

## RAW INFORMATION FROM SALEM INTERVIEWS

### Negative

[redacted] none apart from one incident;

[redacted] a lot more issues with the plant are brought up now because they suffer from maintenance and the prioritization by work management-believes maybe the money is not being spent where it should be to see improved performance indicators, outage times, etc. - if it were up to him, he would only accept the plant at 100% in every issue, Salem Unit 2 spring 2003 grassing recalled issues but he was on shift and he was not pressured-even though he was a [redacted] for only several weeks when [redacted] pushed for minimum number [redacted] thought they could have waited a little bit longer to get the circulators back, then re-evaluated because they had a tide change and thought the screens could handle it-thought they could continue w/power ascension, felt some pressure from above to start the plant (only named [redacted], never directed to do so by [redacted] some equipment operators feel treated wrongly for bringing up industrial safety issues, in spite of safety operator designation and the fact that the issues raised are resolved "all the time", believes union/management issues get emotional and create a lack of communication and animosity-some union members that send the feeling that management disagrees with their issues purely for production purposes-(not true), SMs feel just as frustrated at times, especially w/ the amount of repeat work-sees part of problem with maintenance in that they do not have operational experience in supervision-schedule compliance not good, planning is questionable, mentioned parts availability problem;

[redacted] under [redacted] the discovery phase was taking too long-wanted to wait longer on operability calls-SMs had a meeting under [redacted] and pushed back [redacted] took the position that he wanted more people to weigh in before the call was made, SMs wanted to look at what they had at hand and make the call conservatively and follow the tech spec (meaning shutdown), example of [redacted] coming into CR to push [redacted] into start up without proper surveillance of reactor head vents indicators, pressure to stay within the rules but work through and around issues like reactor head vent indicators, the number of telephone calls to the CR by [redacted] in which SMs "defended" their position-taking a conservative approach - led to discomfort in operating the plant for SMs, example given of [redacted] and circulators (2003) position that procedure says you can move forward-do so in spite of [redacted] comfort level-"have to manage a certain amount of risk", would try to avoid talking w/ [redacted] across the board w/ [redacted] just a "messenger" for the [redacted] believes [redacted] left because he was micromanaged by [redacted] and [redacted] had similar problem, believes K. Harvin had a negative affect on [redacted] dealing with SMs-improved after [redacted] over, explained that there are some personalities on the crew that observed the [redacted] handling of 22 MS42 leak that don't like [redacted] and made this incident into the uproar it became because it was [redacted] actions, management process for repairing equipment is not effective and leads to use of temporary logs for excessive periods-this leads to operator mistakes (ex. Re rad monitors 12/03 time frame)-need to dedicate the resources; saw BF-19 incident delay caused by failure to get "right people" in the room and finally coming up with solutions-eventually they found they had something stuck in the internals of the valve,

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but the process of ruling everything else out and getting the info from the "smart people" takes time", described the SMs as in the position to "buffer" the CRSs and operators from sr management in the "push" they would exhibit by calling into the CR "not uncommonly" to move a start up along (re [redacted] offered [redacted] example of this as salting in switchyard in September 2003. [redacted] described himself as feeling "uncomfortable" because he needed to shut down both units based upon what he viewed in the switchyard-arching, presented facts to [redacted] including the [redacted] from the [redacted] plant who had "word for word" experienced the same problem 10 years earlier. [redacted] in "disbelief" that's what was occurring, had to convince [redacted] that plant needed to be shut down-had to walk [redacted] to switchyard to show him (explained should have been a no brainer to shut down when arching viewed) and still wasn't convinced until 500 KV breaker opened the [redacted] said, that's it I'm shutting down-the financial influences of who's going to make up for the lost generation, pay for switchyard repairs and who is accountable for this should not enter the control room decision making. [redacted] did not come from proper perspective and it added "at least an hour" until [redacted] decision to shut down, offered as example of what he would experience with [redacted] in past-resistance to shut down/offered that his confidence level currently is higher, that he won't be in the same position again-believes won't have that problem with [redacted] environment; under [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] was such that you didn't want to work in it because of the constant coaching and ridicule-not conducive to making best effort, just doing what you had to to avoid coaching-nobody wanted to work for [redacted] or [redacted] and now improved as far as dealing with management-SMs had to fight [redacted] to not become "site managers" because of the issues that Salem would have regularly-needed to be in CR to be backup for CRS due to emerging issues-described as happening more than in other plants-became obvious that [redacted] did not understand what was going on in control-this affected their rapport;

