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7 - 9/02 steam leak event. When doing plant manipulations - it was his mgr expectation that one of the be present for power changes. He came into work later afternoon on 9/21 to support turbine valve testing scheduled for Unit 2 that night - to do that power had to be reduced to 47% - it was his resp to for that evolution - not the entire shift. At approx 11:00 pm FORD reported to him the steam leak. Van told him it was 22-MS-42 and asked if he wanted to take a look - "sure." when he and FORD got there FORD commented that it had gotten worse in the last few minutes.

11 - he and FORD went back to CR, entered abnormal procedure steam 2318, made conf call to FRICKER, WALDINGER, KEN CUTLER - discussed options - call in contractor to fix while on line. Left call with CUTLER pursuing contractor options to see if it could be done - at that point plant was at 47%. During conf. call the CRS is directing the use of the procedure and WHITE holds at section 2335 of procedure - where it asks if the leak is insoluble or repairable in present plant condition. Because could not get contractor to site for several hours - in 2nd conf call decision made to shut plant down - says call last approx 10 minutes - by keeping power at 47% was worse off steam leak wise than keeping plant at 100% - left conf call with all (including him) in alignment to commence plant shut down. FORD then went into CR to begin brief on the down power for the shutdown - and went back into turbine bldg to look at condition of leak again to see where steam was because 1st look did not take time to ID where leak was coming from and saw that leak was all on downstream side of valve and asked one of maintenance supervisor or superintendent if closing valve would isolate leak and was told "yes" believed it would - believes it was Dan Franklin and that Tony Wescott was there (pp. 26-27).

29 comes back to CR and briefing for down power is going on - he informed FORD that he believed by isolating valve 22-MS-42 will isolate steam leak - and to do that would need to reduce speed on one of steam generator feed pumps and take load and put it all on other feed pump - and thinks he asked FORD to hold up the brief, to swap over feed pumps and make that the priority now which you would have to do anyway at 0139 a.m. CR. log reads "Tripped 22 ..." and load transferred over to the MS-21. FORD told him he didn't think safe to do from personal safety standpoint and he and FORD discussed it while rest of crew continued brief on down power. Says his suggestion to swap pumps in attempt to close valve at this point was a decision that had not been made that that was what they going to do. - he was kind of bouncing it off FORD to get his perspective. VF voiced the safety concern with steam leak not allowing for free path to close valve - but explained his belief that it could be done. FOCUS ON P. 36. SEQUENCE OF WHAT AND WHEN HE KNEW AND TOLD VAN.

38 - says while on way to valve with CORDREY he explained to him how he was going to close it with the ladder

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40 because of bus alarms he now believes that continuing to shut plant down is not the safest thing to do because when go to transfer the buses they are most likely not going to transfer - and communicated that to VF - at approx 1240 am he told VF that the solution to the plant problems is to close 22-MS-42 - VF once again says he doesn't think it is safe and he tells VF he can do it - VF says who's going to close it - and [redacted] said "I am going to close it VF says "you are going to close it [redacted] says "yes" I'm going to close it." - he believed if leak stayed as is he could close it safely - but if it got worse while he was up there it could create an injury and he didn't want to subject somebody else to that - "I couldn't live with myself if I'd have asked somebody else to do it and they would've got hurt and that's why I said I'd do it; I didn't want to jeopardize or put somebody in harm's way." (P. 43)

44 - told VF success path to prevent being challenged from loss of reactor coolant pumps is to isolate the steam leak. VF it is not safe who's going to do it - "I'll do it." - he felt if VF saying it not safe [redacted] didn't have the right to say that he would then have one of VF's NEOs close it - so at that point had to have CR swap over feed pumps - not sure who gave direction to RO - either VF or Bill White - CRS RO who swapped pumps was Bill WALLACE. Agrees that someone else in CR was in agreement with the swap - and "wants to say that Van gave the direction, but I just can't recall." He cannot speak on whether or not Van agreed with swapping over - he doesn't remember a lot of resistance about swapping the steam generator feed-pumps, or a lot of discussion about doing it. **ASK BILL WHITE TO EXPLAIN THIS WHOLE ISSUE FROM DIRECTION STANDPOINT AND TECH STANDPOINT - DID THE SWAP HAVE TO BE DONE BEFORE THE SWAP COULD BE DONE???** He says he did not take over direction of shift at that point because all of his discussions were going thru VF, trying to maintain chain of command [and not giving direction directly to crew]

49 - thinks discussion about who going to close valve occurred after they received the overhead alarm [control room log shows alarm at 1235 am] indicating that group bus may not transfer - "To me, that was kind of the point that it was - -became critical in the decision, that, hey, we had the capability to isolate this steam leak and we needed to take actions before further degradation occurred or loss of group busses..." I think that is where the major conversation between VF and [redacted] about closing the valve. CR shows that [redacted] notified CR at 1250 that he closed the valve.

