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# Safety Evaluation Report

With Open Items Related to the License Renewal of  
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410

Constellation Energy Group, LLC

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

March 2006



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## ABSTRACT

This safety evaluation report (SER) documents the technical review of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (NMPNS), license renewal application (LRA) by the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (the staff). By letter dated May 26, 2004, Constellation Energy Group, LLC submitted the LRA for NMPNS in accordance with Title 10, Part 54, of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR Part 54). Due to concerns with the adequacy of support for and documentation of the license renewal activities in the initial submission, the applicant submitted an amended LRA (ALRA) on July 14, 2005. Constellation Energy Group, LLC is requesting renewal of the operating licenses for NMPNS (Facility Operating License Numbers DPR-63 and NPF-69, respectively), for a period of 20 years beyond the current expiration dates of midnight August 22, 2009, for Unit 1 (NMP1) and midnight October 31, 2026, for Unit 2 (NMP2).

NMPNS is located approximately six miles northeast of Oswego, NY. The NRC issued the construction permits for NMP1 on April 12, 1965, and for NMP2 on June 24, 1974. The NRC issued the operating licenses for NMP1 on December 26, 1974 and for NMP2 on July 2, 1987. NMP1 is a boiling water reactor design with a Mark 1 containment. The nuclear steam supply system was supplied by General Electric and the balance of the plant was originally designed and constructed by Stone and Webster with the assistance of its agent, Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation. NMP1's licensed power output is 1850 megawatt thermal, with a gross electrical output of approximately 615 megawatt electric. NMP2 is a boiling water reactor design with a Mark 2 containment. The nuclear steam supply system was supplied by General Electric and the balance of the plant was originally designed and constructed by Stone and Webster. NMP2's licensed power output is 3467 megawatt thermal, with a gross electrical output of approximately 1144 megawatt electric.

This SER presents the status of the staff's review of information submitted to the staff through December 13, 2005, the cutoff date for consideration in this SER. The staff identified two open items that have to be resolved before the staff makes a final determination on the application. The staff will present its final conclusion on the review of the NMPNS application in its update to this SER.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

115KVAC	115KV AC electrical distribution
120VAC	120V AC electrical distribution
125VDC	125V DC electrical distribution
13.8KVAC	13.8KV AC electrical distribution
24VDC	24V DC electrical distribution
4.16KVAC	4.16KV AC electrical distribution
600VAC	600V AC electrical distribution
AC	alternating current
ACI	American Concrete Institute
ACRS	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
ADAMS	Agency Document Access Management System
AERM	aging effects requiring management
AFW	auxiliary feedwater
AISC	American Institute of Steel Construction
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ALRA	amended license renewal application
AMP	aging management program
AMR	aging management review
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
ARI	alternate rod insertion
ART	adjusted reference temperature
ASB	auxiliary service building
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
ATWS	anticipated transient without scram
B24V	battery-24V-station
BSW	biological shield wall
BTP	branch technical position
BWR	boiling water reactor
BWROG	Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group
BWRVIP	boiling water reactor vessel internals project
CAS	compressed air system
CASS	cast austenitic stainless steel
CBF	cycle-based fatigue
CCCWS	closed-cycle cooling water system
CEG	Constellation Energy Group
CF	chemistry factor
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CGG	Constellation Generation Group
CI	confirmatory item
CLB	current licensing basis
CMEB	Chemical and Mechanical Engineering Branch
CRB	control room building

CRD	control rod drive
CRDRL	control rod drive return line
CSH	high pressure core spray
CST	condensate storage tank
CUF	cumulative usage factor
DBA	design basis accident
DBD	design basis document
DBE	design basis event
DBTT	ductile-to-brittle transition temperature
DC	direct current
DER	deviation event report
DG	diesel generator
DGB	diesel generator building
EC	emergency condenser
ECCS	emergency core cooling systems
ECP	electrochemical cooling system
ECS	emergency cooling system
ECT	eddy current testing
EDG	emergency diesel generator
EFPY	effective full power years
EMA	equivalent margin analysis
EOL	end of life
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
EQ	environmental qualification
ERV	electromatic relief valve
ESF	engineered safety feature
EVT-1	enhanced VT-1 visual inspection
EYS	essential yard structures
FAC	flow-accelerated corrosion
$F_{en}$	environmental fatigue life correction factor
FMP	fatigue monitoring program
FP	fire protection
FPEE	fire protection engineering evaluation
FSAR	final safety analysis report
FW	feedwater
FW/HPCI	feedwater/ high pressure coolant injection
FWS	feedwater system
GALL	Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report
GDC	general design criteria or general design criterion
GE	general electric
GEIS	Generic Environmental Impact Statement
GL	generic letter
GSI	generic safety issue
GWT	ground water table

HCU	hydraulic control unit
HELB	high-energy line break
HEPA	high efficiency particulate air
HFIR	high flux isotope reactor
HPCI	high pressure coolant injection
HPCS	high pressure core spray
HVAC	heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
HWC	hydrogen water chemistry
HX	heat exchanger
I&C	instrumentation and controls
IASCC	irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking
IBA	intermediate-break accident
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IGA	intergranular attack
IGSCC	intergranular stress corrosion cracking
IN	information notice
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IPA	integrated plant assessment
ISG	interim staff guidance
ISI	inservice inspection
ISP	integrated surveillance program
J	joule
J-R	joule-resistant
KV	kilovolt
KVA	kilovolt Amperes
LBS	leakage boundary (spatial)
LOCA	loss of coolant accident
LOOP	loss of offsite power
LPCI	low pressure coolant injection
LPCS	low pressure core spray
LR	license renewal
LRA	license renewal application
LRT	leak rate test
MCC	motor control center
MEL	master equipment list
MIC	microbiologically induced corrosion
MG	motor generator
MS	main steam
MSIV	main steam isolation valve
MWe	megawatt electric
MWt	megawatt thermal
NDE	non-destructive examinations
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute

NEIL	Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NER	Nuclear Engineering Report
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NMP1	Nine Mile Point Unit 1
NMP2	Nine Mile Point Unit 2
NMPC	Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation
NMPNS	Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSR	nonsafety-related
NSSS	nuclear steam supply system
NUMARC	Nuclear Management and Resources Council (now NEI)
NUREG	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide
OCCW	open-cycle cooling water
ODSCC	outside-diameter stress-corrosion cracking
OGB	offgas building
OI	open item
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
P&ID	pipng and instrumentation diagram
PAA	program attribute assessment
PCS	primary containment structure
PEO	period of extended operation
PM	preventive maintenance
PMT	post-maintenance test
P-T	pressure-temperature
PTS	pressurized thermal shock
PUAR	plant-unique analysis report
PWR	pressurized water reactor
PWSCC	primary water stress-corrosion cracking
RAI	request for additional information
RB	reactor building
RBCLC	reactor building closed loop cooling
RBEDT	reactor building equipment drain tank
RCIC	reactor core isolation cooling
RCPB	reactor coolant pressure boundary
RCS	reactor coolant system
RG	regulatory guide
RHR	residual heat removal
RI-ISI	risk-informed inservice inspection
RPS	reactor protection system
RPT	reactor recirculation pump trip
RPV	reactor pressure vessel
RSSB	radwaste solidification and storage building
RT <sub>NDT</sub>	reference temperature nil ductility transition
RVID	reactor vessel integrity database
RVSP	Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program

RWB	radwaste building
RWCU	reactor water cleanup
S&W	Stone and Webster
SBA	small-break accident
SBF	stress based fatigue
SBO	station blackout
SC	structure and component
SCC	stress-corrosion cracking
SDC	shutdown cooling
SE	safety evaluation
SER	safety evaluation report
SGTB	standby gas treatment building
SGTS	standby gas treatment system
SIA	structural integrity attached
SIL	service information letters
SOC	statements of consideration
SPH	screen and pumphouse
SR	safety-related
SRP	Standard Review Plan
SRP-LR	Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants
SSC	system, structure, and component
SSE	safe-shutdown earthquake
SWB	screenwell building
t	thickness
TAP	torus attached piping
TB	turbine building
TBCLC	turbine building closed loop cooling
TER	technical evaluation report
TLAA	time-limited aging analysis
TS	technical specification
UFSAR	updated final safety analysis report (for Nine Mile Point Unit 1)
UPS	uninterruptible power supplies
USAR	updated safety analysis report (for Nine Mile Point Unit 2)
USAS	United States of America Standards
USE	upper-shelf energy
UT	ultrasonic testing
UV	ultra violet
V	Volt
WDB	waste disposal building
WO	work order

# SECTION 1

## INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION

### 1.1 Introduction

This document is a safety evaluation report (SER) on the license renewal application (LRA) for Units 1 and 2 of Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS), as filed by Constellation Energy Group, LLC (CEG or the applicant). By letter dated May 26, 2004, CEG submitted its application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for renewal of the NMPNS operating licenses for an additional 20 years. By letter to NMPNS, dated December 7, 2004, the staff stated its concern regarding the applicant's inadequate support of license renewal activities for the initial submission. In its response, by letter dated January 3, 2005, the applicant stated that it had taken additional actions to resolve the contributing factors for past performance and agreed to provide supplemental support for the license renewal process. On March 7, 2005, the staff informed the applicant, by letter, that the review of the LRA had been suspended and that the standard 22-month review schedule would not be met due to the suspended period. On July 14, 2005, NMPNS submitted its amended LRA (ALRA).

In the ALRA, the applicant revised the original LRA sections and tables where applicable to identify each nonsafety-related (NSR) system or NSR portion of a safety-related (SR) system that is within the scope of license renewal. In conjunction with this amended information, the applicant also identified additional NSR component types and intended function(s) and made them consistent with the standardized list of intended functions described in the staff Standard Review Plan for License Renewal (SRP-LR) and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 95-10, "Industry Guidelines for Implementing the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 - The License Renewal Rule."

The NRC staff (the staff) prepared this report, which summarizes the results of its safety review of the LRA for compliance with the requirements of Title 10, Part 54, of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR Part 54), "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants." The NRC license renewal project manager for the NMPNS license renewal review is Ngoc B. (Tommy) Le. Mr. Le can be contacted by telephone at 301-415-1458 or by electronic mail at [nbl@nrc.gov](mailto:nbl@nrc.gov). Alternatively, written correspondence may be sent to the following address:

License Renewal and Environmental Impacts Program  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001  
Attention: Ngoc B. (Tommy) Le, Mail Stop 0-11F1

In its May 26, 2004 submittal letter, as supplemented by its July 14, 2005, letter the applicant requested renewal of the operating licenses issued under Section 104b (Operating License No. DPR-63) and Section 103 (Operating License No. NPF-69) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, for Units 1 (NMP1) and Unit 2 (NMP2), for a period of 20 years beyond the current license expiration dates of midnight August 22, 2009, for NMP1 and midnight October 31, 2026, NMP2.

NMPNS is located approximately six miles northeast of Oswego, NY. The NRC issued the construction permits for NMP1 on April 12, 1965, and for NMP2 on June 24, 1974. The NRC issued the operating licenses for NMP1 on December 26, 1974 and for NMP2 on July 2, 1987. NMP1 is a boiling water reactor design with a Mark 1 containment. The nuclear steam supply system was supplied by General Electric and the balance of the plant was originally designed and constructed by Stone and Webster, with the assistance of its agent, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. NMP1's licensed power output is 1850 megawatt thermal, with a gross electrical output of approximately 615 megawatt electric. NMP2 is a boiling water reactor design with a Mark 2 containment. The nuclear steam supply system was supplied by General Electric and the balance of the plant was originally designed and constructed by Stone and Webster. NMP2's licensed power output is 3467 megawatt thermal, with a gross electrical output of approximately 1144 megawatt electric. The NMP1 updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and the NMP2 updated safety analysis report (USAR) contain details concerning the plant and the site.

The license renewal process consists of two concurrent reviews: (1) a technical review of safety issues and (2) an environmental review. The NRC regulations found in 10 CFR Parts 54 and 51, respectively, set forth the requirements against which license renewal applications are reviewed. The safety review for the NMPNS license renewal is based on the applicant's original LRA, ALRA, and on responses to the staff's requests for additional information. The applicant supplemented its LRA and provided clarifications through its responses to requests for additional information in audits, meetings, and docketed correspondence. Unless otherwise noted, the staff reviewed and considered information submitted through December 13, 2005. The staff reviewed information received after this date on a case-by-case basis depending on the stage of the safety review and on the volume and complexity of the information. The public may view the LRA, ALRA, and all pertinent information and materials, including the UFSAR and USAR mentioned above, at the NRC Public Document Room, located on the first floor of One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738 (301-415-4737 / 800-397-4209), and at the Penfield Library, Reference and Documents Department, 7060 State Route 104, State University of New York, Oswego, NY 13126. In addition, the public may find the LRA and ALRA, as well as materials related to the license renewal review, on the NRC Web Site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/nine-mile-pt.html>.

This SER summarizes the results of the staff's safety review of the NMPNS LRA and ALRA, and describes the technical details considered in evaluating the safety aspects of the proposed operation for an additional 20 years beyond the term of the current operating licenses. The staff reviewed the LRA and ALRA in accordance with NRC regulations and the guidance provided in NUREG-1800, "Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants" (SRP-LR), dated July 2001.

SER Sections 2 through 4 address the staff's review and evaluation of license renewal issues that it has considered during the review of the application. Section 5 is reserved for the report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Conclusions of this report are presented in Section 6.

SER Appendix A contains a table that identifies the applicant's commitments associated with the renewal of the operating licenses. Appendix B provides a chronology of the principal correspondence, between the staff and the applicant, related to the review of the application.



Appendix C is a list of the principal contributors to this SER. Appendix D is a bibliography of the references used in support of the review.

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 51, the staff prepared a draft, plant-specific supplement to NUREG-1437, "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (GEIS)". This supplement discusses the environmental considerations related to renewing the licenses for NMPNS. The staff issued draft Supplement 24 to NUREG-1437 "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Regarding Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Draft Report for Comment," on September 29, 2005. The final report is scheduled to be issued on May 29, 2006.

## **1.2 License Renewal Background**

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and NRC regulations, operating licenses for commercial power reactors are issued for 40 years. These licenses can be renewed for up to 20 additional years. The original 40-year license term was selected on the basis of economic and antitrust considerations, rather than on technical limitations; however, some individual plant and equipment designs may have been engineered on the basis of an expected 40-year service life.

In 1982, the staff anticipated interest in license renewal and held a workshop on nuclear power plant aging. This workshop led the staff to establish a comprehensive program plan for nuclear plant aging research. On the basis of the results of that research, a technical review group concluded that many aging phenomena are readily manageable and do not pose technical issues that would preclude life extension for nuclear power plants. In 1986, the staff published a request for comment on a policy statement that would address major policy, technical, and procedural issues related to license renewal for nuclear power plants.

In 1991, the staff published the license renewal rule in 10 CFR Part 54 (the Rule). The staff participated in an industry-sponsored demonstration program to apply the Rule to a pilot plant and to gain experience necessary to develop implementation guidance. To establish a scope of review for license renewal, the Rule defined age-related degradation unique to license renewal; However, during the demonstration program, the staff found that adverse aging effects occur and are managed during the period of initial license. In addition, the staff found that the scope of the review did not allow sufficient credit for existing programs, particularly the implementation of the Maintenance Rule, which could also manage plant-aging phenomena. As a result, the staff amended the license renewal rule in 1995. The amended Rule established a regulatory process that is simpler, more stable, and more predictable than the previous license renewal rule. In particular, the staff amended the Rule to focus on managing the adverse effects of aging, rather than on identifying age-related degradation unique to license renewal. The staff initiated these rule changes to ensure that important systems, structures, and components (SSCs) will continue to perform their intended functions during the period of extended operation. In addition, the revised Rule clarified and simplified the integrated plant assessment process to be consistent with the revised focus on passive, long-lived structures and components (SCs).

In parallel with these efforts, the staff pursued a separate rulemaking effort and developed an amendment to 10 CFR Part 51 to focus the scope of the review of environmental impacts on license renewal and fulfill the NRC's responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

### 1.2.1 Safety Review

License renewal requirements for power reactors are based on two key principles:

- (1) The regulatory process is adequate to ensure that the licensing bases of all currently operating plants provide and maintain an acceptable level of safety, with the possible exception of the detrimental effects of aging on the functionality of certain SSCs, as well as a few other safety-related issues, during the period of extended operation.
- (2) The plant-specific licensing basis must be maintained during the renewal term in the same manner and to the same extent as during the original licensing term.

In implementing these two principles, 10 CFR 54.4 defines the scope of license renewal as including those SSCs: (1) that are safety-related; (2) whose failure could affect safety-related functions; and (3) that are relied on to demonstrate compliance with the NRC's regulations for fire protection (FP), environmental qualification (EQ), pressurized thermal shock, anticipated transient without scram (ATWS), and station blackout (SBO).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(a), an applicant for a renewed license must review all SSCs that are within the scope of the Rule to identify SCs that are subject to an aging management review (AMR). Those SCs that are subject to an AMR perform an intended function without moving parts or without a change in configuration or properties, and are not subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period. As required by 10 CFR 54.21(a), an applicant for a renewed license must demonstrate that the effects of aging will be managed in such a way that the intended function(s) of those SCs will be maintained, consistent with the current licensing basis (CLB), for the period of extended operation; however, active equipment is considered to be adequately monitored and maintained by existing programs. In other words, the detrimental effects of aging that may affect active equipment are more readily detectable and can be identified and corrected through routine surveillance, performance monitoring, and maintenance activities. The surveillance and maintenance activities programs for active equipment, as well as other aspects of maintaining the plants' design and licensing basis, are required throughout the period of extended operation.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(d), the LRA is required to include a supplement to the UFSAR and USAR. This supplement must contain a summary description of the applicant's programs and activities for managing the effects of aging and evaluation of time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs) for the period of extended operation.

License renewal also requires the identification and updating of the TLAAs. During the design phase for a plant, certain assumptions are made about the length of time that the plant can operate. These assumptions are incorporated into design calculations for several of the plant's SSCs. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1), the applicant must either show that these calculations will remain valid for the period of extended operation, project the analyses to the end of the period of extended operation, or demonstrate that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation.

In 2001, the staff developed and issued Regulatory Guide 1.188, "Standard Format and Content for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses." This regulatory guide endorses Nuclear Energy Institute 95-10, "Industry Guideline for Implementing the

Requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 - The License Renewal Rule,” Revision 3, dated March 2001. Nuclear Energy Institute 95-10 details an acceptable method of implementing the Rule. The staff also used the SRP-LR to review the application.

In the LRA, the applicant fully utilized the process defined in NUREG-1801, “Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report,” dated July 2001. The GALL Report provides the staff with a summary of staff-approved aging management programs (AMPs) for the aging of many SCs that are subject to an AMR. If an applicant commits to implementing these staff-approved AMPs, the time, effort, and resources used to review an applicant’s LRA can be greatly reduced, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the license renewal review process. The GALL Report summarizes the aging management evaluations, programs, and activities credited for managing aging for most of the SCs used throughout the industry. The report also serves as a reference for both applicants and staff reviewers to quickly identify those AMPs and activities that the staff determined can provide adequate aging management during the period of extended operation.

### **1.2.2 Environmental Review**

Environmental protection regulations are codified in 10 CFR Part 51. In December 1996, the staff revised the environmental protection regulations to facilitate the environmental review for license renewal. The staff prepared a Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) to document its evaluation of the possible environmental impacts associated with renewing licenses for nuclear power plants. For certain types of environmental impacts, the GEIS establishes generic findings that are applicable to all nuclear power plants. These generic findings are codified in Appendix B to Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(i), an applicant for license renewal may incorporate these generic findings in its environmental report. In accordance with 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii), an environmental report must also include analyses of those environmental impacts that must be evaluated on a plant-specific basis (i.e., Category 2 issues).

In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 51, the staff performed a plant-specific review of the environmental impacts of license renewal, including whether new and significant information existed that the GEIS did not consider. As part of its scoping process, the staff held a public meeting on September 21, 2004, in Scriba, NY, to identify environmental issues specific to the plant. The draft, plant-specific Supplement 24 to the GEIS, dated September 29, 2005, documents the results of the environmental review and includes a preliminary recommendation with respect to the license renewal action. The staff held two other public meetings on November 17, 2005, in Scriba, NY, to discuss draft GEIS Supplement 24. After considering comments on the draft, the staff is scheduled to separately publish the final, plant-specific GEIS Supplement 24 on May 29, 2006.

### **1.3 Principal Review Matters**

The requirements for renewing operating licenses for nuclear power plants are described in 10 CFR Part 54. The staff performed its technical review of the NMPNS LRA and ALRA in accordance with NRC guidance and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54. The standards for renewing a license are set forth in 10 CFR 54.29. This SER describes the results of the staff’s safety review.

In 10 CFR 54.19(a), the NRC requires a license renewal applicant to submit general information. The applicant provided this general information in the original LRA Section 1, submitted by letter May 26, 2004, and the ALRA, submitted by letter dated July 14, 2005. The staff reviewed Section 1 of the LRA and ALRA and found that the applicant had submitted the information required by 10 CFR 54.19(a).

In 10 CFR 54.19(b), the NRC requires that each LRA include “conforming changes to the standard indemnity agreement, 10 CFR 140.92, Appendix B, to account for the expiration term of the proposed renewed license.” In its LRA and ALRA, the applicant stated the following regarding this issue:

The current indemnity agreement for NMPNS does not contain a specific expiration term for the operating licenses. Therefore, conforming changes to account for the expiration term of the proposed renewed licenses are not necessary, unless the license number is changed upon issuance of the renewed licenses.

The staff intends to maintain the original license numbers upon issuance of the renewed licenses, if approved. Therefore, conforming changes to the indemnity agreement do not need to be made and the requirements of 10 CFR 54.19(b) have been met.

In 10 CFR 54.21, the NRC requires that each LRA contain: (a) an integrated plant assessment, (b) a description of any CLB changes that occurred during the staff’s review of the LRA, (c) an evaluation of TLAAs, and (d) an FSAR supplement. Sections 3, 4 and Appendix B of the LRA and ALRA address the license renewal requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a), (b), and (c). Appendix A of the LRA and ALRA contains the license renewal requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(d).

In 10 CFR 54.21(b), the NRC requires that each year following submission of the LRA, and at least three months before the scheduled completion of the staff’s review, the applicant must submit an amendment to the LRA that identifies any changes to the facility’s CLB that materially affect the contents of the LRA, including the UFSAR and USAR supplements. The applicant submitted an update to the LRA, by letter dated December 20, 2005, which summarizes the changes to the CLB that have occurred during the staff’s review of the original LRA. This submission satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(b) and is still under staff review.

In 10 CFR 54.22, the NRC requires that the LRA include changes or additions to the technical specifications that are necessary to manage the effects of aging during the period of extended operation. In Appendix D of the LRA and ALRA, the applicant stated that it had not identified any technical specification changes necessary to support issuance of the renewed operating licenses for NMPNS. This adequately addresses the requirement specified in 10 CFR 54.22.

The staff evaluated the technical information required by 10 CFR 54.21 and 10 CFR 54.22 in accordance with NRC regulations and the guidance provided by the SRP-LR. SER Sections 2, 3, and 4 document the staff’s evaluation of the technical information contained in the LRA and ALRA.

As required by 10 CFR 54.25, the ACRS will issue a report to document its evaluation of the staff's review of the LRA, ALRA, and associated SER. SER Section 5 will incorporate the ACRS report, once it is issued. SER Section 6 documents the findings required by 10 CFR 54.29.

The final, plant-specific GEIS Supplement 24 will document the staff's evaluation of the environmental information required by 10 CFR 54.23 and will specify the considerations related to renewing the licenses for NMPNS. The staff will prepare this supplement separately from this SER.

#### **1.4 Interim Staff Guidance**

The license renewal program is a living program. The staff, industry, and other interested stakeholders gain experience and develop lessons learned with each renewed license. The lessons learned address the staff's performance goals of maintaining safety, improving effectiveness and efficiency, reducing regulatory burden, and increasing public confidence. Interim staff guidance (ISG) is documented for use by the staff, industry, and other interested stakeholders until it is incorporated into the license renewal guidance documents such as the SRP-LR and the GALL Report.

The following table provides the current ISG, issued by the staff, as well as the SER sections in which the staff addresses each ISG issue.

<b>ISG Issue (Approved ISG No.)</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>SER Section</b>
GALL Report presents one acceptable way to manage aging effects <b>(ISG-1)</b>	This ISG clarifies that the GALL Report contains one acceptable way, but not the only way, to manage aging for license renewal.	N/A
SBO Scoping <b>(ISG-2)</b>	<p>The license renewal rule 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) includes 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1)—SBO.</p> <p>The SBO rule requires that a plant must withstand and recover from an SBO event. The recovery time for offsite power is much faster than that of EDGs.</p> <p>The offsite power system should be included within the scope of license renewal.</p>	<p>2.1.2.1 2.1.2.1.4 2.1.3.1.1 2.1.4.3.5</p>
Concrete AMP <b>(ISG-3)</b>	Lessons learned from the GALL demonstration project indicated that GALL is not clear on whether concrete requires an AMP.	<p>3.5A.2.2 (NMP1) 3.5B.2.2 (NMP2) 3.5.C.1.2 (Common) 3.5.C.3.1 (Common)</p>

ISG Issue (Approved ISG No.)	Purpose	SER Section
<p>FP System Piping (ISG-4)</p>	<p>This ISG clarifies the staff position for wall-thinning of the FP piping system in GALL AMPs XI.M26 and XI.M27.</p> <p>The staff's new position is that there is no need to disassemble FP piping, as disassembly can introduce oxygen to FP piping, which can accelerate corrosion. Instead, use a non-intrusive method, such as volumetric inspection.</p> <p>Testing of sprinkler heads should be performed at year 50 of sprinkler system service life, and every 10 years thereafter.</p> <p>This ISG eliminates the Halon/carbon dioxide system inspections for charging pressure, valve line-ups, and the automatic mode of operation test from GALL; the staff considers these test verifications to be operational activities.</p>	<p>3.0.3.2.14</p>
<p>Identification and Treatment of Electrical Fuse Holders (ISG-5)</p>	<p>This ISG includes electrical fuse holders AMR and AMP (i.e., same as terminal blocks and other electrical connections).</p> <p>The position includes only fuse holders that are not inside the enclosure of active components (e.g., inside of switchgears and inverters).</p> <p>Operating experience finds that metallic clamps (spring-loaded clips) have a history of age-related failures from aging stressors such as vibration, thermal cycling, mechanical stress, corrosion, and chemical contamination.</p> <p>The staff finds that visual inspection of fuse clips is not sufficient to detect the aging effects from fatigue, mechanical stress, and vibration.</p>	<p>3.0.3.3.4</p>

ISG Issue (Approved ISG No.)	Purpose	SER Section
The ISG Process (ISG-8)	This ISG provides clarification and update to the ISG process on Improved License Renewal Guidance Documents.	N/A
Standardized Format for License Renewal Applications (ISG-10)	The purpose of this ISG is to provide a standardized license renewal application format for applicants.	N/A

## 1.5 Summary of Open Items

An issue is considered open if the applicant has not presented sufficient basis for resolution and; therefore, has not met all applicable regulatory requirements. As a result of its review of the LRA and ALRA, including additional information submitted to the staff through December 13, 2005, the staff identified the following open items:

Open Item 3.0.3.2.17-1: Subsequent to the onsite audit and review of NMP ALRA, the staff also reviewed the applicant's Inservice Inspection Owner Activity Report, dated July 23, 2003. In this report, the applicant has stated that, for NMP1, corrosion was identified over the entire 360 degree circumference of the drywell interior surface of the liner plate at the 225 foot elevation. The applicant further stated in the report that (1) a subsequent detailed (D-VT) visual examination (VT-1) was performed and that (2) no unacceptable degradation in the visible areas of the drywell liner was found and that (3) no immediate corrective action was taken. The staff has asked the applicant to provide further discussion to address the staff concern regarding the loss of material due to corrosion for the NMP1 drywell.

Open Item 4.7B.1-1: The neutron fluence methodology for TLAA Section 4.7.1, "RPV Biological Shield (NMP2 Only)," is based on neutron fluence calculations that have been reported in SANDIA Report No. SAND 92-2420, "Accelerated 54 °C Irradiated Test of Shippingport Neutron Shield Tank and HFIR Vessel Materials [January 1993]." However, the methodology for calculating the neutron fluence values reported in SANDIA Report No. SAND 92-2420 has not been approved by the staff. Therefore, the staff requests that Constellation Energy submit an updated 54 EPFY neutron fluence calculation for the biological shield wall (BSW) during the NRC's allocated review period for the amended license renewal application.

The staff also requests that the 54 EPFY neutron fluence calculation be based on a methodology that conforms to the NRC's recommendations in Regulatory Guide 1.190, "Calculational and Dosimetry Methods for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron Fluence [March 2001]," and be submitted for the staff's review and approval.

## 1.6 Summary of Confirmatory Items

A confirmatory item is an issue that the staff has resolved, but for which the applicant has not yet formally submitted the resolution. After completing a review of the ALRA for NMP1 and

NMP2, including all additional information and clarifications submitted to the staff as of December 13, 2005, the staff has identified no confirmatory items.

## **1.7 Summary of Proposed License Conditions**

As a result of the staff's review of the LRA and ALRA, including subsequent information and clarifications provided by the applicant, the staff identified four proposed license conditions.

The first license condition requires the applicant to include the UFSAR and USAR supplements required by 10 CFR 54.21(d) in the next UFSAR and USAR updates, as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e), following the issuance of the renewed licenses.

The second license condition requires that the activities identified in the UFSAR and USAR supplements be completed in accordance with the schedule in Appendix A.

The third license condition requires the implementation of the most recent staff-approved version of the Boiling Water Reactor Vessels and Internals Project (BWRVIP) Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) as the method to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. Any changes to the BWRVIP ISP capsule withdrawal schedule must be submitted for NRC staff review and approval. Any changes to the BWRVIP ISP capsule withdrawal schedule which affects the time of withdrawal of any surveillance capsules must be incorporated into the licensing basis. If any surveillance capsules are removed without the intent to test them, these capsules must be stored in a manner which maintains them in a condition which would support re-insertion into the reactor pressure vessel, if necessary.



## SECTION 2

### STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW

#### 2.1 Scoping and Screening Methodology

##### 2.1.1 Introduction

Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 54 (10 CFR Part 54), "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," Section 54.21, "Contents of Application — Technical Information," requires that each application for license renewal contain an integrated plant assessment (IPA). The IPA must list and identify those structures and components (SCs) that are subject to an aging management review (AMR) from all of the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4.

In Section 2.1, "Scoping and Screening Methodology," of the original license renewal application (LRA) and amended license renewal application (ALRA), the applicant described the scoping and screening methodology used to identify SSCs at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) within the scope of license renewal and the SCs that are subject to an AMR. The staff reviewed the applicant's scoping and screening methodology to determine whether it meets the scoping requirements stated in 10 CFR 54.4(a) and the screening requirements stated in 10 CFR 54.21.

In developing the scoping and screening methodology, the applicant considered the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54, the Statements of Consideration (SOC) for 10 CFR Part 54, and the guidance presented by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), "Industry Guideline for Implementing the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 The License Renewal Rule," Revision 3, March 2001 (NEI 95-10). In addition, in developing this methodology, the applicant considered the correspondence between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other applicants and/or the NEI.

##### 2.1.2 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In the original LRA and ALRA Sections 2.0 and 3.0, the applicant provided the technical information required by 10 CFR 54.21(a). In ALRA Section 2.1, "Scoping and Screening Methodology," the applicant described the process used to identify the SSCs that meet the license renewal scoping criteria under 10 CFR 54.4(a), as well as the process used to identify the SCs that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Additionally, the original LRA and ALRA Sections 2.2, "Plant Level Scoping Results," 2.3, "System Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems," 2.4, "Scoping and Screening Results: Structures and Component Supports," and 2.5, "Scoping and Screening Results: Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls Systems," amplify the process that the applicant used to identify SCs subject to an AMR. ALRA Section 3, "Aging Management Review Results," contains the following information:

Section 3.1, "Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System"

Section 3.2, "Aging Management of Engineered Safety Features Systems"

Section 3.3, "Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems"

Section 3.4, "Aging Management of Steam and Power Conversion Systems"

Section 3.5, "Aging Management of Structures and Component Supports"

Section 3.6, "Aging Management of Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls Components"

The original LRA and ALRA Section 4, "Time-Limited Aging Analyses," contains the applicant's identification and evaluation of time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs).

#### ***2.1.2.1 Scoping Methodology***

In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1, the applicant described the methodology used to scope mechanical, structural, and electrical and instrumentation and controls (I&C) SSCs pursuant to the requirements of the 10 CFR 54.4(a) scoping criteria. The following sections present the applicant's scoping methodology, as described in the original LRA and ALRA.

##### ***2.1.2.1.1 Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)***

The applicant described the general approach to scoping safety-related (SR) and nonsafety-related (NSR) SSCs and SSCs credited with demonstrating compliance with certain regulated events in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.4, "Application of License Renewal Scoping Criterion." The following sections describe the scoping approaches specific to each of the three 10 CFR 54.4(a) scoping criteria.

Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.4.1, "Safety Related Criteria Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)," the applicant discussed the scoping methodology as it pertains to SR criteria in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). With respect to the SR criteria, the applicant stated that the SSCs within the scope of license renewal include SR SSCs that are relied upon during and following design-basis events (DBEs). The DBEs considered are consistent with the NMP Unit 1 (NMP1) and Unit 2 (NMP2) current licensing basis (CLB). As part of the process to identify the SSCs within scope of Criterion 1, NMP used a pre-established safety classification process that identifies and documents the SR functions of SSCs. The Maintenance Rule scoping documents are the primary repository of system function classifications, and the master equipment list (MEL) is the primary repository of component classifications. As a result, the Maintenance Rule scoping documents were used as the main source for identifying SR system functions that satisfy Criterion 1. Supporting information from the NMP1 updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and the NMP2 updated safety analysis report (USAR), technical specifications (TSs), design documents, design drawings and MEL were reviewed to ensure all SR system functions were properly identified. Implementation of the license renewal scoping and screening procedure ensured that the UFSAR/USAR, TSs, Maintenance Rule scoping documents, design

documents, design drawings and MEL were reviewed, as applicable, to ensure all system functions were identified and evaluated against this criterion.

Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.4.2, "Non-Safety Related Criteria Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2)," the applicant discussed the scoping methodology as it related to the NSR criteria in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The applicant stated that the process used to review SSCs for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) applicability ensured that the SSCs within the scope of license renewal include the NSR SSCs whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the Criterion 1 functions of SSCs.

The applicant reviewed UFSAR/USAR, TSs, Maintenance Rule scoping documents, design documents, design drawings and MEL to ensure all NSR SSC functional interactions were identified where an NSR SSC could fail and prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR intended function. The NSR SSCs meeting Criterion 2 that are explicitly identified in the CLB, such as pipe whip restraints in NMP2, were identified.

In the original LRA, the applicant identified three additional areas to review for applicability to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2):

- (1) Supports for NSR Equipment - The applicant determined that component supports required to prevent NSR SSCs from physical interacting with SR SSCs were within the scope of license renewal. The LRA described the applicable supports as those that must remain in place such that they do not impact equipment that is required to perform an intended function in such a way as to prevent the equipment from performing its intended function. The applicant considered all NSR supports to be within the scope of license renewal if located in areas housing SR equipment.
- (2) NSR SCs in Proximity to SR Equipment - The applicant reviewed NSR SCs in proximity of SR equipment in accordance with the guidance contained in NRC Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 09, "Guidance on the Identification and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components which Meet 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2)." The applicant used the preventive option in order to satisfy ISG-09 and considered all NSR piping, fittings, and equipment containing water or steam to be within the scope of license renewal if the NSR SCs were located in the vicinity of SR equipment. NSR SCs were considered to be in the vicinity of SR equipment if located in the same building, corridor, and floor as SR equipment.
- (3) SR/NSR Piping Interface - The applicant used plant drawings to identify classification boundaries and SR/NSR piping interfaces. The scope of the NSR piping system was extended beyond the classification change to the first seismic anchor beyond the depicted class change. The applicant determined that the piping between the depicted classification boundary and the first seismic anchor was considered to be within the scope of license renewal. In addition, the applicant considered all NSR piping, fittings, and equipment containing water or steam to be within the scope of license renewal if located in the vicinity of SR equipment. As a result, for piping containing water or steam, the NSR portion within the scope of license renewal extended beyond the depicted class change until no longer in the vicinity of SR equipment or until the first seismic anchor was reached, whichever was furthest. The applicant defined the term "seismic anchor" as a series of supports and changes in piping geometry that combine to provide restraint

to the piping in six degrees of freedom. For NMP2, the term "seismic anchor" means an actual anchor that provides restraint to the piping in six degrees of freedom.

As a result of the staff's audit of the applicant's scoping and screening methodology, the applicant revised the description of the methodology used to evaluate the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion, and provided that revised description in the ALRA. The details of that revised methodology, and the staff's evaluation is provided in SER Section 2.1.3.1.4.

Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). In the original LRA and ALRA Sections 2.1.4.3, "Regulated Event Scoping Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3);" 2.1.4.3.1, "Fire Protection;" 2.1.4.3.2, "Environmental Qualification (EQ);" 2.1.4.3.3, "Pressurized Thermal Shock; (PTS)" 2.1.4.3.4, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS);" and 2.1.4.3.5, "Station Blackout (SBO)," the applicant discussed the scoping methodology as it related to the regulated event criteria, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). With respect to the scoping criteria related to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3), the applicant evaluated all regulated events including fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO. For each regulated event, the applicant identified and reviewed the applicable UFSAR/USAR, TSs, Maintenance Rule scoping documents, design documents, design drawings, and MEL to ensure all SSCs credited for compliance with the regulated event were identified and evaluated against these criteria. Specific scoping for each regulated event was also described in the relevant section.

In summary, the applicant included within the scope of license renewal the SSCs relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform an intended function that demonstrates compliance with NRC regulations for fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO, in accordance with the criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3).

#### 2.1.2.1.2 Documentation Sources Used for Scoping and Screening

In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.1, "Introduction," the applicant stated that it had reviewed information from the following sources during the license renewal scoping and screening process:

- UFSAR/USAR
- CLB information including TSs and docketed licensing correspondence
- design-basis documents (DBDs)
- Maintenance Rule scoping documents
- controlled drawings
- MEL

The applicant stated that it used this information to identify the functions performed by plant systems and structures. It then compared these functions to the scoping criteria in 10 CFR 54(a)(1)-(3) to determine whether the associated plant system or structure performed a license renewal intended function. It also used these sources to develop the list of structures and components subject to an AMR.

#### 2.1.2.1.3 Plant and System-Level Scoping

In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.2, "Plant Level Scoping," the applicant briefly described the scoping methodology for SR and NSR systems and structures and for equipment relied upon to perform a function for any of the five regulated events described in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). The NMP scoping process began with the review and evaluation of plant systems and structures against the criteria outlined in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)-(3) to determine those systems that met the requirements for inclusion in the scope of license renewal. During the initial scoping process, all functions were defined for all systems and structures in the plant. Subsequently, those functions that are intended functions were identified, and portions of the systems and structures that perform those intended functions were identified. Systems and structures meeting the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4 were, therefore, established.

#### 2.1.2.1.4 Component-Level Scoping

After the applicant identified the intended functions of systems or structures within the scope of license renewal, it performed a review to determine which components of each in-scope system and structure supported license renewal intended functions. The applicant considered the components that supported intended functions to be within the scope of license renewal and screened them to determine whether an AMR was required.

The applicant considered three component classifications during this stage of the evaluation: (1) mechanical, (2) civil and structural, and (3) electrical. The applicant called the process of identifying the individual components of a system or structure component screening, although it also included the scoping criteria (i.e., within the scope of license renewal). The following three paragraphs discuss the scoping methodology for these component classifications.

- (1) Mechanical Component Scoping - The applicant described the scoping methodology for mechanical components within SR and NSR mechanical systems in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5.1. For each mechanical system determined to be within the scope of license renewal, the applicant developed a system evaluation boundary to identify the set of structures and components necessary to perform the intended functions for the given mechanical system. These evaluation boundaries included sets of piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) for each system and the component list from the MEL database. From the system diagrams, the applicant identified components that were required to ensure the system could perform its intended functions. Then, the applicant grouped them into relevant component types associated with each function within the scope of license renewal and listed them in the scoping and screening database for further analysis.
- (2) Structural Component Scoping - The original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5.2 discusses the scoping methodology associated with civil structures. The applicant reviewed the UFSAR/USAR, Maintenance Rule scoping results, design- and license-basis documents, regulatory requirements, the MEL, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B determinations, and plant drawings to determine SCs within the scope of license renewal. All SR SCs were included within the scope of license renewal, and include items such as walls, piping and equipment supports, conduit, cable trays, electrical enclosures, instrument panels, pipe whip restraints, fire barriers, liners, sump screens, doors, blowout panels, flood barriers, missile shields, and jet impingement shields relied upon in the licensing basis. The NSR SCs listed in NEI 95-10, Appendix F; and NSR SCs that perform a function required for compliance with fire protection, ATWS, and

SBO regulations were included within the scope of license renewal. The in-scope NSR SCs include missile shields that protect SR equipment; overhead handling systems that could effect SR equipment; walls, curbs, dikes, and doors that provide flood protection for SR equipment; and jet impingement shields and blowout panels that protect SR equipment from the effects of a high-energy line break (HELB). In this way, the applicant was able to compile a comprehensive list of all SCs within the scope of license renewal.

- (3) Electrical and I&C Component Scoping - The applicant described the scoping process associated with electrical and I&C systems and components in the original LRA and ALRA Sections 2.1.2 through 2.1.5. For these systems, the applicant elected to use the same methodology that it applied to mechanical and structural SSCs, typically, a bounding or spaces approach, as described in NEI 95-10. As a result, the electrical and I&C component types throughout the plant were identified with regard to specific electrical and I&C system intended functions. The applicant evaluated the electrical and I&C component types against the scoping criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)-(3), to determine whether they perform intended functions. This was accomplished using relevant CLB documentation. During the initial scoping process, the applicant described all the electrical and I&C systems and defined their functions. Subsequently, those functions that are intended functions were identified, and portions of the electrical and I&C systems that perform those intended functions were identified.

#### **2.1.2.2 Screening Methodology**

After determining the SSCs within the scope of license renewal, the applicant implemented a process for determining which SSCs would be subject to an AMR, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5, "Component Screening," the applicant discussed the screening activities as they related to the SSCs that are within the scope of license renewal. The applicant divided the screening portion of the integrated license renewal plant assessment into three engineering disciplines: mechanical, civil/structural, and electrical and I&C.

- (1) Mechanical Component Screening - The applicant stated in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5.1, that it screened each system identified to be within the scope of license renewal. This process evaluated the individual structures and components included within in-scope mechanical systems to identify specific structures and components that required an AMR. The applicant evaluated each mechanical component identified in the scoping phase. The in-scope SCs that perform an intended function without moving parts or without a change in configuration or properties (screening criterion of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(i)) were identified. Active/passive screening determinations were based on the guidance in NEI 95-10, Appendix B, Revision 3. The passive, in-scope SCs that are not subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period (screening criterion of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(ii)) were identified as requiring an AMR. The determination of whether a passive, in-scope SC has a qualified life or specified replacement time period was based on a review of maintenance programs and procedures.
- (2) Structural Component Screening - The original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5.2, discusses the screening activities related to SCs within the scope of license renewal. These screening activities consisted of the identification of passive components, long-lived components, component intended functions, consumables, and component

replacement based on performance or condition. The applicant relied on the guidance in NEI 95-10 to develop the plant-specific listing of passive components of interest during the review. Component supports, and fire stops and seals were considered SCs and binned in separate structural commodity groupings.

- (3) Electrical/I&C Component Screening - In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5.4, the applicant described the methodology used to screen electrical and I&C components. Specifically, the applicant applied the screening methodology employed for electrical and I&C components consistent with the guidance in NEI 95-10. All passive, long-lived components, as defined by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(ii), were evaluated as commodities regardless of the system or structure in which they reside in the MEL. As a result, the electrical systems results contain only active components not subject to AMR. An AMR was then conducted on a commodity basis for the entire population of passive, long-lived components. The applicant did not identify individual components that perform intended functions.

Electrical and I&C components associated with the EQ Program are replaced on a specified interval based on a qualified life. Therefore, components in the EQ Program do not meet the "long-lived" criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(ii). They are considered "short-lived" per the regulatory definition and are not subject to AMR. Using these screening criteria, the applicant determined that the passive electrical and I&C component commodity groups at NMPNS that require an AMR are cables and connectors (including splices, connectors, terminal blocks, and fuse holders), non-segregated/switchyard bus, containment electrical penetrations, and various switchyard components.

### **2.1.3 Staff Evaluation**

The staff evaluated the original LRA and ALRA scoping and screening methodology in accordance with the guidance contained in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide (NUREG)-1800, "Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants," (SRP-LR), Section 2.1, "Scoping and Screening Methodology." The following regulations form the basis for the acceptance criteria for the scoping and screening methodology review:

- 10 CFR 54.4(a), as it relates to the identification of plant SSCs within the scope of 10 CFR Part 54
- 10 CFR 54.4(b), as it relates to the identification of the intended functions of plant SSCs determined to be within the scope of 10 CFR Part 54
- 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) and(2), as they relate to the methods utilized by the applicant to identify plant structures and components subject to an AMR

As part of the review of the applicant's scoping and screening methodology, the staff reviewed the activities described in the following sections of the original LRA and ALRA using the guidance contained in the SRP-LR:

- Original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1, "Scoping and Screening Methodology," to ensure that the applicant described a process for identifying SSCs that are within the scope of license renewal, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)-(3).

- Original LRA and ALRA Sections 2.2, "Plant Level Scoping Results;" 2.3, "System Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems;" 2.4, "Scoping and Screening Results: Structures and Component Supports;" and 2.5, "Scoping and Screening Results: Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls Systems," to ensure that the applicant described a process for determining structural, mechanical, and electrical components at NMPNS that are subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) and (2).

In addition, the staff conducted a scoping and screening methodology audit at NMPNS engineering corporate offices in Lycoming, New York, from September 27 to October 1, 2004. The audit focused on ensuring that the applicant had developed and implemented adequate guidance to conduct the scoping and screening of SSCs in accordance with the methodologies described in the application and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54. The staff reviewed implementation procedures and engineering reports describing the applicant's scoping and screening methodology. In addition, the staff conducted detailed discussions with the applicant on the implementation and control of the license renewal program and reviewed administrative control documentation and selected design documentation used by the applicant during the scoping and screening process. The staff reviewed the applicant's processes for quality assurance with respect to development of the original LRA and the training and qualification of the original LRA development team. The staff also reviewed a sample of system scoping and screening results reports for the feedwater/high pressure coolant injection (FW/HPCI) system and reactor building to ensure (1) that the applicant had appropriately implemented the methodology outlined in the administrative controls and (2) that the results were consistent with the CLB. The staff documented its review in an audit report dated November 9, 2004. The report identified several issues requiring additional information from the applicant prior to completion of the review. Each issue is identified and addressed in detail in this section.

### ***2.1.3.1 Scoping Methodology***

The original LRA scoping evaluations were performed by the applicant's license renewal project personnel and contractors from Constellation Energy Group (CEG). The staff discussed the applicant's methodology with the applicant's license renewal project management personnel and reviewed documentation pertinent to the scoping process. The staff assessed whether the scoping methodology outlined in the original LRA and CEG implementation procedures was appropriately implemented and whether the scoping results were consistent with CLB requirements. The staff also reviewed a sample of system scoping results for the following systems: FW/HPCI and reactor building (structural review).

#### ***2.1.3.1.1 Implementation Procedures and Documentation Sources Used for Scoping and Screening***

The staff reviewed the applicant's scoping and screening implementation procedures to verify that the process used to identify structures and components subject to an AMR was consistent with the original LRA and SRP-LR and that the applicant appropriately implemented the procedural guidance. Additionally, the staff reviewed the scope of CLB documentation sources used to support the LRA development and the process used by the applicant to ensure that CLB commitments were appropriately considered during the scoping and screening process.



Scoping and Screening Implementation Procedures. The staff reviewed the following scoping and screening methodology implementation procedures and engineering reports: license renewal guidance (LRG)-01, "License Renewal Project General Guidance," Revision 2; LRG-02, "License Renewal Scoping and Screening," Revision 4; LRG-04, "Aging Management Review for Electrical Commodities," Revision 2; LRG-08, "Work Product Review Guideline," Revision 7; LRG-09, "Site Review Guideline," Revision 5; and LRG-10, "License Renewal Application Guideline," Revision 6.

In reviewing these procedures, the staff focused on the consistency of the detailed procedural guidance with information in the original LRA and the various staff positions documented in SRP-LR and ISG documents. The staff found that the scoping and screening methodology instructions were generally consistent with the original LRA Section 2.1 and were of sufficient detail to provide the applicant with concise guidance on the scoping and screening implementation process to be followed during the LRA activities. One exception was found related to the description of the scoping and screening process used to identify electrical commodity groupings. This issue is addressed further in this SER in Section 2.1.3.1.3.

In addition to reviewing the implementing procedures, the staff reviewed supplemental design information, including the DBDs, system drawings, and selected licensing documentation the applicant relied up during the scoping and screening phases of the review. The staff found these design documentation sources to be useful for ensuring that the initial scope of SSCs identified by the applicant was consistent with the plant's CLB.

Sources of Current Licensing Basis Information. The staff reviewed the scope and depth of the applicant's CLB review to verify that the methodology was sufficiently comprehensive to identify SSCs within the scope of license renewal and SCs requiring an AMR. As defined in 10 CFR 54.3(a), the CLB is the set of staff requirements applicable to a specific plant and an applicant's written commitments for ensuring compliance with and operation within applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis that are docketed and in effect. The CLB includes certain NRC regulations; orders; license conditions; exemptions; TSs; and design-basis information documented in the most recent FSAR. The CLB also includes applicant commitments remaining in effect that were made in docketed licensing correspondence, such as applicant responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters (GLs), and enforcement actions, as well as applicant commitments documented in NRC safety evaluations or applicant event reports.

The staff determined that the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.1 provides a description of the CLB and related documents used during the scoping and screening process that is consistent with the guidance contained in SRP-LR and NEI 95-10. Specifically, the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.1 identified the UFSAR/USAR, TSs, docketed licensing correspondence, MEL, controlled drawings, and the Maintenance Rule scoping documents. Additionally, in Section 3.2.2 of scoping implementation procedure LRG-02, the applicant provided a comprehensive listing of documents that could be used to support scoping and screening evaluations. The applicant noted that system descriptions and system intended functions were identified based on the review of applicable sections of the UFSAR/USAR, Appendix B determinations, Maintenance Rule scoping document, and design and licensing basis documents.

The NMP MEL is the applicant's primary repository for component safety classification information. During the audit, the staff reviewed the applicant's administrative controls for MEL safety classification data and concluded that the applicant had established adequate measures to control their integrity and reliability. Therefore, the staff concluded that the MEL provided a sufficiently controlled source of component data to support scoping and screening evaluations.

In LRG-02, the applicant identified topical reports as a source of information to support identification of systems and structures relied upon to demonstrate compliance with certain regulated events referenced in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). These reports were developed in accordance with the NMP engineering directives that describe the requirements for preparation of Nuclear Engineering Reports (NERs). These reports were developed and maintained as controlled quality documents at the NMP. The topical reports contain a listing of CLB references used for their development that is consistent with the original LRA Section 2.1.1. The staff concluded that the preparation of the topical reports in accordance with the NMPNS requirements for development of NERs provided sufficient guidance to reasonably ensure that topical reports adequately summarized CLB information for the purposes of scoping.

As part of the audit, the staff evaluated the scope and depth of the applicant's document review to provide assurance that the scoping methodology considered all SSC intended functions. In reviewing the original LRA and scoping and screening implementation procedures, the staff was unable to determine (1) the extent that the CLB was reviewed by the applicant during the development of the system description and (2) the extent that related intended function evaluations were performed during the scoping phase of the review. During discussions with the NMP license renewal project team, it was noted that an electronic document database was used to identify CLB documents pertinent to the development of system descriptions and identification of system intended functions. However, the staff remained unable to determine the extent to which that electronic database was used for those purposes at the time of the audit.

In RAI 2.1-3, dated November 22, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide a detailed description of the methodology used to develop system descriptions and identify the system intended functions. The staff also requested that the applicant describe the controls and processes, including proceduralized controls, used to ensure that the electronic CLB document database was complete and accurate.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated, in part, that the system descriptions and system intended functions were developed in accordance with LRG-02, which identified the primary sources for description and intended function information. As part of the review process, the applicant described the use of several levels of review and approval including an independent license project engineer review, discipline lead review, supervisor review, system engineer review, and, finally, project manager review and approval. This review process was implemented to ensure a high confidence that system descriptions were accurate and all functions have been properly identified. The specific documents used for the generation of the system descriptions and intended functions were also referenced in the individual system and structure scoping and screening report for ease of verification.

With respect to the electronic document database, the applicant clarified in its December 22, 2004, letter that the electronic file contained correspondence between the staff and NMP up to February 2003. The latter correspondence was not entered into the system but evaluated as part of the review process in hard copy format. The applicant also clarified that the electronic file

contained documents that were part of the CLB and were used to support the development of position papers and reports for use during the license renewal evaluation. These records were researched specifically to ensure that all functions were properly identified for the fire protection, ATWS, and SBO regulated events. Specific documents reviewed included NMP responses to the issuance of new regulations (i.e., ATWS and SBO), NRC safety evaluations, NMP responses to the safety evaluations, as applicable, and NMP responses to GLs. The electronic files were also researched when specific questions arose during scoping and aging management program reviews.

On the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant in response to the staff's request for information, and the clarification as to what extent that information was reviewed and applied to the license renewal evaluation, the staff found that the applicant has adequately addressed the staff's request for additional information. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-3 is resolved.

Conclusion. On the basis of a review of information provided in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1, a review of the applicant's detailed scoping and screening implementation procedures, and the results from the scoping and screening audit including the applicant's responses to the staff's RAI, the staff concluded that the applicant's scoping and screening methodology considered a scope of CLB information consistent with the guidance contained in SRP-LR and NEI 95-10, and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### 2.1.3.1.2 Quality Assurance Controls Applied to LRA Development

The staff reviewed the quality assurance controls used by the applicant to provide reasonable confidence that the original LRA scoping and screening methodologies were adequately implemented. Although the applicant did not develop the original LRA under a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, quality assurance program, the staff determined that the applicant utilized the following quality assurance processes during the original LRA development:

- Implementation of the scoping and screening methodology was governed by written procedures and guidelines.
- Although much of the original LRA development was performed by contractors, the applicant developed procedures to govern the conduct of owner acceptance reviews of contractor work products. For example, License Renewal Project Guidelines LRG-08 "Work Product Review Guideline," Revision 7; and LRG-09 "Site Review Guideline," Revision 5, describe the process used by the applicant and CEG to review license renewal project documents developed by the CEG staff. Documents subject to this acceptance review included scoping and screening review reports, AMR reports, TLAAs, and aging management program (AMP) attribute and alternatives reports.
- The original LRA was reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Safety Review Board and the Plant Operation Review prior to submittal to the staff. Additionally, the applicant developed procedural guidance for a final review of the original LRA prior to submittal to the staff.
- The applicant planned to retain certain license renewal documents, such as AMRs, individual system scoping reports, TLAAs, and topical reports, as quality records or controlled documents.

- The applicant performed an industry peer review and several quality assurance assessments of license renewal activities.

Conclusion. On the basis of review of pertinent original LRA development guidance, discussion with the applicant's license renewal staff, and review of quality audit reports, the staff concluded that these quality assurance activities provided additional assurance that original LRA development activities were performed consistently with the original LRA descriptions, and that this consistency is maintained in the ALRA.

#### 2.1.3.1.3 Training

The staff reviewed the applicant's training process to ensure the guidelines and methodology for the scoping and screening activities would be performed in a consistent and appropriate manner. The screening and scoping of SSCs for license renewal was accomplished by CEG personnel. The CEG LRA team included personnel who had gained previous license renewal experience working on the Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 LRA. The CEG LRA team was supplemented with additional CEG personnel that were provided with LRA-specific training. The purpose of the training was to provide a framework for ensuring that the personnel assigned to the technical portion of the original LRA acquired a fundamental level of knowledge of the license renewal process and regulatory requirements.

The training program for these personnel consisted of "check-outs" administered by individuals with LRA experience, required reading of selected documents, and lectures by personnel experienced in various LRA topics. A "check-out" is defined as a short interview between a qualification trainee and a subject matter expert to determine whether the trainee has an adequate understanding of a particular subject. With the exception of CEG personnel with prior license renewal experience, each CEG person assigned to license renewal maintained a training qualification record as part of the application development process. The results of the scoping and screening activities accomplished by CEG personnel were reviewed by CEG personnel. Personnel with prior experience on LRA preparation provided lectures on such topics as, scoping, boundaries, screening, AMRs, and TLAA. A check list was developed and used by CEG personnel to complete their reviews. The check list provided general guidance on what was required to be reviewed. Reviewers were required to use the check list, and the check lists were maintained as a permanent record.

The staff reviewed completed qualification and training records of several of the applicant's license renewal personnel and also reviewed completed check lists. The staff did not identify any adverse findings. Additionally, based on discussions with the applicant's license renewal personnel during the audit, the staff verified that the applicant's license renewal personnel were knowledgeable on the license renewal process requirements and the specific technical issues within their areas of responsibility.

Conclusion. On the basis of discussions with the applicant's license renewal project team responsible for the scoping and screening process, and a review of selected design documentation in support of the process, the staff concluded that the applicant's personnel understood the requirements of the original LRA and adequately implemented the scoping and screening methodology established in the original LRA.

#### 2.1.3.1.4 Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)

Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). In part, 10 CFR 54(a)(1) requires that the applicant consider all SR SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs to ensure the following functions:

- To maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
- To shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe-shutdown condition.
- To prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2), or 10 CFR 100.11 to be within the scope of license renewal.

With regard to identification of DBEs, SRP-LR Section 2.1.3, "Review Procedures," states:

The set of design basis events as defined in the rule is not limited to Chapter 15 (or equivalent) of the UFSAR. Examples of design basis events that may not be described in this chapter include external events, such as floods, storms, earthquakes, tornadoes, or hurricanes, and internal events, such as a high-energy-line break. Information regarding design basis events as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b)(1) may be found in any chapter of the facility UFSAR, the Commission's regulations, NRC orders, exemptions, or license conditions within the CLB. These sources should also be reviewed to identify systems, structures and components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b)(1)) to ensure the functions described in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.1-1, dated November 22, 2004, the staff stated that during the scoping and screening methodology audit, the staff questioned how non-accident DBEs, particularly DBEs that may not be described in the UFSAR/USAR, were considered during scoping. The staff noted that limiting the review of DBEs to those described in the UFSAR/USAR accident analysis could result in omission of SR functions described in the CLB and requested the applicant provide a list of all DBEs that were evaluated as part of the license renewal review. However, during the audit, the staff was unable to identify such as listing. Therefore, the staff requested in RAI 2.1-1, that the applicant provide a list of DBEs evaluated as part of the license renewal scoping process, and describe the methodology used to ensure that all DBEs (including conditions of normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, design-basis accidents, external events, and natural phenomena) were addressed during license renewal scoping

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated, in part, that the methodology used to ensure that all DBEs, including operational occurrences, abnormal operating transients, anticipated and abnormal operational occurrences, design-basis accidents, and the general design criteria, were addressed during license renewal scoping was to utilize the NMP controlled documents and databases that identified those SSCs and functions classified as SR. These documents and databases consist of the NMP1 UFSAR and NMP2 USAR, safety-class boundary drawings, Appendix B determinations, Maintenance Rule scoping documents, and MEL, as well as additional CLB information identified in the individual scoping

and screening reports developed for each NMP1 and NMP2 system and structure. The applicant also provided a detailed listing of the various DBEs for each unit and a description of the design and configuration control processes used to ensure that all SSCs required to perform an SR function are properly evaluated and identified.

The staff reviewed the additional information provided by the applicant, and discussed the response at a meeting on February 2, 2005, to verify that HELBs were specifically considered within the DBE evaluations. On the basis of providing (1) a detailed listing of the DBEs for each unit including HELBs; (2) a description of the design and configuration control processes used to identify the SSCs credited for DBE mitigation; and (3) a description of the processes and sources of DBE information used to perform the scoping evaluation consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), the staff found that the applicant has adequately addressed the staff's RAI. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-1 is resolved.

The applicant's approach to satisfying the scoping requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) was to identify and describe all plant systems and structures and evaluate those against the SR criteria. As part of this process, the applicant reviewed various licensing basis documents to identify SR intended functions associated with the NMP units. To accomplish this, the applicant performed scoping of SR SSCs in accordance with implementation LRG-02 Sections 3.3 and 3.7-02. LRG-08 Section 3.3 was used to direct the review of scoping activities by the NMP staff. The applicant classified SSCs as either SR or NSR, using the information provided in the Maintenance Rule scoping document and the component-specific safety classification field in the MEL.

LRG-02 Section 3.8, "Component List," requires that the MEL be used to populate the license renewal database with components of systems or structures within the scope of license renewal. The MEL safety classification field was reviewed to ensure that any system or structure that has a component identified as SR was considered for inclusion in the scope of the license renewal project. Additionally the MEL safety-classification and associated MEL drawings provided a starting point for identifying specific mechanical and structural components required to meet the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criteria. The staff reviewed the safety classification criteria used to determine the NMP safety classification to verify consistency with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criteria. The staff determined that the nuclear SR definition used by the applicant in its safety classification program did not include all the exposure limitations referenced in 10 CFR 54(a)(1)(iii). Specifically, NMP plant procedure NIP-DES-02, "Safety Classification of Items and Activities," did not include a reference to the offsite exposure limitations contained in 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2) for use of an alternate source term. However, during discussions with the applicant it was determined that NMP had not requested a licensing basis change to use the alternate source term criteria; therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2) do not currently impact the license renewal program.

As part of the audit discussions related to the determination of SR SSCs, the staff questioned whether some components classified as SR in the facility database might not perform any of the SR intended functions of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) due to plant-unique considerations or preferences. The applicant stated that these components may have been considered outside the scope of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). During the audit, the applicant described the process used to evaluate components classified as SR that did not perform an SR intended function. As part of the process, the applicant stated that the safety-classification of many SR components was

re-evaluated in order to reconcile differences between scoping determinations and facility database information or the Maintenance Rule scoping results.

In RAI 2.1-2, dated November 22, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide a description of the process used during license renewal scoping activities to disposition components classified as SR that do not perform an SR intended function. In particular, the staff requested that the applicant provide a description of any components or structures classified as SR in the facility safety-classification database that were not included within the scope of license renewal under the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criteria. Additionally, the staff asked the applicant to describe the process used to reconcile the facility database safety classification information with scoping intended function determinations.

In its response, by letter dated January 31, 2005, the applicant stated, in part, that during the scoping and screening process for the NMPNS original LRA, the applicant identified a small percentage of components as SR, but not required to meet any intended function for compliance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). These discrepancies were entered into the NMP corrective action program for resolution. The applicant provided a discussion of the specific cases where such re-classifications were identified. These included several components in NSR systems that were classified as SR in the plant component database, called Master Equipment List for NMP1 and NMP 2 (MEL1, MEL2) when the license renewal project was started, but have since been reclassified as NSR as a result of detailed review of the CLB as part of the renewal process. These components were entered into the corrective action program and reclassified in accordance with the design change process. Secondly, the applicant explained that there were instances of components identified as SR during the scoping and screening process that have been removed from the plant via the modification process. These components have been moved to the plant historical database. Thirdly, the applicant identified several components in MEL1 classified as SR that have been abandoned in place. These components are not within the scope of license renewal as they perform no system function and, therefore, do not perform any license renewal intended function.

The applicant also noted that all components reclassified as NSR that contain liquid and are in the vicinity of SR equipment are still considered within the scope of license renewal for criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Additionally, the applicant provided a description of the process used to evaluate these components to ensure proper classification and disposition within the license renewal evaluation. Generically, the process began when a license renewal team member identified an apparent discrepancy. A license renewal team member would then review the situation with a system and/or design engineer to obtain more information. If it still appeared that there was a component identified as SR that did not support an SR system function, it would be elevated to license renewal project supervision. If it could not be resolved at that point, or if the plant database required a revision, the issue was entered into the corrective action program for resolution. For any resolution that required a change to a design document or the plant database, the design and/or configuration change process was used. Both of these processes required a review and approval of the change by an individual other than the preparer. The resolutions of these discrepancies were then fed back to the license renewal team member for proper incorporation into the scoping and screening process.

On the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant in response, including identification of the types of components that were re-classified, and a description of the process for evaluation and disposition of such components, the staff found that the applicant adequately addressed the RAI. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-2 is resolved.

To provide additional assurance that the applicant adequately implemented its SR scoping methodology, the staff reviewed a sample of the license renewal scoping results for the FW/HPCI system and the reactor building (structural review), and discussed the methodology and results with the applicant's personnel who were responsible for these evaluations. The staff verified that the applicant had identified and used pertinent engineering and licensing information to identify the SSCs required to be within the scope of license renewal.

Conclusion. On the basis of this sample review, discussions with the applicant, review of the applicant's scoping process, and RAI responses, the staff determined that, the applicant's methodology for identifying systems and structures meets the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and is therefore adequate.

Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). In part, 10 CFR 54(a)(2) requires that the applicant consider all NSR SSCs whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in 10 CFR 54(a)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) to be within the scope of license renewal.

By letters dated December 3, 2001, and March 15, 2002, the NRC issued its position to the NEI to provide staff expectations for determining what SSCs meet 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The December 3, 2001, letter provided specific examples of operating experience which identified pipe failure events (summarized in Information Notice (IN) 2001-09, "Main Feedwater System Degradation in Safety-Related ASME Code Class 2 Piping Inside the Containment of a Pressurized Water Reactor") and the approaches the staff considers acceptable to determine which piping systems should be included within the scope of license renewal based on 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The March 15, 2002, letter further described the staff's expectations for the evaluation of non-piping SSCs to determine which additional NSR SSCs are within the scope of license renewal. The position stated that applicants should not consider hypothetical failures, but rather should base their evaluation on the plant's CLB, engineering judgment and analyses, and relevant operating experience. The paper further described operating experience as all documented plant-specific and industry-wide experience that can be used to determine the plausibility of a failure. Documentation would include NRC generic communications and event reports, plant-specific condition reports, industry reports such as Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs), and engineering evaluations.

The applicant implemented the scoping and screening process in accordance with LRG-02, "License Renewal Scoping and Screening." Paragraph 3.4.1 of LRG-02 states that NSR SSCs whose failure could affect the satisfactory accomplishment of any SR functions were considered within the scope of license renewal. The procedure further specified the various NSR SSCs that were considered within the scope of license renewal, such as NSR features which protect SR SSCs from missiles; certain overhead handling systems; walls, curbs and dikes which provide flood barriers to SR SSCs; NSR whip restraints, jet impingement shields, and blowout panels which provide SR SSCs from the effects of a HELB; NSR piping attached to SR piping up to and including the first equivalent anchor; NSR piping in the vicinity of SR equipment; and supports.



The applicant used the UFSAR/USAR, the plant component database, P&IDs, DBD source documents, Maintenance Rule documents, safety class boundary drawings, the CLB, and plant and industry operating experience to identify NSR SSCs for inclusion within the scope of license renewal.

As part of its evaluation of the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion, the applicant prepared a topical report titled, "Scoping and Screening Aging Management Review NSR Piping (NSR Piping Report)," to document the review and evaluation performed to identify those SSCs which met 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). To facilitate that evaluation, the applicant divided the potential NSR/SR interactions into four separate categories: NSR SSC Within the Vicinity of SR SSCs, NSR SSCs Attached to SR SSCs, NSR SSCs Providing Functional Support to SR SSCs, and Fail-Safe Components. Each category is discussed in detail below.

- (1) NSR SSC Within the Vicinity of SR SSCs - The applicant's NSR Piping Report contains the rationale for inclusion of NSR piping attached to SR piping and NSR piping located within the vicinity of SR piping. The piping effects considered by the applicant included spray, flooding, pressure and temperature rise, pipe whip, and jet impingement. The applicant had utilized the preventative option as defined in NEI 95-10 and identified each structure or area containing SR SSCs and NSR SSCs. The applicant then identified all NSR piping systems located within areas containing SR SSCs which contained fluids. The applicant then removed the NSR SSCs which contained air, gas, or oil from within the scope of license renewal. The NSR SSCs that contained water or steam and were within the vicinity of SR SSCs were determined to be within the scope of license renewal.

Discussion with the applicant indicated that a conservative definition of "in the vicinity" had been defined during the scoping process as "within the building, corridor, or floor." In practice, the applicant had applied the scoping criteria to all NSR SSCs located within the same building as SR SSCs (buildings identified as SR). In addition, the applicant had provided an analysis, "Technical Basis for Materials-Environment Group Inputs to the ConRAD Database" (the data base for equipment and components for NMPNS license renewal project), which provided the basis for the exclusion of NSR oil-filled pipe within the vicinity of SR SSCs, from the scope of license renewal. The plant analysis indicated that there were no aging affects associated with oil-filled NSR piping systems based on both plant and industry-wide experience.

- (2) NSR SSCs Attached to SR SSCs - The original LRA states that for NSR SSCs attached to SR SSCs, the scope of the NSR piping system was extended beyond the classification change to the first seismic anchor beyond the depicted class change. The applicant determined that the piping between the depicted classification boundary and the first seismic anchor was considered to be within the scope of license renewal. As a result, for piping containing water or steam, the NSR portion within the scope of license renewal extended beyond the depicted class change until no longer in the vicinity of SR equipment or until the first seismic anchor was reached, whichever is furthest. Paragraph 3.4.2.7 of LRG-02 states that for NSR SCs directly attached to SR SSCs, the NSR piping and supports, up to and including the first equivalent anchor beyond the NSR/SR interface, were within the scope of license renewal.

During the audit, the applicant indicated that this approach had been implemented by considering all NSR piping components within a building containing SR SSCs as within

scope of license renewal. However, the staff noted that the statement in the original LRA, "extended beyond the depicted class change until no longer in the vicinity of SR equipment or until the first seismic anchor is reached, whichever is furthest," had not been effectively implemented. The staff found that the applicant had not evaluated beyond the vicinity of the SR SSCs (outside the building) to verify the seismic anchor (or equipment acting as the seismic anchor) and had not verified that the appropriate anchor/equipment had been included within the scope of license renewal.

In RAI 2.1-4(a), dated November 22, 2004, the staff stated that during the audit, it was noted that in some cases where NSR plant equipment provided a termination point for NSR piping attached to SR piping, the NSR piping was placed within the scope of license renewal, but the plant equipment (such as a heat exchanger) was not considered to be within the scope of license renewal. For cases where an entire pipe run, including both SR and NSR piping, are analyzed as part of the CLB to establish that it could withstand DBE loads, the SRP-LR provides explicit scoping criteria. Specifically, SRP-LR Section 2.1.3.1.2 indicates that the scoping methodology include (1) the NSR piping up to its anchors, and (2) the associated piping anchors as being within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Because in some instances plant equipment was used as a termination point for the NSR piping within the scope of license renewal, this plant equipment appears to be equivalent to an associated piping anchor as described in SRP-LR.

Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information regarding the SR/NSR interface evaluation as follows: the definition of equivalent anchor that was used for the purposes of the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) evaluation; the method used to identify the first seismic anchor for NSR pipe attached to SR pipe, within the scope of license renewal; confirmation that the NSR piping, associated plant equipment, and their supports, up to and including the first seismic anchor, were within the scope of license renewal and subject to aging management review; and how plant equipment identified as the termination point for NSR piping was evaluated during the scoping process.

In its letter dated December 22, 2004, as supplemented by letter dated July 14, 2005, the applicant described the revised scoping methodology and complete re-scoping effort that was applied to the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion as a result of the questions resulting from the staff's methodology audit. As part of those responses, the applicant stated, in part, that the re-scoping was performed consistent with the guidance in NEI 95-10, Revision 5, except for those portions of the guidance with which the staff had taken exceptions. For those cases, the applicant's scoping methodology followed the staff's position rather than the NEI guideline. The applicant provided a revised Section 2.1.4.2 in its ALRA, which describes in detail the re-scoping effort associated with this criterion. As a result of the re-scoping effort, the applicant included all NSR SSCs that are within the boundaries of the equivalent anchor locations, including the equivalent anchors themselves. As part of the ALRA, the applicant defined the equivalent anchor for each unit consistent with the CLB for the plants; described the processes used to identify each equivalent anchor location (including review of plant drawings and performance of plant walk-downs), and ensured that all NSR SSCs within the boundaries up to and including the equivalent anchor were identified and included within the scope of renewal. The staff verified that the ALRA description was consistent with the prior response to the RAI and the results of the staff's audit of the scoping and screening methodology. On the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant in response to the staff's

RAI, and the incorporation of that information into the ALRA, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-4(a) is resolved.

- (3) NSR SSCs Providing Functional Support to SR SSCs - The staff determined that LRG-02, "License Renewal Scoping and Screening," paragraph 3.4.3.2, stated that malfunctions of NSR equipment that result in a challenge to SR equipment (where the SR function is maintained) is not within the scope of license renewal.

In RAI 2.1-4(b), dated November 22, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for this position and all applications of this position during the scoping process.

In its responses, by letter dated December 22, 2004, as supplemented by letter dated July 14, 2005, the applicant stated that its scoping methodology was revised and did not use the "NSR Safety Systems and Components (SSCs) which Functionally Interact with SR SSCs" criterion from NEI 95-10, Revision 4, to exclude from scope any NSR SSCs that could inhibit an SR SSC from performing its intended functions. As a result of this effort, NMP now includes all NSR SSCs that are within the boundaries of the equivalent anchors (including the equivalent anchor) within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The original LRA Section 2.1.4.2 was revised, as reflected in the ALRA, to describe the methodology used in the NMP NSR re-scoping effort. The staff verified that the ALRA description was consistent with the prior response to the RAI, and the results of the staff's audit of the scoping and screening methodology. On the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant in response to the staff's request for information, and the incorporation of that information into the ALRA, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-4(b) is resolved.

- (4) Fail-Safe Components - In RAI 2.1-4(c), dated November 22, 2004, the staff stated that LRG-02, "License Renewal Scoping and Screening," paragraph 4.1.2, stated that fail-safe components are components whose failure (through interaction with the failed NSR SSC) cannot prevent the accomplishment of an SR function since the NSR SSC causes the SR SSC to attain a fail-safe state. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for this position and all applications of this position during the scoping process.

In its responses by letter dated December 22, 2004, as supplemented by letter dated July 14, 2005, the applicant stated that based on the staff's audit, its scoping methodology was revised to ensure that all NSR SSCs within the vicinity of SR SSCs were included within the scope of renewal regardless of whether the SR SSC was active or passive. As a result, the applicant reviewed its scoping results and verified that it did not exclude any NSR SSCs with potential for interaction with SR SSCs based on the fail-safe logic. The staff verified that the ALRA description was consistent with the prior response to RAI 2.1-4(c), and the results of the staff's audit of the scoping and screening methodology. On the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant in response to the staff's request for information, and the incorporation of that information into the ALRA submittal, the staff found that the applicant has adequately addressed the staff's request for additional information. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-4(c) is resolved.

To provide additional assurance that the applicant adequately implemented its NSR scoping methodology, the staff reviewed a sample of the license renewal scoping results for the FW/HPCI system. The staff verified that the applicant had identified and used pertinent

engineering and licensing information to identify the SSCs required to be within the scope of license renewal in accordance with the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criteria.

On the basis of the sample review, discussions with the applicant, and review of the applicant's scoping process, the staff determined that the applicant's methodology for identifying systems and structures meeting the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) was adequate.

Application of the Scoping Criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). In part, 10 CFR 54(a)(3) requires that the applicant consider all SSCs relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the regulations for fire protection, EQ, PTS, ATWS, and SBO to be within the scope of license renewal.

The applicant documented its methodology for performing the scoping of SSCs in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) in implementation procedures LRG-01 and LRG02 and the NERs developed by the applicant for certain regulated events for the applicable NMP unit.

The applicant performed the initial scoping for regulated events by evaluating CLB information relevant to each regulated event to identify whether the structure or system met the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). For ATWS and SBO, the applicant developed an NER describing the relevant 10 CFR Part 54 requirements, a functional description of the implementation of that requirement at the NMPNS, specific information regarding systems and components credited for the event, the process to identify the scoping boundaries associated with the systems credited, the intended functions applicable to the requirement, information on how to record the results of the evaluation in the license renewal database and appropriate MEL, a list of CLB information sources used for the analysis, and a list of systems and components determined to be within scope for the given regulated event.

By letter dated April 1, 2002, the staff provided guidance on the scoping of equipment relied on to meet the requirements of the SBO rule, 10 CFR 50.63. In this letter, the staff noted that, consistent with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1), the plant system portion of the offsite power system that is used to connect the plant to the offsite power source should be included within the scope of the SBO rule. In the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.4.3.5, the applicant stated that based on the guidance in the April 1, 2002, letter for SBO recovery, an additional evaluation was performed at NMP to determine, and bring within the scope of license renewal, components credited for recovery of the offsite power system. For each of the systems credited for SBO recovery, a scoping/screening report was developed. Additionally, an AMR was performed for all long-lived, passive structures and components within these systems. The scoping effort identified structures and components of the offsite power system for each plant required to restore power from the onsite switchyard down to the SR busses in the plant. The applicant also stated that the plant offsite power system and these structures and components were classified as satisfying the criteria in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) and were included within the scope of license renewal. The staff determined that the applicant's approach to scoping SSCs relied on to demonstrate compliance with the SBO rule was consistent with the staff's April 1, 2002, interim guidance.

For EQ, the master list of EQ components is detailed in each unit's MEL. Systems that contain components identified in the EQ MEL, as defined by 10 CFR 50.49, are within the scope of license renewal.

For fire protection, NMP1 UFSAR Sections X.10A, "Fire Hazards Analysis;" X.10B, "Safe Shutdown Analysis;" and X.K, "Fire Protection Program;" and NMP2 USAR Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection Systems," describe the station fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment. Fire protection, detection, mitigation, confinement, and safe shutdown equipment used at the station were reviewed during the scoping process.

Evaluations were performed on equipment needed to meet the fire protection requirements of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCS 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," as well as those needed to meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.48. These evaluations were used as fire protection scoping basis documents. Structures and systems that contain components relied on to protect SR structures and components and equipment required to mitigate offsite release from a fire or explosion are within the scope of license renewal.