[redacted] union/management relationship deteriorating and worsened in last 6-8 months specifically between EOs and mgt (cited firing [redacted] as "incendiary device"), cited animosity over perception by some in management that safety is being used as a weapon by operators-sees the "real organizational risk" as a supervisor may make a decision with that factored in-saying you're just beating me over the head w/safety and the supv. makes the wrong choice-has not seen it happen, believes there's potential to happen and keeps on top of his supv to prevent it-union/mgt relationship needs improvement to be good SCWE and "has a ways to go yet," his major concern is that a CRS or Supt will mishandle a concern of the union's in view of the union/mgt relationship being so poor- offered examples of union using safety erroneously (over 3 yrs ago, hydrazine laden water 1" issue, left bad taste for him as [redacted], operators returned to shift from training-did not like-started raising confined space issues-summer 2003; re conservative decision making-spring 2003, wanted 4 circulators to bring the plant forward without the fear of having to back down. [redacted] pushed for minimum of 3 [redacted] "on the fence" and could go either way from the start-wanted defense in depth in spite of [redacted] persuasive argument that they were still in conservative space with the # (3) they had-did not like operating philosophy of [redacted] that sets the unit at a place that did not allow defense in depth. [redacted] conveyed idea, if not stated, that they were "holding plant hostage"-means Ops being unreasonable, pointed out that [redacted] comfort zone was wider than his own with using 3

right from start, but believes he was persuaded by [REDACTED], another example late 2001 of his disagreement in conservative decision re SJ injection valve w/significant leakage and needed to test to determine which one-he and [REDACTED] agreed and went to meeting to discuss- [REDACTED] made decision not going to test for leakage, they would "engineer it away" (issue paneled at Region I ARB), when decision made to go [REDACTED] way [REDACTED] made conscious decision not to "defy" [REDACTED] in public setting-just went along and met w/ [REDACTED] after to discuss. [REDACTED] Offered engineering issue [REDACTED] believes [REDACTED] a rep. of his bosses, believes [REDACTED] just as taken aback by reversal of [REDACTED] as he was and he thinks he may have said to [REDACTED] "whose license is on the line here, who should make this decision?"; knows [REDACTED] steam leak situation raised as non-conservative decision making by [REDACTED] felt he could safely get to the valve-no indication that sr. mgt had part in [REDACTED] decision to isolate the leak [REDACTED] summarized as did not think anybody was telling [REDACTED] to get up there and close leak, in spite of his differences w/mgt he would not believe that happened-had not seen that kind of behavior; spring 2002 started up with no vacuum, worked fine, compared this with doing upfront mid-loops at beginning of outages, also never done 3-4 years ago, now industry does these things, suggested "maybe that's the insidious creep of non-conservatism"; stuck BF 19 [REDACTED] on shift and no production over safety element for him, it was delayed troubleshooting and the process to look at more and analyze more, thought 2-3 hours less would have been better, no examples of sr mgt going to more conservative direction-seems "I usually fight harder in the other direction"; K Harvin seen as threat by mgrs, did not want to say wrong thing around her or would lose position, coaching in terms of leadership or "think like us" or we'll replace you, heard [REDACTED] reads people the "riot act" for writing notifications-1 source only rumors.

[REDACTED] ineffectiveness of CAP (ineffective maintenance) in resolving long term issues led to perception that plant not operated safely, they lose continuity and focus when management changes occur-(frequently); late 2001 water gushing off nuclear header (primary heat sync for plant) opposed the message being sent of "safety over production" (this was first issue recalled and big issue for [REDACTED], recurring grassing problems questions plant's ability to operate, [REDACTED] criticized him for operability call leading to 72 LCO, wanted more people on board before decision made, [REDACTED] argued not the way it works per licensed operators-led to meeting coupled with other issues not recalled-to discuss proving something inop as opposed to op., (spring 2002), reductions in margin of safety comes from above him-could not judge new sr mgt at time of OI interview-recall SJ valve had negative pressure on those involved but no involvement personally, MS42 leak became big issue because it involved [REDACTED] (see [REDACTED] notes), "hell of a lot of surveys" w/no results;