50 - when he responded to VF statement that it wasn't safe [redacted] told VF that "I was going to close the valve" and would take CORDREY (as his safety guy to notify the CR if something went awry) [as he was walking away from the conversation . . . " what did VF say "I don't remember a response . . He may not have had a response." **QUESTION - FOR VAN FORD - DID [redacted] TELL YOU HE WAS TAKING CORDREY - AS HIS SAFETY GUY?? IF SO - LENDS CREDENCE THAT [redacted] TOLD VF HE WAS GOING TO CLOSE THE VALVE.** At this time the briefing for down power was still going on - his discussion with VF away from center in CR area. "I am positive. . . I was asked, Who is going to close the valve? And I said, I am closing; I am going to close the valve." I'm absolutely positive of that interaction" although WHITE is still briefing the shift the way the shift still thinks the plant is going to go [to shutdown] [redacted] says that is not a conflict because procedurally still in abnormal operating procedure - still following the path/belief that steam cannot be isolated and path is to shut the plant down. [redacted] going down different path [redacted] "That's perfectly acceptable because there are 2

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success paths parallel success paths 1. Is to shut plant down, close main steam isolation valves and isolate steam leak, the other potential success path is close the valve that's leaking and isolate the steam leak. Says pump swap had to be done for either success path. [redacted] says pump swap done most likely to allow him to close the valve. **QUESTION FOR BILL WHITE TRUE OR FALSE????** Because of timing of swap - says would not have done it for plant shutdown because they were still briefing for down power and had not taken steps toward shutdown path. **Bill white true or false???** Says he knows there were reactivity management taking effect [in prep for shutdown] - but not sure if they were being done as part of previous 50% down power or in prep for shutdown. - he remembers discussing the pump swap with **BILL WALLACE - QUESTION FOR HIM?? (P. 57-58)**. Explains process of swapping - take pump 22 to idle, put in manual, reduce speed and pump 21 automatically picks up the load [redacted] says he was physically there when WALLACE swapped the pumps - **QUESTION FOR BILL WHITE AND BILL WALLACE - TRUE OR FALSE???** - REMEMBERS TELLING BILL (NFI) "Hey, we're going to have to do this to support closing the valve so if it is closed, if it gets closed, we don't isolate the steam flow to the pump" Q- bill who??? Ask WHITE and WALLACE . He has no reason to believe VF did not know that was being done - then says he doesn't know for sure or not. He believes **BILL WHITE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THIS DIRECTION WAS GIVEN** - he would HOPE WHITE KNEW AND THAT THE DIRECTION TO DO IT CAME FROM WHITE. - his fear is that after discussing it with WALLACE about needing to take those actions - that was what instigated WALLACE to do it without **DISCUSSING IT WITH THE CRS WHITE - QUESTION FOR BILL WHITE AND WALLACE - TRUE OR FALSE?** Thought he was clear to VF that he wanted VF to remain in CR because of earlier lessons learned - then after closing valve he sees VF there (p. 67). And asked VF - why are you here - VF says "I wanted to make sure this wasn't unsafe. . ." Nothing said by VF that made him believe VF did not know what [redacted] was doing. Q- ASK VF **WHAT HE FIRST SAID TO [redacted] AND ASK CORDREY WHAT HE RECALLS VF SAYING TO [redacted]** [redacted] didn't know the message he got from VF was that VF was unsure how I was going to do it safely. - lends some credence to his belief in that VF did not stop him from leaving the CR with questions on how it was going to be done safely or what my intent was. or follow him immediately - VF arrived at area as valve was being closed or approx 2 minutes after he left CR (P. 71)

71 - [redacted] assumed that VF was going to tell crew that [redacted] closing the valve

78 - admits he did not communicate clearly and up to his own expectations - because after the fact learned that everybody was not aware of what was going on, had full communications, or felt that they were involved in the decisions - but it wasn't intentional

85 - "thinks" **BILL WALLACE** heard [redacted] tell VF he was going to close the valve." **QUESTION FOR WALLACE - TRUE OR FALSE** - but not saying it was where he told VF just before leaving the CR.

93 - says step 340 of AB steam abnormal procedure allowed him to close the valve - says what he did not violate any station operating practice procedures. Says other than VF and Bob

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CORDREY he did not tell anyone else that he was going to close the valve. [REDACTED] 5.

99 more on how he complied with the procedure - think-in-compliance leak was insoluble

104 - that night [REDACTED] thought he was communicating properly with the proper people being VF, we didn't 3 point communicate on it 7C