

10CFR50.90

July 14, 2006

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3  
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56  
NRC Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Subject: License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-423, "Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) hereby requests an amendment to Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TS), of the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses listed above. The proposed amendment would modify TS to risk-inform requirements regarding selected Required Action End States.

Enclosure 1 provides a description of the proposed change, the requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific verifications. The proposed change would revise the TS requirements related to required end states for TS action statements. The change is generally consistent with NRC-approved TSTF-423, Revision 0, "Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants." The availability of this TS Improvement was published in the Federal Register on March 23, 2006 as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). Enclosure 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed change. Enclosure 3 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed change. Enclosure 3 is provided for information only. Enclosure 4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal.

The subject changes are generally consistent with the changes outlined in TSTF-423, Revision 0. Minor differences between the proposed changes and those of TSTF-423, Revision 0 are described in Enclosure 1. While the PBAPS Units 2 and 3 TS are based on NUREG-1433, they are not identical to NUREG-1433. Therefore, adaptation of TSTF-423, Revision 0 was required.



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EGC requests approval of the proposed license amendment by January 31, 2007, with the amendment being implemented within 120 days of approval.

The proposed change has been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and approved by the Nuclear Safety Review Board.


In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, EGC is notifying the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of this application for changes to the TS by transmitting a copy of this letter and its enclosures to the designated State Official.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Dave Robillard at (610) 765-5952.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully,

2078 7/14/06  
Executed on

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Pamela B. Cowan  
Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs  
Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure 1: Description of Proposed Changes, Technical Analysis, and Regulatory Analysis  
Enclosure 2: Marked-up Technical Specification Pages  
Enclosure 3: Marked-up Technical Specification Bases Pages  
Enclosure 4: List of Regulatory Commitments

cc: S. J. Collins, Administrator, Region I, USNRC  
F. L. Bower, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom  
J. Kim, Project Manager, USNRC  
R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania



## **ENCLOSURE 1**

### **Description of Proposed Changes, Technical Analysis and Regulatory Analysis**

- 1.0 DESCRIPTION
- 2.0 ASSESSMENT
  - 2.1 Applicability of Topical Report, TSTF-423 and Published Safety Evaluation
  - 2.2 Optional Changes and Variations
- 3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
  - 3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination
  - 3.2 Verification and Commitments
- 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION
- 5.0 REFERENCES



**ENCLOSURE 1**  
**DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS**  
**AND REGULATORY ANALYSIS**

**1.0 DESCRIPTION**

The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specifications (TS) to risk-inform requirements regarding selected Required Action End States.

The changes are generally consistent with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) TSTF-423, Revision 0. The availability of this TS Improvement was published in the Federal Register on March 23, 2006 as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).

**2.0 ASSESSMENT**

**2.1 Applicability of Topical Report, TSTF-423 and Published Safety Evaluation**

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) has reviewed GE topical report (Reference 1), TSTF-423 (Reference 2), and the NRC model safety evaluation (Reference 3) as part of the CLIIP. EGC has concluded that the information in the GE topical report and TSTF-423, as well as the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Unit Nos. 2 and 3 and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the PBAPS Unit Nos. 2 and 3 TS.

**2.2 Optional Changes and Variations**

EGC is not proposing any variations or deviations from the GE topical report and the TS changes described in the TSTF-423, Revision 0, or the NRC staff's model safety evaluation dated March 23, 2006.

The proposed TS changes are generally consistent with TSTF-423, Revision 0. Minor differences between the proposed changes and those contained in TSTF-423, Revision 0 include:

Changes were made to several paragraphs and Section numbers because the TSTF was written based on NUREG-1433. While the PBAPS Units 2 and 3 TS are based on NUREG-1433, they are not identical to NUREG-1433. Therefore, adaptation of TSTF-423, Revision 0 was required.

The following Standard TS (STS) sections are not applicable to the PBAPS Unit Nos. 2 and 3 TS, and therefore are not part of this submittal:

- 3.6.1.6 Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves
- 3.6.1.9 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS)
- 3.7.5 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System
- 3.8.7 Inverters -Operating

Additionally, the following PBAPS Unit Nos. 2 and 3 TS sections did not require revision as a result of submitting the amendment request, because the existing TS required end states are already in conformance with the changes proposed in TSTF-423, Revision 0:



- 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring
- 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)
- 3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) and Normal Heat Sink

### 3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

#### 3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

EGC has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register as part of the CLIP. EGC has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to PBAPS Unit Nos. 2 and 3 and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

#### 3.2 Verification and Commitments

As discussed in the notice of availability published in the Federal Register on March 23, 2006 for this TS improvement, plant-specific verifications were performed as follows:

EGC commits to the regulatory commitments in Enclosure 4. In addition, EGC has proposed TS Bases consistent with the GE topical report and TSTF-423, which provide guidance and details on how to implement the new requirements. Implementation of TSTF-423 requires that risk be managed and assessed, and the licensee's configuration risk management program is adequate to satisfy this requirement. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative assessment of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more systems are not able to perform their associated function. Finally, EGC has a Bases Control Program consistent with Section 5.5 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS).

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

The amendment changes requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." The NRC staff has determined that the amendment adopting TSTF-423, Revision 0, involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that TSTF-423, Revision 0, involves no significant hazards considerations, and there has been no public comment on the finding in the Federal Register Notice 70 FR 74037, December 14, 2005. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

### 5.0 REFERENCES

1. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, "Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants," December 2002.
2. TSTF-423, Revision 0, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A."



3. Federal Register, Vol. 71, No. 56, p. 14726, "Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specifications for Boiling Water Reactor Plants to Risk-Inform Requirements Regarding Selected Required Action End States Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, and NRC Model Safety Evaluation," March 23, 2006.



## ENCLOSURE 2

### PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Changes (MARK-UP)

#### UNIT 2

3.5-1  
3.5-2  
3.5-3  
3.5-12  
3.6-1  
3.6-19  
3.6-21  
3.6-27  
3.6-29  
3.6-34  
3.6-40  
3.6-41  
3.7-1  
3.7-2  
3.7-7  
3.7-8  
3.7-10  
3.8-5  
3.8-29  
3.8-43

#### UNIT 3

3.5-1  
3.5-2  
3.5-3  
3.5-12  
3.6-1  
3.6-19  
3.6-21  
3.6-27  
3.6-29  
3.6-34  
3.6-40  
3.6-41  
3.7-1  
3.7-2  
3.7-7  
3.7-8  
3.7-10  
3.8-5  
3.8-29  
3.8-43



### 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

#### 3.5.1 ECCS—Operating

LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of five safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

-----NOTE-----  
Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.  
-----

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,  
MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) is not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure  $\leq 150$  psig and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure  $\leq 100$  psig.

#### ACTIONS



----- NOTE -----  
LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI.  
-----

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.  <u>OR</u>  One low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump in each subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.	7 days
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  36 hours

(continued)



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. HPCI System inoperable.	C.1 Verify by administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE.  <u>AND</u> C.2 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.	Immediately  14 days
D. HPCI System inoperable.  <u>AND</u> One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable.	D.1 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.  <u>OR</u> D.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.	72 hours  72 hours
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met.	E.1 Be in MODE 3.  <u>AND</u> E.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to $\leq 150$ psig.	12 hours  36 hours
 F. One ADS valve inoperable.	 F.1 Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.	14 days

(continued)



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p><u>F.</u> → <u>G.</u> One ADS valve inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.</p>	<p><u>G.1</u> Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.</p> <p><u>OR</u> <u>F.</u></p> <p><u>G.2</u> Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>72 hours</p> <p>72 hours</p>
<p>H. Two or more ADS valves inoperable.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F or G not met.</p>	<p>H.1 Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>H.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to ≤ 100 psig.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>
<p>I. Two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>HPCI System and one or more ADS valves inoperable.</p>	<p>I.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.</p>	<p>Immediately</p>

G. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C, D, E or F not met.	G.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
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### 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

#### 3.5.3 RCIC System

LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,  
MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

#### ACTIONS

----- NOTE -----  
LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.  
-----

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. RCIC System inoperable.	A.1 Verify by administrative means High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE.	Immediately
	AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.	14 days
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	AND B.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to $\leq 150$ psig.	36 hours



### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

LCO 3.6.1.1 Primary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.