SRP-LR, Section 2.1.3.1.3, "Regulated Events," states that all SSCs that are relied upon in the plant's CLB (as defined in 10 CFR 54.3), plant-specific experience, industry-wide experience (as appropriate), and safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with NRC regulations identified under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3), are required to be included within the scope of the 10 CFR Part 54. As part of the original LRA review, the staff evaluated the scope and depth of the applicant's document review to provide assurance that the scoping methodology considered all SSC intended functions.

During the scoping and screening methodology audit, the applicant identified several technical position papers as a documentation source for license renewal scoping under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). In reviewing the original LRA, scoping and screening implementation procedures, and evaluation of the feedwater system during the audit, the staff was informed by the applicant that two technical position papers (ATWS and SBO) had not been adequately reviewed and incorporated into the original LRA during its verification activities. This discrepancy was identified by the applicant during the audit and documented in DER-NM-2044, dated September 30, 2004. DER-NM-2044 states that the original LRA Section 2.3.4.B.3 is incomplete because it does not reference an SBO event in the description of why components in the NMP2 feedwater system are within the scope of license renewal. DER-NM-2044 also states that an extent of condition review is necessary to determine whether there are similar instances affecting other system descriptions in the original LRA.

RAI 2.1-5, dated November 22, 2004, requested that the applicant describe the methodology used to develop technical position papers and specifically describe the actions taken to ensure that both NMP1 and NMP2 license renewal scoping and screening reports adequately address the new ATWS and SBO DBDs, as well as any potentially affected the original LRA sections.

In its response, by letter dated January 31, 2005, the applicant stated, in part, that the technical position papers used at NMP are controlled in accordance with engineering administrative procedure NEP-DES-02, "Engineering Evaluations." The general methodology employed involves the preparation of the engineering evaluation, a technical review or design verification, and approval by the responsible supervisor. The preparer is directed to "Perform the evaluation and document in sufficient detail to allow a technically qualified reviewer/design verifier to understand the purpose, inputs, evaluation criteria, assumptions, method, references, and conclusions of the evaluation, and to conclude adequacy without recourse to the originator." Design verification is required when the evaluation involves SR systems, structures, or

components. The evaluation is documented as an NER. This administrative procedure also applies to the review and acceptance of vendor-supplied documents. These documents also require a review and approval by NMP prior to use. However, as noted above, these two technical position papers (ATWS and SBO) were not reviewed and approved for use. It is this error that led to the apparent discrepancy with the feedwater system described above.

In response to the finding, the applicant performed additional reviews to ensure that all the required NMP2 SCs were properly identified within the scope of license renewal and to compare the systems listed in the original LRA to those identified in the approved engineering reports. As a result of this comparison, the applicant determined that the original LRA Section 2.3.4.B.3, "NMP2 Feedwater System," did not need to be identified as within scope for the SBO regulated event since the feedwater components credited for SBO (reactor coolant/containment isolation valves) were already properly included in the original LRA Section 2.3.2.B.5, "NMP2 Primary Containment Isolation System." This system includes the reactor coolant/containment isolation valves for all systems and is properly credited for being within scope for the SBO regulated event. Therefore, the applicant determined that the apparent discrepancy identified during the audit was determined to be incorrectly characterized.

However, during the review to ensure all systems were properly identified for the ATWS and SBO regulated events, the applicant discovered that the NMP2 common electrical system should have been identified as within scope for the SBO regulated event. Therefore, ALRA Section 2.5.B.4 was revised to also include the SBO regulated event as a criterion for this system. On the basis of the supplemental description of the development and approval of technical position papers, and the review of the extent of condition of the apparent discrepancy, including the identification of the NMP2 common electrical system as within scope for the SBO regulated event, and the incorporation of that information into ALRA Section 2.5.B.4, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-5 is resolved.

The staff reviewed a sample of the license renewal database 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) scoping results and discussed the methodology and results with the applicant's license renewal project personnel. From the discussion, the staff concluded that the applicant had identified and used pertinent engineering and licensing information to compile the SSCs required to be within scope in accordance with the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) criteria.

On the basis of the above review and discussions with the applicant, the staff determined that the applicant's methodology for identifying systems and structures meeting the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) was adequate.

#### 2.1.3.1.5 Plant-Level Scoping of Systems and Structures.

The applicant documented its methodology for performing the scoping of SSCs in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) in implementation procedures LRG-01 and LRG-02. The applicant's approach to system and structure scoping was consistent with the methodology described in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.2. Specifically, LRG-02 specified that the personnel performing license renewal scoping use CLB documents and describe the system or structure including a list all functions that the system or structure is required to accomplish. Sources of information regarding the CLB for systems included the USAR, DBDs, MEL database, Maintenance Rule scoping reports, control drawings, and docketed correspondence. The applicant then compared identified system or structures function lists to the scoping criteria to

determine whether the functions met the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a). The applicant documented the results of the plant-level scoping process in accordance with Section 3.2.3 to LRG-02. The database information included a description of the structure or system, a listing of functions performed by the system or structure, information pertaining to system realignment (as applicable), identification of intended functions, the 10 CFR 54.4(a) scoping criteria met by the system or structure, references, and the basis for the classification of the system or structure intended functions. During the scoping methodology audit, the staff reviewed a sampling of scoping reports and concluded that the applicant's scoping results in the LR database and scoping results reports contained an appropriate level of detail to document the scoping process.

Conclusion. On the basis of a review of the original LRA and ALRA, the scoping and screening implementation procedures, and a sampling review of system and structure scoping results during the methodology audit, the staff concluded that the applicant's scoping methodology for systems and structures was adequate. In particular, the staff determined that the applicant's methodology reasonably identified systems and structures within the scope of license renewal and their associated intended functions.

#### 2.1.3.1.6 Component-Level Scoping

After the applicant had identified systems and structures within the scope of license renewal and their associated intended functions, a review was performed to identify the components of each system and structure within the scope of license renewal that supported an intended function. As described in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5, a component is considered to be within the scope of license renewal if it fulfills a system intended function.

Mechanical Component Scoping. The original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5.1, "Mechanical Systems," and LRG-02 Section 3.6, "Component Scoping and Screening," provided the applicant's proceduralized guidance for scoping mechanical system components. To identify system components required to perform a system intended function, the applicant initially generated a listing of mechanical system components based on information derived from controlled system diagrams and the MEL. Procedure LRG-02 discusses in detail how to (1) determine system boundaries, (2) indicate components within a specific flow path that are required for performance of intended functions, and (3) determine and identify system and interdisciplinary interfaces (e.g., mechanical/structural, mechanical/electrical, structural/electrical). The staff reviewed the results of the boundary evaluation and discussed the process further with the applicant. The staff verified that mechanical system evaluation boundaries were established for each system within the scope of license renewal. These boundaries were determined by mapping the pressure boundary associated with system-level license renewal intended functions onto the controlled system drawings. The applicant included the mechanical component types in the scoping and screening database and the applicant performed further review was performed to ensure all component types were identified. If a component type was not already in the MEL, the component type was created for use in the license database. A preparer and an independent reviewer performed a comprehensive evaluation of the boundary drawings to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the review results.

The staff conducted detailed discussions with the applicant's license renewal project management personnel and reviewed documentation pertinent to the scoping process. The staff

assessed whether the applicant had appropriately applied the scoping methodology outlined in the original LRA and implementation procedures and whether the scoping results were consistent with CLB requirements. The staff determined that the applicant's proceduralized methodology was consistent with the description provided in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5.1 and the guidance contained in SRP-LR, Section 2.1, and was adequately implemented.

The staff reviewed the process of scoping for the FW/HPCI system. The staff verified that the applicant had identified and highlighted system P&IDs to develop the system boundaries in accordance with the procedural guidance. The applicant was knowledgeable about the process and conventions for establishing boundaries as defined in the license renewal implementation procedures. Additionally, the staff verified that the applicant had independently verified the results in accordance with the governing procedures. Specifically, other LR personnel knowledgeable about the system had independently reviewed the marked-up drawings to ensure accurate identification of system intended functions. The applicant performed additional cross-discipline verification and independent reviews of the resultant highlighted drawings before final approval of the scoping effort.

On the basis of the above staff review regarding the applicant's detailed scoping implementation procedures and a sampling review of mechanical components scoping results for the FW/HPCI system, the staff concluded that the applicant's methodology for identifying mechanical components within the scope of license renewal met the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a).

Structural Component Scoping. The applicant performed its structural scoping in accordance with the methodology defined in CNS procedure LRG-02, "LR Scoping and Screening." The procedure describes the source design documentation to be used for the evaluation of structures and is used to evaluate plant structures and to determine their functions. UFSAR/USAR, Maintenance Rule scoping results, design and license basis documents, regulatory requirements, the MEL, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B determinations, and plant drawings were reviewed. From this review, a scoping report for each plant structure was developed. The scoping report describes the functions for each structure and indicates the applicable 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1)-(3) criteria. Tables 2.4.a, 2.4.b, and 2.4.c of the original LRA and ALRA provide a complete plant-specific list of structures within the scope of license renewal.

The staff conducted detailed discussions with the applicant's license renewal project management personnel and reviewed documentation pertinent to the scoping process. The staff assessed whether the applicant had appropriately applied the scoping methodology outlined in the original LRA and implementation procedure and whether the scoping results were consistent with CLB requirements. Component supports, and fire stops and seals were binned in separate structural commodity groupings. The staff reviewed scoping reports for the NMP1 reactor building and the NMP1 materials handling/heavy loads. In general, the staff determined that the applicant's overall approach to license renewal structural scoping was adequate.

The staff reviewed the scoping procedure, discussed the structural scoping methodology with the applicant's cognizant engineers, and reviewed several plant structural scoping reports to verify proper implementation of the scoping process for SCs. The staff determined that the applicant's proceduralized scoping methodology was consistent with the description provided in Section 2.1.4 of the original LRA and ALRA and the guidance contained in SRP-LR Section 2.1.



Based on these audit activities, the staff did not identify any discrepancies between the methodology documented and the implementation results.

On the basis of a review of information contained in the original LRA and ALRA, the applicant's scoping implementation procedure, and a sampling review of SC scoping reports, the staff concluded that the applicant's methodology for identifying SCs within the scope of license renewal met the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a).

Electrical and I&C Component Scoping. SRP-LR Section 2.5.3.1, "Components Within the Scope of License Renewal," states that an applicant may use the plant spaces approach in scoping electrical and I&C components. In the plant spaces approach, an applicant may indicate that all electrical and I&C components located within a particular area are either within or not within the scope of license renewal. The applicant did not choose the typical electrical and I&C scoping approach, using instead an approach similar to that used for mechanical systems and structures.

The staff reviewed NMP procedures LRG-01, "License Renewal Project General Guidance," Revision 2, and LRG-02, "License Renewal Scoping and Screening," and determined that adequate guidance was provided to the engineers performing the electrical and I&C license renewal scoping process. SSCs were evaluated to determine whether they were within the scope of license renewal using NMP licensing and design-basis information and regulatory requirements. System descriptions were developed and intended functions were identified and documented in ConRAD. Additionally, SSCs were evaluated to determine whether they provided a license renewal intended function. ConRAD was updated to reflect these conclusions. In unique cases, such as regulated events, NERs were developed to identify components required to support these events. Because these documents were developed late in the project, management deferred entering these components into ConRAD until the annual update. The majority of these components have been entered into the NMP MEL. The components were evaluated by the electrical license renewal engineers, and passive, long-lived components were evaluated in an AMR. This essentially completed the scoping process per LRG-02.

As part of the review, the staff noted that electrical commodities (i.e., cables, connectors, non-segregated bus, electrical penetrations, etc.) were identified and addressed separately from the electrical system scoping evaluations. LRG-01, Section 3.2.2.2.1, stated that commodities are groupings of components that perform the same intended functions and may be associated with many plant systems and structures. Standard groupings of electrical commodities have been well established by prior license renewal applicants and embodied in the industry guidance on the preparation of the LRAs. A separate guideline, LRG-04, "Aging Management Review of Electrical Commodities," was developed by the applicant to govern the evaluation of electrical commodities with respect to aging effects and management of those effects.

The applicant conducted a search of cable design and procurement specification documents, contracts, plant modification packages, controlled drawings, the plant equipment database, and the electrical cable database (TRAC 2000) to February 21, 2006, identify all components required to perform license renewal intended functions. The staff discussed the electrical scoping methodology with the applicant's cognizant engineers, and reviewed several plant electrical packages to verify proper implementation of the scoping process for electrical components. The staff also compared a sample of electrical components identified in the

documentation to the electrical commodity list in the license renewal database to ensure consistency.

In RAI 2.1-6, dated November 22, 2004, the staff stated that during the audit it noted that the applicant's engineering staff had an adequate understanding of the process used to scope electrical and I&C components. However, the staff did identify an issue regarding the level of detail in the associated procedures describing the scoping process. Specifically, the staff was unable to determine the specific activities performed by the applicant's staff to identify the applicable intended functions, plant electrical equipment required to perform those functions, and subsequent development of the electrical commodity list from which the aging management reviews were conducted. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide a detailed description of the methodology used for the scoping and screening of electrical and I&C components.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant addressed the staff's request and provided (1) a detailed description of the process used to identify the intended functions, (2) equipment necessary to perform those functions, and (3) development of the electrical commodities evaluated as part of the AMR. Specifically, the applicant clarified that the methodology used to determine whether an electrical or I&C component supported an intended function is described in project procedure LRG-02. Section 3.7 of LRG-02 requires that the electrical or functional boundary be described for the intended functions of electrical systems. This activity identifies a group of components that support a specific intended function. For example, all electrical and I&C components that are identified on the EQ list for a system are the group of components that support the EQ intended function. Additionally, the applicant described the process used to identify intended functions. Specifically, electrical systems were identified based upon those defined in the MEL, UFSAR/USAR, and Maintenance Rule scoping reports. The boundaries of each electrical system are based upon the components assigned to the system as well as any descriptions in the UFSAR/USAR and/or other DBD. The MEL was used as the design document/database that assigned components to a particular system. The electrical systems and components defined in MEL were imported into the NMP license renewal database, ConRAD. The information contained in ConRAD for each electrical system included a system description, list of system functions, identification of which functions met any of the license renewal scoping criteria, a list of NMP documents from which this information was derived, and any corresponding comments.

The staff found the above response acceptable because the applicant provided additional details regarding the process for identifying intended functions and those components necessary to perform those functions. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.1-6 is resolved.

On the basis of a review of information contained in the original LRA and ALRA, the applicant's detailed scoping implementation procedures, and a sampling review of electrical commodity scoping results, the staff concluded that the applicant's methodology for identifying electrical commodities within the scope of license renewal met the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a).

#### ***2.1.3.2 Screening Methodology***

The staff reviewed the methodology used by the applicant to determine whether mechanical, structural, and electrical and I&C components within the scope of license renewal would be

subject to further aging management review. The applicant provided the staff with a detailed discussion of the processes used for each discipline and provided administrative documentation that described the screening methodology. The staff also reviewed the screening results reports for the FW/HPCI system and reactor building. The staff noted that the applicant's screening process was performed in accordance with its written requirements and was consistent with the guidance provided in the staff's SRP-LR and NEI 95-10, Revision 3. The staff determined that the screening methodology was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54, and that the screening methodology will identify SCs that meet the screening criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff reviewed the screening methodology used by the applicant to determine whether mechanical, structural, and electrical components within the scope of license renewal would be subject to further aging management evaluation. The applicant described its screening process in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.5. In general, the applicant's screening approach consisted of evaluations to determine which in-scope structures and components were passive and long-lived. Passive, long-lived structures and components were then subject to further AMR.

The staff evaluated the applicant's screening methodology against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) and (2), using the review guidance contained in SRP-LR Section 2.1.3.2, "Screening." According to 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1), the applicant's IPA must identify and list those SCs subject to an AMR. Further, 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) requires that SCs subject to an AMR shall encompass those structures and components that (1) perform an intended function, as described in 10 CFR 54.4, without moving parts or a change in configuration or properties, and (2) are not subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period. Per 10 CFR 54.21(a)(2), the applicant must describe and justify the methods used to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). In the original LRA and ALRA, the applicant described screening methodologies that were unique to the mechanical, structural, and electrical disciplines. The following sections describe the staff evaluation of the applicant's screening approach for each of these disciplines.

#### 2.1.3.2.1 Mechanical Component Screening

The staff reviewed the methodology used by the applicant to determine whether mechanical components within the scope of license renewal would be subject to further AMR. For mechanical components, the applicant applied a screening process to each mechanical system determined to be within the scope of license renewal in order to determine the types of mechanical component commodities within the systems and the various materials and environments to be considered in the AMR. The applicant then established evaluation boundaries for the various plant mechanical systems, in order to further identify individual mechanical components for review.

The listing of mechanical components was facilitated by combining these items into commodity groups from a review of each boundary drawing. The applicant placed these commodity groups into the license renewal database and evaluated them in accordance with the screening criteria described in LRG-02. The applicant provided the staff with a detailed discussion of the process and provided screening report information from the license renewal database that described the screening methodology, as well as a sample of the screening results reports for a selected group of SR and NSR systems. The staff determined that the screening methodology was

consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 and that implementation of the methodology will identify SCs that meet the screening criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

During the audit, the staff reviewed the methodology used by the applicant to identify and list the mechanical components and commodities subject to an AMR, as well as the applicant's technical justification for this methodology. The staff discussed the methodology and results with the applicant's cognizant engineers and senior staff. The staff also examined the applicant's results from the implementation of this methodology by reviewing the FW/HPCI system identified as within the scope of license renewal. The review included the evaluation boundaries and resultant in-scope components, the corresponding component-level intended functions, and the resulting list of mechanical components and commodity groups subject to an AMR.

The staff reviewed several summary screening reports that list a breakdown of the mechanical components within the scope of license renewal. Each report lists several categories, including component type, whether an AMR was required, material, and an extensive comment section. The staff also reviewed a sample of the mechanical drawing packages assembled by the applicant and discussed the process and results with the cognizant engineers who performed the review. The staff did not identify any discrepancies between the methodology documented and the implementation results.

Conclusion. On the basis of a review of the original LRA and ALRA, the scoping and screening implementation procedures, and a sampling review of system and screening results, the staff determined that the applicant's mechanical component screening methodology was consistent with the guidance contained in the SRP-LR and was capable of identifying those passive, long-lived components within the scope of license renewal that are subject to an AMR.

#### 2.1.3.2.2 Structural Component Screening

The staff reviewed the methodology used by the applicant to determine whether structures within the scope of license renewal would be subject to further AMR. For structures, the applicant determined the types of structural elements utilized and the various materials and environments to be considered in the AMR. Generally, the boundary for a structure is the entire building including base slabs, foundations, walls, beams, slabs, and steel superstructure. A listing of all the SCs that exist in each plant structure was developed identifying the various types of structural elements, materials, and environments. The applicant created a database to compile the results. The database identifies each individual SCs and indicates whether the SC is subject to AMR. Each SC is identified as a component (e.g., door, gate, anchor support, strut, fastener, or siding) or as a material (e.g., concrete, polymer, or steel). From this review a screening report for each plant structure was developed.

The listing of structural elements was facilitated by placing component supports, and fire stops and seals in separate commodity groups. The applicant provided the staff with a detailed discussion describing the screening methodology, as well as the screening reports for a selected group of structures. The staff determined that the screening methodology was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 and that implementation of the methodology will identify SCs that meet the screening criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

During the audit of the applicant's license renewal screening process, the staff reviewed the methodology used by the applicant to identify and list the SCs and structural commodities subject to an AMR, as well as the applicant's technical justification for this methodology. The staff discussed the methodology and results with the applicant's cognizant engineers and senior staff. The staff also examined the applicant's results from the implementation of this methodology by reviewing a sample of NMP1 plant structures identified as being within the scope of license renewal. The review included the evaluation of in-scope components, the corresponding component-level intended functions, and the resulting list of SCs and structural commodity groups subject to an AMR.

The staff reviewed several screening reports that list a breakdown of the SCs within the scope of license renewal. The reports reviewed by the staff included those for the NMP1 reactor building and NMP1 materials handling/heavy loads. The staff also discussed the process and results with the applicant. The staff did not identify any discrepancies between the methodology documented and the implementation results.

Conclusion. On the basis of a review of the original LRA and ALRA, the scoping and screening implementation procedures, and a sampling review of structural screening results, the staff determined that the applicant's SC screening methodology was consistent with the guidance contained in the SRP-LR and was capable of identifying those passive, long-lived components within the scope of license renewal that are subject to an AMR.

#### 2.1.3.2.3 Electrical and I&C Component Screening

The staff reviewed the methodology used by the applicant to determine whether electrical components within the scope of license renewal would be subject to further AMR. For electrical components, the applicant applied a screening process by identifying electrical commodities within electrical systems. The LRA engineers identified all electrical and I&C component types in use at NMPNS based on the listing provided by Appendix B to NEI 95-10, NUREG-1801, "Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report," Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Electrical Handbook, and from a review of plant documents, controlled drawings, the plant equipment database, and cable database. All passive, long-lived electrical components were evaluated as commodities regardless of the system or structure in which they reside in the MEL. As a result, the electrical systems only contain active components that are not subject to AMR. An AMR was then conducted on a commodity basis for the entire population of passive, long-lived components. Identification of individual components that perform intended functions was not performed. The passive electrical and I&C component commodity groups at NMPNS was based on a review of the UFSAR/USAR, the MEL, DBDs, previous LRAs, and NEI 95-10.

The applicant's list of electrical and I&C commodity groups included cables and connectors (including splices, connectors, terminal blocks, and fuse holders); non-segregated/switch yard bus; containment electrical penetrations; and switchyard components.

The interface of electrical and I&C components with other types of components, and the assessments of these interfacing components, are provided in the appropriate mechanical or civil structural sections. For example, the assessment of electrical racks, panels, frames, cabinets, cable trays, conduits, and their supports is provided in the civil/structural assessment section of the original LRA.

Components with unique identification numbers in the MEL that are identified as part of a system, but are defined as part of a commodity, are not addressed as part of the system. They do not appear on the list of components for that system in the system scoping and screening report. Commodities are treated generically, and a list of unique identification numbers from the MEL that make up a commodity is not provided unless noted otherwise. In this way, components are moved from their actual systems to commodity groups.

The staff discussed the methodology and results with the applicant's cognizant engineers and senior staff. The staff also examined the applicant's results from the implementation of this methodology by reviewing several electrical/I&C commodity reports and samples from the license renewal database. The review verified that the applicant's staff had consistently applied the screening criteria to identify those electrical/I&C commodity groups subject to an AMR. The staff determined that the NMPNS electrical screening process was consistent with criteria in 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)(ii) and excluded those components or commodity groups that are subject to equipment qualification requirements. The staff did not identify any discrepancies between the methodology documented and the implementation results.

The staff also reviewed the applicant's approach to scoping and screening of electrical fuse holders. In license renewal ISG-5, "Identification and Treatment of Electrical Fuse Holders for License Renewal," dated March 10, 2003, the staff stated that, consistent with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 54.4(a), fuse holders (including fuse clips and fuse blocks) are considered to be passive electrical components. Fuse holders would be scoped, screened, and included in the AMR in the same manner as terminal blocks and other types of electrical connections that are currently being treated in the process. This staff position applies only to fuse holders that are not part of a larger assembly, but support SR and NSR functions in which the failure of a fuse precludes a safety function from being accomplished (10 CFR Part 54.4(a)(1) and(2)). As described in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1.6.5, "Identification and Treatment of Electrical Fuse Holders for License Renewal," fuse holders (including fuse clips and fuse blocks) are passive, long-lived electrical components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR as part of the cables and connections commodity. Additionally, NMPNS credits the Fuse Holder Inspection Program for identifying potential age-related degradation for fuse holders. The staff determined that this was consistent with the ISG.

Conclusion. On the basis of a review of the original LRA and ALRA, the scoping and screening implementation procedures, and a sampling review of electrical system screening results, the staff determined that the applicant's electrical and I&C screening methodology was consistent with the guidance contained in SRP-LR and was capable of identifying passive, long-lived components within the scope of license renewal that are subject to an AMR.

#### 2.1.3.2.4 Consumables

Paragraph 3.1.2.4 of procedure LRG-01, "LR Project General Guidance," Revision 2, discusses consumables. Paragraph 3.1.2.4.2 states that structural sealants should be identified as subcomponents, and if they are determined to perform an intended function in support of a larger structure, they must be within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR. The staff reviewed the screening report for the NMP1 reactor building and noted that structural sealants (e.g., neoprene, calking, and urethane) were identified as a component within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### 2.1.3.2.5 Plant Insulation

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 2.1 identified an area in which additional information was necessary regarding plant insulation to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.1-7, dated November 22, 2004, the staff stated that during the audit the applicant was unable to adequately describe the evaluation performed to determine whether any insulation installed in the plant was required to support any system intended functions identified during the scoping process. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe any intended functions performed by insulation or the basis for determining that insulation (e.g. piping insulation) did not meet the scoping criteria described in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3).

In its response, by letter dated January 31, 2004, the applicant stated, in part, that an evaluation of thermal insulation used at NMP1 and NMP2 was performed to determine whether plant insulation was credited for performing any license renewal functions per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), (2), or (3). The applicant also provided a discussion of each scoping criteria and an evaluation of plant insulation with respect to each. Based on this review, the only intended function to meet the license renewal scoping criteria was fire wrap, used for fire protection, which meets 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) and is included within the scope of license renewal. Specifically, these structural steel fire protection coatings are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. They are included as component type, "Fire Wrap in Air," in ALRA Table 2.4.C.2-1. The AMR of the fire wrap is addressed in ALRA Section 3.5.2.C.2 and Table 3.5.2.C-2.

Conclusion. On the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant which describes the analysis of plant insulation in response to RAI 2.1-7, and the incorporation of that information into the ALRA submittal, the staff found that the applicant has adequately addressed the staff's concern.

#### 2.1.4 Evaluation Findings

The staff's review of the information presented in the original LRA and ALRA Section 2.1, the supporting information in the scoping and screening implementation procedures, calculations and reports, and the information presented during the scoping and screening audit formed the basis of the staff's safety determination. The staff verified that the applicant's scoping and screening methodology was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54. On the basis of this review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant's methodology for identifying the SSCs within the scope of license renewal and the structures and components requiring an AMR is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4 and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.2 Plant-Level Scoping Results**

### **2.2.1 Introduction**

In ALRA Section 2.1, the applicant described the methodology for identifying the NMPNS SSCs within the scope of license renewal. In ALRA Section 2.2, the applicant used the scoping methodology to determine which of the SSCs are required to be included within the scope of license renewal. The staff reviewed the plant-level scoping results to determine whether the applicant had properly identified all plant-level systems and structures relied upon to mitigate DBEs, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), or whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the SR functions, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2), as well as the systems and structures relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function required by one of the regulations referenced in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3).

### **2.2.2 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Tables 2.2.-1 and 2.2-2, the applicant provided a list of the plant systems, structures, and commodities for NMP1 and NMP2, identifying those systems, structures, and commodities that are within the scope of license renewal. Based on the DBEs considered in the plant's CLB, other CLB information relating to NSR systems and structures, and certain regulated events, the applicant identified those plant-level systems and structures that are within the scope of license renewal, as defined by 10 CFR 54.4.

In the ALRA Section 2 tables that identify the component types requiring an AMR for the various systems, the applicant, on several occasions, listed "NSR Piping, Fittings, and Equipment" as a component type. This component type was introduced to incorporate the results from 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) scoping, and it was described in the system description sections as "NSR Piping Fittings and Equipment Containing Liquid" in the buildings that were identified in each ALRA section. The SSCs making up this component type thus varied from system to system.

In the ALRA, the applicant revised the methodology used to determine the NSR SSCs that are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The applicant revised the LRA sections and tables where applicable to identify each NSR system or NSR portion of an SR system that is within the scope of license renewal. In conjunction with this change, the applicant also identified the specific NSR component types and intended function(s) and made them consistent with the standardized list of intended functions in SRP-LR and NEI 95-10. The component type, "NSR Piping, Fittings, and Equipment," and its associated intended function of, "Prevent Failure from Affecting SR Equipment," is no longer used in the NMP original LRA, and this change is reflected in the applicable ALRA sections.

In the ALRA, the applicant also revised LRA Section 2.1.4.2, "Non-Safety Related Criteria Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2)," to provide a detailed description of the NSR scoping criteria. As a result of the staff screening and methodology audit, the applicant implemented a revised spatial methodology in addressing systems meeting 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2), 4 mechanical systems for NMP1 and 10 mechanical systems for NMP2, that were previously identified in the original LRA Tables 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 as not being within scope were brought within the scope of license renewal. In addition, three mechanical systems for NMP2 that were previously identified in the original LRA Table 2.2-2 as within scope were deleted from the scope of license renewal.



### 2.2.3 Staff Evaluation

In ALRA Section 2.1, the applicant described its methodology for identifying the systems, structures, and commodities that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The staff reviewed the scoping and screening methodology and provided its evaluation in SER Section 2.1. To verify that the applicant properly implemented its methodology, the staff focused its review on the implementation results, as shown in ALRA Tables 2.2-1, “NMP1 Plant Level Scoping Results,” and 2.2-2, “NMP2 Plant Level Scoping Results,” to confirm that there were no omissions of plant-level systems and structures within the scope of license renewal.

The staff determined whether the applicant properly identified the systems and structures within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4. The staff reviewed selected systems and structures that the applicant did not identify as falling within the scope of license renewal to verify whether the systems and structures have any intended functions that would require their inclusion within the scope of license renewal. The staff’s review of the applicant’s implementation was conducted in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.2, “Plant-Level Scoping Results.”

The staff sampled the contents of the UFSAR/USAR based on the systems, structures, and commodities listed in ALRA Tables 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 to determine whether there were systems or structures that may have intended functions within the scope of license renewal, as defined by 10 CFR 54.4, but were omitted from within the scope of license renewal.

In reviewing ALRA Section 2.2, the staff identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant’s plant-level scoping results. Therefore, the staff issued RAIs concerning each specific issue to determine whether the applicant properly applied the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4 and the screening criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). The following paragraphs describe the staff’s RAIs and the applicant’s related responses.

In RAI 2.2-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that during the original LRA review the staff identified license renewal drawings in multiple original LRA sections that all, or in part, appeared to conflict with the original LRA. The staff discussed the apparent discrepancies with the applicant to determine whether they were intentional or editorial in nature. The applicant identified a large number of the discrepancies as editorial and agreed that corrections to the original LRA or LR drawings would be required to correct the discrepancies.

In order to complete its review, the staff requested that the applicant correct the LR drawings for the following original LRA sections in which the apparent discrepancies were identified:

2.3.3.A.4	2.3.3.A.8	2.3.3.A.16	2.3.3.A.17	2.3.3.A.20	2.3.3.A.21
2.3.3.A.23	2.3.3.B.1	2.3.3.B.13	2.3.3.B.14	2.3.3.B.15	2.3.3.B.21
2.3.3.B.25	2.3.3.B.27	2.3.3.B.29	2.3.3.B.30	2.3.3.B.31	2.3.4.A.5
2.3.4.B.2					

The staff also requested that the applicant identify those LR drawings that have been corrected and the corrections made to the drawings.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that for each of the original LRA sections identified in RAI 2.2-1 answers have been provided to each staff's specific question from those original LRA sections that address drawing issues. The responses to those specific RAIs identify where there are drawing anomalies and whether a change to the original LRA was required. It is the applicant's understanding that the original LRA, the docketed LRA supplemental letters, and the docketed responses to staff RAIs serve as the bases for the results of the staff's review. The drawings that were submitted concurrent with, but separate from, the original LRA were provided as information-only aids to assist the NRC reviewers with their evaluations. The applicant did not intend them to be part of the formal application. Therefore, the applicant does not intend to revise these drawings and resubmit them as part of the original LRA review process.

The applicant further stated that it does plan, upon completion of the original LRA review and approval process, to update the LR drawings, the scoping and screening reports, the AMR reports, and the program basis documents, to be consistent with the content of the final staff safety evaluation. With the exception of the program basis documents, which will be controlled documents, the remaining documents, including the drawings, will not be controlled but will be archival documents maintained within the NMPNS documentation and drawing system for historical reference purposes.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.2-1 acceptable because the applicant has adequately addressed discrepancies associated with the identified LRA sections. The information to resolve these discrepancies were included in the response to applicable RAIs. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.2-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.2-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that during the original LRA review, the staff identified in multiple LRA sections, apparent omissions of component types that were described in the original LRA, from the LRA component type tables. The staff discussed the apparent omissions of component types from the LRA component type tables with the applicant to determine whether they were intentional or editorial in nature. The staff noted that during the original LRA review the applicant agreed to describe where the following component types were represented in the component type tables if they were intentionally omitted, and to include those component types in component type tables that had unintentionally omitted components. Therefore, the staff requested in RAI 2.2-2 that the applicant explain how it represented the following component types in the original LRA: flanges, bolting, orifices, tubing, vacuum breakers, elbows, unions, tees, couplings, thermowells, compressors, reducers, caps, floor drains, flexible hoses, expansion joints, vents, diffusers, manholes, and piping.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant provided the following summary of how each of the components identified in RAI 2.2-2, when subjected to AMR, were represented in the AMR results sections of the original LRA:

- Flanges, tubing, elbows, unions, tees, couplings, reducers, caps, floor drains, vents, and piping were all included with the component type "Piping and Fittings."
- Bolting, where not specifically identified as its own component type within a system, was included with the component for which it was a subcomponent. For example, it would be included with component types "Piping and Fittings," "Pumps," "Valves," etc., as applicable. In general, bolting was identified as its own component type within a system

when it was identified as a separate component type in the GALL Report for that respective system. When not identified as its own component type, bolting was managed for aging based on its material in the applicable air environment.

- Orifices were identified as their own component type, as either "Orifices" or "Flow Elements." However, not all "Flow Elements" were orifices. The terms "Orifices" or "Flow Elements" were used depending on how the components were called out in the plant Mechanical Equipment List databases. The term "Flow Elements" was also used for other types of flow measurement devices such as venturis.
- Vacuum breakers were included with the component type "Valves."
- Thermowells were included with "Piping and Fittings" when they were fabricated of the same material as the piping in which they were a subcomponent. If they were fabricated of a different material than the piping in which they were a subcomponent, they were identified separately as a "Temperature Element."
- Compressors were identified as either "Pumps" or as a "Chiller" subcomponent.
- Expansion joints were included with the component type of "Bellows" or "Piping and Fittings."
- Flexible hoses were included with the component type of "Flexible Hoses," "Flex Hoses," or "Piping and Fittings."
- Diffusers were included with the component type of "Piping and Fittings" or "Structural Steel."
- Manways in large components such as tanks or heat exchangers are included with the component type in which they are a subcomponent, since consistent with that component, they also serve as a pressure boundary and are typically fabricated of the same material.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.2-2 acceptable because the applicant adequately explained how the component types in question are represented in the AMR results sections of the original LRA. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.2-2 is resolved.

The staff reviewed the changes described in the ALRA and evaluated them against the information in the original LRA, the RAIs stemming from the original LRA review, and their own prior evaluation conclusions.

#### **2.2.4 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.2, the applicant's responses to RAIs 2.2-1 and 2.2-1, and the supporting information in the UFSAR and USAR to determine whether any systems and structures within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. The staff's review did not identify any omissions. On the basis of this review, the staff concluded that the applicant properly identified the systems and structures that are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4.

## **2.3 Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems**

This section documents the staff's review of the applicant's scoping and screening results for mechanical systems. Specifically, this section discusses the following mechanical systems for NMP1 and NMP2:

- reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems
- engineered safety features systems
- auxiliary systems
- steam and power conversion systems

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1), the applicant identified and listed passive, long-lived system, structure, and components (SSCs) that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. To verify that the applicant properly implemented its methodology, the staff focused its review on the implementation results. This approach allowed the staff to confirm that there were no omissions of mechanical system components that meet the scoping criteria and are subject to an AMR.

Staff Evaluation Methodology. The staff's evaluation of the information provided in the ALRA was performed in the same manner for all mechanical systems. The objective of the review was to determine if the components and supporting structures for a specific mechanical system, that appeared to meet the scoping criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 54, were identified by the applicant as within the scope of license renewal, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4. Similarly, the staff evaluated the applicant's screening results to verify that all long-lived, passive components were subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Scoping. To perform its evaluation, the staff reviewed the applicable ALRA section and associated component drawings, focusing its review on components that had not been identified as within the scope of license renewal. The staff reviewed relevant licensing basis documents, including the NMP1 UFSAR and NMP2 USAR, for each mechanical system to determine if the applicant had omitted components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a) from the scope of license renewal. The staff also reviewed the licensing basis documents to determine if all intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a) were specified in the ALRA. If omissions were identified, the staff requested additional information to resolve the discrepancies.

Screening. Once the staff completed its review of the scoping results, the staff evaluated the applicant's screening results. For those systems and components with intended functions, the staff sought to determine: (1) if the functions are performed with moving parts or a change in configuration or properties, or (2) if they are subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period, as described in 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). For those that did not meet either of these criteria, the staff sought to confirm that these mechanical systems and components were subject to an AMR as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). If discrepancies were identified, the staff requested additional information to resolve them.

### **2.3A NMP1 Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems**

#### **2.3A.1 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems**

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.A, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP1 reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.1.A.1 NMP1 reactor pressure vessel
- 2.3.1.A.2 NMP1 reactor pressure vessel internals
- 2.3.1.A.3 NMP1 reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system
- 2.3.1.A.4 NMP1 reactor recirculation system
- 2.3.1.A.5 NMP1 control rod drive system
- 2.3.1.A.6 NMP1 reactor coolant pressure boundary components in other systems

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.1.A.1 through 2.3.1.A.6 are presented in SER Sections 2.3A.1.1 through 2.3A.1.6, respectively.

### **2.3A.1.1 NMP1 Reactor Pressure Vessel**

#### **2.3A.1.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.1, the applicant described the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The NMP1 RPV contains and supports the reactor core, reactor internals, and the reactor coolant/moderator. The RPV forms part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and serves as a barrier against leakage of radioactive materials to the drywell.

The RPV is a vertical, cylindrical pressure vessel with hemispherical heads. The cylindrical shell and hemispherical heads are fabricated from low alloy carbon steel that is clad on the interior with weld overlay. The top head is secured to the vessel with studs and nuts and includes two concentric sealings in the vessel head flange area to prevent reactor coolant leakage. The RPV is supported by a steel skirt welded to the bottom head. The base of the skirt is continuously supported by a ring girder and sole plate fastened to a concrete foundation, which carries the load to the reactor building foundation slab.

The RPV contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RPV could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The RPV's intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- pressure boundary - maintains the integrity of the RCPB
- containment - provides a fission product containment barrier
- physical support - provides vertical and horizontal support for the core and other reactor vessel internals
- core cooling - together with the reactor vessel internals, provides a means to distribute coolant to the fuel assemblies located in the core and provides a floodable volume to at least two-thirds core height following DBEs

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.1-1, the applicant identified the following RPV component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bottom head
- nozzles
- nozzle safe ends
- penetrations: core differential pressure, CRD stub tube, flux monitor, instrumentation, vessel drain
- support skirt and attachment welds
- thermal sleeves
- top head
- top head (closure studs and nuts)
- top head (flanges)
- top head (leak detection line)
- top head (nozzles)
- valves
- vessel shell (flange)
- vessel shells: beltline, lower shell, upper nozzle shell, upper RPV shell
- vessel shell welds (including attachment welds)

#### 2.3A.1.1.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.1 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3, "Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems."

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

During the staff review it was noted that ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.1-1 does not list a thermal shield that provides shielding from gamma and neutron radiation for such SR SSCs as the reactor vessel and the internals. Such shielding, which can reduce irradiation-induced embrittlement of the vessel and/or the internals, is not a design feature of the NMP1 RPV nor of any boiling water reactors (BWRs) manufactured by General Electric (GE); therefore, it is not appropriate to consider such a component in the NMP1 scoping evaluation.

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.1.A.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI-2, dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested the applicant to provide additional information pertaining to the reactor recirculation nozzles, and thermal sleeves for core spray, feedwater, and CRD return line. In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that there are no low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) couplings installed in NMNP1. This response resolved the staff's concern described in RAI-2.

In RAI 2.3-1, dated October 11, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant indicate whether the liquid poison pressure nozzle is considered an RPV penetration requiring an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated October 28, 2005, the applicant indicated that the liquid poison pressure nozzle is part of the core differential pressure penetration. NMP1 utilizes a "pipe within a pipe" design similar to many other older BWR designs. The liquid poison pressure nozzle is considered a RPV penetration and is part of the license renewal scope, falling under the "Penetrations: Core Differential Pressure" subset in ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.1-1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3-1 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.1.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and the RAI responses to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RPV components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RPV components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.1.2 NMP1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals**

##### 2.3A.1.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.2, the applicant described the RPV internals. NMP1 RPV internals provide support for the core and other internal components, maintain fuel configuration (coolable geometry) during normal operation and accident conditions, and provide reactor coolant flow distribution through the core.

The RPV internals consist of the components internal to the RPV. The main components are the reactor core (fuel, channels, control rods, and instrumentation), core shroud (including the shroud support), core shroud stabilizers (shroud repair brackets and tie-rod assemblies), core support, top grid, control rod guide tubes, feedwater sparger, core spray spargers, liquid poison sparger and steam separator and dryer. All of the RPV internals, except the shroud support and springs in the fuel assemblies, are fabricated from stainless steel. The shroud support is fabricated from solid Inconel. The shroud support essentially sustains all of the vertical weight of the core structure (except the fuel assembly weights transmitted to the guide tube) and the steam separator assembly. Each guide tube, with its fuel support casting, bears the weight of four fuel assemblies and rests on a control rod drive (CRD) housing welded to the stub tube mounted on the vessel bottom head.

The RPV internals contain SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RPV internals could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

RPV internals components subject to AMR are located inside the RPV and extend from the bottom head to the top guide (excluding the fuel assemblies and control rods).

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.2-1, the applicant identified the following RPV internals component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- CRD assemblies (includes drive mechanism and housing)
- control rod guide tubes
- core plates and bolts
- core shroud
- core shroud head bolts and collars
- core shroud support structures: clamps, core plate spacers, support plates, support rings, support welds, tie rod assemblies
- core spray lines and spargers
- incore instrumentation dry tubes and guide tubes
- liquid poison spray line and sparger
- orificed fuel supports
- steam dryer assembly
- top guide

#### 2.3A.1.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.2 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.1.A.2 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI-4, dated November 17, 2004, the staff noted that the steam separator assembly consists of a base into which are welded an array of standpipes, with a steam separator located at the top of each standpipe. The staff requested that the applicant provide justification why these standpipes and steam separators are not included within the scope of license renewal.

In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the steam separators and their standpipes are not included within the scope of license renewal, since they are not SR components that perform a license renewal intended function, and referred to an evaluation contained in Boiling Water Reactor Vessel Internals Project (BWRVIP)-06-A. Also, the staff's concern about the possibility that failure of these components could prevent the accomplishment of SR functions of nearby components (e.g., the creation of loose parts that might hit and damage SR components). The staff noted that this consideration was also addressed in BWRVIP-06-A, and the evaluation was accepted by the staff in letters dated September 15, 1998, and September 16, 2003. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI-4 is resolved.

In RAI-5 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant indicate where the feedwater sparger is identified as a vessel internal component requiring an AMR. In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant indicated that this, too, was not included within the scope of license renewal. The applicant stated that, per BWRVIP-06-A, "The sole purpose of the feedwater spargers is to control thermal mixing and extend the life of the vessel and internals. The failure of feedwater spargers or associated brackets would not prevent injection of coolant makeup and are not required to safety shut down the reactor." On this basis, the staff accepted the exclusion of the feedwater sparger from within the scope of license renewal. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI-5 is resolved.

In RAI-7 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant indicate whether the core shroud stabilizers should be identified as reactor vessel internal components requiring AMR. In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the core shroud stabilizer components are part of the "Core Shroud Support Structures" (Tie Rod Assemblies) listed in original LRA Table 2.3.1.A.2-1. The AMR for these components is contained in original LRA Table 3.1.2.A-2. The staff reviewed the response and found that the aging management of core shroud stabilizer is properly addressed. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI-7 is resolved.

In RAI-8, dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant indicate whether the core shroud vertical weld repair should be identified as a reactor vessel internal component requiring AMR. In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the core shroud vertical weld repair components are part of the "Core Shroud Support Structures" (Clamps) listed in original LRA Table 2.3.1.A.2-1. The AMR for these components is described in original LRA Table 3.1.2.A-2. The staff reviewed the response and found that the aging management of the core shroud vertical weld repair components are properly addressed; therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI-8 is resolved.

The applicant verified that the liquid poison spray line and sparger are included in the scope of license renewal, and revised the original LRA Table 2.3.1.A.2-1 accordingly. The applicant also indicated that the core shroud stabilizer components (i.e. the tie rod assemblies) and the core shroud vertical weld repair components are part of the core shroud support structures.

#### 2.3A.1.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and RAI responses to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RPV internals components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RPV internals components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.1.3 NMP1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Instrumentation System**

##### 2.3A.1.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.3, the applicant described the RPV instrumentation system. The NMP1 RPV instrumentation system monitors and transmits values for key reactor vessel operating parameters during normal and emergency operations. This information is indicated on meters, chart recorders and hydraulic indicator units located in the control room, remote shutdown panels and instrument rooms. The parameters monitored are reactor vessel temperature, water level and pressure, core differential pressure, core spray sparger differential pressure, vessel head flange leakage and reactor safety valve position. This system also provides control signals to various systems, such as the reactor protection, automatic depressurization, ATWS, feedwater/high pressure coolant injection (FW/HPCI), and shutdown cooling systems.

The RPV instrumentation system consists of piping, valves, and excess flow check valves that provide a fluid path from the RPV to various instrumentation.

The RPV instrumentation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the RPV instrumentation system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.3-1, the applicant identified the following RPV instrumentation system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- closure bolting
- condensing pots
- NSR piping, fittings, and equipment
- piping and fittings
- temperature equalizing columns
- valves

#### 2.3A.1.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.3 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.1.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RPV instrumentation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RPV instrumentation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.1.4 NMP1 Reactor Recirculation System**

#### 2.3A.1.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.4, the applicant described the reactor recirculation system. The NMP1 reactor recirculation system controls reactor power level by varying the reactor coolant flow. The reactor recirculation system is part of the RCPB and consists of five external loops. Each loop draws suction from the downcomer annulus region of the RPV and discharges reactor coolant to the RPV lower plenum. Each loop consists of a variable speed pump, blocking valves, bypass line, and associated instrumentation. The reactor recirculation pumps are controlled by separate variable frequency motor generator sets, each having associated controls and instrumentation. Other systems that connect directly to the reactor recirculation system piping are the emergency cooling system, shutdown cooling system, reactor water cleanup system and the sampling system.

The reactor recirculation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the reactor recirculation system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the reactor recirculation system performs functions that support fire protection, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.4-1, the applicant identified the following reactor recirculation system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- closure bolting
- flow elements
- NSR piping, fittings, and equipment
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- pump seal flanges
- valves

#### 2.3A.1.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.4 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.1.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the reactor recirculation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the reactor recirculation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.1.5 NMP1 Control Rod Drive System**

#### 2.3A.1.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.5, the applicant described the control rod drive (CRD) system. The NMP1 CRD system changes core reactivity level by positioning the control rods within the

reactor core in response to manual control signals, and scrams the reactor in response to manual or automatic signals. The system also provides high-pressure makeup to the RPV to compensate for leakage rates of up to 25 gpm, or for break flows caused by certain small line breaks. The CRD system also provides water to the reactor vessel level instrumentation reference leg backfill system and to the keep-full system for the emergency cooling system.

The CRD system consists of two redundant pumps, filters, strainers, control valves, hydraulic control units, CRD mechanisms, scram discharge volume, isolation valves and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. The normal water supply for the pumps is the condensate system with backup supplies available from the condensate storage tanks and the demineralized water storage tank. The discharge of each pump provides water directly to the reactor level instrumentation reference leg backfill system, emergency cooling system keep-full system and the CRD water filters. The CRD System also supplies cooling water to the CRD mechanisms and charging water to the hydraulic control units. Drive water is provided to the directional control valves, and the remaining water is provided directly to the RPV. Following a reactor scram, the water discharged from the CRD mechanisms is collected in the scram discharge volume.

The CRD system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the CRD system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the CRD system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and ATWS.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.5-1, the applicant identified the following CRD system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- accumulators
- closure bolting
- filters
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tank
- valves

#### 2.3A.1.5.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.5 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.1.A.5 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI-16 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant indicate where CRD hydraulic control units, flow elements and indicators, pumps, and rupture discs should be identified as control rod drive system components requiring AMR. In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that each of the components listed in this RAI is within the scope of license renewal except flow indicators, which are considered active components. The applicant further stated that original LRA Section 2.3.1.A.5 and Table 2.3.1.A.5-1 address the CRD system for scoping and screening and for AMR, original LRA Section 3.1.2.A.5 and Table 3.1.2.A.5 contains the hydraulic control units which are under "Accumulators" component type. Furthermore, the applicant stated that flow elements and pumps are included with the "NSR Piping, Fittings and Equipment" component type, and rupture disks are included with the "Valves" component type. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that the components for CRD are properly addressed. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI-16 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.1.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and RAI response to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the CRD system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the CRD system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.1.6 NMP1 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Components in Other Systems**

#### 2.3A.1.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.6, the applicant stated that the components requiring AMR that have RCPB functions have been maintained in the plant system to which they are normally assigned, rather than grouped with other RCPB components in the reactor vessel internals and reactor

coolant system. ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.6-1 presents a list of plant systems having RCPB components evaluated in the GALL Report as part of the reactor vessel, internals and reactor coolant system.

For each of these systems, applicable system descriptions, USAR references, license renewal boundary diagram references, system intended functions, and complete listings of component groups requiring an AMR are presented in the application section indicated in ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.6-1. AMR results for RCPB components are presented in their sections as follows:

- NMP1 Core Spray System (ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.3)
- NMP1 Emergency Cooling System (ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.4)
- NMP1 Feedwater/high Pressure Coolant Injection System (ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.3)
- NMP1 Liquid Poison System (ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.11)
- NMP1 Main Steam System (ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.5)
- NMP1 Reactor Water Cleanup System (ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.19)
- NMP1 Sampling System (ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.20)
- NMP1 Shutdown Cooling (ALRA System Section 2.3.3.A.22)

#### 2.3A.1.6.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.6 to determine whether there is reasonable assurance that the RCPB components in other systems components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR have been identified in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4 and 54.21(a)(1). The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3 and is described below.

In conducting its review the staff selected system functions described in the UFSAR set forth in 10 CFR 54.4 to verify that components having intended functions were not omitted from the scope of the rule. The staff also focused on components not identified as subject to an AMR to determine if any components were omitted. As part of the evaluation, the staff determined whether the applicant had properly identified the SSCs within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a) and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). The staff reviewed the relevant portions of the UFSAR for the RCPB components in other systems and associated components and compared the information in the UFSAR with the information in the original LRA to identify those portions that the original LRA did not identify as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The staff then reviewed the SCs that were identified as not being within the scope of license renewal to verify that (1) these SCs have none of the intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a), and (2) for those SCs that have an applicable intended function(s), verify that they either perform this function(s) with moving parts or a change in configuration or properties, or that they are subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period, as described in 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff also reviewed the UFSAR for any functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a) not identified as intended functions in the original LRA, to verify that the SSCs with such functions will be adequately managed so that the functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the extended period of operation.

### 2.3A.1.6.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RCPB components in other systems components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RCPB components in other systems components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## 2.3A.2 Engineered Safety Features Systems

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.A, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP1 engineered safety features (ESF) systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the ESF systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.2.A.1 NMP1 Automatic Depressurization System
- 2.3.2.A.2 NMP1 Containment Spray System
- 2.3.2.A.3 NMP1 Core Spray System
- 2.3.2.A.4 NMP1 Emergency Cooling System

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.2.A.1 through 2.3.2.A.4 are presented in SER Sections 2.3A.2.1 through 2.3A.2.4, respectively.

### 2.3A.2.1 NMP1 Automatic Depressurization System

#### 2.3A.2.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.1, the applicant described the automatic depressurization system. The automatic depressurization system reduces RPV pressure for small line breaks when there is no feedwater flow. When RPV pressure is reduced to the low pressure permissive setpoint of the core spray system, sufficient inventory makeup is available to maintain adequate core cooling.

The automatic depressurization system consists of six solenoid-operated relief valves that discharge to the torus. Three relief valves are located on each main steam line. The discharge piping also contains vacuum breakers.

The automatic depressurization system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the automatic depressurization system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The component types subject to an AMR that perform the system intended functions for the automatic depressurization system are part of, and evaluated in, the main steam system. No additional components within the automatic depressurization system are subject to an AMR.



#### 2.3A.2.1.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.1 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.2.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the automatic depressurization system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the automatic depressurization system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.2.2 NMP1 Containment Spray System**

#### **2.3A.2.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.2, the applicant described the containment spray system. The core spray system is designed to prevent fuel damage following any postulated LOCA. The core spray system consists of two redundant loops that take suction from the torus and discharge to one of two spargers inside the RPV. Each loop consists of two redundant trains. Each train consists of a suction strainer, core spray pump, core spray topping (booster) pump, associated piping and valves and a common discharge header to the sparger. A test return line, high-point vents and keep full system are also provided for each loop. A seal water supply line originates from the topping pump discharge header in each core spray loop to pressurize and provide a supply of seal water to the shutdown cooling system (ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.22) isolation valves. Core spray system instrumentation and controls are included within this system.

The containment spray system contains SR components relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the containment spray system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the containment spray system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- converts liquid into spray
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.A.2-1, the applicant identified the following containment spray system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- flow orifices
- heat exchangers
- nozzles
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### 2.3A.2.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.2 and UFSAR Section VII.B using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.2.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the containment spray system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the containment spray system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.2.3 NMP1 Core Spray System**

#### 2.3A.2.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.3, the applicant described the core spray system. The purpose of the core spray system is to prevent fuel damage following any postulated LOCA. For small line breaks, the automatic depressurization system is used in conjunction with the core spray system to prevent fuel damage.

The core spray system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the core spray system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the core spray system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.A.3-1, the applicant identified the following core spray system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- accumulators
- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- flow orifices
- heat exchangers
- level gauges
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### 2.3A.2.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.3 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.2.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the core spray system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the core spray system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.2.4 NMP1 Emergency Cooling System**

#### **2.3A.2.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.4, the applicant described the emergency cooling system (ECS). The purpose of the ECS is to remove decay heat from the RPV fuel in the event that RPV feedwater capability is lost and the main condenser is not available. This system serves as an alternate heat sink when the RPV is isolated from its normal heat sink (i.e., the main condenser). The emergency cooling system consists of two redundant loops connected to the RPV on the steam supply side and to the reactor recirculation system on the condensate return side. Steam side vents are connected to each loop that removes non-condensable gases to the main steam lines or torus (for accident conditions). Drain lines are also provided on each loop's steam lines.

The ECS contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the ECS could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the ECS performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.A.4-1, the applicant identified the following ECS component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchangers
- level gauges
- piping and fittings
- tanks
- valves

#### **2.3A.2.4.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.A.4 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions

delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.2.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the ECS components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the ECS components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3 Auxiliary Systems

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP1 auxiliary systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the auxiliary systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.3.A.1 NMP1 administration building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system
- 2.3.3.A.2 NMP1 circulating water system
- 2.3.3.A.3 NMP1 city water system
- 2.3.3.A.4 NMP1 compressed air systems
- 2.3.3.A.5 NMP1 containment systems
- 2.3.3.A.6 NMP1 control room HVAC system
- 2.3.3.A.7 NMP1 diesel generator building ventilation system
- 2.3.3.A.8 NMP1 emergency diesel generator system
- 2.3.3.A.9 NMP1 fire detection and protection system
- 2.3.3.A.10 NMP1 hydrogen water chemistry system
- 2.3.3.A.11 NMP1 liquid poison system
- 2.3.3.A.12 NMP1 miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system
- 2.3.3.A.13 NMP1 neutron monitoring system
- 2.3.3.A.14 NMP1 process radiation monitoring system
- 2.3.3.A.15 NMP1 radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system
- 2.3.3.A.16 NMP1 radioactive waste system

- 2.3.3.A.17 NMP1 reactor building closed loop cooling water system
- 2.3.3.A.18 NMP1 reactor building HVAC system
- 2.3.3.A.19 NMP1 reactor water cleanup system
- 2.3.3.A.20 NMP1 sampling system
- 2.3.3.A.21 NMP1 service water system
- 2.3.3.A.22 NMP1 shutdown cooling system
- 2.3.3.A.23 NMP1 spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system
- 2.3.3.A.24 NMP1 technical support center HVAC system
- 2.3.3.A.25 NMP1 turbine building closed loop cooling water system
- 2.3.3.A.26 NMP1 turbine building HVAC system
- 2.3.3.A.27 NMP1 electric steam boiler system
- 2.3.3.A.28 NMP1 makeup demineralizer system

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.3.A.1 through 2.3.3.A.28 are presented in SER Sections 2.3A.3.1 through 2.3A.3.28, respectively.

### ***2.3A.3.1 NMP1 Administration Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System***

#### **2.3A.3.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.1, the applicant described the administration building HVAC system. The administration building HVAC system is designed to provide equipment ventilation and personnel comfort. The administration building HVAC system supplies air to the administration building and its extension. This system consists of a rooftop air conditioning unit, supply fans, exhaust fans, and associated ductwork. Individual heating and air conditioning units are provided throughout the original administration building and the administration building extension for personnel comfort. The administration building HVAC system louvered penthouse damper assembly also provides outside air to the control room HVAC system.

The administration building HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs.

The only components requiring an AMR for the administration building HVAC system are the louvered penthouse damper assembly and cooling coil tubes that are shared with the control room HVAC system and are evaluated in that system. The remaining in-scope components for the administration building HVAC system are active components. Therefore, there are no components requiring an AMR for the administration building HVAC system.

#### **2.3A.3.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.1 and UFSAR Section III.E.1.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the administration building HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the administration building HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.2 NMP1 Circulating Water System**

##### 2.3A.3.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.2, the applicant described the circulating water system. The NMP1 circulating water system provides cooling water from Lake Ontario to the main condenser. Lake water is drawn from the intake tunnel through two parallel gates, three trains of mechanical rakes and traveling screens, to the suction of two redundant circulating water pumps. Each pump discharges in a separate line to one side of the condenser divided water box. Fish screens and sluice valves are installed in each line to prevent debris backwashing into the inlet tunnel. After leaving the condenser, the circulating water is discharged back into the lake. The circulating water system consists of the following subsystems: main condenser circulating water, screen washing, hydraulic fluid to tempering gate, and main condenser circulating water box vents.

The circulating water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the circulating water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the circulating water system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components



- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.2-1, the applicant identified the following circulating water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- actuator
- bolting
- circulating water gates
- expansion joints
- filter
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tank
- traveling screens and rakes
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.2 and UFSAR Section XI.B.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.2 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.2-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that because of the unique interface between the circulating water system, the emergency service water pumps, and the intake structure, the staff needed more information to complete its review to understand the configuration of the components requiring an AMR. This information was not clearly depicted in license renewal (LR) drawings LR-18022-C, sheet 1 and LR-26941-C. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant supply the following UFSAR figures: circulating water system; circulating water channels under the screen and pump house - normal operation; circulating water channels under the screen and pump house - special operations; and intake and discharge tunnels plan and profile.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant provided copies of UFSAR Figures III-19, III-20, III-21, and XI-4 for the staff to complete its review. The staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.2-1 acceptable because the UFSAR figures have been reviewed. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.2-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.2-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide information on the intended function of “NSR Functional Support” listed in the original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.2-1. The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant stated that this intended function is no longer used, instead, identified specific NSR intended functions and made them consistent with the standardized list of intended functions in the SRP-LR and NEI 95-10. Based on the information submitted in the ALRA, the staff’s concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.2-2 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and RAI responses to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the circulating water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the circulating water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.3 NMP1 City Water System**

##### 2.3A.3.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.3, the applicant described the city water system. The city water system provides hot and cold domestic water to various areas within the station. Cold water is distributed to the lab, decontamination room, laundry, administration building, emergency showers and two electric hotwater heaters. Hot water is supplied to the lab and administration building. The system is supplied by the offsite water system. The city water system contains one SR breaker since a hot water circulating pump is powered from a SR powerboard.

The city water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the city water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.3-1, the applicant identified the following city water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow orifice
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.3 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

During the staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.3, the staff identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. In RAI 2.3.3.A.3-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant identify the portions of the city water system containing components subject to AMR. The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant's ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.3-1 includes a list of the components subject to an AMR and a list of the new LR drawings. The applicant also provided an LR drawing that accurately depicts all the components subject to an AMR, including those subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on the information submitted in the ALRA, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.3-1 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and RAI response to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the city water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the city water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.4 NMP1 Compressed Air Systems**

#### 2.3A.3.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.4, the applicant described the compressed air systems. The compressed air systems are designed to provide clean, filtered air to various areas of NMP1. The compressed air systems consist of the house service air system, the instrument air system, and the breathing air system. The house service air system is a NSR system designed to provide a reliable source of clean air for use in maintenance and as a backup to the instrument air system. The instrument air system is designed to provide a source of clean, dry air for use in

instruments, controls, and as a backup to the breathing air system. The breathing air system is a NSR system designed to provide a reliable supply of clean, filtered air fit for human breathing.

The compressed air systems contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the compressed air systems could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the compressed air systems performs functions that support EQ and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides heat transfer
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.4-1, the applicant identified the following compressed air systems component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- air dryers: couplings, flanges, heads, nozzles, piping
- air receivers
- bolting
- drain traps
- filters/strainers
- flow gauge
- heat exchangers
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- regulators
- separators
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.4 and UFSAR Section X.I using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not

omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.4 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.4-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff indicated that the original LRA stated that the compressed air system provides air to inflate the reactor building track bay door seal. The component type inflatable seals are not listed in the original LRA tables as subject to an AMR. The original LRA tables list only the fire protection barrier penetration seals as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding inflatable seals as subject to an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the reactor building track bay door inflatable seal is within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR. It is part of the reactor building structure and is covered by the polymer in air component type in original LRA Section 2.4.A.2.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.4-1 acceptable because the applicant stated that the inflatable seal is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, and is part of reactor building structure. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.4-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.4-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant identify which double acting actuators are included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the information, including LR drawings requested by this RAI. Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.4-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.4-3, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing LR-22108-0, sheet 34 shows that the air supply tubing and solenoid valves associated with a valve BV-60-13 are not subject to an AMR; however, LR drawing LR-18017-C, sheet 1 shows the air supply piping and solenoid valves associated valve BV-60-13 are subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant resolve this inconsistency and provide the basis for the resolution.

In its response, by dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that LR drawing LR-18017-C, sheet 1 is incorrect. The applicant stated that, "The air supply piping to valve BV-60-13 is not in-scope for LR. Valve BV-60-13 fails closed on loss of air and is not relied upon for any licensing basis accident mitigation. As such the air supply piping does not perform any intended function for LR."

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.4-3 acceptable because the applicant adequately justified the exclusion of the component in question as not

within the scope of license renewal and not not subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.4-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.4-4, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on several LR drawings (e.g. LR-22111-0, sheet 5) for the compressed air system, the air supply and solenoid valves associated with the SR valves are excluded as subject to an AMR; therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the criteria used to exclude some of the compressed air system auxiliaries to SR valves as subject to an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the SR air supply and solenoid valves identified in the RAI are normally closed fuel pool cooling system isolation valves which fail safe (closed) on loss of air. None of the air system components to these loads are required to be SR for instrument air system integrity or operation. The applicant concluded that, based upon the scoping criteria for license renewal, the subject instrument air valves and piping are not within the scope of license renewal and are not subject to an AMR. The applicant also clarified that, since this system has no liquid-filled components, there are no NSR components within the system that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.4-4 acceptable because the applicant adequately justified the exclusion of the component types in question from within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.4-4 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the compressed air systems components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the compressed air systems components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.5 NMP1 Containment Systems**

##### 2.3A.3.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.5, the applicant described the containment systems. The containment systems are designed to control and monitor the primary containment environment. The containment systems consist of the combustible gas control system, primary containment area cooling system, containment atmospheric monitoring system, torus temperature monitoring system, torus drain system, and the integrated leak rate monitoring system. The combustible gas control system is designed to prevent a combustible hydrogen-oxygen concentration from accumulating in the primary containment atmosphere immediately following or during a LOCA. The combustible gas control system consists of the containment inerting system and the containment atmosphere dilution system.

The containment inerting system is used to inert and deinert primary containment and to makeup nitrogen as required to maintain low oxygen concentration and containment pressure. The containment atmosphere dilution system is designed to monitor and maintain the oxygen concentration of the primary containment atmosphere to less than four percent during a LOCA.

The primary containment area cooling system is designed to remove and dissipate the primary containment area heat gain. The containment atmospheric monitoring system continuously monitors and provides control room indication of the containment airborne radioactivity level. This provides for detection of leaks of the reactor primary systems. The torus temperature monitoring system provides information on torus temperature, water level and airspace pressure to ensure that the cooling capacity of water maintained in the suppression chamber is available within the TS limits and to ensure that the containment structural integrity is maintained. The torus drain system is used when the reactor is in cold shutdown or refueling condition. It allows the torus to be dewatered to permit maintenance or other activities. The integrated leak rate monitoring system is used to support periodic 10 CFR 50, Appendix J testing for overall leakage from primary containment, which demonstrates the ability of containment to control the spread of radioactivity in the event of an accident.

The containment systems contain SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the containment systems could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the containment systems perform functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.5-1, the applicant identified the following containment systems component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- airborne activity monitor
- blower
- bolting
- ducting
- filters/strainers
- flame arresters
- flow elements

- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- rupture discs
- tanks
- traps
- valves
- vaporizers

#### 2.3A.3.5.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.5 and UFSAR Sections VI and VII.G using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.5 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.5, dated December 8, 2004, the staff stated that original LRA Tables 2.3.3.A.5-1 and 3.3.2.A-4, and original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.5 for the containment system, do not include piping/fittings and drywell air cooler units for NMP1; however, these items are shown as within the scope of license renewal on LR drawings and are subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide information on the associated AMR and AMPs in ALRA Tables 2.3.3.A.5-1 and 3.3.2.A-4, if these components are within the scope of license renewal. The staff requested the applicant to provide justification for the exclusion of these components if they are not within the scope of license renewal.

In its response, by letter dated January 7, 2005, the applicant stated that the piping/fittings and drywell air cooler units in the NMP1 containment system are component types that are within the scope of the license renewal and subject to AMR. The piping and fittings component type is included in the system description portion of ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.5, but was inadvertently omitted from ALRA Tables 2.3.3.A.5-1 and 3.3.2.A-4. The applicant stated that the ALRA tables have been revised to incorporate the requested information regarding the intended function, AMR, and AMPs for these components. With respect to drywell air cooler units, the applicant stated that these are addressed under the component types "Ducting" and "Heat Exchanger," respectively, and are included in ALRA Tables 2.3.3.A.5-1 and 3.3.2.A-4.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.5 acceptable because the applicant has included the piping/fittings and drywell air coolers units and associated components within the scope of license renewal subjected to an AMR in accordance



with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.5 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the containment systems components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the containment systems components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.6 NMP1 Control Room HVAC System**

##### 2.3A.3.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.6, the applicant described the control room HVAC system. The control room HVAC system provides filtration, pressurization, heating and cooling to the control complex during normal and emergency conditions. The system is also equipped with an independent smoke and heat removal system for the main and auxiliary control rooms and cable spreading room. The control room HVAC system is comprised of three functional systems which are the normal ventilation, emergency ventilation and smoke purge systems. The normal ventilation system provides fresh and recirculated air for heating and cooling the control complex during normal operation. The emergency ventilation system provides clean, filtered fresh air combined with recirculated air for heating and cooling the control complex during emergency conditions. The smoke purge system is a fire protection ventilation system that removes smoke and heat from the main and auxiliary control rooms and cable spreading room.

The control room HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the control room HVAC system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.6-1, the applicant identified the following control room HVAC system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blowers
- bolting
- ducting
- expansion tank

- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- seals and gaskets
- temperature elements
- valves and dampers

#### 2.3A.3.6.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.6 and UFSAR Section III.B.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.6.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the control room HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the control room HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.7 NMP1 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System**

#### 2.3A.3.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.7, the applicant described the diesel generator building (DGB) ventilation system. The DGB ventilation system is designed to maintain the diesel room temperature below the allowed maximum for continuous operation of the emergency diesel generator. Each diesel generator room is equipped with its own ventilation system. The system consists of roof exhaust fans, a roll-up door, electric heaters, and associated controls. The doors operate in conjunction with the room exhaust fan pairs to ensure that the diesel generator room temperature remains below the allowed maximum. The heaters operate to maintain the diesel generator room ambient temperature at or above 50 °F.

The DGB ventilation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.7-1, the applicant identified the blowers component type of the DGB ventilation system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### 2.3A.3.7.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.7 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.7.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the DGB ventilation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the DGB ventilation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.8 NMP1 Emergency Diesel Generator System**

#### 2.3A.3.8.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.8, the applicant described the emergency diesel generator (EDG) system. The EDG system provides the standby source of electric power for equipment required for mitigation of the consequences of an accident, for safe shutdown and for maintenance of the station in a safe condition under postulated event and accident scenarios. This system consists of two identical, physically separate, and electrically independent standby diesel generators. Each diesel generator has associated subsystems which assist the unit in performing its safety function. The diesel engine subsystem consists of a diesel engine which provides the mechanical power to run the electric generator. The fuel oil subsystem supplies fuel oil for engine combustion and is comprised of the fuel oil storage and handling system and the engine fuel oil system. The air start subsystem supplies high-pressure air to start the diesel engine. The combustion air intake and exhaust subsystem supports the engine combustion process by supplying filtered air to the diesel engine and then discharging the exhaust gases. The lube oil subsystem provides cooling and lubrication for major engine components. The cooling water subsystem removes heat from the diesel engine via the engine cooling system and diesel

generator raw water cooling system. The electric generator subsystem provides the electrical output of the diesel generator unit and includes the required controls.

The EDG system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the EDG system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the EDG system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides heat transfer
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.8-1, the applicant identified the following EDG system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- air intakes
- air start motors
- bolting
- compressors
- exhausts for EDG
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- flow glasses
- heat exchangers
- level glasses
- mufflers and silencers
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.8.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.8 and UFSAR Section IX.B.4.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.8 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.8-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18026-C, sheet 1 (B-1) for diesel #102 shows that the line leading to the fuel injectors is not subject to an AMR. LR drawing LR-18026-C, sheet 2 (C-1) for diesel #103 shows that the line leading to the injectors is highlighted as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant resolve the apparent discrepancy between the two LR drawings.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that LR drawing 18026-C sheet 1 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing that they are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and are subject to AMR.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.8-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.8-1 has been resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.8-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing LR-18026-C, sheet 1 and sheet 2 does not show that the pipes and expansion joints leading to the air start motor are subject to an AMR. The staff noted that the pipe and the expansion joints are not shown on sheet 2 of the drawing. Original LRA Table 2.3.3.B.1-1 lists air start motors as subject to an AMR for NMP2; therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for not requiring an AMR for these NMP1 components.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing is incorrect. It should show the air start motor, associated piping, and expansion joints as subject to AMR. These components have a pressure boundary intended function. The piping and expansion joints are included with the piping and fittings component type. The applicant also stated that the air start motors will be added to the original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.8-1. In addition, the applicant added the air intake silencer, filter, and exhaust muffler on LR drawing LR-18026-C, sheets 1 and 2 should be shown in red to indicate that they are subject to AMR, consistent with original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.8-1.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.8-2 acceptable because it explained that: (1) the LR drawing depicts the air start motor, associated piping, and

expansion joints as not requiring an AMR, but should have been highlighted on the LR drawings; (2) the air start motor is added to Table 2.3.3.A.8-1; and (3) the air intake silencer, filter, and exhaust muffler should be shown on the LR drawings as being subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.8-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.8-3, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18026-C, sheets 1 and 2 shows that the tubing to the pressure gauges on the air receiver tanks is not highlighted as subject to an AMR. This tubing has a passive pressure boundary function and meets the criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Additionally, a note on the LR drawings indicates that there are root valves for these pressure indicators; therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for not requiring an AMR for this tubing and associated root valves.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing is incorrect and does not properly show the tubing between the air receiver tanks and the pressure gauges as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The applicant stated that the original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.8-1 already represents tubing and instrument root valves under the "Piping and Fittings" and "Valves" component types, respectively. The applicant further stated that pressure gauges are active components and, therefore, are not highlighted on the LR drawing as subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.8-3 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but were inadvertently left un-highlighted on the LR drawing. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.8-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.8-4, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18026-C, sheets 1 and 2 do not clearly indicate whether two immersion heaters are subject to an AMR. Depending on the heater design, these heaters can have a pressure boundary intended function; therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify if the heat exchangers component type original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.8-1 represents these heaters.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-18026-C, sheets 1 and 2, are incorrect. Immersion heaters do have a pressure boundary function. Additionally, sheet 2 should look like sheet 1, indicating that there is a chamber around the heating coils. On both sheets, those chambers should be shown in red, indicating that they are within the scope for license renewal and subject to an AMR. The chambers are treated as part of the piping and fittings component type. The heaters themselves are also within the scope of license renewal; however, since they are active components, per Appendix B of NEI 95-10, Revision 3, they are not subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.8-4 acceptable because it adequately explained that: (1) although the immersion heaters are within the scope of license renewal, they are active components and do not perform a pressure boundary function, and therefore are not subject to an AMR; and (2) the chambers around the heating coils are also within the scope of license renewal, subject to an AMR, and treated as the piping and fittings component type. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.8-4 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.8.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the EDG system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the EDG system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.9 NMP1 Fire Detection and Protection System**

##### 2.3A.3.9.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.9, the applicant described the fire detection and protection system. The fire detection and protection system is designed to achieve the following objectives:

- provide automatic fire detection in those areas where the danger of fire exists
- provide fire extinguishment by fixed equipment activated automatically or manually for those areas where the danger of fire exists
- provide manually-operated fire extinguishing equipment for use by station personnel at points throughout the property and station
- provide a backup cooling water source for the reactor emergency cooling system in the event of a complete loss of all other sources of condensing water
- provide an emergency source of water for containment and reactor vessel flooding
- provide an emergency source of water to the spent fuel storage pool (hose)
- provide a backup water source for the emergency service water system
- provide an emergency cooling water supply to either diesel generator

These objectives are accomplished by the fire detection and control, fire water, halon suppression, and carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) suppression systems. The fire detection and control system provides for the identification of a fire, annunciation locally and in the control room, and in certain zones, automatically initiates suppression. The fire water system provides for the extinguishment of fires using water. The halon suppression system provides for the extinguishment of fires using Halon 1301. The CO<sub>2</sub> suppression system provides for the extinguishment of fires using CO<sub>2</sub>. Portable fire extinguishers are also provided throughout the station to provide additional protection.

The fire detection and protection system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the fire detection and protection system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the fire detection and protection system performs functions that support fire protection and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- converts liquid into spray
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.9-1, the applicant identified the following fire detection and protection system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- fire hydrants
- flow elements
- gearbox
- heat-actuated devices
- heat exchangers
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- silencers
- sluice gate for motor driven fire pump
- spray nozzles
- sprinklers
- tanks and air receivers
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.9.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.9 and UFSAR Sections X.10A and X.10B using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff also reviewed approved fire protection safety evaluation (SE) report dated July 26, 1979, and March 21, 1983, for Nine Miles Point Unit 1. This report is referenced directly in the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 fire protection current licensing basis (CLB) and summarize the fire protection program and commitments to 10 CFR 50.48 using the guidance of Appendix A to



Branch Technical Position (BTP) Chemical and Mechanical Engineering Branch (CMEB) 9.5-1. The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant did not omit any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.9 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-2, dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-18030-C, sheet 2 shows five foam water systems as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, including the foam solution supply piping; however, the LR drawing shows the foam tank and pumps as not within the scope of license renewal. Additionally, the foam tanks and pumps are shown disconnected from the foam water system supply piping. The UFSAR does not reference these foam water systems; therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding the foam tank and pumps from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR, since they are necessary for the function of the foam water systems which are shown as within the scope of license renewal.

In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the ALRA correctly describes the NMP1 fire detection and protection system, as credited for 10 CFR 50.48 and, therefore, 10 CFR 54.4(a). The foam subsystem is not included in this section since it is retired in-place and nonfunctional. The foam subsystem is not within the scope of license renewal for NMP1. The applicant further stated that LR drawing LR-18030-C incorrectly identifies portions of the foam subsystem identified as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The only portions that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR are the connections from the fire water headers up to the closed valves to the foam subsystem.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-2 acceptable. The applicant explained that the foam subsystem components in question are not within the scope of license renewal and not subject to an AMR because the foam subsystem is retired in place. The LR drawings inadvertently included highlighted portions of the foam subsystem in error. The staff concluded that the components were correctly excluded from the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-3, dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing LR-18030-C, sheet 6 shows that a sprinkler system is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, except for a portion that services the women's locker room. Areas within the scope of license renewal include administration building, lunch room and wash area, and new locker room and shops. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant identify the basis for excluding a portion of the sprinkler system from within the scope of license renewal, since the rest of the system is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the portions of the fire water system in the administration building, as depicted on LR drawing LR-18030-C, sheet 6, as within scope and subject to an AMR, are incorrect.

