HP [redacted]

Production
over safety

Circ water - grating - "scary" re steam + high press. involved. Weight flow hammers. Slamming as hard as they can. Would not even want to be in area - who were going to do it were present

1994 talker
moving a "pat on the back" for doing great. Mgt. mentality pushed
thru... tho... if all said to shutdown due to cross - he'd be

creature writer
If Paper wrote article on grassing a BF19, for example,
believes it could be written up & he could lose his job over it

SAP is a piece of crap - too complicated. Could not follow
issue through all sub-screens.

Ever heard of issue disappearing from process once input.
Recalled [redacted] fixed 3-4yr old clearing out the system.
At that time - he was part of Maintenance.

1-2 yrs ago
Brought up diesel maintenance - 6 or 7h mentality,
each shift wants # of beans - Supv. looks good
for getting work done - sees problem w/ starting
complicated procedures - people's mind not on job at time -
Believes happens a lot -

Seen cause safety related problem? This diesel
incident was close. He's explained what happened.
Talked about not avoiding error traps, mgt. trying
to handle error traps. Sees as detrimental to
mcc. safety. Questioned spending money to fix - wait
until kept outage.

People used like machines over productivity issues.

Sees it as frustrating - can get hot headed. Believes a lot
done to safety is shown - were about money. Respects
[redacted] believes both have changed. Believes

1-7003045
Kathy Harwin didn't understand she was only there to placate
then - he thinks she thought mgt. was going to take action. Didn't
know KH was fired until just recently.

[redacted] not set. - 11/13

10/24/03

MARK FELDER

CHARGES BA. 1 BEN 894
HASSLER

7C

4/ [redacted] @ HC - same dept. Since

would ^{raise} concern re nuc. safety -

has written notification - not one of the "larger generators"
of notification.

never gives negative feedback for having done so

- 1st line not included in this -

Rad Pro. stresses frequently - if you have anything - take care of
good core group of workers / supervisors who know how to do things

never want to see a fatality on island - that's why it's open
& honest & ^{open to} anything you want to say
anywhere else - different!

wouldn't tolerate it as union stew. -

negative exp. w/ CAL or notifications - none personally

ECP - all aware, yes, dealt with? went well - ECP always ^{professional}

aware of notification for using ECP -
no

Any issues re nuclear safety not being addressed - none

pointed out Rad Pro as different "animal" from Operations -

industrial - Trend - emphasis on safety getting more emphatic every day - adequate
Nuc. mat. + local 944

10/24 10/22/03

1C

Salem
- Scott Brubaker, Charles Hassler, Dns Rep. Local 94

SCWE issues - aware of programs.

Nuclear Safety - How handled?
Would work up through boss up the chain -
could always go to NRC (knows of ECP & grievance process)

Raised concerns - yes written notification re plant config. problem,
or components insufficient

no re n.c. safety.

Resolution - satisfied personally - will chase it down himself
others - knows filed - believed addressed, maybe not always true
issues (goes back before 1997)

Can't think of any recent issues - notifications
- BFI9 incident - only issue could think of -

ECP - doesn't use, knows of it being used, [redacted] does good
through job / leaves confidentiality - others satisfied

Knowledge or concern re reluctance to bring up issues - some
people feared what they would be thought of - brought issue to
[redacted] - not frequently & not necessarily safety related - example
of what one was - tagging issues

Support what it should be re 12 week schedule?

[redacted] gathered of system engineers - now they're coming back -
everything works better now - seems like they changed every couple

re Raising issues - reticent - not disciplined & afraid
People may fear how they'll be received - attributes to their personality - afraid

Any situation where they expressed fear specifically
re raising issues? - no, because they would go through
EOP or grievance process, all aware of processes

Claimed these "guys" are not afraid to speak their mind

Re: Safety Issues

Conservative decision making - there are issues
behind there are issues with how far is conservative
Situation examples - production pressure w/ safety issue to resolve
nothing lately -
long time ago - went through "fiasco"
nothing since then - with [redacted] there is
a push for ~~strong~~ conservative decision making -
guy on reactor - other guy on rest of plant - now have
w/ 120k

Any other issues not being addressed? No - because [redacted] chases it down

Sometimes it will be a slow response -

w/ [redacted] it's a clear, concise different approach
to ret. - issues ^{w/ out} that [redacted] at all - same
for [redacted]

nothing to add

7C

10/23/03

W/MA

Hassler + Ferdes
requested transcript review

Raise issues? nuclear safety? asked what meant?
Issues that affect operating of reactor in adverse way?
No response.