[REDACTED] leaking SJ check valve, thought they had a safety issue and [REDACTED] got info from Engineering that indicated not and nothing needed to be done, some people took this as a signal and would be reluctant to talk w/ [REDACTED] because they did not feel he would support them; offered another example of non-conservative w/ [REDACTED] Dilution in RCS to get to point where they could start up-had to argue w/ [REDACTED] to not add water and "see what happens," became part of a notification written by outage management that sent the message that conservative decision making cost them productivity-was supposed to be a lessons learned-we could improve on these

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issues, but came across as production over conservative decision making for the operation of the station, named other SMs who got same message as he did, thought happened in late 2001, notification written close to it (October 2001 per doc.), discussed this notification with [REDACTED] w/ result that [REDACTED] said it was a "lessons learned" intent, he and [REDACTED] disagreed because [REDACTED] saw it as sometimes you can go too far with conservative, had a meeting to confront this w/ [REDACTED] about the push to have [REDACTED] coming to CR to make decisions that were not his to make; offered another example of that as [REDACTED] suggesting NA the reactor vent valve strobe time and questioning (inappropriately) why needed-purpose of meeting was to get back to working relationship where shift managers ran the shift without intervention and do the "right thing" and attempt to have SMs wait on operability calls, [REDACTED] fought that personally and encourage SMs to do what they had to-management responded to this meeting by calling them "victims" and did not want to hear their complaints and whining (not stated at meeting, came back down from Ops Manager)-SMs and [REDACTED] continued to operate as they had, no further discussion was offered by sr. mgt. Even though they indicated they would have follow up, packing the gland seals in spring 2002 to create vacuum-did not have a problem with testing the secondary side, but did not want to heat up the plant and do low power physics testing-everybody drew the line there-got the sense that it came from [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] but did not deal with them, [REDACTED] discussed as his own direction, overall believes the pressure he felt was excessive-as he compared it to prior experience at [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] sees a failure to properly document concerns as part of problem, [REDACTED] sanity would cause SMs to question whether they would engage in a conversation with him, questioned [REDACTED] direction for on the spot change re strobe time testing for reactor head vents-had

to get him to accept they could not go around the procedure-would have saved, SJ 150 valve testing and [redacted] push not to do the testing-worked w/engineering, may have pushed engineering to point where they finished paperwork to support not completing the testing, fall 2001 coming out of 1R14 held up power ascension due to reported leak on 14 fan coolant unit-a containment integrity issue. [redacted] came into CR to ask [redacted] "Who's holding up the power ascension?", had no doubts that [redacted] came specifically because the startup had been stopped-unusual for [redacted] in timing and different from other behavior, spring 2003 startup of Salem Unit 2, had agreed due to conditions of the river and equipment to have five circs. For margin of safety-defense in depth, schedule pressure came into play and the plant was ready but only 4 circs available. [redacted] pushed to start and called it a "management decision" pointed out Unit 1 up with 4 and 50-55%. [redacted] left conversation when it became obvious to him that [redacted] had one position and he had another and it would not change, had gotten personal and his "manhood was challenged" by [redacted] saw situation as inappropriate by [redacted] and discussion that took place in front of SM, could have had it with [redacted] but the pressure from [redacted] may have been felt by the SM (in response to questions about New SM on duty and [redacted] left the discussion), had meeting w/SMs re challenges by [redacted] to certain decisions (some discussed) -also re length of time to make operability calls-recalled discussion about having to prove something inop as opposed to op., but did not change the way he did business, had most challenges and did most defending of his position when it was a combination of [redacted] and [redacted] was [redacted] though he thinks that's their job to challenge and question it did become that he defended his position under this team-could not think of any time when pressure was undue, mostly had a problem when the shift or shift manager was present while challenging and questioning went on-otherwise took it as their job to do so-believes he felt on the defensive more than discussed-just could not recall the incidents; his confidence level w/[redacted] was not high based upon the number of incidents he experienced where [redacted] would push for something that could not be done-not so much for [redacted] because had more limited interaction with him and [redacted] was more a personality issue-liked to physically make himself known as a presence in room. [redacted] disappointed him by delivering message in late 1999 that "you don't get it", operators do not have authority to raise power, [redacted] did; sent message that SMs making wrong decisions and don't have the right to make power up decisions-questioned himself for taking the job then, after that meeting and (lightning strike event) the SM had less authority-TARP came into existence and they evaluated events and actions taken by crew then recommended corrective actions and advised sr mgt on where they were and whether they were to go up in power, had heard hearsay re arcing and sparking and SM had to prove to sr mgt [redacted], had also heard that [redacted] hesitant based upon who would pay for the incident, sees affect of former sr mgt that Ops management would be slower to do what they think is the right thing because of fear of backlash on decision-w/new team that's not there because there's no history to say you would be questioned "on half of what you do."