The applicant further stated that original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.9 properly describes the portion of the fire water system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR as "...the connecting fire water supply piping and valves from the pump discharge header to the Reactor Building and Turbine Building fire zones [excluding supplies to non-critical areas, (e.g., storage areas, changing rooms, locker rooms)]." The fire water system in the administration building is provided for commercial purposes and is not credited for compliance with 10 CFR 50.48. As described in UFSAR Section 10A.3.10, the only SR equipment located in the administration building is a DC power board located in the foam room. This area is protected by detection and alarm. There is no fire water suppression to this room. This UFSAR section further states that a fire in the administration building will not result in the loss of capability to achieve safe shutdown and that there are no sources of radioactivity in the building. Therefore, the portion of the fire water system located in the administration building is not within the scope of license renewal is not subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-3 acceptable because it adequately explained that the administration building fire detection and protection system in the administration building is not credited to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and is not part of the plant's license. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-6, dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the UFSAR requires at least 1000 gallons of fuel in the fire pump diesel fuel oil storage tank. LR drawing LR-18040-C, sheet 2 shows level instrumentation consisting of air tubing and other components supplying the level indicating instrumentation for a fuel oil storage tank, as excluded from within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff asked that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of these components from within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that LR drawing LR-18040-C, sheet 2 incorrectly reflects the current plant configuration. The drawing does not reflect the installation of a replacement tank (TANK-82-116) in place of the tank (TANK-88-20) shown on the drawing. TANK-82-116 has new fuel oil level instrumentation (LR-82-113) installed that does not require instrument air as a support system. Instrument LR-82-113 is now used in place of LI-82-28 to verify that the fuel oil supply for the NMP1 diesel fire pump is maintained at greater than or equal to 1000 gallons in compliance with UFSAR Appendix 10A, Section 2.5.2.3.2. Tank level verification is performed on a weekly basis.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-6 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are not within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, but were inadvertently left on the LR drawing that does not reflect the current plant configuration. The staff concluded that the components were correctly excluded from the scope of license renewal and not subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-6 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-7, dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.9-1 includes the following component types as subject to an AMR: filters/strainers, flow elements, and orifices; however, the intended function assigned to these components is NSR functional support. ALRA Table 2.0-1 identifies intended functions that are applicable to these component types that are not identified in the ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.9-1. Aging management to ensure that

the component level intended functions can be performed is necessary to ensure that the system level intended functions can be maintained. The intended functions include filtration and flow restriction. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe how the intended functions for these components were assigned and evaluated.

In its response, by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that a component function would be considered an intended function for license renewal only if failure of that component would cause the failure of a system intended function. Failure of the filtration or flow restriction functions for the above mentioned components would not prevent the NMP1 Fire Detection and Protection System from performing its intended functions. Therefore, the only intended function credited for these components is NSR functional support, as identified in ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.9-1.

In evaluating the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-7, the staff found that it was incomplete and that review of ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.9 could not be completed. The applicant did not explain how the intended function, NSR functional support is applied to the component types in the fire detection and protection system, including piping, valves, strainers, pumps, and orifices, as requested in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-7. Therefore, the staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 25, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-7. The product of the teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information in a follow-up letter.

By letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant stated that NSR functional support is a "catch-all" function for NSR components. The applicant also provided a table identifying each component to its intended function, further explaining the use of NSR functional support.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-7, including additional information from the letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable because they adequately explained what intended functions NSR functional support represent and how it is applied to all the component types in the fire detection and protection system, including piping, valves, strainers, pumps, and orifices. Additionally, the applicant provided a table identifying each component to its intended function, which further explains the use of NSR functional support. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-7 is resolved.

### **2.3A.3.9.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the fire detection and protection system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the fire detection and protection system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.10 NMP1 Hydrogen Water Chemistry System**

#### **2.3A.3.10.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.10, the applicant described the hydrogen water chemistry system. The hydrogen water chemistry system and noble metal chemical addition systems are designed to mitigate intergranular stress corrosion cracking of the reactor recirculation piping and the RPV internals. The hydrogen water chemistry system injects hydrogen into the FW/HPCI system to suppress the radiolytic generated oxidant concentration in the reactor core regions. This significantly reduces the electrochemical potential of the reactor components and greatly reduces crack initiation and growth. The noble metal chemical addition system includes permanent monitoring equipment as well as connections for periodically injecting a noble metal solution. The hydrogen water chemistry system does not perform any intended functions for license renewal purposes and, therefore, is not described further. The monitoring portion of the noble metal chemical injection system does, however, perform an intended function. The monitoring portion draws a sample from the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system, analyzes the effectiveness of the noble metal treatment in the durability monitor, and returns the sample to the RWCU system.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the hydrogen water chemistry system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.10-1, the applicant identified the following hydrogen water chemistry system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow element
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.10.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.10 and UFSAR Section X.M using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.10.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On

the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the hydrogen water chemistry system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the hydrogen water chemistry system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.11 NMP1 Liquid Poison System**

#### **2.3A.3.11.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.11, the applicant described the liquid poison system. The liquid poison system is a standby, redundant, independent control system that is designed to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition in the unlikely event that the control rod system fails to shut down and hold the reactor sub-critical as the reactor cools and xenon decays.

The liquid poison system consists of an ambient pressure tank with immersion heater for low-temperature sodium pentaborate solution storage, two high-pressure positive displacement pumps for injecting the solution into the reactor core, two explosive actuated shear plug valves for isolating the liquid poison from the RPV until required, an in-vessel sparger ring, a test tank, two reactor coolant isolation check valves, pressure relief valves and associated piping, valves, instrumentation and controls.

The liquid poison system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the liquid poison system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the liquid poison system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and ATWS.

The component types subject to an AMR include the liquid poison tank, the liquid poison accumulators, liquid poison pumps, and the connecting piping, fittings and valves.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.11-1, the applicant identified the following liquid poison system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.11.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.11 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.11 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3-3, dated October 11, 2005, the staff stated that the liquid poison system contains two elements that monitor the liquid poison storage tank temperature. One of these components is within the scope of license renewal since it is an SR component. The other component is NSR and has no license renewal intended function. The in-scope temperature element itself is an active component and, therefore, not subject to AMR. However, the temperature sensor is housed in a thermowell that is subject to AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant identify which is the in-scope temperature element, TE 41-35 or TE 41-28.

In its response, by letter dated October 28, 2005, the applicant indicated that the thermowell for temperature element 41-28 is SR and is within the scope of license renewal. Temperature element 41-28 is SR because it monitors the sodium pentaborate solution in the liquid poison storage tank and provides input to the temperature controller that drives the heater that maintains the temperature in the solution within the proper range. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3-3 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.11.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and RAI response to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the liquid poison system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the liquid poison system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.12 NMP1 Miscellaneous Non-Contaminated Vents and Drains System**

#### 2.3A.3.12.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.12, the applicant described the miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system. The miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system is designed to route the non-contaminated effluents to floor drains, building sumps, the discharge tunnel, and the turbine building equipment drain tank.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.12-1, the applicant identified that the piping and fittings component type of the miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### 2.3A.3.12.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.12 and UFSAR Section XII.A.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.12.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.13 NMP1 Neutron Monitoring System**

#### 2.3A.3.13.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.13, the applicant described the neutron monitoring system. The neutron monitoring system monitors neutron flux level, in the reactor, in three separate ranges: source range, intermediate range, and power range. This system also includes the capability to calibrate the local power range monitors during normal operation.

The source range monitoring and intermediate range monitoring systems are equipped with mechanically retractable detector assemblies which allow the operator to insert the detectors into the reactor core, and then retract the detectors to a low neutron flux region below the core when the proper point in reactor operation is reached. The local power range monitoring detectors are installed at fixed locations in the reactor core. The average power range monitoring system utilizes the signals from the local power range monitoring detectors to provide average power range signals for monitoring.

The neutron monitoring system also includes the traversing in-core probe system which provides the capability to calibrate the local power range monitors during normal operation. The traversing in-core probe system consists of four identical trains, each containing ionization chamber detectors, indexing mechanism, ball valve, shear valve, chamber shield, drive mechanism and drive control unit. The drive mechanism drives the traversing in-core probe detector through the ball and shear valves and indexing mechanism into calibration tubes and then guide tubes located in the reactor core. The ball and shear valves function as reactor coolant isolation valves if a leak were to occur in a calibration or guide tube. The drive mechanisms, indexer mechanisms and calibration and guide tubes are purged continuously with nitrogen gas.

The neutron monitoring system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs.

The components subject to an AMR include the four traversing in-core probe system ball valves and their associated guide tubes from the shear valves to the containment penetration. The dry tubes for source range monitoring and intermediate range monitoring detectors are not included in the system boundary. The dry tubes are included in the RPV internals (Section 2.3.1.A.2).

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.13-1, the applicant identified the following neutron monitoring system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.13.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.13 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not



omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.13.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the neutron monitoring system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the neutron monitoring system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.14 NMP1 Process Radiation Monitoring System**

##### 2.3A.3.14.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.14, the applicant described the process radiation monitoring system. The process radiation monitoring system is designed to monitor radiation levels of liquid and gaseous processes throughout the plant, assist in controlling the release of radioactive byproducts, and provide for personnel safety by warning of abnormal radiation levels. The process radiation monitoring system consists of the following independent subsystems: main steam line radiation monitoring, air-ejector off-gas radiation monitoring, stack effluent radiation monitoring, process liquid radiation monitoring, reactor building ventilation radiation monitoring, emergency cooling condenser vent monitor, and refueling bridge high radiation monitor. Each of these subsystems consists of an appropriate detector and monitor and provide readouts, alarms and computer points to aide the operator. Only the air-ejector off-gas, stack effluent and process liquid radiation monitors draw a sample from their respective process streams. These subsystems were evaluated and determined to not be within the scope of license renewal. The remaining subsystems measure radiation levels directly on the process piping or local area.

The process radiation monitoring system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the process radiation monitoring system performs functions that support EQ.

The in-scope components for the process radiation monitoring system are active components. Therefore, there are no components requiring an AMR for the process radiation monitoring system.

##### 2.3A.3.14.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.14 and UFSAR Section VIII.C.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions

delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3A.3.14.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the process radiation monitoring system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the process radiation monitoring system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.15 NMP1 Radioactive Waste Disposal Building HVAC System**

#### 2.3A.3.15.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.15, the applicant described the radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system. The radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system provides heating and ventilation for personnel comfort, equipment protection and for controlling possible radioactivity release to the atmosphere. Air is drawn into the system through an inlet louver, filter and heater by two supply fans and distributed throughout the waste building and waste building extension. An air outlet is located in each room and at each piece of equipment where radioactive contamination could be released. The exhaust ductwork leads to two trains of inlet and outlet dampers, roughing and high efficiency filters, and exhaust fans. The discharge from all of the exhaust fans travels through one of three backdraft dampers and exits the station through the vent stack.

The radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.15-1, the applicant identified that the dampers component type of the radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### 2.3A.3.15.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.15 and UFSAR Section III.C.1.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had

not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.15.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.16 NMP1 Radioactive Waste System**

##### 2.3A.3.16.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.16, the applicant described the radioactive waste system. The radioactive waste system is designed to meet the following objectives:

- collect and process all radioactive waste generated without limiting normal station operation
- collect and process radioactive wastes for disposal, or transfer to a vendor for processing and disposal
- release radioactive material to the environment in a controlled manner so that all releases are within the limits of 10 CFR 20 and the TSs
- retain radioactive wastes, if they accidentally leak from the systems, so that they can be recovered and reprocessed

The radioactive waste system consists of the gaseous waste system, liquid waste system, and solid waste system. Gaseous radioactive wastes include airborne particulates as well as gases vented from process equipment. Sources of gaseous waste activity are the offgas system effluent, steam-packing exhaust system effluent, and building ventilation exhausts. The liquid waste system processes the liquids collected in equipment drains and floor drains in areas that are potentially contaminated with radioactive materials. The wastes are collected in the floor drain sumps located within the drywell, the reactor building (RB), the turbine building (TB), the radioactive waste solidification and storage building, the offgas building, and the waste disposal building (WDB). The liquids in these floor drain sumps are pumped into the floor drain collector, waste neutralizer tank, or utility collector tank, which are located in the WDB. The solid waste system processes spent resins, filter sludge, and concentrated waste. It also is designed for collection and shipment of lowlevel solids. Wastes may be processed or solidified onsite, or transferred to a vendor for processing.

The radioactive waste system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the radioactive waste system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the radioactive waste system performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides flood protection barrier
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.16-1, the applicant identified the following radioactive waste system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow element
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- separator
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.16.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.16 and UFSAR Section XII.A using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.16 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAIs 2.3.3.A.16-1 through 2.3.3.A.16-3, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify inconsistencies between the original LRA and LR drawings that the staff encountered in its review. The applicant's response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings correcting the inconsistencies and accurately depicting all the components subject to AMR, including those subject under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, the staff's concerns described in RAIs 2.3.3.A.16-1 through 2.3.3.A.16-3 are resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.16-4, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing LR-18006-C, sheet 3 shows piping sleeves for two pipelines as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The piping sleeves are passive and long-lived components. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify if these components are included with a component type which is listed in original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.16-1 or justify the exclusion of these components from subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff further stated that LR drawing LR-18006-C, sheet 3 shows two pipelines from the N<sub>2</sub> leak test on another LR drawing to the above-mentioned sleeve pipes as subject to an AMR. The AMR boundary flag for one pipeline indicates that this pipeline is included in the containment system. No boundary flag is shown for the other pipeline. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify whether these pipelines are included in the NMP1 radioactive waste system, or, if not, show the location of the radioactive waste AMR boundary interface with other license renewal systems.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the sleeve pipes represent primary containment penetrations X-25 and X-26, respectively. These penetrations are subject to AMR and are addressed in original LRA Section 2.4.A.1. In addition, the applicant clarified that both these lines should have a containment boundary flag. However, the boundary flag for the latter pipeline was inadvertently omitted.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.16-4 acceptable because it adequately clarified that the sleeve pipes are part of the primary containment structure penetration and are addressed in original LRA Section 2.4.A.1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.16-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.16-5, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing LR 18018-C, sheet 1 shows the pipeline from two shutdown cooling heat exchangers as being subject to an AMR. However, the pipeline from the shutdown cooling heat exchanger is shown as excluded as subject to an AMR, although an AMR boundary flag indicates that this line should be within the scope of the radioactive waste system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify whether this is an inadvertent error in highlighting the LR drawing, or, if not, explain how the latter pipeline differs from the former pipelines.

In addition, the staff stated that LR drawing LR 18045-C, sheet 7 shows the shutdown cooling system drains line, which appears to be the continuation of the above-mentioned pipelines to the reactor building equipment drain tank (RBEDT). However, an AMR boundary flag indicates that the portion of this line that is shown on this drawing is within the scope of the compressed

air system (CAS). Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant to explain why this line is included in the compressed air system.

In its response, by letter dated, December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that LR drawing LR-18018-C is incorrect for the pipeline from the shutdown cooling heat exchanger to the RBEDT and should have been highlighted in red. The applicant provided corrections to the boundary flag locations and locations on the LR drawings.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.16-5 acceptable because it stated that the LR drawings are incorrect and identified the required corrections to the drawings. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.16-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawings show the pressure and level instruments' drain lines and their associated components (fittings and valves) tie in to the pipeline which runs to the RBEDT. That pipeline is shown on these drawings as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Also, another LR drawing shows a pipeline which connects fuel pool cooling system drains to the reactor building drain tanks as subject to an AMR. However, one of the previous LR drawings shows that pipeline as being excluded as subject to an AMR. Also, this pipeline is not highlighted in red on that LR drawing, although an AMR boundary flag shows it as being within the scope of the RWS. Further, this AMR boundary flag indicates that a portion of the pipeline from the fuel pool cooling drains on an LR drawing is within the scope of the CAS.

Therefore, to resolve the above discrepancies, the staff requested that the applicant:

- (a) Provide drawings or descriptive information that shows how the instrumentation drains header connects to the fuel pool cooling system drains pipeline.
- (b) Provide drawings or descriptive information that clearly identify portions of the radioactive waste system to RBEDT which are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, and eliminate inconsistencies between the above-mentioned drawings.

In its response to RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6a, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated:

The instrument drain headers identified in the RAI do not connect to the fuel pool cooling system drains pipeline. For NMP1, the line identification (i.e., 89-2-C) is not a unique piping component number. Using the line identification legend shown on drawing LR-18000-C, Sheet 1 (location E3), the line identifier "89-2-C" indicates a pipe in system 89 (RWS) that is 2 inches in diameter and made of carbon steel. Therefore, this identification applies to every 2-inch, carbon steel line in system 89 (RWS) regardless of its function. This identification does not, therefore, imply a connection between the identically designated piping segments described in this RAI.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6a acceptable because the applicant adequately explained why there is no connection between the pipelines in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6a is resolved.

In its response to RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6b, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated:

The depiction of the input lines to the RBEDT on drawing LR-18045-C, Sheets 7 and 7A, that are contrary to the above-referenced description are drafting errors. AMR boundary flag designators contrary to this description, including the ones referencing the CAS, are also drafting errors.

As stated in the response to RAI 2.3.3.A.16-1, drawing LR-18045-C, Sheet 7A, provides no additional information to that shown on Sheet 7 and should, therefore, be disregarded.

Based on its review of the applicant's response, the staff found that it was incomplete and that its review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.16 could not be completed. Although the applicant stated that the depiction of the input lines to the RBEDT on drawing LR-18045-C, sheets 7 and 7A, are contrary to the above-referenced description due to drafting errors, it did not adequately identify which of the LR drawings are correct. In addition, the applicant stated that LR drawing LR-18045-C, sheet 7A does not add any information to LR-18045-C, sheet 7 and should be disregarded; however, the applicant did not explain the inconsistency between these two sheets. As a result, the staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 27, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve its concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6b. The product of the teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information in a follow-up letter.

In its follow-up response, by letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant provided detailed descriptive information that resolved RAIs 2.3.3.A.16-1 through 2.3.3.A.16-3. That response is also applicable to the concern in 2.3.3.A.16-6b and provides complete resolution.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6b, including the information in the letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable because it adequately described all of the portions of the NMP1 radioactive waste system. Additionally, this information described the impact on the original LRA. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.16-6b is resolved.

### 2.3A.3.16.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the radioactive waste system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the radioactive waste system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.17 NMP1 Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System**

#### 2.3A.3.17.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.17, the applicant described the reactor building closed loop cooling (RBCLC) water system. The RBCLC water system is designed to provide demineralized water

to cool reactor auxiliary equipment located in the primary containment, RB, TB, and WDB. The closed loop permits isolation of systems containing radioactive liquids from the service water.

The RBCLC water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RBCLC water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RBCLC water system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.17-1, the applicant identified the following RBCLC water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- actuator
- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- temperature elements
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.17.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.17 and UFSAR Section X.D using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not



omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.17 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAIs 2.3.3.A.17-1 and 2.3.3.A.17-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on a license renewal boundary drawing concerning SSC's that are within scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided revised LR drawings which identify SSC's in scope and subject to AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on its review of the information submitted in the ALRA, the staff's concerns described in RAIs 2.3.3.A.17-1 and 2.3.3.A.17-2 are resolved.

### 2.3A.3.17.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RBCLC water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RBCLC water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.18 NMP1 Reactor Building HVAC System**

#### 2.3A.3.18.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.18, the applicant described the reactor building HVAC system. The reactor building HVAC system is designed to control the RB atmosphere within limits during normal and emergency operating conditions. Additionally, the system is an alternative system for venting the primary containment to the atmosphere, if necessary. The reactor building HVAC system consists of the reactor building normal ventilation system and the reactor building emergency ventilation system. The reactor building normal ventilation system provides clean fresh air to the RB, removes air from areas where excessive heat concentration and potential airborne contamination exist, and maintains a negative pressure in the RB relative to the atmosphere by regulating the amount of outside air introduced into the building. The clean air is required to remove air from areas where excessive heat concentration exists. The normal ventilation system automatically isolated upon initiation of the emergency ventilation system. The reactor building emergency ventilation system removes air from areas where excessive heat concentration and potential airborne contamination exists, maintains a negative pressure in the RB relative to atmosphere, and removes and filters contaminated air during accident conditions. The reactor building emergency ventilation system is a standby system consisting of

redundant filter trains, which operates in the event of an accident or normal ventilation failure. This system can also be used to process the drywell and torus atmospheres when venting.

The reactor building HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the reactor building HVAC system performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.18-1, the applicant identified the following reactor building HVAC system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blowers
- bolting
- ducting
- filters
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- temperature elements
- valves and dampers

#### 2.3A.3.18.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.18 and UFSAR Sections VI.E.2 and VII.H using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.18.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the reactor building HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the reactor building HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.19 NMP1 Reactor Water Cleanup System**

#### **2.3A.3.19.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.19, the applicant described the RWCU system. The RWCU system is designed to maintain high reactor water purity in order to: minimize deposits on fuel clad surfaces by reducing the amount of water-borne impurities in the primary system and reduce the secondary sources of beta and gamma radiation resulting from the deposition of corrosion products, fission products, and impurities in the primary system. The RWCU system continuously purifies a portion of the reactor recirculation flow and reactor bottom head drain flow with a minimum of heat loss from the cycle. Water is normally removed at reactor pressure from one of the reactor recirculation loops and the reactor bottom head drain line, cooled in regenerative and non-regenerative heat exchangers, reduced in pressure, filtered, demineralized, and pumped through the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger to the RPV through the FW/HPCI System. Whenever reactor pressure is insufficient to maintain suction pressure at the main cleanup pumps, an auxiliary pump is used.

The RWCU system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RWCU system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RWCU system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.19-1, the applicant identified the following RWCU system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchangers
- filters
- flow elements
- flow gauges
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

### 2.3A.3.19.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.19 and UFSAR Section X.B using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.19 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.19-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-1809-C, sheet 1 shows oil coolers for the clean-up pumps to be within the "CU" system boundary and requiring an AMR. The original LRA Table 2.3.3.A-19-1 lists heat exchangers as a component type; however, original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-17-1 does not include heat exchangers with a lubricating oil environment and original LRA Section 3.3.2.A.17 does not list lubricating oil as an environment to which the RWCU system is exposed. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that the clean-up pump oil coolers have been properly evaluated within the original LRA or justify their exclusion from requiring an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1, shows the cooling water side of the heat exchangers as being subject to AMR. This is because of the "Pressure Boundary" intended function for the RBCLC System. The shell side of the heat exchanger is not SR so it is not shown as within the scope of license renewal (depicted in black on the drawing), and the heat exchanger itself does not have an LR intended function of heat transfer. Therefore, the drawing boundary flags are incorrect. The "LR-CU" side of each of those flags should be solid blue. Consistent with original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.19, the pump oil coolers are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR to meet 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2), since they are NSR equipment containing liquid in the vicinity of SR components. Per LR drawing convention, components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR for criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) only are not identified in red. The only heat exchanger within the RWCU system that is subject to AMR for criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) is the non-regenerative heat exchanger, which does not have a lube oil environment.

Based on its review, the staff found that the applicant's response was incomplete and that its review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.19 could not be completed because:

- Although the applicant explained that the pump oil cooler is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2), original LRA Tables 2.3.3.A.19-1 and 3.3.3.A-17-1 do not include heat exchangers with the intended function to prevent failure from affecting SR equipment in a lubricating oil environment.

- In its response, the applicant stated that the drawing boundary flags are incorrect and the "LR-CU" side of each of those flags should be solid blue. This does not appear to be correct since the oil cooler tubes are within the scope of license renewal with the pressure boundary intended function for the reactor building closed loop cooling system.

As a result, the staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 27, 2005 to discuss information necessary to resolve the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.19-1. The product of this teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information in a follow-up letter.

In its follow-up response, by letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant stated that the RWCU pump oil coolers are within the scope of license renewal since they are a pressure boundary for the reactor building closed RBCLC system. As such, only the end covers, tube sheets and tubes exposed to RBCLC water are within the scope of license renewal. The external surface of the tubes exposed to the lubricating oil are within the scope of license renewal, but have no aging effects requiring management.

In the ALRA, submitted by the applicant on July 14, 2005, ALRA Tables 2.3.3.A.19-1 and 3.3.3.A.17-1 are revised and now include the heat exchangers with the intended function to prevent failure from affecting SR equipment in a lubricating oil environment.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.19-1 acceptable because the applicant stated that the pump oil cooler is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and the applicant clarified that the drawing boundary flags are incorrect and that the tubes of the RWCU heat exchanger should have been shown within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.19-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.19-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the inconsistencies between the original LRA and LR drawings that the staff encountered in its review. The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawing correcting the inconsistencies and accurately depicting all the components subject to AMR, including those subject under criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.19-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.19-3, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1 shows piping and penetration downstream of a check valve as not subject to an AMR; however, drawing LR-18006, sheet 2 shows this same piping as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent discrepancy between these drawings and confirm that the piping downstream of the check valve and penetration on the first drawing received an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1 is incorrect. The applicant explained that the piping and penetration downstream of valve CU-37 (CKV-63.1-02) are subject to an AMR. The penetration itself is part of the primary containment structure, which is addressed in original LRA Sections 2.4.A.1 and

3.5.2.A.1. The penetration piping is covered in the RWCU system, which is covered in original LRA Sections 2.3.3.A.19 and 3.3.2.A.17. In addition, the applicant stated that drawing LR-18006-C, sheet 2, is incorrect at the referenced location. In its response, the applicant provided corrections to the locations of the boundary flags on this drawing and also provided revisions to original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.19.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.19-3 acceptable because it adequately explained that the LR drawings in question are incorrect, provided corrections to the locations of boundary flags on LR drawings, and provided the revisions required to original LRA 2.3.3.A.19-3. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.19-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.19-4, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1 shows piping upstream of a valve as not subject to an AMR; however, drawing LR-18006-C, sheet 1 shows this same piping as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent discrepancy between these drawings and confirm that the identified piping does not require an AMR, as indicated on drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that with respect to the inconsistency between drawings LR-18009-C, sheet 1 and LR-18006-C, sheet 1, the former drawing is correct. However, as stated in original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.19, the NSR portions of the RWCU system are within the scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) and subject to AMR. Per the convention adopted for the LR drawings, components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR for the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion only are not identified in red. Therefore, on LR drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1, the components shown in red and black are actually in-scope and subject to AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.19-4 acceptable because the applicant adequately clarified the inconsistency between the two LR drawings. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.19-4 is resolved.

### 2.3A.3.19.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RWCU system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RWCU system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.20 NMP1 Sampling System**

#### **2.3A.3.20.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.20, the applicant described the sampling system. The sampling system provides for the sampling of liquid, steam and gases from various systems in the plant under all operating modes. Liquid samples can be obtained from the RPV, spent fuel pool, RWCU, core spray, torus, liquid poison, condensate, feedwater, RBCLC, turbine building closed loop cooling (TBCLC), circulating water, radioactive waste disposal and make-up systems. Steam samples from the main steam system are obtainable. Gaseous samples can be obtained from primary containment, vent stack and off gas systems.

The sampling system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the sampling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the sampling system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.20-1, the applicant identified the following sampling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- rupture disc
- valves

#### **2.3A.3.20.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.20 and UFSAR Section VIII.C.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.20 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.20-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify drawing inconsistencies that the staff encountered in its review. The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings correcting the inconsistencies and accurately depicting all the components subject to AMR, including those subject under criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.20-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.20-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-18041-C, sheet 1 shows condensate sampling points at BV 110-72 and BV 110-73 as not subject to an AMR. The LR drawing for the condensate system indicates that the condensate line leading to CS 50-233 is within the condensate system AMR boundary flags and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant identify where the AMR boundary exists between the condensate system and the sampling points at BV 110-72 and BV 110-73 and explain the basis for excluding these blocking valves as subject to an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-18041-C, sheet 1 is incorrect. The AMR boundary on this drawing should include valves 110-251, 110-252, and 110-598, and all associated piping up to and including the condensate pumps and the main condenser. The applicant also noted that the component referenced in the RAI should read "CE 50-233" not "CS 50-233."

In addition, the applicant further clarified that per original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.20, the sampling system liquid-filled piping, fittings, equipment on LR drawing LR-18041-C, sheet 1, that are shown in black are also in-scope for LR and subject to AMR for criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) since they are liquid-filled components in the vicinity of SR components. Per LR drawing convention, only components in-scope for LR and subject to AMR for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) are not to be shown in red on LR drawings.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.20-2 acceptable because it concurred with the applicant that the sampling LR drawing AMR boundary should include valves and all associated piping up to and including condensate pumps, back to the main condensers, but were inadvertently left un-highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were correctly included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.20-2 is resolved.

In RAIs 2.3.3.A.20-3, 2.3.3.A.20-4, and 2.3.3.A.20-5, dated November 19, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on LR drawings concerning SSC's within the scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a). The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant revised the LR drawing which identifies all SSC's within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR including those in scope under criterion



10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, the staff's concerns described in RAIs 2.3.3.A.20-3, 2.3.3.A.20-4, and 2.3.3.A.20-5 are resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.20-6, dated November 19, 2004, the staff indicated that 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) states that all NSR SSC's whose failure could prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions described in 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) is within the scope of license renewal. Drawing LR-18041-C, sheet 7 shows heat exchangers 122-44 and 122-45 outside the AMR boundary flags of the reactor building closed loop cooling water system and the sampling system. However, these heat exchangers are shown within the reactor building closed loop cooling water system and sampling system AMR boundary on drawing LR-18022-C, sheet 2. Since failure of either the tube side or shell side of these heat exchangers could affect the integrity of the reactor building closed loop cooling water system, the staff requested that the applicant explain the basis for excluding these heat exchangers as subject to an AMR as indicated on drawing LR-18041-C, sheet 7.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the post accident sample system is NSR and therefore, supplying reactor building closed loop cooling water to post accident sample coolers is an NSR function. The reactor building closed loop cooling water system line supplying the post accident sample system includes an excess flow check valve to prevent high flow rates from a downstream break and the return line includes a check valve which prevents back flow from the reactor building closed loop cooling water system.

The applicant further stated that drawing LR-18041-C, sheet 7 correctly shows the boundary at the check valves based on the above evaluation. However, drawing LR-18022-C, sheet 2 incorrectly shows the sample coolers as subject to an AMR. Based on the function of the excess flow check valve and the return line check valve, the NSR portion of the reactor building closed loop cooling water system cannot affect the performance of the required SR function. The boundary at the check valves meets the requirement of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, drawing LR-18022-C, sheet 2 should be corrected by removing the AMR boundary from the sample coolers and associated piping and placing the reactor building closed loop cooling water system scope boundary flag at the drawing continuation flags. However, the applicant further explained that even though the subject heat exchanger shells should be shown in black, per original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.20, they are still within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) since they are liquid-filled components in the vicinity of SR components.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.20-6 acceptable because it adequately explained that the NSR sample coolers are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) only and, as such, were highlighted (red colored) on the LR drawing in error. The applicant also clarified that the AMR boundary on the LR drawing at the check valves meets the requirement of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) and the boundary flag on the LR drawing should be moved from the sample coolers to the drawing continuation flag. The staff concluded that the components were correctly included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.20-6 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.20-7, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-18041-C, sheet 2 shows the air supply to AOV 110-83A as subject to an AMR for the NMP1 sampling system. The staff believed that this valve should be evaluated as part of the instrument air

system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that this valve and its environment are within the sampling system or explain this apparent discrepancy.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant confirmed that the valve operator is not subject to AMR because it is not liquid-filled. Therefore, it is not within the scope of license renewal. The applicant stated that the LR drawing is incorrect and improperly shows the air supply valve as subject to an AMR. The components in question should not have been highlighted on the LR drawing as being subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a) but were highlighted inadvertently.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.20-7 acceptable because it adequately explained that the air supply valve in question was highlighted (in red color) on the LR drawing in error. This air valve is not necessary for its associated air operated block valve to perform its intended function. Therefore, the air valve in question is not within the scope of license renewal and not subject to an AMR. The staff concluded that the components were correctly excluded from within the scope of license renewal and from requiring an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.20-7 is resolved.

### 2.3A.3.20.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the sampling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the sampling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.21 NMP1 Service Water System**

#### 2.3A.3.21.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.21, the applicant described the service water system. The service water system is designed to provide a reliable supply of cooling water to various safety and NSR components and systems. Systems cooled by the service water system include the RBCLC water system, TBCLC water system, RB HVAC system, TB HVAC system, and radioactive WDB HVAC system. Service water also is supplied to the screenwash pumps, the radwaste solidification and storage building, and the makeup demineralizer. The service water system is injected with chemicals to control biological growth by the chemical injection system.

The service water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the service water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the service water system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.21-1, the applicant identified the following service water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.21.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.21 and UFSAR Section X.F using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.21 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.21-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on a license renewal boundary drawing concerning SSC's within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawing which identifies all SSC's in scope and subject to AMR including those under criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.21-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.21-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify drawing inconsistencies that the staff encountered in its review. The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings correcting the inconsistencies and accurately depicting all components subject to AMR including those subject under criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.21-2 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.21.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the service water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the service water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.22 NMP1 Shutdown Cooling System**

##### 2.3A.3.22.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.22, the applicant described the shutdown cooling system. The shutdown cooling system is designed to cool reactor water below temperatures and pressures at which the main condenser may be used as a heat sink following reactor shutdown. This system provides the capability to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown condition by removal of reactor fission product decay heat. The shutdown cooling system consists of reactor coolant isolation valves, three redundant loops each having a pump, heat exchanger and flow control valve, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation and controls. The heater exchangers are cooled by the RBCLC water system.

The shutdown cooling system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the shutdown cooling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the shutdown cooling system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat sink during station black-out or DBAs
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.22-1, the applicant identified the following shutdown cooling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.22.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.22 and the UFSAR Section X.A using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.22 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.22-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on LR drawing 18018-C, sheet 1 concerning SSC's in scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a). The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the revised LR drawing which identifies all SSC's in scope of license renewal and subject to AMR including those subject under criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.22-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.22-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.22-1 does not list temperature elements or thermowells as component types within the shutdown cooling system. Drawing LR-18018-C, sheet 1 shows a temperature element within the AMR boundary of the shutdown cooling system. A general note number on the LR drawing states that all temperature devices including temperature elements have

thermowells. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the basis for excluding temperature elements and/or thermowells (pressure boundary function) as component types in original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.22-1 as subject to an AMR.

In addition the staff stated that the original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.22-1 does not list bolting as a component type within the shutdown cooling system. Bolted connections appear to be used on a number of flow elements within the shutdown cooling system. Therefore, the staff also requested that the applicant explain the basis for excluding bolting as a component type in the original LRA Table 2.3.3.A.22-1 as subject to an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated:

The thermowell for TE-38-115, "Temperature Primary Element - Water To Reactor Recirc Loop," is constructed of the same material as the piping; therefore, there is no reason to create a thermowell subcomponent for TE-38-115 or to list thermowells as a separate component type in [original] LRA Tables 2.3.3.A.22-1 and 3.3.2.A-20. The convention adopted for the [original] LRA was that thermowells made of the same material as the piping were included under the component type of "Piping and Fittings" as being a portion of the pressure boundary of the pipe. Drawing LR-18018-C, Sheet 1, incorrectly highlighted temperature element TE-38-115 as being subject to AMR. It is actually not in-scope for LR. The following additional instruments are also incorrectly shown as being subject to AMR on drawing LR-18018-C, Sheet 1: PT-38-141, PT-38-153, PT-38-148, TE-38-130, and TE-38-136. Pressure transmitters PT-38-141, PT-38-153, and PT-38-148 are in-scope for LR, but are not subject to AMR.

In regard to bolting, the applicant in its ALRA, submitted July 14, 2005, now includes bolting as a component type requiring an AMR in original LRA tables 2.3.3.A.22-1 and 3.3.2.A-20.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.22-2 acceptable. The applicant adequately clarified that thermowells and bolting are included in the component type of "Piping and Fittings." Additionally, the applicant added carbon steel, "Piping and Fittings," in an air environment with a pressure boundary function to represent the thermowells, and has added bolting to the component types requiring an AMR. The staff agreed that temperature element TE-38-115 is not within the scope of license renewal, and that is because they are active components, the instruments (TEs and PTs) identified in the applicant's response are not subject to AMRs. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.22-2 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.22.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the shutdown cooling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required

by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the shutdown cooling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.23 NMP1 Spent Fuel Pool Filtering and Cooling System**

#### **2.3A.3.23.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.23, the applicant described the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system. The spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system is designed to remove decay heat from the spent fuel assemblies and the impurities from the pool water. This system maintains the temperature and purity of the spent fuel pool water at acceptable levels. Cooling water is supplied to the heat exchangers from the RBCLC water system. Makeup water to the spent fuel storage pool is provided by the condensate and condensate transfer system. The spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system is also used after reactor refueling to drain the reactor internals storage pit and head cavity. Alternate lines allow transport of the water to either the main condenser or to the waste disposal system for processing.

The spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.23-1, the applicant identified the following spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- flow gauge
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps

- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.23.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.23 and UFSAR Section X.H using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.A.23 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAIs 2.3.3.A.23-1 and -2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on an LR drawing concerning SSC's in scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a). The applicant's response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings which identify all SSC's within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR including those subject under criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on review of the information submitted in the amended LRA the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.23-1 and RAI 2.3.3.A.23-2 are resolved.

#### 2.3A.3.23.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.24 NMP1 Technical Support Center HVAC System**

#### 2.3A.3.24.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application



In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.24, the applicant described the technical support center HVAC system. The technical support center HVAC system is designed to maintain the technical support center temperature and supply tempered, recirculated, and outside air to maintain a suitable environment for emergency response personnel. During the normal mode of operation, air is drawn into the system through a louvered intake, electric heater, filter and cooling coil to the circulating fan. This fan discharges air to the technical support center. Air is exhausted through the exhaust fan to the environment. In the emergency mode, the normal mode flow path isolates and the supply fan draws air through a separate louvered intake. The air is then directed through a prefilter, HEPA filter, charcoal filter and a second HEPA filter to the suction of the circulating fan. There is no direct exhaust path in the emergency mode as the technical support center is maintained at a positive pressure. The HVAC system also has a separate exhaust path for the removal of smoke.

The technical support center HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the technical support center HVAC system performs functions that support EQ.

The applicant stated that the in-scope components for the technical support center HVAC system are active components. Therefore, there are no components requiring an AMR for the technical support center HVAC system.

#### 2.3A.3.24.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.24 and UFSAR Section III.E.1.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.24.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the technical support center HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the technical support center HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.25 NMP1 Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System**

#### 2.3A.3.25.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.25, the applicant described the TBCLC water system. The TBCLC water system provides demineralized water to cool various NSR auxiliary equipment in the TB in support of power generation. The closed loop provides isolation of systems containing radioactive liquids from the service water, which returns to the lake.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the TBCLC water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.25-1, the applicant identified the following TBCLC water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tank
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.25.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.25 and UFSAR Section X.E using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.25.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On

the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the TBCLC water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the TBCLC water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.26 NMP1 Turbine Building HVAC System**

#### **2.3A.3.26.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.26, the applicant described the turbine building HVAC system. The turbine building HVAC system is designed to provide a continuous flow of fresh tempered air throughout the building, while maintaining a negative atmospheric pressure. This system also has heat and smoke removal capability for three smoke zones and the upper elevation of the TB. The turbine building HVAC system consists of air intakes, filters, electric heating units, flow control dampers, dampers, and ductwork to distribute air to various areas in the TB. Outside air is taken in through louvered, screened penthouses, which supply air to the turbine building HVAC supply fans. The air then passes through filters and heating coils. Exhaust air is directed through a plenum to the stack for discharge and is monitored for radiation. The exhaust system discharges into the plenum, which also receives air from the containment and other buildings. The smoke removal function of the turbine building HVAC system consists of three independent air make-up fans, dampers and ductwork (one for each smoke zone) and automatic isolation dampers and exhaust fans of the normal ventilation system. In addition, there are twelve motor operated roof vents and five sidewall vents.

The turbine building HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the turbine building HVAC system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides path for release of filtered and unfiltered gaseous discharge
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.26-1, the applicant identified the following turbine building HVAC system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blowers
- bolting
- ducting
- muffler
- valves and dampers
- vents

#### **2.3A.3.26.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.26 and UFSAR Section III.A.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.26.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the turbine building HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the turbine building HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.3.27 NMP1 Electric Steam Boiler System**

##### 2.3A.3.27.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.27, the applicant described the electric steam boiler system. The electric steam boiler system is designed to supply saturated steam to the radwaste concentrator #12 heat exchanger to support the processing of radioactive waste, the nitrogen vaporizer to support drywell inerting, and the TB decontamination area to support decontamination activities. The system includes a condensate receiver which supplies the condensate to the boiler for generation of saturated steam. The steam is routed through steam piping to the above loads.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the electric steam boiler system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.27-1, the applicant identified the following electric steam boiler system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- boiler
- bolting
- drain trap
- level gauge
- piping and fittings
- strainer
- valves

#### 2.3A.3.27.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.27 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.3.27.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the electric steam boiler system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the electric steam boiler system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.3.28 NMP1 Makeup Demineralizer System**

#### **2.3A.3.28.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.28, the applicant described the makeup demineralizer system. The makeup demineralizer system is designed to supply batches of demineralized water to fill the demineralized water makeup tank, the condensate storage tanks, and other reservoirs as necessary. It also provides water directly to the liquid poison system, laboratories and sample sinks, and the stator winding liquid cooling system. Demineralized water from this system can be used as an alternate source for several plant systems, including the RWCU and CRD systems. The makeup demineralizer system utilizes a portable skid- or truck-mounted demineralized water unit to process service water or city water for use in the station. Water is processed through several components acting as tanks (i.e., precipitator, clearwell, filter and purifier) while pumped to the portable demineralized water unit. The discharge of the portable unit is directed to the demineralized water storage tank and then to the condensate storage tanks and/or other system loads.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the makeup demineralizer system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.28-1, the applicant identified the following makeup demineralizer system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- level gauge
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### **2.3A.3.28.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.28 and UFSAR Section X.G.1.0 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3A.3.28.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the makeup demineralizer system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the makeup demineralizer system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3A.4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP1 steam and power conversion systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the steam and power conversion systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.4.A.1 NMP1 condensate and condensate transfer system
- 2.3.4.A.2 NMP1 condenser air removal and off-gas system
- 2.3.4.A.3 NMP1 feedwater/high pressure coolant injection system
- 2.3.4.A.4 NMP1 main generator and auxiliary system
- 2.3.4.A.5 NMP1 main steam system
- 2.3.4.A.6 NMP1 main turbine and auxiliary systems
- 2.3.4.A.7 NMP1 moisture separator reheater steam system

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.4.A.1 – 2.3.4.A.7 are presented in SER Sections 2.3A.4.1 – 2.3A.4.7, respectively.

#### **2.3A.4.1 NMP1 Condensate and Condensate Transfer System**

##### 2.3A.4.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.1, the applicant described the condensate and condensate transfer system. The condensate and condensate transfer system condenses steam exhausted from the lowpressure turbines and the turbine bypass valves. This condensate then becomes the primary water supply to the FW/HPCI system. The main condenser also acts as a collecting basin for various leakage, drains, and relief valve discharges from balance of plant systems. The condensate system also removes impurities from the condensed liquid for re-use as reactor water. The condensate serves as a cooling medium for the off gas system steam jet air ejector condensers, steam entering the condenser when the turbine bypass valves are open, and the turbine exhaust hood spray. Additionally, under emergency conditions such as a small break LOCA, the condensate system supplies water from the main condenser to support the HPCI mode of operation to supply makeup water to the reactor. For license renewal purposes, the condensate system also includes the condensate transfer system. The condensate transfer system supplies various systems and equipment throughout the plant with clean demineralized water. The condensate transfer system takes condensate from the condensate storage tanks

(CSTs), which are cross-connected, and delivers the water through one of two redundant pumps.

The condensate and condensate transfer system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the condensate and condensate transfer system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the condensate and condensate transfer system performs functions that support, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1, the applicant identified the following condensate and condensate transfer system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- condensate demineralizers
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- flow gauges
- flow indicators
- flow orifices
- level observation glasses
- main condenser
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.4.1.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.1 and UFSAR Section XI.B using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.1-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18003, shows an inter-condenser and after-condenser within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Additionally, two re-combiner condensers are also shown within scope and subject to an AMR; however, original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1 does not include these heat exchangers individually among the list of components subject to an AMR, nor is the generic component type "Heat Exchanger" included in the table. The applicant was asked to justify exclusion of the heat exchangers from original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1.

In its response, dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.1 states that the AMR includes the main flow path from the main condenser to the boundary with the feedwater system. This includes the tube side of the recombiner condensers and the inter-condenser (the after-condenser is retired in place and isolated from the condensate system). The tube sides of these condensers are included in the "Piping and Fittings" component type listed in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1. The recombiner condensers and inter-condenser are evaluated in the within the scope of license renewal for criteria 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) or (3). The subject LR drawing incorrectly shows the shell sides of the recombiner condensers and inter-condenser, as well as the entire after-condenser, as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

The applicant further stated for clarification that all of the liquid-filled components on the subject LR drawing shown in black are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR to meet 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2), since they are in the turbine building and in the vicinity of SR components; however, per the LR drawing convention, components within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) only, are not shown in red on the LR drawings.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.1-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the subject LR drawing incorrectly shows the shell sides of the recombiner condensers and inter-condenser, as well as the entire after-condenser, as in-scope for license renewal and subject to AMR. Only the tube side of the recombiner condensers and the inter-condenser are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and are subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a). The components in question are included in the "Piping and Fittings" component type listed in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1. The staff concluded that the components were correctly included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.1-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.1-2, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18008, sheet 1 shows that a valve labeled CT-38, on line 57-3/4 -B, is outside the scope of license renewal and excluded from requiring an AMR. To ensure that the valve has the capability of isolating this line, the staff believed that it should be within scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant was asked to justify exclusion of valve CT-38 from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing is incorrect and does not properly show the component within the scope of license renewal and

subject to an AMR. The component in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing that it is within the scope of license renewal and is subject to an AMR. However, the component was inadvertently not highlighted. The component in question has been included within the scope of license renewal and is subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.1-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that the component in question is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but was inadvertently left un-highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the component was correctly included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.1-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.1-3, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify drawing inconsistencies that the staff encountered in its review. The applicant response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings correcting the inconsistencies and accurately depicting the components subject to AMR under criterion 10 CFR 54.4. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.1-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.1-4, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18048, shows line 57-4 -B within the scope of license renewal and ending in a continuation flag labeled "relief to condensate surge and storage tank." This flag shows a continuation to drawing 18003, location G1; however, at this location on drawing 18003, the continuation of line 57-4-B is shown outside the scope of license renewal. There is no license renewal boundary flag on either of these drawings marking this change in classification, nor any valve present that could isolate the in-scope portion from the out-of-scope portion of the line. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the absence of a boundary flag and an isolation valve separating the in-scope and out-of-scope portions of the abovementioned line.

In its response, dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing is incorrect and does not properly show the license renewal boundary for the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The drawing incorrectly shows line 57-4-B beyond valve PSV-57-57 as within the scope of license renewal. There should be a boundary flag on the discharge side of the valve showing solid blue pointing away from the valve and "LR-CS" pointing toward the valve. Line 57-4-B beyond the relief valve should be shown in black.

For clarification the applicant stated, to be consistent with the description in original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.1, all of the liquid-filled components on the subject drawing that are not highlighted are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR, since they are in the turbine building and in the vicinity of SR components. Per the LR drawing convention, components within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) only, are not shown in red on the LR drawings.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.1-4 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question beyond the subject valve are not within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components beyond the valve representing the license renewal boundary were correctly not included within the scope of

license renewal and not subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.1-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.1-5, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that the two condensate surge and storage tanks are shown within the scope of license renewal on LR drawing 18003. Original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1 lists "Tanks" as a component type subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that the condensate surge and storage tanks are included in the component type "Tanks" and identify other tanks (if any) belonging to the condensate and condensate transfer system that are within the scope of license renewal and included in the component type "Tanks."

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that both tanks are within the scope of license renewal, subject to an AMR, and included in the component type "Tanks" in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1. There are no other tanks within NMP1 condensate and condensate transfer system that are SR and subject to AMR. There are, however, other tanks in the system that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR to meet 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). These are among the other liquid-filled NSR equipment identified in original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.1 that are located in the reactor building, radwaste solidification and storage building, screen and pump house building, turbine building, or waste disposal building as being in the vicinity of SR components. Per the LR drawing convention, only components within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) are not to be shown in red on the LR drawings.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the subject tanks in question are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a). In addition, the response explained that the subject tanks are included in the component type "tanks" in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1 and that there are no other tanks within NMP1 condensate and condensate transfer system that are SR and subject to AMR. The response noted, however, that other tanks in the system that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.1-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.1-6, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested information on the intended function of "NSR Functional Support" listed in the original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.1-1. The applicant's response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, is reflected in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant stated that this intended function is no longer used. Instead, the applicant identified specific NSR intended functions and made them consistent with the standardized list of intended functions in SRP-LR and NEI-95-10. Based on the information submitted in the ALRA the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.1-6 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.1-7, November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18009, sheet 1 shows that the only component located between valve CT-53 and valves BV 57-103/104 is flow indicator FI 57-168. However, LR drawing 18048 shows that flow gauge FG 57-175 is the only component located between these same valves. The applicant was asked to explain this apparent discrepancy.

In its response, dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that it agrees that LR drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1 (location G5), identifies FI-57-168, a flow indicator for the clean-up demineralizer, as in-scope for license renewal and subject to AMR.

In addition, drawing LR-18048-C (location A6), identifies FG-57-175, a flow gauge for the clean-up demineralizer, as also being within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

The applicant stated that a review of NMP1 plant drawings C-18009-C, sheet 1, and C-18048-C, revealed the same discrepancy between these drawings as identified in the RAI. The discrepancy is corrected by replacing FG-57-175 on drawing LR-18048-C with FI-57-168, consistent with drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1, and with the as-built configuration of the plant.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.1-7 acceptable because it adequately explained that the discrepancy between the two LR drawings was carried over from a discrepancy on two NMP1 P&ID drawings. The as-built configuration of the plant shows FI-57-168 between valve CT-53 and valve BV 57-103/104. LR drawing LR-18009-C, sheet 1 is correct as shown and LR-18048-C should have agreed with it to match the plant as-built configuration. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.1-7 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.4.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the condensate and condensate transfer system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the condensate and condensate transfer system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.4.2 NMP1 Condenser Air Removal and Off-Gas System**

##### 2.3A.4.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.2, the applicant described the condenser air removal and off-gas system. The condenser air removal and off-gas system remove noncondensable radioactive gases that accumulate in the main condenser during plant startup and normal operation. The gases evacuated by this system are mainly concentrated in the condenser, but steam, air, and other gases evacuated by the steam packing exhauster are also discharged to the condenser air removal and off-gas system. The condenser air removal and off-gas system draws a suction from the air volume in the main condenser, processes the gases and exhausts the gases to the main stack. The processing of the non-condensable radioactive gases includes recombining the hydrogen and oxygen gases to form water, removing the moisture content of the gases and providing for radioactive decay so as to minimize the level of radiation exhausted to the main stack. This system also includes equipment to draw the initial vacuum on the main condenser during plant startup. The water removed by the processing of the condenser air is returned to the main condenser.

The condenser air removal and off-gas system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the condenser air removal and off-gas system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.A.2-1, the applicant identified the following condenser air removal and off-gas system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- air ejectors
- bolting
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3A.4.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.2 and UFSAR Section XI.B.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.2 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.2-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff noted that original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.2 states that the condenser air removal and off-gas system removes and processes non-condensable radioactive gases that accumulate in the main condenser during startup and normal operation. The processing of the radioactive gases includes recombining the hydrogen and oxygen to form water. The original LRA further states that this system is in-scope for performing SR functions per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and that because components within this system are either active or subject to replacement based on qualified life or specified time period no AMR is required. NMP1 UFSAR Section XI, Steam-to-Power Conversion System, B.3.0 (Condenser Air Removal and Offgas System), describes the operation and components of this system. Major components for the system are listed including many which appear to be passive and long-lived. Those components that are described as performing the process include: preheater, recombiner, condenser, drain tank, vent cooler, and 30-min holdup pipe. Therefore, in order for the staff to complete its review, the applicant was requested to confirm

that the aforementioned components are not passive or long-lived or otherwise do not perform an intended function identified in original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.2. If found to require an AMR, then the applicant was to identify them on drawing(s) and include them in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.2.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the intended function of the condenser air removal and off-gas systems is to provide fault protection and isolation for the SR reactor protection system distribution system. This system intended function is performed by active electrical components which are within the scope of license renewal but not subject to an AMR. The functions performed by passive components of the system, such as removing and processing non-condensable radioactive gases that accumulate in the main condenser during startup and normal operation, are not within the scope of license renewal. The information in the response has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA.

In its ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with a revised LR drawing which identifies SSC's in scope and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.2-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the SR function it performs is accomplished by electrical components that are active and not subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.2-1 is resolved

#### 2.3A.4.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and accompanying scoping boundary drawing to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the condenser air removal and off-gas system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the condenser air removal and off-gas system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.4.3 NMP1 Feedwater/High Pressure Coolant Injection System**

#### 2.3A.4.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.3, the applicant described the FW/HPCI system. The FW/HPCI system is the main source of processed water to the reactor during normal operation and also is designed to ensure that the core is adequately cooled under small break LOCA conditions, which do not result in a rapid depressurization of the RPV. The primary function of the FW system is to transfer the water from the condensate system to the RPV. The FW system also preheats the feedwater prior to entering the RPV. The HPCI system is an operating mode of the FW system. The purpose of the HPCI system is to provide adequate cooling of the reactor core under abnormal and accident conditions, remove the heat from radioactive decay and residual heat from the reactor core at such a rate that fuel clad melting would be prevented, and provide for continuity of core cooling over the complete range of postulated break sizes in the primary system process barrier. Upon initiation, the HPCI system provides the control functions to

deliver water from the condensate storage tanks to the RPV. However, the HPCI system is not an engineered safeguards system and is not considered in any LOCA analyses.

The FW/HPCI system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the FW/HPCI system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the FW/HPCI system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1, the applicant identified the following FW/HPCI system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- feedwater heaters
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- flow indicators
- flow orifices
- oil coolers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### 2.3A.4.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.3 and UFSAR Sections VII.I and XI.B using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.3-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1 includes "oil coolers" as a component type subject to an AMR. However, the staff has been unable to locate oil coolers on the LR drawings referenced in original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.3. Drain coolers, on the other hand, are shown within the scope of license renewal on these drawings and are subject to an AMR, yet have not been included in the table. Therefore, the staff requested the applicant to confirm that "oil coolers" were mistakenly entered in place of "drain coolers" in the table and, if so, make the appropriate corrections. Otherwise, add the component type "drain coolers" to the table and provide drawings showing the subject oil coolers as well as the components they serve.

In its response, by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the subject table is correct and provided the following explanation:

LR drawing LR-18004-C identifies three drain coolers. They are Drain Cooler 11 (51-04) at location G1; Drain Cooler 12 (51-05) at location G3; and Drain Cooler 13 (51-06) at location G5. These drain coolers are actually the first stage of the feedwater heaters. The shells for these coolers are not safety-related and not subject to AMR; however, the tube sides of these coolers are in-scope for LR and subject to AMR for a feedwater pressure boundary function. Per LRA Section 2.3.4.A.3, as liquid-filled components in the Turbine Building, the shell sides of these coolers are in-scope for LR and subject to AMR for criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Consistent with LR drawing convention, the components in-scope for LR and subject to AMR for criterion (a)(2) only are not shown in red on the LR drawings.

LR drawing LR-18023-C, Sheet 2, which is listed in LRA Section 2.3.4.A.3, identifies two oil coolers, 29-02 and 29-03. HTX-29-02 is the oil cooler for motor-driven Reactor Feedwater Pump 11 and HTX-29-03 is the oil cooler for motor-driven Reactor Feedwater Pump 12. As for the drain coolers above, the shells for these coolers are not safety-related and not subject to AMR for criteria 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) or (a)(3); however, the tube sides are in-scope for LR and subject to AMR for a lube oil pressure boundary function. As with the drain coolers/feedwater heaters above, since they are liquid-filled components in the Turbine Building, they are in-scope for LR and subject to AMR for criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

As noted in the RAI, LRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1 includes "Oil Coolers." Since the drain coolers are actually the first stage feedwater heaters, they are included in Table 2.3.4.A.3-1 under the component type "Feedwater Heaters."

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.3-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the subject drain cooler and oil cooler shell sides as liquid-filled components in the turbine building, are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR for criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Also, the tube sides are in-scope for license renewal and subject to AMR for a feedwater and lube oil pressure boundary function per criteria



10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The applicant explains that the drain coolers are the first stage feedwater heater and are included in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1 under the component type "feedwater heaters." Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.3-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.3-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1 includes the following component types as subject to AMR: filters/strainers, flow elements, flow indicators, and flow orifices; however, the intended function assigned to these components is "NSR Functional Support." original LRA Table 2.0-1 identifies intended functions applicable to these components not identified in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1. Aging management to ensure that the component level intended functions can be performed is necessary to ensure that the system level intended functions can be maintained. The intended functions include "filtration" and "flow restriction." The applicant was asked to describe how the intended functions for these components are assigned and evaluated.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that a component's particular function of filtration for a filter or flow restriction for a flow orifice is not an intended function for license renewal but that a component function would be considered an intended function only if failure of that component would cause the failure of a system intended function and failure of the "filtration" or "flow restriction" functions for the components would not prevent the NMP1 FW/HPCI system from performing its intended function; therefore, the only intended function for these components is "NSR Functional Support" as identified in original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1.

In evaluating this response the staff found it incomplete and review of original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.3 could not be completed because the applicant did not explain adequately what intended functions "NSR Functional Support" represents and how that intended function applies to all the component types in the feedwater/high pressure coolant injection system including filters/strainers, flow elements, flow indicators, and flow orifices. The staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 27, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.4.A.3-2. The result of the teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information by a follow-up letter.

By letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant defined the "NSR Functional Support" function for NSR components. Tables containing clarifying information regarding the intended functions for components in the FW/HPCI system were provided. The tables identify all the functions accomplished by each of the listed component types.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.3-2 including the information in the letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable because it adequately explained what intended functions, "NSR Functional Support" represent and how it is applied to all the component types in the feedwater/high pressure coolant injection system including filters/strainers, flow elements, flow indicators, and flow orifices. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.3-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.3-3, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.3-1 includes the following component types as being subject to an AMR: flow elements, flow indicators, and flow orifices. However, the drawing legend does not clearly define or distinguish between these components. For example, under "Flow Devices" in the legend, one of the symbols shown is denoted "FE" and defined as "flow element orifice" while another is

denoted "FI" and defined as "in-line flow device." The distinction between these three component types and where each appears on the boundary drawings was not clear to the staff.

With respect to the LR drawings the staff asked the applicant to provide examples that clarify the distinction between the above mentioned three component types.

In its response, by letter December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that as an example, drawing LR-18005-C, sheet 1 (location F5), identifies FE-29-113, a flow element in the feedwater pump 13 discharge piping. The component identification is consistent with the drawing legend for flow devices as shown on license drawing LR-18000-C, sheet 1. This component is within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR.

Another example is drawing LR-18005-C, sheet 1 (location G3), which identifies FI-51-106, a 1-inch flow indicator for feedwater pump 12 seal water. The component identification is consistent with the drawing legend for flow devices as shown on LR drawing LR-18000-C, sheet 1. This component is within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR.

The last example is drawing LR-18005-C, sheet 1 (location F4), which identifies FOR-29-45, a restricting flow orifice for feedwater pump 12 recirculation. The component identification is consistent with the drawing legend for flow devices as shown on drawing LR-18000-C, sheet 1. This component is within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR.

The applicant also stated that drawing LR-18000-C, sheet 1 (location A1 to E3 inclusive), provides a comprehensive matrix table that lists numerous component ID prefixes. In the matrix table for these instrument component types, "Flow" is the Measured Variable and the instrument functions are "primary element" (FE), "indicating" (FI), and "orifice restricting" (FOR), respectively. The drawing legend (location G5) is informational only and not meant to be all inclusive.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.3-3 acceptable because it adequately provided examples of component types flow elements, flow indicators, and flow orifices on license renewal drawings and explains the distinction between the subject three component types. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.3-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.3-4, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18003 shows the symbol "boxed letter B" on the suction side of each of the three feedwater booster pumps. This symbol is not defined in the legend nor is the staff able to determine what it represents. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant define the above described symbol.

In its response, by letter December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the symbol "boxed letter B" represents the start-up strainer shell for feedwater booster pumps 11, 12, and 13. The details can be found on license renewal drawing LR-18003-C (location H4). The element has been removed from the strainer.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.3-4 acceptable because the applicant adequately explained what the "boxed letter B" on the subject LR drawing stands for and how it is not relevant to license renewal. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.3-4 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.4.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the FW/HPCI system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the FW/HPCI system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.4.4 NMP1 Main Generator and Auxiliary System**

##### 2.3A.4.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.4, the applicant described the main generator and auxiliary system. The main generator and auxiliary system consists of the main generator, generator stator cooling water system, hydrogen seal oil system and hydrogen cooling system. The hydrogen cooling system fills the main generator with high-purity hydrogen gas to cool the generator during plant operation. The main generator is filled with hydrogen gas by first purging air with carbon dioxide and then purging the carbon dioxide with hydrogen. The equipment used to supply carbon dioxide to the main generator is the only equipment of the main generator and auxiliary system that is in scope for license renewal.

The main generator and auxiliary system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.A.4-1, the applicant identified the following main generator and auxiliary system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- tanks
- valves

##### 2.3A.4.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.4 and UFSAR Section XI.B.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not

omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.4.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the main generator and auxiliary system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the main generator and auxiliary system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.4.5 NMP1 Main Steam System**

##### 2.3A.4.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.5, the applicant described the main steam system. The main steam system supplies dry steam from the RPV to the main turbine and to various support systems. The main steam system consists of two main steam lines, four main steam isolation valves, six electromatic relief valves, four turbine stop valves, four turbine control valves, nine turbine bypass valves, controls, instrumentation, piping, valves and associated equipment. The system extends from the RPV main steam nozzles to the turbine stop, control and bypass valves and to the inlet of the various components to which it supplies steam. The discharge piping and valves from the electromatic relief valves to the torus, including the Y-quenchers, are also included within this system. The electromatic relief valves are also used by the automatic depressurization system to depressurize the RPV during accident conditions.

The main steam system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the main steam system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the main steam system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.A.5-1, the applicant identified the following main steam system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- condensing pots
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- regulator
- valves
- Y-quenchers

#### 2.3A.4.5.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.5 and UFSAR Sections V.B.1, V.B.5, and XI.B.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.5-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR Note #1 on drawing LR-18000-C, "License Renewal Boundary Drawing Symbols, Notes, and Acronyms," states that portions of the system subject to AMR are highlighted in red with boundaries indicated by blue flags. The blue flags are described on drawing LR-18000-C as "AMR Boundary Flags." Portions of a license renewal system indicated with solid blue flags may perform intended functions and are within scope of license renewal but are not subject to AMR; however, when an LR drawing is composed of a system diagram that has a continuation on another system diagram not provided by the applicant, the staff is unable to complete its review of whether the license renewal system incorporates all portions necessary to satisfy its plant level system intended functions.

LR-18002-C for the NMP1 main steam system is composed of system diagram C-18002 sheet 1. A portion of the main steam system is depicted on C-18002 sheet 2, which has not been provided. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that no portion of the main steam system on C-18002 sheet 2 has SR components or otherwise meets criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), (2), or (3), or, if such components exist, identify them and ensure that their component types and intended functions are represented in Table 2.3.4.A.5-1.

In its response dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that there are no components subject to AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) on the subject system diagram for the main steam

system. Therefore, this diagram was not included in the original LRA. The applicant further stated that the main steam system components within the scope of license renewal for 10 CFR 50.54(a)(2) and subject to an AMR are not highlighted on the LR drawings.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.5-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that there are no components subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) existing on other system diagrams for the main steam system that are not used as license renewal drawings. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.5-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.5-2 dated November 19, 2004, the applicant stated that original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.5 identifies LR drawings depicting components requiring AMR for the NMP1 main steam system. During the review of the original LRA, however, the staff found other LR drawings that have main steam components shown to require AMR not identified in original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.5. These include LR-18006-C, "Drywell and Torus Isolation Valves." For the staff to complete its review of the main steam system the applicant was asked to identify other drawings depicting main steam components requiring AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that LR drawing LR-18002-C sheet 1 identifies the main steam system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR for 10 CFR 50.54 (a)(1) and (a)(3), that although drawing LR-18006-C sheet 1 also shows main steam system components within the scope of license renewal they are the same as those shown on LR-18002-C, that as such drawing LR-18006-C should have been referenced in original LRA Section 2.3.4.A.5, that LR drawing LR-18006 sheet 1 should have been referenced for the containment spray, liquid poison, emergency cooling, and feedwater systems because components from those systems also appear on the drawing, and that main steam components within scope of license renewal subject to an AMR for 10 CFR 50.54(a)(2) are not redlined on LR drawings; therefore, there are no additional LR drawings that show main steam components subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.5-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that although there are some main steam components subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) that are duplicated on other license renewal drawings, they are highlighted as well in accordance with the license renewal guidance. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.5-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.5-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18002 sheet 1 shows the branch line connecting the discharge line of safety relief valve MSER V-2 to temperature element 01-17 omitted from AMR. This branch line forms part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and is passive, and long-lived; therefore, it should require an AMR. (Note that the corresponding branch lines for the remaining five safety relief valves are shown correctly as requiring AMR). The staff requested that the applicant justify omission of the branch line from AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing is incorrect and does not properly show the line within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR. The line in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing it within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR but inadvertently was not highlighted.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.5-3 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but were inadvertently left un-highlighted on the license renewal drawing. The staff concluded that the components were correctly included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.5-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.5-4 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 18002, sheet 1 (locations A2, A3, D2, D3) shows the discharge line from each of the six safety-relief valves (MSER V-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) ending at a continuation flag labeled "To Torus" with no continuation drawing specified. At that point there is also a boundary flag showing an interface between the main steam system and the primary containment system. For the staff to determine if all components in this SR system within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR have been identified, it must review of the continuation drawing. The applicant was asked to provide a drawing showing the continuation of the safety-relief valve discharge lines to the torus or, if already provided in the original LRA as an LR drawing, identify the drawing number.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the safety-relief valve discharge lines are routed through the drywell-to-torus vent lines and terminate in the torus below the water line. The applicant also stated that the continuation of the safety-relief valve discharge lines is as shown on the referenced license renewal drawing to signify that the safety-relief valve discharge line piping continues to the torus, and that there are no other components in those lines.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.5-4 acceptable because it adequately explained that although the safety relief valve discharge line is routed through the drywell to the torus vent, there are no continuation drawings depicting this piping that contain components other than the piping that is already subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.5-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.5-5, dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested information on the intended function of "NSR Functional Support" listed in Table 2.3.4.A.5-1 of the original original LRA. The applicant's December 22, 2004, response information to this RAI is reflected in the ALRA as described below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant stated that this intended function is no longer used, instead, the applicant identified specific NSR intended functions and made them consistent with the standardized list of intended functions in SRP-LR and NEI-95-10. Based on the information submitted in the ALRA, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.5-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.A.5-6, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing LR-18002-C indicates that bellows expansion joints 66-01R, -02R, -03R, -04R, -05R, and -06R are subject to an AMR in the main steam system. original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.5-1 does not include bellows expansion joints as a "component type" with an intended function; therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify the omission of the bellows expansion joints from original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.5-1 or revise the table to include this component type.

In its response, dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that expansion joints are included under the component type "Piping and Fittings" in the original LRA Table 2.3.4.A.5-1.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.A.5-6 acceptable because it adequately explained that the bellows expansion joints in question are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Further, the applicant stated that the bellows expansion joints are represented in the original LRA Table. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.A.5-6 is resolved.

#### 2.3A.4.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the main steam system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the main steam system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3A.4.6 NMP1 Main Turbine and Auxiliary Systems**

##### 2.3A.4.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.6, the applicant described the main turbine and auxiliary systems. The main turbine and auxiliary systems converts the thermal energy contained in the steam supplied by the reactor into electrical energy. The turbine is a tandem-compound, 1800 RPM unit with a single admission, double-flow high pressure section and a six-flow low pressure section. A bypass system is provided that allows bypassing excess steam flow to the condenser when the turbine cannot absorb all the generated steam.

The main turbine and auxiliary systems consist of multiple subsystems including the main turbine system, turbine-generator controls system, turbine gland sealing system, turbine oil storage and purification system, turbine protection system and turbine supervisory instruments system. Of these systems, the turbine gland sealing system, turbine oil storage and purification system and the turbine protection system, specifically the turbine overspeed system, contain components that are within the scope of license renewal. The turbine gland sealing system functions to seal the shaft of the main turbine against leakage of steam from the turbine shell to atmosphere as well as leakage of air from atmosphere to the main condenser. The turbine oil storage and purification system supplies purified lubricating and cooling oil to the turbine-generator bearings, shaft-driven feedwater pump and the turbine-generator controls system. The turbine protection system monitors selected parameters, including turbine overspeed, and provides various trips and alarms designed to protect the turbine from damage.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the main turbine and auxiliary systems could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.



The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.A.6-1, the applicant identified the following main turbine and auxiliary systems component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- regulator
- valves

#### 2.3A.4.6.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.6 and UFSAR Sections XI.B.1 and VIII.B.2.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.4.6.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the main turbine and auxiliary systems components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the main turbine and auxiliary systems components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3A.4.7 NMP1 Moisture Separator Reheater Steam System**

#### 2.3A.4.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.7, the applicant described the moisture separator reheater steam system. The moisture separator reheater steam system removes entrained moisture from the high pressure turbine exhaust and reheats the dried steam to superheated conditions before it passes on to the low pressure turbine.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the moisture separator reheater steam system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.A.7-1, the applicant identified the following moisture separator reheater steam system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow element
- flow orifices
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- separator
- strainer
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3A.4.7.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.A.7 and UFSAR Section XI.B.1.0 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3A.4.7.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the moisture separator reheater steam system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the moisture separator reheater steam system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.3B NMP2 Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems**

### **2.3B.1 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems**

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.B, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP2 reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.1.B.1 NMP2 reactor pressure vessel
- 2.3.1.B.2 NMP2 reactor pressure vessel internals
- 2.3.1.B.3 NMP2 reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system
- 2.3.1.B.4 NMP2 reactor recirculation system
- 2.3.1.B.5 NMP2 control rod drive system
- 2.3.1.B.6 NMP2 reactor coolant pressure boundary components in other systems

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.1.B.1 through 2.3.1.B.6 are presented in SER Sections 2.3B.1.1 through 2.3B.1.6, respectively.

#### **2.3B.1.1 *NMP2 Reactor Pressure Vessel***

##### **2.3B.1.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.1, the applicant described the RPV. The RPV contains and supports the reactor core, reactor internals, and the reactor coolant/moderator. The RPV forms part of the RCPB and serves as a barrier against leakage of radioactive materials to the drywell. The RPV is a vertical cylindrical pressure vessel of welded construction with hemispherical bottom and top heads. The cylindrical shell and top and bottom heads of the RPV are fabricated of low-alloy steel, the interior of which is clad with stainless steel weld overlay, except for the top head and nozzle and nozzle weld zones. The RPV top head is secured to the RPV by studs and nuts. The RPV flanges are sealed with two concentric metal seal rings designed to permit no detectable leakage through the inner or outer seal at any operating condition. The top head leak detection lines tap off of the vessel head between the seal rings to detect leakage should the inner seal-ring fail. The RPV is penetrated by various nozzles and penetrations. The CRD housings and in-core instrumentation thimbles are welded to the bottom head of the RPV. The concrete and steel vessel support pedestal is constructed as an integral part of the building foundation. Steel anchor bolts, set in the concrete, extend through the bearing plate and secure the flange of the reactor vessel support skirt to the bearing plate, and thus to the support pedestal.

The RPV contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.1-1, the applicant identified the following RPV component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bottom head
- nozzles
- nozzle safe ends
- nozzle thermal sleeves
- penetrations: core differential pressure and liquid control, CRD stub tubes, drain lines, in-core instruments, instrumentation
- support skirt
- top head and nozzles
- top head (closure studs and nuts)
- top head (flanges)
- top head (leak detection lines)
- valves
- vessel shells (flange)
- vessel shells: lower intermediate shell, lower shell, upper intermediate shell, upper shell
- vessel welds (including attachment welds)

#### 2.3B.1.1.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.1 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.1.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RPV components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RPV components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.1.2 NMP2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals**

#### 2.3B.1.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.2, the applicant described the reactor pressure vessel internals. The reactor pressure vessel internals provide support for the core and other internal components, maintain fuel configuration (coolable geometry) during normal operation and accident conditions, and provide reactor coolant flow distribution through the core. The reactor pressure vessel internals consists of the components internal to the RPV. The main structures within the RPV are the core (fuel, channels, control rods and instrumentation), the core support structure (including the shroud, top guide and core plate), the shroud head and steam separator assembly, the steam dryer assembly, the feedwater spargers, the core spray spargers, and the jet pumps. Except for the Zircaloy used in the fuel assemblies, reactor internals are stainless steel or other corrosion-resistant alloys. The fuel assemblies (which include fuel rods and channel), control rods, in-core instrumentation, shroud head and steam separator assembly, and steam dryers are removable when the reactor vessel is opened for refueling or maintenance.

The reactor pressure vessel internals contain SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the reactor pressure vessel internals could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.2-1, the applicant identified the following reactor pressure vessel internals component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- access hole covers
- CRD assemblies (includes drive mechanism and housing)
- control rod guide tubes
- core plate, bolts, and supports
- core shroud
- core shroud head bolts
- core/shroud support structures: bolts, brackets, clamps, keepers, supports
- core spray lines and spargers
- differential pressure liquid control line
- flanges
- incore housings
- incore instrumentation dry tubes
- jet pump assemblies
- low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) couplings
- orificed fuel supports
- peripheral fuel supports
- power range detector assemblies
- spray nozzles

- steam dryer assembly
- top guide and supports

#### 2.3B.1.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.2 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.1.B.2 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI-4, dated November 17, 2004, the staff noted that the steam separator assembly consists of a base into which are welded an array of standpipes with a steam separator located at the top of each standpipe. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide justification why these standpipes and steam separators were not included within the scope of license renewal.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the steam separators and their standpipes are not included within the scope of license renewal because they are not SR components that perform a license renewal intended function and referred to an evaluation contained in BWRVIP-06-A. Also, the staff's concern about the possibility that failure of these components could prevent the accomplishment of SR functions of nearby components (e.g., the creation of loose parts that might hit and damage SR components). The staff noted that this consideration was also addressed in BWRVIP-06-A and the evaluation was accepted by the staff in letters dated September 15, 1998, and September 16, 2003. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI-4 is resolved.

In RAI-5 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant indicate where the feedwater sparger is identified as a vessel internal component requiring an AMR. In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant indicated that this sparger also was not included within the scope of license renewal. The applicant stated that, per BWRVIP-06-A, "The sole purpose of the feedwater spargers is to control thermal mixing and extend the life of the vessel and internals. The failure of feedwater spargers or associated brackets would not prevent injection of coolant makeup and are not required to safety shut down the reactor." On this basis the staff found exclusion of the feedwater sparger from within the scope of license renewal acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3-4, dated October 11, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant indicate whether the diffuser seal ring and shroud support plate should be identified as an RPV internal component requiring an AMR. In its response, by letter dated October 28, 2005, the applicant indicated that

the diffuser seal ring and the shroud support plate are reactor pressure vessel internal components subject to aging management review, that the diffuser seal ring is included under “Jet Pump Assemblies” identified in ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.2-1, and that the shroud support plate is included under “Core Shroud Support Structures” in ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.2-1. Therefore, the staff’s concern described in RAI 2.3-4 is resolved.

#### 2.3B.1.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and RAI responses to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the reactor pressure vessel internals components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the reactor pressure vessel internals components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.1.3 NMP2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Instrumentation System**

##### 2.3B.1.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.3, the applicant described the reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system. The reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system provides a means of monitoring and transmitting information concerning key reactor vessel operating parameters during normal and emergency operations. Instrumentation is installed to monitor reactor parameters and indicate these on meters and chart recorders in the control room and remote shutdown panels. The parameters monitored are reactor vessel temperature, water level and pressure, core flow and core plate differential pressure. This system also provides control signals to various systems which, in turn, initiate the appropriate actions required if the monitored parameter exceeds its desired setpoint. Systems receiving control signals from the reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system include reactor protection, primary containment isolation, automatic depressurization, feedwater control, reactor recirculation flow control, redundant reactivity control and residual heat removal (shutdown cooling mode) systems.

The reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides shielding against radiation
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.3-1, the applicant identified the following reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- closure bolting
- condensing chambers
- piping and fittings
- radiation collars
- restriction orifices
- vacuum breakers
- valves

#### 2.3B.1.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.3 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.1.B.3 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3-2 dated October 11, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant indicate whether temperature equalizing columns should be identified as RPV instrumentation system components requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated October 28, 2005, the applicant indicated that the NMP2 RPV instrumentation system does not utilize temperature equalizing columns. For NMP2 the type of level measurement system makes no correction for changes in reactor vessel or reference leg water temperature or density and is termed "non-compensated." Each instrument is calibrated at the vessel pressure and drywell temperature at which the instrument is normally used. Therefore, there are no temperature equalizing columns listed for review in the reactor vessel instrumentation system section.

Based on this review, the staff found the applicant's assessment acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3-2 is resolved.

#### 2.3B.1.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and RAI response to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were



identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.1.4 NMP2 Reactor Recirculation System**

##### **2.3B.1.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.4, the applicant described the reactor recirculation system. The reactor recirculation system is designed to provide a variable reactor coolant flow in order to control reactor power levels. The reactor recirculation system is part of the RCPB and consists of two external loops. Each loop contains a pump, flow control valve, two blocking valves, piping and associated controls and instrumentation. Coolant flow is from the RPV annulus region, through a recirculation pump and flow control valve, into an external manifold from which individual recirculation inlet lines are routed to the jet pump risers within the RPV. The jet pumps are evaluated as part of the reactor pressure vessel internals. The recirculation pumps operate at two speeds with power coming from either the low frequency motor generator set (25 percent) or a 60-Hz power source (100 percent). The flow control valves are controlled by two separate sets of control system components, one for each valve.

The reactor recirculation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the reactor recirculation system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the reactor recirculation system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides shielding against radiation
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.4-1, the applicant identified the following reactor recirculation system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- closure bolting
- piping and fittings

- pumps
- radiation collars
- restriction orifices
- seal coolers
- valves

#### 2.3B.1.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.4 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.1.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the reactor recirculation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the reactor recirculation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.1.5 NMP2 Control Rod Drive System**

#### 2.3B.1.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.5, the applicant described the control rod drive (CRD) system. The CRD system is designed to change core reactivity by changing the position of control rods within the reactor core in response to manual control signals and to scram the reactor in response to manual or automatic signals. The system also provides water to the nuclear boiler instrumentation system reference leg backfill injection lines and the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) and reactor recirculation pump seals. The control rod drive system consists of two redundant pumps, filters, control valves, hydraulic control units, control rod drive mechanisms, scram discharge volume and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. The normal water supply for the pumps is the condensate system with a backup supply from the condensate storage tank (CST). The discharge of each pump provides water to the nuclear boiler instrumentation system reference leg backfill injection lines, RWCU and reactor recirculation pump seals and through filters and pressure and control valves to several portions of the system. These portions are cooling water to the control rod drive mechanisms, charging water to the hydraulic control units, and drive water to the directional control valves. Following a

reactor scram the exhaust water from the control rod drive mechanisms is collected in the scram discharge volume.

