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March 29, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Duke Energy Corporation
Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 270 and 287
Withdrawal of Unresolved Item 2005004-08 Response

References: (1) Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2005004, 05000270/2005004, 05000287/2005004,
(2) Duke letter to the NRC dated February 15, 2006, that provided supporting information in the disposition of Unresolved Items (URI) 2005004-10 and 2005004-08 as detailed in Ref. 1 above.

In Reference (2), Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) provided supporting information for the Staff's consideration in the disposition of Unresolved Items (URI) 2005004-10 and 2005004-08 as detailed in Reference (1). The purpose of this letter is to notify the Staff that the evaluation in Ref. 2 in connection with URI 2005004-08 contained two inaccuracies which were identified after the letter was sent. Accordingly, Duke is withdrawing that evaluation from further consideration.

Specifically, in Ref. 2, Attachment 2, Duke addressed two conditions from an evaluation of an Auxiliary Building (AB) HELB event. The first condition was the potential flooding of Main Feedwater (MFDW) breaks located at the terminal end(s). Breaks at these locations are described in MDS Report OS-73.2, and form part of the HELB CLB. Duke affirms that the analysis of this condition described in Ref. 2, Attachment 2, is accurate. As initially identified by the NRC senior resident, the second condition involved the potential flooding from critical cracks in the MFDW System located in the AB. Associated with this condition, Duke reanalyzed the actual plant configuration and concluded that the description of AB interconnecting trenches was indeed, inaccurate. Specifically, it was stated in Ref. 2, Attachment 2, that "no direct pathways exist that would allow water to flow preferentially to one unit's HPI pump rooms via the pipe chase." This statement was based on an inadequate

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visual inspection of the construction of interconnecting trenches. Additionally, based upon further review and discussions with industry peers, Duke has determined that the use in Ref. 2, Attachment 2, of a reduced discharge coefficient in connection with this event was not defensible based on current regulatory standards and industry best practices. For this reason, Duke's initial URI evaluation is being withdrawn.

In evaluating the AB HELB event addressed in URI 2005004-08, Duke was addressing a matter outside the CLB with regards to the choice of MFDW critical crack locations and the associated potential flooding issues. Specifically, upon a re-review of the design basis as described in MDS report OS-73.2, which was previously reviewed and approved by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Duke has determined that critical cracks were properly addressed and eliminated from consideration based on stress. As stated in this report, certain MFDW break and crack locations had previously been analyzed with arbitrary break/crack locations eliminated from consideration based on pipe stress results. This rationale was based on reasonable engineering analysis and satisfied the overall intent of the HELB requirements established by the AEC at that time (Ref. "Safety Evaluation prepared by the Directorate of Licensing relating to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3," dated July 6, 1973). Consequently, the CLB does not identify any additional MFDW break/crack locations in the AB other than those provided in MDS Report OS-73.2.

Based on technical enhancements in HELB analysis criteria, Duke continues to evaluate prior assumptions used in the original 1973 report. As a part of the effort, Duke will seek to gain acceptance from the NRC to apply certain portions of BTP MEB 3-1 for determining critical crack locations. Following Staff approval of the MEB LAR, Duke will evaluate those critical crack locations and incorporate these into the licensing basis. In addition, modifications will be implemented by the end of 2007 that will eliminate the flooding potential to the AB due to HELBs occurring in the East Penetration Room.

Although Duke concludes that the conditions regarding the analysis of critical cracks in the MFDW system located in the AB described in URI 2005004-08 are outside the CLB, Duke believes that the assumptions in the CLB warrant submission of a Licensee Event Report to the Staff. Duke continues in its efforts to completely reconstitute the HELB CLB in an effort to improve the overall HELB mitigation strategy.

If you have any questions or comments regarding these issues, please contact Stephen C. Newman of the Oconee Nuclear Site Regulatory Compliance Group at 864-885-4388.

Sincerely,

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