



March 31, 2006

L-MT-06-017
10 CFR Part 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Docket No. 50-263
License No. DPR-22

LER 2006-001, "Unplanned LCO due to Emergency Filter Flexible Connector Failure"

A Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached.

This letter makes no new commitments or changes any existing commitments.

John T. Conway
Site Vice President, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Enclosure

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Monticello, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Monticello, USNRC

JE22

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 <small>Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.</small>		EXPIRES 6-30-2007		
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)								
FACILITY NAME (1) Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant				DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000263		PAGE (3) 1 of 3		
TITLE (4) Unplanned LCO due to Emergency Filter Flexible Connector Failure								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)		
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR
02	01	2006	2006	- 001	- 00	04	03	2006
OPERATING MODE (9)			POWER LEVEL (10)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)		
N			100			20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)		
20.2201(d)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)		
20.2203(a)(1)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 73.71(a)(4)		
20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(5)		
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) OTHER		
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.46(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) Specify in Abstract below or		
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)			X	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)								
NAME Ron Baumer						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 763-295-1357		
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER
X	BH	FCON	A220	Y				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO						MONTH	DAY	YEAR
ABSTRACT <p>On February 1, 2006 at 2300 with the unit operating at 100% power, the unit "A" train (V-ERF-11) of the Emergency Filtration (EFT) system tripped. Investigation found that the rubber boot between the filter unit and the suction of the fan had ripped resulting in a low flow condition through the filter. The low flow condition initiated an automatic trip of the operating unit. Due to the back leakage through the tear in the "A" filter boot and in order to perform an extent of condition review, the "B" train (V-ERF-12) of the EFT system was declared inoperable. The station entered a 24-hour LCO for both trains being inoperable at 2300. A manual damper was closed to isolate the potential in-leakage from the "A" train to the "B" train. An extent of condition review of the "B" unit boot was completed and the "B" EFT system was declared operable at 0302 on February 2, 2006. The 24-hour LCO was exited at 0302. An eight hour ENS notification was made to the NRC at 0351 on February 2, 2006 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (v) (D). The replacement of the boots on EFT Train "A" and "B" were completed on February 2, 2006.</p> <p>The cause of the event was failure by the station to consider the effect of changing operating conditions on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) frequency for V-ERF-11 and -12. The station has replaced the rubber boots on both EFT trains and will revise the PM frequency for future replacements of the rubber boots.</p>								

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Description

On February 1, 2006 at 2300 with the unit operating at 100% power, the unit "A" train (V-ERF-11) of the Emergency Filtration (EFT) [BH] system tripped. Investigation found that the rubber boot [FCON] between the filter unit and the suction of the fan had ripped resulting in a low flow condition through the filter. The low flow condition initiated an automatic trip of the operating unit. Due to the back leakage through the tear in the "A" filter boot and in order to perform an extent of condition review, the "B" train (V-ERF-12) of the EFT system was declared inoperable. The station entered a 24-hour LCO for both trains being inoperable at 2300. A manual damper was closed to isolate the potential in-leakage from the "A" train to the "B" train. An extent of condition review of the "B" unit boot was completed and the "B" EFT system was declared operable at 0302 on February 2, 2006. The 24-hour LCO was exited at 0302. An eight hour ENS notification was made to the NRC at 0351 on February 2, 2006 in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The replacement of the boots on EFT Train "A" and "B" were completed on February 2, 2006.

Investigation of the failed boot from Train "A" found cracks and tears due to aging and service related degradation. Inspection of the boot removed from Train "B" found similar cracking to a smaller extent, however no tears were found in the boot.

Event Analysis

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), "Event or Condition that could have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function," an eight-hour event notification was made to the USNRC, due to the loss of the emergency filtration capability for accident mitigation. Per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D), a Licensee Event report is required for this event.

The event is classified as a safety system functional failure.

Safety Significance

Following trip of V-ERF-11, both trains of EFT were declared inoperable. This was due to the tear on V-ERF-11 boot which prevented proper functioning of the unit, and potential backflow through the tear that could have prevented proper operation of V-ERF-12. This condition could have prevented the "A" and "B" EFT/CRV system trains from performing the safety related functions. These functions include maintaining habitability during a toxic chemical release or in the event of high radiation detected in the outside air, and providing a controlled environment (humidity and temperature) for safety related equipment located in the Main Control Room and the EFT Building boundaries during post accident conditions. The "A" CRV was not capable of performing those functions until the boot was replaced. Following isolation of V-ERF-11, an evaluation of the V-ERF-12 boot was performed and V-ERF-12 was declared operable. Subsequently, the boot on V-ERF-12 was replaced.

The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) group performed an evaluation for significance. The risk impact incurred by the failure of the rubber boot was of low significance. Scenarios that involve control room habitability concluded that the risk of requiring control room ventilation to be isolated is negligible,

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and degradation of EFT ventilation system reliability (loss of both trains, for example) poses a negligible risk impact.

Cause

The station changed the operating conditions of V-ERF-11 and V-ERF-12 in 1996 from a standby condition to continuous operation. The cause of this event was failure by the station to consider the effect of changing the operating conditions on the PM frequency on V-ERF-11 and V-ERF-12. This change increased the amount of time the rubber boots were under stress from temperature changes and operating stresses.

Corrective Action

The following corrective actions have been taken or will be tracked to completion in the station's corrective action program:

1. The rubber boot on V-ERF-11 was replaced.
2. The rubber boot on V-ERF-12 was replaced.
3. The station will revise the replacement frequency for the rubber boots.

Failed Component Identification

Manufacturer: American Air Filter
Connector, Flexible (9 inch diameter) – Catalog ID - VAGSGC

Previous Similar Events

No previous station events were found.