The CRD system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the CRD system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the CRD system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.5-1, the applicant identified the following CRD system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- accumulators
- closure bolting
- CRD hydraulic control units
- filters
- flow elements
- flow indicators
- flow orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- rupture discs
- valves

#### 2.3B.1.5.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.5 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3B.1.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the CRD system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the CRD system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.1.6 NMP2 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Components in Other Systems**

#### 2.3B.1.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

RCPB components in other systems are evaluated in the GALL Report as part of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system. In ALRA Section 2.3 RCPB components requiring an AMR have been maintained in the plant system to which they are normally assigned rather than grouped with other RCPB components in the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant system. These NMP2 plant systems are listed below:

- NMP2 feedwater system (SER Section 2.3B.4.3)
- NMP2 floor and equipment drains system (SER Section 2.3B.3.14)
- NMP2 high-pressure core spray system (SER Section 2.3B.2.3)
- NMP2 low-pressure core spray system (SER Section 2.3B.2.4)
- NMP2 main steam system (SER Section 2.3B.4.4)
- NMP2 reactor core isolation cooling system (SER Section 2.3B.2.6)
- NMP2 reactor water cleanup system (SER Section 2.3B.3.25)
- NMP2 residual heat removal system (SER Section 2.3B.2.7)
- NMP2 standby liquid control system (SER Section 2.3B.3.31)

#### 2.3B.1.6.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff's evaluations of each plant system is contained in the SER sections listed above.

#### 2.3B.1.6.3 Conclusions

The staff's conclusions for each plant system are provided in the SER sections listed above.

### **2.3B.2 Engineered Safety Features Systems**

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP2 ESF systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the ESF systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.2.B.1 NMP2 automatic depressurization system
- 2.3.2.B.2 NMP2 hydrogen recombiner system

- 2.3.2.B.3 NMP2 high pressure core spray system
- 2.3.2.B.4 NMP2 low pressure core spray system
- 2.3.2.B.5 NMP2 primary containment isolation system
- 2.3.2.B.6 NMP2 reactor core isolation cooling system
- 2.3.2.B.7 NMP2 residual heat removal system
- 2.3.2.B.8 NMP2 standby gas treatment system

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.2.B.1 through 2.3.2.B.8 are presented in SER Sections 2.3B.2.1 through 2.3B.2.8, respectively.

### **2.3B.2.1 NMP2 Automatic Depressurization System**

#### **2.3B.2.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.1, the applicant described the automatic depressurization system. The purpose of the automatic depressurization system is to reduce reactor pressure following small line breaks in the event of high-pressure core spray (HPCS) failure. When reactor vessel pressure is reduced to within the capacity of the low-pressure systems [LPCI (described in the residual heat removal (RHR) system) and low pressure core spray (LPCS) systems] these systems provide inventory makeup to maintain acceptable post-accident temperatures.

The automatic depressurization system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the automatic depressurization system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The component types subject to an AMR that perform the system intended functions for the automatic depressurization system are part of and evaluated in the main steam system (SER Section 2.3B4.4). No additional components within the automatic depressurization system are subject to aging management review.

#### **2.3B.2.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.1 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.2.1.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be

subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the automatic depressurization system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the automatic depressurization system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.2.2 NMP2 Hydrogen Recombiner System**

#### **2.3B.2.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.2, the applicant described the hydrogen recombiner system. The purpose of the hydrogen recombiner system is to process the hydrogen and oxygen released to the primary containment during a LOCA. The hydrogen recombiner system takes suction from the drywell and suppression pool, recombines the hydrogen and oxygen gases, and returns the resulting water vapor and other gases to the suppression pool.

The hydrogen recombiner system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the hydrogen recombiner system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the hydrogen recombiner system performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.B.2-1, the applicant identified the following hydrogen recombiner system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blowers
- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- hydrogen recombiners
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### **2.3B.2.2.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.2 and USAR Section 6.2.5.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not

omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.2.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the hydrogen recombiner system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the hydrogen recombiner system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.2.3 NMP2 High Pressure Core Spray System**

##### 2.3B.2.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.3, the applicant described the HPCS system. The purpose of the HPCS system is to maintain RPV coolant inventory after small breaks that do not depressurize the RPV. The HPCS system also provides spray cooling heat transfer during breaks in which core uncover is calculated.

The HPCS system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the HPCS system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the HPCS system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and ATWS.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.B.3-1, the applicant identified the following HPCS system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- restriction orifices
- valves

#### 2.3B.2.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.3 and USAR Sections 6.3.1.2.1 and 6.3.2.2.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.2.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the HPCS system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the HPCS system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.2.4 NMP2 Low Pressure Core Spray System**

##### 2.3B.2.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.4, the applicant described the low pressure core spray (LPCS) system. The purpose of the LPCS system is to provide RPV coolant inventory makeup and spray cooling during large breaks in which the core is calculated to uncover. Also, following a small break and automatic depressurization system initiation, the LPCS system provides coolant inventory makeup.

The LPCS system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the LPCS system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the LPCS system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components



In ALRA Table 2.3.2.B.4-1, the applicant identified the following LPCS system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- restriction orifices
- valves

#### 2.3B.2.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.4 and the USAR Sections 6.3.1.2.2 and 6.3.2.2.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.2.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the LPCS system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the LPCS system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.2.5 NMP2 Primary Containment Isolation System**

#### 2.3B.2.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.5, the applicant described the primary containment isolation system. The purpose of the primary containment isolation system is to provide protection against a release of radioactive materials to the environment from accidents occurring to the RCPB, lines connected to the RCPB, or lines that penetrate the primary containment. This is accomplished by automatic isolation valve closure of appropriate lines that penetrate the primary containment system. The primary containment isolation system consists of automatic isolation valves and associated piping for lines that penetrate the primary containment.

The primary containment isolation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the primary containment isolation system performs functions that support SBO.

The component types requiring an AMR for the primary containment isolation system are evaluated in their respective systems.

#### 2.3B.2.5.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.5 and USAR Section 6.2.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.2.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the primary containment isolation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the primary containment isolation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.2.6 NMP2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System**

#### 2.3B.2.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.6, the applicant described the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. The purpose of the RCIC system is to assure that sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel to permit adequate core cooling following those events in which the normal feedwater supply is unavailable. This system can be used for accident and nonaccident conditions.

The RCIC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RCIC system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RCIC system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.B.6-1, the applicant identified the following RCIC system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blower
- bolting
- condensing chambers
- drain pots
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- restriction orifices
- rupture discs
- terry turbine
- valves

#### 2.3B.2.6.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.6 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.2.6.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RCIC system components that are within the scope of license

renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RCIC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.2.7 NMP2 Residual Heat Removal System**

#### **2.3B.2.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.7, the applicant described the residual heat removal system. The residual heat removal system is composed of three independent loops, each of which contains a motor-driven pump, piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls. Each loop has a suction source from the suppression pool and is capable of discharging water to either the reactor vessel via a separate nozzle or back to the suppression pool via a full-flow test line. The A and B loops have heat exchangers cooled by service water. Loops A and B can also take suction from the reactor recirculation system suction and can discharge into the reactor recirculation discharge or to the suppression pool and drywell spray spargers. The A and B loops also have connections to reactor steam via the RCIC system steam line (Section 2.3.2.B.6) and can discharge the resultant condensate to the RCIC system pump suction or to the suppression pool. In addition, Loops A and B take suction from the fuel pool and discharge to the fuel pool cooling discharge.

The three loops of the RHR system combine to fulfill five modes of operation. Each mode has its own functional requirements and is presented separately as follows:

- (1) low pressure coolant injection mode—following a small break and automatic depressurization system initiation this mode provides coolant inventory makeup
- (2) suppression pool cooling mode—ensures that the suppression pool temperature does not exceed design limits following a reactor vessel blowdown or isolation event
- (3) containment spray cooling mode—provides two redundant means to spray the drywell and suppression pool to reduce internal pressure to below design limits
- (4) reactor steam-condensing mode—provides in conjunction with the RCIC turbine the capability to condense all of the steam generated 1-½ hours after a reactor scram
- (5) shutdown cooling mode—provides the capability to remove decay and sensible heat from the reactor primary system so that the cold shutdown condition can be achieved and maintained

The RHR system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RHR system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RHR system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.B.7-1, the applicant identified the following RHR system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- “T” quenchers
- bolting
- condensing chambers
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- level elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- restriction orifices
- temperature elements
- valves

#### 2.3B.2.7.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.7 and the USAR Section 5.4.7 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.2.7.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RHR system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RHR system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.2.8 NMP2 Standby Gas Treatment System**

#### 2.3B.2.8.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.8, the applicant described the standby gas treatment system (SGTS). The purpose of the SGTS is to limit the release of radioactive gases from the RB to the environment within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 in the event of a LOCA and to maintain a negative pressure in the RB under accident conditions. It is also used to provide charcoal filtration of the primary containment atmosphere when inerting, deinerting or controlling primary containment pressure.

The SGTS contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the SGTS could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the SGTS performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.2.B.8-1, the applicant identified the following SGTS component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- actuator
- blowers
- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heaters
- piping and fittings
- restriction orifices
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.2.8.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.2.B.8 and USAR Section 6.5.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3B.2.8.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the SGTS components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the SGTS components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3B.3 Auxiliary Systems

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP2 auxiliary systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the auxiliary systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.3.B.1 NMP2 startup-standby diesel generator system
- 2.3.3.B.2 NMP2 alternate decay heat removal system
- 2.3.3.B.3 NMP2 auxiliary service building HVAC system
- 2.3.3.B.4 NMP2 chilled water ventilation system (removed)
- 2.3.3.B.5 NMP2 compressed air systems
- 2.3.3.B.6 NMP2 containment atmosphere monitoring system
- 2.3.3.B.7 NMP2 containment leakage monitoring system
- 2.3.3.B.8 NMP2 control building chilled water system
- 2.3.3.B.9 NMP2 control building HVAC system
- 2.3.3.B.10 NMP2 diesel generator building ventilation system
- 2.3.3.B.11 NMP2 domestic water system
- 2.3.3.B.12 NMP2 engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system
- 2.3.3.B.13 NMP2 fire detection and protection system
- 2.3.3.B.14 NMP2 floor and equipment drains system
- 2.3.3.B.15 NMP2 generator standby lube oil system
- 2.3.3.B.16 NMP2 glycol heating system (removed)
- 2.3.3.B.17 NMP2 hot water heating system
- 2.3.3.B.18 NMP2 makeup water system
- 2.3.3.B.19 NMP2 neutron monitoring system
- 2.3.3.B.20 NMP2 primary containment purge system
- 2.3.3.B.21 NMP2 process sampling system
- 2.3.3.B.22 NMP2 radiation monitoring system
- 2.3.3.B.23 NMP2 reactor building closed loop cooling water system
- 2.3.3.B.24 NMP2 reactor building HVAC system
- 2.3.3.B.25 NMP2 reactor water cleanup system
- 2.3.3.B.26 NMP2 seal water system (removed)
- 2.3.3.B.27 NMP2 service water system
- 2.3.3.B.28 NMP2 spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
- 2.3.3.B.29 NMP2 standby diesel generator fuel oil system
- 2.3.3.B.30 NMP2 standby diesel generator protection (generator) system

- 2.3.3.B.31 NMP2 standby liquid control system
- 2.3.3.B.32 NMP2 yard structures ventilation system
- 2.3.3.B.33 NMP2 auxiliary boiler system
- 2.3.3.B.34 NMP2 circulating water system
- 2.3.3.B.35 NMP2 makeup water treatment system
- 2.3.3.B.36 NMP2 radioactive liquid waste management system
- 2.3.3.B.37 NMP2 roof drainage system
- 2.3.3.B.38 NMP2 sanitary drains and disposal system
- 2.3.3.B.39 service water chemical treatment system
- 2.3.3.B.40 NMP2 turbine building closed loop cooling water system

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.3.B.1 through 2.3.3.B.40 are presented in SER Sections 2.3B.3.1 through 2.3B.3.40, respectively.

### **2.3B.3.1 NMP2 Startup-Standby Diesel Generator System**

#### **2.3B.3.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.1, the applicant described the air startup-standby diesel generator system. The air startup-standby diesel generator system includes the diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system. It is designed to provide: (1) a sufficient volume and pressure of compressed air to enable the EDG to start within the required times and (2) reliable combustion air intake and exhaust paths that supply clean air for combustion and a means to discharge exhaust gases outside the diesel generator building. Each standby diesel generator has redundant air starting systems, either of which is capable of starting the engine. To supply combustion air and an exhaust path, fresh air is drawn from outside and passes through an intake filter and an intake silencer located just inside the DGB. The air then passes through the overspeed trip valve, an exhaust driven turbocharger, through a pair of combination intercooler-heaters and then is distributed to each cylinder bank through the engine intake manifolds. Exhaust gases are discharged to the atmosphere above the DGB.

The air startup-standby diesel generator system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the air startup-standby diesel generator system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the air startup-standby diesel generator system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.1-1, the applicant identified the following startup-standby diesel generator system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting



- diesel engine air start motors
- expansion joints
- filters/strainers
- moisture air separators
- mufflers
- piping and fittings
- starting air lubricator
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.1.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.1 and USAR Sections 9.5.6 and 9.5.8 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of original LRA Section 2.3.3.B.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.1-1, dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-104A-0 shows that the license renewal boundary for the air startup standby diesel generator system stops at two valves. Downstream piping and equipment have an SR pressure boundary function. Original original LRA Table 2.3.3.B-1 lists the starting air lubricators as subject to an AMR. The drawing shows that two lubricators are not part of the boundary. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for not including this piping and the associated equipment within the license renewal boundary.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the boundary flag upstream of air startup lubricators 2EGA\*LU325A and 2EGA\*LU325B on drawing LR-104A-0 is incorrect, that these components are SR and subject to an AMR, and that the boundary flag should be downstream of these components but upstream of the high pressure core spray diesel generator 2EGS\*EG2. The applicant further clarified that the high pressure core spray diesel generator remains within the scope of license renewal but is not subject to an AMR since it is an active component and that there is no piping or equipment in this system within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) because there is no liquid in the system.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.1-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR in accordance with

10 CFR 54.21(a), but were inadvertently left un-highlighted on the LR drawing. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.1-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.1-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that USAR Section 9.5.8 states that turbocharger and intercooler heaters are part of the combustion air intake and exhaust system. These components are not listed in the original LRA Table 2.3.3.B-1. These components have a pressure boundary function. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding these components as subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the turbocharger is an engine-mounted subcomponent of the Division I and II standby diesel generators and that the Division III HPCS diesel generator also has an engine-mounted turbocharger. The applicant explained that the Division I and II and HPCS diesel generators are SR and within the scope of license renewal but are not subject to an AMR as they are active components. Thus, according to the applicant, their turbocharger subcomponents are also within the scope of license renewal but as part of the engine not subject to an AMR. The description of these subcomponents can be found in USAR Section 9.5.8.2.

Based on its review the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.1-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that the turbocharger is an engine-mounted subcomponent of the Division I and II standby diesel generators. The Division III HPCS diesel generator also has an engine-mounted turbocharger. The Division I and II and HPCS diesel generators are SR and within the scope of license renewal but are not subject to an AMR because they are active components. For license renewal purposes, the intercooler heater is part of the NMP2 standby generator protection system and listed in original LRA Table 2.3.3.B.30-1 as a heat exchanger. The intercooler heater is passive and long-lived and within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). The intercooler heater is shown in red on the LR drawing for the jacket water subsystem of the standby diesel generator protection system. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.1-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.1-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on the related boundary drawing and in original LRA Table 2.3.3.B.1-1 concerning SSCs in scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a). In original LRA Table 2.3.3.B.1 the component type "Moisture Separator" is not listed as being subject to an AMR. This exclusion is inconsistent with the original LRA drawing LRA-104A-0 showing the moisture separator within the license renewal boundary.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that original LRA Table 2.3.3.B.1-1 does list the component type "Air Separators," an abbreviated form of the description "Moisture Air Separator" listed for components 2EGA\*SP 1A, 2EGA\*SP1B, 2EGA\*SP2A, and 2EGA\*SP2B. These air separators are subject to an AMR as shown in original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-1 (page 3.3-191). Therefore, the applicant stated that the original LRA drawing LR-104A-0 is correct as drawn with respect to the moisture separators. The applicant will revise the original LRA Table 2.3.3.B.1-1 to call these components "Moisture Air Separators" and this response has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with the revised LR drawing identifying SSCs within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR under

10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The applicant also provided clarification on the component groups included in original LRA Table 2.3.3.B.1-1.

Based on review of the information submitted in the amended LRA the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.1-3 is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the startup-standby diesel generator system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the startup-standby diesel generator system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.2 NMP2 Alternate Decay Heat Removal System**

#### 2.3B.3.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.2, the applicant described the alternate decay heat removal system. The alternate decay heat removal system in conjunction with natural circulation is designed to remove the decay heat released from the spent fuel pool, reactor core, reactor internals, storage pool, and cavity during refueling outages to maintain reactor coolant temperatures suitable for refueling. The alternate decay heat removal system accomplishes its design function by utilizing a primary loop for removing decay heat from the spent fuel pool and the reactor core and a secondary loop to transfer the decay heat to the atmosphere.

The alternate decay heat removal system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the alternate decay heat removal system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the alternate decay heat removal system performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.2-1, the applicant identified the following alternate decay heat removal system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting

- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.2 and the USAR Section 9.1.6 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the alternate decay heat removal system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the alternate decay heat removal system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.3 NMP2 Auxiliary Service Building HVAC System**

#### 2.3B.3.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.3, the applicant described the auxiliary service building HVAC system. The auxiliary service building HVAC system is designed to provide an environment that ensures habitability of the areas served consistent with personnel comfort and optimum performance of equipment. The system also supplies filtered and tempered outdoor air for all air conditioned areas.

The auxiliary service building HVAC system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.3-1 the applicant identified that the “Fire Dampers” component type of the auxiliary service building HVAC system is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### 2.3B.3.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.3 and USAR Section 9.4.9 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the auxiliary service building HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the auxiliary service building HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.4 NMP2 Chilled Water Ventilation System (Removed)**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.4, the applicant stated the chilled water ventilation system has been removed from the scope of license renewal since it has been determined that it does not meet any of the criteria of 10 CFR 54.4. The original LRA included this system within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). However, based upon the applicant's detailed evaluations this system is not credited for mitigation of any CLB event, contains no SR/NSR interfaces, nor introduces any spatial interactions with SR SSCs. Therefore, the chilled water ventilation system is not within the scope of license renewal.

#### **2.3B.3.5 NMP2 Compressed Air Systems**

##### 2.3B.3.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.5, the applicant described the compressed air systems. The compressed air systems are designed to provide clean, filtered air to various areas of NMP2. The compressed air systems consist of the instrument air system, service air system, breathing air system, and the primary containment ventilation, purge, and nitrogen system. The instrument air system is designed to supply clean, dry, and oil-free air to plant instrumentation and control systems that require an air supply. The service air system is designed to distribute service air to the plant systems that require air as a motive force or for mixing. The breathing air system is designed to provide a reliable supply of clean, filtered air for human breathing. It also supplies clean dry air for use of instruments. The primary containment ventilation, purge, and nitrogen

system is used in conjunction with the standby gas treatment system to inert and de-inert the primary containment as required. Functions of the primary containment ventilation, purge, and nitrogen system include providing a dedicated source of nitrogen gas for the operation of the automatic depressurization system relief valves, providing a primary source of instrument nitrogen for the operation of gas-operated valves in primary containment, providing containment isolation and containment bypass leakage control.

The compressed air systems contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the compressed air systems could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the compressed air systems performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides shielding against radiation
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.5-1, the applicant identified the following compressed air systems component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filter
- piping and fittings
- orifices
- radiation collars
- rupture discs
- tanks and receivers
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.5.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.5 and the USAR Section 9.3.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.5 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAIs 2.3.3.B.5-1 and 2.3.3.B.5-4 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on LR boundary drawings concerning SSCs in scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a). In RAI 2.3.3.B.5-1 the staff stated that LR drawing LR-006 Sheet A shows air operated control valves FV2A, 2B, and 2C (locations F-3, F-7 and F-10) as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding compressed air system auxiliaries to these valves from requiring an AMR. In RAI 2.3.3.B.5-4 the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding the double acting cylinders from AMR, noting that the LR drawings do not show the air cylinders as part of the license renewal boundary. This RAI was based on the assumption that the valves will go to their fail-safe position on loss of air pressure. This assumption would be true for single-acting air cylinders with springs but double-acting cylinders require air pressure for one of the cylinders to effect valve repositioning to its fail-safe position. Therefore, the double acting cylinders have a pressure boundary function.

In its response to 2.3.3.B.5-1 by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-6A-0 is incorrect, that air-operated valves 2FWR-FV2A, 2FWR-FV2B, and 2FWRFV2C are not within the scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) or (3) as these valves are NSR and part of the feedwater pump recirculation balance drum leakoff system which supports feedwater control and main feedwater in their functions to maintain reactor water level during normal plant operation and as such the system and the subject valves are not credited for safe shutdown of the plant. Therefore, the applicant explained that the air supply tubing and the solenoid valves are not within the scope of license renewal. Per LRA Section 2.3.4.B.3, however, the referenced FWR valves and their associated piping are in-scope for LR and subject to an AMR per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) as they are liquid-filled components located in the turbine building in the vicinity of SR components. In its response to RAI 2.3.3.B.5-4 by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant agreed that SR double-acting actuators are in-scope for LR and subject to an AMR for a "Pressure Boundary" intended function. The applicant stated that revisions to incorporate the AMR results and other associated LRA changes will be submitted to the staff.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings which identify all SSCs within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR including those subject under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA the staff's concerns described in RAIs 2.3.3.B.5-1 and 2.3.3.B.5-4 are resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.5-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-013 sheet E shows a fail closed valve as subject to an AMR. However, the air supply tubing and solenoid valves are not shown as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding the compressed air system auxiliaries to this valve as subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated:

Drawing LR-13E-0 is correct for the air supply tubing to valve 2CCP\*AOV37B (location D7), but incorrect for the air supply tubing to valve 2CCP\*AOV38B. The tubing to the actuator for 2CCP\*AOV38B should also be shown in red as safety-related and subject to AMR. The actuators for both of these fail-safe, air-operated valves (AOV) are safety-related and in-scope for LR but are not subject to AMR since they are active components per NEI 95-10, Revision 3, Appendix B. As such, the actuators are correctly colored black; however, both actuators should have a boundary flag at the actuator air inlet with an indicating arrow "LR-CAS" towards the air supply side of the actuator and a solid blue arrow towards the actuator itself.

Similar corrections apply on drawing LR-13E-0 for the air supplies to valves 2CCP\*AOV37A and 2CCP\*AOV38A (coordinated K2 and K4, respectively).

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.5-2 acceptable because the air supply tubing and solenoid valves to the valve in question are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.5-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.5-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on drawing LR-019 sheets L and M main steam isolation valves are shown as subject to an AMR. However, the air supply tubing and solenoid valves are not shown on detail A of drawing LR-019 sheet L as requiring an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding the compressed air system auxiliaries to these valves as subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that detail A of drawing LR-19L-0 is incorrect. The applicant explained that the instrument air tubing and solenoid valves should all be highlighted in red up to the operator for valve 2MSS\*AOV6C as SR within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR consistent with the indication for these lines and components at the other locations for the AOV-6s on this drawing. Since the MSS\*AOV-6s are SR valves the supply air tubing and in-line components are also SR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.5-3 acceptable because it stated that the air tubing and solenoid valves to the operator for valve AOV6C are SR within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1), respectively. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.5-3 is resolved.

#### 2.3B.3.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the compressed air systems components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the compressed air systems components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



### **2.3B.3.6 NMP2 Containment Atmosphere Monitoring System**

#### **2.3B.3.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.6, the applicant described the containment atmosphere monitoring system. The containment atmosphere monitoring system is designed to supply information concerning containment parameters during normal and post-accident conditions. Monitored drywell parameters are pressure, air temperature, hydrogen, and oxygen concentration along with gaseous and particulate radiation levels. Monitored suppression chamber parameters are pressure, air temperature, hydrogen and oxygen concentration, suppression pool level, and temperature. In addition, drywell and suppression chamber humidity are monitored during containment leak rate testing. The containment atmosphere monitoring system consists of radiation and hydrogen/oxygen monitoring lines. Each line penetrates the primary containment and monitors the radiation level and hydrogen/oxygen concentration during normal operation so they are equipped with containment isolation valves.

The containment atmosphere monitoring system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the containment atmosphere monitoring system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the containment atmosphere monitoring system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.6-1, the applicant identified the following containment atmosphere monitoring system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- condensing chambers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### **2.3B.3.6.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.6 and USAR Sections 6.2.1.7 and 6.2.4.3.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant

had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.6.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the containment atmosphere monitoring system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the containment atmosphere monitoring system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.7 NMP2 Containment Leakage Monitoring System**

##### 2.3B.3.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.7, the applicant described the containment leakage monitoring system. The containment leakage monitoring system is designed to provide a means of monitoring the drywell area pressure and the suppression chamber pressure during periodic leak rate testing. Two independent pressure sensing lines penetrate the primary containment and connect to instrumentation outside the drywell during testing. The system also continuously monitors the drywell electrical penetrations to detect leakage past the sealing mechanism.

The containment leakage monitoring system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the containment leakage monitoring system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the containment leakage monitoring system performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.7-1, the applicant identified the following containment leakage monitoring system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.7.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.7 and USAR Section 6.2.6 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.7.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the containment leakage monitoring system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the containment leakage monitoring system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.8 NMP2 Control Building Chilled Water System**

##### 2.3B.3.8.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.8, the applicant described the control building chilled water system. The control building chilled water system is designed to provide chilled water to the air conditioning units that provide cooling for personnel and equipment in the control room, relay room, remote shutdown room, and computer room. This system is designed to perform during normal operation, plant shutdown, or accident conditions without loss of function. The control building chilled water system is a closed loop piping system consisting of two independent, redundant chilled water loops.

The control building chilled water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the control building chilled water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the control building chilled water system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.8-1, the applicant identified the following control building chilled water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- chillers
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.8.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.8 and the USAR Sections 7.3.1.1.11 and 9.4.10.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.8.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the control building chilled water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the control building chilled water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.9 NMP2 Control Building HVAC System**

#### 2.3B.3.9.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.9, the applicant described the control building HVAC system. The control building HVAC system provides filtration, pressurization, heating, and cooling to the

control building envelope during normal and emergency operations by operating in normal, smoke purge, and emergency modes. Outdoor air is supplied to the control building through missile and tornado protected air intakes. From the intakes the air is drawn into large duct chases by the four air conditioning units. The air is heated or cooled by cooling coils in the air conditioning units or by heaters in the ductwork and force circulated by the air conditioning unit fans throughout the control building envelope. Natural exhaust ventilation is provided through return registers back to the duct chases where most of the air is then recirculated. In the emergency mode the system will divert the intake air through special filters under certain conditions. The filter trains are normally bypassed and automatically come on line on either a supply air radiation monitor trip system signal or a LOCA signal. They would then provide filtered air to the control, relay, and computer rooms. The system is equipped with a special smoke removal system for use post-fire. It removes smoke and heat from the control building using special supply and exhaust fans, dampers, and controls.

The control building HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the control building HVAC system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.9-1, the applicant identified the following control building HVAC system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- air handling unit
- blowers
- bolting
- ducting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- radiation sample point
- valves and dampers (includes fire dampers)

#### 2.3B.3.9.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.9 and USAR Section 9.4.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not

omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.9.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the control building HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the control building HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.10 NMP2 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System**

##### 2.3B.3.10.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.10, the applicant described the diesel generator building ventilation system. The diesel generator building ventilation system is designed to provide heating and outside air ventilation to the diesel rooms and diesel generator control rooms. Each diesel generator room is equipped with its own ventilation system. Additionally, the diesel generator building ventilation HVAC system is designed with unit coolers to maintain habitable conditions for personnel comfort within the diesel generator control rooms. The diesel generator building ventilation system performs the following functions: normal heating, normal ventilation, control room cooling, and general area emergency ventilation. The normal duty heating function maintains the diesel generator rooms above 65 °F during the winter. The normal ventilation function maintains the diesel generator rooms adequately ventilated and exhausts room air to the atmosphere. The control room cooling function maintains the diesel generator rooms below the maximum design temperature via unit coolers which is provided from the service water system (SER Section 2.3.3B.24). The general area emergency ventilation function establishes a ventilating flow of outside air through the diesel generator rooms to ensure that the space temperatures remain below 125 °F outside the control room or 104 °F inside the control room for efficient equipment operation.

The diesel generator building ventilation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the diesel generator building ventilation system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.10-1, the applicant identified the following diesel generator building ventilation system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blowers
- dampers (includes fire dampers)
- ducting

- unit coolers

#### 2.3B.3.10.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.10 and USAR Section 9.4.6 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.10.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the diesel generator building ventilation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the diesel generator building ventilation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.11 NMP2 Domestic Water System**

#### 2.3B.3.11.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.11, the applicant described the domestic water system. The domestic water system is designed to provide sufficient domestic water from an existing city main to various areas of the plant including the makeup water treatment system (SER Section 2.3.3B.35) and the fire protection system (SER Section 2.3.3B.13). Additionally the domestic water system ensures minimization of flooding potential by providing isolation capabilities of the control building from domestic water supply should piping within the building rupture during a seismic event. Domestic water is supplied to various buildings throughout the plant including the control building, TB, and the auxiliary building. The domestic water system also provides makeup water to various systems including the fire protection system and the filtered water tank.

The domestic water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the domestic water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.11-1, the applicant identified the following domestic water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.11.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.11 and USAR Sections 1.2.10.10 and 9.2.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.11.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the domestic water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the domestic water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.12 NMP2 Engine-Driven Fire Pump Fuel Oil System**

#### 2.3B.3.12.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.12, the applicant described the engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system. The engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system is designed to supply fuel oil to the diesel engine-driven fire pump. The electric-driven fire pump and diesel engine-driven fire pump are located in separate rooms within the SWB. The fuel oil storage tank for the diesel fire pump is located in the diesel fire pump room above a sump. Fuel is gravity fed to the engine and excess fuel supplied to the engine by its fuel pump is recirculated to the tank.



The engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.12-1, the applicant identified the following engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- tank
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.12.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.12 and USAR Sections 9.5.1.2.2 and 9A.3.1.2.5.6 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff also reviewed approved fire protection safety evaluation report NUREG-1047, dated February 1985 (and Supplements 1 through 6) for Unit 2. This report is referenced directly in the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 fire protection CLB and summarizes the fire protection program and commitments to 10 CFR 50.48 using the guidance of Appendix A to BTP CMEB 9.5-1. The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant did not omit any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

On the basis of its review, the staff found that the applicant has identified those portions of the engine driven fire pump fuel oil system that meet the scoping requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) and has included them within the scope of license renewal in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.12. The applicant has also included engine driven fire pump fuel oil system components that are subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) in ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.12-1. The staff did not identify any omissions.

#### 2.3B.3.12.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system components that are within

the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.13 NMP2 Fire Detection and Protection System**

#### **2.3B.3.13.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13, the applicant described the fire detection and protection system. The fire detection and protection system is designed for detecting, alarming, isolating, and suppressing fires in the plant. The fire protection system consists in part of a reliable freshwater supply, one electric motor-driven fire pump and one diesel engine-driven fire pump, two pressure maintenance fire pumps, one pressure maintenance pump supply tank, one hydropneumatic tank, fire water yard mains, hydrants, standpipes, hose stations, sprinkler, water spray, preaction and deluge systems, foamwater deluge systems, low-pressure CO<sub>2</sub> systems, Halon 1301 systems, and a detection and signaling system. These components in the fire detection and protection system are further divided into the fire protection foam system, the fire protection halon system, the Cardox fire protection system, the fire detection system, and the fire protection water system. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to SR equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program. The fire protection foam system provides fire suppression through blanketing affected areas with dense foam provided by mixing of fire system water, foam concentrate, and air. The fire protection halon system is designed to suppress cable fires in the floor sections of the computer room, relay room, control room, and the radwaste control room. The Cardox fire protection system is designed to supply CO<sub>2</sub> to fixed and hose reel stations for the purpose of extinguishing fires. The fire detection system is designed to provide early detection, annunciation, and actuation of suppression systems in the event of a fire. The thermal and smoke detection systems function to detect products of combustion, alarming both locally and in the main control room. The fire protection water system is designed to provide a reliable, readily available source of water for controlling and extinguishing fires. Additionally the fire protection water system provides control room indication and may be used as an alternative injection/spray source into the RPV or as primary containment by cross-connecting fire protection water to the RHR system. The water source for the fire protection system is Lake Ontario, which is considered to be unlimited.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the fire detection and protection system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. The fire detection and protection system also performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides over-pressure protection
- converts liquid into spray
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.13-1 the applicant identified the following fire detection and protection system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- fire hydrants
- flow elements
- halon tank flex hoses
- heat exchangers
- hose reels
- manifold
- nozzles
- odorizers
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- ratio flow proportioner
- rupture discs
- silencer
- strainers
- tanks
- temperature indicators
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.13.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 and USAR Sections 9.5.1, 9A.3.1.2.5.4, and 9A.3.6 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

The staff also reviewed approved fire protection safety evaluation report NUREG-1047, dated February 1985 (and Supplements 1 through 6) for Unit 2. This report is referenced directly in the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 fire protection CLB and summarize the fire protection program and commitments to 10 CFR 50.48 using the guidance of Appendix A to BTP CMEB 9.5-1. The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant did not omit any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

In reviewing ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13, the staff identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. Therefore, by letter to the applicant dated November 17, 2004, the staff issued a request for RAI concerning the specific issues to determine whether the applicant has properly applied the scoping criteria of 10 CFR 54.4(a) and the screening criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-1 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that GALL Report Section XI.27 describes the requirements for aging management of the fire protection water system. It requires that an AMP be established to evaluate the aging effects of microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) and biofouling of carbon steel and cast iron components in fire protection systems exposed to water.

The ALRA discusses requirements for the fire detection and protection program but does not mention trash racks and traveling screens for the fire pump suction water supply. Trash racks and traveling screens are mentioned in the ALRA section for the service water system but are not listed in the associated ALRA table for that system containing the list of components that require aging management. The components are not mentioned in the ALRA.

The USAR states that the trash racks and traveling screens are located upstream of the fire pump suction to remove any major debris from the water. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of the trash racks and traveling screens located upstream of the fire pump suction from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that although the trash racks and traveling screens are addressed in USAR Section 9.2.5 as preventing large debris from reaching the service water pumps and therefore the fire pumps as well the collection of debris on the trash racks and/or the traveling screens such that blockage could occur is not a license renewal intended function under 10 CFR 50.48. If such a blockage occurred bypass valves would open automatically to bypass the blockage and continue to supply water to the pump suction. Additionally the fire pump suction headers have their own strainers in line so the loss of the trash racks or traveling screens would not affect the operation of these pumps until repair/replacement of the damaged component could be performed.

The applicant further stated that the supports of the trash racks are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

In evaluating this response the staff found that it was incomplete and that review of ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 could not be completed. The response explains that the trash racks and traveling screens are addressed in the USAR but that they perform no intended function. The staff found this explanation contrary to the USAR, which includes the original NMP2 fire protection SE as CLB. As a result the staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 25, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-1. The product of the teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information by a follow-up letter.

By letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant provided references to the USAR that describes the bypass valves that provide a traveling water screen bypass flow path to the service water pumps and the fire water pumps. This bypass operates automatically using safety-related, seismically-qualified components, thereby assuring sufficient service water suction bay water level and adequate fire pump suction supply in the event of blockage of the trash racks or traveling screens. Thus, the applicant stated that the trash racks and traveling screens do not perform or support any fire protection intended functions.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-1, including the information in the teleconference and letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable because it adequately described the intended function supporting the fire pump suction supply as accomplished by the automatic bypass valves. Further, the bypass valves and their controls are SR and are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-2 dated November 17, 2004, the staff noted that the GALL Report Section XI.27, "Fire Water System," states the requirements for sprinklers, including the inspection frequency recommended by the National Fire Protection Association 25 leading to their eventual replacement. LRA Table 2.3.3.B.13-1 does not include sprinklers within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant was asked to verify that sprinklers in the fire detection and protection system are within the scope of license renewal and to indicate where they are identified in the LRA.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that sprinklers are included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR under the component type "Nozzles" in the ALRA table associated with the fire detection and protection system and that the corresponding AMR summary is addressed in ALRA Section 3.3.2.B.13 and in Table 3.3.2.B-13.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that the sprinklers in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). Further, the applicant stated that the sprinklers are represented in the LRA table by the component type "Nozzles." Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-3 dated November 17, 2004, the staff noted that ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 states that the fire protection foam subsystem components subject to an AMR consist of one water header valve. ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-13 lists valve environments as air, dried air or gas, and raw water, low flow. Also, the water supply portion of the fire protection foam subsystem includes two foam concentrate storage tanks, four foam concentrate pumps, a foam water ratio flow proportioner, numerous valves exposed to foam concentrate and valves exposed to foam-water mixture, and a piping distribution system exposed to both foam concentrate and foam-water mixture. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant identify where the components in question were shown in the ALRA.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the ALRA section for the fire detection and protection system identifying the foam subsystem components subject to an AMR consisting of one water header valve is in error and that the components subject to an AMR for the fire protection foam subsystem are shown on its LR drawing and include the foam concentrate tanks, foam concentrate pumps, valves, ratio flow proportioner, and piping as indicated on the drawing. The applicant revised LRA Sections 2.3.3.B.13 and 3.3.2.B.13, and Table 3.3.2.B-13 to address the fire protection foam subsystem properly. The applicant revised ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 to include the two foam concentrate tanks, the four foam concentrate pumps, the ratio foam proportioner, and the associated piping, fittings, and valves connecting these components which make up the foam distribution system as components subject to an AMR.

ALRA Section 3.3.2.B.13 was revised to add liquid foam concentrate and liquid foam concentrate/raw water, low flow environments. ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-13 was revised by the applicant to add AMR for the subject foam system components in these environments. The applicant stated that ALRA scoping and screening Table 2.3.3.B.13-1 did not require revision because it already generically included the components in question.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-3 acceptable because it adequately explained that the ALRA erroneously excluded components in the foam subsystem of the fire detection and protection system and that the associated AMR table and ALRA sections have been revised to add the subject components and environments. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-4 dated November 17, 2005, the staff stated that the NMP2 USAR states that fusible link-actuated heat vents are provided in the turbine building roof. The fusible links are set high enough to preclude release due to a steam leak. These vents reduce the possibility of roof collapse in the event of a fire on the operating level.

Fusible links are not described in the fire detection and protection section of the ALRA. Fire dampers are described in another part of the ALRA and identify a one-time inspection to manage their aging effects.

Heat-sensitive fusible links are composed of heat-sensitive solder and are long-lived passive components that should be within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of the heat-sensitive fusible links in the turbine building heat removal system from requiring an AMR and how a one-time inspection would adequately manage the aging effects of fire dampers which utilize fusible links as their actuating devices.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that because the fusible links require a change in state to perform their function they are considered an active component. Therefore, although they are within scope of license renewal they are not subject to an AMR. Further, the applicant explained that the NMP2 turbine building roof vent housings inadvertently were excluded from scope and AMR. The applicant stated that these components fall into a component type already addressed in the ALRA. In ALRA Table 2.4.B.13-1 the roof vent housings fall under the last component type in the table, i.e., "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air." Their intended function is "Structural Support for NSR." Their AMR is addressed in ALRA Section 3.5.2.B.13 and Table 3.5.2.B-13. These components will be managed for aging consistent with the information presented in the referenced ALRA locations.

As to aging management of the fire dampers included in ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-9, because of their fabrication material, the environment to which they are exposed, and plant operating history the fire dampers are not expected to experience loss of material. For that reason the one-time inspection program has been deemed to be adequate for aging management of these dampers. If the aging effect is discovered as a function of that inspection the inspection scope will be expanded consistent with the program requirements described in ALRA Section B2.1.20.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-4 acceptable because it adequately explained that although the fusible links in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) they are active components and are not subject to an

AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). In addition the applicant explained that due to their fabrication material, the environment to which they are exposed, and plant operating history the fire dampers are not expected to experience loss of material and the one-time inspection program is adequate for managing the aging of these components. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-5 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing LR-43A-O for the diesel engine-driven fire pump identifies the fuel oil supply piping immediately upstream of the diesel engine as within scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Additionally the LR drawing indicates that the engine should be subject to an AMR because it is enclosed within "flags." The engine itself, however, is not shown as highlighted for AMR. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent discrepancy between the LR drawing and the AMR boundary flags.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant explained that drawing LR-43A-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant further stated that the engine is not subject to an AMR but its fuel oil supply piping is.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-5 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a), but were inadvertently left un-highlighted on the LR drawing, except for the engine which was correctly identified as not being subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-6 dated November 17, 2005, the staff stated that LR drawing LR-43B-0 for the fire detection and protection system identifies piping upstream of a valve leading to the radwaste building via the yard as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. However, the yard piping between the valve in question and the radwaste building appears to be excluded from requiring an AMR. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing in question, LR-43B-0, was in error and that the yard piping and components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-6 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but were inadvertently left un-highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were correctly included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-6 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-7 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that although LR drawing LR-43E-0 for the fire detection and protection shows a valve installed in piping within the scope of

license renewal and subject to an AMR the valve itself is not. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of this valve from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-43E-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the component within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing it within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently was not highlighted. The component in question has been included within the scope of license renewal and is subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-7 acceptable because it adequately explained that the component in question is within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a), but inadvertently was not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-7 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-8 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that although drawing LR-43E-0 depicts the water spray system for one of the reactor feedwater pumps in scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR two other reactor feedwater pumps do not require AMR. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire protection system from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that LR drawing LR-43E-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing that they are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-8 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-8 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-10 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-43F-0 depicts several portions of piping zones within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other portions of the same piping zone. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of these portions of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-43F-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, that the components in question should have



been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-10 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-10 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-11 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that although drawing LR-43G-0 at location E-4 depicts piping adjacent to a specific valve as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR the piping to this valve is not. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of these portions of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-43G-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-11 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-11 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-12 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-43H-0 depicts piping to some pressure switches in the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other piping to similar pressure switches. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-43H-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-12 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently

were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were correctly included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-12 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-13 dated November 17, 2005, the staff stated that drawing LR-43H-0 depicts piping to some valve tamper switches in the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other piping to similar valve tamper switches. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-43H-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should not have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing that they are within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR but were highlighted inadvertently. The components in question should not have been included within the scope of license renewal and are not subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-13 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are not within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but were highlighted inadvertently on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included incorrectly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-13 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-14 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-44A-0 depicts a piping section in the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not another piece of piping within this section connecting the system to a valve. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-44A-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-14 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-14 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-15 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-44A-0 depicts drain line piping in some portions of the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not drain line piping in other portions of the system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-44A-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing that they are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-15 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-15 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-16 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-44A-0 depicts piping in some portions of the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other sections of piping connecting the system to valves. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-44A-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-16 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-16 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-17 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-45C-0 depicts several solenoid valves in some portions of the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other similar solenoid valves in the system. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of such valves in the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that Drawing LR-45C-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-17 acceptable

because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-17 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-18 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-45C-0 depicts piping sections associated with several solenoid valves in portions of the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other similar piping sections associated with similar solenoid valves in the system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of these valves of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-45C-0 is correct and properly shows some of the identified piping associated with SV153 excluded from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR, that although some of the components in question were highlighted incorrectly none of the identified piping downstream of the solenoid valves should have been highlighted on the LR drawing in question, LR-45C-0, showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, that the piping downstream of the solenoid valves is associated with cardox hose reels and provides venting and that the piping described is not required for the cardox system to perform its intended function and therefore is not subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-18 acceptable because it adequately explained that all the similar components in question are not within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and not subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but that some were highlighted inadvertently on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were excluded correctly from the scope of license renewal. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-18 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-19 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-45C-0 depicts piping sections associated with several solenoid valves in portions of the cardox system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other similar piping sections associated with similar solenoid valves in the system. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of these sections of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-45C-0 is correct and properly shows some of the components in question excluded from the scope of license renewal and requiring an AMR. Although some of the components in question were highlighted incorrectly none of the components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question are associated with cardox zone discharge piping and provide venting. The piping described is not required for the cardox system to perform its intended function. Therefore, they are not subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-19 acceptable because it adequately explained that all the similar components in question are not within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and not subject to an AMR in under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but that some were highlighted inadvertently on the LR drawing. The staff

concluded that the components were correctly excluded from the scope of license renewal. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-19 is resolved.

In RAI-2.3.3.B.13-20 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-46-0 depicts piping to a specific solenoid valve at a halon storage bottle in a portion of the halon system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not similar piping to other solenoid valves in the system. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-46A-0 is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-20 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-20 is resolved.

In RAI-2.3.3.B.13-21 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that various LR drawings for the fire detection and protection system depict tamper switches associated with several water supply valves in the system as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR but not other similar tamper switches in the foam and the cardox subsystems. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of these switches of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the identified LR drawings are incorrect and do not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR that the tamper switches in question should not have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and that the components in question have been included within the scope of license renewal but are active components and therefore excluded from being subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-21 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) but are active and therefore not subject to an AMR under CFR 54.21(a). The staff concluded that the components correctly were included within the scope of license renewal and excluded from being subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-21 is resolved.

In RAI-2.3.3.B.13-22 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated USAR Section 9A.3.1.2.5, "Detailed Fire Hazard Analysis by Building," includes descriptions of drains and smoke removal for various buildings and also describes the floor drains provided to collect and remove fire water detection and protection system water discharge. This section states that drains are

designed for sufficient capacity for this purpose. The applicant was asked whether drainage of such capacity was included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that floor drains are included in the floor and equipment drains system, which is within the scope of license renewal, for performing an NSR functional support intended function and are subject to an AMR. The applicant further stated that the scoping and screening LRA table for the floor and equipment drains system identifies these components and that the AMR table describes their environments.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-22 acceptable because it adequately explained that the floor and equipment drains of sufficient capacity to provide drainage from a discharge of the fire detection and protection system are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-22 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-23 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-43C-0 depicts a portion of the dry pipe sprinkler system for the reactor building railroad access bay as being excluded from the scope of license renewal and requiring an AMR. The applicant was asked to explain the apparent exclusion of this portion of the fire detection and protection system from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-43C-0 is correct and properly shows the components in question excluded from the scope of license renewal and from requiring an AMR. The dry-pipe sprinkler system in the railroad access bay is not credited to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and therefore not within the scope of license renewal because it has no license renewal intended functions. The dry-pipe sprinkler system in question is depicted correctly on its LR drawing and is not subject to an AMR.

In evaluating this response the staff found it incomplete and that review of ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 could not be completed. Although it explains that the dry-pipe sprinkler system in question is not credited to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 the staff found this explanation contrary to the USAR, which includes the original NMP2 fire protection SER as CLB. The NMP2 USAR includes a description of this sprinkler system. The staff held a telephone conference with the applicant on January 25, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-23. The product of the telephone conference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information by a follow-up letter.

By letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant provided references in the USAR that describe the railroad access bay as within the standby gas treatment building. Further, USAR Table 9A.3-3 notes that there is no SR equipment in the railroad access bay. The USAR states that the only SR equipment in the standby gas treatment building is the standby gas treatment system units. These units are located in the standby gas treatment system rooms, which are separated from the railroad access bay by 3-hour fire walls and floors. Additionally, the USAR states that the safe shutdown analysis summarized in USAR Section 9B.8 does not identify any equipment located in the railroad access bay (Fire Area 4, Zone 242 NW) required for safe shutdown of the plant. Thus, the applicant stated that the dry-pipe sprinkler system in the railroad access bay does not perform or support any fire protection intended functions.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-23 including the information in the teleconference and letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable because it adequately provided the CLB references that eliminate the dry-pipe sprinkler system in the railroad access bay from compliance with 10 CFR 50.48. Further, this elimination conforms to ALRA Section 2.1.4.3.1, "Fire Protection (FP)," which describes the scoping criteria to determine whether systems and structures require inclusion within scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-23 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-24 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that USAR 9.5.1.2.14 describes structural steel fire protection coating but that it was not clear from review of the ALRA that the fire protection coatings for structural steel and steel embedded in fire barriers are included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant was asked to identify where in the ALRA the fire protection coating for structural steel is evaluated or to explain its exclusion.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the structural steel fire protection coatings are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. They are included in the scoping and screening table for the fire stops and seals commodity system of the ALRA represented by the component type "Fire Wrap in Air." Further, the applicant explained that their aging management is described in the AMR table for this commodity system.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-24 acceptable because it adequately explained that fire protection coatings for structural steel are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-24 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-25 dated November 17, 2005, the staff stated that USAR 9.5.1.2.16 describes criteria for fire resistance of interior finishes but that it was not clear from review of the ALRA that interior finishes are included within the scope of license renewal. The applicant was asked to confirm that interior finishes are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR or to explain their exclusion.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant explained that the USAR states that noncombustible and fire-resistive building and interior finish materials are used wherever practical throughout the plant, particularly in structures containing safety-related systems and components, that the interior finishes, which consist of paint and floor coverings, serve no intended function and are not in scope for license renewal, and that the materials used to seal structural gaps and joints that have an intended function for fire protection can be found in the ALRA Section 2.4.C.2, "Fire Stops and Seals."

In evaluating this response the staff found it incomplete and that review of original ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 could not be completed. Although it explains that the interior finishes in question are not credited with meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 the staff found this explanation contrary to the USAR, which includes the original NMP2 fire protection SE as CLB. The USAR includes a description of the fire resistance of interior finishes. The staff held a telephone conference with the applicant on January 25, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-25. The product of the teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information by a follow-up letter.

By letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant provided references in the USAR that describe the use and characteristics of interior finishes required for building construction. USAR Section 9.5.1.2.16 provides the required flame spread and smoke and fuel contribution rating applicable to structures containing SR systems and components. Further, USAR Section 9.5.1.4 satisfactorily evaluates the requirements of interior finishes against the basis for the original NMP2 fire protection SE and determines that they are in compliance. Additionally, the USAR and the SE do not describe finish materials as performing a fire barrier or fire proofing function. Thus, interior finish materials do not perform or support any fire protection intended functions.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-25, including the information in the teleconference and letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable because it adequately provided the CLB references stating the use and characteristics of interior finishes required for building construction containing SR systems and components. The USAR and the staff SE do not describe finish materials as performing a fire barrier or fire proofing function. Thus, interior finish materials do not perform or support any fire protection intended functions. Further, this finding conforms to the original ALRA Section 2.1.4.3.1, which describes the scoping criteria to determine whether systems and structures require inclusion within scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-25 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-26 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the original ALRA Section 2.4.B does not include the condensate storage tank structure and the normal switchgear building as structures within the scope of license renewal. These structures are found in the USAR Appendix 9A as the fire protection licensing basis and thus should be considered within the scope of license renewal. Because these structures support fire protection intended functions, the applicant was asked to explain their apparent exclusion from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant explained that the normal switchgear building and the condensate storage building are located in the protected area and considered to be nonessential yard structures. The applicant explained further that these structures do not meet any of the three criteria of 10 CFR 54.4; that they contain no SR equipment, equipment required for safe plant shutdown, or radioactive material; that fire protection equipment in these structures is for asset protection only; and that neither of these buildings is credited for 10 CFR 50.48 fire protection.

In evaluating this response the staff found it incomplete and that review of ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.13 could not be completed. Although it explained that the normal switchgear building and the condensate storage building are not credited to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48, the staff found this explanation contrary to the USAR, which includes the original NMP2 fire protection SER as CLB. The staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 25, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-26. The result of the telephone conference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information by a follow-up letter.

By letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant provided references in the USAR that describe the attributes of both the condensate storage facility and the normal switchgear building. The condensate storage facility is shown in USAR Section 9.2.6.1 to include the condensate storage tanks, condensate storage tank building, and access way to the turbine building. The USAR



states that condensate storage system is not required to effect or support safe shutdown of the reactor. USAR Section 9A.3.1.2.5.8 describes the normal switchgear building NSR switchgear and ventilation systems as not required to effect safe shutdown of the reactor. Further, the applicant explained that neither the condensate storage facility nor the normal switchgear building has any intended functions and have been excluded from the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-26, including the information in the teleconference and letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable because it adequately provided the CLB references stating that the condensate storage facility and the normal switchgear building do not have intended functions under 10 CFR 54.4 and have been correctly excluded from the scope of license renewal. Further, this exclusion conforms to LRA Section 2.1.4.3.1, which describes the scoping criteria to determine whether systems and structures require inclusion within scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-26 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-27, dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that USAR Section 9A.3.6.2.6 requires at least 350 gallons of fuel in the fire pump diesel fuel oil storage tank. Drawing LR-43A-0 shows air tubing and other components supplying the level indicating instrumentation for the fuel oil storage tank excluded from the scope of license renewal and requiring an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent exclusion of these components from the scope of license renewal and from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant explained that the LR drawing identifies the diesel fire pump fuel storage tank, which has a capacity of 650 gallons, as subject to an AMR and that lines running from the tank to the fuel storage tank level transmitter are also within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. However, the fuel storage tank level indicator and the level switch in question are not subject to an AMR because they are active components.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-27 acceptable because it adequately explained that level instrumentation in question for the diesel fire pump fuel storage tank is within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) but are active components and are therefore not subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-27 is resolved.

#### **2.3B.3.13.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the fire detection and protection system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the fire detection and protection system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.14 NMP2 Floor and Equipment Drains System**

#### 2.3B.3.14.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.14, the applicant described the floor and equipment drains system. The floor and equipment drains system collects, holds, monitors, and discharges drainage from floor and equipment drain subsystems from various buildings/areas and provides for the proper handling and disposal of radioactive and nonradioactive effluents. The floor and equipment drains system consists of the drywell and reactor building equipment drains/floor drains, the standby diesel generator building floor and equipment drains, the miscellaneous floor and equipment drains, the radwaste building floor and equipment drains, the auxiliary service building floor and equipment drains, the turbine building equipment and floor drains, and the turbine plant miscellaneous drains subsystems. Floor and equipment drain systems are designed to prevent contamination of the storm drain system with effluent from sumps containing radioactive or potentially radioactive drainage. The floor and equipment drain systems serving buildings that house SR equipment have sufficient capacity to prevent excessive drain buildup that could affect the operability of the equipment. Each equipment and floor drain sump receiving radioactive influent is lined with either stainless steel or fiberglass to prevent migration of its contents. Flow from floor and equipment drains that has no potential for radioactive contamination is discharged to the storm drainage system.

The floor and equipment drains system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the floor and equipment drains system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the floor and equipment drains system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- converts liquid into spray
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.14-1, the applicant identified the following floor and equipment drains system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- drain tank
- floor drains
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps

- orifices
- spray nozzle
- strainers
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.14.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.14 and USAR Section 9.3.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.14 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.14-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawings LR-63C, LR-63D, LR-63E, and LR-66B do not show in-scope flagging as depicted in the typical boundary flagging legend on each drawing. Both red-colored and black-colored piping and fittings are shown beyond the license renewal floor and equipment drains' blue flagging on the drawings. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain why the black-colored piping and fittings are shown beyond the license renewal blue flagging. The staff also requested that the applicant discuss if the black-colored piping and fittings are within scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2), and if not, justify how their failure would not affect the pressure boundary function of the in-scope piping with which this piping connects.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated:

The AMR boundary flags were purposely drawn this way so as not to obscure the depiction of the floor on the drawings. In all cases, the AMR boundary is correctly shown by the components highlighted in red. NSR components of this system containing liquid in the Auxiliary Service Building, Control Room Building, Diesel Generator Building, Main Stack, Primary Containment Structure, Radwaste Building, Reactor Building (secondary containment), Screenwell Building, and Turbine Building are in-scope and subject to an AMR per criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Per the convention adopted for the LR drawings, components in-scope for LR and subject to an AMR for criterion (a)(2) only are not identified in red on the LR drawings.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.14-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the AMR boundary flags were purposely drawn as shown on the subject LR drawings so as not to obscure the depiction of the individual floor levels on

the drawings. In addition the applicant stated that NSR components of the floor and equipment drains system containing liquid in the auxiliary service building, control room building, diesel generator building, main stack, primary containment structure, radwaste building, reactor building (secondary containment), screenwell building, and turbine building are within the scope of license renewal, subject to an AMR, and are shown therefore only in black on the drawings instead of in red. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.14-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.14-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on drawing LR-67A concerning SSCs in scope of license renewal. The staff stated in the RAI that drawing LR-67A shows the drywell equipment drain tank 1, associated discharge piping and fittings, and downstream valves and downstream equipment drain pumps in red and within blue flagging boundaries, indicating that these components are in scope for license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). However, the inlet piping and fittings to the drywell equipment drain tank 1 upstream valves and upstream drywell equipment drain cooler are shown in black, indicating these components are functionally outside the scope of license renewal. The staff also requested that the applicant identify the intended function of the portion of the system beyond the drywell equipment drain tank 1 that satisfies 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) and explain how the function is performed without reliance on the inlet piping to the tank to be functional and within the scope of license renewal.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that, consistent with the description of equipment subject to an AMR in LRA Section 2.3.3.B.14, the identified liquid-filled inlet piping and components are within the scope of licence renewal and subject to an AMR per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) because they are located in the reactor building in the vicinity of SR components and, per the convention adopted for the LR drawings components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR for 10 CFR 54.4 (a)(2) only, are not to be identified in red on the LR drawings.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with a revised LR drawing which identifies all SSCs in scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR including those subject under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.14-2 is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.14.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the floor and equipment drains system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the floor and equipment drains system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.15 NMP2 Generator Standby Lube Oil System**

#### **2.3B.3.15.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.15, the applicant described the generator standby lube oil system. The generator standby lube oil system is designed to lubricate the engine bearings, turbocharger, and other moving parts of the emergency diesel generators. Additionally, this system preheats the oil, prelubricates the engine, warms the jacket water, cools the pistons, and keeps the inside of the engine clean by preventing rust and corrosion. The generator standby lube oil system also features a generator standby temperature system that preheats the lubricating oil and jacket water to enhance long-term engine reliability and first-try starting of the diesel engine. When the engine starts the circulating oil pump stops and the main engine-driven oil pump takes over. A thermostatic valve controls the oil temperature to the engine by regulating the flow to the oil cooler.

The generator standby lube oil system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the generator standby lube oil system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1 the applicant identified the following generator standby lube oil system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- orifices
- sight glasses
- valves

#### **2.3B.3.15.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.15 and USAR Section 9.5.7 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.15 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.15-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 104E-0 shows several sight glasses not highlighted, indicating that they are not subject to an AMR. Sight glasses are passive and long-lived components. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify or justify the exclusion of this component from requiring an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the sight glasses in question were excluded inadvertently from within the scope of license renewal. They should have been identified as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, and highlighted in red on the drawing LR-104E-0. In its response, the applicant provided revisions to LRA Tables 2.3.3.B.15-1 and 3.3.3.B-15, and LRA Section 3.3.2.B.15 that included sight glasses with the intended function of pressure boundary as within the scope of license renewal. The applicant stated that the components connecting the sight glasses to the system piping are included with the "Piping and Fittings" component type.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.15-1 acceptable because it clarified that the sight glasses had been excluded inadvertently from the scope of license renewal, stated that sight glasses on the LR drawing should be highlighted in red, and provided the LRA revisions to include the components in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.15-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.15-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 104E-0 shows the turbo lube oil pressure trip valves, PEV-18, for the Division I and II diesels and connecting tubing as not subject to an AMR. It appears that failure of this component and its connecting tubing could prevent its associated standby diesel generator from performing its intended function. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe the function of this component and its effects on the intended function for the standby diesel generator. Further, the staff requested that the applicant include PEV-18 as a component requiring an AMR if found to have an intended function.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that AMR boundary depiction shown on drawing LR-104E-0 for valve PEV-18 and its associated tubing components is incorrect and does not show the components in question properly as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant further explained that valve PEV-18 is the turbocharger lube oil pressure trip valve and its function is to trip the diesel engine on low turbo oil pressure; as such PEV-18 (similar to valve PEV-14) and connecting tubing as well as 2EGS\*HV118A, -B, -C, and -D are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant further stated that the LRA table already represents these components under the component types "Valves" and "Piping and Fittings."

Based on its review the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.15-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that (1) the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing and (2) the valves and tubing are already

covered in the LRA tables. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.15-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.15-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawing 104E-0 shows three restricting orifices for the Division III diesel as subject to an AMR. LRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1 includes the "Orifices" component type with a pressure boundary intended function. Restricting orifices also have a flow restriction function (as defined in LRA Table 2.0-1) that has not been identified in the LRA table. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that the loss of flow restriction is not an intended function for restricting orifices in the generator lube oil system requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that failure of the flow restriction function of the orifices in question would not prevent the system from performing its intended function. The applicant further stated that "pressure boundary" is the only intended function credited for these components as identified in the LRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.15-3 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question perform only a pressure boundary function and that the loss of the flow restriction function would not prevent the system from performing its intended function. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.15-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.15-4 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-104E-0 shows Y-strainers for the Division III diesel generator as subject to an AMR. LRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1 includes the "Filters/Strainers" component type with an intended function of pressure boundary. Y-strainers also have a filtration function that has not been identified in the LRA table. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that the loss of filtration is not an intended function for Y-strainers in the generator lube oil system requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the filtration function of the Y-strainers is to establish an "initial condition" for the generator lube oil system and that the failure of this function would not prevent the system from performing its intended function. The applicant further stated that pressure boundary is the only intended function credited for these components as identified in the LRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.15-4 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question perform only a pressure boundary function and that the loss of the filtration function would not prevent the system from performing its intended function. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.15-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.15-5 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that USAR Section 9.5.7 states that each standby diesel generator has an independent lubrication system to lubricate engine bearings and other moving parts. LR drawing 104E-0 shows a line labeled "To Engine Bearings" at location C8 for the Division I and II diesel generators as not requiring an AMR. This line appears to support the intended function for the generator standby lube oil system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain why this line is not subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-104E-0 is incorrect. The lubrication to the engine bearing is within the scope of license renewal, subject to an AMR, and included in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1 under the "Piping and Fittings" component type and as such should be highlighted in red on the drawing.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.15-5 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, as represented by the "Piping and Fittings" component type in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.15-5 is resolved.

### **2.3B.3.15.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the generator standby lube oil system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the generator standby lube oil system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.16 NMP2 Glycol Heating System (Removed)**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.16, the applicant stated that the glycol heating system has been removed from the scope of license renewal since it has been determined that it does not meet any of the criteria of 10 CFR 54.4. The original LRA included this system within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). However, based upon the applicant's detailed explanation that this system is not credited for mitigation of any CLB event, this system does not contain any SR/NSR interfaces, nor does this system introduce any spatial interactions with SR SSCs, the staff agrees with the applicant that the glycol heating system is not within the scope of license renewal.

### **2.3B.3.17 NMP2 Hot Water Heating System**

#### **2.3B.3.17.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.17, the applicant described the hot water heating system. The hot water heating system functions with the glycol heating system to heat outdoor makeup air used for ventilation. Hot water is generated from steam and circulated through glycol heat exchangers. The hot water heating system is equipped with piping connections to allow this system to be connected to a temporary hot water heating plant. This is only used if the hot water heating system is not available and glycol heating in the RB is needed. The system is closed loop. Depending upon the operating mode, electric boiler, auxiliary steam, or extraction steam is supplied to the shell side of both the building heating auxiliary heat exchangers and the intermediate heat exchangers.



The failure of NSR SSCs in the hot water heating system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.17-1 the applicant identified the following hot water heating system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.17.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 and USAR Section 9.4.12 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.17-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide information to describe the interface between the reactor water and the hot water system that precludes the interface from being a pressure boundary. The staff stated that the system description section of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 indicates that reactor water may be supplied to the shell side of the building heating auxiliary heat exchangers and the intermediate heat exchangers. No LR drawings were provided for this system. LRA Table 2.3.3.B.17 indicates that NSR piping, fittings, and equipment with the intended function of preventing failure from affecting safety-related equipment are subject to an AMR.

The applicant stated in the response by letter dated December 22, 2004, that the description in LRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 is incorrect, that reactor water does not interface with the hot water heating system, and that LRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 will be revised to remove "reactor water" and replace it with "auxiliary steam."

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with a revised LRA system description and LR drawing which identify SSCs within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4. The applicant also provided clarification on the component

groups included in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.17-1 to address the concern in RAI 2.3.3.B.17-1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.17-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.17-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that the system description section of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 states that components subject to an AMR include the NSR piping, fittings, and equipment containing liquid in the control room building, reactor building (secondary containment), radwaste building, screenwell building, standby gas treatment building, and turbine building. No LR drawings were provided for this system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide information that describes the boundaries of this system and confirms that there are no other components subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated, "Consistent with LR drawing convention, marked-up LR drawings were not provided for systems where the only system intended function was to meet the 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion." The applicant further stated that the components subject to an AMR for this system include the NSR piping, fittings, and equipment containing liquid or steam physically located in the control room building, radwaste building, reactor containment (secondary containment), screenwell building, standby gas treatment building, and turbine building. The applicant also referred to the diagram provided with its response to RAI 2.3.3.B.16-1 and stated that the system description from LRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 in conjunction with the diagram provides an adequate description of the components that are subject to an AMR.

In evaluating the applicant's response the staff found it incomplete and that review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.17 could not be completed because the applicant did not describe the SR components in the radwaste building with which hot water heating system components can interact. The staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 27, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.3.B.17-2. The result of this teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information in a follow-up letter.

In its follow-up response dated January 31, 2005, the applicant stated that the methodology employed for determining those NSR systems and components in the radwaste building within the scope of license renewal was based on the building in which the system/component was located, that this approach is conservative in that it brings into scope many more components than would be required if detailed walkdowns were performed, and that as such NMPNS did not specifically identify the SR components with which the hot water heating system could interact because the entire system within the radwaste building is subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a).

Prior to the issuing of its ALRA, on July 14, 2005, the applicant performed a new scoping of the system, using the methodology from ALRA Section 2.1. In its ALRA, the applicant stated that the components subject to AMR for this system include the Hot water heating system NSR piping, fittings, and valves in the reactor building that are in the vicinity of the liquid poison tanks. The remaining portions of this system are not credited for the mitigation of CLB events, do not contain any SR/NSR interfaces, and are not located in the vicinity of SR SSCs. Therefore, those portions are not within the scope of license renewal.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.17-2, acceptable because it adequately explained what NSR piping, fittings, and equipment is subject to an AMR

because of the possibility of spatial interaction with SR components. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.17-2 is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.17.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the hot water heating system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the hot water heating system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.18 NMP2 Makeup Water System**

#### 2.3B.3.18.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.18, the applicant described the makeup water system. The makeup water system is designed to provide demineralized makeup water for the TB closed loop cooling water system and the RB closed loop cooling water system. The makeup water system produces demineralized water by removing dissolved and suspended solids from city water using a portable demineralizer. The makeup water system also stores and distributes demineralized water from the makeup water treatment system. The system consists of the makeup water treatment system and the makeup water storage and transfer system. Additionally, the makeup water system meets plant requirements for demineralized water, including the suppression pool and the spent fuel pool.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the makeup water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.18-1 the applicant identified the following makeup water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.18.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.18 and the USAR Section 1.2.10.9 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.18.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the makeup water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the makeup water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.19 NMP2 Neutron Monitoring System**

#### 2.3B.3.19.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.19, the applicant described the neutron monitoring system. The neutron monitoring system is designed to provide neutron flux level monitoring of the reactor in three separate ranges, source range monitoring, intermediate range monitoring, and power range monitoring. It is used to monitor and aid the operator in controlling the reactor from startup through full power, inputs to the reactor manual control system (not within scope of license renewal) to initiate rod blocks if preset flux limits are exceeded, and it inputs signals to the reactor protection system to initiate a scram if limits are exceeded.

The neutron monitoring system has five subsystems. The source range monitoring subsystem measures the flux from startup through criticality. The intermediate range monitoring subsystem overlaps the source range monitoring subsystem and extends well into the power range. The power range is monitored by detectors that make up the local power range monitor subsystem. The average power range monitor subsystem is composed of core-wide sets of local power range monitor detectors that are averaged to provide a core average neutron flux. The traversing in-core probe subsystem provides a means for calibrating the local power range monitor subsystem.

The neutron monitoring system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the neutron monitoring system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to provide pressure retaining boundary.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.19-1, the applicant identified the following neutron monitoring system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bellows
- bolting
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.19.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.19 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.19.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the neutron monitoring system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the neutron monitoring system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.20 NMP2 Primary Containment Purge System**

#### 2.3B.3.20.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.20, the applicant described the primary containment purge system. The primary containment purge system is designed to inert the primary containment with nitrogen, and to limit oxygen and hydrogen concentrations in the primary containment and ensure a combustible atmosphere does not occur following a LOCA. The primary containment purge system is also designed to de-inert and ventilate the primary containment during plant shutdown for the purpose of drywell entry. The primary containment purge system operates as a subsystem of the reactor building HVAC system. Inerting the primary containment is accomplished by feed and bleed. To inert, nitrogen gas from the nitrogen system is fed into the

drywell or suppression chamber. Air is exhausted into and processed by the standby gas treatment system before it is discharged through the main stack.

The primary containment purge system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the primary containment purge system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the primary containment purge system performs functions that support EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.20-1, the applicant identified the following primary containment purge system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- debris screens
- flow element
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.20.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.20 and the USAR Section 9.4.2.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.20.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the primary containment purge system components that are within the

scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the primary containment purge system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.21 NMP2 Process Sampling System**

#### **2.3B.3.21.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.21, the applicant described the process sampling system. The process sampling system is designed to monitor selected plant process streams and provide grab sample points to back up the continuous analyzers and allow laboratory analysis of other process streams. The process sampling system is a water chemistry analysis system involving multipoint sample panels and grab sample sinks in the RB, TB, and radwaste building (RWB). Miscellaneous sample points are provided on individual process systems where needed.

The process sampling system consists of the following subsystems: post-accident sampling system, RWB sampling system, reactor plant sampling system, and turbine plant sampling system. The post-accident sampling system is designed to obtain representative liquid and gas samples from within the primary containment for radiological analysis in association with the possible consequences of a LOCA. The radwaste building sampling system is used for obtaining grab samples for monitoring the radioactive liquid waste management and radwaste auxiliary steam system drain coolers. The reactor plant sampling system monitors the quality of reactor coolant and various reactor plant fluids. The turbine plant sampling system monitors the quality of reactor grade water flowing in the TB.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the process sampling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.21-1, the applicant identified the following process sampling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow indicators
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### **2.3B.3.21.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.21 and USAR Sections 1.2.10.7, 1.10.II.B.3, and 9.3.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.21 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.21-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify drawing inconsistencies that the staff encountered in its review. The staff stated that LR drawing LRA-31 sheet D (location G7) and sheet E (location D8) show valves 2-RHS-SOV-35A and 2-RHS-SOV-35B highlighted in red and within the residual heat removal system AMR boundary flags. However, LR drawing LR-17 sheet G (locations I1, K1) does not show these valves within the AMR boundary of the residual heat removal system. The staff requested that the applicant confirm that valves 2-RHS-SOV-35A and 2-RHS-SOV-35B are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR or explain the discrepancy between the LR drawings.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that valves 2RHS\*SOV35A and 2RHS\*SOV35B are SR within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, that drawing LR-17G for these valves and their associated piping should be highlighted in red consistent with the depiction of the respective valves on drawings LR-31D and LR-31E, and that at continuation locations I1 and K1 on drawing LR-17G the continuation flags should be marked as "LR-31D" and "LR-31E" as appropriate and include LR continuation flags showing "LR-RHS" in both directions.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings correcting the inconsistencies and accurately depicting all the components subject to an AMR, including those subject under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.21-1 is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.21.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the process sampling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the process sampling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



### **2.3B.3.22 NMP2 Radiation Monitoring System**

#### **2.3B.3.22.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.22, the applicant described the radiation monitoring system. The radiation monitoring system is designed to initiate appropriate manual or automatic protective action to limit the potential release of radioactive materials from the reactor vessel, primary and secondary containment, and fuel storage areas if predetermined radiation levels are exceeded in major process/effluent streams and to provide main control room personnel with radiation level indication throughout the course of an accident.

The radiation monitoring system consists of a computer-based digital radiation monitoring system, a computer-based gaseous effluent monitoring system, and the main steam line radiation monitors. The digital radiation monitoring system measures, evaluates, and reports radioactivity in process streams and liquid effluents and annunciates and/or initiates an automatic control function for abnormal system or plant operating conditions. The gaseous effluent monitoring system measures, evaluates, and reports radioactivity in gaseous effluents. It also provides annunciation if release levels approach limits specified in the offsite dose calculation manual. The gaseous effluent monitoring system also provides real time noble gas isotopic analysis and continuous iodine and particulate sample collection for main stack, RWB, and RB vent releases. The main steam line radiation monitoring system monitors the gamma radiation level exterior to the main steam lines. In the event of a gross release of fission products from the core this monitoring system provides annunciation in the control room.

The radiation monitoring system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the radiation monitoring system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.22-1, the applicant identified the following radiation monitoring system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- valves

#### **2.3B.3.22.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.22 and USAR Sections 11.5.2 and 12.3.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.22 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.22-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that the applicant did not identify the radiation monitoring system components within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and (2). Furthermore, an LR drawing for the NMP2 radiation monitoring system was not provided to show the portions of this system containing components within the scope of license renewal. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant identify the components of the radiation monitoring system within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and (2) and justify the exclusion of these components from being subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that SR radiation monitors and their inclusive mechanical components are in-scope for LR and subject to an AMR for a "Pressure Boundary" intended function that the subject components that perform the LR intended function will be identified, and that AMR of those components will be performed. The applicant stated that LRA revisions to incorporate the AMR results and any other associated LRA changes would be submitted to the staff.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings accurately depicting all the components subject to an AMR, including those subject under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The applicant also added ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.22-1 to provide a list of component types requiring an AMR and their intended functions. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.22-1 is resolved.

### **2.3B.3.22.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the radiation monitoring system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the radiation monitoring system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.23 NMP2 Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System**

#### **2.3B.3.23.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.23, the applicant described the reactor building closed loop cooling water system. The RBCLC water system is designed to remove heat from various reactor auxiliary equipment located in the primary containment, RB, and TB. The RBCLC water system is cooled by the service water system and makeup water is supplied from the makeup water system. During normal plant operation the system provides an intermediate barrier between systems containing radioactive products and the service water system, which precludes a direct release of radioactive products into the environment.

The RBCLC water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RBCLC water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RBCLC water system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.23-1, the applicant identified the following RBCLC water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow element
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- unit coolers
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.23.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.23 and USAR Section 9.2.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3B.3.23.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RBCLC water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RBCLC water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.24 NMP2 Reactor Building HVAC System**

#### 2.3B.3.24.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.24, the applicant described the reactor building HVAC system. The reactor building HVAC system is designed to remove heat generated within the drywell and maintain ambient temperature within design limits, thus providing an environment that ensures optimum performance of equipment. Additionally, the reactor building HVAC system is an alternative system for venting the primary containment to the atmosphere if necessary.

The reactor building HVAC system consists of the following subsystems: drywell cooling, primary containment purge, and all other RB areas. The drywell cooling system conditions the air inside the drywell where unit coolers control drywell temperature and pressure for all other reactor building areas subsystems. The supply ventilation air handling unit assembly consists of an air intake, prefilter, filter, heating coil, cooling coil, dampers, controls, and supply fans. The system operates in both a normal operation mode and an emergency operation mode.

The reactor building HVAC system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the reactor building HVAC system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides rated fire barrier
- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.24-1, the applicant identified the following reactor building HVAC system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- ducting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- radiation sample points
- unit coolers

- valves and dampers (includes fire dampers)

#### 2.3B.3.24.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.24 and USAR Section 9.4.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.24.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the reactor building HVAC system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the reactor building HVAC system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.25 NMP2 Reactor Water Cleanup System**

#### 2.3B.3.25.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.25, the applicant described the RWCU system. The purpose of the RWCU system is to maintain high reactor water quality and remove excess reactor coolant from the RPV during all modes of plant operation. High water quality is maintained to minimize the fouling of heat transfer surfaces and limit impurities available for neutron activation. The RWCU system provides the means to maintain water chemistry within the limits outlined in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.56, Revision 1. The RWCU system recirculates a portion of reactor coolant through a filter demineralizer to remove particulate and dissolved impurities from the reactor coolant. It also removes excess coolant from the reactor system under controlled conditions. The major components of the RWCU system are located outside the drywell.

The RWCU system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RWCU system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RWCU system performs functions that support fire protection, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.25-1, the applicant identified the following RWCU system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filter/strainer
- flow elements
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- orifices
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.25.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.25 and the USAR Section 5.4.8 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.25 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.25-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawings LR-37A-1 and LR-37B-2 show components not highlighted indicating that they require no AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify the exclusion of these components from within the scope of license renewal and not subject to an AMR. The applicant's response by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with a revised LRA Table 2.3.3.B.25-1 identifying components subject to an AMR and revised LR drawings which identify SSCs within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.25-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.25-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that the introduction to NMP2 USAR Table 3.9B-2 states that this table lists the major SR components in the plant. Item W and X identify the RWCU system pumps and the RWCU heat exchangers respectively as parts of this table. However, neither of these components is highlighted on drawing LR-37B-0 as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Also the LRA Table 2.3.3.B.25-1 does not include the component type "Pumps or Heat Exchangers." The staff believes that these components meet 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criteria and should require a 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify the exclusion of these components from within the scope of license renewal and AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that NMP2 USAR Table 3.2-1 describes in additional detail the portions of the RWCU system that perform a safety function and are therefore within the scope of license renewal for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) or (3). According to the applicant, the RWCU system pumps and heat exchangers are not SR per NMP2 USAR Table 3.2-1 or the NMP2 MEL and are not required for safe shutdown of the reactor. The applicant indicated that consistent with 10 CFR 54.4(b) these components do not support any system intended functions pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) or (3).