#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Primary containment inoperable.	A.1 Restore primary containment to OPERABLE status.	1 hour
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours



**Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers**  
3.6.1.5

**ACTIONS (continued)**

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
 <b>Two lines with one or more reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers inoperable for opening.</b>	 <b>Restore all vacuum breakers in one line to OPERABLE status.</b>	1 hour
 <b>Required Action and Associated Completion Time not met.</b> <i>of Conditions A, B, or E</i>	 <b>Be in MODE 3.</b> <b>AND</b>  <b>Be in MODE 4.</b>	12 hours  36 hours

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.1.5.1    Verify Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) System nitrogen storage tank level is $\geq$ 16 inches water column.	24 hours
SR 3.6.1.5.2    Verify Safety Grade Instrument Gas (SGIG) System header pressure $\geq$ 80 psig.	24 hours

(continued)

D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
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Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers  
3.6.1.6

### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers







LCO 3.6.1.6 Nine suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE for opening.

AND

Twelve suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers shall be closed, except when performing their intended function.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One required suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker inoperable for opening.	A.1 Restore one required vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status.	72 hours
 B. One suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker not closed.	 B.1 Close the open vacuum breaker.	10 hours
 D. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.  	 D.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u>  D.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  36 hours

B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours









### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling

LCO 3.6.2.3 Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
 B. Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable.	 B.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.	8 hours
 C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. 	 C.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u>  C.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours

B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
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### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray

LCO 3.6.2.4 Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
B. Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable.	B.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.	8 hours
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	C.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	AND C.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours



### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment

LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,  
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the  
secondary containment,  
During CORE ALTERATIONS,  
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor  
vessel (OPDRVs).

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Secondary containment inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	A.1 Restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.	4 hours
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours <del>36 hours</del>
C. Secondary containment inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	C.1 -----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. ----- Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately          (continued)



### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,  
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the  
secondary containment,  
During CORE ALTERATIONS,  
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor  
vessel (OPDRVs).

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One SGT subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours 36 hours
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	-----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. ----- C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT subsystem in operation. <u>OR</u>	Immediately  (continued)



ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. (continued)	C.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	C.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	C.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately
D. Two SGT subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	D.1 <del>Enter LCO 3.0/3</del> Be in MODE 3	<del>Immediately</del> 12 hours
E. Two SGT subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	E.1 -----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. -----  Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	E.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	E.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately





### 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3.7.1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System

LCO 3.7.1 Two HPSW subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS





CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One HPSW subsystem inoperable.	<p>-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System—Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by HPSW System. -----</p> <p>A.1 Restore HPSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	7 days
 <p>B. Both HPSW subsystems inoperable.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by HPSW System. -----</p> <p> B.1 Restore one HPSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	8 hours

(continued)

B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
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ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
 Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. 	 E.1 Be in MODE 3. AND  E.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  36 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each HPSW manual and power operated valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	31 days



### 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3.7.4 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System

LCO 3.7.4 Two MCREV subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,  
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the  
secondary containment,  
During CORE ALTERATIONS,  
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor  
vessel (OPDRVs).

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One MCREV subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore MCREV subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> <del>B.2 Be in MODE 4.</del>	12 hours <del>36 hours</del>
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	-----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. ----- C.1 Place OPERABLE MCREV subsystem in operation. <u>OR</u>	Immediately  (continued)



ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. (continued)	C.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	C.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	C.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately
D. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	D.1 <u>Enter LCO 3.0.3.</u> Be in MODE 3.	<u>Immediately</u> 12 hours
E. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	-----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. -----	
	E.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	E.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	E.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately



### 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas

LCO 3.7.5 The gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases measured at the steam jet air ejector (SJAE) discharge at the offgas sample rack shall be  $\leq 320,000 \mu\text{Ci/second}$  after decay of 30 minutes.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,  
MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and SJAE in operation.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases not within limit.	A.1 Restore gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases to within limit.	72 hours
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 Isolate all main steam lines.	12 hours
	<u>OR</u>	
	B.2 Isolate SJAE.	12 hours
	<u>OR</u>	
	B.3 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u>	
	B.3.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>E. One offsite circuit inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>One DG inoperable.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems—Operating," when Condition E is entered with no AC power source to any 4 kV emergency bus. -----</p> <p>E.1 Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>E.2 Restore DG to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>12 hours</p>
<p>F. Two or more DGs inoperable.</p>	<p>F.1 Restore all but one DG to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>2 hours</p>
<p>G. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, E, or F not met.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Required Action B.2, B.3, B.4.1, B.4.2, or B.5 and associated Completion Time not met.</p>	<p>G.1 Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>G.2 Be in MODE 4.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>

(continued)



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. One Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.	<p>-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems—Operating," when Condition B results in de-energization of a Unit 2 4 kV emergency bus. -----</p> <p>B.1 Restore Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	12 hours
C. One Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystem inoperable.	C.1 Restore Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.	2 hours
D. Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.	<p>D.1 Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>D.2 Be in MODE 4.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>
E. Two or more inoperable DC electrical power subsystems.	E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately



**ACTIONS (continued)**

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. One Unit 2 DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable.	D.1 Restore Unit 2 DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.	2 hours <u>AND</u> 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.7.a
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.	E.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> E.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  <u>36 hours</u>
F. Two or more inoperable electrical power distribution subsystems that result in a loss of function.	F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.8.7.1 Verify:  a. Correct breaker alignments to required AC electrical power distribution subsystems; and  b. Indicated power availability to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems.	7 days



### 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

#### 3.5.1 ECCS—Operating

LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of five safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

----- NOTE -----  
Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.  
-----

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,  
MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) is not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure  $\leq 150$  psig and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure  $\leq 100$  psig.

#### ACTIONS


----- NOTE -----  
LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI.  
-----

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>A. One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>One low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump in each subsystem inoperable.</p>	<p>A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>7 days</p>
<p>B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.</p>	<p>B.1 Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2 Be in MODE 4.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>

(continued)







ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. HPCI System inoperable.	C.1 Verify by administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.	14 days
D. HPCI System inoperable.  <u>AND</u> One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable.	D.1 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.	72 hours
	<u>OR</u> D.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.	72 hours
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met.	E.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> E.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to $\leq 150$ psig.	36 hours
 F. One ADS valve inoperable.	F.1 Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.	14 days

(continued)



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p> <b>G.</b> One ADS valve inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.</p>	<p> <b>G.1</b> Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.</p> <p><u>OR</u> </p> <p> <b>G.2</b> Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>72 hours</p> <p>72 hours</p>
<p><b>H.</b> Two or more ADS valves inoperable.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p><del>Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F or G not met.</del></p>	<p><b>H.1</b> Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p><b>H.2</b> Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to <math>\leq 100</math> psig.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>
<p><b>I.</b> Two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>HPCI System and one or more ADS valves inoperable.</p>	<p><b>I.1</b> Enter LCO 3.0.3.</p>	<p>Immediately</p>

G. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C, D, E or F not met.

G.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours



### 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

#### 3.5.3 RCIC System

LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,  
MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

#### ACTIONS

----- NOTE -----  
LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.  
-----

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. RCIC System inoperable.	A.1 Verify by administrative means High Pressure Coolant Injection System is OPERABLE.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.	14 days
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to $\leq 150$ psig.	36 hours



### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

LCO 3.6.1.1 Primary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Primary containment inoperable.	A.1 Restore primary containment to OPERABLE status.	1 hour
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours



**Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers**  
3.6.1.5

**ACTIONS (continued)**

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 0px;">E</div> <div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 20px;">D</div> Two lines with one or more reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers inoperable for opening.	<div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 0px;">E</div> <div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 20px;">D.1</div> Restore all vacuum breakers in one line to OPERABLE status.	1 hour
<div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 0px;">F</div> <div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 20px;">E</div> Required Action and Associated Completion Time not met. <i>of Conditions A, B, or E</i>	<div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 0px;">F</div> <div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 20px;">E.1</div> Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> <div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 40px;">E.2</div> <div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 60px;">F</div> Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  36 hours

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.1.5.1    Verify Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) System nitrogen storage tank level is $\geq$ 16 inches water column.	24 hours
SR 3.6.1.5.2    Verify Safety Grade Instrument Gas (SGIG) System header pressure $\geq$ 80 psig.	24 hours

(continued)

D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
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Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers  
3.6.1.6

### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers







LCO 3.6.1.6 Nine suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE for opening.