[redacted] don't address some equipment problems timely and industrial safety issues not timely handled-agreed w/letter of Jan 04( NRC), offered one instance as part of basis for part of letter re disagreements between operators and sr mgt was the circulator issue in spring 2003-believes the problem was that the phone call should not have been conducted with all those people present-he should have discussed it himself with [redacted] and [redacted] then presented it to shift-

why? Undermines chain of command/leadership if go around them, changed his mind because he looked at it from [redacted] point of view- of not a safety consideration, an economic and reliability decision [redacted] argued economic impact decision, BF 19 should have put the info together sooner to come to conclusion valve physically stuck-operator raised that concern.

### Positive

[redacted]: sees no weaknesses in the safety culture, no concern over operations he has been asked to perform, no unusual pressure recently, people can and do raise nuclear safety concerns and do so w/o fear of retaliation-includes self, some reluctance on the part of some due to an introverted personality issue, no personal experience in having operability decisions questioned by sr. mgt (however, offered only one instance as possibly feeding into rift OI heard about between SM and sr mgt that in early 2003 related that in regard to grassing and circulators on Unit 2, sr management [redacted] had initially given one direction and after things did not improve re grassing, they changed their philosophy [redacted] wanted 5 in accordance w/original criteria and [redacted] said 4 OK), believes culture is far more conservative now than 6 or 7 years ago and believes that's the case across the industry.

[redacted]: no issues with people raising issues or ability to do so, offered an incident involving [redacted] yelling at operators (re isolating condensity) for being unsafe [redacted] shut down the job-never saw a "just do it anyway" attitude (re industrial safety issues).

[redacted]: people always able to raise concerns without repercussions, sees a change in senior mgt from [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] to current as positive in that people believe their concerns are more listened to and properly dealt with-there's more emphasis and a more engaged safety committee, never saw a hesitation to bring a nuclear concern up-both operators and peer level, under new management believes nuclear safety concerns will be discussed without [redacted] or [redacted] trying to talk him out of it or minimize the concern; offered that the environment now is that sr mgt asks what's the conservative and right thing to do to give operators a comfort level (example given of # of circulators for startup spring 2002 or 2003) without the chance of down powers, perturbations or abnormal procedures. Added that was displayed between [redacted] and [redacted] when they declined to start up/heat up using MS-10s (coming out of 2R13 in November 2003).

[redacted]: feels more comfortable now raising concerns-less comfortable w/ [redacted] heated arguments, confrontations, union doesn't hesitate to raise concerns to him, no knowledge of retaliation for raising concerns-pointed out that [redacted] believes this is so, but respectfully disagrees with that.

[redacted]: will raise concerns, no reluctance, no retal (for self believes the way he raises concerns has affected his pay raise/eval) [redacted] supported taking plant off line on 2 occasions and described as typical behavior for [redacted] involved circulators available in spring 2002 and MS42 steam leak).

[redacted] people did raise concerns and did not believe anyone felt like they could not, sees belief that things will change under [redacted] and SM will be decision maker, sees the belief from not only Ops, but workforce in general, union and maintenance mentioned. Does not echo [redacted] on water gushing off nuclear header from underground-sent message opposed to safety first, [redacted] said if pushed his comfort level but OK with it and sees it a lesson learned, but could see where it would send poor message to below him.

[redacted] people [redacted] and he would do what he thought right (negative) but believes employees were careful with how they raised the concerns-lot of anonymous in CAP, some people did not want their name associated with a concern, saw as unusual based upon industry experience. 7D

[redacted] had never heard anyone claim they did not want their name associated with a concern, mentioned positive change in environment exhibited in March 2004 example of units sharing decision on load reduction-did right thing, sees union/management bond improving based upon [redacted] return, never got the sense that [redacted] was putting pressure on anybody on site.

[redacted] sees changes in management realignment, focus on fixing equipment-long standing equip issues, new personality in [redacted] than [redacted] now empowered to make decisions to bring plant back up, plant managers and dedicated maintenance engineering-before lost ownership because not site specific engineers, had no sense that Newark management involved in plant operating decisions. Offered two circulator examples (after the fact re decisions) that he and [redacted] supported/questioned safety issue, 1 [redacted] questioned raising power w/o six circs (in same time frame that he pushed for starting up w/4) and another when [redacted] tripped the unit-he was congratulated [redacted] explored decisions from both sides-only incident that came to mind re disagreements (discuss in section w/incidents that caused disagreements-along with [redacted] examples above).