The applicant further clarified that the NSR liquid filled piping and components shown in black on drawing LR-37B-0 are in-scope for license renewal and subject to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) AMR because all of these components are located in the reactor building in the vicinity of SR components. However, these components are not highlighted on the LR drawing because they are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) only.

In evaluating this response the staff found it incomplete and that review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.25 could not be completed because (1) it does not explain why RWCU heat exchangers and pumps are listed in NMP2 USAR Table 3.9B-2 as the major safety-related component in the plant if they are not safety-related and (2) USAR Table 3.2-1 classifies RWCU heat exchangers and pumps as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Safety Class 3 and differs from the applicant's response. The staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 27, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.3.B.25-2. The result of the teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information by a follow-up letter.

By letter dated February 11, 2005, the applicant acknowledged a discrepancy between USAR sections, in that the applicant has categorized the RWCU pump and heat exchangers as nonsafety-related components for the purpose of license renewal, but these components also are listed in NMP2 UFSAR Table as a major safety-related component and in the UFSAR Table 3.2-1 as ASME safety class 3, which differs from the applicant's previous response to the RAI. In the February 11, 2005, the applicant stated that NMPNS applied design criteria that exceed those required for the RWCU component safety classifications. The USAR Section 3.9B.3.1.14 states:

The RWCU pump and regenerative and non-regenerative heat exchangers are not part of a safety system and are not designed to Category I requirements.

The requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Safety Class 3 components are used as guidelines in evaluating the RWCU system pump and heat exchanger components. The loading conditions, stress criteria,

and calculated and allowable stresses are summarized in Tables 3.9B-2w and 3.9B-2x.

The applicant further stated in the February 11, 2005, letter, that (1) USAR Section 5.4.8 provides the description of the RWCU System and states that the portion of the system from the RPV to the outboard isolation valves is SR and the remainder of the system is NSR, and that (2) the discrepancy between the USAR sections has been placed into the site corrective action program for resolution. The applicant stated that it did not consider the resolution of this issue to be an impact to license renewal since the components are in-scope under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review of the above applicant's explanation that the discrepancy between the USAR sections has been placed into the site corrective action program for resolution, and that the RWCU pump and heat exchangers were evaluated under ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Safety Class 3 guide lines, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.25-2, including the information in the letter dated February 11, 2005, acceptable, because it adequately explained that the USAR had a discrepancy that will be resolved and that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.25-2 is resolved.

#### 2.3B.3.25.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RWCU system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RWCU system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.26 NMP2 Seal Water System (Removed)**

The NMP2 seal water system has been removed from the scope of license renewal since it has been determined that it does not meet any of the criteria of 10 CFR 54.4. The original LRA included this system within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). However, based upon detailed evaluations, this system is not credited for mitigation of any CLB event, does not contain any SR/NSR interfaces, nor introduce any spatial interactions with SR SSCs. Therefore, the seal water system is not within the scope of license renewal.

#### **2.3B.3.27 NMP2 Service Water System**

##### 2.3B.3.27.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.27, the applicant described the service water system. The service water system is designed to provide a reliable supply of cooling water for essential components and systems. The service water system provides cooling water to the secondary sides of the RBCLC water system and TBCLC water system heat exchangers during normal plant operation



and planned outages. Service water is also supplied to the secondary side of the RHR system heat exchangers during planned unit outages. In addition, the system is designed to provide makeup water to the circulating water system (not in scope for license renewal) and cooling water to miscellaneous nonessential TB and RB components during normal plant operation. The service water system is a once-through system which utilizes raw lake water from Lake Ontario.

The service water system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the service water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the service water system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.27-1, the applicant identified the following service water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- temperature elements
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.27.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.27 and USAR Section 9.2.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.27 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.27-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-11 for the service water system shows a certain component within the AMR boundary of the service water system, an expansion joint or bellows. Similarly, the same LR drawing shows two components that appear to be expansion joints or bellows connecting to the high pressure core spray diesel generator cooler. The LRA table associated with the service water system does not list expansion joints or bellows as a component subject to an AMR within the NMP2 service water system. In addition a review of the AMR table associated with the service water system did not identify expansion joints or bellows as a component type. The applicant was asked to confirm that this component is included in the AMR of piping and fittings or explain the basis for omitting these component types from LRA Table 2.3.3.B.27-1 and from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the components addressed in question are expansion joints in the suction lines for the service water pumps P1D, B, F, and C respectively. These expansion joints are within the scope of license renewal and are shown as components subject to an AMR under the component type "Piping and Fittings" in the LRA tables for the NMP2 service water system.

(%)

xBased on its review, the staff found the applicants response acceptable because it identifies the expansion joints in question and confirmed their inclusion within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concerns described in RAI 2.3.3.B.27-1 are resolved.

In RAIs 2.3.3.B.27-2 through 2.3.3.B.27-4 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information given on such LR drawings as LR-11 sheet B, LR-11J-0, LR-43 sheet G, LR-11 sheet E concerning SSCs for NMP2 service water systems that are within the scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a). The applicant's response by letter dated December 22, 2004, provided adequate information to the staff and the information has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings which identify all SSCs within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR including those under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA the staff's concerns described in RAI 2.3.3.A.27-2 through 2.3.3.A.27-4 are resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.27-5 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-11 shows two flow element root valves, V53B and V54B, and associated piping outside the scope of license renewal and not subject to an AMR. Failure of these pipes could affect the integrity of the service water system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the basis for excluding these components from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the root valves V53B and V54B and their associated piping highlighted in black are SR globe root valves. Therefore, these valves and their associated piping back to flow element FE-161B should be highlighted in red as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because the applicant concurred that the flow element root valves and associated piping are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.27-5 is resolved.

#### 2.3B.3.27.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the service water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the service water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.28 NMP2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System**

##### 2.3B.3.28.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.28, the applicant described the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is designed to remove the decay heat released from the spent fuel elements and maintain a specified fuel pool water temperature, water clarity, and water level. The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is also designed to provide cooling to the spent fuel pool, reactor cavity pool, and reactor internals during plant refueling outages. The cooling section can operate independently from the cleanup section.

The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.28-1, the applicant identified the following spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an

AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- orifices
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.28.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.28 and the USAR Section 9.1.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.28 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.28-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is shown primarily on LR drawings LR-38A, -B, and -C. Because the cooling and cleanup systems operate independently of one another and the majority of the cleanup system does not contain components subject to an AMR the drawings supplied by the applicant do not contain all of the detail the staff needs for complete review to understand the configuration of the components requiring an AMR. This information is not depicted clearly in the LR drawings supplied. The staff requested that the applicant supply figures from the NMP2 USAR for the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system and for drawing LR-38D-0.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that NMP2 USAR Figures 9.1-5a through 9.1-5d were enclosed. The applicant also clarified that the drawing LR-38D-0 does not exist since there are on that drawing no components in-scope to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) or (a)(3).

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because the applicant provided the requested USAR figures and clarified that there is no drawing LR-38D-0. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.28-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.28-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that there are spargers noted on

LR drawings at the bottom of the spent fuel pool (LR-38B-0), the reactor refueling cavity (LR-38A-0), and the reactor internals storage pit (LR-38A-0) as subject to an AMR. The staff asked the applicant to clarify whether these spargers are included in the component type "Piping and Fittings" in the LRA Table 2.3.3.B.28-1 or indicate if they are included in the table under any another component type.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that these spargers, also known as spray nozzles, are included with the component type "Piping and Fittings" in Table 2.3.3.B.28-1.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it stated that the spargers are included with the component type "Piping and Fittings" in the AMR tables for this system. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.28-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.28-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that The LRA Tables 2.3.3.B.28-1 and 3.2.2.B-27 list the component "Filter/Strainer" as subject to an AMR. In LR drawings for the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system no filters or strainers were found. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify whether there are any filters or strainers in the spent fuel cooling and cleanup system subject to an AMR and, If not, that the applicant remove the reference from the LRA tables.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-038A-0 identifies one of the strainers, STRT1B, in question, and drawing LR-038B-0 identifies the other, STRT1A. Both components are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Both components are included with the component type "Filters/Strainers" in LRA Tables 2.3.3.B.28-1 and 3.2.2.B-27.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.28-3 acceptable because it adequately identified the strainers on the LR drawings. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.28-3 is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.28.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.29 NMP2 Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System**

#### 2.3B.3.29.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.29, the applicant described the standby diesel generator fuel oil system. The standby diesel generator fuel oil system is designed to deliver sufficient fuel oil flow

to the EDGs and provide fuel oil storage capacity for each diesel generator for seven days of continuous diesel generator operation without interconnection to any other onsite fuel oil system. The EDGs are equipped with a fuel oil day tank which has enough fuel for approximately one hour of running time plus a margin of 10 percent at the highest allowed gravity. The day tank is elevated above the EDG and kept full of fuel oil from the fuel oil storage tank by the fuel oil transfer pumps. The elevated location of the tank provides adequate net positive suction head to the engine-driven fuel pump of the diesel engine. Each storage tank is filled from its own tank truck fill station located in the yard. Electric oil transfer pumps mounted on top of each tank permit the transfer of fuel oil to the day tanks. One fuel oil transfer pump is capable of supplying the maximum fuel demand of a standby diesel generator. Each pump discharges through a strainer with an automatic shutoff in case of high differential pressure. After passing through the strainer the fuel oil discharges into the day tank.

The standby diesel generator fuel oil system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the standby diesel generator fuel oil system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the standby diesel generator fuel oil system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides filtration
- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1, the applicant identified the following standby diesel generator fuel oil system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.29.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.29 and USAR Section 9.5.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had

not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.29 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.29-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on LR drawing KR-104F-0 orifices are shown to be within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. However, "Orifice" is not included as a component type in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1. LRA Table 2.0-1 identifies "Flow Restriction" as a component intended function applicable to an orifice. The staff asked the applicant to clarify whether this component is included with another component type within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and, if not, to justify its exclusion from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR or update the corresponding table to include this component.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that flow orifices are included under the component type "Flow Element" in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1. The applicant also explained that not all orifices have an intended function of "Flow Restriction," which is an intended function only if required for the system in which it is installed to meet an intended functions for safe shutdown of the plant. Most orifices have a "Pressure Boundary" function only.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the flow orifices in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). Further, the applicant stated that the flow orifices are represented in the LRA table by the component type flow element. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.29-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.29-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on LR drawing KR-103B-0, flexible hoses are shown within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. However, flexible hose is not included as a component type in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1 associated with the standby diesel generator fuel oil system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify whether this component is included with another component type within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and, if not, to justify its exclusion from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR or update the corresponding table to include this component.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the flexible hoses in question are stainless steel and included under the component type "Piping and Fittings" in the LRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.29-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that the flexible hoses in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). Further, the applicant stated that the flexible hoses are represented in the LRA Table by the component

type "Piping and Fittings." Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.29-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.29-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that NMP2 USAR Section 9.5.4 states that the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system consists of six electric motor-driven, vertical, turbine-type fuel oil transfer pumps. The pumps are mounted in duplex sets on top of each fuel oil storage tank and each duplex set is connected in parallel to its respective day tank to permit the transfer of fuel oil by the pumps. Drawing LR-104C-0 shows two of these pumps and drawing LR-104B-0 shows four within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. However, the LR drawings do not show the piping within the standby diesel generator storage tanks connecting to these pumps as subject to an AMR. The staff believed that this piece of piping should be within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR for the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks to perform their intended function to ensure the transfer of fuel oil to the day tanks. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify the exclusion of this piece of piping from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant agreed with the staff that the suction piping inside the diesel fuel oil storage tanks is in-scope for license renewal and subject to an AMR, that the piping is included with the component type "Piping and Fittings" in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1, and that LR drawings LR-104B and LR-104C should show these piping segments highlighted in red.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the piping in question is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and included with the component type "Piping and Fittings." The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.29-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.29-4 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-104B-0 shows piping within the standby diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system connecting to nine level switches and drawing LR-104C-0 shows such piping connecting to four level switches as not within the scope of license renewal or subject to an AMR. The staff believed that the level switches are used to monitor the oil level in their associated day tanks and that the piping connecting to these level switches should be within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify the exclusion of this piping from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the sensing lines up to the referenced level switches are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The components in question should have been highlighted on drawing LR-104B-0 showing them within the scope of license renewal and are subject to an AMR but inadvertently were not highlighted.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern



described in RAI 2.3.3.B.29-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.29-5 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on LR drawings LR-104B-0, LR-104C-0, and LR-104F-0 vents are shown to be within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. However, vents are not included as a component type in the LRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify whether this component is included with another component type within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and, if not, to justify its exclusion from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR or update the corresponding table to include this component.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that vents were included under the component type "Piping and Fittings" in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the vents are represented in the LRA table by the component type "Piping and Fittings." Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.29-5 is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.29.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the standby diesel generator fuel oil system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the standby diesel generator fuel oil system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.30 NMP2 Standby Diesel Generator Protection (Generator) System**

#### 2.3B.3.30.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.30, the applicant described the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system. The standby diesel generator protection (generator) system is designed to provide for the operation of emergency systems and ESFs during and following the shutdown of the reactor when the preferred power supply is not available. The standby power supply system consists of three standby diesel generators. One generator is dedicated to each of the three divisions of the SR electric power distribution system feeding each Class 1E load group. Any two of the three standby diesel generators have sufficient capacity to start and supply all needed ESFs and emergency shutdown loads in case of a LOCA or LOOP. The standby diesel generators are normally maintained in a standby status. In case of a LOOP or degraded offsite voltage condition the standby diesel generators automatically start, accelerate to rated speed and voltage, and start picking up loads sequentially. In case of a LOCA the standby diesel generators automatically start, accelerate to rated speed, voltage, and frequency, and run unloaded. Should any subsequent LOOP occur, the standby diesel generators would then energize their respective busses. The standby diesel generator protection (generator) system also includes the generator support systems for cooling water and lube oil discussed in the generator standby lube oil system.

The standby diesel generator protection (generator) system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.30-1, the applicant identified the following standby diesel generator protection (generator) system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- sight glass
- tank
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.30.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.30 and USAR Sections 1.2.9.17 and 8.3.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.3.B.30 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.30-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-104D-0 (location C-3) shows the turbocharger as not subject to an AMR. The turbocharger is required for the proper operation of the diesel and has a passive pressure boundary function. This component meets 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criteria. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding the turbocharger from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the emergency diesel generators and its turbochargers, are within the scope of license renewal; however, since they are active components, they are not subject to an AMR. This statement is consistent with

the guidance provided in NEI 95-10, Revision 3, Appendix B.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the component in question is within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) but not subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) because it is an active component. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.30-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.30-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-104D-0 (locations H4 and H5) shows that lube oil coolers, fuel oil coolers, and inter coolers were not highlighted as subject to an AMR. These components have a passive pressure boundary function and meet 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) criteria. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for omitting these components from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-104D-0 (locations H4 and H5) identifies intercoolers, fuel oil coolers, and lube oil coolers. These heat exchangers are passive and long-lived. They are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. As such they should be shown in red on this drawing. They are included in LRA Sections 2.3.3.B.29, 2.3.3.B.30, 3.3.2.B.28, and 3.3.2.B.29, and in Tables 3.3.2.B-29 and 3.3.2.B-30.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.30-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.30-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-104D-0 shows jacket water circulation heaters as not subject to an AMR. The USAR does not describe clearly how the heater functions. If the immersion heater works by immersing the heating element in the cooling fluid, then the heater containing the cooling fluid has a passive pressure boundary function and is subject to an AMR per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Because drawing LR-104E-0 shows a similar heater as subject to an AMR the applicant was asked to provide the basis for not including these heaters on drawing LR-104D-0 in the license renewal boundary.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-104D-0 is incorrect, that the jacket water heaters in question 2EGT\*CH4/5 and immersion heater 2EGT\*CH1 have a pressure boundary function similar to that of lube oil heaters 2EGT\*CH2 and 2EGT\*CH3 on drawing LR-104E-0, that the chamber for 2EGT\*CH4/5 is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant explained that these chambers are treated as part of the "Piping and Fittings" component type. The applicant stated that, however, these heaters themselves are also in-scope but are active components per NEI 95-10, Revision 3, Appendix B, and as such not subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly

within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR as part of the "Piping and Fittings" component type. The heaters themselves are also in-scope but are active components not subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.30-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.30-4 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-104D-0 shows the water expansion tank and overflow line as subject to an AMR. However, the tubing leading to the level switches and the sight glass on the expansion tank is specifically excluded from AMR. LRA Table 2.3.3.B.30-1 does not identify tanks as a component type requiring an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for excluding the sight glass and tubing from the scope of license renewal and omitting the component type "Tank" from the referenced table. The applicant's response by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with a revised LR drawing which identifies SSCs in scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). The applicant also provided clarification on the component groups included in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.30 -1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.30-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.30-5 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on drawing LR-104D-0 the tube sides of jacket water coolers are not highlighted as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for not including this portion of the component within the scope of license renewal.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-104D-0 identifies the jacket water coolers in question, 2EGS\*E1A, 2EGS\*E1B, 2EGS\*E2A, and 2EGS\*E2B. The applicant stated that, these coolers and their subcomponents are safety-related, in-scope for license renewal, and subject to an AMR. The LR drawing therefore should show the tube side of the jacket water coolers in red.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the component type was included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR as part of the "Piping and Fittings" component type. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.30-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.30-6 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on drawing LR-104E-0 the LR boundary stops at an open valve HV31J. The tubing beyond this valve has a pressure boundary function subject to an AMR. The same concern exists at location B-7 for piping downstream of valve HV18C. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the basis for not subjecting the piping/tubing down stream of an open valve to AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that drawing LR-104E-0 has several errors such as at location D10, hand valves 2EGS\*HV131J, 2EGS\*HV131K, 2EGS\*HV231J, and 2EGS\*HV231K are shown in black. These components are safety-related, in-scope for license renewal, and should be shown in red as subject to an AMR. In addition the associated piping (from 2EGS\*V165 and 2EGS\*V265 up to but not including 2EGS\*PS4002A

and 2EGS\*PS4002B) also should be shown in red as in-scope and subject to an AMR.

With respect to hand valve 2EGS\*HV118C the same issue was also addressed by the applicant in its response to RAI 2.3.3.B.15-2 (discussed in SER Section 2.3.3.B.15).

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the component types were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR as part of the "Piping and Fittings" and "Valves" component types. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.30-6 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.30-7 dated November 19, 2004, the staff noted a discrepancy between drawings LR-104B-0 and LR-104F-0 in that LR-104B-0 showed the interconnecting piping on LR-104F-0 as not subject to an AMR while LR-104F-0 showed the piping as subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent discrepancy.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant assumed that the location referenced for drawing LR-104B-0 is in error and that the correct location reference in the RAI for drawing LR-104B-0 appears to be M8, and that the LR continuation flag at location M8 should indicate "LR-EGF" in both directions as opposed to "LR-EGF|solid blue." The drawing continuation flag directs the reader to "LR-104F (G4)." The LR continuation flag at location G4 on drawing LR-104F-0, showing "LR-EGF" in both directions is correct and the lower of the two drawing continuation flags at this location correctly sends the reader to "LR-104B (M8)."

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.30-7 acceptable because it adequately explained that the LR renewal continuation flags at location M8 should have indicated "LR-EGF" in both directions as opposed to "LR-EGF" in one direction and "solid blue" in the other. The components on both sides of the continuation flags in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.30-7 is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.30.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.31 NMP2 Standby Liquid Control System**

#### 2.3B.3.31.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.31, the applicant described the standby liquid control system. The standby liquid control system is designed to inject a boron solution into the reactor when needed to bring the core to a subcritical condition, providing an alternate method to shut down the reactor in the event that sufficient control rods cannot be inserted in the reactor core to accomplish shutdown and cooldown in the normal manner. This system is designed to provide sufficient negative reactivity to shut down the reactor and keep the reactor from going critical as it cools by mixing a neutron absorber with the primary reactor coolant. The neutron absorber is injected within the core zone via the HPCS system injection line. The standby liquid control system can be initiated manually or automatically by the redundant reactivity control system. The sodium pentaborate solution is discharged radially over the top of the core through the high pressure core spray sparger.

The standby liquid control system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the standby liquid control system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the standby liquid control system performs functions that support ATWS.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.31-1, the applicant identified the following standby liquid control system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- expansion joint
- filters/strainers
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- orifices
- tanks
- temperature elements
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.31.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.31 and USAR Section 9.3.5 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

In reviewing LRA Section 2.3.3.B.31, the staff identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.31-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-36A-0 shows Y-strainers at locations G5 and G9 and a strainer element plate at location B9 as subject to an AMR. LRA Table 2.3.3.B.31-1 includes the component type "Filters/Strainers" with an intended function of "Pressure Boundary." Strainers also have a filtration function (as defined in LRA Table 2.0-1) not identified in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.31-1. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that filtration is not an intended function for the strainers in the standby liquid control system that requires AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that a component function would be considered an intended function only if failure of that component function would cause the failure of a system intended function. The applicant also stated that failure of the "Filtration" function of the Y-strainers in question would not prevent the system from performing its intended function the only intended function credited for these components is "Pressure Boundary" as identified in the LRA Table.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.31-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question perform only a pressure boundary function and that the loss of the filtration function would not prevent the system from performing its intended function. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.31-1 is resolved.

IN RAI 2.3.3.B.31-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-36A-0 shows a manhole as subject to an AMR. However, manhole is not listed in the LRA Table 2.3.3.B.31-1 as a component type subject to an AMR. Manholes serve a pressure boundary intended function and are passive, long-lived components. To clarify whether this component is a sub-component of a component type listed in LRA Table 2.3.3.B.31-1 the staff requested that the applicant justify the exclusion of the manhole component from being subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

In its response dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that manholes are within the scope of license renewal, subject to an AMR, and included under the component type "Tanks"

in the LRA Table.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.31-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that the manhole component in question is within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a). Further, the applicant stated that the manhole component is represented in the LRA Table by the component type "Tanks." Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.31-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.31-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify information on drawing LR-36A-0 concerning SSCs in the scope of license renewal. The applicant's response by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with revised LR drawings which identify all SSCs within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR including those subject under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Based on review of the information submitted in the amended LRA the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.31-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.31-4 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-36A-0 shows the pneumatic signals from the FIC103, LT-103, and LIX103 to the storage tank TK1 as subject to an AMR. However, the flow indicator controller FIC103 is shown as excluded from requiring an AMR. This instrument as shown on LR-36A-0 is installed in-line for isolation of the air supply to the level instruments. Therefore, FIC103 serves a pressure boundary intended function. The applicant was asked to explain why FIC103 had been excluded from the scope of license renewal and from requiring an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Furthermore, drawing LR-36A-0 does not show how this pneumatic signal (line) extends inside the storage tank. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify whether the pneumatic line portions inside the storage tank are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and, if not, justify their exclusion under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the pneumatic lines are shown incorrectly on drawing LR-36A-0 as in-scope for license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant stated that these lines are NSR and should be shown in black. Additionally, the applicant explained that the instruments are NSR and as such are not within the scope of license renewal. As active devices if they were within scope they would not be subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found that the applicant's NSR level instruments in question are not needed to perform safe shutdown of the reactor and do not have an intended function under 10 CFR 54.4(a). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.31-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.31-5 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-36A-0 shows pipeline 2-MWS-001-68-4 at location B1, to 2-SLC-001-28-4, at location C-1. The staff therefore sought the following additional information:

- a. The acronym MWS, apparently the makeup water system that provides demineralized water, is not defined in the license renewal boundary drawing LR-000-2F-0. Define the



MWS acronym.

- b. The check valve V3 at location C1 function is to isolate the in-scope portion of the pipeline 2-SLC-001-28-4 from the out of scope pipeline 2-MWS-001-68-4. Check valves are passive and long-lived components. Justify the exclusion of V3 from the scope of license renewal and from being subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated:

- a. "MWS" does stand for Make-up Water System. This acronym was inadvertently omitted from drawing LR-000-2F-0.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.31-5a acceptable because it adequately explained that the acronym MWS stands for make-up water system. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.31-5a is resolved.

In its response to part b the applicant further stated:

- b. See response to RAI 2.3.3.B.31-3. The described correction in that RAI includes the incorrect depiction of valve 2SLS-V3 on drawing LR-36A-0.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.31-5b acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.31-5b is resolved.

### 2.3B.3.31.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the standby liquid control system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the standby liquid control system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.32 NMP2 Yard Structures Ventilation System**

#### 2.3B.3.32.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.32, the applicant described the yard structures ventilation system. The yard structures ventilation system is designed to provide heating and outside air ventilation for the service water pump bays, screenwell building, fire pump rooms, demineralizer water storage tank building, CST building, electrical bay, screenhouse, and chiller building. Each of the service

water pump bays is also equipped with redundant unit coolers which maintain the space temperature within design limits by discharging heat to the service water system. The yard structures ventilation system also provides space cooling to the service water pump bays, ensuring that ambient temperature remains within the pump operating design limits.

The yard structures ventilation system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the yard structures ventilation system performs functions that support fire protection and EQ.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides rated fire barrier
- provides heat transfer
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.32-1, the applicant identified the following yard structures ventilation system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blowers
- dampers (includes fire dampers)
- ducting
- unit coolers

#### 2.3B.3.32.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.32 and USAR Sections 9.4.7 and 9B.4.4.3.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.32.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the yard structures ventilation system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the yard structures ventilation system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.33 NMP2 Auxiliary Boiler System**

#### 2.3B.3.33.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.33, the applicant described the auxiliary boiler system. The auxiliary boiler system is designed to supply primary loads during plant shutdown including building heating, radwaste process reboiler system, and other auxiliary system heat exchangers. As the auxiliary boilers are not normally used to augment the auxiliary steam system, auxiliary boiler steam may be used to provide a heat source to the off-gas system and clean steam reboilers prior to start-up.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the auxiliary boiler system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.33-1, the applicant identified the following auxiliary boiler system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- accumulator
- bolting
- filter housing
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- restricting orifices
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.33.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.33 and USAR Section 9.5.10 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.33.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On

the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the auxiliary boiler system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the auxiliary boiler system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.34 NMP2 Circulating Water System**

#### **2.3B.3.34.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.34, the applicant described the circulating water system. The function of the circulating water system is to provide the main condenser with a continuous supply of cooling water. The water is used to remove the heat discharged from the turbine exhaust and turbine bypass steam as well as from other equipment over the full range of operating loads. Makeup water for the circulating water system is obtained from the service water system. During the winter months warm water from the circulating water system is used to temper the lake intake water.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the circulating water system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.34-1, the applicant identified the following circulating water system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### **2.3B.3.34.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.34 and USAR Section 10.4.5 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.34.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the circulating water system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the circulating water system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.35 NMP2 Makeup Water Treatment System**

##### 2.3B.3.35.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.35, the applicant described the makeup water treatment system. The makeup water treatment system processes domestic water to supply the makeup water storage and transfer system with demineralized water. The system will also provide domestic water from the filtered water storage tank for seal water to the circulating water system pumps. The domestic water is pumped by one of the filter pumps from either the filtered water storage tank or the waste water recovery tanks through the water treating filter to the Ecolochem trailer. After processing through the Ecolochem trailer, it is pumped to the demineralized water storage tanks.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the makeup water treatment system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.35-1, the applicant identified the following makeup water treatment system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- valves

##### 2.3B.3.35.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.35 and USAR Section 9.2.3.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.35.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the makeup water treatment system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the makeup water treatment system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.3.36 NMP2 Radioactive Liquid Waste Management System**

##### 2.3B.3.36.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.36, the applicant described the radioactive liquid waste management system. The radioactive liquid waste management system is conceptually divided into four subsystems: the waste collector subsystem, the floor drain collector subsystem, the regenerant waste subsystem, and the phase separator subsystem. The waste collection subsystem provides for collection, filtering, and demineralizing of generally low conductivity waste. The floor drain collector system pumps provide necessary head and flow for mixing, sampling, or processing. Floor drain system water is normally processed using vendor-supplied equipment (Thermex). The two cleanup phase separator tanks accept RWCU filter/demineralizer backwashes. The spent fuel pool phase separator tank accepts spent fuel pool filter/demineralizer backwashes. The two regenerant waste tanks receive waste transferred from the waste neutralizer tank at the demineralizer regeneration system or from the radwaste chemical sump. Regenerant waste pumps provide necessary head and flow for mixing, sampling, and processing to vendor-supplied equipment (Thermex) or through spent resin. The spent resin tank accepts transfers from the phase separator tanks, filter backwash tank, waste sludge tank, Thermex, and demineralizer regeneration system. The tank is decanted by gravity drain to the floor drain collector tanks. The remaining waste is transferred to the waste sludge tank for transfer to a liner using solid radwaste procedures.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the radioactive liquid waste management system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.36-1, the applicant identified the following radioactive liquid waste management system component types within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- filters
- piping and fittings
- pumps

- restricting orifice
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.36.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.36 and USAR Section 11.2.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.36.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the radioactive liquid waste management system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the radioactive liquid waste management system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.37 NMP2 Roof Drainage System**

#### 2.3B.3.37.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.37, the applicant described the roof drainage system. The roof drainage system is designed to collect water accumulation on building roofs and transport it to Lake Ontario.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the roof drainage system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.37-1, the applicant identified that the “Piping and Fittings” component type of the roof drainage system is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### 2.3B.3.37.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.37 and USAR Section 2.4.2.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.37.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the roof drainage system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the roof drainage system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.38 NMP2 Sanitary Drains and Disposal System**

#### 2.3B.3.38.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.38, the applicant described the sanitary drains and disposal system. The sanitary drains and disposal system is designed to treat and dispose of the waste from all plumbing fixtures except lavatories, sinks, and drains containing waste that is contaminated or potentially contaminated with chemicals or radioactivity. Such contaminated or potentially contaminated waste is physically segregated from the sanitary drains and disposal system and is connected to the floor and equipment drains systems. Noncontaminated sanitary waste from NMP2 flows by gravity to an underground wetwell (11,500-gallon storage capacity). The wetwell is located adjacent to a sewage lift station equipped with two sewage pumps to transport the waste to an on-site sanitary waste treatment facility. All noncontaminated waste lines are vented to the atmosphere.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the sanitary drains and disposal system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.38-1, the applicant identified that the “Piping and Fittings” component type of the sanitary drains and disposal system is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.



#### 2.3B.3.38.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.38 and USAR Section 9.2.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.38.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the sanitary drains and disposal system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the sanitary drains and disposal system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.39 NMP2 Service Water Chemical Treatment System**

#### 2.3B.3.39.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.39, the applicant described the service water chemical treatment system. The service water chemical treatment system provides biocides and detoxification to the service water system to control MIC. The biocides (sodium hypochlorite and sodium bromide) are dripped into the service water intake bay and the detoxification agent (sodium bisulfite) is introduced into the two 30-inch return lines. The chemicals are stored in the refurbished acid and hypochlorite tanks. The chemicals are delivered by six skid-mounted dosing pumps, two sodium bisulfite pumps, two sodium hypochlorite pumps, and two sodium bromide pumps. Demineralized carrier water is supplied from the makeup water system and is used to deliver chemicals from the dosing pumps to the appropriate delivery point.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the service water chemical treatment system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.39-1, the applicant identified the following service water chemical treatment system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.39.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.39 and USAR Section 9.2.4 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.39.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the service water chemical treatment system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the service water chemical treatment system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.3.40 NMP2 Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System**

#### 2.3B.3.40.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.40, the applicant described the turbine building closed loop cooling water (TBCLCW) system. The TBCLCW system is a demineralized water, closed-cycle, heat transfer system that consists of three 50-percent capacity pumps and heat exchangers along with appropriate controls and instrumentation to ensure adequate cooling capacity for the TB and RWB auxiliary systems and components during normal plant operation. Heat removed from components by the TBCLCW system is transferred to the service water system. A surge and makeup tank accommodates system volume changes due to temperature variations, maintains static head on the pumps, and allows detection of gross leaks in the system. It also provides for normal leakage in the system. Makeup water to the surge tank is provided by the makeup water system.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the TBCLCW system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.40-1, the applicant identified the following TBCLCW system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- piping and fittings
- sample cooler
- valves

#### 2.3B.3.40.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.40 and USAR Section 9.2.7 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.3.40.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the TBCLCW system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the TBCLCW system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### 2.3B.4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B, the applicant identified the structures and components of the NMP2 steam and power conversion systems that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the steam and power conversion systems in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.3.4.B.1 NMP2 Main Condenser Air Removal System
- 2.3.4.B.2 NMP2 Condensate System
- 2.3.4.B.3 NMP2 Feedwater System

- 2.3.4.B.4 NMP2 Main Steam System
- 2.3.4.B.5 NMP2 Moisture Separator and Reheater System
- 2.3.4.B.6 NMP2 Extraction Steam and Feedwater Heater Drain System
- 2.3.4.B.7 NMP2 Turbine Main System

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.3.4.B.1 through 2.3.4.B.7 are presented in SER Sections 2.3B.4.1 through 2.3B.4.7, respectively.

### **2.3B.4.1 NMP2 Main Condenser Air Removal System**

#### **2.3B.4.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.1, the applicant described the main condenser air removal system. The purpose of the main condenser air removal system is to establish and maintain a main condenser vacuum by removing air and noncondensable gases from the main condenser. This system consists of two subsystems. The hogging subsystem is used to establish condenser vacuum during plant startup. The holding subsystem is used to maintain condenser vacuum during normal plant operations.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the main condenser air removal system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.B.1-1, the applicant identified the following main condenser air removal system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- air ejectors
- bolting
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- valves

#### **2.3B.4.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.1 and USAR Section 10.4.2 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.4.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the main condenser air removal system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the main condenser air removal system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.4.2 NMP2 Condensate System**

##### 2.3B.4.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.2, the applicant described the condensate system. The condensate system provides a reliable supply of condensate to the feedwater (FW) system. The condensate system consists of the main condenser, three condensate pumps, three condensate booster pumps, three trains of drain coolers and low pressure heaters, controls, instrumentation, piping, valves, and associated equipment to supply the FW system with heated, high quality condensate.

For license renewal purposes the condensate system also includes the following systems: condensate makeup and drawoff system, condensate demineralizer system, condensate demineralizer system – mixed bed system, condensate booster pump lube oil system, and auxiliary condensate system. The condensate makeup and drawoff system provides makeup water to various systems in the plant, serves as a source of water during refueling operations, serves as reserve for the RCIC system and the HPCS system, and provides for condenser hotwell level control. The condensate demineralizer system and condensate demineralizer system – mixed bed system are designed to maintain reactor feedwater purity by the removal of soluble and insoluble impurities from the condensate. They also provide a means of cleaning the condensate resins. The condensate booster pump lube oil system provides lubricating oil to the condensate booster pump seals. The auxiliary condensate system provides level controls and condensate removal functions for systems, structures, and components that are supplied with auxiliary steam.

The condensate system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the condensate system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the condensate system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.B.2-1, the applicant identified the following condensate system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow element
- heat exchanger
- main condenser
- piping and fittings
- pump
- restriction orifice
- tanks
- valves

#### 2.3B.4.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.2 and USAR Sections 9.2.6, 10.4.1, 10.4.6, and 10.4.7 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.4.B.2 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.2-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-004B-0 shows that check valve \*V298 is subject to an AMR. However, the line on which this valve is located is shown not requiring an AMR on both the upstream (line 2-CNS-006-44-4) and downstream (line 2-CNS-006-298-4) sides of the valve. The staff believes that a failure in these lines could affect structural support of the valve, cause a discontinuity in pressure boundary across the valve, and possibly prevent the valve from performing its intended function. The applicant was asked to describe the intended function of check valve \*V298 and justify why the valve line would not require AMR.

In its response dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the intended function for this check valve is "Pressure Boundary" to provide secondary containment integrity. The applicant stated that all support to the line in which the valve is located is seismic that and the associated piping upstream and downstream of the check valve is not required to be within the scope of license renewal for pressure boundary. The applicant stated further that the main supply line into the secondary containment contains this check valve at a low point which in case of a pipe break outside the containment is sealed by a 70-foot column of water. A line break within the reactor building would provide a preferential flow path for containment atmosphere leakage into the reactor building atmosphere and any gaseous leakage would be collected by the standby

gas treatment system and thus not be classified as bypass leakage. The applicant also stated that the associated piping upstream and downstream of 2CNS\*V298 is not required to be within the scope of license renewal for the pressure boundary intended function. However, the piping, on either end of the valve that is contained within the reactor building and piping tunnel is within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criterion.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.2-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that although the check valve in question provides a pressure boundary function to preserve secondary containment integrity and is therefore in the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) its upstream and downstream piping is not necessary for secondary containment integrity. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.2-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.2-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that NMP2 USAR page 9.2-43 states that the "condensate storage facility's condensate makeup and drawoff (CNS) system" which contains both condensate storage tanks "is not required to effect or support safe shutdown of the reactor or to support the operation of any nuclear safety system." However, NMP2 USAR page 8.3-64 states that the CST inventory is monitored daily to assure the "availability, adequacy, and capability to achieve and maintain a safe plant shutdown and to recover from an SBO for the four-hour coping duration." Further, LRA Section 2.3.4.B.2 states that the CSTs are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the apparent discrepancy described above.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that NMP2 USAR Sections 9.2.6.1.1 and 9.2.6.3 properly state the safety design basis for the condensate storage facility CNS system. The applicant stated that the CNS system is NSR and is not required to prevent or mitigate DBEs but that, as discussed in USAR Section 8.3.1.5, the inventory in the condensate storage tanks is credited in the station blackout coping analysis. The applicant stated further that USAR Section 9.2.6.3 notes the condensate storage requirements related to station blackout. Therefore, there is no discrepancy and the condensate storage tanks and other components identified in the LRA section are included correctly within the scope of license renewal.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.2-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that although the nonsafety-related condensate storage tanks in question provide a pressure boundary function to recover from an SBO and are therefore in the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR they are not required to prevent or mitigate DBEs under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.2-2 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.2-3 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant clarify inconsistencies in drawing LR-004A-0. The applicant's response by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the staff with a revised LR drawing correcting the inconsistencies and accurately depicting the components subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.2-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.2-4 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-003A-0 shows lines from connections labeled 39 on condenser 1A and 1C to pressure transmitters 46A,B and 46C,D respectively. These instruments transmit condenser vacuum pressure. Upon loss of condenser vacuum the signal from these transmitters will effect a reactor scram and main turbine trip. However, only a segment of these lines from valves V2A and V2B to their respective transmitters is shown within the scope of license renewal. The segment from the condenser connection up to and including these valves is shown outside of scope. Since these transmitters perform a safety function the staff believed the entire line should have been within scope. Further, the drawing did not show corresponding lines and transmitters for condenser 1B. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify exclusion of such line segments and valves from the scope of license renewal and to explain the absence of the corresponding lines and transmitters for condenser 1B.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that condenser 1B was not provided with the safety-related pressure transmitters per the original design and that the three condenser shells are connected by equalizing ducts in the condenser necks and by condensate pipes between the hotwells.

The applicant stated further that the SR pressure transmitters monitor main condenser vacuum and upon loss of vacuum will effect main steam line isolation and reactor trip, that the main condenser itself is NSR and not required for the safe shutdown of the reactor that the line segment from the main condenser up to and including valves addressed in the RAI form part of the NSR main condenser boundary, and that the SR pressure transmitters and the connecting tubing function to monitor loss of main condenser vacuum due to air in-leakage caused by failure of the NSR main condenser boundary.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.2-4 acceptable because it adequately explained that although the safety-related pressure transmitters effect a main steam line isolation and reactor trip on loss of condenser vacuum, the transmitters' piping and condensers they monitor are non-safety related, not required for safe shutdown of the reactor, and have no intended functions under 10 CFR 54.4(a). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.2-4 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.2-5 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawings LR-004A-0, LR-033B-0, and LR-035D-0 show that the vent on each condensate tank does not require AMR while the tank itself is within scope and subject to an AMR. The staff believed that failure of this vent could prevent the tank from performing its intended function by debris falling into the tank and blocking the supply lines to the RCIC and HPCS systems or tank collapse due to inadequate venting. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify exclusion of the condensate tank vents from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the NSR condensate storage tank vent line does not have an intended function for license renewal and therefore is not in-scope. The applicant stated that the condensate piping connects to the side of the tank and any potential negligible debris from general corrosion from the vent line would settle to the bottom of the tank with no possibility of condensate piping blockage. The applicant stated further that a sudden catastrophic failure of the vent line blocking the vent path is also implausible and that elimination of the vent piping would result in a hole in the tank which would act as a vent path.



Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.2-6 acceptable because it adequately explained that due to the configuration of the suction piping to the tank and the geometry of the vent line piping debris falling into the tank would not cause loss of the venting function. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.2-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.2-6 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that on drawing LR-033B-0, the acronyms "F1" and "GEX1" are shown encircled at various locations. However, they were not defined in the LRA, the USAR, the drawing legend, or on the drawing itself. The applicant was asked to define the acronyms F1 and GEX1.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the "F1" and "GEX1" notations relate to the ASME in-service pressure test program.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.2-6 acceptable because it adequately explained that the acronyms F1 and GEX1 shown on LR drawings relate to the ASME in-service pressure test program and may be ignored for LRA purposes. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.2-6 is resolved.

### 2.3B.4.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the condensate system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the condensate system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.3B.4.3 NMP2 Feedwater System**

#### 2.3B.4.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.3, the applicant described the FW system. The FW system provides a reliable supply of feedwater to the reactor at the temperature, pressure, quality, and flow rate required by the reactor. Connections from the zinc injection passivation system are provided on both the suction and discharge to the feedwater pumps. The RWCU system also connects to the FW system between the feedwater heaters and system isolation valves.

For license renewal purposes the FW system also includes the following systems: feedwater pump seals and leakoff system, feedwater pump recirculation balance drum leakoff system, and feedwater pump drive lube oil system. The feedwater pump seals and leakoff system provides seal water to the pump mechanical seals from the condensate booster pump discharge. The seal water minimizes pump mechanical seal leakage and cools the pump seals to minimize seal degradation. The feedwater pump recirculation balance drum leakoff system provides minimum flow protection for each feedwater pump via a recirculation line to the main condenser. The feedwater pump drive lube oil system provides lube oil to the reactor feed pumps.

The FW system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the FW system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the FW system performs functions that support EQ and ATWS.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.B.3-1, the applicant identified the following FW system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- flow element
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- pump
- restriction orifice
- strainer
- valves

#### 2.3B.4.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.3 and USAR Section 10.4.7 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.3.4.B.3 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.3-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that drawing LR-037B shows segments of piping labeled 2-WCS-008-89-1 and 2-WCS-008-250-1 within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR and the branch lines that connect these segments to

temperature elements TE79A and TE79B not subject to an AMR. In the LR drawing it appeared that these branch lines are exposed to the same fluid and not isolated from the lines they connect. Therefore, the staff believed they should be subject to an AMR. The applicant was asked to justify exclusion of the abovementioned branch lines from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the LR drawing is incorrect and does not properly show the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, that the components should have been highlighted on the LR drawing showing them within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and are subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted. The components have been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.3-1 acceptable because it adequately explained that the components in question are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) but inadvertently were not highlighted on the LR drawing. The staff concluded that the components were included correctly within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.3-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.3-2 dated November 19, 2004, the staff stated that on drawing LR-006A the only components shown within the scope of license renewal are eight valves located on the discharge side of the three reactor feed pumps (LV10A, -B, -C, FV2A, -B, -C, and LV55A, -B). However, the piping on both the upstream and downstream sides of these valves is shown outside of scope and not subject to an AMR. Further, on LRA page 2.3-203 the paragraph which describes the portions of the system containing components subject to an AMR does not reference these valves. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe the intended function of the eight valves per 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) or (a)(3) and discuss the effect of a pressure boundary breach in the lines housing these valves on the ability of the valves to perform their intended function.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the valves located on the discharge side of the reactor feed pumps and the feedwater bypass valves to the condenser work in conjunction to mitigate the consequences of an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event by isolating feed flow to the reactor and diverting flow to the main condenser. The applicant stated that although the valves are within the scope of license renewal and NSR they do not have the pressure boundary intended function to accomplish the system level ATWS function. Further, the applicant explained that a pressure boundary breach in the lines housing these valves will not affect the ability of the valves to prevent feedwater flow to the reactor.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.3-2 acceptable because it adequately explained that although the nonsafety-related valves in question work in conjunction to isolate feedwater flow to the reactor to mitigate an ATWS and are therefore in the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) and subject to an AMR under 10 CFR 54.21(a) a pressure boundary breach in their associated piping would not affect this intended function. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.3-2 is resolved.

#### 2.3B.4.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the FW system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the FW system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.4.4 NMP2 Main Steam System**

##### 2.3B.4.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.4, the applicant described the main steam system. The main steam system provides high pressure steam from the RPV to the main turbine and the reheating side of the moisture separator/reheater. The main steam system also provides steam to the RCIC system for operation of its turbine-driven pump. The main steam system consists of four main steam lines, eight main steam isolation valves, eighteen safety relief valves, controls, instrumentation, piping, valves, and associated equipment. Seven of the safety relief valves are used by the automatic depressurization system to depressurize the RPV during accident conditions.

For license renewal purposes the main steam system also includes the auxiliary steam system and the main steam safety valves vents and drains system. The auxiliary steam system provides reduced pressure steam to the steam jet air ejectors, offgas preheaters, clean steam reboiler, building heating intermediate heat exchanger and is the backup steam supply for the turbine gland seal system. The main steam safety valves vents and drains system directs high pressure steam from the safety relief valves to the suppression pool.

The main steam system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the main steam system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the main steam system performs functions that support fire protection, EQ, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components to prevent spatial interactions with SR components
- provides removal and/or holdup of fission products
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- maintains mechanical and structural integrity of NSR components that provide structural support to attached SR components
- provides flow restriction

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.B.4-1, the applicant identified the following main steam system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- “T” quenchers
- bolting
- condensing chambers
- flexible hose
- flow elements
- piping and fittings
- restriction orifices
- strainers
- valves

#### 2.3B.4.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.4 and USAR Sections 5.2.2, 5.4, and 10.3 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff’s review of LRA Section 2.3.4.B.4 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant’s scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff’s RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.4-1 dated November 19, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide information concerning the auxiliary steam system, specifically if it had been included within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant’s response by letter dated December 22, 2004, has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

The applicant stated in its response letter that it had transferred all of the auxiliary steam system components to the main steam system and thus evaluated them as part of this system in the LRA but that because none of the auxiliary steam system components were within the scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) or (a)(3) they were not included on any LR drawings. Consistent with the system description in LRA Section 2.3.4.B.4, the applicant explained that any of the fluid-filled main steam or auxiliary steam system components located in the main steam tunnel, the reactor building, or the turbine building are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Consistent with LR drawing convention, components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) only, are not to be shown in red.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant provided the requested information. Based on review of the information submitted in the ALRA the staff’s concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.4-1

is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.4.B.4-2 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that LR drawings LR-1E-0 and LR-1F-0 show the inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) respectively for each of the four main steam lines. These valves perform an SR function (system isolation) and are shown as requiring an AMR on the drawings. However, the pneumatic actuators for these valves are not shown to require AMR. Because the actuators are required to effect operation of the MSIVs the staff believes they likewise should be subject to an AMR. The applicant was asked to justify exclusion of the MSIV actuators from requiring an AMR.

In its response by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated that the MSIV pneumatic actuators are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR for a pressure boundary intended function. The applicant further stated that AMR of these actuators will be performed and LRA revisions to incorporate the AMR results and any other associated LRA changes will be submitted by February 28, 2005.

In evaluating this response the staff found it incomplete and that review of LRA Section 2.3.4.B.4 could not be completed. Although it adequately explained that the MSIV pneumatic actuators in question are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, however, the applicant did not provide LRA revisions to incorporate the AMR results and any other associated LRA changes. The staff held a teleconference with the applicant on January 27, 2005, to discuss information necessary to resolve the concern in RAI 2.3.4.B.4-2. The product of the teleconference was an agreement by the applicant to transmit the required information by a follow-up letter.

By letter dated January 31, 2005, the applicant stated that NMPNS has reviewed the function of the NMP2 MSIV actuators and has concluded that an AMR is not required for license renewal. The eight MSIVs are air-operated valves normally open with a fail-safe position of closed. The actuator is a double-acting cylinder and air is used to move the valve in both the open and closed directions. The valves are also equipped with closing springs that will close them upon loss of air pressure. Valve closure following loss of air is assisted by air directed from an air tank accumulator to the top of the actuator cylinder but the closing spring forces are sufficient to meet the accident analysis time limit (3 to 10 seconds) for MSIV closure without the air assist feature. Therefore, the air pressure boundary function of the actuators is not required for the MSIVs to travel to their fail-safe (closed) positions. The applicant stated that more information regarding the design and evaluation of the MSIVs is available in NMP2 USAR Section 5.4.5.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.4.B.4-2, including the information in the teleconference and letter dated January 31, 2005, acceptable, because it adequately explained that the MSIV air cylinder actuators possess no pressure boundary intended function and therefore do not require an AMR. Additionally, the response described the USAR section applicable to these valve actuators. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.4.B.4-2 is resolved.

#### 2.3B.4.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and accompanying scoping boundary drawings to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a

review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the main steam system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the main steam system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.4.5 NMP2 Moisture Separator and Reheater System**

##### **2.3B.4.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.5, the applicant described the moisture separator and reheater system. The moisture separator and reheater system removes entrained moisture from the high pressure turbine exhaust and reheats the dried steam to superheated conditions before it passes on to the low pressure turbine. The moisture separator and reheater system encompasses the cold reheat steam, hot reheat steam, moisture separator and reheater vents, and moisture separator vents and drains systems.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the moisture separator and reheater system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.B.5-1, the applicant identified the following moisture separator and reheater system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- restriction orifice
- strainer
- tank
- valve

##### **2.3B.4.5.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.5 and USAR Sections 10.1 and 10.2.2.1 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.4.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the moisture separator and reheater system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the moisture separator and reheater system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.4.6 NMP2 Extraction Steam and Feedwater Heater Drain System**

##### 2.3B.4.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.6, the applicant described the extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system. The extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system is designed to heat the reactor feedwater to meet reactor inlet requirements. The system also provides heating steam to the building heating intermediate heat exchangers and clean steam reboilers. The low-pressure section of the system consists of three independent strings of feedwater heaters, each containing two drain coolers and five closed feedwater heaters. The high-pressure section consists of three strings each with one closed feedwater heater.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.B.6-1, the applicant identified the following extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchangers
- piping and fittings
- pumps
- tanks
- valves

##### 2.3B.4.6.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.6 and USAR Section 10.4.10 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had



not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.4.6.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.3B.4.7 NMP2 Turbine Main System**

##### 2.3B.4.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.7, the applicant described the turbine main system. The turbine main system converts the thermal energy contained in the steam from the reactor into electrical energy. The turbine is a tandem-compound, single-stage reheat unit with 38-inch last-stage, low-pressure buckets. It consists of a double-flow, high-pressure turbine and three double-flow, low-pressure turbines.

The turbine main system consists of multiple subsystems including the main turbine system, turbine electric hydraulic oil and controls system, turbine generator gland seal and exhaust steam system, turbine generator lube oil system, turning gear and seal system, turbine generator oil conditioner and storage system, turbine main alarms and trips system, turbine main lube oil system, turbine main supervisory instrumentation system, and the turbine plant equipment vents system. Of these systems the turbine generator gland seal and exhaust steam system and the turbine electric hydraulic oil and controls system, specifically the turbine overspeed trip system, are in scope for license renewal. The turbine gland sealing system is designed to provide clean sealing steam for the turbine shaft and turbine steam control valves and to exhaust air drawn into the system to the stack. The sealing steam prevents steam leakage out through the high-pressure turbine shaft and turbine steam control valves (i.e., stop valves, control valves, bypass valves, and combined intermediate valves) and prevents air in-leakage through the low-pressure turbine shaft. The turbine generator has an emergency trip system which will close the main stop valves, control valves, and low-pressure turbine combined intermediate valves upon receipt of various protective signals, including a mechanical (110 percent) or electrical (112 percent) overspeed trip signal. These setpoints prevent the turbine rotor from exceeding the maximum transient speed of 120 percent (design overspeed) of rated turbine speed.

The failure of NSR SSCs in the turbine main system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to maintain mechanical and structural integrity to prevent spatial interactions.

In ALRA Table 2.3.4.B.7-1, the applicant identified the following turbine main system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bolting
- heat exchanger
- piping and fittings
- restriction orifice
- tank
- valves

#### 2.3B.4.7.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.3.4.B.7 and USAR Section 10 using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.3. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.3.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.3B.4.7.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the turbine main system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the turbine main system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.4 Scoping and Screening Results: Structures and Component Supports**

This section documents the staff's review of the applicant's scoping and screening results for structures and component supports. Specifically, this section discusses the following structures, component supports, and commodities:

- NMP1 structures
- NMP2 structures
- NMPNS structural commodities

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1), the applicant identified and listed

passive, long-lived SCs that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. To verify that the applicant properly implemented its methodology, the staff focused its review on the implementation results. This approach allowed the staff to confirm that there were no omissions of structures and components that meet the scoping criteria and are subject to an AMR.

Staff Evaluation Methodology. The staff's evaluation of the information provided in the ALRA was performed in the same manner for all structures, components, and commodities. The objective of the review was to determine if the components and supporting structures for a specific structure, component, or commodity that appeared to meet the scoping criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 54 were identified by the applicant as within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4. Similarly, the staff evaluated the applicant's screening results to verify that all long-lived, passive components were subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Scoping. To perform its evaluation, the staff reviewed the applicable ALRA section and associated component drawings, focusing its review on components that had not been identified as within the scope of license renewal. The staff reviewed relevant licensing basis documents, including the NMP1 UFSAR and NMP2 USAR, for each structure, component, and commodity to determine if the applicant had omitted components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a) from the scope of license renewal. The staff also reviewed the licensing basis documents to determine if all intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a) were specified in the ALRA. If omissions were identified, the staff requested additional information to resolve the discrepancies.

Screening. Once the staff completed its review of the scoping results, the staff evaluated the applicant's screening results. For those structures, components, and commodities with intended functions, the staff sought to determine (1) if the functions are performed with moving parts or a change in configuration or properties or (2) if they are subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period as described in 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). For those that did not meet either of these criteria, the staff sought to confirm that these structures, components, and commodities were subject to an AMR as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). If discrepancies were identified, the staff requested additional information to resolve them.

## **2.4A NMP1 Structures**

In ALRA Section 2.4.A, the applicant identified the NMP1 structures that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting systems and structures for the structures in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.4.A.1 NMP1 primary containment structure
- 2.4.A.2 NMP1 reactor building
- 2.4.A.3 NMP1 essential yard structures
- 2.4.A.4 NMP1 fuel handling system
- 2.4.A.5 NMP1 material handling system
- 2.4.A.6 NMP1 offgas building
- 2.4.A.7 NMP1 personnel/equipment access system

- 2.4.A.8 NMP1 radwaste solidification and storage building
- 2.4.A.9 NMP1 screen and pump house building
- 2.4.A.10 NMP1 turbine building
- 2.4.A.11 NMP1 vent stack
- 2.4.A.12 NMP1 waste disposal building

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.4.A.1 through 2.4.A.12 are presented in SER Sections 2.4A.1.1 through 2.4A.1.12 respectively.

## **2.4A.1 NMP1 Primary Containment Structure**

### **2.4A.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.1, the applicant described the primary containment structure (PCS). The PCS is a seismic Class I structure. The primary containment is a Mark I design that consists of a drywell, a suppression chamber in the shape of a torus, and a connecting vent system between the drywell and the suppression chamber. It also includes valves and piping associated with the vacuum breaker system and the structural portions of primary containment penetrations. The drywell is a steel pressure vessel in the shape of an inverted light bulb. The drywell is enclosed in reinforced concrete for shielding purposes. The stiffened pressure suppression chamber is a steel pressure vessel in the shape of a torus located below and encircling the drywell. The PCS is part of a multibarrier system with a primary barrier consisting of the primary containment with its pressure suppression system and a secondary barrier consisting of the RB. The PCS contains the released steam in the event of the design basis LOCA to limit the release to the RB of fission products associated with this accident. The PCS is an enclosure for the RPV, the reactor recirculation system, and other branch connections of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

The PCS contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the PCS could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides shielding against high energy line breaks
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.1-1, the applicant identified the following PCS component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- beam seats
- bearing plates
- concrete & grout
- containment penetrations (electrical)
- containment penetrations (instrument)
- containment penetrations (mechanical)
- downcomer tie straps
- drywell
- drywell coating
- drywell equipment hatch
- drywell emergency airlock
- drywell floor
- drywell floor seal
- drywell head
- drywell head closure bolts
- drywell head manway
- drywell jet deflector
- drywell personnel airlock
- drywell ring girder
- drywell stabilizer hatches
- embedded structural plates
- expansion joints (mechanical)
- expansion/grouted anchors
- moisture barrier
- primary containment bellows
- primary containment sump
- reactor pedestal
- reactor pedestal anchor bolts
- reactor shield wall
- reactor stabilizers
- refueling seal platform
- refueling seal platform bellows
- refueling seal platform covers
- seals and gaskets
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines
- torus
- torus access manhole fasteners
- torus access manholes
- vacuum breaker small bore piping
- vacuum relief piping
- vacuum relief valves
- vent header deflector
- vent header supports

#### 2.4A.1.1.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.1 and the UFSAR. The staff's review, using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4, was conducted in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4, "Scoping and Screening Results: Structures."

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.A.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4A-1, dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant identify the location in the LRA where the following specific components that may perform SR functions per 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) are addressed:

- (a) reactor vessel to biological shield stabilizers
- (b) biological shield to containment stabilizer
- (c) RPV male stabilizer attached to outside of drywell shell
- (d) RPV female stabilizer and anchor rods (also referred to as GIB) embedded in reactor building concrete wall
- (e) biological shield wall and anchor bolts
- (f) reactor vessel support skirt and anchor bolts
- (g) reactor vessel support ring girder and anchor bolts and reactor vessel support pedestal
- (h) drywell internal steel shear ring
- (i) drywell steel support skirt and anchor bolts
- (j) drywell head closure bolts and double gasket, tongue-and-groove seal arrangement.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the specific information requested. The staff reviewed the response and found the information acceptable because the applicant had included the structures and components and their intended functions adequately in LRA Table 2.4.A.1-1.

In follow-up to RAI 2.4.A-1 dated October 11, 2005, the staff noted that leakage through the refueling seals located at the top of the drywell potentially exposes the carbon steel drywell shell inner and outer surfaces to loss of material due to corrosion. This concern was particularly applicable to the embedded portion of the drywell shell. The staff pointed out that the corrosion

detected on the outer shell surface in the sand pocket region in a number of Mark I steel containments has been attributed to leakage past the drywell-to-reactor building refueling seal coupled with clogging of the sand pocket drains. Leakage into the drywell past the reactor vessel-to-drywell refueling seal creates the potential for corrosion of the inaccessible portion of the inner surface of the drywell shell embedded in the concrete floor. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify whether all components of the drywell to the refueling cavity seal are within the scope of license renewal.

The staff further noted that from the information in ALRA Table 2.4.A.1-1 it was not clear (1) whether the refueling seals have been included in the license renewal scope or (2) if included how aging management is addressed. Therefore, in RAI 2.4.A-1 dated October 11, 2005, the staff also requested that the applicant provide the following information:

- Verification that the refueling seals are included in the license renewal scope or a detailed explanation for their exclusion.
- A detailed description of the plant-specific operating experience for the refueling seals including incidences of degradation, method of detection, root cause, corrective actions, and current inspection procedures.
- A detailed description of the scoping, screening, and aging management review for the refueling seals.
- The AMPs credited to manage aging of the refueling seals.

In its response by letter dated October 28, 2005, the applicant stated that the NMP1 refueling seals are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The applicant described in detail the six components of the refueling seal. Two of the components are stainless steel bellows, one between the liner and the drywell shell and the other between the refueling seal platform and the reactor vessel flange. The third component is the carbon steel refueling seal platform, the fourth is the aluminum refueling seal platform cover, the fifth is the gaskets between the covers and the platform, and the sixth is the stainless steel bolting that fastens the platform covers to the platform proper. The applicant stated that all of these components are within the scope of license renewal except the gaskets. The gaskets between the cover pieces and the platform are within scope of license renewal but not subject to an AMR because new gaskets are used during each refueling outage.

The applicant also explained that the components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR are addressed in the ALRA Table 2.4.A.1-1 as follows: (1) the bellows are included as the component "Refueling Seal Platform Bellows," (2) the refueling seal platform is included with the component "Refueling Seal Platform" as the component type "Structural Steel (Carbon Low Alloy Steel) in Air," (3) the refueling seal platform covers are included as the component "Refueling Seal Platform Covers," and (4) the bolting is included with the Component "Refueling Seal Platform" as the component type "Fasteners (Wrought Austenitic Stainless Steel) in Air." The indication in the ALRA that the bolting component type is "Fasteners (Carbon or Low Alloy Steel) in Air" is an error. The bolting is stainless steel. The environment is air because these components are in an air environment during normal operation. They are wetted only during refueling operations.

As requested in the RAI, the applicant stated that there had been no plant operating experience

indicating leakage from the refueling seals at NMPNS. Furthermore, any corrosion of the drywell in visible areas would be detected and mitigated at each refueling outage when the refueling cavity is filled. Any leakage would be observed prior to settling in an inaccessible area of the drywell.

Additionally, the applicant noted that the NRC staff had requested that utilities mitigate and/or identify potential degradation of Mark I containments in Information Notice IN 86-99 and Generic Letter GL 87-05. Such degradation occurred at Oyster Creek Generating Station as a result of water intrusion in the air gap from leakage past the refueling seal and subsequent wetting of the sand cushion at the bottom of the air gap. NMPNS conducted several investigations and inspections which determined that water intrusion into the NMP1 sand cushion had not occurred and that periodic examination of the sand cushion area drain lines is not warranted.

Historically, the applicant's management of this area has been vigilant in detecting water leakage. The applicant has found no leakage from this area and stated in the response that NMPNS plans to manage the components of the refueling seal during the period of extended operation. The staff found the applicant's approach of managing the reactor cavity to drywell refueling seal acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4.A-1 is resolved.

#### 2.4A.1.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the PCS components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the PCS components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4A.1.2 NMP1 Reactor Building**

#### 2.4A.1.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.2, the applicant described the RB. The RB is a seismic Class I structure which encloses the PCS pressure suppression system. The RB is a multi-floored structure, comprising a substantial reinforced concrete substructure with reinforced concrete walls extending up to the operating floor level and a steel framed superstructure above the operating floor level. Airlocks are provided on the areas of the building where access doors are provided. The reinforced concrete building substructure is founded on bedrock. Precast concrete panels and uninsulated metal wall panels are applied to the exterior of the reinforced concrete walls of the reactor building, except around the airlocks. However, these panels do not form a part of the building support. Metal wall panels and roofing above the operating floor are leak tight. This structure provides secondary containment when the pressure suppression system is in service, and primary containment during refueling, maintenance, or testing, when the PCS is open or not required. The RB houses the refueling and reactor servicing equipment, fresh and spent fuel storage facilities, and other reactor auxiliary or service equipment.



The RB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides over-pressure protection
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.2-1, the applicant identified the following RB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- blowout panels
- compressible joints
- concrete & grout
- concrete columns
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- doors and framing/hardware
- drywell shield wall
- drywell shield wall sleeves
- electrical and air duct sleeves
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- fuel pool gate gaskets
- fuel pool gates
- fuel transfer canal
- fuel transfer canal liner
- hatch cover seals
- hatch covers
- main steam tunnel
- masonry walls

- penetration seal clamps
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- precast concrete panels
- RB foundation fill concrete
- RB foundation mat
- RB metal siding
- RB overhead crane rail clips and fasteners
- RB overhead crane rail crane girder
- RB sumps
- reactor head cavity
- reactor head cavity liner
- reactor internal storage pit
- reactor internal storage pit liner
- reactor shield plug liners
- reactor shield plugs
- refueling platform rubber seal
- refueling platform track anchor bolts
- refueling platform track and embedded plate
- removable masonry wall anchors
- removable masonry wall framing
- rock anchors
- sealing compounds
- seals and gaskets
- spent fuel storage pool
- spent fuel storage pool liner
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines
- sump liner fasteners (RB and auxiliary bay)
- torus ring girder
- torus saddle anchors
- torus support column sway rod turnbuckles
- torus support column sway rods
- torus support columns
- torus support foundation

#### 2.4A.1.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.2 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant

had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.A.2 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.A-4 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that from LRA Table 2.4.A.2-1 it was not clear whether the entire enclosure building of the BWR reactor building with steel superstructure (including metal structure, metal panels) is within the scope of license renewal. RAI 2.4.A.2-4 requested that the applicant clarify the extent to which items of the enclosure building are within the scope of license renewal and indicate the locations where its components are included in AMR in Table 3.5.2.A-2.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated:

The reactor building (RB) is a concrete structure up to the refueling floor elevation. Above this elevation, it is a steel-framed structure with metal wall and panels. The concrete structure of the RB is included under the component type "Concrete in Air" in LRA Tables 2.4.A.2-1 and 3.5.2.A-2. The steel structural members above the refueling floor are included under the component type "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air" in LRA Tables 2.4.A.2-1 and 3.5.2.A-2. The metal panels are included under the component type Siding in Air" in LRA Table 2.4.A.2-1 and under the component type "Metal Siding in Air" in LRA Table 3.5.2.A-2. The concrete, steel, and metal siding are all within the scope of LR. The last sentence on LRA page 2.4-5 states: "The entire RB is made up of components that require AMR." This was meant to indicate that all of the components that comprise the RB are within the scope of LR and subject to AMR.

The staff found the applicant's explanation adequate. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4.A-4 is resolved.

#### 2.4A.1.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4A.1.3 NMP1 Essential Yard Structures**

#### **2.4A.1.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.3, the applicant described the essential yard structures (EYS). The EYS include the seismic Class I and Class II essential yard buildings, plus structures and civil foundation supports for SR electrical or mechanical equipment items located within the yard. The yard is defined as the owner controlled outside areas surrounding the major NMP1 plant buildings, both inside and outside the NMPNS protected area. The earthen structures, which provide flood protection to the site, are included in the EYS. Included in the EYS are the administration building and the administration building extension and the radwaste pipe tunnel extension. The administration building extension is a Class II structure and is seismically designed due to its proximity to the NMP1 diesel generator rooms. Also included are SR tank foundations. There are no class 1E ductlines or manholes in the yard at NMP1. The EYS also include the structures that support the equipment and high voltage lines in the 115KV switchyard for SBO. The SBO components are addressed in the 115KV AC electrical distribution system.

The EYS contain SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the EYS could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the EYS perform functions that support fire protection and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides rated fire barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.3-1, the applicant identified the following EYS component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- administration building concrete columns
- administration building concrete floors
- administration building concrete foundation
- administration building concrete walls
- administration building structural beams
- administration building structural columns
- administration building structural fasteners
- concrete encasement of ductlines
- emergency diesel fuel oil tank foundations
- nitrogen tank foundations
- nitrogen tank protective structure
- pipe tunnels

- SBO equipment foundations
- structural polymer bearing pad

#### 2.4A.1.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.3 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.4A.1.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the EYS components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the EYS components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4A.1.4 NMP1 Fuel Handling System**

#### 2.4A.1.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.4, the applicant described the fuel handling system. The fuel handling system involves those components used to move fuel from the time of receipt of new fuel to the storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. Components that are evaluated in the fuel handling system include the refueling platform, fuel preparation machines, and spent fuel racks. Although the reactor building crane handles fuel, it is analyzed in the material handling system.

The fuel handling system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the fuel handling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.4-1, the applicant identified the following fuel handling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- fuel preparation machines
- spent fuel rack fasteners
- spent fuel racks

#### 2.4A.1.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.4 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.4A.1.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the fuel handling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the fuel handling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4A.1.5 NMP1 Material Handling System**

#### 2.4A.1.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.5, the applicant described the material handling system. The material handling system consists of overhead traveling cranes, monorail hoists, platform cranes, jib cranes, and associated mechanical and electrical components. For license renewal purposes, the crane girders and rails are included in the structural steel asset of the structure in which the crane is located.

The material handling system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the material handling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.5-1, the applicant identified the following material handling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- decontamination area monorail hoist
- reactor building crane
- reactor building jib crane
- screen house building crane
- screen house building gate hoists
- turbine building 30 ton capacity crane
- turbine building crane
- turbine building monorail hoist

#### 2.4A.1.5.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.5 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.A.5 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.A-5 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that LRA Section 2.4.A.5 indicates the only components that require AMR are the screenhouse gate hoists and the 125-ton capacity RB crane. No rail or crane associated components appear to be included within the scope requiring AMR. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the treatment of cranes, rails, and hoists in the scoping and screening and in the AMR. RAI 2.4A.5-5 requested that the applicant submit the following information:

- a. A list of all cranes, hoists, rails, and associated components in the scope of license renewal.
- b. A list of all cranes, hoists, rails, and associated components requiring aging management review (i.e., passive, long-lived).

- c. A list of all cranes, hoists, rails, and associated components requiring aging management and/or TLAA.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated:

- (a) The NMP1 125-ton capacity RB overhead crane and the screenhouse gate hoists are the only cranes/hoists that meet 10 CFR 54.4(a) criteria for inclusion within the scope of LR. These components perform safety-related intended functions. LRA Section 2.4.A.5 includes the crane rails and girders as part of the structural steel component type for the building in which the crane is located. Other associated components, annunciators, circuit breakers, switches, motors, relays, resistors, and transformers, are classified as active components and, therefore, are not subject to AMR.
- (b) The list of components requiring AMR along with corresponding LRA table locations:
- 125-ton RB Crane - Table 3.5.2.A-5
  - Screenhouse Gate Hoists - Table 3.5.2.A-5
  - 125-ton RB Crane Girders and Rails - Table 3.5.2.A-2 under the component type "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air"
  - Screenhouse Gate Hoists Girders and Rails - Table 3.5.2.A-8 under the component type "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air"
- (c) LRA Section 2.4.A.5 and Table 2.4.A.5-1 list component types within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR. Because the in-scope NMP1 cranes are designated Service Class A ("Standby or Infrequent Service") by the Crane Manufacturers Association of America none meet the fatigue analysis requirement for a TLAA.

The staff found the above applicant's response acceptable because it provides adequate information. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4A-5 is resolved.

#### 2.4A.1.5.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the material handling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the material handling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



### **2.4A.1.6 NMP1 Offgas Building**

#### **2.4A.1.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.6, the applicant described the offgas building (OGB). The OGB is a seismic Class I structure. The OGB is located adjacent to the TB and the WDB. The OGB substructure is a reinforced concrete structure and is founded on bedrock. The superstructure is structural steel frame with exterior metal walls and masonry block. The interior walls of the substructure are reinforced concrete and concrete block. The OGB contains the piping and equipment associated with the condenser air removal and offgas system.

The OGB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the OGB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the OGB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides rated fire barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.6-1, the applicant identified the following OGB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- building foundation
- concrete and grout
- concrete columns
- concrete floors
- concrete lean fill
- concrete walls
- doors and framing/hardware
- expansion/grouted anchors
- masonry wall fasteners
- masonry wall framing
- masonry walls
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines

#### **2.4A.1.6.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.6 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.4A.1.6.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the OGB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the OGB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4A.1.7 NMP1 Personnel/Equipment Access System**

##### 2.4A.1.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.7, the applicant described the personnel/equipment access system. The personnel/equipment access system consists of doors, gates, and the electronic equipment that monitors their positions. The gates and electronic equipment are not in scope for license renewal.

The personnel/equipment access system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the personnel/equipment access system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the personnel/equipment access system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides compartment isolation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier

All doors are addressed in the sections for the structures where the doors are located. There are no other components subject to an AMR for this system.

##### 2.4A.1.7.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.7 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and

UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.4A.1.7.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the personnel/equipment access system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the personnel/equipment access system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4A.1.8 NMP1 Radwaste Solidification and Storage Building**

##### 2.4A.1.8.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.8, the applicant described the radwaste solidification and storage building (RSSB). The RSSB is a seismic Class I structure located to the east of, and directly adjacent to, the OGB and the WDB. The RSSB is a reinforced concrete structure. The foundation mat is founded on bedrock. During normal operation, maintenance, and loading and unloading operations, the structure provides sufficient environmental isolation.

The RSSB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RSSB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RSSB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.8-1, the applicant identified the following RSSB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- concrete & grout
- concrete caissons
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- doors and framing/hardware
- embedded structural plates
- masonry walls
- penetration sleeves
- pipe tunnels
- radwaste building foundation
- radwaste building sump
- roof hatch
- roof plug lifting pins
- seals and gaskets
- steel liner
- steel shield wall

#### 2.4A.1.8.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.8 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.4A.1.8.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RSSB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RSSB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4A.1.9 NMP1 Screen and Pump House Building**

#### **2.4A.1.9.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.9, the applicant described the screen and pump house (SPH) building. The SPH building is a seismic Class I and Class II structure which is adjacent to the north wall of the RB and TB. The Class II superstructure is framed structural steel supported on a Class I reinforced concrete substructure that is founded on bedrock. The exterior wall is internally-insulated precast concrete panels. The SPH building comprises channels for the flow of very large quantities of raw lake water, gates, stop logs for control of the flow, racks, screens for cleaning the water, and pumps.

The SPH building contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the SPH building could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the SPH building performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides source of cooling water for plant shutdown
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.9-1, the applicant identified the following SPH building component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- building foundation
- concrete and grout
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete piers
- concrete slab
- concrete walls
- crane rails and girders
- doors and framing/hardware
- expansion/grouted anchors
- intake structure
- intake structure structural fasteners
- intake structure structural steel
- intake tunnel
- masonry walls
- miscellaneous structural steel

- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- wall shoring

#### 2.4A.1.9.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.9 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.A.9 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.A-7 dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant confirm for the NMP1 screen and pump house that such items as hatches and plugs, structural steel embedments, reinforced concrete foundation footings, grouted concrete, and water proofing membrane materials are within the scope of license renewal and require AMR. For such items within the scope of license renewal the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information in the format of LRA Table 2.4.A.9-1. For such items not within the scope of license renewal the applicant was asked to provide the basis for omission.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that the items listed in the RAI are within the scope of license renewal, subject to an AMR, and represented by the component types listed in LRA Table 2.4.A.9-1:

- There are no "hatches" in the NMP1 Screen and Pump House.
- All doors are included under the component type "Door."
- Plugs are concrete and included in the component type "Concrete in Air."
- Embedded portions of structural steel embedments are integral with the concrete and included with the component type "Concrete in Air" or "Concrete in Raw Water" depending on the location of the embedment.
- Structural steel exposed to atmosphere is included under the component type "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air" or "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Raw Water" depending on the location of the embedment.
- Reinforced concrete foundation footings are included in the component type "Concrete in Soil Above the Ground Water Table" (GWT) or "Concrete in Soil Below the GWT"

depending on the footing depth.

- Grouted concrete is not used at NMP1.
- Structural concrete is included in the various concrete component types depending on environment.
- Waterproofing membranes are not included because they are applied as coatings. NMPNS does not credit coatings to mitigate aging effects.

The staff found the above applicant's response complete and adequate. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4A.-7 is resolved.

#### 2.4A.1.9.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the SPH building components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the SPH building components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4A.1.10 NMP1 Turbine Building**

#### 2.4A.1.10.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.10, the applicant described the TB. The TB is a Class II structure with integrated seismic Class I areas. The reinforced concrete turbine generator foundation pedestal is isolated from the floors of the building to minimize transmission of vibration to the floors. The reinforced concrete TB foundations are supported by concrete column piers founded on bedrock 15 to 25 feet below grade. The TB superstructure consists of an enclosed structural steel frame. The roof is covered with metal decking, insulation, and tar roofing material. Located within the TB are the generating area, the auxiliary equipment area, the feedwater heater area, the auxiliary extension building, and the control room.

The TB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the TB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the TB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier

- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides over-pressure protection
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.10-1, the applicant identified the following TB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- auxiliary control room concrete curbs
- auxiliary control room concrete floors
- auxiliary control room concrete walls
- auxiliary control room masonry walls
- beam seats
- bearing plates
- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete columns
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- control room concrete floors
- control room concrete walls
- control room metal partition wall
- control room structural beams
- control room structural columns
- control room structural fasteners
- control room/auxiliary control room penetration seals
- control room/auxiliary control room penetration sleeves
- diesel generator foundations
- diesel generator room ceiling
- diesel generator room concrete floors
- diesel generator room concrete slabs
- diesel generator room concrete walls
- diesel generator room protection panels
- diesel generator room 102 missile shield
- doors and framing/hardware
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- main steam tunnel
- monorail beams
- penetration sleeves
- removable concrete slabs



- removable masonry wall framing
- removable masonry walls
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, and mezzanines
- turbine building blowout panels
- turbine building foundation slab
- turbine building manhole cover and frame
- turbine building overhead crane rail and embedded plate
- turbine building overhead crane rail clips and fasteners
- turbine building sump liner fasteners
- turbine building sump liners
- turbine building sump sleeves
- turbine building sumps
- turbine support structure

#### 2.4A.1.10.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.10 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.A.10 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.A-6 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that in some of the LRA Section 2.4.A tables the staff could not identify the insulation and insulation jacketing included in the license renewal scope nor the specific subsets of insulation and insulation jacketing included in the LRA Section 2.4.A tables. It was also unclear whether insulation and jacketing on the reactor coolant system had been included. Insulation and jacketing are commodities that may perform SR functions as per 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1). Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant:

- a. Identify the structures and structural components within the scope of license renewal with insulation and/or insulation jacketing.
- b. List all insulation and insulation jacketing materials associated with such structures and structural components that require AMR and the AMR results for each.
- c. For insulation and insulation jacketing materials associated with such structures and structural components not requiring aging management, submit the technical basis for

this conclusion, including plant-specific operating experience.

- d. For insulation and insulation jacketing materials associated with such structures and structural components that require aging management indicate the applicable LRA sections that identify the AMP(s) credited.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that NMP1 has no structures or structural components within the scope of LR with insulation or insulation jacketing. Therefore, insulation was not included in any LRA Section 2.4.A table. The NMP1 design does not require insulation of structural steel and/or concrete according to CLB documents including safety analyses and plant evaluations. The staff found this plant-specific configuration-based response adequate. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4A-6 is resolved.