AND

Twelve suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers shall be closed, except when performing their intended function.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One required suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker inoperable for opening.	A.1 Restore one required vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status.	72 hours
 B. One suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker not closed.	 B.1 Close the open vacuum breaker.	10 hours
 C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. 	 C.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u>  C.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  36 hours

B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours









### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling

LCO 3.6.2.3 Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
 B. Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable.	 B.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.	8 hours
 C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.  2 of Condition C	 C.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u>  C.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  36 hours

B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours



### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray

LCO 3.6.2.4 Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
B. Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable.	B.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.	8 hours
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	C.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours



### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment

LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,  
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the  
secondary containment,  
During CORE ALTERATIONS,  
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor  
vessel (OPDRVs).

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Secondary containment inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	A.1 Restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.	4 hours
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours
C. Secondary containment inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	C.1 -----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. ----- Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately          (continued)



### 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,  
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the  
secondary containment,  
During CORE ALTERATIONS,  
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor  
vessel (OPDRVs).

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One SGT subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> <del>B.2 Be in MODE 4.</del>	12 hours <del>36 hours</del>
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	-----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. ----- C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT subsystem in operation. <u>OR</u>	Immediately  (continued)



ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. (continued)	C.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	C.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	C.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately
D. Two SGT subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	D.1 <del>Enter LCO 3.0.3</del> Be in MODE 3.	<del>Immediately</del> 12 hours
E. Two SGT subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	E.1 -----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. ----- Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	E.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.  <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	E.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately





### 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3.7.1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System

LCO 3.7.1 Two HPSW subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

#### ACTIONS




CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One HPSW subsystem inoperable.	<p>-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System—Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by HPSW System. -----</p> <p>A.1 Restore HPSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	7 days
 <p>B. Both HPSW subsystems inoperable.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by HPSW System. -----</p> <p> B.1 Restore one HPSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	8 hours

(continued)

B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
---	-------------------	----------



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
 <p>Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.</p> <p><i>of Condition C</i></p>	<p> C.1 Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p> C.2 Be in MODE 4.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each HPSW manual and power operated valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.</p>	<p>31 days</p>



### 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3.7.4 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System

LCO 3.7.4 Two MCREV subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,  
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the  
secondary containment,  
During CORE ALTERATIONS,  
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor  
vessel (OPDRVs).

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One MCREV subsystem inoperable.	A.1 Restore MCREV subsystem to OPERABLE status.	7 days
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	B.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> B.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  36 hours
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	-----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. ----- C.1 Place OPERABLE MCREV subsystem in operation. <u>OR</u>	Immediately  (continued)



ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. (continued)	C.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	C.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	C.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately
D. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	D.1 <del>Enter LCO 3.0.3.</del> <i>Be in MODE 3.</i>	<del>Immediately</del> <i>12 hours</i>
E. Two MCREV subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.	-----NOTE----- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. -----	
	E.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	E.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	E.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately



### 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas

LCO 3.7.5 The gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases measured at the steam jet air ejector (SJAE) discharge at the offgas sample rack shall be  $\leq 320,000 \mu\text{Ci/second}$  after decay of 30 minutes.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1,  
MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and SJAE in operation.

#### ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases not within limit.	A.1 Restore gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases to within limit.	72 hours
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 Isolate all main steam lines.	12 hours
	<u>OR</u>	
	B.2 Isolate SJAE.	12 hours
	<u>OR</u>	
	B.3 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u>	
	B.3.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
E. One offsite circuit inoperable.  <u>AND</u>  One DG inoperable.	-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems—Operating," when Condition E is entered with no AC power source to any 4 kV emergency bus. -----	
	E.1 Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.	12 hours
	<u>OR</u>  E.2 Restore DG to OPERABLE status.	12 hours
F. Two or more DGs inoperable.	F.1 Restore all but one DG to OPERABLE status.	2 hours
G. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, E, or F not met.  <u>OR</u>  Required Action B.2, B.3, B.4.1, B.4.2, or B.5 and associated Completion Time not met.	G.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> G.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours

(continued)



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. One Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.	<p>-----NOTE----- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems—Operating," when Condition B results in de-energization of a Unit 3 4 kV emergency bus. -----</p> <p>B.1 Restore Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.</p>	12 hours
C. One Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystem inoperable.	C.1 Restore Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.	2 hours
D. Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.	<p>D.1 Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><b>AND</b></p> <p>D.2 Be in MODE 4.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>
E. Two or more inoperable DC electrical power subsystems.	E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately



ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. One Unit 3 DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable.	D.1 Restore Unit 3 DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.	2 hours  <u>AND</u> 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.7.a
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.	E.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> E.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours  <u>36 hours</u>
F. Two or more inoperable electrical power distribution subsystems that result in a loss of function.	F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.8.7.1 Verify:  a. Correct breaker alignments to required AC electrical power distribution subsystems; and  b. Indicated power availability to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems.	7 days



## ENCLOSURE 3

### TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE INSERTS

#### PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES

##### UNIT 2

B 3.3-203  
B 3.3-205  
B 3.4-18  
B 3.5-7  
B 3.5-8  
B 3.5-9  
B 3.5-17  
B 3.5-26  
B 3.5-27  
B 3.5-30  
B 3.6-3  
B 3.6-5  
B 3.6-38  
B 3.6-39  
B 3.6-41  
B 3.6-45  
B 3.6-46  
B 3.6-47  
B 3.6-58  
B 3.6-59  
B 3.6-62  
B 3.6-63  
B 3.6-75  
B 3.6-77  
B 3.6-87  
B 3.6-88  
B 3.6-89  
B 3.6-90  
B 3.7-4  
B 3.7-5  
B 3.7-10  
B 3.7-18  
B 3.7-19  
B 3.7-21  
B 3.7-23  
B 3.7-24  
B 3.8-17  
B 3.8-39  
B 3.8-64  
B 3.8-71  
B 3.8-91  
B 3.8-92

##### UNIT 3

B 3.3-203  
B 3.3-205  
B 3.4-18  
B 3.5-7  
B 3.5-8  
B 3.5-9  
B 3.5-17  
B 3.5-26  
B 3.5-27  
B 3.5-30  
B 3.6-3  
B 3.6-5  
B 3.6-38  
B 3.6-39  
B 3.6-41  
B 3.6-45  
B 3.6-46  
B 3.6-47  
B 3.6-58  
B 3.6-59  
B 3.6-62  
B 3.6-63  
B 3.6-75  
B 3.6-77  
B 3.6-87  
B 3.6-88  
B 3.6-89  
B 3.6-90  
B 3.7-4  
B 3.7-5  
B 3.7-10  
B 3.7-18  
B 3.7-19  
B 3.7-21  
B 3.7-23  
B 3.7-24  
B 3.8-17  
B 3.8-39  
B 3.8-64  
B 3.8-71  
B 3.8-91  
B 3.8-92



### **LCO 3.3.8.2 RPS Electric Power Monitoring**

#### **INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

#### **INSERT 2**

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

### **LCO 3.4.3 Safety / Relief Valves**

#### **INSERT 1**

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

### **LCO 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating**

#### **INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 12) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

#### **INSERT 2**

#### **H.1 and H.2**

If two or more ADS valves are inoperable, there is a reduction in the depressurization capability. The plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to  $\leq 100$  psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

#### **INSERT 3**

12. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

### **LCO 3.5.3. RCIC System**

#### **INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.



**INSERT 2**

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.6.1.1, Primary Containment**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 8), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

8. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.6.1.5 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers**

**INSERT 1**

**D.1**

If one line has one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening and they are not restored within the Completion Time in Condition C, the remaining vacuum breakers in the remaining line can provide the opening function. The plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 1) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**INSERT 2**

1. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.



**LCO 3.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers**

**INSERT 1**

**B.1**

If a required suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker is inoperable for opening and is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**INSERT 2**

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling**

**INSERT 1**

**B.1**

If one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is inoperable and is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**INSERT 2**

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.