Raised issues himself + hoped others to - Can't think
of anything recently - mentioned on Safety Tagging
Committee

more immediate it had to be dealt with now -
Sretenski's response good / sometimes not - can depend
on how the supervisor views it - may not be as big
as w/ working guy.

Overall - issues raised are addressed
Can't think of ~~any~~ w/ reactor safety or nuc. safety that were not addressed
Other issues usually get taken care of, but take a while - generally

example:
General feeling is management take too long - tagging issues
are seen as immediate concern - now prioritized by NRC.
Admin tagging error - SAP, no sign on, nomenclature wrong
Senior - tag not thing that should have been

charged
w/ 32 yrs.

would have a stand-down if there was a tagging issue

Described fear that something might happen due to
lack of knowledge w/ tagging system, complicated SAP

~~REDACTED~~

Retaliation for those w/ concerns? never seen, never heard
from those who raised a concern - knew wouldn't allow it to happen

Some people are afraid to raise concerns - has seen
more ineffectiveness re ECP not doing anything for them
- gave example re recent ECP handling

Indicated he's comfortable w/ handling situations based
upon length of employment there.

1st line supervisors - good w/ concerns

When it goes higher - if mgt or Superintendent feels it
a priority or not - that's where conflict comes in

Head of mgt against 1st line ^{re: addressing employees' concerns?} not aware

~~REDACTED~~ ^{employees} They are promoted to come forward - it's whether mgt
action meets the needs of person who comes forward - sometimes


Questions legitimacy of concerns
Ex. ^{EO had concern} indicating lights on equip. throughout station - not being repaired
wrote notification - told being addressed - not good
enough for EO - kept pushing - ~~REDACTED~~ had to intervene & question
if it was a big enough issue -

Time pressure - yes -

Never heard of skipping steps - blatantly ^{instructing someone to} would be "suicide"

Production over safety - not seen as culture - sees it starting to happen.

Since deems more emphasis on money. They move faster - as exhibited


dismisses charge Allen - control room staff - in deregulated environ
sees swing in emphasis on production. However, lines drawn
regarding reactor safety - but company draws fine line between
acceptable risk & what isn't - believes company ~~has~~ compares
itself to what other stations do in risk tolerance

— Pushing the line —

Example — ~~some~~ ^{more} guys adamant about need to shut down — (good staff turned over from)

Stack feed reg valve — believed it was ^{attributed to} ~~was~~ ^{inherent} ~~new~~ ^{stuck} ~~other~~

stuck packing — (unfortunately, valve was mechanical, stuck)




During this problem troubleshooting — believed it was
handled somewhat conservatively ^{by AOM} (at first would have been to shutdown
by percentage ^{of generator levels} ~~of power~~)

STA believed it would "free up" —

"Business decision" — engineering + technician thought one
other thing should be addressed — believed a controls issue
taken over at 25% — continued on

Very smooth shutdown — due to extra people on outage

elect this
something that
as to be brought
up

led to issue with co. wanting to move to 4 man crew from 5 —
extra help — org "pushing to streamline" — want to go 5 to 4 —
(min. tech. spec.) Mgt. says other stations do this — 99% of operators
don't agree with this.  gets abused constantly —  doesn't
want/union doesn't want this to happen  addressed this
through Safety Committee (non-governance) — currently being addressed
Comfortable with mindset of being a backup (since mid 1990's).
Seems like Co. is slipping away from their restart training.
Attributes to "unless guy they have to pay" — OT issue.