[redacted] perceived restart pressure resulted in push to fix a valve by flashlight rather than waiting to fix lights (resolved w/temp lighting).

[redacted] perception that co. takes easiest/cheapest way out examples given: chronic problems with boron leakage and charging pump cooler cleaning during grassing season, perception of surveys is management does them to get numbers to justify whatever they want, no corrections come from the surveys.

[redacted]: identified industrial safety concerns of scaffolding by flashlight, failure of SS-661 valve, no one from management or union wants to be the one to say they held a job up.

[redacted]: ECP ineffective, perception that it takes too long to fix some things that union believes should be done immediately, expressed concerns of self and others that tagging is complicated and not well enough known to the people hanging them, surveys are not useful 7C

because they get too many to pay attention to, results not well published, regularly hear about missing parts because the warehouse sold them, known as a "general joke" that a needed part was in the warehouse as surplus to be sold at a sale.

[REDACTED] some people just do not have the personality to raise an issue no matter where they work.

[REDACTED] believes the environment intentionally cumbersome to discourage-or has effect of discouraging-complaints, surveys can be interpreted any way and did not believe management listened to what was said, industrial safety issues overlooked to get the job done, first line supervisors push production over safety because their pay structure rewards that-could not attach any nuclear safety issues to this though, industrial safety; corrective actions are less than adequate and that's because they do not conduct post job briefs for the lessons learned (1 in 100 would be a lot); company and union battle too much where they should not have to, hopes [REDACTED] will help this, expects so.

[REDACTED] industrial safety issues (equipment and personnel safety related) need some work re backlog of notifications in CAP, perception that EDG at HC was [REDACTED] concerned w/tech specs, not OSHA requirements-caused a problem for operators by term insubordinate, ECP thorough, but did not roll out findings clearly.

[REDACTED] does not see production over safety yet, but does not like the trend that he sees as sitting and waiting before making a call-believes the push to not be the person to bring a unit down could affect decisions-offered BF 19 controls vs. mechanically stuck issue and it took too long to call it mechanically stuck.

[REDACTED] perception that declaring the BF19 valve mechanically stuck avoided because it would have led to a 1-hour shutdown (production push-error), sees production push in issues like BF19, and the handling of two issues developed under hurricane startup in Sept 03-, re main steam isolation valves and steam dump valves-seen as examples of pushing the envelope of conservative decision making to keep units on line, id'd three incidents involving [REDACTED] that sent a message to operators indicating no regard for personal safety and believes it sent message that's ok to take short cuts because it happened w/ another supervisor, different situation.

[REDACTED] stuck BF19 troubleshooting allowed them to generate more megawatts, then continued w/shutdown, cites problem with work week scheduling and bumping of one issue as another one becomes immediate or next priority-effect is to just keep postponing an issue-example given CR indicators-keep sliding and don't get addressed, seemed resources and or time not applied, this works the same way w/CAP, notification system cumbersome to use, sees difference in CR staff in deregulated environment in a swing in emphasis on production, maintain fine line between what is acceptable risk and what is not, concerned re push to move to four man crews (from five) and potential effect on safe Ops.



[redacted] concern is that people are not heard when they raise concerns-most NEOs feel they are "white noise" and some people (but not pervasive through group) don't want their names tied to a concern so the union stewards raise it for them, CRSs are caught between battle of union and management and are aggravated by both parties, it's become "tit for tat on piddly stuff," work management process is "horrendous" and the workers have been telling management that since 2000 with nothing done about it-in part does not work because they don't have the parts to complete the work with-leads to criticism of workers for "low wrench time" and gets everybody pissed off causing bad attitudes, can't seem to get a handle on the SAP work clearance modules for tags and work clearance documents, why aren't we fixing more stuff in the primary plant?-raises issue that it seems that only goal is to say we had a 28 day outage as opposed to 38 or 42 and really get things fixed; saw [redacted] act at MS42 valve as production over safety, unsafe and exhibiting megawatt mentality; Salem 2 bolting issue (summer 2001 or 02) deferred repair because they did not want to extend the refuel outage, grassing issues did the right thing but [redacted] looked uncomfortable having to take unit off line-however, did receive "attaboy" from [redacted] to [redacted] and crew for having done so.