**INSERT 2**

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**INSERT 3**

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.



**LCO 3.7.1 High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System**

**INSERT 1**

**B.1**

If one HPSW subsystem is inoperable and not restored within the provided Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**INSERT 2**

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.7.4 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**INSERT 3**

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.



**LCO 3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 11) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

11. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 6) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

6. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

**LCO 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating**

**INSERT 1**

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

**INSERT 2**

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.



BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the plant operations personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or removal from service of the electric power monitoring assemblies.

Alternately, if it is not desired to remove the power supply(s) from service (e.g., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) from service would result in a scram or isolation), Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met in MODE 1 or 2, a plant shutdown must be performed. This places the plant in a condition where minimal equipment, powered through the inoperable RPS electric power monitoring assembly(s), is required and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of control rods) is not required. The plant shutdown is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are 15 minutes, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1

D.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Required Action D.1 results in the least reactive condition for the reactor core and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of control rods) is not required.

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.8.2.4 (continued)

per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class 1E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.2.3.2.
2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System."

Insert 2



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.4.3.2

The pneumatic actuator of each SRV valve is stroked to verify that the second stage pilot disc rod is mechanically displaced when the actuator strokes. Second stage pilot rod movement is determined by the measurement of actuator rod travel. The total amount of movement of the second stage pilot rod from the valve closed position to the open position shall meet criteria established by the SRV supplier. If the valve fails to actuate due only to the failure of the solenoid, but is capable of opening on overpressure, the safety function of the SRV is considered OPERABLE.

Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling outage. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

1. NEDC-32183P, "Power Rerate Safety Analysis Report for Peach Bottom 2 & 3," May 1993.
2. UFSAR, Chapter 14.

*Insert 1* →

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BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the inoperable low pressure ECCS subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

overall plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1

C.1 and C.2

If the HPCI System is inoperable and the RCIC System is immediately verified to be OPERABLE, the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diverse low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems in conjunction with ADS. Also, the RCIC System will automatically provide makeup water at most reactor operating pressures. Immediate verification of RCIC OPERABILITY is therefore required when HPCI is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine if RCIC is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the RCIC System. If the OPERABILITY of the RCIC System cannot be verified immediately, however, Condition E must be immediately entered. If a single active component fails concurrent with a design basis LOCA, there is a potential, depending on the specific failure, that the minimum required ECCS equipment will not be available. A 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

D.1 and D.2

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to an inoperable HPCI System, the inoperable low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, adequate core cooling is

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

ensured by the OPERABILITY of the ADS and the remaining low pressure ECCS subsystems. However, the overall ECCS reliability is significantly reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design basis LOCA may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. Since both a high pressure system (HPCI) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore either the HPCI System or the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D is not met, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to  $\leq 150$  psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E → E.1


The LCO requires five ADS valves to be OPERABLE in order to provide the ADS function. Reference 7 contains the results of an analysis that evaluated the effect of one ADS valve being out of service. Per this analysis, operation of only four ADS valves will provide the required depressurization. However, overall reliability of the ADS is reduced, because a single failure in the OPERABLE ADS valves could result in a reduction in depressurization capability. Therefore, operation is only allowed for a limited time. The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

(continued)




BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)



If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to one inoperable ADS valve, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of HPCI and the remaining low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced because a single active component failure concurrent with a design basis LOCA could result in the minimum required ECCS equipment not being available. Since both a high pressure system (ADS) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore either the low pressure ECCS subsystem or the ADS valve to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.



If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition ~~F or G~~ is not met, ~~or if two or more ADS valves are inoperable~~, the plant must be brought to a ~~condition~~ in which the ~~LCO does not apply~~. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours ~~and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to ≤ 100 psig within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Time ~~is~~ reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

over all plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1

Insert 2

I.1

When multiple ECCS subsystems are inoperable (for reasons other than the second Condition of Condition A), as stated in Condition I, the plant is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.1

The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly,

(continued)



BASES (continued)

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- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.3.
  2. UFSAR, Section 6.4.4.
  3. UFSAR, Section 6.4.1.
  4. UFSAR, Sections 4.4.5 and 6.4.2.
  5. UFSAR, Section 14.6.
  6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
  7. NEDC-32163P, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis," January 1993.
  8. 10 CFR 50.46.
  9. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
  10. UFSAR, Section 10.17.6.
  11. Issue Report 189167, Operability of RHR while in Test Modes/Torus Cooling.

Insert 3 →

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BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable RCIC system. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable RCIC system and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

A.1 and A.2

If the RCIC System is inoperable during MODE 1, or MODE 2 or 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, and the HPCI System is immediately verified to be OPERABLE, the RCIC System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, loss of the RCIC System will not affect the overall plant capability to provide makeup inventory at high reactor pressure since the HPCI System is the only high pressure system assumed to function during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). OPERABILITY of HPCI is therefore immediately verified when the RCIC System is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if HPCI is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean it is necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System. If the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System cannot be verified immediately, however, Condition B must be immediately entered. For certain transients and abnormal events with no LOCA, RCIC (as opposed to HPCI) is the preferred source of makeup coolant because of its relatively small capacity, which allows easier control of the RPV water level. Therefore, a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable RCIC to OPERABLE status.

The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 3) that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (AOTs). Because of similar functions of HPCI and RCIC, the AOTs (i.e., Completion Times) determined for HPCI are also applied to RCIC.

B.1 and B.2

overall plant risk is minimized.

If the RCIC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if the HPCI System is simultaneously inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the ~~LCO does not apply~~. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to ~~≤ 180 psig within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Time ~~is~~

Insert 1

(continued)



BASES

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ACTIONS

~~B.1 and B.2~~ (continued)

is

are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1

The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. An acceptable method of ensuring the line is full is to vent at the high points. The 31 day Frequency is based on the gradual nature of void buildup in the RCIC piping, the procedural controls governing system operation, and operating experience.

SR 3.5.3.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

(continued)



BASES (continued)

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 1.5.
2. UFSAR, Section 4.7.
3. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

Insert 2 →

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BASES

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LCO (continued) Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

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APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

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ACTIONS

A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Overall plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), or main steam isolation

(continued)



BASES (continued)

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 14.9.
2. Letter G94-PEPR-183, Peach Bottom Improved Technical Specification Project Increased Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure Analytical Limits, from G.V. Kumar (GE) to A.A. Winter (PECO), August 23, 1994.
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
4. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment Nos. 127 and 130 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, dated February 18, 1988.
5. NEI 94-01, Revision 0, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J."
6. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements."
7. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Evaluation for Extended Final Feedwater Reduction, NEDC-32707P, Supplement 1, Revision 0, May, 1998.

Insert 2 →



BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)


"Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers." The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining breakers, the fact that the OPERABLE breaker in each of the lines is closed, and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the vacuum breakers to be OPERABLE during this period.

B.1

With one or more lines with two vacuum breakers not closed, primary containment integrity is not maintained. Therefore, one open vacuum breaker must be closed within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

C.1

With one line with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the leak tight primary containment boundary is intact. The ability to mitigate an event that causes a containment depressurization is threatened if one or more vacuum breakers in at least one vacuum breaker penetration are not OPERABLE. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breaker must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This is consistent with the Completion Time for Condition A and the fact that the leak tight primary containment boundary is being maintained.



With two lines with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the primary containment boundary is intact. However, in the event of a containment depressurization, the function of the vacuum breakers is lost. Therefore, all vacuum breakers in one line must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

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(continued)



Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers  
B 3.6.1.5

BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

(P) → E.1 and E.2 (F)

for Conditions A, B, or E

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.5.1

Verifying that the level in the CAD liquid nitrogen tank is  $\geq 16$  inches water column will ensure at least 7 days of post-LOCA SGIG System operation. This minimum volume of liquid nitrogen allows sufficient time after an accident to replenish the nitrogen supply in order to maintain the design function of the reactor building-to-suppression vacuum breakers. The level is verified every 24 hours to ensure that the system is capable of performing its intended isolation function when required. The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience, which has shown to be an acceptable period to verify liquid nitrogen supply. The 24 hour Frequency also signifies the importance of the SGIG System for maintaining the design function of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers.