#### 2.4A.1.10.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the TB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the TB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4A.1.11 NMP1 Vent Stack**

##### 2.4A.1.11.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.11, the applicant described the vent stack. The vent stack is a seismic Class I reinforced-concrete chimney, 350 feet high, located 100 feet east of the northeast corner of the RB. The height of the stack and the velocity of discharge provide a high degree of dilution for station effluents. The vent stack's foundation is on a massive reinforced concrete base which extends to bedrock. From this base, it rises through the turbine auxiliary building extension from which it is completely structurally isolated.

The vent stack contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the vent stack performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides path for release of filtered and unfiltered gaseous discharge
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.11-1, the applicant identified the following vent stack component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- compressible joints and seals
- concrete chimney shell
- concrete floors
- vent duct framing
- vent stack foundation

#### 2.4A.1.11.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.11 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.4A.1.11.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the vent stack components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the vent stack components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4A.1.12 NMP1 Waste Disposal Building**

#### 2.4A.1.12.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.4.A.12, the applicant described the WDB. The WDB and WDB extension are seismic Class I structures located between and adjacent to the RSSB and the turbine auxiliary extension building. The WDB and extension consist of reinforced concrete substructures with steel framed superstructures from grade to their respective roof elevations. The interior walls of the substructure are reinforced concrete. The superstructure walls are also reinforced concrete or concrete masonry units. The reinforced concrete building substructure is founded on bedrock.

The WDB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the WDB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the WDB performs functions that support fire

protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.A.12-1, the applicant identified the following WDB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- building foundation
- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete sumps
- concrete walls
- doors and framing/hardware
- expansion/grouted anchors
- masonry fasteners
- masonry walls
- miscellaneous structural steel
- steel curbs
- steel sump liner
- steel troughs
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines

#### 2.4A.1.12.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.A.12 and the UFSAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and UFSAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the

applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### 2.4A.1.12.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the WDB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the WDB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B NMP2 Structures**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B, the applicant identified the NMP2 structures that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described, in the ALRA, the following sections for supporting systems and structures for the NMP2 structures:

- 2.4.B.1 NMP2 primary containment structure
- 2.4.B.2 NMP2 reactor building
- 2.4.B.3 NMP2 auxiliary service building
- 2.4.B.4 NMP2 control room building
- 2.4.B.5 NMP2 diesel generator building
- 2.4.B.6 NMP2 essential yard structures
- 2.4.B.7 NMP2 fuel handling system
- 2.4.B.8 NMP2 main stack
- 2.4.B.9 NMP2 material handling system
- 2.4.B.10 NMP2 motor operated doors system
- 2.4.B.11 NMP2 radwaste building
- 2.4.B.12 NMP2 screenwell building
- 2.4.B.13 NMP2 standby gas treatment building
- 2.4.B.14 NMP2 turbine building

The staff's review findings regarding the above ALRA Sections 2.4.B.1 through 2.4.B.14 are presented in SER Sections 2.4B.1 through 2.4B.14, respectively.

#### **2.4B.1 NMP2 Primary Containment Structure**

##### ***2.4B.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.1, the applicant described the primary containment structure (PCS). The PCS is a seismic Category I structure consisting of a drywell chamber, located above a suppression chamber, and a drywell floor, which separates the drywell chamber from the suppression chamber. It also includes the structural portions of primary containment

penetrations. The PCS is supported on a 10-ft thick reinforced concrete mat, which also supports the reactor building (RB). A series of 24-in diameter downcomer vent pipes penetrates the drywell floor. The drywell is a steellined reinforced concrete vessel in the shape of a frustum of two cones, closed by a dome with a torispherical head. The PCS contains a Mark II pressure suppression system. The pressure suppression chamber is a cylindrical stainless steel clad steel-lined reinforced concrete vessel located below the drywell. The PCS houses the RPV, the reactor recirculation system, and other branch connections of the RCPB.

The PCS contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the PCS could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides shielding against high energy line breaks
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pipe whip restraint
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.1-1, the applicant identified the following PCS component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- beam seats
- bearing plates
- biological shield wall
- biological shield wall door radiation shields
- biological shield wall doors
- concrete & grout
- concrete slabs
- containment penetrations (electrical)
- containment penetrations (instrument)
- containment penetrations (mechanical)
- control rod drive removal hatch
- downcomers
- drywell
- drywell coating
- drywell emergency escape lock

- drywell equipment hatch
- drywell floor
- drywell floor concrete insulation
- drywell floor supplementary steel
- drywell head
- drywell head closure pins
- drywell head fasteners
- drywell head stainless steel elements
- drywell liner
- drywell personnel airlock
- embedded structural plates
- equipment hatch ring beam
- impingement and jet shielding
- inner refueling seal
- insulation support framing
- lubrite plate
- monorail beams
- pipe whip restraint fasteners
- pipe whip restraints
- precast concrete beams
- radiation shields
- reactor pedestal
- reactor pedestal anchor bolts
- reactor stabilizers
- refueling bulkhead
- sealing compounds
- seals and gaskets
- star truss
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural girders
- structural insulation liner
- structural plates
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines, removable curbs
- suppression chamber seal
- suppression pool
- suppression pool access hatches
- suppression pool liner
- water level indicator shields

#### **2.4B.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.1 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the

applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 2.4.B.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.B-1 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that the NMP2 PCS encloses the reactor vessel and such structures as the biological shield wall, concrete pedestal, and the barrier floor between the drywell and the suppression chamber. The original LRA Table 2.4.B.1-1 does not include these structures in the scope of license renewal though they perform SR functions per 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1). Therefore, the staff requested, if they were not included by oversight, that the applicant describe its scoping and AMR or indicate their location in the LRA if somewhere else. The staff further requested that, if omitted from the scope of license renewal, the applicant provide the basis for omitting these items.

The applicant responded by letter dated January 10, 2005, and stated that the components listed in the staff RAI are within the scope of license renewal and are subject to AMR, they are included in the original LRA Table 2.4.B.1-1. Since the structures in question are comprised of multiple materials, they have been captured in the LRA Table 2.4.B.1-1 as a function of their materials of construction instead of their functional names. This information has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the staff found the above response acceptable because the applicant correctly identified these structures and components within the scope of license renewal and included them in ALRA Table 2.4.B.1-1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4.B-1 is resolved.

In RAI 2.4.B-2 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the Group 2 structures defined in GALL Report Chapter III include the BWR RB with steel superstructure (enclosure building) and should be within the scope of license renewal. LRA Table 2.4.B.1-1 was unclear whether the entire enclosure building (including the concrete structure, metal panels) is within the scope of license renewal. The staff requested that the applicant clarify the extent to which the enclosure building is within the scope of license renewal and the locations where its components are included in AMR in Table 3.5.2.B-2. The applicant's response by letter dated January 10, 2005, has been incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

In its ALRA dated July 14, 2005, the applicant included the essential components of the enclosure building in ALRA Table 2.4.B.1-1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4.B-2 is resolved.

### **2.4B.1.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to



determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the PCS components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the PCS components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.4B.2 NMP2 Reactor Building**

### ***2.4B.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.2, the applicant described the RB. The RB is a seismic Category I structure that encloses the PCS. The RB wall is a reinforced concrete cylinder with varying wall thickness, extending from the top of the mat to the polar crane level. The wall from the crane rail elevation to the roof is steel framing with insulated metal siding. The metal siding panels have sealed joints to minimize air leakage. The RB, including the auxiliary bays, is founded on a rock-bearing, reinforced concrete mat. The mat acts to support the RB, auxiliary bays, and the primary containment. The auxiliary bays are rigidly attached to the RB and considered part of the secondary containment structure. The RB houses the refueling and reactor servicing equipment, new and spent fuel storage facilities, and other reactor auxiliary or service equipment, including the RCIC system, RWCU system, standby liquid control system, CRD system equipment, core standby cooling systems, RHR systems, and electrical equipment components. Included within the RB for the purposes of license renewal are the secondary containment, the north and south auxiliary bays, and the main steam tunnel east of the turbine building. Civil/structural components from the fuel nuclear transfer system and the vents – turbine and RB system are also evaluated as part of the RB.

The RB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides shielding against high energy line breaks
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pipe whip restraint
- provides over-pressure protection
- provides shelter/protection to SR components

- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.2-1, the applicant identified the following RB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- auxiliary bay foundations
- auxiliary bay sumps
- beam pockets
- bearing plates
- cask pit cavity
- cask pit cavity liner
- cask washdown pit
- cask washdown pit liner
- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete columns
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete lean fill
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- doors and framing/hardware
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- fuel pool canal
- fuel pool canal liner
- fuel pool gates
- fuel transfer shielding bridge
- main steam tunnel
- miscellaneous structural steel framing
- monorail beams
- overpressurization vent panel fasteners
- overpressurization vent panels
- penetration seal clamps
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- pipe whip restraint fasteners
- pipe whip restraints
- porous concrete pipe
- radiation shields
- rail track and support beams
- reactor building foundation mat
- reactor building metal siding
- reactor building metal siding fasteners
- reactor building polar crane rail and embedded plate
- reactor building polar crane rail clips and fasteners

- reactor building sumps
- reactor head cavity pit
- reactor head cavity pit liner
- reactor head cavity plug liners
- reactor head cavity plugs
- reactor internal storage pool
- reactor internal storage pool liner
- refueling bridge crane rail and embedded plate
- refueling bridge crane rail clips and fasteners
- refueling canal/dryer-separator canal plug liners
- refueling canal/dryer-separator canal plugs
- removable concrete slabs
- removable masonry wall anchors
- removable masonry wall framing
- sealing compounds
- seals and gaskets
- spent fuel pool girders
- spent fuel pool structural steel framing
- spent fuel storage pool
- spent fuel storage pool liner
- spent fuel storage pool structural fasteners
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural plates
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines
- sump liner fasteners (reactor building and auxiliary bay)
- sump liners (reactor building and auxiliary bay)

#### **2.4B.2.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.2 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.B.2 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.B-3 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that it was not clear from LRA Table 2.4.B.2-1 whether the entire enclosure building (including the steel framing, metal siding,

sealer materials, the overhead crane, and its railing) is within the scope of license renewal. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the extent to which items of the enclosure building above the operating floor are within the scope of license renewal and describe in the format of LRA Table 2.4.B.2-1 scoping and AMR for the applicable components.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that the RB is a concrete structure up to the refueling floor elevation and above this elevation a steel-framed structure with metal wall panels. The steel framing members above the refueling floor are included in LRA Table 2.4.B.2-1 in the component type "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air." The metal panels are included in LRA Table 2.4.B.2-1 in the component type "Metal Siding in Air." Sealer materials are included in the component type "Polymer in Air" in LRA Table 2.4.B.2-1. The RB overhead crane is included in LRA Table 2.4.B.9-1 as the component type "Polar Crane." The crane rails are included in LRA Table 2.4.B.2-1 in the component type "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air." The applicant stated that these components and component types are within the scope of LR and subject to AMR. The applicant also pointed it out that the last sentence on LRA page 2.4-28 states: "The entire RB is made up of components that require an AMR," indicating that all components that comprise the RB are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR.

The staff found the applicant's response adequate and acceptable and its concern described in RAI 2.4B.2-3 is resolved.

In RAI 2.4.B-6 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that it could not identify from some of the tables of LRA Section 2.4.B the insulation and insulation jacketing included within the scope of license renewal nor the specific subsets of insulation and insulation jacketing included in the Section 2.4.B tables. It was also unclear whether insulation and jacketing on the reactor coolant system had been included. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant:

- Identify the structures and structural components within the scope of license renewal with insulation and/or insulation jacketing.
- List all insulation and insulation jacketing materials associated with such structures and structural components that require aging management review and the results of aging management review for each.
- For insulation and insulation jacketing materials associated with such structures and structural components that do not require aging management submit the technical basis for this omission including plant-specific operating experience.
- For insulation and insulation jacketing materials associated with such structures and structural components that require aging management indicate the LRA sections that identify the AMPs credited to manage aging.

The applicant responded that NMP2 has no structures or structural components within the scope of license renewal with insulation and/or insulation jacketing. Therefore, the applicant did not include insulation in any LRA Section 2.4.B table. The NMP2 design does not require insulation of structural steel or concrete according to current licensing basis documents including safety analyses and plant evaluations.

Since NMP2 has no structures or structural components within the scope of license renewal

with insulation and/or insulation jacketing, the staff found the applicant's response acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4.B-6 is resolved.

### **2.4B.2.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B.3 NMP2 Auxiliary Service Building**

#### **2.4B.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.3, the applicant described the auxiliary service building (ASB). The ASB is a reinforced concrete and steel-framed structure. The ASB is surrounded by the RB, TB, and CRB. The ASB below elevation 261 ft is classified as seismic Category I. The basement floor is a reinforced concrete slab poured over electrical tunnels. The floor at elevation 261 ft is a concrete slab on steel deck supported by structural steel. The ASB contains the HVAC room, instrument calibration facility, and decontamination and shower facilities for personnel.

The ASB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the ASB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the ASB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.3-1, the applicant identified the following ASB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- ASB foundation
- compressible joints and seals
- concrete & grout
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- doors and framing/hardware
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- removable concrete slabs
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines

#### **2.4B.3.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.3 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.3.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the ASB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the ASB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.4B.4 NMP2 Control Room Building**

### ***2.4B.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.4, the applicant described the control room building (CRB). The CRB is a seismic Category I structure. It is a five-story reinforced concrete and steel structure. The exterior walls and roof are constructed of reinforced concrete. The interior floors are concrete decking supported by steel framing. The building is founded on bedrock and is supported by a reinforced concrete mat. The upper four floors are reinforced concrete slabs on steel deck supported by structural steel. Underground concrete tunnels connect the CRB to the RB. The CRB contains the control room, SR switchgear, batteries, and associated equipment.

The CRB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the CRB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the CRB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.4-1, the applicant identified the following CRB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete columns
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete lean fill
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- control room building foundation
- control room building sump

- doors and framing/hardware
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- miscellaneous structural steel
- penetration seal clamp
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- removable concrete slabs
- sealing compounds
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines
- supplemental structural steel
- suspended seismic support framing
- tornado-proof steel duct
- ventilation duct framing

#### **2.4B.4.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.4 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.4.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the CRB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the CRB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



## **2.4B.5 NMP2 Diesel Generator Building**

### ***2.4B.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.5, the applicant described the diesel generator building (DGB). The DGB is a seismic Category I reinforced concrete structure enclosing the three diesel generators (DGs) and their associated equipment. The DGs are supported on reinforced concrete pedestals. The building is divided into three rooms separated by fire walls, each housing one DG. Fuel oil storage tanks are located below the building, with their fuel oil pumps housed in the individual DG rooms. The DGB is founded on bedrock and supported by reinforced concrete wall footings.

The DGB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the DGB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the DGB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.5-1, the applicant identified the following DGB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- compressible joints and seals
- concrete & grout
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- concrete lean fill
- crane rails/girders
- diesel generator building foundation
- diesel generator pedestals
- diesel generator tank foundations and encasements
- doors and framing/hardware
- expansion/grouted anchors

- manhole cover and frame
- missile logs
- penetration seal clamp
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- oil sump
- sealing compounds
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, mezzanines

#### **2.4B.5.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.5 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.5.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the DGB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the DGB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B.6 NMP2 Essential Yard Structures**

#### **2.4B.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.6, the applicant described the EYS. The EYS include, but are not limited to, electrical, piping, and vent tunnels; manholes; underground duct banks; and earth berms and ditches used for flood control. Seismic Category I electrical tunnels and piping tunnels contain Category I systems and are constructed of reinforced concrete. Included in the essential yard structures are all Class 1E duct banks and manholes. Earthen berms are located around the perimeter of the site to provide flood protection to the site. A stone-faced dike was constructed along the shoreline. The dike prevents flooding of the plant from high lake water levels and the effects of the probable maximum windstorm. The EYS also include the structures that support

the equipment and high voltage lines in the 115KV switchyard and Scriba substation for SBO. The SBO components are evaluated in the switchyard system.

The EYS contain SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the EYS could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the EYS perform functions that support fire protection and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides path for release of filtered and unfiltered gaseous discharge
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.6-1, the applicant identified the following EYS component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- bus duct enclosure
- Class 1E manhole sumps
- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete encasement of ductlines
- concrete lean fill
- doors and framing/hardware
- earthen berm
- electrical and radwaste tunnels removable concrete slabs
- electrical and radwaste tunnels steel beams
- electrical and radwaste tunnels steel columns
- electrical and radwaste tunnels
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- manhole covers and frames
- manholes
- penetration seal clamp
- penetration seals

- penetration sleeves
- pipe tunnel structural framing
- pipe tunnels
- pipe tunnel sumps
- revetment ditch
- sealing compounds
- service water tunnel
- service water tunnel removable concrete slabs
- service water valve pit
- service water valve pit removable concrete slabs
- service water valve pit sealants
- stone-faced dike
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, and mezzanines
- transformer area walls
- transformer curbs
- transformer foundation pads
- vent tunnel
- vent tunnel fill concrete
- 115 KV steel transmission towers
- 115 KV steel transmission tower foundations
- 115 KV wooden transmission towers

#### **2.4B.6.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.6 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.B.6 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.B-4 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that LRA Section 2.4.B.6 states that the NMP2 EYS include electrical equipment, piping, vent tunnels, manholes, underground duct banks, and earth berms and ditches used for flood control. The EYS also are said to include structures that support the equipment and high voltage lines in the switchyard and Scriba substation for SBO. LRA Table 2.4.B.6-1 does not indicate that some associated structural steel supports or embedments are in the scope of license renewal though they perform SR functions per 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1). Therefore, the staff requested that, if they were within the scope of license renewal, the applicant provide a description of its scoping and include the structural

steel items in the format of LRA Table 2.4.B.6-1. The staff also requested that the applicant provide the basis for omission from the scope of license renewal.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that the equipment and high voltage line supports in the switchyard and Scriba substation are within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) for SBO. In LRA Section 2.4.B.6 and Table 2.4.B.6-1, structures that support the equipment and high voltage lines in the switchyard and the Scriba substation are included in the component types "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air," "Treated Wood in Air," "Treated Wood in Soil Above the GWT," and "Treated Wood in Soil Below the GWT." Embedments are included as part of the "Concrete in Air" component type with the exposed portions of anchor bolts included in the component type "Fasteners (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air." Hilti bolts are included in the "Expansion/Grouted Anchors (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air" component type.

The staff found the applicant's explanation adequate and acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4.B-4 is resolved.

### **2.4B.6.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the EYS components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the EYS components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B.7 NMP2 Fuel Handling System**

#### **2.4B.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.7 the applicant described the fuel handling system. The fuel handling system involves those components used to move fuel from the time of receipt of new fuel to the storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. Components that are evaluated in the fuel handling system include the channel handling boom, the fuel preparation machines, the fuel transfer shielding bridge, the refueling crane platform and equipment, the new fuel storage vault, lifting and handling equipment, and spent fuel pool storage racks. Although the RB polar crane handles fuel, it is analyzed in the material handling system. Civil/structural components from the fuel nuclear refueling, the fuel nuclear storage, and the materials handling fuel storage area subsystems are also evaluated as part of the fuel handling system.

The fuel handling system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the fuel handling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent

accomplishment of SR function(s)

- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.7-1, the applicant identified the following fuel handling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- channel handling boom
- control blade storage frame
- fuel preparation machines
- fuel storage racks
- head strongback carousel
- in-vessel storage rack
- new fuel storage rack
- new fuel storage vault cover
- recirculation pump motor lifting lugs
- refueling crane and platform equipment
- steam dryer primary lifting beam

#### **2.4B.7.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.7 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.7.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the fuel handling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the fuel handling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.4B.8 NMP2 Main Stack**

### ***2.4B.8.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.8, the applicant described the main stack. The main stack is a seismic Category I reinforced-concrete chimney, approximately 430-ft high, located on the northeast side of the power station. The main stack is designed and constructed to provide elevated release of offgas, standby gas treatment, turbine building ventilation, and other systems. The main stack foundation is on a reinforced concrete base, which extends to bedrock.

The main stack contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the main stack could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides path for release of filtered and unfiltered gaseous discharge
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.8-1, the applicant identified the following main stack component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- compressible joints and seals
- concrete chimney shell
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete lean fill
- embedded steel
- expansion/grouted anchors
- main stack foundation
- penetration seal clamp
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, and mezzanines

#### **2.4B.8.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.8 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.8.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the main stack components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the main stack components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B.9 NMP2 Material Handling System**

#### **2.4B.9.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.9, the applicant described the material handling system. The material handling system consists of overhead traveling cranes, monorail hoists, platform cranes, jib cranes, and associated mechanical and electrical components. For license renewal purposes, the crane girders and rails are included in the structural steel asset of the structure in which the crane is located.

The material handling system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the material handling system could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.9-1, the applicant identified the following material handling system component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:



- control building equipment hoist (el. 306)
- emergency diesel generator cranes
- main steam isolation valve crane
- main steam isolation valve hoist
- main turbine area traveling crane
- reactor building polar crane
- recirculation motor handling cranes
- safety relief valve hoists
- screenwell area traveling crane
- stop log area crane

#### **2.4B.9.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.9 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.9.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the material handling system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the material handling system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B.10 NMP2 Motor Operated Doors System**

#### **2.4B.10.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.10, the applicant described the motor operated doors system. The motor operated doors system consists of various motor operated doors and the associated electronic equipment that monitors their positions.

The motor operated doors system contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the motor operated doors system performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier

All doors have been identified and are addressed in appropriate tables describing structures in which the doors are physically located. The remaining electrical components are active components. There are no other components subject to an AMR for this system.

#### **2.4B.10.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.10 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.10.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the motor operated doors system components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the motor operated doors system components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B.11 NMP2 Radwaste Building**

#### **2.4B.11.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.11, the applicant described the radwaste building (RWB). The RWB is a seismic Category I structure and contains the radioactive waste system. It is a five-story, concrete and steel building. The exterior walls are reinforced concrete. A rolling steel door is provided in the north wall for truck access into the building. The basement floor is a concrete mat on bedrock. The upper four floors are concrete supported by steel deck and beams. The roof consists of steel framing with steel deck, insulation, and four-ply, built-up roofing. The decontamination area is located south of the RWB, and is an extension of the TB and the RWB.

The RWB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the RWB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the RWB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.11-1, the applicant identified the following RWB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- concrete and grout
- concrete floors
- concrete lean fill
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- decontamination area compressible joints and seals
- decontamination area concrete floors
- decontamination area concrete lean fill
- decontamination area concrete slabs
- decontamination area concrete walls
- decontamination area foundation
- doors and framing/hardware
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- hotline trough
- penetration seal clamp
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- radwaste building foundation
- radwaste building sump
- radwaste building sump flange plate
- steel liner
- structural beams

- structural columns
- structural fasteners

#### **2.4B.11.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.11 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.11.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the RWB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the RWB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4B.12 NMP2 Screenwell Building**

#### **2.4B.12.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.12, the applicant described the screenwell building (SWB). The SWB consists of a concrete substructure and a steel frame superstructure. The substructure, below grade elevation 261'-0", including the service water pump room, is designated seismic Category I, whereas the steel frame superstructure, including the circulating water pump and water treatment area, is designed as a non-Category I area. The SWB includes the service water pump rooms, the diesel and electric fire pump rooms, the water treatment area, the circulating water pump area, and other associated equipment. Stop logs, traveling screens, trash rakes, etc., are set in the concrete walls, as required to divert the flow of water. These components are built-up structures of steel and concrete guided and supported by the reinforced concrete walls and floors. For license renewal purposes, the SWB also includes the intake structures and the intake/discharge tunnels.

The SWB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the SWB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the SWB performs functions that support fire protection, ATWS, and SBO.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides filtration
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides source of cooling water for plant shutdown
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.12-1, the applicant identified the following SWB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- crane rails/girders
- doors and framing/hardware
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- hot line tunnel
- intake shaft access door and framing
- intake shaft concrete lean fill
- intake shafts
- intake structure anchor bolts
- intake structure bar racks
- intake structure concrete and grout
- intake structure fasteners
- intake structure hatch cover and manhole
- intake structure structural steel and embedments
- intake structure Tremie concrete
- intake structures
- intake tunnel compressible material
- intake tunnel concrete lean fill
- intake tunnels
- masonry walls
- penetration seal clamp

- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- removable concrete slabs
- removable steel nose piece
- screenwell building sumps
- screenwell building foundation
- service water pump bay sumps
- service water tunnel
- service water valve missile protection
- stop log fasteners
- stop log seals
- stop logs and guides
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural foundation piles
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, and mezzanines
- trash racks and guides

#### **2.4B.12.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.12 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.B.12 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the evaluation of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.B-5 dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that LRA Table 2.4.B.11-1 lists structural steel foundation piles (carbon and low alloy steel) in undisturbed soil as one of the component types in the NMP2 screenwell building requiring AMR. Because these piles are inaccessible, the staff requested that the applicant discuss results of the AMR of the piles and indicate where in the LRA the aging management of the piles is addressed.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that the structural steel foundation piles in undisturbed soil are subject to AMR; however, the component type "Structural Steel Foundation Piles (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Undisturbed Soil" has no aging effects and, as stated in Section 4.3.1.1 of EPRI TR-103842, undisturbed soils are so deficient in oxygen at levels a few feet below the surface or the water table that steel piles are not appreciably affected by corrosion regardless of the soil type or properties. The NMPNS site

ground water and soil are both non-aggressive in nature as defined by SRP-LR. The applicant indicated that previous LRAs (e.g., Fort Calhoun) that the staff had reviewed have also not identified any aging effects requiring management for carbon steel foundation piles.

The staff found the above response adequate. Therefore, the concern described in RAI 2.4.B-5 is resolved.

In RAI 2.4.B-7 dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant confirm that such Screenwell Building items as hatches and plugs, structural steel embedments, reinforced concrete foundation footings, grouted concrete, and water proofing membrane materials are within the scope of license renewal and require AMR and, if within the scope of license renewal, that the applicant provide additional information in the format of LRA Table 2.4.B.11-1. If not within the scope of license renewal, the applicant was to provide the basis for their omission.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant responded that the items listed in the RAI are within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR with the exception of the waterproofing membranes, which are not included because they are applied as coatings. NMPNS does not credit coatings to mitigate aging effects. The LRA lists in Table 2.4.B.11-1 component types that represent these items:

- There are no “hatches” in the NMP2 Screenwell Building. All doors are included in the component type “Door.”
- Plugs are concrete and included in the component type “Concrete in Air.”
- Embedded portions of structural steel embedments are integral with the concrete and included in the component type “Concrete in Air” or “Concrete in Raw Water” depending on location. Structural steel exposed to atmosphere is included in the component type “Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air” or “Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Raw Water” depending on location.
- Reinforced concrete foundation footings are included in the component type “Concrete in Soil Above the GWT” or “Concrete in Soil Below the GWT” depending on footing depth.
- Grouted concrete is not used at NMP2. Structural concrete is included in the various concrete component types depending on its environment.

The staff found the applicant’s response complete and adequate. Therefore, the concern described in RAI 2.4.B-7 is resolved.

### **2.4B.12.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI responses, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the SWB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the SWB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.4B.13 NMP2 Standby Gas Treatment Building**

### ***2.4B.13.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.13, the applicant described the standby gas treatment building (SGTB). The SGTB and railroad access area contain the standby gas treatment (SGT) filters and associated equipment and allow access for spent fuel shipping. This structure is classified a seismic Category I structure up to elevation 286 ft. The portion of the building above elevation 286 ft is classified as nonseismic. The SGTB is a two-story, reinforced concrete and steel-framed structure. The structure shares a common wall with the railroad access lock adjacent to the RB. The reinforced concrete floor slab is provided at the grade level of elevation 261 ft. A railroad access lock approximately 25 x 90 ft is provided adjacent to the RB. This building is a reinforced concrete and steel-framed structure and shares a common wall with the SGTB.

The SGTB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the SGTB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the SGTB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides shielding against high energy line breaks
- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pressure retaining boundary
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides pressure boundary or essentially leaktight barrier
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.13-1, the applicant identified the following SGTB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete floors
- concrete lean fill
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- doors and framing/hardware



- embedded rail girders
- embedded structural plates
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- SGTB foundation
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, and mezzanines

#### **2.4B.13.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.13 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.13.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the SGTB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the SGTB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.14 NMP2 Turbine Building**

##### **2.4B.14.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.4.B.14, the applicant described the TB. The TB complex includes the TB, heater bays, main steam tunnel, and condensate demineralizer regenerative and offgas area. A portion of the TB, main steam tunnel area, and offgas area are analyzed to seismic conditions, whereas the remaining portions are designed as nonseismic. The complex houses the turbine generator, condenser, moisture separator, etc., in the TB areas, heaters and related pumps and accessories in heater bay areas, and offgas system equipment and tanks in offgas areas. The main steam tunnel connects the TB with the RB. The TB complex is constructed partially on spread footings and partially on a mat foundation. This building complex is constructed of reinforced concrete floors and walls up to the operating floor level. The TB's operating floor is concrete supported by steel deck and beams. The structure above the operating floor level is

constructed of a structural steel framing system braced by vertical and horizontal bracing systems up to roof level, enclosed by metal siding. A steel roof deck with roofing is provided at the top of the structure.

The TB contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the TB could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function. In addition, the TB performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides spray shield or curbs for directing flow
- provides for thermal expansion and/or seismic separation
- provides rated fire barrier
- provides flood protection barrier
- provides shielding against high energy line breaks
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides pipe whip restraint
- provides shelter/protection to SR components
- provides shielding against radiation
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.B.14-1, the applicant identified the following TB component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- compressible joints and seals
- concrete and grout
- concrete columns
- concrete curbs
- concrete floors
- concrete slabs
- concrete walls
- concrete lean fill
- crane rails/girders
- doors and framing/hardware
- embedded structural plates
- expansion/grouted anchors
- main steam tunnel
- masonry walls
- penetration seal clamp
- penetration seals
- penetration sleeves
- pipe whip restraints

- pipe whip restraint fasteners
- removable concrete slabs
- removable masonry wall framing
- removable masonry walls
- structural beams
- structural columns
- structural fasteners
- structural steel: platforms, stairways, and mezzanines
- TB foundation
- TB sumps
- turbine support mat
- turbine support structure

#### **2.4B.14.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.B.14 and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.4B.14.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the TB components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the TB components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4C NMPNS Structural Commodities**

In ALRA Section 2.4.C, the applicant identified the NMPNS structural commodities that are subject to an AMR for license renewal.

The applicant described the supporting structures and components of the structural commodities in the following sections of the ALRA:

- 2.4.C.1 component supports
- 2.4.C.2 fire stops and seals

The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.4.C.1 and 2.4.C.2 are presented in SER Sections 2.4A.2.1 and 2.4A.2.2, respectively.

## **2.4C.1 Component Supports**

### ***2.4C.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.C.1, the applicant described the component supports commodity. Component supports are connections between a system component and a plant structural member such as a concrete wall or floor or structural steel beam or column. Supports for both the distributive portions of systems and equipment like pumps and pressure vessels are included as parts of this commodity group. Supported components include vessels, piping, passive pump components, and heat exchangers. Supports for electrical cables, cable trays, cable tray missile shields, conduits, HVAC ducting, motor control center cabinets, electrical enclosures, fans, filters, and heaters are also included in this commodity. Seismic restraints, which may or may not provide support during normal operation, are also considered parts of this commodity.

The component supports commodity contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. The failure of NSR SSCs in the component supports commodity could potentially prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of an SR function.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides missile barrier
- provides structural support to NSR components whose failure could prevent accomplishment of SR function(s)
- provides structural and/or functional support to SR equipment

In ALRA Table 2.4.C.1-1, the applicant identified the following component supports commodity component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- ASME Class 1, 2, 3 and MC hangers and supports
- cable trays and supports
- cable tray missile shields (NMP1 only)
- conduit
- electrical panels, racks, cabinets, and other enclosures
- equipment supports and foundations
- instrumentation racks, frames, panels, enclosures
- lubrite plates
- non-ASME class hangers and supports
- tube track
- vibration isolating elements

### ***2.4C.1.2 Staff Evaluation***

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.C.1, the UFSAR, and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with

the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the system functions described in the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff's review of LRA Section 2.4.C.1 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete review of the applicant's scoping and screening results. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 2.4.C.1-1 dated October 11, 2005, the staff stated that in ALRA Table 2.4.C-1 the applicant included ASME Classes 1, 2, 3, and MC hangers and supports. The staff assumed that the drywell and torus external supports were included within the Class MC supports. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant confirm the staff's assumption.

In its response by letter dated October 28, 2005, the applicant clarified:

- (1) The drywell supports are included in ALRA Section 2.4.C.1, "Component Supports," under the Component Type "ASME Class 1, 2, 3, and MC Hangers and Supports" in Table 2.4.C.1-1.
- (2) The torus supports are included in ALRA Section 2.4.A.2, "NMP1 Reactor Building." They are listed in Table 2.4.A.2-1 under the Component Type "Torus Support Columns."

The applicant explained that these two component types encompass all drywell and torus supports.

The applicant further stated that the aging management of the drywell supports is addressed under the Component Type "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air" in ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1. These supports are managed by the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program consistent with GALL Report Item III.B1.3.1-a.

The applicant finally stated that the aging management of the Torus Support Columns is addressed in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-2 under the Component Type "Torus Support Columns." These supports are managed by the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program consistent with GALL Report Item III.B1.3.1-a.

The staff found the clarification provided by the applicant consistent with the staff's assumption and with GALL item III.B1.3.1-a. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.4.C.1-1 is resolved.

### **2.4C.1.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA, RAI response, and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by

the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the component supports commodity components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the component supports commodity components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.4C.2 Fire Stops and Seals**

### ***2.4C.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 2.4.C.2 the applicant described the fire stops and seals commodity. The fire stops and seals commodity addresses penetration fire stop/seal and structural fire seal materials. The following items are not included under this commodity: (1) process piping, electrical cables, or conduits running through the fire penetration (included under the associated mechanical or electrical systems), (2) cast in place penetration sleeves and any flanges or welds (evaluated as part of the structural steel asset associated with the structure), (3) embedded portions of cast-in-place sleeves (included under the concrete asset for the structure), and (4) fire barrier walls, which are included under the structure.

The fire stops and seals commodity contains SR components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following DBEs. In addition, the fire stops and seals commodity performs functions that support fire protection.

The intended function within the scope of license renewal is to provide rated fire barrier.

In ALRA Table 2.4.C.2-1, the applicant identified the following fire stops and seals commodity component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- aluminum spacers
- stainless steel clamps
- fire stop materials
- fire wrap materials
- penetration extensions

### ***2.4C.2.2 Staff Evaluation***

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.4.C.2, the UFSAR, and the USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.4. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.4.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the structural component functions described in the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.4C.2.3 Conclusion**

The staff reviewed the ALRA and related structural components to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the fire stops and seals commodity components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the fire stops and seals commodity components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

## **2.5 Scoping and Screening Results: Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls Systems**

This section documents the staff's review of the applicant's scoping and screening results for electrical systems and instrumentation and controls (I&C) systems. Specifically, ALRA Section 2.5 discusses the following electrical and I&C systems that are within the scope of license renewal:

- NMP1 24V DC electrical distribution system
- NMP1 125V DC electrical distribution system
- NMP1 120V AC electrical distribution system
- NMP1 600V AC electrical distribution system
- NMP1 4.16KV AC electrical distribution system
- NMP1 115KV AC electrical distribution system
- NMP1 anticipated transients without scram system
- NMP1 communications system
- NMP1 plant lighting system
- NMP1 plant process computer system
- NMP1 reactor protection system
- NMP1 remote shutdown system
- NMP1 Neutron monitoring system
- NMP2 13.8KV AC electrical distribution system
- NMP2 4.16KV AC electrical distribution system
- NMP2 battery-24V-station system
- NMP2 common electrical system
- NMP2 communications paging system
- NMP2 communications telephone system
- NMP2 emergency DC distribution system
- NMP2 emergency uninterruptible power supplies system
- NMP2 feedwater control system
- NMP2 heat tracing system
- NMP2 information handling annunciator system
- NMP2 motor control center emergency system
- NMP2 normal AC high voltage distribution system
- NMP2 normal DC distribution system
- NMP2 normal UPS system
- NMP2 process computer system

- NMP2 reactor protection motor generator system
- NMP2 reactor protection system
- NMP2 redundant reactivity control system
- NMP2 remote shutdown system
- NMP2 reserve station service transformers system
- NMP2 standby and emergency AC distribution system
- NMP2 standby diesel generator protection (breaker) system
- NMP2 startup transient analysis system
- NMP2 station control bus nonvital AC supply system
- NMP2 station control bus vital AC supply system
- NMP2 station lighting system
- NMP2 switchyard system
- NMP2 synchronizing - diesel generator system
- NMP2 unit substation emergency AC controls and heater supply
- NMP2 unit substation emergency system
- NMP2 unit substation system
- NMP2 uninterruptible power supplies distribution system
- NMP2 standby diesel generator protection (generator) system

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1), the applicant identified and listed passive, long-lived SCs that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. To verify that the applicant properly implemented its methodology, the staff focused its review on the implementation results. This approach allowed the staff to confirm that there were no omissions of electrical and I&C system components that meet the scoping criteria and are subject to an AMR.

Staff Evaluation Methodology. The staff's evaluation of the information provided in the ALRA was performed in the same manner for all electrical and I&C systems and commodities. The objective of the review was to determine if the components and supporting structures for a specific electrical and I&C system or commodity, that appeared to meet the scoping criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 54, were identified by the applicant as within the scope of license renewal, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4. Similarly, the staff evaluated the applicant's screening results to verify that all long-lived, passive components were subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Scoping. To perform its evaluation, the staff reviewed the applicable ALRA section and associated component drawings, focusing its review on components that had not been identified as within the scope of license renewal. The staff reviewed relevant licensing basis documents, including the UFSAR and USAR, for each electrical and I&C system component to determine if the applicant had omitted components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a) from the scope of license renewal. The staff also reviewed the licensing basis documents to determine if all intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a) were specified in the ALRA. If omissions were identified, the staff requested additional information to resolve the discrepancies.

Screening. Once the staff completed its review of the scoping results, the staff evaluated the applicant's screening results. For those systems and components with intended functions, the staff sought to determine: (1) if the functions are performed with moving parts or a change in configuration or properties, or (2) if they are subject to replacement based on a qualified life or



specified time period, as described in 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). For those that did not meet either of these criteria, the staff sought to confirm that these electrical and I&C systems and components were subject to an AMR as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). If discrepancies were identified, the staff requested additional information to resolve them.

### **2.5.1 NMPNS Electrical Commodities**

In LRA Section 2.5.C, the applicant described the components and systems included in the commodity group:

- 2.5.C.1 Cables and Connectors
- 2.5.C.2 Non-Segregated/switchyard Bus
- 2.5.C.3 Containment Electrical Penetrations
- 2.5.C.4 Switchyard Components

The commodity group is within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) because it provides electrical power to safety Class 1, 2, and 3 components. Some SSCs in the system are considered within the scope of license renewal because their failure could affect the capability of safety-related SSCs per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). Others are within the scope of license renewal because they support fire protection, anticipated transient without scram, and station blackout per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). An intended function within the scope of license renewal is to electrically connect specified sections of an electrical circuit to deliver voltage, current, or signal. Additional intended functions are to isolate electrically and provide structural support to transmission conductors, phase buses, and switchyard buses.

In ALRA Tables 2.5.C.1-1, 2.5.C.2-1, 2.5.C.3-1, and 2.5.C.4-1, the applicant identified the following commodity group component types within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- conductor insulation for electrical cables and connector
- conductor insulation for electrical cables used in circuits sensitive to reduction in conductor insulation resistance (IR)
- fuse holders (not part of a larger assembly)
- insulators
- non-segregated busses
- switchyard busses
- electrical penetrations
- high-voltage insulators
- transmission conductors
- transmission conductor connectors

In ALRA Section 2.5.C the applicant identified the NMPNS electrical commodities subject to an AMR for license renewal.

After applying the scoping and screening methodology the applicant categorized the components requiring AMR into passive commodity groups. In ALRA Section 2.5.C, the applicant identified the SCs of the electrical and I&C systems subject to an AMR for license renewal. The staff's review findings regarding ALRA Sections 2.5.C.1 through 2.5.C.4 are presented in SER Sections 2.5.1.1 through 2.5.1.4, respectively, for both NMP1 and NMP2.

### **2.5.1.1 Cables and Connectors**

#### **2.5.1.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 2.5.C.1, the applicant described the cables and connectors commodity. The components addressed in this commodity are electrical cables, connectors, splices, terminal blocks, and fuse blocks. Cables are identified on a plant-wide basis, and are not identified as being associated with a particular system.

The intended function, within the scope of license renewal, is to provide continuity to deliver electrical signals or power (includes insulation).

In ALRA Table 2.5.C.1-1, the applicant identified the following cables and connectors commodity component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- conductor insulation for electrical cables and connectors
- conductor insulation for electrical cables used in circuits that are to reduction in conductor insulation resistance (IR)
- fuse holders (not part of a larger assembly)

#### **2.5.1.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.5.C.1, UFSAR, and USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.5. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.5.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the commodity functions described in the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The applicant evaluated the cables and connectors plant-wide as commodities across system boundaries. In ALRA Section 2.5.C.1 the applicant stated that the components addressed in this commodity are electrical cables, connectors, splices, terminal blocks, and fuse blocks. Cables are identified plant-wide and are not identified as associated with particular systems. Cables and their associated connectors provide electrical continuity to specified sections of an electrical circuit to deliver voltage, current, and signals to various equipment and components throughout the plant to enable them to perform their intended functions.

The staff found that the applicant correctly identified the cables and connectors as components that perform their functions without moving parts or change in configuration or properties (passive and long-lived) and, therefore, subject to AMR.

#### 2.5.1.1.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the cables and connectors commodity components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the cables and connectors commodity components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.5.1.2 Non-Segregated/Switchyard Bus**

##### 2.5.1.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.5.C.2, the applicant described the non-segregated/switchyard bus commodity. The components evaluated in this commodity encompass the electrical switchyard and non-segregated busses, as well as their associated insulators. Electrical busses perform the function of providing electrical continuity to specified sections of an electrical circuit voltage and current to various equipment and components throughout the plant to enable them to perform their intended functions.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides continuity to deliver electrical signals or power (includes insulation)
- insulates and supports an electrical conductor

In ALRA Table 2.5.C.2-1, the applicant identified the following non-segregated/switchyard bus commodity component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- insulators
- non-segregated bus
- switchyard bus

##### 2.5.1.2.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.5.C.2, UFSAR, and USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.5. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.5.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the commodity functions described in the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended

functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The non-segregated/switchyard bus identified by the applicant requiring an AMR includes insulators, a non-segregated bus, and a switchyard bus. Electrical busses provide electrical continuity to an electrical circuit and voltage and current to equipment and components throughout the plant to enable them to perform their intended functions. The intended function of the insulators is electrical insulation and NSR functional support through separation of busses and conductors from other components and structures.

The staff reviewed these component categories and found them subject to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and 10 CFR 54.4(b) requirements. The staff reviewed the information in the UFSAR and USAR and found that the applicant had identified correctly the non-segregated/switchyard bus commodity component types that perform intended functions without moving parts or change in configuration or properties (passive and long lived) and are, therefore, subject to an AMR.

#### 2.5.1.2.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the non-segregated/switchyard bus commodity components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the non-segregated/switchyard bus commodity components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.5.1.3 Containment Electrical Penetrations**

#### 2.5.1.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.5.C.3, the applicant described the containment electrical penetrations commodity. The components evaluated in this commodity encompass the non-EQ electrical penetrations that form part of the containment pressure boundary. An electrical penetration provides an electrical connection between two sections of the electrical/I&C circuit. The pigtail at each end of the penetration is connected to the field cable in various ways and is included in this evaluation. The connector or connection method is included in the cables and connectors commodity group. The structural steel portion of the primary containment electrical penetrations is evaluated in the NMP1 primary containment structure and the NMP2 primary containment structure.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides continuity to deliver electrical signals or power (includes insulation)
- provides pressure retaining boundary

In ALRA Table 2.5.C.3-1, the applicant identified that the electrical penetrations component type of the containment electrical penetrations commodity is within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### 2.5.1.3.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.5.C.3, UFSAR, and USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.5. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.5.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the commodity functions described in the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The containment electrical penetrations identified by the applicant are non-EQ and form part of the containment pressure boundary. They also provide electrical continuity to an electrical circuit to deliver voltage, current, and signals across the containment boundary (either continuously or intermittently) to equipment and components throughout the plant to enable them to perform their intended functions. An electrical penetration is a device used to provide an electrical connection between two sections of the electrical/I&C circuit, inside and outside of the containment. This evaluation includes the pigtail located at each end of the penetration. The pigtail connects the end of the penetration to the field cable in various ways. The connector or connection method is addressed in the cables and connectors commodity group section.

The staff reviewed these component categories and found them subject to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and 10 CFR 54.4(b) requirements. The staff reviewed the information in the UFSAR and USAR and found that the applicant had identified correctly the containment electrical penetrations that perform their intended functions without moving parts or change in configuration or properties (passive and long lived) and are, therefore, subject to an AMR.

#### 2.5.1.3.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the containment electrical penetrations commodity components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the containment electrical penetrations commodity components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

#### **2.5.1.4 Switchyard Components**

##### 2.5.1.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 2.5.C.4, the applicant described the switchyard components commodity. The switchyard components commodity was developed to address the addition of the 115KV switchyards for SBO recovery to the scope of license renewal. Cables, connectors, and busbars are evaluated in their respective commodity groups.

The intended functions within the scope of license renewal include the following:

- provides continuity to deliver electrical signals or power (includes insulation)
- insulates and supports an electrical conductor

In ALRA Table 2.5.C.4-1, the applicant identified the following switchyard components commodity component types that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR:

- high voltage insulators
- transmission conductors
- transmission conductor connectors

#### 2.5.1.4.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 2.5.C.4, UFSAR, and USAR using the evaluation methodology described in SER Section 2.5. The staff conducted its review in accordance with the guidance described in SRP-LR Section 2.5.

In conducting its review, the staff evaluated the commodity functions described in the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) to verify that the applicant had not omitted from the scope of license renewal any components with intended functions delineated under 10 CFR 54.4(a). The staff then reviewed those components that the applicant had identified as being within the scope of license renewal to verify that the applicant had not omitted any passive and long-lived components that should be subject to an AMR in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

As identified by the applicant the switchyard component commodity was developed to address the addition of the 115kV switchyard for SBO recovery to the scope of license renewal. The components subject to AMR within the yard are the transmission conductors, insulators, and associated connectors. Cables, connectors, and bus bars are evaluated in their respective commodity group sections. Switchyard transmission conductors and associated connectors provide electrical connections to electrical circuits to deliver voltage, current, and signals to equipment and components throughout the switchyard to enable them to perform their intended functions. The intended function of the high-voltage insulators is electrical insulation and NSR function support through separation of the busses and conductors from other components and structures.

The staff reviewed these component categories and found them subject to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) and 10 CFR 54.4(b) requirements. The staff reviewed the information in the UFSAR and USAR and found that the applicant had identified correctly the switchyard components that perform their intended functions without moving parts or change in configuration or properties (passive and long lived) and are, therefore, subject to an AMR.

#### 2.5.1.4.3 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the ALRA, UFSAR, and USAR to determine whether any SSCs that should be within the scope of license renewal had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. In addition, the staff performed a review to determine whether any components that should be subject to an AMR had not been identified by the applicant. No omissions were identified. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the applicant had adequately identified the switchyard components commodity components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and the switchyard components commodity components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

### **2.6 Conclusion for Scoping and Screening**

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2, "Scoping and Screening Methodology for Identifying Structures and Components Subject to Aging Management Review, and Implementation Results." The staff determined that the applicant's scoping and screening, including its supplement 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) review, which brought additional NSR piping segments and associated components within the scope of license renewal, was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) and the staff's position on the treatment of SR and NSR SSCs within the scope of license renewal and the structures and components requiring an AMR is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4 and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the applicant had adequately identified those systems and components that are within the scope of license renewal, as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a), and those systems and components that are subject to an AMR, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

The staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed licenses will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB, and any changes made to the CLB, in order to comply with 10 CFR 54.29(a), are in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the NRC's regulations.

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## SECTION 3

### AGING MANAGEMENT REVIEW RESULTS

This section of the safety evaluation report (SER) contains the staff's evaluation of the applicant's aging management programs (AMPs) and aging management reviews (AMRs). In amended license renewal application (ALRA) Appendix B, the applicant described the 42 AMPs that it relies on to manage or monitor the aging of long-lived, passive components and structures.

In ALRA Section 3, the applicant provided the results of the AMRs for those structures and components that were identified in ALRA Section 2 as being within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR.

#### **3.0 Applicant's Use of the Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report**

In preparing its ALRA, Constellation Energy Group, LLC (CEG or the applicant) credited NUREG-1801, "Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report," The GALL Report contains the staff's generic evaluation of the existing plant programs, and it documents the technical basis for determining when existing programs are adequate without modification, and when existing programs should be augmented for the extended period of operation. The evaluation results documented in the GALL Report indicate that many of the existing programs are adequate to manage the aging effects for particular structures or components for license renewal without change. The GALL Report also contains recommendations on specific areas for which existing programs should be augmented for license renewal. An applicant may reference the GALL Report in its LRA to demonstrate that the programs at its facility correspond to those reviewed and approved in the Report.

The purpose of the GALL Report is to provide the staff with a summary of staff-approved AMPs to manage or monitor the aging of structures and components that are subject to an AMR. If an applicant commits to implementing these staff-approved AMPs, the time, effort, and resources used to review an applicant's LRA will likely be reduced, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the license renewal review process. The GALL Report also serves as a reference for applicants and staff reviewers to quickly identify those AMPs and activities that the staff has determined will adequately manage or monitor aging during the period of extended operation.

The GALL Report identifies: (1) systems, structures, and components (SSCs); (2) structure and component (SC) materials; (3) the environments to which the SCs are exposed; (4) the aging effects associated with the materials and environments; (5) the AMPs that are credited with managing or monitoring the aging effects; and (6) recommendations for further applicant evaluations of aging management for certain component types.

To determine whether using the GALL Report would improve the efficiency of the license renewal review, the staff conducted a demonstration project to exercise the GALL process and to determine the format and content of a safety evaluation based on this process. The results of the demonstration project confirmed that the GALL process will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the LRA review, while maintaining the staff's focus on public health and safety.

NUREG-1800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of License Renewal Applications," dated April 2001 (SRP-LR) was prepared based on both the GALL Report model and lessons learned from the demonstration project.

The staff performed its review in accordance with the requirements of Title 10, Part 54, of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR Part 54), "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," the guidance provided in the SRP-LR, and the guidance provided in the GALL Report.

In addition to its review of the ALRA, the staff conducted an onsite audit of selected AMRs and associated AMPs, as described in the "Audit and Review Plan for Plant Aging Management Reviews and Programs, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2," (Audit and Review Report) dated January 18, 2006. The onsite audits and reviews are designed to maximize the efficiency of the staff's review of the LRA. The need for formal correspondence between the staff and the applicant is reduced, thereby resulting in an improvement in the review's efficiency. Also, the applicant could respond to questions and the staff could readily evaluate the applicant's responses.

### **3.0.1 Format of the License Renewal Application**

The applicant submitted an application that followed the standard LRA format, which was agreed to by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) (see letter dated April 7, 2003, ML030990052). This revised LRA format incorporates lessons learned from the staff's reviews of the previous five LRAs. These previous applications used a format developed from information gained during an NRC staff and NEI demonstration project that was conducted to evaluate the use of the GALL Report in the staff's review process.

The organization of the amended LRA (ALRA) Section 3 parallels SRP-LR Chapter 3. The AMR results information in ALRA Section 3 is presented in the following two table types:

- Table 1: Table 3.x.1.A or 3.x.1.B – where "3" indicates the ALRA section number, "x" indicates the subsection number from the GALL Report, "1" indicates that this is the first table type in ALRA Section 3; "A" and "B" indicate that the table applies to Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) or Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2), respectively.
- Table 2: Table 3.x.2.A-y or 3.x.2.B-y – where "3" indicates the ALRA section number; "x" indicates the subsection number from the GALL Report; "2" indicates that this is the second table type in ALRA Section 3; "A" and "B" indicate that the table applies to NMP1 or NMP2, respectively; and "y" indicates the system table number.

The content of the original LRA and the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) ALRA is essentially the same. The intent of the ALRA revised format was to modify the tables in LRA Section 3 to provide additional information that would assist the staff in its review. Table 1 of ALRA Section 3, summarizes portions of the application that it is considered to be consistent with the GALL Report. In Table 2 of ALRA Section 3, the applicant identified the linkage between the scoping and screening results in ALRA Section 2 and the AMRs in ALRA Section 3.

### **3.0.1.1 Overview of Table 1**

Table 3.x.1.A or 3.x.1.B (Table 1) provides a summary comparison of how the facility aligns with the corresponding tables of the GALL Report, Volume 1. The table is essentially the same as Tables 1 through 6 provided in the GALL Report, Volume 1, except that the “Type” column has been replaced by an “Item Number” column and the “Item Number in GALL” column has been replaced by a “Discussion” column. The “Item Number” column provides the reviewer with a means to cross-reference from Table 2 to Table 1. The “Discussion” column is used by the applicant to provide clarifying and amplifying information. The following are examples of information that might be contained within this column:

- further evaluation recommended – information or reference to where that information is located
- the name of a plant-specific program being used
- exceptions to the GALL Report assumptions
- a discussion of how the line is consistent with the corresponding line item in the GALL Report when this may not be intuitively obvious
- a discussion of how the item is different from the corresponding line item in the GALL Report (e.g., when there is exception taken to a GALL AMP)

The format of Table 1 allows the staff to align a specific Table 1 row with the corresponding GALL Report, Volume 1, table row so that the consistency can be verified.

### **3.0.1.2 Overview of Table 2**

Table 3.x.2.A-y or 3.x.2.B-y (Table 2) provides the detailed results of the AMRs for those components identified in ALRA Section 2 as being subject to an AMR. The ALRA contains a Table 2 for each of the systems or components within a system grouping (e.g., reactor coolant systems, engineered safety features, auxiliary systems, etc.). For example, the engineered safety features group contains tables specific to the core spray system, high pressure coolant injection system, and residual heat removal system. Table 2 consists of the following nine columns:

- (1) Component Type – The first column identifies the component types from ALRA Section 2 that are subject to aging management review. The component types are listed in alphabetical order.
- (2) Intended Function – The second column contains the license renewal intended functions (including abbreviations, where applicable) for the listed component types. Definitions and abbreviations of intended functions are contained within ALRA Table 2.0-1.
- (3) Material – The third column lists the particular materials of construction for the component type.
- (4) Environment – The fourth column lists the environment to which the component types are exposed. Internal and external service environments are indicated and a list of these environments is provided in ALRA Table 3.0-1.

- (5) Aging Effect Requiring Management – The fifth column lists aging effects requiring management (AERMs). As part of the aging management review process, the applicant determined any AERMs for each combination of material and environment.
- (6) Aging Management Programs – The sixth column lists the AMPs that the applicant used to manage the identified aging effects.
- (7) NUREG-1801 Volume 2 Item – The seventh column lists the GALL Report item(s) that the applicant identified as being similar to the AMR results in the ALRA. The applicant compared each combination of component type, material, environment, AERM, and AMP in Table 2 of the ALRA to the items in the GALL Report. If there were no corresponding items in the GALL Report, the applicant left the column blank. In this way, the applicant identified the AMR results in the ALRA tables that corresponded to the items in the GALL Report tables.
- (8) Table 1 Item – The eighth column lists the corresponding summary item number from Table 1. If the applicant identifies AMR results in Table 2 that are consistent with the GALL Report, then the associated Table 1 line summary item number should be listed in Table 2. If there is no corresponding item in the GALL Report, then column eight is left blank. That way, the information from the two tables can be correlated.
- (9) Notes – The ninth column lists the corresponding notes that the applicant used to identify how the information in Table 2 aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The notes (identified by alphabet letters) were developed by an NEI working group and will be used in future license renewal applications. Any plant-specific notes are identified by a number and provide additional information concerning the consistency of the line item with the GALL Report.

### **3.0.2 Staff's Review Process**

The staff conducted the following three types of evaluations of the AMRs and associated AMPs:

- (1) For items that the applicant stated were consistent with the GALL Report, the staff conducted either an audit or a technical review to determine consistency with the GALL Report.
- (2) For items that the applicant stated were consistent with the GALL Report with exceptions and/or enhancements, the staff conducted either an audit or a technical review of the item to determine consistency with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff conducted either an audit or a technical review of the applicant's technical justification for the exceptions and the adequacy of the enhancements.
- (3) For other items, the staff conducted a technical review.

The staff performed audits and technical reviews of the license renewal applicant's AMPs and AMRs. These audit and technical reviews are to determine whether the effects of aging on structures and components can be adequately managed so that their intended functions can be maintained consistently with the plant's current licensing basis (CLB) for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants."

### **3.0.2.1 Review of AMPs**

For those AMPs for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL AMPs, the staff conducted either an audit or a technical review to verify that the applicant's AMPs were consistent with the AMPs in the GALL Report. For each AMP that had one or more deviations, the staff evaluated each deviation to determine: (1) whether the deviation was acceptable; and (2) whether the AMP, as modified, would adequately manage the aging effect(s) for which it was credited. For AMPs that were not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff performed a full review to determine the adequacy of the AMPs. The staff evaluated the AMPs against the following 10 program elements defined in SRP-LR Appendix A.

- (1) Scope of the Program – Scope of the program should include the specific structures and components subject to an AMR for license renewal.
- (2) Preventive Actions – Preventive actions should prevent or mitigate aging degradation.
- (3) Parameters Monitored or Inspected – Parameters monitored or inspected should be linked to the degradation of the particular structure or component intended function(s).
- (4) Detection of Aging Effects – Detection of aging effects should occur before there is a loss of structure or component intended function(s). This includes aspects such as method or technique (i.e., visual, volumetric, surface inspection), frequency, sample size, data collection, and timing of new/one-time inspections to ensure a timely detection of aging effects.
- (5) Monitoring and Trending – Monitoring and trending should provide predictability of the extent of degradation, as well as timely corrective or mitigative actions.
- (6) Acceptance Criteria – Acceptance criteria, against which the need for corrective action will be evaluated, should ensure that the structure or component intended function(s) are maintained under all CLB design conditions during the period of extended operation.
- (7) Corrective Actions – Corrective actions, including root cause determination and prevention of recurrence, should be timely.
- (8) Confirmation Process – Confirmation process should ensure that preventive actions are adequate and that appropriate corrective actions have been completed and are effective.
- (9) Administrative Controls - Administrative controls should provide a formal review and approval process.
- (10) Operating Experience – Operating experience of the AMP, including past corrective actions resulting in program enhancements or additional programs, should provide objective evidence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the SC intended function(s) will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

Details of the staff's audit evaluation of program elements (1) through (6) are documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18, 2006, and are summarized in SER Section 3.0.3.

The staff reviewed the applicant's corrective action program and documented its evaluations in SER Section 3.0.4. The staff's evaluation of the corrective action program included assessment of the following program elements: (7) corrective actions, (8) confirmation process, and (9)

administrative controls.

The staff reviewed the information concerning the (10) operating experience program element and documented its evaluation in the Audit and Review Report. The staff also included a summary of the program in SER Section 3.0.3.

The staff reviewed the respective NMP1 updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and NMP2 updated safety analysis report (USAR) supplements for each AMP to determine if it provided an adequate description of the program or activity, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **3.0.2.2 Review of AMR Results**

ALRA Table 2 contains information concerning whether or not the AMRs align with the AMRs identified in the GALL Report. For a given AMR in Table 2, the staff reviewed the intended function, material, environment, AERM, and AMP combination for a particular component type within a system. The AMRs that correlate between a combination in Table 2 and a combination in the GALL Report were identified by a referenced item number in column seven, "NUREG-1801 Volume 2 Item." The staff also conducted onsite audits to verify the correlation. A blank column seven indicates that the applicant was unable to locate an appropriate corresponding combination in the GALL Report. The staff conducted a technical review of these combinations that were not consistent with the GALL Report. The next column, "Table 1 Item," provided a reference number that indicated the corresponding row in Table 1.

#### **3.0.2.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

Consistent with the SRP-LR, for the AMRs and associated AMPs that it reviewed, the staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements that summarize the applicant's programs and activities for managing the effects of aging for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **3.0.2.4 Documentation and Documents Reviewed**

In performing its review, the staff used the ALRA, ALRA supplements, SRP-LR, and the GALL Report.

Also, during the onsite audit, the staff examined the applicant's justification, as documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report, to verify that the applicant's activities and programs will adequately manage the effects of aging on SCs. The staff also conducted detailed discussions and interviews with the applicant's license renewal project personnel and others with technical expertise relevant to aging management.

### **3.0.3 Aging Management Programs**

SER Table 3.0.3-1 presents the AMPs credited by the applicant and described in ALRA Appendix B. The table also indicates the GALL AMP that the applicant claimed its AMP was consistent with (if applicable) and the SSCs for managing or monitoring aging. The section of the SER, in which the staff's evaluation of the program is documented, is also provided.

**Table 3.0.3-1 NMPNS's Aging Management Programs**

NMPNS's AMP (ALRA Section)	GALL Comparison	GALL AMP(s)	ALRA Systems or Structures That Credit the AMP	Staff's SER Section
<b>Existing AMPs</b>				
ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1)	Consistent with exception	XI.M1	NMP1: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems  NMP2: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems	3.0.3.2.1
Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with exceptions	XI.M2	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems; structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.2
Reactor Head Closure Studs Program (B2.1.3)	Consistent with exception	XI.M3	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems	3.0.3.2.3
BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program (B2.1.4)	Consistent	XI.M4	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems	3.0.3.1.1
BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program (B2.1.5)	Consistent with exception	XI.M5	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems	3.0.3.2.4
BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program (B2.1.6)	Consistent with exception	XI.M7	NMP1: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems  NMP2: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features	3.0.3.2.5
BWR Penetrations Program (B2.1.7)	Consistent	XI.M8	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems	3.0.3.1.2
BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M9	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems	3.0.3.2.6

<b>NMPNS's AMP (ALRA Section)</b>	<b>GALL Comparison</b>	<b>GALL AMP(s)</b>	<b>ALRA Systems or Structures That Credit the AMP</b>	<b>Staff's SER Section</b>
Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (B2.1.9)	Consistent	XI.M17	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems	3.0.3.1.3
Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.10)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M20	engineered safety features; auxiliary systems	3.0.3.2.7
Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.11)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M21	NMP1: auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems  NMP2: auxiliary systems	3.0.3.2.8
Boraflex Monitoring Program, NMP1 Only (B2.1.12)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M22	structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.9
Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program (B2.1.13)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M23	structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.10
Compressed Air Monitoring Program, NMP1 Only (B2.1.14)	Consistent with exceptions and enhancements	XI.M24	auxiliary systems	3.0.3.2.11
BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program (B2.1.15)	Consistent with exception	XI.M25	NMP1 auxiliary systems	3.0.3.2.12
Fire Protection Program (B2.1.16)	Consistent with exceptions and enhancements	XI.M26	auxiliary systems; structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.13
Fire Water System Program (B2.1.17)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M27	auxiliary systems	3.0.3.2.14
Fuel Oil Chemistry Program (B2.1.18)	Consistent with exceptions and enhancements	XI.M30	auxiliary systems	3.0.3.2.15
Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program (B2.1.19)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M31	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems	3.0.3.2.16



<b>NMPNS's AMP (ALRA Section)</b>	<b>GALL Comparison</b>	<b>GALL AMP(s)</b>	<b>ALRA Systems or Structures That Credit the AMP</b>	<b>Staff's SER Section</b>
ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23)	Consistent with exceptions and enhancement	XI.S1	structures and component supports; electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.2.17
ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program, NMP2 Only (B2.1.24)	Consistent with exceptions	XI.S2	structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.18
ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program (B2.1.25)	Consistent with exceptions	XI.S3	structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.19
10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent	XI.S4	auxiliary systems; structures and component supports; electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.1.7
Masonry Wall Program (B2.1.27)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.S5	structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.20
Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.S6	structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.21
Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program (B2.1.30)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.E2	electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.2.22
Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Program, NMP2 Only (B2.1.31)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.E3	electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.2.27
Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Plant-specific		engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems; electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.3.1
Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33)	Plant-specific		reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems	3.0.3.3.2
Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program (B2.1.34)	Plant-specific		electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.3.3

<b>NMPNS's AMP (ALRA Section)</b>	<b>GALL Comparison</b>	<b>GALL AMP(s)</b>	<b>ALRA Systems or Structures That Credit the AMP</b>	<b>Staff's SER Section</b>
Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with enhancements	XI.M18	NMP1: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems  NMP2: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems; structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.23
BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program (B2.1.37)	Consistent with exceptions	XI.M6	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems	3.0.3.2.24
Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program (B2.1.38)	Consistent with exceptions and enhancements	XI.S8	structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.25
Environmental Qualification Program (B3.1)	Consistent	X.E1	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems; structures and component supports	3.0.3.1.9
Fatigue Monitoring Program (B3.2)	Consistent with enhancements	X.M1	reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems; structures and component supports	3.0.3.2.26
Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program, NMP1 Only (B3.3)	Plant-specific		structures and component supports	3.0.3.3.7
<b>New AMPs</b>				

<b>NMPNS's AMP (ALRA Section)</b>	<b>GALL Comparison</b>	<b>GALL AMP(s)</b>	<b>ALRA Systems or Structures That Credit the AMP</b>	<b>Staff's SER Section</b>
One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent	XI.M32	NMP1: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems; structures and component supports  NMP2: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems	3.0.3.1.4
Selective Leaching of Materials Program (B2.1.21)	Consistent	XI.M33	NMP1: reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems; engineered safety features; auxiliary systems; steam and power conversion systems  NMP2: auxiliary systems	3.0.3.1.5
Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program (B2.1.22)	Consistent	XI.M34	auxiliary systems	3.0.3.1.6
Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program (B2.1.29)	Consistent	XI.E1	electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.1.8
Fuse Holder Inspection Program (B2.1.35)	Plant-specific		electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.3.4
Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program (B2.1.39)	Plant-specific		electrical and instrumentation and controls systems	3.0.3.3.5
Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program, NMP2 Only (B2.1.40)	Plant-specific		structures and component supports	3.0.3.3.6

### **3.0.3.1 AMPs That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

In ALRA Appendix B, the applicant identified that the following AMPs were consistent with the GALL Report:

- BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program
- BWR Penetrations Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program
- Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program
- Environmental Qualification Program

#### **3.0.3.1.1 BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.4, the applicant described the BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M4, “BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds.” The BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program manages the effects of cracking in reactor pressure vessel inside diameter attachment welds. The BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program is based on industry guidelines issued by the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel Internals Project (BWRVIP) and approved by the staff. Implementation of the BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program is discussed in the program description for the BWR Vessel Internals Program (ALRA Section B2.1.8). The attributes of the BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program related to maintaining reactor coolant water chemistry are discussed in the program description for the Water Chemistry Control Program (ALRA Section B2.1.2).

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant’s claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff’s evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that NMP credited Revisions 1 and 2 of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) TR-103515 guidelines for its reactor coolant water chemistry instead of the GALL Report recommended guidelines in BWRVIP-29. The applicant stated that the “Preventive Actions” program element is addressed in its Water Chemistry Control Program. The staff’s review and evaluation of the applicant’s Water Chemistry Control Program are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.2. The staff found this method acceptable.

The staff reviewed those portions of the BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M4 and found them consistent.

Operating Experience. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant explained that no industry operating experience with vessel ID attachment weld flaws has emerged since the release of BWRVIP-48; therefore, there is no recent applicable operating experience. The applicant also stated that program changes and updates have resulted from the ongoing review

of regulatory notices for applicability to the reactor vessel internals. NMP closely monitors the activity of the BWR Vessel Internals Program and ASME Section XI Code Committees. In these ways, the applicant addresses vessel internal degradation noted at other BWRs systematically and revises BWR Vessel Internals Program inspections accordingly. Operating experience issues affecting NMP1 include core shroud cracking, shroud support weld cracking, control rod drive (CRD) stub tube intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) and leakage and top guide cracking. Operating experience issues identified at NMP2 include core shroud cracking and jet pump wedge wear. No other cracking has been identified for vessel internals at either unit.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant's BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.11 and A2.1.12, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.1.2 BWR Penetrations Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.7, the applicant described the BWR Penetrations Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M8, "BWR Penetrations." The BWR Penetrations Program manages the effects of cracking in the various penetrations of the reactor pressure vessels. The BWR Penetrations Program is based on guidelines issued by the BWRVIP and approved by the NRC. Implementation of the BWR Penetrations Program is discussed in the program description for the BWR Vessel Internals Program (ALRA Section B2.1.8). The attributes of the BWR Penetrations Program related to maintaining reactor coolant water chemistry are included in the Water Chemistry Control Program (ALRA Section B2.1.2).

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP

described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that NMP credited Revision 1 and Revision 2 of the EPRI TR-103515 guidelines for its reactor coolant water chemistry instead of the GALL Report recommended guidelines in BWRVIP-29. The applicant stated that the "Preventive Actions" program element is addressed in its Water Chemistry Control Program. The staff's review and evaluation reviewed the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.2. The staff found this method acceptable.

The staff reviewed those portions of the BWR Penetrations Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M8 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's BWR Penetrations Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M8.

Operating Experience. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant explained that operating experience issues affecting NMP1 include core shroud cracking, shroud support weld cracking, CRD stub tube penetration IGSCC and leakage, and top guide cracking. Operating experience issues identified at NMP2 include core shroud cracking and jet pump wedge wear. No other cracking has been identified for vessel internals at either unit. The applicant also stated that program changes and updates have resulted from the ongoing review of industry operating experience and regulatory notices for applicability to the reactor vessel internals. NMP closely monitors the activity in the BWRVIP and ASME Section XI Code Committees. In these ways the applicant addressed vessel internal degradation noted at other BWRs in a systematic manner and revised the BWRVIP inspections accordingly.

The staff reviewed the operating experience referenced in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that (1) the plant-specific operating experience did not reveal any degradation not bounded by industry experience and (2) no industry operating experience with penetration and nozzle cracking has emerged since the release of BWRVIP-49 and BWRVIP-27.

The staff recognized that the corrective action program, which captures internal and external plant operating experience issues, ensures operating experience review and incorporation of objective evidence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging will be adequately managed.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.8 and A2.1.9, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the BWR Penetrations Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's BWR Penetrations Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.0.3.1.3 Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.9, the applicant described the Flow-Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M17, "Flow-Accelerated Corrosion." The FAC Program, also referred to as the Erosion/Corrosion Program, manages aging effects due to flow-accelerated corrosion in carbon steel and low alloy steel piping containing single-phase and two-phase high-energy fluids. Program activities include: (1) analysis using a predictive code (CHECWORKS) to determine critical locations, (2) baseline inspections to determine the extent of thinning at the selected locations, (3) follow-up inspections to confirm the predictions, and (4) repair or replacement of components, as necessary. The inspection results provide input to the predictive computer code to calculate the number of refueling or operating cycles remaining before the component reaches the minimum allowable wall thickness. If the component trend indicates that an area will reach the minimum allowed thickness before the next scheduled outage, the component is repaired, replaced, or re-evaluated. The program considers the recommended actions in NRC Bulletin 87-01 and Information Notice (IN) 91-18, and implements the guidelines for an effective FAC program presented in EPRI Report NSAC-202L-R2. The program also implements the recommendations provided in NRC generic letter (GL) 89-08, "Erosion/Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall Thinning."

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the minimum acceptable wall thickness defined in its FAC Program. The applicant stated that its FAC Program minimum acceptable wall thickness is the thickness required by the design code to withstand design loads. The applicant's FAC Program uses 87.5 percent of the nominal wall thickness as the first threshold for minimum wall thickness because newly purchased pipe to a nominal design specification could have actual wall thickness as low as 87.5 percent of the nominal wall thickness. The applicant also explained that if degradation is detected such that the measured wall thickness is less than the minimum predicted thickness it will take additional examinations in adjacent areas and at similar locations in sister trains/parallel lines to bound the thinning and ensure that the actual minimum wall is measured. Because the applicant is using an industry-accepted 87.5 percent of the nominal pipe wall thickness based on the piping manufacturer's design tolerance for the minimum acceptable wall thickness determination and because the applicant is following the EPRI Report NSAC-202L-R2, "Recommendations for an Effective Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program," for selection of the sampling size the staff found this explanation satisfactory.

The staff found the applicant's FAC Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL XI.M17 as claimed by the applicant in the ALRA.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.9, the applicant explained that wall thinning problems in single- and two-phase systems have occurred throughout the industry, as documented in various NRC Bulletins and INs. NMPNS reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience in establishing the basis for the FAC Program, which is continually adjusted to account for further industry experience and research.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience did not reveal any degradation not bounded by industry experience.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant how well the CHECWORKS model predictions compared with the actual field measurements. The applicant informed the staff that the specific software inputs pertaining to the NMP application have been verified properly and tested satisfactorily. Although minor changes in wall thickness were detected the measurements confirmed that overall the CHECWORKS model was conservative. The applicant also stated that the model will be updated periodically, refined, and calibrated based on the comparison of inspection data with predicted wear rates.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's carbon steel piping erosion/corrosion program review plan for high energy systems. This procedure lists all NMP1 SSCs inspected in the applicant's FAC Program. The staff noted that plant-specific operating experience has been incorporated into this procedure. The staff also sampled several deviation event reports (DERs) that resulted from flow-accelerated corrosion inspections. The staff noted that these inspection results were evaluated and documented properly. The staff also noted that the applicant's FAC Program resulted in the identification and replacement of susceptible piping sections with materials more resistant to FAC. For example, in 1997 the reheater drain line inlet nozzles to the fifth point feedwater heat exchangers were found to be degrading due to FAC. As a corrective measure FAC-resistant materials were used to replace these piping components and in 2002 at NMP2 a second point feedwater heat exchanger low pressure drain line leaked before its scheduled FAC inspection. The degraded low pressure heater drain lines were replaced with FAC-resistant chrome-moly piping material. Based on this review, the staff concluded that continued review of operating experience will ensure that FAC aging effects will be adequately managed.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's FAC Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.19 and A2.1.19, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the FAC Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's FAC Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).



#### 3.0.3.1.4 One-Time Inspection Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.20, the applicant described the One-Time Inspection Program, stating that this is a new program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M32, "One-Time Inspection." The One-Time Inspection Program manages aging effects with potentially long incubation periods for susceptible components within the scope of license renewal. Program activities include visual, volumetric, and other established inspection techniques consistent with industry practice to provide a means of verifying that an aging effect is either not occurring or progressing so slowly that it has a negligible effect on the intended function of the structure or component. The program also provides measures for verifying the effectiveness of existing AMPs. If a one-time inspection reveals an AERM, an evaluation is required to determine the ability of the affected component to perform its intended function(s) during the period of extended operation and any appropriate corrective action. For stagnant or low flow areas in treated-water systems, the One-Time Inspection Program will determine the effectiveness of the Water Chemistry Control Program in managing the effects of aging. For Class 1 piping less than four inches in diameter (nominal pipe size) that is directly connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the One-Time Inspection Program will determine if cracking is occurring. If a flaw is detected, appropriate additional examinations will be performed using methods currently employed for similar components within the scope of the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program. Selective leaching is also part of the One-Time Inspection Program. It is an aging effect that occurs very slowly, and NMPNS has identified potentially susceptible components in various systems.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

The staff reviewed those portions of the One-Time Inspection Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M32 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M32.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.20, the applicant explained that the One-Time Inspection Program is a new program at NMPNS; therefore, no programmatic operating experience is available.

The staff recognized that the corrective action program captures internal and external plant operating experience issues and ensures review and incorporation of operating experience for objective evidence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging are adequately managed.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.28 and A2.1.28, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the One-Time Inspection Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed

consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.1.5 Selective Leaching of Materials Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.21, the applicant described the Selective Leaching of Materials Program, stating that this is a new program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M33, "Selective Leaching of Materials." The Selective Leaching of Materials Program manages aging of components susceptible to selective leaching. The potentially susceptible components include valve bodies, valve bonnets, pump casings, and heat exchanger components in various systems. Implementation of the Selective Leaching of Materials Program is discussed in the program description for the One-Time Inspection Program.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute. The staff found the applicant's Selective Leaching of Materials Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M33.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.21, the applicant explained that the Selective Leaching of Materials Program is implemented through its One-Time Inspection Program. However, the applicant has had plant-specific operating experience with selective leaching.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff reviewed the operating experience in the ALRA for the applicant's Selective Leaching of Materials Program and interviewed the applicant's technical staff. The staff determined that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.33 and A2.1.33, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Selective Leaching of Materials Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Selective Leaching of Materials Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.0.3.1.6 Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.22, the applicant described the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program, stating that this is a new program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M34, "Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection." The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program will manage the aging effects on the external surfaces of carbon steel, low-alloy steel, and cast iron components (e.g., tanks, piping) that are buried in soil. Program activities will include visual inspections of external coatings and wrappings to detect damage and degradation. Periodicity of inspections will be based on plant operating experience and opportunities for inspection due to maintenance. If an opportunistic inspection does not occur within the first ten years of extended operation, NMPNS will excavate a representative sample for the purpose of inspection.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

In ALRA Section B2.1.22 the applicant stated that its new Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program will manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms on the external surfaces of carbon steel, low-alloy steel, and cast iron components buried in soil. However, GALL AMP XI.M.34 states that the program manages the effects of corrosion on the pressure-retaining capacity of buried carbon steel piping and tanks. During the staff audit and review of the original LRA documented in the March 3, 2005, initial Audit and Review Report (ML050660380) the staff asked the applicant to explain how aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of cast iron and low-alloy components will be managed, e.g., how selective leaching for cast iron will be detected and managed. The applicant responded that low alloy steel and malleable cast iron are in the same material group as carbon steel with similar AERM. Selective leaching is a gray cast iron AERM that will be diagnosed by visual inspection and hardness measurement of selected samples.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. Low alloy steel and malleable cast iron have similar aging effects and aging effects mechanisms as carbon steel and selective leaching for cast iron components will be discovered by hardness testing.