— Re. example of Feb 2003 unit trip 1 March 1st. & same as
^{both units}

, nothing further - same origin equipment issues

never had a problem w/ right in terms of safety of op. the reason -
nothing blatant or indirect -

VOICE MAILS

10/30

~~_____~~ - wrong message
left - wrong ~~_____~~ } TC

KH 10A Monday - 11/17

~~8:30 11/15~~

~~_____~~

11/14

Kym Harris to confirm 10A

Monday 11/17 at Gregg, Ctr

Wanted ~~_____~~ trans. -

Wanted 2 from 045 intrus

Wanted EC transcript related ~~_____~~

11/14 - ^{postponed} ~~_____~~ meeting due
to ARB ~~_____~~, tape return,

TC

10/15

re photos & summary

9/29/03 12:55 A K. Haron

left message re copying files -

wanted to postpone 9A meeting due to late work

Asking for help to meet w/ Huck Miller - urgent to avoid "black
law suit going public" this week. to NCC.
after she provides the details - she will have copied everything

10/3/03 - re tapes -

cannot reach them in 5-6 days

wanted to wait & not feel ch-

offered message service

10/7/03 ~~Jeff Keenan~~ offered review in East area

Root cause reports available re plant locs

10/7/03 ~~Keenan~~ re review started w/ East Tele
and dated mail to late March 03 -
wait to when available

10/8/03 ~~[redacted]~~ - Coord tapes

10/8 ~~[redacted]~~

10/9 ~~Jeff Keenan~~ (856-339-5439) AL
offered Mr. S investigation ~~[redacted]~~ AL
to answer questions re 10/14 meeting.

10/12 ~~[redacted]~~ re open/closed




1038

Rem 9/9 trans.


1 Call

Salem

added
9/24



From Emails



TC

[REDACTED] - WANTS TO TALK ABOUT
BF19 INCIDENT & CONSERVATIVE D.C. MAKING
1st TALKED w/ NEW ORS MGR.

[REDACTED] CAME TO VITO LAST YEAR

① Shift

DAYS
FRI - SAT - SUN

70

1/14/03

w/ Jeff Keenan

[Redacted]

Billup - done 3x

Call in w/ Supr. ID Code - Anonymous
need at least 10 in group

[Redacted]

has no data from surveys --
prior to 2000

1-5 patz -

[Redacted]

16
Fisher's list - cont. pencil yr.
too many 7's - perpetuated it

2003 Complete in March

2001 possibly end year

2000 possibly toward end yr

Skipped 2002 due to finances - period may only have
been 1 1/2 yrs between

Skip from 2001 - 2003 plan to pull into

[Redacted]

decision to change to make
it relate to nuclear as opposed to manufacturing

[Redacted]
Systems Solutions

paper survey to mail in or turn in -

Harry Keiser - CNO former left late 3/03 - on paper in line
Capacity, [Redacted] initiated 2000 - not sure why

ff. 9/29/03 July - Aug reorganization - fueled with top down
approach

1452 - total org. in site

757 - under [Redacted]

7K

Ca. as the VP to next man to see where is the situation.

Notes Change - #s come from -

results come in just before prog - did better in survey
but going in different direction -

1850 2001 - 2003

now 1750

any other plans requested were done at the supervision
level if they had enough people to rate (10) in their group.

nothing indicated that anyone deliberately messed up
the survey - too many used the wrong mgr. for example

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ 7C

Early 95 - started with
T/False
Yes/No

7C

21 statements for approx. 3 yrs. changed to quarterly HQ 2000
Part of Mgr. Forum in ECP - helped develop survey statements

Under ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ changed to quarterly, going to 25% of
MAST, represented 1 Contractor (only Wackerhut) practically # difference
does a list 1, 2, 3, 4 + goes out to 450 approx each time

through 2 yrs → strongly disagree

(2)

1-5 Culture / environment

6-10 ECA

11-15 Management team

16-21 CAP

Can track comments - if I'd more specifically
will act on that directly if sees a problem w/ a supervisor

Results go to Nuclear Outlook on website - results plus rolling
average of survey

Excel spreadsheet

3% down red number

3% up blue number

no significant black number

35% return

4HR. - long period

"Taking Action" - Employment Innovation Co.

SCWE, handling concerns -

Started "Managing Nuclear Safety" Nov/Dec 1995 tied to MARK trig.