SR 3.6.1.5.2

This SR ensures that the pressure in the SGIG System header is  $\geq 80$  psig. This ensures that the post-LOCA nitrogen pressure provided to the valve operators and valve seals that is adequate for the SGIG to perform its design function. The 24 hour Frequency was developed considering the importance of the SGIG System for maintaining the design function of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers. The 24 hour Frequency is also considered to be adequate to ensure timely detection of any breach in the SGIG System which would render the system incapable of performing its function.

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.5.5

Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properly to perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 92 day Frequency of this SR was developed based upon Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days.

SR 3.6.1.5.6

Demonstration of air operated vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of  $\leq 0.75$  psid is valid. The 18 month Frequency is based on requirements associated with the instruments that monitor differential pressure between the reactor building and suppression chamber and that this Surveillance can be performed while the plant is operating. For this unit, the 18 month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the surveillance when performed at an 18 month frequency, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

SR 3.6.1.5.7

This SR ensures that in case the non-safety grade instrument air system is unavailable, the SGIG System will perform its design function to supply nitrogen gas at the required pressure for valve operators and valve seals supported by the SGIG System. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during a plant outage. Operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

~~None~~

Insert 2




BASES


ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

because a single failure in one of the remaining vacuum breakers could result in an excessive suppression chamber-to-drywell differential pressure during a DBA. Therefore, with one of the nine required vacuum breakers inoperable, 72 hours is allowed to restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status so that plant conditions are consistent with those assumed for the design basis analysis. The 72 hour Completion Time is considered acceptable due to the low probability of an event in which the remaining vacuum breaker capability would not be adequate.



An open vacuum breaker allows communication between the drywell and suppression chamber airspace, and, as a result, there is the potential for suppression chamber overpressurization due to this bypass leakage if a LOCA were to occur. Therefore, the open vacuum breaker must be closed. A short time is allowed to close the vacuum breaker due to the low probability of an event that would pressurize primary containment. If vacuum breaker position indication is not reliable, an alternate method of verifying that the vacuum breakers are closed must be performed within 10 hours. All suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers are considered closed, even if the "not fully seated" indication is shown, if a leak test confirms that the bypass area between the drywell and suppression chamber is less than or equivalent to a one-inch diameter hole (Ref. 1). The required 10 hour Completion Time is considered adequate to perform this test. If the leak test fails, not only must the Actions be taken (close the open vacuum breaker within 10 hours), but also the appropriate Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, Primary Containment, must be entered.



If the inoperable suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker cannot be closed or restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least

(continued)



BASES



ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.6.1

Each vacuum breaker is verified closed to ensure that this potential large bypass leakage path is not present. This Surveillance is performed by observing the vacuum breaker position indication or by performing a leak test that confirms that the bypass area between the drywell and suppression chamber is less than or equivalent to a one-inch diameter hole. If the bypass test fails, not only must the vacuum breaker(s) be considered open and the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of this LCO be entered, but also the appropriate Condition and Required Action of LCO 3.6.1.1 must be entered. The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

A Note is added to this SR which allows suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers.

SR 3.6.1.6.2

Each required vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 31 day Frequency of this SR was developed, based on Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days. A 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide additional assurance that the vacuum breakers are OPERABLE, since they are located in a harsh environment (the suppression chamber airspace).

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.6.3

Verification of the vacuum breaker setpoint for full opening is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. For this facility, the 24 month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

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REFERENCES

1. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment Nos. 127 and 130 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, dated February 18, 1988.
2. ME-0161, "Det. Actual # Wetwell to Drywell Vacuum Breakers Req'd"

Insert 2 →

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BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

Insert 1

C → B.1

With two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable, one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment pressure and temperature mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available.

D  
C.1 and C.2

of Condition C

If ~~any~~ Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met ~~within the required Completion Time~~, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1 (continued)

the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

SR 3.6.2.3.2

Verifying that each required RHR pump develops a flow rate  $\geq 10,000$  gpm while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode with flow through the associated heat exchanger ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 2). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

Insert 2

3

3



BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment bypass mitigation capability. The 7 day Completion Time was chosen in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool spray capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1

With both RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this Condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available.

C.1 and C.2

If the inoperable RHR suppression pool spray subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the ~~LCO does not apply~~. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours ~~and~~ ~~MODE 4 within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Times ~~are~~ reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Overall plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1

(S)

(S)

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1 (continued)

exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

SR 3.6.2.4.2

This Surveillance is performed every 10 years to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that flow will be provided when required. The 10 year Frequency is adequate to detect degradation in performance due to the passive nozzle design and its normally dry state and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Sections 5.2 and 14.6.3.

Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

overall plant  
risk is minimized.

2 is

If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 1

C.1, C.2, and C.3

Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued)

seconds using one SGT subsystem. SR 3.6.4.1.4 demonstrates that the pressure in the secondary containment can be maintained  $\geq 0.25$  inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour using one SGT subsystem at a flow rate  $\leq 10,500$  cfm. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. The primary purpose of these SRs is to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. The secondary purpose of these SRs is to ensure that the SGT subsystem being tested functions as designed. There is a Separate LCO with Surveillance Requirements which serves the primary purpose of ensuring OPERABILITY of the SGT System. These SRs need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystem used for these Surveillances is staggered to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform this test. The inoperability of the SGT System does not necessarily constitute a failure of these Surveillances relative to the secondary containment OPERABILITY. Operating experience has shown the secondary containment boundary usually passes these Surveillances when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.
2. UFSAR, Section 14.6.4.

Insert 2



BASES

LCO  
(continued)

For Unit 2, one SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when one charcoal filter train, one fan (OAV020) and associated ductwork, dampers, valves, and controls are OPERABLE. The second SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when the other charcoal filter train, one fan (OBV020) and associated ductwork, damper, valves, and controls are OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within

*Overall plant risk is minimized.*

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Insert 1

36 hours. The allowed Completion Times <sup>is</sup> are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)



## BASES

### ACTIONS (continued)

#### D.1

Insert 2

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, actions are required to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

#### E.1, E.2, and E.3

When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

#### SR 3.6.4.3.1

Operating each SGT subsystem (including each filter train fan) for  $\geq 15$  minutes ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) for  $\geq 15$  minutes every 31 days is sufficient to eliminate moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters since during idle periods instrument air is injected into the filter plenum to keep the filters dry. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system.

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.4.3.2

This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3

This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 1.5.1.6.
2. UFSAR, Section 14.9.

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Insert 3




BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)


could result in loss of HPSW function. The Completion Time is based on the redundant HPSW capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of an event occurring requiring HPSW during this period.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.7, be entered and Required Actions taken if an inoperable HPSW subsystem results in an inoperable RHR shutdown cooling subsystem. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.



With both HPSW subsystems inoperable, the HPSW System is not capable of performing its intended function. At least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time for restoring one HPSW subsystem to OPERABLE status, is based on the Completion Times provided for the RHR suppression pool cooling and spray functions.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.7, be entered and Required Actions taken if an inoperable HPSW subsystem results in an inoperable RHR shutdown cooling subsystem. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.



If the HPSW subsystems cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Times, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)



BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.1.1

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual and power operated valve in each HPSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for HPSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be realigned to its accident position. This is acceptable because the HPSW System is a manually initiated system.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 10.7.
2. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
3. NEDC-32183P, "Power Rerate Safety Analysis Report For Peach Bottom 2 & 3," May 1993.
4. UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.

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Insert 2



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.7.2.4

This SR verifies that the ESW System pumps will automatically start to provide cooling water to the required safety related equipment during an accident event. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated initiation signal.

Operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
- 

Insert 1



## BASES

### ACTIONS

#### A.1 (continued)

result in reduced MCREV System capability. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

#### B.1 and B.2

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable MCREV subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

overall  
plant

Insert 1

is

#### C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable MCREV subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE MCREV subsystem may be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3 (continued)

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

D.1

If both MCREV subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the MCREV System may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

Insert 2

E.1, E.2, and E.3

The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two MCREV subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.7.4.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas (the turbine building), is periodically tested to verify proper function of the MCREV System. During operation, the MCREV System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room  $\geq 0.1$  inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the turbine building to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The MCREV System is designed to provide this positive pressure at a flow rate of  $\geq 2700$  cfm and  $\leq 3300$  cfm to the control room when in operation. Manual adjustment of the MCREV System may be required to establish the flow rate of  $\geq 2700$  cfm and  $\leq 3300$  cfm during SR performance. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with other filtration systems SRs.