The following sentence has been added to ALRA Section B2.1.22, Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program, under the program description (Page B2-51): "If an opportunistic inspection does not occur within the first ten years of extended operation, NMPNS will excavate a representative sample for the purpose of inspection." The staff asked the applicant to explain why the program description in the ALRA for its Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program was revised to address the possible need for focused inspections for only the first 10-year period of extended operation and not also for the 10-year period prior to extended operation. The applicant responded that its Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program was incomplete and that the ALRA will be amended to address the need for possible focused inspections during the 10-year period prior to extended operation.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that Sections A1.1.6, A2.1.7, and B2.1.22 under the program description of the ALRA will be revised to read as follows:

The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program is a new program that will manage the aging effects/mechanisms on the external surfaces of carbon steel, low-alloy steel, and cast iron components (e.g. tanks, piping) that are buried in soil. Program activities will include visual inspections of external coatings and wrappings to detect damage and degradation. Prior to entering the period of extended operation, NMP will verify that there has been at least one opportunistic or focused inspection within the past ten years. Upon entering the period of extended operation, NMP will perform a focused inspection within ten years, unless an opportunistic inspection occurred within this ten year period. All credited inspections will be performed in areas with the highest likelihood of corrosion problems, and in areas with a history of corrosion problems.

Sections A1.1.6 and A2.1.7 include the following additional last sentence:

This program will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. With the clarification statements added by the applicant to the ALRA to perform focused inspections as needed 10 years prior and within the first 10 years of license extension, the applicant's Buried Piping and Tank Inspection Program is now consistent with Element 4 of GALL AMP XI.M34.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M34 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program acceptable because it conformed to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M34.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.22, the applicant explained that the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program is a new program at NMPNS; therefore, no programmatic operating experience is available.

The staff reviewed the operating experience provided in the ALRA (however, only information about related plant-specific and industry experience was available) and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

The staff recognized that the corrective action program, which captures internal and external plant operating experience issues, ensures operating experience review and incorporation for objective evidence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging are adequately managed.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.6 and A2.1.7, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed

so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.1.7 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.26, the applicant described the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.S4, "10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J." The 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program [or Containment Leak Rate Test (LRT) Program] detects degradation of the containment structure and components that comprise the containment pressure boundary, including seals and gaskets. The program is not relied on to detect the onset or progression of degradation prior to it resulting in leakage. Containment leak rate tests are performed to assure that leakage through the primary containment and systems and components penetrating primary containment does not exceed allowable leakage limits specified in the technical specifications (TSs). Type A tests measure the primary reactor containment overall integrated leakage rate, and include visual examination of the interior and exterior surfaces of the containment for evidence of structural deterioration. Type B tests measure leakage across each pressure-containing or leakage-limiting boundary, including: (1) containment penetrations whose design incorporates resilient seals, gaskets, or sealant compounds; (2) piping penetrations fitted with expansion bellows; (3) electrical penetrations fitted with flexible metal seal assemblies; (4) air lock door seals; and (5) doors with resilient seals or gaskets. Type C tests measure the leakage rates for containment isolation valves.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff reviewed those portions of the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.S4 to confirm the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18 2006. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.26, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Containment LRT Program. Neither NMP1 nor NMP2 has experienced in the past two refueling outages a total leakage rate above Containment LRT Program acceptance criteria.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, in response to the staff's inquiry the applicant stated that during the past two refueling outages the corrective action program identified no problems affecting its Appendix J Program. In March-May 2004 the Appendix J Program was appraised to be sound by the applicant's self-assessment and by an external independent organization. The staff noted that the applicant has demonstrated good operating experience in maintaining the integrity of the primary containment boundaries as shown by the selection of Option B of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J leakage testing requirements at established frequencies consistent with plant experience.

The staff sampled several items on the DER list that were associated with the containment LRT testing and did not identify any items related to the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program that would necessitate a change to NMP AMP B2.1.26.

The staff reviewed the operating experience provided in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

The staff found that based on the review of operating history, corrective actions, and self-assessments the applicant's 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J Program is monitored continually and enhanced to incorporate the results of operating experience; as such it provides an effective means of managing aging affecting the structural integrity and leakproof tightness of the NMP containers.

After review of plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.1 and A2.1.1, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.1.8 Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.29, the applicant described the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program, stating that this is a new program that is consistent with GALL AMP XI.E1, "Electrical Cables and Connections Not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements." The Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program manages aging of cables and connectors within the scope of license renewal exposed to adverse localized temperature, moisture, or radiation environments. Program activities include visual inspection of susceptible cables for evidence of cable and connection jacket surface anomalies. Inspections are conducted at least once every ten years, with the first representative sample of susceptible cables inspected prior to expiration of the current NMPNS licenses.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.E1 and found them consistent. The

staff found the applicant's Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program acceptable because it conformed to the recommended GALL AMP XI.E1.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.29, the applicant explained that the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program is a new program at NMPNS; therefore, no programmatic operating experience is available.

The staff reviewed the plant-specific operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

ALRA stated that the applicant will thoroughly review accessible non-EQ cables and connections documents (e.g., bulletins, letters, notices, advisories, et cetera) for applicability. If these documents are affecting or thought to affect NMP, the applicant will enter these documents into its corrective action program for resolution. Other nuclear power plants operating experience reports are reviewed to assess potential impact to NMP. Operating experience found to be applicable to NMP is added to its corrective action program for resolution.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant's Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

The staff recognizes that the corrective action program captures internal and external plant operating experience issues and ensures operating experience review and incorporation for objective evidence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging are adequately managed.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.24 and A2.1.24, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.1.9 Environmental Qualification Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B3.1, the applicant described the Environmental Qualification Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent with GALL AMP X.E1, "Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Electric Components." The Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program manages thermal, radiation, and

cyclical aging for electrical equipment important to safety and located in harsh plant environments at NMPNS. At NMP2, the EQ Program also manages these effects for active safety-related mechanical equipment located in harsh plant environments. EQ program activities (1) identify applicable equipment and environmental requirements; (2) establish, demonstrate, and document the level of qualification (including configuration, maintenance, surveillance, and replacement requirements); and (3) maintain (or preserve) qualification. The EQ Program employs aging evaluations based on 10 CFR 50.49(f) qualification methods. Components in the EQ Program must be refurbished, replaced, or have their qualification extended prior to reaching the aging limits established in the evaluation. Aging evaluations for environmentally qualified components that specify a qualification of at least 40 years are considered time-limited aging analysis (TLAAs) for license renewal. The EQ Program ensures that these SSCs are maintained within the bounds of their qualification bases.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff determined that this AMP is consistent with the AMP described in the GALL Report, including the associated operating experience attribute.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff identified one difference between the GALL AMP and the EQ Program description. EQ of electrical equipment in ALRA Section 4.4 indicates that the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of the EQ of electrical equipment identified in the TLAA will be managed during the extended period of operation under 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). However, as documented in the Audit and Review Report, no information is provided on reanalysis of an aging evaluation to extend the qualification life of electrical equipment identified in the TLAA. Important attributes of a reanalysis are analytical methods, data collection and reduction methods, underlying assumptions, acceptance criteria, and corrective actions. GALL AMP X.E1 under the EQ component reanalysis attributes describes each attribute under the program description. The EQ Program does not include this information.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant address the reanalysis attributes listed in GALL AMP X.E1 or justify why this information was not included. In response to this request, the applicant informed the staff that it agreed to include the detailed EQ component reanalysis attributes in its NMP AMP. The staff concluded that the applicant's response is acceptable because the NMP AMP will be consistent with the GALL Report AMP program description. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant revised its ALRA to include a detailed description of reanalysis attributes.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also asked if the applicant has plans to monitor temperature in order to extend the qualified life of components if the EQ reanalysis option is chosen. The applicant's response recognized that thermal aging is limiting components. It plans to incorporate actual plant temperature monitoring data into the aging evaluation reanalysis for EQ components with a qualified life greater than 40 years similar to the temperature monitoring data used to assess equipment qualified life during the current operation period to represent existing plant thermal conditions accurately.

The staff reviewed those portions of the EQ Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP X.E1 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's EQ Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP X.E1.



Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B3.1, the applicant explained that the EQ Program started in 1980 as a project at NMP1, and was developed as an integral part of construction at NMP2. Since its inception, consideration of plant and industry operating experience has been an important element of the EQ Program. Recorded measurements of ambient temperature have been used to define conditions for some harsh environments, and records of representative actual temperatures have been used as preliminary data to resolve concerns for certain terminal blocks installed in the NMP1 drywell. Qualified life evaluations for certain sealing materials and lamp assemblies were reevaluated to remove excess conservatism and eliminate unnecessary maintenance activities. The program is evolving as administrative improvements have been identified to address issues such as communication and organizational transitions. A major program reconstitution effort began in 2003, in response to internal assessments, to improve the overall strength of the EQ Program. With additional operating experience lessons learned will be used to adjust this program as needed. The applicant's EQ Program has been effective in managing thermal, radiative, and cyclical aging of components within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's EQ Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.15 and A2.1.15, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Environmental Qualification Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Environmental Qualification Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### ***3.0.3.2 AMPs That Are Consistent with the GALL Report with Exceptions or Enhancements***

In ALRA Appendix B, the applicant identified that the following AMPs were, or will be, consistent with the GALL Report, with exceptions or enhancements:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Reactor Head Closure Studs Program

- BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program
- BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program
- BWR Vessel Internals Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Boraflex Monitoring Program (NMP1 Only)
- Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program
- Compressed Air Monitoring Program (NMP1 Only)
- BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program
- Fire Protection Program
- Fire Water System Program
- Fuel Oil Chemistry Program
- Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program (NMP2 Only)
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program
- Masonry Wall Program
- Structures Monitoring Program
- Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program
- Bolting Integrity Program
- BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program
- Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program
- Fatigue Monitoring Program
- Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables Program (NMP2 Only)

For AMPs that the applicant claimed are consistent with the GALL Report, with exceptions or enhancements, the staff performed an audit to confirm that those attributes or features of the program for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report were indeed consistent. The staff also reviewed the exceptions and enhancements to the GALL Report to determine whether they were adequate and acceptable. The results of the staff's audit and reviews are documented in the following sections.

#### 3.0.3.2.1 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.1, the applicant described the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exception, with GALL AMP XI.M1, "ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection, Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD." The ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (referred to herein as the IWB/C/D ISI Program) manages aging of Class 1, 2, and 3 pressure-retaining components and their integral attachments. Program activities include periodic visual, surface, and/or volumetric examination and pressure tests of Class 1, 2, and 3 pressure-retaining components. The IWB/C/D ISI Program is based on ASME Section XI, 1989 edition, with no Addenda and ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda. Examination categories B-F, B-J, C-F-1, C-F-2 and IGSCC Category A are inspected using the EPRI risk-informed methodology and implemented in accordance with ASME Code Case N-578-1 as approved by NRC plant-specific Relief Request.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exception, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the IWB/C/D ISI Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M1 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's IWB/C/D ISI Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M1 with exceptions.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its IWB/C/D ISI Program is consistent with the GALL Report with exceptions in the "Detection of Aging Effects" and "Monitoring and Trending" program elements. The program is based on the 1989 Edition of ASME Section XI with no addenda. Examination categories B-F, B-J, C-F-1, and C-F-2 and IGSCC Category A are inspected per the requirements of the EPRI risk-informed methodology and ASME Code Case N-578-1.

In addition in the ALRA the applicant stated that its IWB/C/D ISI Program based on the 1989 Edition with no addenda was found acceptable by the NRC in safety evaluations (SEs) dated October 5, 2000 and March 3, 2000, and that the IWB/C/D ISI Program for NMP1 and NMP2 implement the EPRI risk-informed methodology and ASME Code Case N-578-1 as approved by the staff in an NRC plant-specific relief request.

The GALL Report states that the 1989 Code Edition covers all examination categories identified in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda and that the 1995 ASME Code Edition eliminates the hydrostatic test because equivalent results are obtained from the leakage test. The staff also compared the acceptance criteria differences between the 1989 and 1995 Editions through the 1996 Addenda of ASME Section XI. The staff found the acceptance criteria of the 1989 Edition more conservative than those of the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda. Subsection IWB-3640 in the 1989 Edition sets the acceptable flaw depth upper limit as 60 percent of wall thickness whereas Subsection IWB-3640 in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda sets the acceptable flaw depth upper limit as 75 percent of wall thickness for shielded metal-arc welds and submerged arc welds. The staff also reviewed the SERs for the NMP ISI plans based on the ASME Section XI 1989 Edition. On this basis, the staff finds the code edition exception acceptable.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant's risk-informed Inservice inspection (RI-ISI) relief request is valid for a 10-year inspection interval under the CLB and requested that the applicant provide additional justification for extending this risk-informed relief request for the period of extended operation. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the program description had been revised by deleting "using the EPRI risk-informed methodology and implemented in accordance with ASME Code Case N-578-1 as approved by the NRC plant-specific Relief Request" and inserting "using NRC approved Risk-Informed Methodology. Prior to the period of extended operation, the ISI Program will be updated to the latest Edition and Addenda of ASME Section XI as mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a and 10 CFR Part 54 requirements." At present, an RI-ISI program is approved for use on an ASME Code 10-year ISI for specific intervals. However, the applicant will have to request approval to use the RI-ISI program for specific intervals 12 months prior to each interval

during the period of extended operation under 10 CFR 50.55a. Therefore, the staff determined that the ASME Section XI code in effect referenced in 10 CFR 50.55a, for which the applicant will request approval 12 months prior to each inspection interval, is acceptable for the period of extended operation. The staff concluded that the applicant's response is acceptable.

The staff determined that although the number of the examinations is reduced, the risk from implementation of RI-ISI is expected to decrease slightly from that estimated from the current requirements. The primary reason for the risk reduction is that examinations will be required for piping segments of safety significance that may not be inspected per the existing ASME Section XI Program. In addition the RI-ISI program is an ongoing program that requires update and expansion based on industry and site-specific inspection findings. On this basis the staff finds this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.1, the applicant explained it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the IWB/C/D ISI Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed DERs documenting indications of flaws in recirculation components, piping, and various nozzle connection welds. Deficiencies identified by IWB/C/D ISI Program activities have been repaired, replaced, or evaluated as acceptable in accordance with ASME Section XI and station implementing procedures.

The staff reviewed the applicant's supporting documents that evaluate industry experiences as identified in General Electric (GE) service information letters (SILs) against the applicant's ISI Program. The staff determined that the applicant continuously evaluates industry operating experience and adjusts its inspection plans accordingly.

The staff also reviewed the applicant's corrective action program, which revealed that DERs were initiated when ISI inspections found stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in the reactor coolant system. The staff reviewed the applicant's DERs as described in the Audit and Review Report and found that the applicant's ISI Program is effective in identifying degradation and implementing repairs.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant's IWB/C/D ISI Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. The applicant provided its UFSAR and USAR supplements for the IWB/C/D ISI Program in ALRA Section A1.1.4 for NMP1 and Section A2.1.5 for NMP2 stating that the program manages aging of Class 1, 2, or 3 pressure-retaining components and their integral attachments. Program activities include periodic visual surface or volumetric examinations and pressure tests of Class 1, 2, and 3 pressure-retaining components. The applicant also stated that its IWB/C/D ISI Program is based on the ASME Section XI 1989 Edition with no Addenda and ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda. Examination categories B-F, B-J, C-F-1, and C-F-2 and IGSCC Category A are inspected using EPRI risk-informed methodology and implemented in accordance with ASME

Code Case N-578-1 as approved by an NRC plant-specific relief request. These are program exceptions described in the GALL Report (which cites ASME Section XI requirements covered in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda).

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant's RI-ISI relief request is valid for a 10-year inspection interval under the CLB and requested that the applicant provide additional justification for extending this risk-informed relief request for the period of extended operation. The applicant stated that it would revise Appendix A to remove that relief request. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that ALRA Sections A1.1.4 and A2.1.5 have been revised by deleting "using the EPRI risk-informed methodology and implemented in accordance with ASME Code Case N-578-1 as approved by the NRC plant-specific Relief Request" and replacing it with "using NRC approved Risk-Informed Methodology." Prior to the period of extended operation, the ISI Program will be updated to the latest Edition and Addenda of ASME Section XI as mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a and 10 CFR 54 requirements." The staff reviewed the applicant's response, found the revised information to be adequate, and concluded that it is acceptable. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the UFSAR and USAR supplements also provides adequate summary program descriptions required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's IWB/C/D ISI Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exception, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that the supplements provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.2 Water Chemistry Control Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.2, the applicant described the Water Chemistry Control Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions, with GALL AMP XI.M2, "Water Chemistry." The Water Chemistry Control Program manages aging effects by controlling the internal environment of the reactor water, feedwater, condensate, and control rod drive systems, and related auxiliaries (such as the NMP1 torus, NMP2 suppression pool, condensate storage tank, and spent fuel pool). The aging effects of concern are loss of material and crack initiation and growth. Program activities include monitoring and controlling concentrations of known detrimental chemical species below the levels known to cause degradation. The Water Chemistry Control Program implements the guidelines for BWR water chemistry presented in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Reports TR-103515-R1 and TR-103515-R2. The Water Chemistry Control Program credits activities performed under the direction of the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (IWB, IWC, IWD) Program and the One-Time Inspection Program to verify program effectiveness, including areas of low flow or stagnant water.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are

documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Water Chemistry Control Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M2 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M2 with exceptions.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Water Chemistry Control Program is consistent with the GALL Report with an exception to the "Scope of Program" program element. The program described in GALL AMP XI.M2 identifies the EPRI TR-103515-R0 report as the basis for BWR water chemistry programs. EPRI periodically updates the water chemistry guidelines as new industry experience becomes available. Revisions 1 and 2 of the EPRI report incorporate the industry experience and are the basis for the NMP1 Water Chemistry Control Program whereas NMP2 uses only TR-103515 Revision 2.

The specific impacts of this scope of program exception are addressed with the program elements affected by the use of later revisions of the EPRI TR-103515 so no evaluation is provided for the "Scope of Program" element.

The applicant also stated in the ALRA that its Water Chemistry Control Program has an exception to the "parameters monitored/inspected" program element. The program described in GALL AMP XI.M2 identifies the EPRI TR-103515-R0 report as the basis for BWR water chemistry programs. EPRI TR-103515-R0 recommends that electrochemical potential (ECP) be monitored during power operations and does not distinguish between normal water chemistry and hydrogen water chemistry (HWC). The NMP1 program makes an exception in that ECP is monitored only under HWC operation. The NMP2 program also makes an exception by not monitoring ECP directly but the molar ratio of hydrogen-to-oxygen as an acceptable alternative. The GALL Report also recommends that hydrogen peroxide be monitored to manage stress corrosion cracking and corrosion in BWR plants. Both NMP1 and NMP2 programs make exceptions to this recommendation because accurate measurement of this chemical is extremely difficult due to its rapid decomposition in the sample lines. As an alternative consistent with Revision 2 of the EPRI report NMP1 measures ECP and NMP2 measures the molar ratio of hydrogen to oxygen.

In regard to the NMP1 exception of monitoring ECP only when under HWC, EPRI TR-10315 Revision 2 recommends on the latest industry experience that ECP be monitored only if plants implement HWC or HWC with noble metal chemical addition (NMCA). Based on the latest industry information the staff found this practice acceptable. In regard to NMP2 the applicant stated in the ALRA that it does not monitor ECP directly but rather the molar ratio of hydrogen to oxygen as an acceptable alternative based on the latest industry guidance of EPRI TR-10315 Revision 2. The staff found acceptable this use of an alternative measurement providing the same level of effectiveness.

From review of the information provided in the ALRA the staff determined that the applicant proposed acceptable alternative methods for both NMP1 and NMP2 for measuring the level of hydrogen peroxide in the coolant. As described in the exception, NMP1 measures electrochemical potential. The molar ratio of hydrogen to oxygen is used by NMP2 to monitor

the presence of excessive hydrogen peroxide. The staff found these exceptions acceptable.

In addition, in the ALRA the applicant stated that its Water Chemistry Control Program also makes an exception to the “Monitoring and Trending” program element. The program described in GALL AMP XI.M2 identifies the EPRI TR-103515-R0 report as the basis for BWR water chemistry programs. EPRI TR-103515-R0 recommends that chlorides and sulfates in reactor water be sampled daily. NMP2 makes an exception to this recommendation by sampling for these chemical species only three times per week. EPRI TR-103515-R0 recommends that ECP be monitored continuously for reactor water. NMP2 makes an exception to this recommendation by not monitoring ECP. EPRI TR-103515-R0 recommends that the sampling frequencies and action levels for feedwater iron and copper commence at >10 percent power. Both NMP1 and NMP2 make exceptions to this recommendation by not commencing these sampling activities until 25 percent power.

In regard to the NMP2 exception to daily monitoring of chlorides and sulfates, the applicant stated in the ALRA that these species are part of the conductivity measurement monitored continuously and any increase in conductivity above Action Level 1 requires daily sampling to determine the concentration of monitored species. The applicant further stated that this sampling plan is consistent with the guidance of Revisions 0 and 2 of the EPRI report. Because the program does not reduce the effectiveness of the NMP2 Water Chemistry Control Program, the staff found this exception acceptable.

In regard to NMP2 not continuously monitoring ECP the applicant stated in the ALRA that the molar ratio of hydrogen to oxygen is used as an acceptable alternative. Furthermore, the applicant stated that BWRVIP-62 provides the technical correlation between these two parameters and establishes an operating goal for the value of hydrogen-to-oxygen molar ratio. Because the program does not reduce the effectiveness of the NMP2 Water Chemistry Control Program, the staff found this exception acceptable.

In regard to initiating sampling frequencies and action levels at >10% power, the applicant states, in the ALRA, that, for both NMP1 and NMP2, the justification for this exception is that the filter samples collected below 25 percent power are not representative and the operating time between 10 and 25 percent power is short enough to be considered insignificant. Because of the limited time between 10 and 25 percent power, the staff concluded that this does not reduce the effectiveness of the applicant’s Water Chemistry Control Program. On this basis, the staff found this acceptable.

Furthermore, in the ALRA the applicant stated that its Water Chemistry Control Program makes an exception to the “Acceptance Criteria” program element. The program described in GALL AMP XI.M2 identifies the EPRI TR-103515-R0 report as the basis for BWR water chemistry programs. EPRI periodically updates water chemistry guidelines as new industry experience becomes available. Revisions 1 and 2 of the EPRI report incorporating the industry experience are the basis for the NMP1 Water Chemistry Control Program whereas NMP2 uses only TR-103515 Revision 2. EPRI TR-103515-R0 recommends that an action level be established for ECP during power operations. NMP1 makes an exception to the establishment of an action level but establishes an administrative goal of the same value. EPRI TR-103515-R0 recommends specific values for action levels 2 and 3 for reactor water chlorides and sulfates under HWC/NMCA conditions during power operations. NMP2 makes an exception to these values by using the corresponding values recommended in Revision 2 of the EPRI report.

In regard to NMP1 establishing an action level for ECP in the ALRA, the applicant stated that it establishes a plant-specific administrative goal for ECP and the actions required by the NMP administrative procedure are consistent with the EPRI recommended actions for exceeding the value. The applicant further stated that there is, therefore, no impact on program effectiveness. Because NMP1 has established an administrative procedure that does not reduce the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program the staff found this exception acceptable.

In regard to establishing action levels 2 and 3 for reactor water chlorides and sulfates in the ALRA, the applicant stated that the latest industry experience indicates that these higher values do not reduce the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program while operating at power using HWC. For maintaining program effectiveness the staff found this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.2, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Water Chemistry Control Program. As chemistry control guidelines were evolving in the industry, NMP experience with reactor water system chemistry was similar to that of the industry. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed DERs documenting instances where monitored parameters exceeded specified action levels or goals. In those instances where a chemistry action level was exceeded, prompt corrective actions were taken to re-establish proper chemistry.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18, 2006, the staff reviewed the summary of specific operating experience for the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program. The staff found a significant number of DERs on water chemistry control limit monitoring, demonstrating the effectiveness of the program in minimizing propagation of aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of concern for SSCs for which water chemistry is controlled.

The staff also reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.37 and A2.1.36, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Water Chemistry Control Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed



so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.3 Reactor Head Closure Studs Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.3, the applicant described the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exception, with GALL AMP XI.M3, "Reactor Head Closure Studs." The Reactor Head Closure Studs Program manages cracking of and loss of material from the reactor pressure vessel closure studs. The Reactor Head Closure Studs Program implements the preventive measures of Regulatory Guide 1.65. Inservice examinations are performed in accordance with the 1989 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code with no Addenda, and ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems," 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda as approved by the NRC in plant-specific exemptions.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exception, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed portions of the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M3 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Reactor Head Closure Studs Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M3.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Reactor Head Closure Studs Program is consistent with the GALL Report with an exception to the program description. The program described in GALL AMP XI.M3 cites ASME Section XI requirements covered in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda. The IWB/C/D ISI Programs for NMP1 and NMP2 are based on the 1989 Edition with no addenda.

The staff noted that the code of record is updated and approved by the staff for each inspection interval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a and that this regulation mandates the application of ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems," (1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda). On this basis, the staff found this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.3, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program. NMP reactor vessel studs have experienced very little degradation. A review of plant-specific operating experience revealed only a few DERs initiated as a result of inspections of the studs, associated nuts, and washers. The review demonstrated that the DERs were related to normal maintenance issues and not to age-related defects. There are no existing defects in the head studs or nuts.

The staff determined that the applicant's inspection program is adequate to detect timely indications of aging to allow for repair or replacement prior to bolting failure.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's Reactor Head Closure Studs Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.31 and A2.1.31, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Reactor Head Closure Studs Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exception, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.4 BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.5, the applicant described the BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exception, with GALL AMP XI.M5, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle." The NMP1 and NMP2 Feedwater Nozzle Programs are existing programs that require ultrasonic testing (UT) inspections of the feedwater nozzles every 10 years to verify the nozzles are acceptable for continued service. The Feedwater Nozzle Programs are implemented through the ISI Program which at the time the original LRA was submitted conformed to the requirements in ASME Code, Section XI, Subsection IWB, Table IWB 2500-1 (1989 Edition, no Addenda), and ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda, "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems," to ASME Section XI, Division 1. UT and PT inspections discussed in NUREG-0619 have been superseded because the inspections are now performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exception, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M5 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M5 with an exception.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program is consistent with the GALL Report with an exception to the program description. The NMP Inservice Inspection Program does not comply with the specific edition and addenda of ASME Section XI cited in the GALL Report because prior to the start of each inspection interval, the program is updated to the latest edition and addenda of ASME Section XI as mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a. This exception (i.e., updating the ISI Program to the latest edition and addenda of ASME Section XI as mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a) is acceptable because the NMP ISI Programs are consistent with the recommendation of GALL AMP XI.M5 in that the feedwater nozzles are subject to ASME Section XI requirements.

In the ALRA the applicant further stated that the program described in GALL AMP XI.M5 cites ASME Section XI requirements covered in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda. The IWB/C/D ISI Programs for NMP are based on the 1989 Edition with no addenda and ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the code of record is updated and approved by the NRC staff for each inspection interval under 10 CFR 50.55a. On this basis the staff found this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.5, the applicant explained that no industry experience was identified that indicates that existing programs and practices will not be effective in the timely identification of feedwater nozzle cracking.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program will adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.7 and A2.1.8, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exception, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement

for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.5 BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.6, the applicant described the BWR SCC Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exception, with GALL AMP XI.M7, "BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking." The BWR SCC Program manages intergranular stress corrosion cracking in reactor coolant pressure boundary piping made of stainless steel as delineated in NUREG-0313, Revision 2, and Generic Letter 88-01 and its Supplement 1, as modified by BWRVIP-75. Augmented inspections are performed in accordance with these documents. The attributes of the BWR SCC Program related to maintaining reactor coolant water chemistry are included in the Water Chemistry Control Program.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exception, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that NMP credited Revision 1 and Revision 2 of the EPRI TR-103515 guidelines for its reactor coolant water chemistry instead of the GALL Report recommended guidelines in BWRVIP-29. The applicant stated that the "Preventive Actions" program element is addressed in its Water Chemistry Control Program. The staff reviewed the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program and documented its evaluation documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.2. The staff found this exception acceptable.

The staff reviewed those portions of the BWR SCC Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M7 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's BWR SCC Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M7 with an exception.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its BWR SCC Program is consistent with the GALL Report with an exception to the "Acceptance Criteria" program element. The current NMP licensing is based on the 1989 Edition of ASME Section XI whereas the GALL Report cites the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda of the ASME Section XI Code.

The staff compared the 1989 Edition to the 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda of ASME Section XI Subsection IWB-3640. The staff found the acceptance criteria in the 1989 Edition more conservative than those in the 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda. Subsection IWB-3640 in the 1989 Edition sets the acceptable flaw depth upper limit as 60 percent of the wall thickness whereas IWB-3640 in the 1995 Edition through 1996 Addenda sets the acceptable flaw depth upper limit as 75 percent of the wall thickness for the shielded metal-arc welds and submerged arc welds. On this basis the staff found the exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.6, the applicant explained it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to BWR stress corrosion cracking. Along with other plants in the BWR fleet, NMP has found indications of IGSCC in recirculation

system piping and welds that were evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with the applicable ISI Program plan.

The staff reviewed the applicant's corrective action program, which shows that DERs were initiated when ISI inspections found SCC in the reactor coolant system.

The staff reviewed the applicant's DERs as described in the Audit and Review Report and found that operating experience indicates that the BWR SCC Program at NMP has been generally effective in managing aging effects and aging effects mechanisms in BWR coolant pressure-retaining boundary piping.

The staff also reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's BWR SCC Program adequately manages the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.10 and A2.1.11, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the BWR SCC Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's BWR SCC Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exception, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.6 BWR Vessel Internals Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.8, the applicant described the BWR Vessel Internals Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M9, "BWR Vessel Internals." The BWR Vessel Internals Program manages aging of materials inside the reactor vessel. Program activities include: (1) inspections for the presence and effects of cracking and (2) monitoring and control of water chemistry. This program is based on guidelines issued by the BWRVIP and approved (or pending approval) by the NRC. The attributes of the BWR Vessel Internals Program related to maintaining reactor coolant water chemistry are included in the Water Chemistry Control Program. Inspections and evaluations of reactor vessel components are consistent with the guidelines provided in the following BWRVIP reports:

- BWRVIP-18, BWR Core Spray Internals Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-25, BWR Core Plate Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-26, BWR Top Guide Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-27, BWR Standby Liquid Control System/Core Plate  $\Delta P$  Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-38, BWR Shroud Support Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-41, BWR Jet Pump Assembly Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (NMP2 only)
- BWRVIP-42, LPCI Coupling Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (NMP2 only)
- BWRVIP-47, BWR Lower Plenum Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-48, Vessel ID Attachment Weld Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-49, Instrument Penetration Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-74, BWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines
- BWRVIP-76, BWR Core Shroud Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant credited Revisions 1 and 2 of EPRI TR-103515, "BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines – 1996," for its reactor coolant water chemistry instead of the GALL Report recommended guidelines in BWRVIP-29. The applicant stated that the "Preventive Actions" program element is addressed in its Water Chemistry Control Program. The staff reviewed the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program and documented its evaluation in SER Section 3.0.3.2.2. The staff found this method acceptable.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant clarify that BWRVIP-62, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Technical Basis for Inspection Relief for BWR Internal Components with Hydrogen Injection," is cited in the GALL Report. Since BWRVIP-62 has not been approved by the NRC, the staff requested that the applicant provide a program with respect to BWRVIP-62. The applicant responded that BWRVIP-62 allows inspection relief for plants using HWC. Furthermore, the applicant responded that NMP2 credited BWRVIP-62 in a shroud evaluation during 2000-2004 but is not invoking BWRVIP-62 currently and that NMP1 has never taken credit for HWC in shroud reinspection evaluations. In the future the applicant plans to credit the relief allowed by BWRVIP-62 when the document is approved for license renewal by the staff. The staff found this response acceptable.

The staff reviewed those portions of the BWR Vessel Internals Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M9 and found them consistent. The staff found the

applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M9 with enhancements.

In the ALRA, the applicant stated that its BWR Vessel Internals Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M9 with enhancements. As stated in the ALRA, the first enhancement in meeting the GALL Report for the "detection of aging effects" program element is that NMP will address open items identified in the staff's SER for the BWRVIP, herein referred as BWRVIP open items, regarding the inspection of inaccessible welds for core spray, jet pump, and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) components (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 13).

In the ALRA the applicant also stated that BWRVIP-18, "BWR Core Spray Internals Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," BWRVIP-41, "BWR Jet Pump Assembly Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (NMP2 Only)," and BWRVIP-42, "LPCI Coupling Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (NMP2 Only)" identify BWRVIP open items regarding the inspection of inaccessible welds for core spray, jet pump, and LPCI components respectively. The applicant additionally stated that it will implement the resolution of these BWRVIP open items as documented in the BWR Vessel Internals Program response to be reviewed and accepted by the NRC. These three BWRVIP open items are applicable to NMP2. For NMP1 only the open item for core spray components is applicable due to the design of the plant. The staff found that this enhancement addresses the renewal application BWRVIP open items. The staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In the ALRA the applicant further stated that its BWR Vessel Internals Program is consistent with the GALL Report with the second enhancement in meeting the "detection of aging effects" program element by steam dryers inspection (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 13). The applicant stated that the inspection and evaluation guidelines for steam dryers are currently under development by the BWR Vessel Internals Program committee. Once these guidelines are documented, reviewed, and accepted by the NRC staff, actions will be implemented at NMP1 and NMP2 according to the BWR Vessel Internals Program. The staff was aware that BWRVIP-139, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Steam Dryer Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," issued by the BWR Vessel Internals Program is under staff review to address steam dryer inspection activities. The staff found this enhancement consistent with the GALL Report and acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In addition in the ALRA the applicant stated that its BWR Vessel Internals Program is consistent with the GALL Report with the third enhancement in meeting the "detection of aging effects" program element, access cover holes inspection.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the inspection and evaluation guidelines for access hole covers are currently under development by the BWR Vessel Internals Program committee. Once these guidelines are documented, reviewed, and accepted by the NRC the actions will be implemented at NMP2 according to the BWR Vessel Internals Program (NMP2 Commitment 13). This issue is not applicable to NMP1 due to the design of the plant. The staff found that currently, inspection of access cover holes is per a GE SIL and the BWR Vessel Internals Program will develop guidelines for such inspections. Because the applicant's enhancement is consistent with the GALL Report the staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be

adequately managed.

Furthermore, in the ALRA the applicant stated that its BWR Vessel Internals Program is consistent with the GALL Report with the fourth enhancement in meeting the GALL Report “detection of aging effects” program element. The baseline inspections for the BWR lower plenum components will be incorporated into the appropriate program and implementation documents (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 13).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the baseline inspections recommended in BWRVIP-47 for the BWR lower plenum components will be incorporated into the appropriate program and implementation documents. The staff found that this enhancement meets the recommendation of the BWRVIP-47. The staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Regarding the fifth enhancement, in the ALRA, the applicant also stated that its BWR Vessel Internals Program is consistent with the GALL Report in meeting the “detection of aging effects” program element, top guide inspection regarding BWRVIP-26 (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 13).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that a schedule for additional inspections of the top guide locations (using enhanced VT-1 visual inspection (EVT-1) or techniques demonstrated to be appropriate in BWRVIP-03, “BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Examination Guidelines”) will be incorporated into the appropriate program and implementation documents. A minimum of 10 percent of the locations will be inspected within 12 years of the beginning of the period of extended operation with at least 5 percent of the inspections completed within six years. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the inspection commitment (NMP2 Commitment 13) is within 12 years of the beginning of the period of extended operation only. The staff asked the applicant to confirm that the commitment also addressed subsequent intervals. The staff reviewed the latest NMP1 top guide inspection findings and requested that the applicant provide additional plant-specific information regarding the reinspection and scope expansion to additional locations. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant provided its plant-specific information regarding the top guide inspection summarized as follows:

- Prior to 2003 the NMP1 top guide fluence was estimated, using the latest best estimate transport techniques, to have exceeded the GALL Report identified  $5E20$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> threshold for irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) concerns.
- Consistent with the GALL Report guidance and a GE SIL recommendation, NMP1 implemented the recommended EVT-1 sample inspection in 2003 (Refueling Outage 17 (RFO17)) and found one crack.
- In the subsequent 2005 outage (RFO18) NMP1 expanded the inspection scope to include all accessible top guide grid beam locations using UT inspection methods. The scope expansion achieved essentially 95 percent coverage of the grid beam. This scope expansion and the UT inspection method are fully consistent with the current guidance in BWRVIP-26, “BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Top Guide Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines,” and with a GE SIL specifically issued for the top guide grid beam. This UT inspection verified the presence of the crack identified by the 2003 EVT-1 examination and identified five others.



- A DER provides the disposition of the indications identified in the 2005 inspection. The DER disposition references the NMP1 flaw handbook and justifies at least one operating cycle prior to the next inspection. The DER corrective actions include a reanalysis of the as-found condition and the definition of the appropriate inspection scope and frequency. This plan is consistent with the guidance provided in BWRVIP-26 for top guide grid beam flaw analysis (i.e., to perform a plant-specific flaw analysis to define the structural margin and the appropriate inspection interval and scope) to which NMP is committed.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant also stated that the top guide grid beam inspection sample plan addressed in the GALL Report is a sample program. At NMP1 the inspection program included a sample inspection similar to the GALL Report recommendation and the program has identified top guide cracking.

BWRVIP-26 does not identify any inspection plan for the top guide. The BWRVIP-47 sample inspection plan was chosen for the top guide grid beam. NMP1 implemented a scope expansion inspection of the grid beam during RFO18 (2005) as a result of the inspection results from RFO17 (2003). This scope expansion was performed using UT inspection methods which achieved approximately 95 percent coverage of the grid beam. The volumetric coverage was capable of detecting flaws through the height of both the upper and lower grid beams and at the intersections. The 2005 UT inspection is the NMP1 top guide grid beam baseline inspection identified in the BWRVIP-47 guidance. The staff determined that the applicant's sample inspection plan was acceptable and concluded that the program identified in the ALRA enhancements needed for its sample inspection plan. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that NMP will (1) revise its program basis document to address inspection locations and re-inspection frequency, (2) revise ALRA Sections A1.1.12, A1.4, and B2.1.8 to address the top guide inspection enhancement, and (3) revise ALRA Sections A2.1.13, A2.4, and B2.1.8 to address the top guide inspection enhancement. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant provided its ALRA revisions:

In Sections A1.1.12 and A1.4 the existing enhancement and commitment on top guide inspections for NMP1 will be revised to address re-inspection frequency as follows:

The reinspection scope and frequency for the grid beam going forward will be based on BWRVIP-26 guidance for plant-specific flaw analysis and crack growth assessment. The maximum reinspection interval for the grid beam will not exceed 10 years, consistent with standard BWRVIP guidance for the core shroud. The reinspection scope will be equivalent to the UT baseline 2005 inspection scope. In addition, the reinspection scope will include an EVT-1 sample inspection of at least two locations with accessible indications within the initial six years of the 10 year interval. The intent of the EVT-1 is to monitor the known cracking to confirm flaw analysis crack growth assumptions.

In Sections A2.1.13 and A2.4, the existing enhancement and commitment to perform the top guide inspections for NMP2 will be revised as follows:

NMP2 will perform inspections of the guide beams similar (in inspection methods, scope and frequency of inspection) to the inspections specified in BWRVIP-47 for the control rod guide tube components. The extent of examination and its

frequency will be based on a ten percent sample of the total population, which includes all grid beam and beam-to-crevice slots, being inspected within 12 years of entry into the period of extended operation with five percent of the population being inspected within the first six years. The sample locations selected for examination will be in areas that are exposed to the highest neutron fluence. The top guide grid beam reinspection requirements will depend on the inspection results; however, at a minimum, the applicant's BWRVIP will follow the same guidance for the subsequent 12 year interval as defined for the initial 12 year baseline.

In Section B2.1.8, the existing enhancement to the "Detection of Aging Effects" program element to perform the top guide inspections will be revised as follows:

The reinspection scope and frequency for the NMP1 grid beam going forward will be based on BWRVIP-26 guidance for plant-specific flaw analysis and crack growth assessment. The maximum reinspection interval for the grid beam will not exceed 10 years, consistent with standard BWRVIP guidance for the core shroud. The reinspection scope will be equivalent to the UT baseline 2005 inspection scope. In addition, the reinspection scope will include an EVT-1 sample inspection of at least two locations with accessible indications within the initial six years of the 10 year interval. The intent of the EVT-1 is to monitor the known cracking to confirm flaw analysis crack growth assumptions.

NMP2 will perform inspections of the guide beams similar (in inspection methods, scope and frequency of inspection) to the inspections specified in BWRVIP-47 for the control rod guide tube components. The extent of examination and its frequency will be based on a ten percent sample of the total population, which includes all grid beam and beam-to-crevice slots, being inspected within 12 years of entry into the period of extended operation with five percent of the population being inspected within the first six years. The sample locations selected for examination will be in areas that are exposed to the highest neutron fluence. The top guide grid beam reinspection requirements will depend on the inspection results; however, at a minimum, the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program will follow the same guidance for the subsequent 12 year interval as defined for the initial 12 year baseline.

Because the applicant's enhancement is consistent with the GALL Report recommendations, the staff found the enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In the ALRA the applicant also stated that its BWR Vessel Internals Program is consistent with the GALL Report with another enhancement in meeting the GALL report "corrective actions" program element by performing CRD stub tube repair (NMP1 Commitment 36).

In Request for Additional Information (RAI) 3.1.2-1 dated January 13, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant address the difference between the alternative repair roll/expansion techniques and the accepted ASME Code weld repair for NMP1 CRD stub tube penetration leakage. In a letter dated February 14, 2005, the applicant responded to RAI 3.1.2-1, stating that, "NMP committed to implement a strategy whereby during the period of extended operation

a leaking CRD stub tube penetration would be roll repaired. If following the roll repair, this stub tube was to leak within acceptable limits, then a weld repair would be effected no later than one operating cycle following discovery of the leakage.” In the ALRA the applicant stated that it will follow the status of the proposed ASME Code change with respect to allowing roll/expansion techniques for CRD stub tubes and will implement the final code change or provide an alternative plan for the NMP1 period of extended operation at least one year prior to the expiration of the current operating license.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the wording in ALRA Table 3.1.1.A and in the applicant’s response to RAI 3.1.2-1 imply that NMP1 will operate with CRD stub tube leakage for one operating cycle (two years). The staff did not consider this implication acceptable for the period of extended operation. The staff’s safety evaluation dated March 25, 1987, allowing NMP1 to operate with CRD stub tube leakage was acceptable only as a temporary repair. Specifically, Item (6) of the staff’s safety evaluation conclusions stated that, “The proposed leakage criteria provide sufficient time to complete the final development of the prototype mechanical seal and associated tooling and to investigate other methods like weld repair.”

In a-RAI 3.1.2-1 dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant address CRD stub tube leaking for an additional operating cycle.

In its response by letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant revised ALRA Section 2.1.8 Commitment 36 in ALRA Section A1.4 and ALRA Table 3.1.1.A Item 3.1.1.A-30 to clarify its position related to the use of roll/expansion techniques for the repair of leaking NMP1 CRD stub tubes as follows:

The 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph of ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, LA Item 3.1.1.A-30 (Page 3.1-29), Commitment 36 of ALRA Section A1.4 (Page A1-42), and the Corrective Action bullet in ALRA Section B2.1.8 (Page B2-25) is replaced with:

If the 10/19/05 draft of Code Case N-730 is approved by the ASME, NMP Unit 1 will implement the final code case as conditioned by the NRC. If the code case is not approved by the ASME, NMP1 will seek NRC approval of the 10/19/05 code case draft on a plant specific basis as conditioned by the NRC.

During the period of extended operation, should a CRD stub tube rolled in accordance with the provisions of the code case resume leaking, NMP will implement one of the following zero leakage permanent repair strategies prior to startup from the outage in which the leakage was detected:

- (1) A welded repair consistent with BWRVIP-58-A, “BWRVIP Internal access Weld Repair” and Code Case N-606-1, as endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.147.
- (2) A variation of the welded repair geometry specified in BWRVIP-58-A subject to the approval of the NRC using Code Case N-606-1.
- (3) A future developed mechanical/welded repair method subject to the approval of the NRC.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable as consistent with the GALL Report recommendation. The staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.1.2-1 is resolved.

In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant revised its original enhancement in meeting the GALL Report for the "parameters monitored or inspected" program element as follows: add management of fracture toughness of NMP1 and NMP2 Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel (CASS) components (NMP1 Commitment 37 and NNP2 Commitment 35).

In the ALRA, the applicant stated that maintenance procedures for the inspection of the orificed fuel support casting will be enhanced to include a sample VT-1 inspection of the casting and an EVT-1 inspection if any evidence of impact or mishandling is identified. In a letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant provided its self-identified changes and its basis for change to the ALRA for the management of the fracture toughness of NMP1 and NMP2 CASS components with the BWR Vessel Internals Program as follows:

In Sections A1.1.12, A2.1.13 and B2.1.8, clarify that the program activities include effects on fracture toughness due to neutron fluence and thermal embrittlement by 1) replacing the last bullet on Page A1-6 of Section A1.1.12; 2) replacing the last bullet on Page A2.6 of Section A2.1.13; and 3) replacing the text under the "parameters monitored/inspected" program element in NMP AMP B2.1.8 with the following:

Enhance the program to evaluate component susceptibility to loss of fracture toughness. Assessments and inspections will be performed, as necessary to ensure that intended functions are not impacted by the aging effect.

In Sections A1.4 and A2.4, replace the commitments in Item 37 of Section A1.4 and Item 35 in Section A2.4 as follows:

Enhance the program to evaluate component susceptibility to loss of fracture toughness. Assessments and inspections will be performed, as necessary to ensure that intended functions are not impacted by the aging effect.

The staff reviewed the applicant's self-identified ALRA change. The staff found this acceptable since its change meets the GALL Report's recommendation. On this basis, the staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant provided an additional enhancement to the GALL Report "parameters monitored or inspected" program element: Inspect additional locations to address the aging management for reactor vessel feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves and control rod drive return line nozzle thermal sleeves (NMP1 Commitment 38 and NMP2 Commitment 37). An EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 and NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be performed. The inspection extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket

vessel attachment welds. If the final fabrication review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeves concludes that the hidden welds are not IGSCC susceptible the NMP2 inspections will be discontinued as appropriate (NMP1 Commitment 38 and NMP2 Commitment 37). NMP1 will perform an EVT-1 inspection of the thermal shield to flow shield weld starting 2007 and proceeding at a 10 year-frequency thereafter consistent with the ISI inspection interval (NMP1 Commitment 40).

In a letter dated September 15, 2005, the applicant stated that its BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program and BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program had been removed as credits for the feedwater nozzle and CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to address aging management for the thermal sleeves. In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will use inspections performed under its BWR Vessel Internals Program using surrogate components more readily accessible for examination. For NMP1 the surrogate components will be the feedwater sparger end bracket welds. In this letter the applicant also provided its basis for choosing the feedwater sparger end bracket welds:

The NMP1 feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves are fabricated from nickel-based Alloy 600 (Inconel 600). A full penetration weld joins the thermal sleeve to the outboard end of the carbon steel feedwater sparger. This weld was made with Alloy 82 and Alloy 182 weld fillers. The thermal-sleeve to sparger weld, or the heat affected zone in the Alloy 600 base material, is considered the most likely location for IGSCC in the thermal sleeve.

The applicant added that each feedwater sparger is supported by end brackets providing a spring force that helps hold the thermal sleeve in place. The feedwater sparger end bracket welds consist of three welds, sparger arm to sparger end plate welds (Weld #1), sparger end plate to bracket end plate weld (Weld #2), and sparger bracket end plate to end bracket assembly welds (Weld #3), which are dissimilar metal welds that use Alloy 182 or 82 weld fillers.

In addition the applicant stated that SCC of the feedwater thermal sleeves or the associated welds is possible but considered less likely than for other welds with the same weld filler associated with the feedwater sparger because the inconel to carbon steel welds are heat-treated shop welds and are not creviced. Service experience has demonstrated that Alloy 82 is resistant to IGSCC in BWR coolant. Alloy 182 is less resistant to IGSCC than Alloy 82 but performs acceptably with such aggravating factors as lack of fusion or a creviced condition. These conditions are more likely in field welds. The Alloy 600-to-carbon steel welds in the thermal sleeve are full penetration and do not create a creviced condition. Additionally, the thermal sleeve assembly was heat-treated after welding. The #1 end bracket welds use Alloy 182 filler metal in a mildly creviced condition, making them more susceptible to IGSCC than the thermal sleeve-to-sparger welds. Additionally, the #1 welds are exposed to reactor coolant chemistry on the outer diameter, which has a higher ECP, and thus are more likely to cause IGSCC than feedwater, which has a much lower ECP. Therefore, the applicant stated, if cracking is not found in the #1 welds inspection of the thermal sleeve-to-sparger welds is not necessary.

Furthermore, the applicant stated that the most susceptible of the three feedwater sparger end bracket welds (Weld #2) is subject to EVT-1 under a BWRVIP. If cracking is found in these welds the other end bracket welds (#1 and #3) will be inspected. If cracking is found in the less

susceptible end bracket welds the necessity to inspect the thermal sleeve-to-sparger welds will be evaluated. The applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program will, therefore, be credited with managing cracking of the thermal sleeve as the susceptibility of the critical thermal sleeve weld to IGSCC is covered by other welds inspected under the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will revise the ALRA to add an EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 feedwater sparger brackets as a BWR Vessel Internals Program enhancement to address this issue. The staff found the applicant's response acceptable because it demonstrated that inspection of surrogate components includes the NMP1 feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that NMP2 also will use inspections performed under the BWR Vessel Internals Program using surrogate components that are more readily accessible for examination. For NMP2 the surrogate components will be the feedwater sparger end bracket welds. In this letter the applicant also provided its basis for choosing the feedwater sparger end bracket welds:

...a similar evaluation of the NMP2 feedwater sparger welds and the selection of surrogate welds that are accessible for inspection would also be acceptable for NMP2. These accessible welds would be used as a leading indicator for potential IGSCC cracking of the thermal sleeve. If cracking is found in these welds, a supplemental evaluation of the thermal sleeve integrity would be required.

The applicant also stated that the review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeve and sparger had been completed and had confirmed that the thermal sleeve material is 316L with several hidden stainless steel welds. The incomplete fabrication method review will determine the welding procedures and whether the welds were stress-relieved. If the hidden welds were stress-relieved they would not be considered susceptible to IGSCC and the cracking aging mechanism would not be considered applicable to NMP2.

In addition the applicant stated that the review of the NMP2 feedwater sparger installation details found that the field installation applied a 20,000 lbs load creating a 0.125" cold spring to the sparger. The sparger end brackets were pinned, locking in the cold spring, and then final field-welded with a fillet weld. The applicant further stated that this installation detail is similar to that of NMP1. The result of the cold spring is a fit-up net tensile stress superimposed on the weld residual stress. The combination of the fit-up stress (cold spring) and the residual stress of the field weld conditions and the fillet weld crevice geometry creates a susceptibility to IGSCC higher than that of the thermal sleeve welds. The corrosion potential of the reactor water in the region of the feedwater sparger end bracket welds is equivalent to if not greater than that of the reactor water in contact with the outside diameter weld of the thermal sleeve. The applicant also stated that an EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 and NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be added to its BWR Vessel Internals Program as a program enhancement. The inspection extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket vessel attachment welds. If the final fabrication review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeve finds that the hidden welds are not IGSCC susceptible the NMP2 inspections will be discontinued.

Furthermore, the applicant stated that examination of the NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds represents a conservative approach to the material condition of the hidden thermal sleeve welds regarding potential IGSCC cracking. Therefore, consistent with the discussion between

the staff and the applicant documented in the Audit and Review Report, cracking of the NMP2 feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves will be a matter for the applicant's BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program, BWR Vessel Internals Program, and Water Chemistry Control Program. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that an EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 and NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be added to its BWR Vessel Internals Program as a program enhancement (NMP1 Commitment 38 and NMP2 Commitment 37). The inspection extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as for the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket vessel attachment welds. If the final fabrication review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeve finds that the hidden welds are not IGSCC susceptible the NMP2 inspections will be discontinued. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable since the applicant's surrogate weld inspection provides adequate aging management for the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeve. The staff found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism for NMP2 feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant also narrated operating experience in addressing the CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves:

The inspections of the CRDRL nozzle and safe-ends in 1978 identified IGSCC cracking of the safe-end material, but did not identify fatigue-related cracking. The CRDRL safe-end and the thermal sleeve were replaced in 1978 with design changes to improve resistance to both IGSCC and fatigue. The replacement thermal sleeve material is IGSCC resistant low carbon Type 316L stainless steel material. The thermal sleeve is welded to the safe-end with low carbon Type 308L weld filler. To reduce the probability of fatigue, the thermal sleeve pipe protrudes 7 inches out from the flow shield which promotes mixing away from the vessel wall thus preventing thermal cycling at the vessel wall and at the flow shield.

The applicant stated that as a result of industry operating experience from 2002 and 2003, NMP completed detailed thermal fatigue assessments and expanded inspections of the safe-end, the thermal sleeve attachment weld to the safe-end, and the thermal sleeve weld to the flow shield. These inspections were performed in 2004 and 2005. The inspections to date have identified no IGSCC or thermal fatigue-related cracking. Because the 2003 operating experience identified cracking of the thermal shield flow baffle additional EVT-1s of the thermal shield to flow shield weld from the vessel ID are planned for 2007 and at a 10-year frequency thereafter consistent with the ISI inspection interval. This EVT-1 examination of the CRDRL thermal sleeve flow shield weld visible from the vessel ID during each ISI interval is consistent with the frequency that has been adopted for the feedwater nozzle surrogate weld location on the feedwater end brackets.

In addition the applicant stated that a one-time UT of the CRDRL safe-end base metal in 2004 was performed under the NMP augmented ISI program 26 years of operation after the 1978 replacement (three outages prior to the license renewal term). This inspection identified no IGSCC or thermal fatigue cracking of the safe-end location. The inspection was a manual performance demonstration initiative (PDI) qualified inspection and the PDI mockup included the thermal sleeve attachment weld to the safe-end. The inspection records note the presence of the thermal sleeve attachment weld. This inspection is considered sufficient to detect significant circumferential IGSCC cracking of the thermal sleeve at the thermal sleeve attachment weld;

however, consistent with the surrogate weld inspection methodology employed for the feedwater nozzle thermal sleeve, the EVT-1 inspection of the thermal sleeve flow shield weld also will be used as a surrogate weld inspection location for the thermal sleeve to safe-end attachment weld.

In addition to the inspections the applicant stated that temperature monitoring for thermal cycling was performed to confirm that the CRD return flow rates were sufficient at NMP1 to ensure that no unstable thermal cycling caused by hot reactor water return flow occurs. The testing and analyses have found the minimum CRD return flow required to ensure stable return line conditions and that no reverse flow.

The applicant's overall assessment is that the safe-end and thermal sleeve replacement with IGSCC-resistant materials and the one-time UT of the thermal sleeve attachment weld after 26 years establish that the thermal sleeve attachment weld is not a high risk IGSCC location. In addition the thermal monitoring of this location and the inspection after 26 years of operation also found no high-cycle thermal fatigue conditions at this location that could create high thermal cycle fatigue-related cracking.

Furthermore, the applicant continued, the analyses and one-time inspections performed in 2004 to 2005 are adequate to detect potential cracking of the CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeve to safe-end attachment weld from either IGSCC or fatigue. Even though IGSCC is considered a low probability for this location for materials of construction the BWR Vessel Internals Program will include an enhancement starting in 2007. An EVT-1 inspection of the thermal shield to flow shield weld from the vessel ID will be performed at that time and thereafter at a 10-year frequency consistent with the ISI inspection frequency.

The applicant also stated that in addition to determining the condition of the flow shield weld this EVT-1 inspection will be used as a surrogate weld inspection location for the thermal sleeve to the safe-end attachment weld. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant provided its ALRA revisions:

- Revise ALRA Sections A1.1.12, A1.4, and B2.1.8 to incorporate the commitment to perform the EVT-1 inspection of the thermal shield to flow shield weld starting in 2007 and proceeding at a 10 year frequency consistent with the ISI inspection interval thereafter.
- Revise ALRA Table 3.1.1.A-1, Item 3.1.1.A-27 and ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 to reflect the changes.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable because since the applicant's surrogate weld inspection in addition to the results of its one-time inspections 2004 to 2005 provide adequate aging management for the CRDRL thermal sleeve. The staff concluded that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism for NMP1 CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.8, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the BWR Vessel Internals Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed conditions discovered by BWRVIP examinations similar to those identified elsewhere in the BWR fleet. In each case,



indications were evaluated and either found acceptable for further service or appropriately repaired. The BWRVIP is continually adjusted to account for industry experience and research (including activities of the BWRVIP and ASME Section XI Code Committees). In 2001, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) conducted a review of activities related to BWR Vessel Internals Program at NMP2. Several strengths were identified, and recommendations for improvement were addressed by program upgrades at NMP1 and NMP2.

The staff reviewed the operating experience provided in the ALRA and the applicant's operating issues related to SCC and determined that the current program has proven to be effective in managing the aging of the vessel internals within the scope of license renewal. The following is a sample list of NMP1 operating experience issues including core shroud cracking, shroud support weld cracking, CRD stub tube IGSCC and leakage, and top guide cracking:

- NMP1 identified CRD stub tube leakage in 1984. The root cause investigation and inspection confirmed IGSCC of the furnace-sensitized 304 CRD stub tubes. The applicant implemented a roll repair of the leakage and a structural evaluation of the tolerability of the cracking. NMP1 is also working through its BWR Vessel Internals Program to obtain approval of an ASME Section XI code case for the roll repair technique for this location.
- NMP1 identified core shroud horizontal weld cracking following the BWRVIP-01, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Core Shroud Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guideline (Revision 2)," baseline inspection in 1995. The corrective action taken was to install a pre-emptive core shroud tie-rod repair which followed the BWRVIP-02, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Core Shroud Repair Design Criteria," shroud repair guidelines. This repair was designed for a 20-year license renewal term.
- NMP1 identified core shroud vertical weld cracking in 1997 following a baseline inspection required by BWRVIP-02 guidelines. This inspection safeguarded operations for at least two years until the next inspection. A pre-emptive repair was installed in 1999 for the core shroud vertical welds. This repair was designed for a 20-year license renewal term.
- NMP1 detected indications in the core shroud support H9 vessel attachment weld during baseline BWRVIP-38, "BWR Shroud Support Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," inspections in 2001. This attachment weld is an Alloy 182 nickel-based alloy with operational experience from an overseas BWR of IGSCC. The analysis was consistent with BWRVIP-38 methods and the detected indications were deemed acceptable over a 10-year re-inspection frequency. Supplemental sampling inspections have shown the indications are confined to the weld with no propagation into the vessel low-alloy steel. The indications were similar to those discussed in a GE SIL. Other core shroud indications were found in weld H8, weld H3, and weld H6A.
- NMP1 completed a sample baseline inspection of the top guide grid beam identified in BWRVIP-26, "BWR Top Guide Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," as having the potential for IASCC and as such representing a condition that warranted review for license renewal. The inspection of the top guide based on the recommendations of a GE SIL detected one indication consistent with grid beam cracking at Oyster Creek. The indication was evaluated consistently with BWRVIP-26 methods and found to be tolerable for continued service. Ongoing inspection and monitoring consistent with BWRVIP-26 requirements are proper long-term based on the current top guide fluence

predictions and extent of cracking.

Operating experience problems that have been identified at NMP2 include core shroud cracking and jet pump wedge wear. The applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program has not identified other cracking of internals covered by its BWR Vessel Internals Program. The BWR Vessel Internals Program recommended actions to inspect the core shroud and internals welds for cracks illustrate the effectiveness of the BWR Vessel Internals Program inspections. For example:

- NMP2 detected core shroud horizontal weld cracking during the BWRVIP-01 required baseline inspection in 1998. The inspection found that the core shroud welds H4, H5, and H7 had greater than 30 percent cracking warranting plant-specific evaluation. The condition was evaluated consistently with BWRVIP-01 methods and judged to be fit for conditioned service without repair. The limiting inspection interval is four years for each re-inspection. The condition currently is managed through IGSCC mitigation and re-inspection. Core shroud repair according to BWRVIP-02 is considered a contingency dependent on observed IGSCC growth.
- The BWRVIP-41 required baseline inspections are approximately 75 percent complete with no cracking detected. The baseline inspections that detected wedge bearing surface wear contact and set screw gaps were recommended by the BWR Vessel Internals Program based on industry operating experience. The inspections detected jet pump wedge wear in the sample population. The required BWRVIP-41 scope expansion was completed and the results showed the wear isolated to one location. The scope expansion identified set screw gaps one of which warranted a preemptive auxiliary wedge installation to eliminate it. The program has identified corrective measures needed to prevent flow- induced vibration if NMP2 operates above rated core flow.
- NMP2 detected several cracks in the steam dryer upper support ring side of drain channel 1, 2, and 3 horizontal 304 stainless steel welds ranging in length from 0.1 to 0.7 inches during inspections in RFO6. A GE evaluation concluded the indications observed are typical of IGSCC. Factors contributing to the initiation of IGSCC (weld residual stresses, weld sensitized 304 stainless steel in the heat affected zone (HAZ), and surface cold work due to fabrication) are all present in the steam dryer upper support ring. The cracking discovered at the NMP2 steam dryer upper support ring is similar to but less severe than that seen on several similar steam dryers at other plants. The ISI program plan was revised to re-inspect the locations of the cracks to detect any significant increase in length or number.
- NMP2 detected several cracks on the stiffener to upper guide ring welds at various locations between the shroud head bolts during inspections performed in 1998. A GE evaluation concluded that the indications detected are characteristic of IGSCC known to occur in weld-sensitized type 304 stainless steel. NMP2 determined that no repair was required during the current outage; however, the ISI program plan was revised to re-inspect the locations of the indications to detect any significant increase in length or number.

The staff found that the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program recommended actions to inspect the core shroud and internal welds for cracks indicate the effectiveness of its BWR Vessel Internals Program inspections. The staff also found that changes and updates to the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program have resulted from the ongoing review of industry

operating experience and regulatory notices as these are reviewed regularly for applicability to the reactor vessel internals. In these ways the applicant addressed vessel internals degradation noted at other BWRs systematically manner and revised its BWR Vessel Internals Program inspections accordingly.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program will adequately manage the aging effects identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. The applicant provided its UFSAR and USAR supplements for the BWR Vessel Internals Program in ALRA Section A1.1.12 for NMP1 and Section A2.1.13 for NMP2 stating that its BWR Vessel Internals Program manages aging of materials inside the reactor vessel. Program activities include (1) inspections for the presence and effects of cracking and (2) monitoring and control of water chemistry. This program is based on guidelines issued by the BWRVIP and approved (or pending approval) by the staff. Inspections and evaluations of reactor vessel components are consistent with the guidelines provided in the applicable BWRVIP reports.

The applicant has completed or will complete each of the license renewal BWRVIP action items described in the staff safety evaluations for these BWRVIP reports. In addition the applicant will implement the NRC-approved inspection and flaw evaluation guidelines for the steam dryer, access hole cover, and inaccessible core spray, jet pump, and LPCI component welds when issued.

The applicant also provided its UFSAR supplement for enhancements to its BWRVIP including the following revisions to existing activities credited for license renewal.

The reinspection scope and frequency for the grid beam will be based on BWRVIP-26 guidance for plant-specific flaw analysis and crack growth assessment. The maximum reinspection interval for the grid beam will not exceed 10 years consistent with standard BWRVIP guidance for the core shroud. The reinspection scope will be equivalent to the UT baseline 2005 inspection scope. In addition the reinspection scope will include an EVT-1 sample inspection of at least two locations with accessible indications within the initial six years of the 10-year interval. The intent of the EVT-1 is to monitor the known cracking to test flaw analysis crack growth assumptions.

As stated in the ALRA, the applicant will implement the resolution of the BWRVIP-18 open items regarding the inspection of inaccessible welds for core spray. It will be included in its BWRVIP response to be reviewed and accepted by the staff.

Once the guidelines for inspection and evaluation for steam dryers currently under development by the BWRVIP committee are documented, reviewed and accepted by the staff, the actions will be implemented in accordance with the BWRVIP.

The baseline inspections recommended in BWRVIP-47 for the BWR lower plenum components will be incorporated into the program.

If the October 19, 2005 draft of Code Case N-730 is approved by the ASME, NMP1 will

implement the final code case as conditioned by the staff. If the code case is not approved by the ASME, NMP1 will seek staff approval of the 10/19/05 code case draft on a plant specific basis from the staff.

If during the period of extended operation, a CRD stub tube, rolled in accordance with the provisions of the code case, resumes leaking, NMP will implement one of the following zero leakage permanent repair strategies prior to startup from the outage in which the leakage was detected:

- (1) A welded repair consistent with BWRVIP-58-A, "BWRVIP Internal access Weld Repair" and Code Case N-606-1, as endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.147.
- (2) A variation of the welded repair geometry specified in BWRVIP-58-A subject to the approval of the NRC using Code Case N-606-1.
- (3) A future developed mechanical/welded repair method subject to the approval of the staff.
  - Enhance the program to evaluate component susceptibility to loss of fracture toughness. Assessments and Inspections will be performed, as necessary to ensure that intended functions are not impacted by the aging effect. (Note: This enhancement was revised through its letter dated December 1, 2005).
  - An EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be performed. The inspection extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket vessel attachment welds. (Note: This enhancement was revised through its letter dated December 1, 2005).
  - NMP1 will perform an EVT-1 inspection of the thermal shield to flow shield weld starting 2007 and proceeding at a 10 year frequency thereafter consistent with the ISI inspection interval. (Note: This enhancement was revised through its letter dated December 1, 2005).

The applicant also provided its USAR supplement for NMP2 enhancements to its BWRVIP including the following revisions to existing activities credited for license renewal:

- NMP2 will perform inspections of the guide beams similar in methods, scope, and frequency to the inspections specified in BWRVIP-47 for the control rod guide tube components. The extent of examination and its frequency will be based on inspection of a 10 percent sample of the total population, which includes all grid beam and beam-to-crevice slots, within 12 years of entry into the period of extended operation with 5 percent of the population inspected within the first six years. The sample locations selected for inspection will be in areas exposed to the highest neutron fluence. The top guide grid beam reinspection requirements will depend on the inspection results; however, at a minimum the applicant's BWRVIP will follow the same guidance for the subsequent 12-year interval as defined for the initial 12-year baseline. (Note: This enhancement was revised through letters dated December 1, 2005, and December 13, 2005).
- The applicant will implement the resolution of the open items documented in

BWRVIP-18, BWRVIP-41, and BWRVIP-42 regarding the inspection of inaccessible welds for core spray, jet pump, and LPCI components, respectively. It will be included in its BWRVIP response to be reviewed and accepted by the staff. (Note: This enhancement was provided in the ALRA).

- Once the guidelines for inspection and evaluation for steam dryers currently under development by the BWRVIP committee are documented, reviewed, and accepted by the staff they will be implemented according to the BWRVIP. (Note: This enhancement was provided in the ALRA).
- Once the inspection and evaluation guidelines for access hole covers guidelines are documented, reviewed, and accepted by the staff they will be implemented according to the BWRVIP. (Note: This enhancement was provided in the ALRA).
- The baseline inspections recommended in BWRVIP-47 for the BWR lower plenum components will be incorporated into the program. (Note: This enhancement was provided in the ALRA).
- The applicant will enhance the program to evaluate component susceptibility to loss of fracture toughness. Assessments and inspections will be performed as necessary to ensure that intended functions are not impacted by the aging effect. (Note: This enhancement was revised through a letter. An EVT-1 examination of the NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be performed. The extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket vessel attachment welds. If the final fabrication review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeves finds that the hidden welds are not IGSCC-susceptible NMP2 inspections will be discontinued. (Note: This enhancement was revised through its letter dated December 1, 2005).

The staff reviewed the information in the supplements and found that they provide adequate summary descriptions of the program required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's BWRVIP, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.7 Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.10, the applicant described the Open-Cycle Cooling Water System (OCCWS) Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M20, "Open-Cycle Cooling Water System." The OCCWS Program manages aging of components exposed to raw, untreated (e.g., service) water. For NMP1 this includes portions of the service water system associated with the emergency service water pumps internal components of the

reactor building closed loop cooling heat exchangers; the raw cooling water portions of the emergency DG and containment spray systems portions of the circulating water system required to support the raw water supply; as well as other components within the scope of license renewal wetted by service water that are credited in the AMR. The NMP2 OCCWS scope includes a portion of the alternate decay heat system with associated portions of the service water system, the RHR heat exchangers, diesel generator jacket water coolers, and control room chillers. Also included are components Within the scope of license renewal that are wetted by the service water system and credited in the AMR. Program activities include: (1) surveillance and control of biofouling (including biocide injection); (2) verification of heat transfer capabilities for components cooled by the service water system; (3) inspection and maintenance; (4) walkdown inspections; and (5) review of maintenance, operating and training practices and procedures. Inspections may include visual, UT, and ECT methods. The OCCWS Program is based on the recommendations of GL 89-13.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the OCCWS Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M20 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's OCCWS Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M20 with enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its OCCWS Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M20 with enhancements and that the enhancement in meeting the GALL Report "Scope of Program" program element revises procedures to address the following:

- Ensure that the applicable NMP1 commitments made for GL 89-13 and the recommendations in GALL AMP XI.M20 are stated in the NMP1 implementation documents for GL 89-13. (NMP1 Commitment 14).
- Ensure that the applicable NMP2 commitments made for GL 89-13 and the recommendations in GALL AMP XI.M20 are stated in N2-TDP-REL-0104, "GL 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment Program Plan," (NMP2 Commitment 14).
- Incorporate into the OCCWS Program GALL AMP XI.M20 recommendations when they are more conservative than the GL 89-13 commitments (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 14).

As documented in the audit and review report, the applicant stated that it is developing an implementing program for both units to integrate the commitments made according to GL 89-13 and the recommendations made in the GALL Report for GALL AMP XI.M20. When the GALL Report recommendations are more conservative than the GL 89-13 commitments, the GALL Report recommendations will be integrated. This enhancement will make the applicant's AMP consistent with the GALL Report and is, therefore, acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Also in its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant revised the ALRA to expand the discussion of the program to clarify that it includes internal portions of nonsafety-related segments of the circulating water and service water systems within the scope of license renewal under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) to maintain their pressure integrity. This letter also stated that this program manages all aging effects for components subject to the recommendations for GL 89-13. The staff found this enhancement acceptable because it clarifies the overall program scope.

In addition in the ALRA the applicant stated that its OCCWS Program is consistent with the GALL Report with another enhancement revising procedures to address the following:

- Revise the NMP1 and NMP2 preventive maintenance and heat transfer performance test procedures to incorporate specific inspection criteria, corrective actions, and frequencies. (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 14).

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that the heat exchanger preventive maintenance procedures will be revised to incorporate inspection criteria to ensure thorough cleaning of all affected OCCW components and to initiate appropriate corrective actions prior to the loss of intended function if progressive degradation persists. This enhancement makes the applicant's AMP consistent with the GALL Report and is, therefore, acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.10, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the OCCWS Program. Inspections implementing the guidance of GL 89-13 have identified deterioration (including pipe wall thinning, pinhole leakage, and microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC)) and degradation (including clogged lines, flow restrictions, and fouling). These deficiencies were documented in DERs and resulted in cleaning, repair, or replacement of the affected components prior to loss of system function.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's OCCWS Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.29 and A2.1.29, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the OCCWS Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's OCCWS Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period

of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.8 Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.11, the applicant described the Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (CCCWS), stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M21, "Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System." The CCCWS Program manages loss of material and fouling of components exposed to closed-cycle cooling water environments. The applicable piping systems at NMPNS include the NMP1 and NMP2 reactor building closed loop cooling systems, NMP1 control room HVAC system, the NMP2 control building ventilation chilled water system, the heat exchanger jacket water cooling portions of the NMP1 emergency diesel generator system and the NMP2 standby diesel generator protection (generator) system. Program activities include chemistry monitoring, surveillance testing, data trending, and component inspections. The CCCWS Program implements the guidelines for controlling system performance and aging effects described in EPRI Report TR-107396.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the CCCWS Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M21 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's CCCWS Program acceptable because it conforms to the GALL AMP XI.M21 recommendations with enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its CCCWS Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M21 with enhancements to meet the GALL Report "Preventive Actions" program element by revising procedures to address the following:

- Expand periodic chemistry checks of CCCW systems consistent with the guidelines of EPRI TR-107396 (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).
- Implement a program to use corrosion inhibitors in the NMP1 and NMP2 reactor building closed loop cooling systems and NMP1 control room HVAC system (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that it is expanding chemistry parameters for the closed-cycle cooling water systems for consistency with the guidelines of EPRI TR-107396. The staff found this enhancement acceptable because it will make the applicant's AMP consistent with the GALL Report. Furthermore, in the ALRA the applicant stated that it will develop an



enhancement to implement the use of corrosion inhibitors in the NMP1 and NMP2 reactor building closed loop cooling system, NMP1 control room HVAC system, and NMP2 control building ventilation chilled water system according to the guidelines in EPRI TR-107396. The staff found this enhancement acceptable because it will make the applicant's AMP consistent with the GALL Report.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify whether the chromate corrosion inhibitor used in the NMP1 diesel generator jacket cooling water is consistent with the guidelines in EPRI TR-107396. The applicant responded that the chromate concentrations are outside the range of values provided in that document. The staff asked the applicant to justify the use of a corrosion inhibitor concentration outside the range of values recommended in EPRI Report TR-107396.

In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the chromate concentration is above the EPRI recommended control limit but consistent with vendor recommendations. In this letter the applicant further stated that the lower concentration limit in the EPRI report is based on the potential impact that the more highly concentrated corrosion inhibitor could have on the life of mechanical seals. The applicant further stated that it had reviewed the maintenance history of mechanical seals at NMP1 and found no occurrence of catastrophic failure. In order to manage the impact of the higher concentration of corrosion inhibitor on the mechanical seal life, the applicant stated that it will establish a required seal replacement frequency of 10 years maximum in lieu of the recommended replacement frequency of every 12 years. Based on satisfactory operation with the vendor-recommended chromate corrosion inhibitor concentration and the establishment of a program to replace the mechanical seals more frequently than recommended, the staff found this enhancement acceptable (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).

For NMP2 the applicant is using a nitrite corrosion inhibitor in the diesel generator jacket cooling water. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify whether the nitrite corrosion inhibitor used in the NMP2 diesel generator jacket cooling water is consistent with the guidelines in EPRI TR-107396. The applicant stated that the nitrite concentrations are within the range of values provided in that report. The staff found this use acceptable because it is consistent with the chemistry basis recommended in the GALL Report.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its CCCWS Program is consistent with the GALL Report with additional enhancements to meet the GALL Report "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" and "Detection of Aging Effects" program elements by revising procedures to address the following:

- Direct periodic inspections to monitor for loss of material in CCCW systems piping (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).
- A corrosion monitoring program for larger bore CCCW piping not subject to inspection under another NMP1 program (NMP1 Commitment 15).

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that expanding the existing corrosion monitoring program for small bore CCCW piping to include larger bore (greater than 3-inch outer diameter) makes its CCCWS Program consistent with the GALL Report. The staff found this enhancement consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately

managed.

Furthermore, in the ALRA the applicant stated that its CCCWS Program is consistent with the GALL Report with enhancements to meet the GALL Report “Monitoring and Trending” program element by revising procedures to address the following:

- Establish inspection frequencies for degradation of components in CCCW systems, including heat exchanger tube wall thinning (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).
- Perform a heat removal capability test for the NMP1 control room HVAC system at least every five years (NMP1 Commitment 15).
- Establish periodic monitoring, trending, and evaluation of performance parameters for the NMP1 and NMP2 reactor building closed loop cooling, NMP1 control room HVAC, and NMP2 control building ventilation chilled water systems (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).
- Specify chemistry sampling frequency for the NMP2 control building ventilation chilled water system. (NMP2 Commitment 15).

The staff found these enhancements to be consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable as such changes to the applicant’s program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its CCCWS Program is consistent with the GALL Report with additional enhancements to meet the GALL Report “Acceptance Criteria” program element by revising procedures to address the following:

- Provide controls and sampling necessary to maintain water chemistry parameters in CCCW systems within the guidelines of EPRI Report TR-107396. (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).
- Ensure acceptance criteria are specified in implementing procedures for indications of degradation (NMP1 and NMP2 Commitment 15).

The staff reviewed these enhancements and found them consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable as such changes to the applicant’s program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that these enhancements are scheduled for completion prior to the period of extended operation.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.11, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the CCCWS Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed various forms of degradation that were discovered by CCCWS Program activities at NMP. Corrective actions for observed degradation included increased monitoring, component repair, or component replacement as deemed necessary. Periodic monitoring of CCCW systems assures that any worsening trends are identified and the capabilities of CCCWS components within the scope of license renewal are maintained.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant's CCCWS Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.13 and A2.1.14, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the CCCWS Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's CCCWS Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.9 Boraflex Monitoring Program (NMP1 Only)

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.12, the applicant described the Boraflex Monitoring Program for NMP1, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M22, "Boraflex Monitoring." The Boraflex Monitoring Program manages degradation of neutron absorbing material in spent fuel pool storage racks resulting from radiation exposure and possible water ingress. Program activities include: (1) inspection of the NMP1 test coupons to detect dimensional changes; (2) correlation of measured levels of silica in the spent fuel pool with analysis using a predictive code (e.g., RACKLIFE) to estimate boron loss from Boraflex panels; and (3) neutron attenuation testing to measure the boron areal density of the short-length test coupons. The Boraflex Monitoring Program will be enhanced to require periodic in-situ neutron attenuation testing and measurement of boron areal density to confirm the correlation of the conditions of test coupons to those of Boraflex racks that remain in use during the period of extended operation.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Boraflex Monitoring Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M22 and found them consistent. The staff found the

applicant's Boraflex Monitoring Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M22, "Boraflex Monitoring Program," with enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Boraflex Monitoring Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M22 with enhancements to meet the GALL Report "Preventive Actions," "Parameters Monitored/Inspected," and "Detection of Aging Effects" program elements is to include performance of periodic neutron attenuation testing and measurement of boron areal density to confirm the correlation of the conditions of the test coupons to those of the Boraflex racks remaining in use during the period of extended operation (NMP1 Commitment 16).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that it originally planned to rely mainly on the test coupons, both short and full-length versions, to monitor the Boraflex panel condition. During the initial audit and review (August 9-13, 2004), the staff expressed concern that there is no plan to perform periodic boron areal density testing in the current NMP Boraflex panel conditions. To address the staff's concern, the applicant revised its plan and stated in the ALRA that it will provide direction for periodic performance of neutron attenuation testing and measurement of boron areal density to confirm the correlation of the conditions of the test coupons to those of the Boraflex racks remaining in use during the period of extended operation. The staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.12, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Boraflex Monitoring Program. Plant-specific operating experience at NMP is related to testing of surveillance coupons, whose results indicate expected levels of degradation. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed additional conditions that were discovered by Boraflex Monitoring Program activities in 2002. When the results of chemistry analysis indicated silica levels in the NMP1 spent fuel pool slightly greater than the established criteria for plant operation, a DER was initiated. A technical evaluation determined that actual silica levels were acceptable and the operating range was revised accordingly.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant is managing the current Boraflex rack conditions. For NMP1 the applicant is in the process of replacing six of the eight Boraflex racks with racks made of Boral. Boraflex racks remaining in the spent fuel pool will be used only in low flux areas and not in the vicinity of freshly discharged fuel. For NMP2 the applicant plans to replace all Boraflex panels with Boral panels prior to period of extended operation (NMP2 Commitment 36).