"Taking Action" 1998 →

for supervisors & above
until 2003

then to Leadership Academy - fewer
opportunities

due to downturn in sales. H052

(4)

still given to supervisors - will include some

Has new initiative to reach people across the band
giving out Monkeys (tied to a study) - picked people to deliver
unions - most - Ops mgr - people who do good job and not
reluctant to speak

Under [redacted] - has task of SCWE -
Came up with program -

Under pers. ^{now} [redacted] - as Supr. - not from nuclear, comes from [redacted]
[redacted] called because [redacted] asked to meet
him right away

Q. survey - go out during quarter end to late

4Q'02 - Cover letter sent out 12/4/02 -
2 weeks to complete


some roll over if come in too late - addresses
issue if need to

Questions pretty much the same since 1999 -

Assessment of SCWE from 5 questions - 50% overall "Culture is
such that I can
raise concerns
4Q'02 recognized work to do
1 from each of the other
4 categories

(5)

(2) PowerPoints for NRB 1Q'03
2Q'03



PERS review
Discussed SCWE - 4Q'02 downturn

Comments go into database - coded against what he
can piece the comment goes forward - gets scrubbed
for id - so they

Survey does - Added as he goes
not any complete package on hand
may have some in added file

Nothing in actual survey that is not included
in his survey comments - all positive and negative


Management ^{Team} gets results -

prior to TL comment survey / color coded - not sure
how comments gathered prior to his change - no checking
on how many quarters available prior to that -

7C

10/15/03 w/ G Keenan ~~II~~
HOLE POMEKANT 2

Newark Corp. Counsel



- Madley

prep. to respond to Civil Suit

7C

10/7/03
3:24P

ECP files offered if issues
are same - re met to late March
review

~~expended to pay~~

- does quarterly survey

- environment

group - ECP

- management team

- CAP program

shared w/ WRC during 1st q. 03 - slightly better
Painted out 4q 02 - downward turn
2nd + 3rd q - continued improvement

Looks at trends - + or - 3% ^{changes} per attention

Lead in ECP Forum
in gathering -

Re 1-2003-045 AL

Letter to [redacted] given to take
outside law firm. Brought in
- interview of Winston Stuen - 20th
- coordinated through Jeff Keenan
- ECP assisted in gathering data

response letter w/ [redacted] name - due
to her concern - brief summation
of two areas - SCWE

10/7/03 tel conv. ^{10/7 2nd} ^{case from Jeff Keenan} ^{per 1/4 of 01/03/03}
[redacted] ^{discrimination} ^{allegations at high level}
[redacted] ^{allegations at high level} ^{10/7}

emphat potential so brought
Winston & Stuen in -
pointed out that K. Harwin only provided

Letter to [redacted] to ECR - did
not cooperate further w/ investigation
[redacted] has additional
info to add - not requesting
counsel
[redacted] would like Counsel
present at any further intro

10/8/03 requested personnel file for KH,
Lake survey will
copy
for


10/9/03 messg from Jeff Keen ^{JK} indicating
he would have Winston + Strawn
investigators available for 10/14 meetg.
if En requested. - Advised G.K. [redacted]
would like to review report

JK

Wed. / Hunt (Scott) start 3 latest
KOP Pg 4 - Took to KOP 4

transcript reviews re-027

discussed PI & R reviews as considered under 051F
re corrective action program

 no interview per Scott

1/7/04



PI & R, 2000-2003

Tolson would address
corrective actions
in SAP issues

(Bartlett Scott) re next
scheduled -

to H2/C. Lic. Res, 2 Engineer
ET/Dec. ps 1.

7c

12/01/03

called 1.2 7/03 MCKIN

was 4-2 1-12 present

SWITZERLAND

Told

[REDACTED]

lot

[REDACTED]

later

all 5000s
next morning

told [REDACTED]

after week away

at [REDACTED] 7C

no others recalled

7C

12/24/03 Salem / Hope Creek 12/24/03

2 1/2 yrs

11/5/03 - 23

things getting better left
manual valve w/yr

Mini neg - early 2002

Work packages closed out
wp work done

- safety

- + xon safety

Per Court

Relief valves - various

- Supervisor showing work

Closed Per order of Supt. - not

documented that Supt. told
to close out (more than once)

forced to close paperwork

document into work order

- relief valve,

Test prior to installation

- Manual System unavailability

- Test removed test valve

if Failed - extended condition

Automatic System

Part of problem is due to

remove - replace & test -

1-К заар

get bachlor done - KEWAN
close work nellers

Rehmanial—

5. - [REDACTED] - 1st
5. - [REDACTED] - Main Chief
(with word protection - grant trust)


A.C.