---

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.19.
  2. UFSAR, Section 10.13.
  3. UFSAR, Section 12.3.4.
  4. UFSAR, Section 14.9.1.5.
- 

Insert 3



BASES

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LCO  
(continued) with this requirement ( $3293 \text{ MWt} \times 100 \mu\text{Ci/MWt-second} = 320,000 \mu\text{Ci/second}$ ) and is based on the original licensed rated thermal power.

---

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System. This occurs during MODE 1, and during MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and the SJAE in operation. In MODES 4 and 5, steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable.

---

ACTIONS

A.1

If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the low probability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture.

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.3.2

If the gross gamma activity rate is not restored to within the limits in the associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAE must be isolated. This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from the source of the radioactive steam. The main steam lines are considered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line inboard of the main steam isolation valves is closed. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Overall plant risk is minimized.

An alternative to Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is to place the unit in a MODE in which the ~~LCO does not apply~~. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating

(continued)

Insert 1



BASES

---

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3.1, and B.3.2 (continued)

experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

---

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.1

This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85m, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by  $\geq 50\%$  after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31 day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitor the offgas, and is acceptable, based on operating experience.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.

---

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.4.5.
  2. 10 CFR 100.
- 

Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

F.1

With two or more DGs inoperable, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for the majority of ESF equipment at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown. (The immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power.) Since any inadvertent unit generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with two or more DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours. (Regulatory Guide 1.93 assumed the unit has two DGs. Thus, a loss of both DGs results in a total loss of onsite power. Therefore, a loss of more than two DGs, in the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station design, results in degradation no worse than that assumed in Regulatory Guide 1.93.)

G.1 and B.2

If the inoperable AC electrical power source(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time (Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, E, or F not met; or Required Action B.2, B.3, B.4.1, B.4.2, or B.5 and associated Completion Time not met), the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 1

(continued)

overall plant risk is minimized.



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.21 (continued)

Unit 3 Technical Specifications exempts performance of a Unit 3 SR (However, as stated in the Unit 3 SR 3.8.2.1 Note, while performance of an SR is exempted, the SR still must be met).

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Sections 1.5 and 8.4.2.
  2. UFSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4.
  3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, July 1993.
  4. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
  5. Generic Letter 84-15.
  6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
  7. UFSAR, Section 1.5.1.
  8. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.
  9. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.
  10. UFSAR, Section 8.5.
- 

Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

D.1 and D.2

overall plant  
risk is minimized.

Insert 1

If the DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time specified in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 4).

is

E.1

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the DC electrical power subsystems that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one DC source is lost, this results in a loss of a required function, thus the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

As Noted at the beginning of the SRs, SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 are applicable only to the Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems and SR 3.8.4.9 is applicable only to the Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystems.

SR 3.8.4.1

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are

(continued)



BASES

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REFERENCES  
(continued)

4. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
  5. IEEE Standard 450, 1987.
- 

Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 (continued)

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition D was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely.

E.1 and E.2

overall plant  
risk is minimized.

If the inoperable electrical power distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to ~~MODE 4 within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Time ~~is~~ is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 1

F.1

Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one Condition is entered, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment (for the AC electrical power distribution system only). The correct AC breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and power is available to each required bus. The verification of indicated power availability on the AC and DC buses

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1 (continued)

ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. This may be performed by verification of absence of low voltage alarms. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
  2. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
- 

Insert Z



BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the plant operations personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or removal from service of the electric power monitoring assemblies.

Alternately, if it is not desired to remove the power supply(s) from service (e.g., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) from service would result in a scram or isolation), Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

C.1 and C.2

the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized

Insert 1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met in MODE 1 or 2, a plant shutdown must be performed. This places the plant in a condition where minimal equipment, powered through the inoperable RPS electric power monitoring assembly(s), is required and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of control rods) is not required. The plant shutdown is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times ~~are~~ <sup>is</sup> reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Required Action D.1 results in the least reactive condition for the reactor core and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e.g., scram of control rods) is not required.

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.8.2.4 (continued)

per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class 1E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.2.3.2.
2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System."

Insert 2



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.4.3.2

The pneumatic actuator of each SRV valve is stroked to verify that the second stage pilot disc rod is mechanically displaced when the actuator strokes. Second stage pilot rod movement is determined by the measurement of actuator rod travel. The total amount of movement of the second stage pilot rod from the valve closed position to the open position shall meet criteria established by the SRV supplier. If the valve fails to actuate due only to the failure of the solenoid, but is capable of opening on overpressure, the safety function of the SRV is considered OPERABLE.

Operating experience has shown that these components will pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling outage. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

1. NEDC-32183P, "Power Rerate Safety Analysis Report for Peach Bottom 2 & 3," May 1993.
2. UFSAR, Chapter 14.

---

Insert 1



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

Overall plant risk is minimized.

If the inoperable low pressure ECCS subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the ECO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

is

Insert 1

C.1 and C.2

If the HPCI System is inoperable and the RCIC System is immediately verified to be OPERABLE, the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diverse low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems in conjunction with ADS. Also, the RCIC System will automatically provide makeup water at most reactor operating pressures. Immediate verification of RCIC OPERABILITY is therefore required when HPCI is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine if RCIC is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the RCIC System. If the OPERABILITY of the RCIC System cannot be verified immediately, however, Condition E must be immediately entered. If a single active component fails concurrent with a design basis LOCA, there is a potential, depending on the specific failure, that the minimum required ECCS equipment will not be available. A 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

D.1 and D.2

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to an inoperable HPCI System, the inoperable low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, adequate core cooling is

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

ensured by the OPERABILITY of the ADS and the remaining low pressure ECCS subsystems. However, the overall ECCS reliability is significantly reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design basis LOCA may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. Since both a high pressure system (HPCI) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore either the HPCI System or the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D is not met, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to  $\leq 150$  psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E → A.1

The LCO requires five ADS valves to be OPERABLE in order to provide the ADS function. Reference 7 contains the results of an analysis that evaluated the effect of one ADS valve being out of service. Per this analysis, operation of only four ADS valves will provide the required depressurization. However, overall reliability of the ADS is reduced, because a single failure in the OPERABLE ADS valves could result in a reduction in depressurization capability. Therefore, operation is only allowed for a limited time. The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

G.1 and G.2

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to one inoperable ADS valve, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of HPCI and the remaining low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced because a single active component failure concurrent with a design basis LOCA could result in the minimum required ECCS equipment not being available. Since both a high pressure system (ADS) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore either the low pressure ECCS subsystem or the ADS valve to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 9 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

H.1 and H.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition ~~F or G~~ is not met, ~~or if two or more ADS valves are inoperable~~, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours ~~and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to  $\leq 100$  psig within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Times ~~are reasonable~~, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C, D, E, or F

overall plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1

Insert 2

I.1

When multiple ECCS subsystems are inoperable (for reasons other than the second Condition of Condition A), as stated in Condition I, the plant is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.1

The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly,

(continued)



BASES (continued)

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- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.3.
  2. UFSAR, Section 6.4.4.
  3. UFSAR, Section 6.4.1.
  4. UFSAR, Sections 4.4.5 and 6.4.2.
  5. UFSAR, Section 14.6.
  6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
  7. NEDC-32163P, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis," January 1993.
  8. 10 CFR 50.46.
  9. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
  10. UFSAR, Section 10.17.6.
  11. Issue Report 189167, Operability of RHR while in Test Modes/Torus Cooling.
- 

→  
Insert 3



BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable RCIC system. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable RCIC system and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

A.1 and A.2

If the RCIC System is inoperable during MODE 1, or MODE 2 or 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, and the HPCI System is immediately verified to be OPERABLE, the RCIC System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, loss of the RCIC System will not affect the overall plant capability to provide makeup inventory at high reactor pressure since the HPCI System is the only high pressure system assumed to function during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). OPERABILITY of HPCI is therefore immediately verified when the RCIC System is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if HPCI is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean it is necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System. If the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System cannot be verified immediately, however, Condition B must be immediately entered. For certain transients and abnormal events with no LOCA, RCIC (as opposed to HPCI) is the preferred source of makeup coolant because of its relatively small capacity, which allows easier control of the RPV water level. Therefore, a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable RCIC to OPERABLE status.