[redacted] SAP difficult to research previous deficiencies, broken equipment tends to go on forever-cited long term plant deficiencies as primary issue, believes "new guys" would not raise a concern of a nuclear safety nature for fear of losing job; gave five examples of schedule pressure, production over safety issues including a stuck feed reg valve where the unit should have tripped, criticized the OSs for starting surveillances just before the end of the shift to get credit, grading by "beans"-led to stress on individuals working the surveillance and those taking over from oncoming shift.

[redacted] saw as starting in late 2001 a major problem with culture that allows equipment that needs repair to languish-don't want to spend the money, raised same issue as [redacted] re turbine header testing not handled properly and equipment released; people may not report smaller issues out of the belief that nothing would be done (like small oil leaks), 14 BF 19 issue as example of non conservative approach to operation, MS 42 and [redacted] issue seen as sr mgt preaching conservatism not taken to heart, indicative of non conservative and megawatt mentality, very weak in carrying out corrective actions;

[redacted] operators will say why should I bring that up if they're not going to do anything about it? People will raise concerns if issue is major, examples of production over safety: [redacted] mS42, BF19 valve-mentality was to stall and not shut down, ms28S Bypass Valve on main steam line stuck, so struck w/hammers to grassing issues-guys who keep it running on one circulator get pats on the back, management picks "low hanging fruit" to fix, things that don't cost a lot of money-overall they don't pose a safety threat to people or environment, but we try to see how close we can come to that-meant accepting risks, believes [redacted] and [redacted] have been beaten down -not the same as when they started their positions, after trying to do the right things (taking time and money) and they have changed, no cooperation from [redacted] level up with union which leads to morale problem, SAP is "piece of crap" because concerns cannot be located/researched and screens are difficult to work with; he believes the practice of starting

surveillances at the close of shift are error traps to avoid but the push is to get "the bean" to make the shift look better, example of diesel maintenance -starting complicated procedures at shift change can be detriment to nuc safety.

Others: no specific retaliation known.

[REDACTED] believes "labeled" for trying to do the right thing, seen as a problem, believes [REDACTED] received poor rating for voicing concerns.

[REDACTED]: believes [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] harassed for their positions-do it by the book believes two outspoken [REDACTED] are adversely treated because they raise issues-has not stopped them from raising concerns.

[REDACTED] believes made an example of re comments repeated to him by Harvin re [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] perception that [REDACTED] pulled off shift for a couple of weeks and "reprogrammed" for backing his people up-got him in trouble, sees [REDACTED] as come down on hard for raising concerns.

[REDACTED] seen as a hindrance, knows the procedures and holds mgt "to the letter."

Positive:

[REDACTED] no problem raising concerns, good relationship as far as radiological safety, did not see push for production over nuclear safety, sees more support and enforcement of the industrial safety culture under [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]: no nuclear safety issues, will raise concerns and limits dealings to immediate supervisor; believes responsibility taken away from supervision and lower managers.

[REDACTED] will raise concerns and others will too.

[REDACTED]: raises concerns and does for others; experience to support retaliation raise concern.

[REDACTED] nuclear safety issues would be addressed; [REDACTED] does a good, thorough job and people have confidence in him to not use their name. [REDACTED] seen as having strong operator background and pushing for conservative decision making and nuclear safety, [REDACTED] influence has changed the way issues are addressed, they won't languish any longer.

[REDACTED] return "great," thinks will help return to old way (after 1996 startup of getting it done) where union/management worked together.

[REDACTED] no issues w/nuclear safety.

[REDACTED] & [REDACTED] no retaliation seen for raising concerns (discussion around his [REDACTED] own termination) did not evoke discrim complaint; others will raise concerns and confident that nuclear safety issues are raised.

[REDACTED] concerns are raised, people jump over mgt if they have to to get something addressed and has never seen an issue where he questioned the company attitude toward nuclear safety; offered that operator decisions to trip unit have been backed up by ops mgt and offered two examples.

[REDACTED]: thinks co does good job of protecting health and safety of public, big safety issues and primary plant issues are looked at in depth, everyone would report a concern of importance, sees improvement recently in procedures that required a fix either get a notification or more resources applied in the procedure group have resulted in more refined procedures w/not many major errors or problems any longer; typically only sees small issues now with procedures, majority will raise issues if they have a concern, for self, is comfortable in raising concerns that mgt believes are valid-made distinction in discussing [REDACTED] issues (neg); impressed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (new [REDACTED]) - expects positive changes.

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