~~fold not patent~~
don't write notification -
not really broken -

ex. service water
gas + valves

He


HC
 1st Lt. made aware of
 "She went up to him w/ aymal problem
 After recog. - mgs. told Supt's
 Supts to 1st line
 per backlog,
 with orders - cleared out
 8 mos to 1 yr. - Sept 03

 76
oel relief valve testing


 will provide straight
info re delays in valve
testing - diligently - takes
ownership - wants to do it right
- gone to new schedule
+ tells him of things not being
addressed

to go to 9/03 reorg.

Brown pecin pump - significant
issues

Believes not seen as team player
because he wanted to fix
repairs to next refuel outage
if pump + seal fails do you
see lock - response was they
designed to handle - plant designed
to handle -  6x

Wanted spare rotating element -
wanted it rebalanced - brought in
pecin seal - ^{wanted} vendors to support
wanted it for upcoming refuel

 asked for everything
had - got
no response

forced outage - drywell leakage
attributed to Boro pump seal

Leak - upon initial start
chilled water line found leaking -
immediately - [REDACTED] 7C

[REDACTED] put out that the outage
was due -

- Pump Seal removed -

Mechanical face chewed up -
primary containment water allowed in
under seal - stuffing -
auxiliary ^{rippler} $\frac{1}{8}$ " clearance degraded
between - stuff. box - bearing

look at upper & lower bearings to
of motor

had to have excessive wear -
- knows no repair & no plans
plan to validate current
condition -

- in house mechanics upset
because it's not a complete
fix - ^{potential} catastrophic failure
due to seal leakage

- [REDACTED]
How severe Rep. - [REDACTED]

agreed they needed
to go internal

out of alignment because of
seal - impeller & box below

- Chilling effect is result
of these 2 issues w/
management's handling -


critical piece of equipment

2 1/2 yrs. = 0 human perf. issues

0 safety issues

had respect of craft & ^{superior} ~~work~~

Knows of




when they claimed
they did not shut down
knowing ^{present} ~~work~~


Example -

people don't believe

No forced a trust in right
team -

mgmt. + director levels -
individual freedom



from 
protected her upfront - would
not later admit -

- Still agreed to id. taggins
issues, known performance issues
- don't fix issue

"fascist
decision"

for the record Paul - anyone wants
to question

76

[REDACTED]

KF06 or 07 - Lorejoy Eng.
brought in - \$ millions contract -
Lorejoy considered it a big fix -
mechanical coupling - moved
rebrake in prox. pipe, shortly
(4-5 mo.) pump spread out

[REDACTED]

Understands [REDACTED] some people
like to work for - Salen loved it

[REDACTED] ✓ Valve team super.

[REDACTED]

- have not talked w/ lawyer
Believe would have successful suit
Believes would take away from what
NRC doing - by motivation
Knows in his heart

per D. V. 7
Consider as allegor
pe technical issue -

nuclear power has come
too far + has a bright
future.

12/23

check Jff re




" trans. Neo/Neo -

p. 17

p. 39 frustrated
w/ equipment not being
fixed -

Softy related
& primary plant gets
fixed - secondary - tertiary

p. 8 - 17
p. 11





12/16

✓ doz. slant - 11/6 - 11/13 at home, 9/9
✓ check M. Muller

✓ check J. Jester

pe:



2nd call 4:30P
1/26

did not happen during
his time there - he would not
falsify work packages - during
period 9/03

[redacted] wrote notification
re "troubleshooting plan" -
not a specific notification
- [redacted]

after spring 2003 refuel outage
'nobody wanted to hear
about going internal w/ pump

TOOK IT APART + PUT IT BACK TOGETHER:

- ① [redacted] 7C
- ② [redacted]
- ③ [redacted]

precise final conditions
who told, who saw + who knows
= what's being done
ask if Supt. level. - ✓

- need to believe in NRC

~C

1st 3 interviews -

prefers not to have his name
associated - going to job offers