The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 3) that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (AOTs). Because of similar functions of HPCI and RCIC, the AOTs (i.e., Completion Times) determined for HPCI are also applied to RCIC.

B.1 and B.2

If the RCIC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if the HPCI System is simultaneously inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the ~~LCO does not apply~~. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to ~~≤ 150 psig within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Time is

Overall plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1

(continued)



BASES

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ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

*is* ~~are~~ reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

---

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1

The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. An acceptable method of ensuring the line is full is to vent at the high points. The 31 day Frequency is based on the gradual nature of void buildup in the RCIC piping, the procedural controls governing system operation, and operating experience.

SR 3.5.3.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

(continued)

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BASES (continued)

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- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 1.5.
  2. UFSAR, Section 4.7.
  3. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
- 

Insert 2



BASES

LCO  
(continued)

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

overall plant risk is minimized.

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 1

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), or main steam isolation

(continued)



BASES (continued)

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 14.9.
2. Letter G94-PEPR-183, Peach Bottom Improved Technical Specification Project Increased Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure Analytical Limits, from G.V. Kumar (GE) to A.A. Winter (PECO), August 23, 1994.
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
4. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment Nos. 127 and 130 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, dated February 18, 1988.
5. NEI 94-01, Revision 0, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J."
6. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements."
7. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Evaluation for Extended Final Feedwater Reduction, NEDC-32707P, Supplement 1, Revision 0, May, 1998.

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Insert Z



BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)


"Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers." The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining breakers, the fact that the OPERABLE breaker in each of the lines is closed, and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the vacuum breakers to be OPERABLE during this period.

B.1

With one or more lines with two vacuum breakers not closed, primary containment integrity is not maintained. Therefore, one open vacuum breaker must be closed within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

C.1

With one line with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the leak tight primary containment boundary is intact. The ability to mitigate an event that causes a containment depressurization is threatened if one or more vacuum breakers in at least one vacuum breaker penetration are not OPERABLE. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breaker must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This is consistent with the Completion Time for Condition A and the fact that the leak tight primary containment boundary is being maintained.



With two lines with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the primary containment boundary is intact. However, in the event of a containment depressurization, the function of the vacuum breakers is lost. Therefore, all vacuum breakers in one line must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

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(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

E → E.1 and E.2 F

for Conditions A, B, or E

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.5.1

Verifying that the level in the CAD liquid nitrogen tank is  $\geq 16$  inches water column will ensure at least 7 days of post-LOCA SGIG System operation. This minimum volume of liquid nitrogen allows sufficient time after an accident to replenish the nitrogen supply in order to maintain the design function of the reactor building-to-suppression vacuum breakers. The level is verified every 24 hours to ensure that the system is capable of performing its intended isolation function when required. The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience, which has shown to be an acceptable period to verify liquid nitrogen supply. The 24 hour Frequency also signifies the importance of the SGIG System for maintaining the design function of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers.

SR 3.6.1.5.2

This SR ensures that the pressure in the SGIG System header is  $\geq 80$  psig. This ensures that the post-LOCA nitrogen pressure provided to the valve operators and valve seals that is adequate for the SGIG to perform its design function. The 24 hour Frequency was developed considering the importance of the SGIG System for maintaining the design function of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers. The 24 hour Frequency is also considered to be adequate to ensure timely detection of any breach in the SGIG System which would render the system incapable of performing its function.

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.5.5

Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properly to perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 92 day Frequency of this SR was developed based upon Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days.

SR 3.6.1.5.6

Demonstration of air operated vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of  $\leq 0.75$  psid is valid. The 18 month Frequency is based on requirements associated with the instruments that monitor differential pressure between the reactor building and suppression chamber and that this Surveillance can be performed while the plant is operating. For this unit, the 18 month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the surveillance when performed at an 18 month frequency, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

SR 3.6.1.5.7

This SR ensures that in case the non-safety grade instrument air system is unavailable, the SGIG System will perform its design function to supply nitrogen gas at the required pressure for valve operators and valve seals supported by the SGIG System. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during a plant outage. Operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

None

Insert 2




BASES


ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

because a single failure in one of the remaining vacuum breakers could result in an excessive suppression chamber-to-drywell differential pressure during a DBA. Therefore, with one of the nine required vacuum breakers inoperable, 72 hours is allowed to restore the inoperable vacuum breaker to OPERABLE status so that plant conditions are consistent with those assumed for the design basis analysis. The 72 hour Completion Time is considered acceptable due to the low probability of an event in which the remaining vacuum breaker capability would not be adequate.



An open vacuum breaker allows communication between the drywell and suppression chamber airspace, and, as a result, there is the potential for suppression chamber overpressurization due to this bypass leakage if a LOCA were to occur. Therefore, the open vacuum breaker must be closed. A short time is allowed to close the vacuum breaker due to the low probability of an event that would pressurize primary containment. If vacuum breaker position indication is not reliable, an alternate method of verifying that the vacuum breakers are closed must be performed within 10 hours. All suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers are considered closed, even if the "not fully seated" indication is shown, if a leak test confirms that the bypass area between the drywell and suppression chamber is less than or equivalent to a one-inch diameter hole (Ref. 1). The required 10 hour Completion Time is considered adequate to perform this test. If the leak test fails, not only must the Actions be taken (close the open vacuum breaker within 10 hours), but also the appropriate Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, Primary Containment, must be entered.



If the ~~inoperable~~ suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker cannot be closed ~~or restored to OPERABLE status~~ within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least

(continued)



BASES



ACTIONS

0.1 and 0.2 (continued)

MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.6.1

Each vacuum breaker is verified closed to ensure that this potential large bypass leakage path is not present. This Surveillance is performed by observing the vacuum breaker position indication or by performing a leak test that confirms that the bypass area between the drywell and suppression chamber is less than or equivalent to a one-inch diameter hole. If the bypass test fails, not only must the vacuum breaker(s) be considered open and the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of this LCO be entered, but also the appropriate Condition and Required Action of LCO 3.6.1.1 must be entered. The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

A Note is added to this SR which allows suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR. These periods of opening vacuum breakers are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable vacuum breakers.

SR 3.6.1.6.2

Each required vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 31 day Frequency of this SR was developed, based on Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days. A 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide additional assurance that the vacuum breakers are OPERABLE, since they are located in a harsh environment (the suppression chamber airspace).

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.6.3

Verification of the vacuum breaker setpoint for full opening is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of 0.5 psid is valid. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. For this facility, the 24 month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

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REFERENCES

1. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment Nos. 127 and 130 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, dated February 18, 1988.
2. ME-0161, "Det. Actual # Wetwell to Drywell Vacuum Breakers Req'd"

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Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

Insert 1 →

C → B.1

With two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable, one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment pressure and temperature mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available.

D  
→ C.1 and C.2

of condition C

the

If ~~any~~ Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met ~~within the required Completion Time~~, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1 (continued)

the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

SR 3.6.2.3.2

Verifying that each required RHR pump develops a flow rate  $\geq 10,000$  gpm while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode with flow through the associated heat exchanger ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 2). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.



BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment bypass mitigation capability. The 7 day Completion Time was chosen in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool spray capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1

With both RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this Condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available.

C.1 and C.2

If the inoperable RHR suppression pool spray subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the ~~LCO does not apply~~. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours ~~and~~ ~~MODE 4 within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Times ~~are~~ reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Overall plant risk is minimized.

Insert 1

(5)

IS

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1 (continued)

exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

SR 3.6.2.4.2

This Surveillance is performed every 10 years to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that flow will be provided when required. The 10 year Frequency is adequate to detect degradation in performance due to the passive nozzle design and its normally dry state and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Sections 5.2 and 14.6.3.

Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

Overall plant  
risk is minimized.

is

If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 1

C.1, C.2, and C.3

Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 (continued)

seconds using one SGT subsystem. SR 3.6.4.1.4 demonstrates that the pressure in the secondary containment can be maintained  $\geq 0.25$  inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour using one SGT subsystem at a flow rate  $\leq 10,500$  cfm. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. The primary purpose of these SRs is to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. The secondary purpose of these SRs is to ensure that the SGT subsystem being tested functions as designed. There is a Separate LCO with Surveillance Requirements which serves the primary purpose of ensuring OPERABILITY of the SGT System. These SRs need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystem used for these Surveillances is staggered to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform this test. The inoperability of the SGT System does not necessarily constitute a failure of these Surveillances relative to the secondary containment OPERABILITY. Operating experience has shown the secondary containment boundary usually passes these Surveillances when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.
2. UFSAR, Section 14.6.4.

Insert 2



## BASES

LCO  
(continued)

For Unit 3, one SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when one charcoal filter train, one fan (OCV020) and associated ductwork, dampers, valves, and controls are OPERABLE. The second SGT subsystem is OPERABLE when the other charcoal filter train, one fan (OBV020) and associated ductwork, damper, valves, and controls are OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

### A.1

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

### B.1 and B.2

*Overall plant risk is minimized.*

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

*Insert 1*

*36 hours*. The allowed Completion Times *are* reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. *is*

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

D.1

Insert 2

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, actions are required to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

E.1, E.2, and E.3

When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.3.1

Operating each SGT subsystem (including each filter train fan) for  $\geq 15$  minutes ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) for  $\geq 15$  minutes every 31 days is sufficient to eliminate moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters since during idle periods instrument air is injected into the filter plenum to keep the filters dry. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system.

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.4.3.2

This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3

This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.6.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 1.5.1.6.
  2. UFSAR, Section 14.9.
- 

Insert 3




BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)


could result in loss of HPSW function. The Completion Time is based on the redundant HPSW capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of an event occurring requiring HPSW during this period.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.7, be entered and Required Actions taken if an inoperable HPSW subsystem results in an inoperable RHR shutdown cooling subsystem. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.



With both HPSW subsystems inoperable, the HPSW System is not capable of performing its intended function. At least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time for restoring one HPSW subsystem to OPERABLE status, is based on the Completion Times provided for the RHR suppression pool cooling and spray functions.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.7, be entered and Required Actions taken if an inoperable HPSW subsystem results in an inoperable RHR shutdown cooling subsystem. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.



If the HPSW subsystems cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

of Condition C

(continued)



BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.1.1

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual and power operated valve in each HPSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for HPSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be realigned to its accident position. This is acceptable because the HPSW System is a manually initiated system.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 10.7.
  2. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
  3. NEDC-32183P, "Power Rerate Safety Analysis Report For Peach Bottom 2 & 3," May 1993.
  4. UFSAR, Section 14.6.3.
- 

Insert 2



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.7.2.4

This SR verifies that the ESW System pumps will automatically start to provide cooling water to the required safety related equipment during an accident event. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated initiation signal.

Operating experience has shown that these components will usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
- 

Insert 1



## BASES

### ACTIONS

#### A.1 (continued)

result in reduced MCREV System capability. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

#### B.1 and B.2

Overall plant

Insert 1

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable MCREV subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours ~~and in MODE 4 within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Times ~~are~~ <sup>is</sup> reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

#### C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable MCREV subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE MCREV subsystem may be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

(continued)



BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3 (continued)

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

D.1

If both MCREV subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the MCREV System may not be capable of performing the intended function ~~and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.~~

Insert 2

E.1, E.2, and E.3

The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two MCREV subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.7.4.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas (the turbine building), is periodically tested to verify proper function of the MCREV System. During operation, the MCREV System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room  $\geq 0.1$  inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the turbine building to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The MCREV System is designed to provide this positive pressure at a flow rate of  $\geq 2700$  cfm and  $\leq 3300$  cfm to the control room when in operation. Manual adjustment of the MCREV System may be required to establish the flow rate of  $\geq 2700$  cfm and  $\leq 3300$  cfm during SR performance. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with other filtration systems SRs.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.19.
2. UFSAR, Section 10.13.
3. UFSAR, Section 12.3.4.
4. UFSAR, Section 14.9.1.5.

Insert 3



BASES

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LCO (continued) with this requirement ( $3293 \text{ MWt} \times 100 \mu\text{Ci/MWt-second} = 320,000 \mu\text{Ci/second}$ ) and is based on the original licensed rated thermal power.

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APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System. This occurs during MODE 1, and during MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and the SJAE in operation. In MODES 4 and 5, steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable.

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ACTIONS

A.1

If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the low probability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture.

B.1, B.2, <sup>and</sup> B.3.1, and B.3.2

If the gross gamma activity rate is not restored to within the limits in the associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAE must be isolated. This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from the source of the radioactive steam. The main steam lines are considered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line inboard of the main steam isolation valves is closed. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

overall plant risk is minimized.

An alternative to Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is to place the unit in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating

(continued)

Insert 1



BASES

---

ACTIONS

*and*  
B.1, B.2, B.3 ~~1~~ and ~~B.3.2~~ (continued)

experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

---

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.1

This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85m, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by  $\geq 50\%$  after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31 day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitor the offgas, and is acceptable, based on operating experience.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.4.5.
  2. 10 CFR 100.
- 

*Insert 2*



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

F.1

With two or more DGs inoperable, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for the majority of ESF equipment at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown. (The immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power.) Since any inadvertent unit generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with two or more DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours. (Regulatory Guide 1.93 assumed the unit has two DGs. Thus, a loss of both DGs results in a total loss of onsite power. Therefore, a loss of more than two DGs, in the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station design, results in degradation no worse than that assumed in Regulatory Guide 1.93.)

G.1 and G.2

If the inoperable AC electrical power source(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time (Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, E, or F not met; or Required Action B.2, B.3, B.4.1, B.4.2, or B.5 and associated Completion Time not met), the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. is

Insert 1

(continued)

overall plant risk is minimized.



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.21 (continued)

Unit 2 Technical Specifications exempts performance of a Unit 2 SR (However, as stated in the Unit 2 SR 3.8.2.1 Note, while performance of an SR is exempted, the SR still must be met).

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Sections 1.5 and 8.4.2.
  2. UFSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4.
  3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, July 1993.
  4. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
  5. Generic Letter 84-15.
  6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
  7. UFSAR, Section 1.5.1.
  8. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.
  9. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.
  10. UFSAR, Section 8.5.
- 

Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

D.1 and D.2

overall plant  
risk is minimized.

Insert 1

If the DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the ~~LCO does not apply~~. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours ~~and to MODE 4 within 36 hours~~. The allowed Completion Times ~~are~~ reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time specified in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref 4).

is

E.1

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the DC electrical power subsystems that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one DC source is lost, this results in a loss of a required function, thus the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

As Noted at the beginning of the SRs, SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 are applicable only to the Unit 3 DC electrical power subsystems and SR 3.8.4.9 is applicable only to the Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems.

SR 3.8.4.1

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are

(continued)



BASES

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REFERENCES  
(continued)

4. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
  5. IEEE Standard 450, 1987.
- 

Insert 2



BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 (continued)

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition D was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely.

E.1 and E.2

overall plant risk is minimized.

If the inoperable electrical power distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

is

Insert 1

F.1

Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one Condition is entered, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment (for the AC electrical power distribution system only). The correct AC breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and power is available to each required bus. The verification of indicated power availability on the AC and DC buses

(continued)



BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1 (continued)

ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. This may be performed by verification of absence of low voltage alarms. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

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REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
  2. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
- 

Insert 2



## ENCLOSURE 4

### LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) in this document. Any other statements in the submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENT	COMMITTED DATE	COMMITMENT TYPE	
		ONE-TIME ACTION (Yes/No)	PROGRAMMATIC (Yes/No)
EGC will follow the guidance established in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear Management and Resource Council, Revision 3, July 2000.	Ongoing	No	Yes
EGC will follow the guidance established in TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance for TSTF-423, Revision 0, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," September 2005.	Implement with amendment	No	Yes