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff conclude that the Boraflex Monitoring Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR Supplement. In ALRA Section A1.1.5, the applicant provided the UFSAR supplement for the Boraflex Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed this section and determined that the

information in the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Boraflex Monitoring Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.10 Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.13, the applicant described the Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M23, "Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load (Related to Refueling) Handling Systems." The Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program (referred to herein as the Crane Inspection Program) manages loss of material due to corrosion of cranes Within the scope of license renewal. Program activities include: (1) performance of various maintenance activities on a specified frequency and (2) pre-operational inspections of equipment prior to lifting activities. Crane inspection activities are based on applicable industry standards and the guidance of NUREG-0612.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

During the initial audit and review (August 9-13, 2004) the applicant stated in the program attribute assessment document "Units 1 and 2 Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program" (since superseded) that under the GALL Report program element "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" comparison "the program ensures that crane operation is within the design limits in regards to the number and magnitude of lifts." The staff asked the applicant during the initial audit and review to explain how the number and magnitude of lifts for each crane within the scope of license renewal have been documented historically and will be documented in the future under a renewed license. The applicant also was asked to explain how the individual or individuals responsible for ensuring that crane operations are within crane design limits on the number and magnitude of lifts for license renewal cranes track and maintain this information on a daily or outage basis.

During the initial audit and review, the applicant stated in response to the staff's questions that the statement in the program attribute assessment document that the program ensures crane operation is within the design limits on the number and magnitude of lifts is a qualitative and not

a quantitative review. The applicant stated in the superseded program attribute assessment document that the cranes at NMP within the scope of license renewal are designed for standby or infrequent service like most cranes in similar applications. Crane capacity loads may be handled for initial installation of equipment and for infrequent maintenance. This crane use is the lightest (Class A) duty cycle according to the Crane Manufacturers Association of America crane service classifications. The applicant concludes that the infrequent use of the cranes below their capacity rated by industry experience and engineering judgment meets the recommendation of GALL AMP XI.M23 for the number and magnitude of lifts and that a documented history is not required. The staff found that the applicant maintained this same view of this GALL AMP XI.M23 program element in the ALRA.

The staff found this explanation acceptable because the cranes within the scope of license renewal are used infrequently. A qualitative review of the number and magnitude of crane lifts is reasonable because recording of the number and magnitude of every crane lift would be an undue documentation burden where crane utilization is well below their design life.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M23 and found them consistent. Furthermore, the staff concluded that the applicant's Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program provides reasonable assurance that aging management of loss of material from corrosion of crane structural components within the scope of license renewal will be performed. The staff found the applicant's Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M23 with an enhancement.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Inspection of Overhead Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M23 with an enhancement to meet the GALL Report "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" and "Detection of Aging Effects" program elements. The applicant stated that various cranes and hoists are not inspected for loss of material of the load-bearing components; therefore, an enhancement to the corresponding preventive maintenance procedure will be made to add a visual inspection for loss of material of the hoist lifting assembly components (NMP1 Commitment 17 and NMP2 Commitment 16).

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that each crane within the scope of license renewal has a procedure which periodically performs an inspection of the crane. This inspection, however, is not specifically of components for loss of material and corrosion. Also, the procedures do not identify specifically the effects of wear on the rails in the rail system. Procedures will be enhanced to add visual inspection for loss of material from corrosion and wear on the rails in the rail system.

In addition, as documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that this enhancement will add specific inspection steps for general corrosion to the preventive maintenance procedures for each crane within the scope of license renewal. Adding visual inspections to the procedures will be adequate to ensure that loss of material is detected before a loss of intended function. With these additional inspections, the applicant's Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program inspection will meet the program recommendations described in GALL AMP XI.M23. The staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.13, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Crane Inspection Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed no failures caused by loss of material in crane structural components.

The staff also reviewed the summary of specific operating experience as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The review indicated the Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program is effective in identifying crane degradation and implementing repairs. A review of NMP plant corrective action records revealed that there have been no failures from loss of material of crane structural components. Any deficiencies in NMP cranes have been attributed to design flaws, installation deficiencies, adjustments, or improper maintenance procedures. None of these deficiencies resulted in loss of intended function from age-related degradation. These findings provided assurance that loss of material of crane and trolley structural components had not occurred since the inception of the program. After enhancement program procedures will be more effective in detecting age-related degradation, implementing repairs, and maintaining the integrity of NMP load handling systems within the scope of license renewal to ensure discovery and evaluation of loss of material before a loss of intended function.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.22 and A2.1.22, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.0.3.2.11 Compressed Air Monitoring Program (NMP1 Only)

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.14, the applicant described the Compressed Air Monitoring Program for NMP1, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions and enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M24, "Compressed Air Monitoring." The Compressed Air Monitoring Program manages aging effects for portions of the compressed air systems Within the scope of license renewal, including cracking and loss of material due to general corrosion, by controlling the internal environment of systems and components. Program activities include air quality checks at various locations to detect contaminants that would affect the system's intended function. Additional visual inspections are credited for identification and monitoring of degradation for air compressors, receivers, and air dryers. The Compressed Air Monitoring Program is based on GL 88-14 and recommendations presented in INPO Significant Operating Event Report 88-01. The Compressed Air Monitoring Program is only applicable to NMP1 since the components requiring aging management for the NMP2 compressed air system are managed under the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Program and the One-Time Inspection Program.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions and enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

In the "Exceptions to NUREG-1801" section of the ALRA the applicant stated that it took specific exception to any maintenance recommended in EPRI TR-108147, "Compressor and Instrument Air System Maintenance Guide: Revision to NP-7079," not endorsed also by the equipment manufacturers and to the pre-service and in-service testing guidelines of ASME OM-S/G-1998, Part 17, "Performance Testing of Instrument Air Systems Information Notice Light-Water Reactor Power Plants." As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify why this exception was not mentioned in the "NUREG-1801 Consistency" section of the ALRA. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will revise NMP AMP B2.1.14, to read:

The Compressed Air Monitoring Program is an existing program that will be consistent with NUREG-1801, Section XL.M24 (Compressed Air Monitoring) (Reference 2), with exceptions, after enhancements are incorporated.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Compressed Air Monitoring program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M24 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Compressed Air Monitoring Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M24 with exceptions and enhancements.

During the audit, the applicant stated that its Compressed Air Monitoring Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M24 with an exception. The Compressed Air Monitoring Program makes an exception to the GALL Report "Preventive Actions" and "Detection of Aging Effects" program elements. As stated in the ALRA, NMP1 makes a limited exception related to maintenance suggestions in EPRI NP-7079 and EPRI TR-108147 not also endorsed by the manufacturer. NMP1 takes specific exception to the pre-service and in-service testing guidelines of ASME



OM-S/G-1998, Part 17. It also takes specific exception to the pre-service and in-service testing guidelines of ASME OM-S/G-1998, Part 17.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its current Compressed Air Monitoring Program includes good practice elements of the general maintenance and inspection activities for the compressor, receiver, and dryer as addressed in EPRI TR-108147 (revision to EPRI NP-7079) and ASME OM-S/G-1998, Part 17. The applicant also stated in justification for the GALL Report exception that (1) the maintenance practices reviewed and enhanced under the NMP1 response to GL 88-14 are adequate to manage aging without additional testing and (2) there have been no age-related failures of the compressed air monitoring system under its current program.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant did not list ANSI/ISA-S7.0.01-1996 in NMP AMP B2.1.14. The staff inquired whether the applicant used this standard for air quality. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will add the following for clarification:

NMP also takes exception to the use of ISA-S7.0.01-1996 for air quality standards. This is acceptable because the system air quality is monitored and maintained in compliance with the requirements of ANSI/ISA-S7.3-1975, "Air Quality Standards for Pneumatic Instruments" which meets or exceeds the quality requirements for dew point, hydrocarbons, and particulate of Section 4.4 of EPRI TR-108147 and ISA-S7.0.01-1996.

The staff agreed with the applicant's assessment because the ANSI/ISA-S7.3-1975 air quality standard is higher than the ANSI/ISA-S7.0.01-1996 standard.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that (1) the applicant had performed a satisfactory design and operations verification of the instrument air system in response to GL 88-14, (2) the applicant has incorporated the INPO good engineering practice recommendations on the instrument air system into its maintenance procedures, as described in the INPO Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 88-01, (3) the applicant's air sampling analysis procedure specifies the quality requirements of dew point, oil, water, and particle size based on ANSI/ISA-S7.0.01-1975, "Quality Standard for Instrument Air," (4) the applicant routinely performs preventative maintenance and inspection on the compressor and carbon steel components to limit the introduction of contaminants into the air supply, and (5) the applicant regularly tests the active compressed air system valves and skid mounted compressor components to ensure their operability. All of these activities demonstrate that the applicant has an adequate preventive maintenance program for inoperability of air-operated components due to corrosion and the presence of oil, water, rust, and other contaminants. In addition review of the applicant's operating experience indicated that the its Compressed Air Monitoring Program has an acceptable record of ensuring maintenance of the design basis function of the system. Therefore, the staff agreed with the applicant's assessment and concluded that the applicant's Compressed Air Monitoring Program includes good practice for general maintenance and inspection of the compressor, receiver, and dryer as addressed in EPRI TR-108147 and ASME OM-S/G-1998, Part 17. On these bases the staff found this exception acceptable.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Compressed Air Monitoring Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M24 with enhancements to meet the GALL Report "Scope of Program," "Preventive Actions," "Detection of Aging Effects," "Monitoring and Trending," and "Acceptance

Criteria” program elements by revising procedures to address such elements.

- “Scope of Program,” “Preventive Action,” and “Detection of Aging Effects” program elements - develop new activities to manage loss of material and SCC, perform periodic system leak checks, and expand the scope and frequency of inspections to ensure aging management of aging of certain subcomponents of the dryers and compressors (e.g., valves, heat exchangers) (NMP1 Commitment 18).
- “Monitoring and Trending” program element - establish activities that manage the aging of internal surfaces of carbon steel piping and that require system leak checks to detect deterioration of the pressure boundaries (NMP1 Commitment 18).
- “Acceptance Criteria” program element - expand the acceptance criteria to ensure aging management of certain subcomponents of the dryers and compressors (e.g., valves, heat exchangers) (NMP1 Commitment 18).

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that these enhancements are required to develop activities that manage loss of material due to general corrosion of such carbon steel components upstream of the dryers as piping, receivers, and valves. Other new required activities will address red brass pipe SCC and perform periodic system leak checks. Certain existing activities will be revised to expand the scope and frequency of inspections so that aging of such sub-components of the dryers and compressors as solenoid-operated valves and heat exchangers is addressed adequately. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that these additional activities are results of the applicant’s ongoing evaluation of its Compressed Air Monitoring Program to account for internal and external plant operating experience problems. The staff found these enhancements acceptable as such changes to the applicant’s program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.14, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Compressed Air Monitoring Program. Since its inception in 1992, the Compressed Air Monitoring Program has effectively detected the buildup of corrosion products and prevented component failure. NMP1 has experienced age related degradation due to stress corrosion cracking in unannealed red brass piping in areas that may have been chemically contaminated. However, no pneumatic component within the scope of license renewal has experienced a loss of intended function due to corrosion, corrosion product buildup, or dirt buildup in the instrument air system.

The applicant also stated in the ALRA that it reviews both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to its Compressed Air Monitoring Program and continually adjusts to account for internal and external plant operating experience issues. After discussions with the applicant’s technical staff and a sampling review of the DER list associated with the applicant’s Compressed Air Monitoring Program the staff concurred that the applicant incorporates the operating experience into its operations effectively.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant’s technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant’s technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant’s Compressed Air Monitoring

Program (NMP1 only) will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR Supplement. In ALRA Section A1.1.14, the applicant provided the UFSAR supplement for the Compressed Air Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed this section and determined that the information in the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Compressed Air Monitoring Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.12 BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.15, the applicant described the BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exception, with GALL AMP XI.M25, "BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System." The BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program manages the effects of SCC or IGSCC on the intended function of austenitic stainless steel piping in the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system. This program is based on the NRC criteria related to inspection guidelines for RWCU piping welds outboard of the containment isolation valve as delineated in NUREG-0313, Revision 2, and GL 88-01. An exception is taken to the Acceptance Criteria program element in that NMP1 utilizes the 1989 edition with no addenda of the ASME Section XI code versus the 1995 edition through the 1996 addenda as defined in the GALL. The design of the NMP2 RWCU system is such that carbon steel piping welds are not required to be examined in accordance with GL 88-01. The attributes of the BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program related to maintaining reactor coolant water chemistry are included in the Water Chemistry Control Program.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exception, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M25 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M25 with an exception.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M25 with an exception. The BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program makes an exception to the "Acceptance Criteria" program element. As stated in the ALRA, the exception to this program element is that the program described in GALL AMP XI.M25 cites ASME Section XI requirements covered in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda for the "Acceptance Criteria" element. NMP1 uses the 1989 Edition with no addenda.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the ASME edition that would be used for aging management during the extended period of operation. The applicant stated that the use of later code editions and addenda of ASME Section XI is determined according to 10 CFR 50.55a requirements 12 months before the start of each 120-month inspection interval subject to limitations and modifications by the staff and requires NRC approval. The staff found this response acceptable as the applicant clarified that the ASME XI Edition will have to be chosen according to applicable regulations and submitted for NRC approval. On this basis the staff found this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.15, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to cracking in the reactor water cleanup system. Review of plant-specific operating experience for NMP1 identified that leaks were experienced in two welds outboard of the second isolation valve. Weld 33-FW-22 had undergone a localized repair during its original construction and consequently, became more sensitized. Weld 33-FW-23A is a one of a kind design configuration that promotes very high stresses due to the fact that it connects very large shells that have different thermal movement that cannot be accommodated by the short and stiff pipe. In addition, the pipe is subject to thermal cycling. Both welds were repaired by a full structural weld overlay.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff reviewed plant-specific experience documented in a DER and summarized in the RWCU program basis document. The DER addressed a leak in the RWCU system from a 7/16" axial crack (in a bimetallic weld where stainless steel piping was replaced with carbon steel). The mechanism was classified as IGSCC and the leak was repaired with a weld overlay. This type of leak was discussed in GL 88-01. To confirm that this weld failure was a unique incident the applicant performed additional UT exams on a sample of three other RWCU welds. The sample size was based on the planned sample expansion criteria used during outages for RWCU inspections performed to comply with GL 88-01.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant's BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.9 and A2.1.10, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by

10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exception and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exception, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.13 Fire Protection Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.16, the applicant described the Fire Protection Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions and enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M26, "Fire Protection." The Fire Protection Program provides guidance for performance of periodic visual inspections to manage aging of the various materials comprising rated fire barriers. These include: (1) sealants in rated penetration seals (subject to shrinkage due to weathering); (2) concrete and steel in fire rated walls, ceilings, and floors (subject to loss of material due to flaking and abrasion; separation and concrete damage due to relative motion, vibration, and shrinkage); and (3) steel in rated fire doors (subject to loss of material due to corrosion and wear or mechanical damage). In addition, the program requires testing of the diesel-driven fire pump to verify that it is performing its intended function. This activity manages aging of the diesel engine's fuel oil supply line and exhaust system, which may experience loss of material due to corrosion. Inspection and testing is performed in accordance with the guidance of applicable standards.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions and enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Fire Protection Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M26 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Fire Protection Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M26 with exceptions and enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Fire Protection Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M26 with exceptions. The Fire Protection Program makes an exception to the GALL Report "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" program element where it requires bi-monthly inspection of hollow metal fire doors and monthly inspection of the halon/carbon dioxide suppression system valve lineup. Rather, NMP is consistent with Interim Staff Guidance (ISG-) 04, "Aging Management of Fire Protection Systems for License Renewal," on both issues.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the current fire doors inspection frequency will be changed to comply with a plant-specific engineering evaluation of inspection intervals. This change is consistent with ISG-04, as it states that fire doors are inspected visually on plant-specific intervals for integrity of door surfaces and for clearances. On this basis the staff found this exception acceptable.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that consistent with ISG-04 and the latest regulatory guidance of GL-86-10 valve lineups on the carbon dioxide/halon suppression systems will not be credited for aging management in its Fire Protection Program. Because ISG-04 states that valve lineup inspection, charging pressure inspection, and an automatic mode of operation verification are operational activities pertaining to system or component configurations or properties that may change and are not related to aging management the staff found this exception acceptable.

In the ALRA the applicant further stated that its Fire Protection Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M26 with enhancements to the GALL Report "Scope of Program," "Parameters Monitored/Inspected," "Detection of Aging Effects," and "Acceptance Criteria" program elements.

As part of the proposed enhancement the applicant will revise procedures to address the following elements:

- Incorporate periodic visual inspections of piping and fittings in a non-water environment (e.g., halon) and carbon dioxide fire suppression systems components to detect evidence of corrosion and any system mechanical damage that could affect its intended function (NMP1 Commitment 19, NMP2 Commitment 17).
- Expand the scope of periodic function tests of the diesel-driven fire pump to include inspection of engine exhaust system components to verify that loss of material is managed (NMP1 Commitment 19, NMP2 Commitment 17).
- Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the plant-specific inspection frequency of fire doors (NMP1 Commitment 19, NMP2 Commitment 17).

The staff found Commitment 19 of Appendix A1.4 for NMP1 and Commitment 17 of Appendix A2.4 for NMP2 consistent with ISG-04 which provides a specific frequency for both inspections and function tests. The staff found that the enhancement adequately manages the aging effects of piping and fittings in halon and carbon dioxide fire suppression systems components.

As part of these commitments the scope of periodic functional tests of the diesel-driven fire pump will be expanded to include inspection of engine exhaust system components. The staff found that the enhancement adequately manages to maintain the functional reliability of the diesel-driven fire pump.

As part of these commitments engineering evaluations will determine the plant-specific inspection frequency of fire doors. The staff determined that though is not consistent with the GALL Report this enhancement is consistent with ISG-04, which states that hollow metal fire doors should be inspected on a plant-specific interval and that this interval should be determined by an engineering evaluation. On this basis the staff found this enhancement acceptable.

In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant stated that an enhancement to meet the GALL Report "Detection of Aging Effects" program element revised procedures to address the following elements:

Halon and carbon dioxide functional test frequencies will be changed to semi-annual in the Fire Protection Program procedures as an addition to NMP1 Commitment 19 and NMP2 Commitment 17. The staff reviewed this enhancement and found it consistent with the GALL Report and acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.16, the applicant explained that it has evaluated applicable industry operating experience. Applicable guidelines and requirements have been incorporated into Fire Protection Program implementing procedures. Minor degradation has been identified while performing Fire Protection Program activities (e.g., fire barrier penetration seals found damaged or cracked, fire dampers failed surveillance testing, and fire door inspections not satisfactory) and corrective actions taken. No significant age-related problems have been reported for NMP fire protection systems and components managed by the Fire Protection Program.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's Fire Protection Program, NMP AMP B2.1.16, will manage adequately the aging effects identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.17 and A2.1.17, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Fire Protection Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Fire Protection Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.14 Fire Water System Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.17, the applicant described the Fire Water System Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M27, "Fire Water System." The Fire Water System Program manages aging of water-based fire protection systems due to loss of material and biofouling. Program activities include periodic maintenance, testing, and inspection of system piping and components containing water (e.g., sprinklers, nozzles, fittings, valves, hydrants, hose stations, standpipes). Inspection and testing is performed in accordance with the guidance of applicable National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards and the Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited Members' Manual.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Fire Water System Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M27 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Fire Water System Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended



GALL AMP XI.M27 with enhancements.

In the ALRA and in its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant stated that its Fire Water System Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M27 with enhancements to meet the GALL Report "Scope of Program" program element. The enhancement includes revising procedures to address the following elements:

- Incorporate into existing periodic test procedures inspections to detect and manage loss of material due to corrosion (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).
- Incorporate into sprinkler head replacements or inspections procedures and preventive maintenance tasks to meet NFPA 25, "Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-based Fire Protection System," Section 5.3.1 (2003 Edition) requirements (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).

This enhancement is stated in Commitment 20 of ALRA Section A1.4 for NMP1 and Commitment 18 of Section A2.4 for NMP2. The GALL Report recommends that portions of the fire protection suppression piping located above ground and exposed to water be disassembled and internally inspected visually once every refueling outage. ISG-04, "Aging Management of Fire Protection Systems for License Renewal," recommends the use of non-intrusive testing of the piping system. The incorporation of new inspection and NFPA 25 requirements into existing procedures will satisfy ISG-04. The staff found this enhancement acceptable.

In addition the applicant stated in its letter dated November 17, 2005, that as an addition to Commitment 20 of ALRA Section A1.4 and Commitment 18 of ALRA Section A2.4 new procedures and preventive maintenance tasks for sprinkler head replacements or inspections to meet NFPA 25 will be added to its Fire Water System Program. The staff reviewed this enhancement and found it consistent with the GALL Report and acceptable.

In the ALRA and in its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant also stated that an enhancement in meeting the GALL Report "Preventive Actions" program element revises procedures to address the following element:

- Specify periodic component inspections to verify management of loss of material (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).
- Add new specifications to procedures and preventive maintenance tasks to increase sprinkler head replacements or inspections scope (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that an enhancement to increase the frequency of inspection of components will be added to the scope of its Fire Water System Program to ensure further that loss of material is managed. This improvement of procedures consistent with ISG-04 and with the GALL Report is stated in NMP1 Commitment 20 and NMP2 Commitment 18. The staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In the ALRA and in its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant further stated an enhancement to meet the GALL Report "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" program element to revise procedures to address the following:

- Add procedural guidance for performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and detect biofouling (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).
- Incorporate new procedures and preventive maintenance tasks to implement sprinkler head replacement or inspections to meet NFPA 25, Section 5.3.1 (2003 Edition) requirements (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).

In the ALRA the applicant stated in Commitment 20 of ALRA Section A1.4 and Commitment 18 of Section A2.4 that an enhancement will be made to add procedural guidance for improving visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and detect biofouling for fire protection piping systems. The applicant also stated in its letter dated November 17, 2005, that the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced by adding the requirements for procedures and preventive maintenance tasks to implement sprinkler head replacement or inspections to meet NFPA 25. The staff reviewed this enhancement and concluded that it will make the applicant's Fire Water System Program consistent with ISG-04 and NFPA 25 for non-intrusive inspections. ISG-04 states that disassembly of piping may not be the most effective method to detect aging effects. Each opening of the system introduces oxygen which accelerates the potential for general corrosion. ISG-04 recommends non-intrusive pipe wall thickness evaluations like volumetric inspection. ISG-04 also states that the plant maintenance process may include a visual inspection of the internal surface of the fire protection piping with routine or corrective maintenance.

In addition the applicant stated in its letter dated November 17, 2005, that new procedures and preventive maintenance tasks for sprinkler head replacements or inspections will be added to its Fire Water System Program to meet NFPA 25. On this basis, the staff found this enhancement sufficient to manage the aging effects of fire protection piping systems.

In the ALRA the applicant also stated that an enhancement to meet the GALL Report "Detection of Aging Effects" program element revises procedures to address the following:

- Add specifications to periodically check water-based fire protection systems for microbiological contamination (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).
- Measure fire protection system piping wall thickness using non-intrusive techniques (e.g., volumetric testing) to detect loss of material from corrosion (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).

In the ALRA the applicant stated in Commitment 20 of ALRA Section A1.4 and Commitment 18 of ALRA Section A2.4 for NMP2 that requirements are to be added to check the water-based fire protection systems periodically for microbiological contamination. The staff reviewed this enhancement and found it consistent with the GALL Report and acceptable.

In the ALRA the applicant stated in Commitment 20 of ALRA Section A1.4 for NMP1 and Commitment 18 of ALRA Section A2.4 for NMP2 that measurement of fire protection piping wall thicknesses using non-intrusive techniques (e.g., volumetric testing) will be implemented. The staff reviewed this enhancement and found it consistent with ISG-04. The staff found these enhancements acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that the affects of aging will be adequately managed.

In addition in the ALRA the applicant stated that an enhancement in meeting the GALL Report

“Monitoring and Trending” program element revises procedures to address the following elements:

- Establish an appropriate means of recording, evaluating, reviewing, and trending the results of visual inspections and volumetric testing. (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18)

In the ALRA in Commitment 20 of ALRA Section A1.4 and Commitment 18 of ALRA Section A2.4 the applicant stated that an appropriate means of recording, evaluating, reviewing, and trending the results of visual inspections and volumetric testings will be added to existing procedures. The staff found this enhancement consistent with ISG-04. An appropriate means of recording, evaluating, reviewing, and trending the results of visual inspections is consistent with the GALL Report and an appropriate means of recording, evaluating, reviewing, and trending the results of volumetric testing is consistent with the ISG-04. On this basis the staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant’s program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Furthermore, in the ALRA the applicant stated in Commitment 20 of ALRA Section A1.4 and Commitment 18 of ALRA Section A2.4 that the enhancement in meeting the GALL Report “Acceptance Criteria” program element revises procedures to address the following element:

- Define acceptance criteria for visual inspections and volumetric testing (NMP1 Commitment 20, NMP2 Commitment 18).

The staff reviewed this enhancement and found it acceptable. The new acceptance criteria will provide in the inspection procedure parameters more specific than those listed in the GALL Report, which states that no unacceptable signs of degradation should be observed during visual assessment of internal system conditions under the program element “Acceptance Criteria.” The GALL Report does not include volumetric testing; hence, it does not have acceptance criteria for volumetric testing. The staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant’s program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.17, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Fire Water System Program. A review of the corrective action program shows that individual components have experienced various types of non-conformances (e.g., pinhole leaks, pipe wall thinning). Evaluations have demonstrated that no loss of system function would occur. DERs have been initiated to document conditions discovered while performing Fire Water System Program activities. Internal system leakage and failed surveillance tests were often traced to fouling of valve seating surfaces with sand or silt. Typical resolutions included adding sections of piping to specific flushing procedures or periodic disassembly and cleaning of components.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant’s technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant’s technical staff, the staff concluded that the applicant’s Fire Water System Program

will manage adequately the aging effects identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.18 and A2.1.18, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Fire Water System Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provides adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Fire Water System Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.15 Fuel Oil Chemistry Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.18, the applicant described the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions and enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M30, "Fuel Oil Chemistry." The Fuel Oil Chemistry Program manages loss of material due to corrosion that may result from introduction of contaminants into the plant's fuel oil tanks. Program activities include: (1) sampling and chemical analysis of the fuel oil inventory at the plant; (2) sampling, testing, and analysis of new fuel oil as it is unloaded at the plant; and (3) cleaning and inspection of fuel oil tanks. The Fuel Oil Chemistry Program is based on maintaining fuel oil quality in accordance with the guidelines of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards D975, D1796, D2276, and D4057.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions and enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M30 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M30, "Fuel Oil Chemistry," with exceptions and enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Fuel Oil Chemistry Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M30 with exceptions. The Fuel Oil Chemistry Program makes exceptions to the GALL Report "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" and "Acceptance Criteria" program elements. NMP1 and NMP2 take exception to using both ASTM D1796 and ASTM D2709, "Standard Test Method for Water and Sediment in Middle Distillate Fuels by Centrifuge," to determine the

concentration of water and sediment in the diesel fuel oil tanks. NMP1 and NMP2 use only the guidance given in ASTM D1796. These standards apply to fuel oils of different viscosities. The ASTM D1796 standard applies to the diesel fuel used at NMP1 and NMP2. NMP1 and NMP2 take exception to using the modified ASTM D2276 Method A, which specifies a pore size of 3.0 µm. NMP1 and NMP2 use a filter with a pore size of 0.8 µm as specified in ASTM D2276.

On the first exception the staff found that the applicant is using the standard recommended by the GALL Report and one that the applicant states is appropriate for the viscosity of the fuel oil in use at the site. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff found the use of ASTM D1796 acceptable because it is the appropriate testing procedure for the fuel oil in use at NMP1 and NMP2. The staff determined the applicant's use of a filter pore size of 0.8 microns instead of the 3.0 micron pore size recommended by the modified ASTM D2276 Method A to be prudent for monitoring the presence of particulates in the fuel oil. The staff found this exception in selection of the pore filter size acceptable.

The applicant also stated in the ALRA that it makes exceptions to the GALL Report "Detection of Aging Effects" program element. NMP1 and NMP2 take exception to multilevel sampling in the diesel fuel oil tanks. The physical configuration of the fuel oil tanks does not allow a representative fuel oil sample to be taken at multiple levels.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant clarified that the measurements are taken at approximately six inches from the tank bottom. The tanks also are drained and cleaned periodically to reduce the build-up of water or sediment. Because the sample is taken from near the bottom where water and sediment would accumulate the staff found sampling at this location a conservative representation of the whole tank contents. On this basis the staff found this exception acceptable.

The applicant further stated in the ALRA that it takes exception to the GALL Report "Monitoring and Trending" program element. NMP1 and NMP2 take exception to periodic sampling of the diesel fuel oil day tanks. These small tanks have no provision for sampling. Per technical specification surveillance testing, the lower portion of the diesel fuel oil is drained quarterly in NMP1 and monthly in NMP2. Such an exception has been accepted in NUREG-1796, "Dresden and Quad Cities Safety Evaluation Report."

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant clarified that these are small tanks, the diesel fire pump day tank approximately 275 gallons and the emergency diesel fuel oil day tank approximately 400 gallons. In addition per technical specification surveillance testing the lower portion of the diesel fuel oil in these tanks is drained back to the larger storage tanks be done quarterly for NMP1 and monthly for NMP2. Any water in the fuel oil is detected during the surveillance of the bulk storage tanks. Based on its review of this information the staff concluded that as the oil in the diesel fuel oil day tanks is sampled periodically when drained back to the larger storage tank, the staff found this exception acceptable.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Fuel Oil Chemistry Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M30 with additional enhancements to meet the GALL Report "Scope of Program," "Preventive Actions," "Parameters Monitored/Inspected," "Detection of Aging Effects," and "Monitoring and Trending" by revising procedures to address the following:

- Incorporate periodic tests for microbiological organisms at NMP1.

- Provide guidelines for the appropriate use of biocides, corrosion inhibitors, or fuel stabilizers to maintain fuel oil quality (NMP1 Commitment 21, NMP2 Commitment 19).
- Add specifications to sample the NMP2 diesel fuel oil storage tanks for water and sediment at least quarterly per the ASTM standard (NMP2 Commitment 19)

In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant deleted the first enhancement, “incorporate periodic tests for microbiological organisms at NMP1” because this test already is performed and the enhancement is not needed.

The staff found these enhancements consistent with the GALL Report recommendations and therefore acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In addition in the ALRA the applicant stated that an enhancement to meeting the GALL Report “Preventive Actions” and “Detection of Aging Effects” program elements revises applicable existing procedures to address the following:

- Add specifications to inspect the interior surfaces of the NMP1 emergency diesel fuel oil tanks and diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank and the NMP2 fuel oil tanks periodically for evidence of significant degradation, including a specific requirement that the tank bottom thickness be determined (NMP1 Commitment 21, NMP2 Commitment 19)

In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant deleted the “diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank” from this enhancement. The staff found this enhancement consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that an enhancement in meeting the GALL Report “Monitoring and Trending” program element revises procedures to address the following:

- Add specifications for quarterly trending of particulate contamination analysis results (NMP1 Commitment 21, NMP2 Commitment 19).

In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant added the following to the “Monitoring and Trending” and the “Parameters Monitored and Inspected” program elements to the program elements affected:

- An enhancement for quarterly trending of water and sediment (NMP1 and NMP2).
- An enhancement for periodic opening of the diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank drain (NMP1).
- An enhancement for removal of water if found (NMP1 and NMP2).

The staff found these enhancements consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

The enhancement for periodic opening of the diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank drain (NMP1) supports the exception taken by the applicant from periodic sampling of the diesel fuel oil day

tanks. The staff found the remaining two new enhancements consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

In the ALRA the applicant also stated that an enhancement in meeting the GALL Report "Acceptance Criteria" program element revises procedures to address the following:

- Ensure acceptance criteria are specified in the implementing procedures for indications of potential degradation. (NMP1 Commitment 21, NMP2 Commitment 19)

In the ALRA program description for the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program the applicant stated that this AMP is to maintain fuel oil quality according to ASTM Standards D975, D1796, D2276 and D4057. This enhancement is to specify acceptance criteria in the implementing procedures. The staff found this information consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable. On this basis, the staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that aging effects will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.18, the applicant explained it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed several incidents where contaminants (e.g., water, particulate) were detected through Fuel Oil Chemistry Program examinations. Corrective actions included contamination removal and system/component cleaning. However, there have been no instances of fuel oil system component failures at NMP attributed to contamination.

From review of the applicant's operating experience, the staff found evidence that the fuel oil is sampled periodically and that when acceptance limits are exceeded appropriate corrective actions have been taken. The staff found that the applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program is effective in managing the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of loss of material from the presence of contaminants.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical staff to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

During the initial audit and review (August 9-13, 2004), the staff requested that the applicant provide examples of the tank inspections for verification of the effectiveness of the program and state if any aging effects and aging effects mechanisms were identified. The applicant stated in response that the most recent emergency diesel generator (EDG) tank inspections returned normal results. The applicant concluded that initial ultrasound test of NMP2 fuel oil tanks had found no undue degradation of the tank wall. Ultrasound test of the NMP1 tank has not yet been implemented. The staff reviewed these reports and other documentation and concluded that no aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of the fuel tanks had been detected.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical staff the staff concluded that the applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. The applicant provided its UFSAR supplement for the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program in ALRA, Appendix A, Section A1.1.20 for NMP1 stating that the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program manages loss of material from corrosion that may result from introduction of contaminants into the plant's fuel oil tanks. Program activities include (1) sampling and chemical analysis of the fuel oil inventory at the plant, (2) sampling, testing, and analysis of new fuel oil unloaded at the plant, and (3) cleaning and inspection of fuel oil tanks. The applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program is based on maintaining fuel oil quality according to the guidelines of ASTM Standards D975, D1796, D2276, and D4057.

The applicant further stated in the ALRA that enhancements to its Fuel Oil Chemistry Program include the following revisions to existing activities credited for license renewal:

- Incorporate periodic tests for microbiological organisms.
- Add specifications for quarterly trending of particulate contamination analysis results.
- Add specifications to inspect the interior surfaces of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tanks and diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank periodically for evidence of significant degradation, including a requirement that tank bottom thickness be determined.
- Provide guidelines for the appropriate use of biocides, corrosion inhibitors, and fuel stabilizers to maintain fuel oil quality.
- Ensure acceptance criteria are specified in the procedures for indications of potential degradation.

In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant identified the following changes to the ALRA. First, the enhancement to incorporate periodic microbiological organisms was deleted. Second, the following additional enhancements were included in Section A1.1.20:

- An enhancement for quarterly trending of water and sediment
- An enhancement for periodic opening of the diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank drain
- An enhancement for removal of water if found

The applicant provided its USAR supplement for the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program in ALRA Appendix A, Section A2.1.20 for NMP2 stating that the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program manages loss of material due to corrosion that may result from introduction of contaminants into the plant's fuel oil tanks. Program activities include (1) sampling and chemical analysis of the fuel oil inventory at the plant, (2) sampling, testing, and analysis of new fuel oil unloaded at the plant, and (3) cleaning and inspection of fuel oil tanks. The applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program is based on maintaining fuel oil quality according to the guidelines of ASTM Standards D975, D1796, D2276, and D4057.

In addition in the ALRA the applicant stated that enhancements to its Fuel Oil Chemistry Program include the following revisions to existing activities credited for license renewal:

- Add specifications for quarterly trending of particulate contamination analysis results.
- Add specifications to inspect the fuel oil tanks periodically for evidence of significant degradation, including a requirement that tank thickness be determined.
- Provide guidelines for the appropriate use of biocides, corrosion inhibitors, and fuel



stabilizers to maintain fuel oil quality.

- Add specifications to sample the diesel fuel oil storage tanks for water and sediment at least quarterly per the ASTM standard.
- Ensure acceptance criteria are specified in the procedures for indications of potential degradation.

In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant identified the following changes to the ALRA, namely, the following additional enhancements in Section A2.1.20:

- Add a enhancement for quarterly trending of water and sediment.
- Add a enhancement for removal of water, if found.

Furthermore, in the ALRA the applicant stated that enhancements will be completed prior to the period of extended operation.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. The staff reviewed the ALRA and information provided in supplemental letters and determined that the information provides adequate summary descriptions of the program as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition, the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that the supplement provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.16 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.19, the applicant described the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program (RVSP), stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.M31, "Reactor Vessel Surveillance." The applicant indicated that enhancements to the RVSP encompass revisions to existing activities that are credited for license renewal to ensure the applicable aging effects are discovered and evaluated. The enhancements will be completed prior to the period of extended operation. The RVSP manages loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) beltline material. Program activities include: (1) periodic withdrawal and testing of surveillance capsules from each RPV; (2) use of test results and allowable stress loadings for the ferritic RPV materials to determine operating limits; and (3) comparison with a large industry data set to confirm validity of test results. Analysis and testing are based on the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix H, and ASTM Standard E-185.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements to determine whether the AMP, with enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

In ALRA Section B.2.1.19 the applicant described how this AMP will manage irradiation embrittlement of the RV through testing that monitors RV beltline materials. The ALRA states that the RVSP will be enhanced by making it consistent with the BWRVIP integrated surveillance program (ISP) for periods of extended operation (currently reviewed by the staff as BWRVIP-116) before NMPNS units enter their period of extended operation. The ALRA further states that the enhanced program will be consistent with GALL AMP XI.M31 described in the GALL Report. For this AMP the GALL Report recommends further evaluation. The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement to determine whether it provides an adequate description of the program.

The applicant has implemented the BWRVIP ISP (as documented in the BWRVIP-86-A Report, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, Updated BWR Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Implementation Plan") for the period of the current NMPNS operating licenses. The staff concluded that the BWRVIP ISP in the BWRVIP-86-A Report is acceptable for BWR licensee implementation provided that all participating licensees use one or more compatible neutron fluence methodologies acceptable to the staff for determining surveillance capsule and RV neutron fluences. The staff acceptance of the BWRVIP ISP for the current term is documented in the staff SE dated February 1, 2002, from Bill Bateman of the NRC to Carl Terry, BWRVIP Chairman. The BWRVIP-116 report provides guidelines for an ISP to monitor neutron irradiation embrittlement of the RV beltline materials for all United States (US) BWR power plants for the license renewal period.

The staff's review of the original LRA Section B2.1.19 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the applicant's program elements. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI B.2.1.19-1 by letter dated January 13, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant make a commitment to implement the BWRVIP-116 ISP currently under review by the staff or to submit a plant-specific surveillance program for each NMPNS unit two years before it enters the extended period of operation.

In its response by letter dated February 14, 2005, the applicant indicated that it will implement either BWRVIP-116 as approved by the staff or if the ISP is not approved two years prior to the NMPNS units' period of extended operation a plant-specific surveillance program will be submitted to the NRC. In this response the applicant also stated that it will revise the original LRA Sections A1.1.32 and A2.1.32 as shown in the staff's evaluation of the USAR supplement. The staff noted that the applicant had made a formal commitment to incorporate either BWRVIP-116 as approved by the staff or a plant-specific surveillance program for each of the NMPNS units to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H (NMP1 Commitment 22 and NMP2 Commitment 20).

The applicant stated that the future withdrawal and testing of the NMP1 and NMP2 surveillance

capsules will be deferred permanently because NMP1 and NMP2 are not host reactors within the BWRVIP-116 ISP. The applicant further stated that through participation in the BWRVIP ISP the RVSP will be adjusted to account for industry experience and research and that as additional operating experience is obtained lessons learned will be used to adjust this program as needed. Therefore, the staff will require the following license condition:

Implementation of the most recent staff-approved version of the Boiling Water Reactor Vessels and Internals Project (BWRVIP) Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) as the method to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. Any changes to the BWRVIP ISP capsule withdrawal schedule must be submitted for NRC staff review and approval. Any changes to the BWRVIP ISP capsule withdrawal schedule which affects the time of withdrawal of any surveillance capsules must be incorporated into the licensing basis. If any surveillance capsules are removed without the intent to test them, these capsules must be stored in manner which maintains them in a condition which would support re-insertion into the reactor pressure vessel, if necessary.

The staff found the applicant has demonstrated that the effects of aging from loss of fracture toughness of the RV beltline materials will be adequately managed with the enhancements so that the intended functions will be maintained consistently with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.19, the applicant indicated that NMPNS has successfully implemented a plant-specific RVSP that is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, 10 CFR 50, Appendix H, and ASTM Standard E-185. Three surveillance capsules that were originally installed in the NMP1 RV have been removed and tested with satisfactory results. One of the three surveillance capsules that were originally installed in the NMP2 RV has been removed and tested. Data from LaSalle, Units 1 and 2 and Columbia Generating Station have been used to supplement the NMP2 surveillance data.

The applicant stated that under the ISP, neither NMP1 or NMP2 is identified as a host plant; the representative materials for the limiting RV plate and weld materials, and their associated withdrawal schedules are identified in the BWRVIP-116 report. Thus, future withdrawal and testing of the NMP1 and NMP2 surveillance capsules will be permanently deferred.

The applicant also stated that through participation in the BWRVIP ISP, the RVSP will be adjusted to account for industry experience and research. The applicant stated that With additional operating experience lessons learned will be used to adjust this program as needed.

The applicant maintains that the RVSP has been effective in managing loss of fracture toughness in RV beltline materials.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In RAI B2.1.19-1 the staff further requested that the applicant state, in the UFSAR and USAR its commitment regarding the implementation of BWRVIP-116 and in its response to RAI B.2.1.19-1 by letter dated February 14, 2005, the applicant stated that it will revise the ALRA Sections A.1.1.32 and A.2.1.32, to include the following:

The reactor vessel surveillance program is an existing program that manages

loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement in the reactor pressure vessel beltline material. Program activities include (1) periodic withdrawal and testing of surveillance capsules from the RPV; (2) use of test results and allowable stress loadings from the ferritic RPV materials to determine operating limits; and (3) comparison with a large industry data set to confirm validity of test results. Analysis and testing are based on the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix H, and ASTM Standard E-185. NMPNS commits to implement the Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) described in BWRVIP-116 (if approved by the NRC staff). When the NRC issues a final safety evaluation for BWRVIP-116, NMPNS will address any open items and complete the SER Action Items. Should BWRVIP-116 not be approved by the NRC, a plant specific reactor vessel surveillance program will be submitted to the NRC two years prior to commencement of the period of extended operation.

Enhancements to the RVSP include the following revisions to existing activities credited for license renewal:

Incorporate the requirements and elements of the ISP, as documented in BWRVIP-116 and approved by NRC, or an NRC-approved plant-specific program, into the reactor vessel surveillance program, and include a requirement that if NMPNS surveillance capsules are tested, the tested specimens will be stored in lieu of optional disposal. When the NRC issues a final safety evaluation report for BWRVIP-116, NMPNS will address any open items and complete the SER Action items. Should BWRVIP-116 not be approved by the NRC, a plant specific reactor vessel surveillance program will be submitted to the NRC two years prior to commencement of the period of extended operation.

Project analyses of upper shelf energy and pressure-temperature limits to 60 years using methods prescribed by Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, and include the applicable bounds of the data, such as operating and neutron fluence.

Enhancements will be completed prior to the period of extended operation.

This information has been incorporated into the ALRA. The staff reviewed the applicant's proposed revision to ALRA Sections A.1.1.32 and A.2.1.32 of the UFSAR and USAR supplements and determined that the applicant has committed to implement an approved plant-specific RPV surveillance program or the most recent staff-approved version of the BWRVIP ISP to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI B.2.1.19-1 is resolved.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's RVSP and RAI response, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP

and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.17 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.23, the applicant described the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions and enhancement, with GALL AMP XI.S1, "ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE." The ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (referred to herein as the IWE ISI Program) manages aging effects due to: (1) corrosion of carbon steel components comprising the NMP1 and NMP2 containment pressure boundaries and (2) degradation of NMP1 and NMP2 containment pressure-retaining polymers. Program activities include visual examination, with limited surface or volumetric examinations when augmented examination is required. The IWE ISI Program is based on the 1998 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Subsection IWE) for containment inservice inspection (ISI) with plant-specific exceptions approved by the staff.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and enhancement and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions and enhancement, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to explain why there is an identified enhancement in the ASME Section XI ISI (SubSection IWE) Program with no affected program elements listed. The applicant stated that the reason no elements are identified is that the enhancement shown is not required to ensure consistency with the GALL Report but adopted as a function of the applicant's response to a staff request early in the application review period. To avoid confusion with the specialized definition of "enhancement" consistent with the GALL Report changes will be incorporated into the ALRA.

In its supplemental letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the first sentence in the second paragraph in ALRA Section A1.1.2 changes the word "enhanced" to "improved" with the following sentence added at the end of this paragraph: "This improvement is not required for consistency with the GALL but is an activity NMP is adopting to ensure consistency with industry practice." The same change is made to ALRA Section. In the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program under the enhancement paragraph a new first paragraph of "None" is added. The following sentence is added to the beginning of the second paragraph: "The following improvement is not required for consistency with the GALL Report but is an activity NMP is adopting to ensure consistency with industry practice." The last sentence of this paragraph is replaced with the following sentence: "This improvement will be implemented prior to entry into the period of extended operation." Also the phrase "and requires enhancements to be consistent with others" is deleted from the GALL Report consistency Section of the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. With the clarification statements made by the applicant no enhancement is required to make the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI

(Subsection IWE) Program consistent with the GALL Report.

The staff reviewed those portions of the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.S1 and found them consistent with this GALL Report AMP. The staff found the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.S1 with an exception.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.S1 with exceptions. The ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program makes exceptions to the GALL Report "parameters monitored/inspected," "Detection of Aging Effects," "monitoring and trending," and "acceptance criteria" program elements. The GALL Report program elements identify both the ASME 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda and the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda as applicable to the NMP1 and NMP2 Application for Renewed Operating License Appendix B - Aging Management Program ASME Section XI-IWE as approved in 10 CFR 50.55a. The NMP IWE ISI Program complies with the ASME Section XI 1998 Edition with no Addenda.

In the ALRA the applicant further stated that the GALL Report program description for this AMP identifies both the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda and the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda as the applicable editions for the NMP1 and NMP2 ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program as approved in 10 CFR 50.55a. The applicant's IWE ISI Program complies with ASME Section XI 1998 Edition with no Addenda. Although differences exist between code editions the applicant's IWE ISI Program complies with an edition of Section XI approved by the staff for use at NMP. Implementation of guidance from this later code edition meets the recommendations of the GALL Report.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the staff previously found this exception acceptable because the NMP code of record is an ASME Code version later than that cited by the GALL Report. The use of the 1998 Edition of the ASME Code was found acceptable in a letter from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dated August 17, 2000, with the subject "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Relief From the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a Related to Containment Inspection (TAC Nos. MA7116, MA7117, and MA7118)." The staff also noted that under the applicant's ASME Code of record for ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) a 10-year inspection interval is valid under the CLB. At present an ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program is approved for use on an ASME Code 10-year ISI interval specific basis. However, the applicant will have to request approval to use the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program for the specific intervals during the period of extended operation under 10 CFR 50.55a 12 months prior to each interval. Therefore, the staff determined that the ASME Section XI Code Edition as referenced in 10 CFR 50.55a, for which the applicant will request approval 12 months prior to each inspection interval, is acceptable for the period of extended operation and found this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.23, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the IWE ISI Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed few discrepancies and no age-related equipment failures. Deficiencies discovered by recent IWE ISI Program examinations included damage to the NMP1 torus equipment hatch, damage to the NMP1 drywell dome manway hatch sealing surface, minor corrosion on the NMP1 drywell dome sealing surface, and minor corrosion on the

NMP2 drywell liner. These indications were corrected for NMP1 and NMP2.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also reviewed the summary of specific operating experience for the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program. The review indicated that the program is effective in identifying age-related degradation, implementing repairs, and maintaining the integrity of the containment pressure boundaries and NMP1 and NMP2 containment pressure-retaining polymers.

During the initial audit and review (August 9-13, 2004) NMP1 plant maintenance records revealed that there have been only a few DERs written and no age-related component failures following IWE inspections since the inception of the program with deficiencies limited to damage to the torus equipment hatch, damage to the drywell dome manway hatch sealing surface, corrosion of the drywell liner, and minor damage or corrosion on the drywell dome sealing surface. None of these deficiencies resulted in loss of intended function from age-related degradation. These records provide assurance that containment pressure boundary degradation has not occurred since the inception of the program. Subsequent to the onsite audit and review of NMP ALRA, the staff also reviewed the applicant's Inservice Inspection Owner Activity Report, dated July 23, 2003. In this report, the applicant has stated that, for NMP1, corrosion was identified over the entire 360 degree circumference of the drywell interior surface of the liner plate at the 225 foot elevation. The applicant further stated in the report that (1) a subsequent detailed (D-VT) visual examination (VT-1) was performed and that (2) no unacceptable degradation in the visible areas of the drywell liner was found and that (3) no immediate corrective action was taken. The staff has asked the applicant to provide further discussion to address the staff concern regarding the loss of material due to corrosion of the NMP1 drywell. This is designated as Open Item (OI) 3.0.3.2.17-1.

In addition during the initial audit and review NMP2 plant maintenance records revealed that there has been only one DER written and no age-related component failures following IWE inspections since the inception of the program. In 2000 minor corrosion was discovered and removed from the drywell liner with no loss of integrity. These records provided assurance that containment pressure boundary degradation had not occurred since the inception of the program.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. The applicant provided its UFSAR supplement for the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program in ALRA Appendix A, Section A1.1.2 for NMP1 stating that the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (referred to herein as the IWE Inservice Inspection Program) manages aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to (1) corrosion of carbon steel components comprising the containment pressure boundary and (2) degradation of containment pressure-retaining polymers. Program activities include visual examinations with limited surface or volumetric

examinations when augmented examination is required. The IWE Inservice Inspection Program is based on the 1998 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI (Subsection IWE) for containment inservice inspection with plant-specific exceptions to the evaluation in the GALL Report (which covers ASME Section XI requirements from both the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda and the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda) approved by the staff. The NMP1 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program will be enhanced to add an augmented VT-1 visual examination of the NMP1 containment penetration bellows. This inspection will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC per NUREG-1611, "Aging Management of Nuclear Power Plant Containments for License Renewal," Table 2, Item 12.

In addition the applicant provided its USAR supplement for the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program in ALRA Appendix A Section A2.1.2 for NMP2 stating that the program manages aging effects and aging effects mechanisms from (1) corrosion of carbon steel components comprising the containment pressure boundary and (2) degradation of containment pressure-retaining polymers. Program activities include visual examinations with limited surface or volumetric examinations when augmented examination is required. The IWE ISI Program is based on the 1998 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Subsection IWE) for containment ISI with plant-specific exceptions to the evaluation in the GALL Report (which covers ASME Section XI requirements from both the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda and the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda) approved by the staff. The NMP2 ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program will be enhanced to add an augmented VT-1 visual examination of the NMP2 containment penetration bellows. This inspection will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC per NUREG-1611, Table 2, Item 12.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to explain why there is an enhancement in ALRA Section B2.1.23 for its ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program with no affected program elements listed. The applicant stated that there are no elements identified because the enhancement shown is not required to ensure consistency with the GALL Report has been adopted in response to a staff request early in the application review period. To avoid confusion with the specialized definition of "enhancement" consistent with the GALL Report changes will be incorporated into the ALRA.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the first sentence in the second paragraph in ALRA Section A1.1.2 changes the word "enhanced" to "improved" with the following sentence added at the end of this paragraph: "This improvement is not required for consistency with the GALL but is an activity NMP is adopting to ensure consistency with industry practice." The same change is made to ALRA Section A2.1.2.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. With the clarification made by the applicant there is no enhancement required to make the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWE) Program consistent with the GALL Report.

The staff reviewed these sections and information in the ALRA and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).



Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancement and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancement prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.0.3.2.18 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program (NMP2 Only)

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.24, the applicant described the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program for NMP2, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions, with GALL AMP XI.S2, "ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL." The ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program (referred to herein as the IWL ISI Program) manages aging of concrete in the NMP2 containment wall, base mat, and drywell floor. Program activities include general visual examination of all accessible concrete surface areas, with provisions for detailed visual examination when deterioration and distress of suspect areas is detected. The IWL ISI Program is based on the 1998 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Subsection IWL) for containment inservice inspection with plant-specific exceptions approved by the NRC. This program applies to concrete elements of BWR Mark II and III containment structures. NMP1 is a BWR Mark I containment, therefore, this program does not apply to NMP1.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to explain why in NMP AMP B2.1.24 under the consistency paragraph "IWE" is shown in the first sentence instead of "IWL." The applicant responded that this typographical error should have been "IWL," not "IWE." In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that in NMP AMP B2.1.24 under the consistency paragraph the typographical error "IWE" has been changed to "IWL."

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. With the correction of "IWE" to "IWL" the sentence agrees with the NMP AMP described in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program.

The staff reviewed those portions of the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) Program (Unit 2 only) for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.S2 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) Program (Unit

2 only) acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.S2 with exceptions.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) Program takes exception to the GALL Report “parameters monitored/inspected,” “Detection of Aging Effects,” “monitoring and trending,” and “acceptance criteria” program elements. The GALL Report program elements identify both the ASME 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda and the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda as applicable editions for the NMP2 Application for Renewed Operating License Appendix B - Aging Management Program ASME Section XI-IWL as approved in 10 CFR 50.55a. The NMP IWL ISI Program complies with the ASME Section XI 1998 Edition with no addenda.

The applicant stated in the ALRA that the GALL Report program description for this AMP identifies both the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda and the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda as applicable editions for the its ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) Program as approved in 10 CFR 50.55a. The applicant’s IWL ISI Program complies with the ASME Section XI 1998 Edition with no addenda. Although differences exist between code editions the applicant’s IWL ISI Program complies with an edition of Section XI approved by the NRC for use at NMP. Implementation according to this later code edition meets the recommendation of the GALL Report description.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff previously found this exception acceptable because the code of record for NMP2 is an ASME Code version later than that cited by the GALL Report. The use of the 1998 Edition of the ASME Code was found acceptable in a letter from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dated August 17, 2000, with the subject “Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Relief From the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a Related to Containment Inspection (TAC Nos. MA7116, MA7117, and MA7118).” The staff also noted that under the applicant’s ASME code of record for ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) a 10-year inspection interval is valid under the CLB. At present an ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) program is approved for use on an ASME Code 10-year ISI interval-specific basis. However, the applicant will have to request approval to use the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) program for the specific intervals during the period of extended operation under 10 CFR 50.55a 12 months prior to each interval. Therefore, the staff determined that the ASME Section XI Code Edition as referenced in 10 CFR 50.55a, for which the applicant will request approval 12 months prior to each inspection interval is acceptable for the period of extended operation and found this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.24, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the IWL ISI Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed no DERs written as a result of IWL ISI Program inspections since program inception.

During the initial audit and review, (August 9-13, 2004) the staff reviewed operating experience for the applicant’s ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) Program (Unit 2 only). The review indicated that the applicant’s program is effective in maintaining the integrity of the containment concrete with processes in place to identify age-related degradation and implement repairs.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also reviewed the summary of specific operating experience for the applicant’s ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) Program. The review indicated that there have been no DERs written following IWL inspections since the

inception of the program and provided assurance that containment degradation has not occurred since the inception of the program.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWL) Program (Unit 2 Only) will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

USAR Supplement. In ALRA Section A2.1.4, the applicant provided the USAR supplement for the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program. The staff reviewed this section and determined that the information in the USAR supplement provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the USAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.19 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.25, the applicant described the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions, with GALL AMP XI.S3, "ASME Section XI, Subsection IWF." The ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program (referred to herein as the IWF ISI Program) manages aging of carbon steel component and piping supports, including ASME Class MC supports, due to general corrosion and wear. Program activities include visual examination to determine the general mechanical and structural condition of components and their supports. The IWF Inservice Inspection Program is based on the 1989 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Subsection IWF) for inservice inspection of supports and implements the alternate examination requirements of ASME Code Case N-491-1.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program for

which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.S3 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.S3 with exceptions.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.S3 with exceptions to the GALL Report "scope of program," "parameters monitored/inspected," and "acceptance criteria" program elements. The GALL Report program elements identify the ASME 1989 Edition through the 1995 Edition and Addenda through the 1996 Addenda as applicable to the NMP1 and NMP2 Application for Renewed Operating License Appendix B - Aging Management Program ASME Section XI-IWF as approved in 10 CFR 50.55a. The NMP IWE ISI Program complies with the ASME Section XI 1989 Edition with no addenda.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the NRC previously found this exception acceptable because the code of record for NMP IWF inspections is the 1989 version of the ASME Code found acceptable in two letters from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dated October 5, 2000 and March 3, 2000. The subject of the October 5, 2000, letter was "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 - Reliefs for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Program Plan, Revision 1 (TAC No. MA7129)." The subject of the March 3, 2000, letter was "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2 - Reliefs for the Second 10-Year Inservice Inspection Program Plan, Revision 1 (TAC No. MA6273)." The staff also noted that under the applicant's ASME code of record for ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) a 10-year inspection interval is valid under the CLB. At present an ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program is approved for use on an ASME Code 10-year ISI interval specific basis. However, the applicant will have to request approval to use the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program for the specific intervals during the period of extended operation under 10 CFR 50.55a 12 months prior to each interval. Therefore, the staff determined that the ASME Section XI Code Edition as referenced in 10 CFR 50.55a, for which the applicant will request approval 12 months prior to each inspection interval is acceptable for the period of extended operation and found this exception acceptable.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the GALL Report AMP program identifies the ASME 1989 Edition through the 1995 Edition and addenda through the 1996 Addenda as applicable to applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program as approved in 10 CFR 50.55a. The applicant's IWF ISI Program complies with the ASME Section XI 1989 Edition with no addenda. Although differences exist between code editions the applicant's IWF ISI Program complies with an edition of Section XI approved by the staff for use at NMP. Implementation according to this code edition meets the recommendation of the GALL Report description.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.25, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the IWF Inservice Inspection Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed no age-related failures of any supports within the scope of the IWF Inservice Inspection Program.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also reviewed the summary of specific operating experience for its ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program. Review of the summary indicated that the applicant did not identify any age-related ASME Code Class 1, 2, 3, and MC component support failures. During the initial audit and review (August 9-13, 2004)

NMP1 plant maintenance records revealed that there have been no age-related failures of any supports in the program and internal audits have revealed only administrative deficiencies that did not affect the ability of any support to perform its intended function. One DER which demonstrated the effectiveness of inspection techniques in use at NMP1 reported a support that may have lost a degree of freedom from the improper application of paint. Further investigation revealed the support maintained its intended function with no age-related degradation. Other DERs documented deficiencies discovered and corrected through site quality assurance and corrective action programs. No improperly managed age-related degradation was discovered, assurance that support degradation had not occurred since the inception of the program.

During the initial audit and review (August 9-13, 2004) NMP2 plant maintenance records also revealed that there have been no age-related failures of any supports in the program, and internal audits have revealed only administrative deficiencies that did not affect the ability of any support to perform its intended function. One DER demonstrating effective inspection techniques in use at NMP2 reported a support with a gap between the inner nut and clamp. The pipe clamp bolts were tightened to their original design specification and the support was found to be operable so there was no loss of intended function. Other DERs documented deficiencies discovered and corrected through site quality assurance and corrective action programs. No improperly managed age-related degradation was discovered, assurance that support degradation had not occurred since the inception of the program.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience reveals no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWF) Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.3 and A2.1.3, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.20 Masonry Wall Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.27, the applicant described the Masonry Wall Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.S5, "Masonry Wall Program." The Masonry Wall Program manages aging effects so that the evaluation basis established for each masonry wall within the scope of license renewal remains valid through the period of extended operation. The Masonry Wall Program is based on the structures monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 50.65. Implementation of the Masonry Wall Program is discussed in the program description for the Structures Monitoring Program.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

Because the applicant chose to implement its Masonry Wall Program through its Structures Monitoring Program the staff evaluations are combined with the evaluations of the Structures Monitoring Program in SER Section 3.0.3.2.21.

Operating Experience. Refer to SER Section 3.0.3.2.21.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.23 and A2.1.23, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Masonry Wall Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Masonry Wall Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.21 Structures Monitoring Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.28, the applicant described the Structures Monitoring Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.S6, "Structures Monitoring Program." The Structures Monitoring Program manages aging of structures, structural components, and structural supports within the scope of license renewal. The program provides for periodic visual inspections, surveys, and examination of all safety related buildings (including the primary containment and substructures within the primary containment) and various other buildings

within the scope of license renewal. Program activities identify degradation of materials of construction, which include structural steel, concrete, masonry block, sealing materials. While not credited for mitigation of aging, protective coatings are also inspected under this program. The Structures Monitoring Program, which was initially developed to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, implements guidance provided in RG 1.160, NUMARC 93-01, and NEI 96-03.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

During the initial audit and review (August 9-13, 2004) the staff asked the applicant to explain the design of the foundations for its structures within license renewal and whether any have porous concrete subfoundations. In addition the staff requested the applicant to explain if any license renewal structures have settlement issues and if there is a site de-watering system.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated in response to the staff's questions that the foundations for the structures within the scope of license renewal are reinforced concrete on bedrock. Porous concrete sub-foundation construction was not used at NMP. The applicant also responded that settlement is not an aging effect or aging effect mechanism at NMP and that there is no site de-watering system.

GALL AMP XI.S5 under the "detection of aging effects" program element states that the frequency of inspection is selected to ensure no loss of intended function between inspections. The inspection frequency may vary from wall to wall depending on the significance of cracking in the evaluation basis. Unreinforced masonry walls not contained by bracing warrant the most frequent inspection because cracks may invalidate the existing evaluation basis. The applicant stated in its Masonry Wall Program basis document that the inspection frequency of six years for the unreinforced walls is consistent with the GALL Report. However, this inspection frequency is the same as that for reinforced masonry walls as discussed in the applicant's program basis document.

In addition as documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to explain how the same inspection frequency for all reinforced, unreinforced, and braced masonry walls within the scope of license renewal is consistent with the GALL Report. The applicant responded that it will require as part of its Masonry Wall Program (as managed by its Structures Monitoring Program) that unreinforced masonry walls without bracing be inspected for cracking more frequently than reinforced or braced masonry walls.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant added to the ALRA a commitment to enhance its Masonry Wall Program (as managed by its Structures Monitoring Program) based on the GALL Report text in the program element, "Detection of Aging Effects." The program enhancement will provide guidance for inspecting NMP1 unreinforced or unbraced masonry walls within the scope of license renewal more frequently than reinforced masonry walls. The ALRA sections affected are A1.1.34, A1.4, and B2.1.28.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. With the commitment to inspect

unreinforced masonry walls more frequently the applicant's Structural Monitoring Program is now consistent with the "detection of aging effects" program element of GALL AMP XI.S5.

As further documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program basis document lists wood in air as one of the NMP1 component/commodity groups managed by the program. The staff requested the applicant to explain why wood was not listed under the program description in ALRA Section A1.1.34 and NMP AMP B2.1.28 as one of the construction materials inspected for degradation by the program. The applicant responded that it would add wood to the list of materials for NMP1 in the program description of ALRA Sections B2.1.28 and A1.1.34.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that ALRA Section A1.1.34 had been revised to add NMP1 wooden structure to the list of construction materials in the first paragraph and that ALRA Section B2.1.28 had been revised by adding NMP1 wooden structure to the list of construction materials in the first paragraph under the program description.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. With the addition of wood to ALRA Sections A1.1.34 and B2.1.28 the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program in the ALRA is now in agreement with the program basis document.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Structures Monitoring Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.S5 and GALL AMP XI.S6, and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.S5, "Masonry Wall Program," and GALL AMP XI.S6, "Structures Monitoring Program," with enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Structures Monitoring Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.S6 with an enhancement. As stated in the ALRA, the enhancement in meeting the GALL Report "scope of program," "parameters monitored/inspected," "Detection of Aging Effects," and "acceptance criteria" program elements is to expand scope and make revisions to activities (i.e., procedures) credited for license renewal to ensure that aging effects and aging effects mechanisms are discovered and evaluated (NMP1 Commitment 26, NMP2 Commitment 24).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Structures Monitoring Program will be expanded to include within the scope of license renewal the following listed activities or components not currently within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65:

- (a) NMP2 fire-rated assemblies and watertight penetration visual inspections,
- (b) NMP2 masonry walls in the turbine building and service water tunnel serving a fire barrier function, and
- (c) the steel electrical transmission towers required for the station blackout (SBO) and recovery paths for NMP1 and NMP2.

Also parameters monitored during structural inspections will be expanded to include those relevant to aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for structural bolting. In addition regularly scheduled ground water monitoring will ensure that a benign environment is maintained.



The staff determined that with these additional inspections of SCs the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program will meet the recommendation of GALL AMP XI.S6. The applicant identified commitments to the NRC with this enhancement relative to GALL AMP XI.S6. Because inspection of these additional structural components will make the applicant's program consistent with GALL AMP XI.S6 the staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that the effects of aging will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.28, the applicant explained it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Structures Monitoring Program. Since implementation of inspections under the Structures Monitoring Program, minor cracking has been identified in various concrete structures and slight (but stable) ground water leaks have occurred in some tunnels. However, a review of plant-specific operating experience revealed no cases of structural failure caused by unidentified degradation. Similarly, no structural deficiencies have been identified in flood control structures.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also reviewed the summary of specific operating experience for the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program. The review indicated that the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program is effective in identifying structural degradation, implementing corrective actions, and trending parameters for NMP structures within the scope of license renewal. When degradation has been identified corrective actions have been implemented to ensure that the integrity of the affected structure is maintained without loss of intended function.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

As stated in the Audit and Review Report, NMP1 and NMP2 plant maintenance/ inspection records revealed that since implementation the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program has been effective identifying structural degradation before a loss of intended function occurs.

Several DERs have identified minor cracking in concrete structures including the service water pipe tunnel. Because the service water pipe tunnel is susceptible to small wall cracks allowing leakage of ground water the staff requested the applicant to discuss the results of the latest inspections of the tunnel and how often these inspections were done. The applicant stated in response that the repaired areas referenced in the service water pipe tunnel DER had been inspected recently and that there continued to be no entry of ground water in the areas repaired. The frequency of inspections following the repairs has varied. Initially repair inspections were monthly, then quarterly, then annually. Inspections of the tunnel are now scheduled for every refueling outage.

In addition during the initial audit and review the staff asked the applicant to explain if there is any rust staining in the tunnel, indicating corrosion of rebar in the concrete, the reason for not performing any external waterproofing repairs to the tunnel. The applicant responded that inspections of accessible areas adjacent to inaccessible areas can indicate the condition of the inaccessible areas. Rust stains have not been identified on the internal surface of the concrete adjacent to the areas of leakage through the tunnel concrete walls. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that degradation of the reinforcing steel is not occurring. Waterproof coating of the

exterior surface of the structure is not required due to successful repairs to water penetration paths from the inside the structure.

Furthermore, during the initial audit and review the staff asked the applicant to explain how the design of the service water pipe tunnel keep the flood depth under three inches if ground water entered again and the sump pumps as reported in the DER. The applicant stated that the tunnel is sectioned by various curbs and elevations. If the sumps failed in the tunnel water would flow over the curb and into another sump.

The applicant was also asked at the time to discuss the latest inspections for the normal switchgear building, service water tunnels, and the radwaste building for below grade exterior walls where groundwater also has entered. The applicant stated that the latest inspections have not identified significant water entry for the structures within the scope of license renewal.

Based on the initial audit and review that the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program procedures provide for buried structures that when inaccessible areas are excavated or exposed if practical an inspection of these structures will be performed and findings included in the program's database.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.34 and A2.1.34, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Structures Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.22 Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.30, the applicant described the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.E2, "Electrical Cables and Connections Not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements Used in Instrumentation Circuits." The Non-EQ

Electrical Cables Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program manages aging of cables and connections exposed to adverse localized temperature and radiation environments that could result in loss of insulation resistance. It applies to accessible and inaccessible electrical cables that are not in the EQ Program and are used in circuits with sensitive, high-voltage, low-level signals such as radiation monitoring, nuclear instrumentation, and other such cables subject to AMR that are sensitive to a reduction in insulation resistance. Activities include routine calibration tests of instrumentation loops or direct testing of the cable system in those cases where cable testing is conducted as an alternate to surveillance testing, and in either case are implemented through the Surveillance Testing and Preventive Maintenance Programs. Testing is based on requirements of the particular calibrations, surveillances, or testing performed on the specific instrumentation circuit or cable and is implemented through the NMP work control system. Where cable testing is conducted as an alternate to surveillance testing the acceptance criteria for each test will be defined by the specific type of test performed and the specific cable tested.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed nuclear engineering reports (NERs) for NMP1 and NMP2. The staff found inconsistency between NMP1 and NMP2 non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program scopes. For example, the scope for NMP1 includes power range monitoring (PRM) and intermediate range monitoring (IRM). However, the AMP scope for NMP2 includes only the IRM circuit. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant review the NERs and clarify the differences between the scoping of the two units. The applicant clarified differences between the scoping of NMP1 and NMP2. The applicant indicated that some cables are not within the scope of the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program because these cables are in the EQ Program and therefore not within the scope of Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program. The applicant also informed the staff that as a result of responding to the staff's request it reviewed the NERs and found a discrepancy in the safety classification between NMP1 and NMP2. The applicant informed the staff that it would initiate a correction report to document the discrepancy between NMP1 and NMP2 and revise the NMP1 and NMP2 NERs and the program basis document. The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. The staff reviewed the applicant's revised program basis document and NERs and concluded that the scope of cables in the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program is acceptable.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also requested that the applicant verify tests performed by procedures including the entire loop (cables and connections) credited in the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program basis document. The applicant responded that the credited procedure steps listed in its program basis document (GALL Report program element "acceptance criteria") were reviewed to ensure that all cables and connections of the system were tested. The applicant verified for each procedure credited that all cables and connections within the scope of GALL AMP XI.E2 are tested. The staff found the applicant's response acceptable.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.E2 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.E2 with enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.E2 with enhancements to the GALL Report "detection of aging effects" program element by reviews of calibration or surveillance data for indications of aging degradation affecting instrument circuit performance. The first reviews will be completed prior to the period of extended operation and every ten years thereafter. A review of the calibration and surveillance results can indicate aging effects and aging effects mechanisms by monitoring key parameters and providing instrumentation circuit performance data reviewed at the time of the calibrations and surveillances, thereby providing reasonable assurance that severe aging degradation will be detected prior to loss of the cables' intended function. Where a calibration or surveillance program does not include the cabling system in the testing circuit alternatives like insulation resistance tests or other testing effective in determining cable insulation condition or deterioration of the insulation system will be performed. The first test will be completed prior to the period of extended operation. Test frequency will be based on engineering evaluation but will be at least every 10 years (NMP1 Commitment 28, NMP2 Commitment 26).

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff concluded that these enhancements will not impact adversely the ability of this AMP to manage the effects of aging as either of the two methods is acceptable to detect aging degradation. Calibration results or surveillance testing program findings are evaluated to detect cable aging degradation. Direct testing of the cable system will be effective in determining the condition of cable insulation. On this basis, the staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that the effects of aging will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.30, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Non-EQ Electrical Cables Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed documentation of cable degradation identified through routine calibration testing that is similar to the industry operating experience (e.g., degraded cables for temperature instruments, degraded shielding for drywell instrument cables).

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's Non-EQ Electrical Cables Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.25 and A2.1.25, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program. The staff reviewed these sections and

determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.0.3.2.23 Bolting Integrity Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.36, and as supplemented by letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant described the Bolting Integrity Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent with enhancements and an exception to GALL AMP XI.M18, "Bolting Integrity." The Bolting Integrity Program manages aging effects due to loss of preload, cracking and loss of material from bolting within the scope of license renewal including SR bolting, bolting for NSSS component supports, bolting for other pressure-retaining components, and structural bolting. Program activities include periodic inspections of bolting for indication of loss of preload, cracking and loss of material due to corrosion, etc. This program is based on the guidelines delineated in NUREG-1339, "Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 29: Bolting Degradation or Failure in Nuclear Power Plants," and the guidance contained in EPRI NP-5769, "Degradation and Failure of Bolting in Nuclear Power Plants," with exceptions noted in NUREG-1339 for safety-related bolting and EPRI TR-104213, "Bolted Joint Maintenance and Applications Guide," for other bolting. The Bolting Integrity Program is implemented through the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWB, IWC, IWD) Program, ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program, ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program, Structures Monitoring Program, Preventive Maintenance Program, and Systems Walkdown Program.

The applicant stated that the Bolting Integrity Program when enhanced will be consistent with GALL AMP X1.M18 (Bolting Integrity) with an exception. The details of the enhancements and the exception are provided below.

*Enhancements* - As stated in ALRA Section B2.1.36, enhancements to the Bolting Integrity Program include establishing an augmented inspection program for high-strength bolts in nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) supports and revisions to activities credited for license renewal.

Program Elements Affected - Documents will be prepared or revised to address the following elements:

Scope of Program - The Structures Monitoring, Preventive Maintenance, and Systems Walkdown Programs will be enhanced to include requirements to inspect

bolting for loss of preload, cracking, and loss of material. References to the bolting integrity program and industry guidance will be included in NMP program documents.

Detection of Aging Effects - An augmented inspection program for high-strength (actual yield strength  $\geq$  150 ksi) bolts will be established to prescribe the examination requirements of Tables IWB-2500-1 and IWC-2500-1 of ASME Section XI for high-strength bolts in the Class 1 and Class 2 component supports, respectively.

The applicant stated that the enhancements will be completed prior to the period of extended operation (NMP1 Commitment 33 and NMP2 Commitment 31).

*Exception* - As stated in the applicant's letter dated November 17, 2005, an exception to GALL Report Section XI.M18, "Bolting Integrity," was added for its reference to the 1995 Edition-1996 Addenda of the ASME Code.

The program described in GALL AMP XI.M18 under "detection of aging effects" cites ASME Section XI requirements covered in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda. The code of record for NMP1 and NMP2 is the 1989 Code with no addenda; this is an exception to GALL.

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Section B.2.1.36, "Bolting Integrity Program," and by letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant described its AMP to manage effects of aging in bolting. The applicant states that this AMP when enhanced will be consistent with GALL AMP XI.M18 with an exception. The staff's review of the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program is provided. The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement to determine whether it provides an adequate description of the program.

For SR bolting the applicant relies on the NRC recommendations and guidelines of NUREG-1339 and industry's technical basis for material selection and testing, bolting preload control, ISI, plant operation and maintenance, and evaluation of structural integrity of bolted joints outlined in EPRI NP-5769 with the exceptions noted in NUREG-1339. This guidance is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M18 and the staff found it acceptable.

With regard to other bolting the applicant states that it will comply with the aging management attributes of EPRI TR-104213. The staff found that for other bolting the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program will be consistent with the recommendations in the GALL Report and will meet the standards of EPRI TR-104213 with the inclusion of enhancements.

The first enhancement to the Bolting Integrity Program is that the applicant will establish an augmented inspection program for high-strength (actual yield strength  $\geq$  150 ksi) bolts. The staff noted that this augmented program will prescribe the examination requirements of Tables IWB-2500-1 and IWC-2500-1 of ASME Section XI for high-strength bolts in the Class 1 and Class 2 component supports, respectively. The second enhancement is that the Structures Monitoring, Preventive Maintenance and Systems Walkdown Programs will be enhanced to include requirements to inspect bolting for loss of preload, cracking, and loss of material. The last enhancement is that references to the Bolting Integrity Program and industry guidance will be included in NMPNS program documents. The staff noted that the existing Bolting Integrity Program with these enhancements will be consistent with GALL AMP XI.M18.

Previously the staff has accepted the use of periodic ISI of closure bolting as an acceptable AMP for loss of mechanical closure integrity as failure of the mechanical joint indicated by leakage can be attributed to loss of material, cracking of bolting materials, or loss of preload. The staff determined that periodic ASME Section XI ISI and plant preventive maintenance programs as described in NUREG-1339 and EPRI NP-5769 can be relied upon effectively to detect loss of closure integrity for bolted assemblies. Therefore, the applicant's program for loss of mechanical closure integrity is adequate for managing aging effects of loss of material cracking and loss of preload. The staff finds that the applicant with its enhancements to the Bolting Integrity Program has demonstrated its compliance with all the attributes of GALL AMP XI.M18 for bolting within the scope of license renewal including safety-related bolting, bolting for NSSS component supports, and bolting for other pressure-retaining components.

The applicant in its letter dated November 17, 2005, indicated that an exception had been added to the Bolting Integrity Program. The exception was with respect to the reference to the 1995 Edition-1996 Addenda of the ASME Code in GALL Report Section XI.M18. However, the Code of record for NMP1 and NMP2 is the 1989 Code with no addenda, an exception to the GALL Report. The staff compared the examination requirements of Tables IWB-2500-1 and IWC-2500-1 in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda against those of the 1989 Edition and found them to be consistent with the exception of the examination requirement for the RV closure head nuts. The staff noted that the examination requirement in the 1989 Code Edition for the RV closure head nuts is more conservative than that required in the 1995 Edition through the 1996 Addenda. Furthermore, the staff noted that the RV closure head nuts will be managed by the applicant's Reactor Head Closure Studs Program (ALRA Section B2.1.3), which is assessed in SER Section 3.0.3.2.3. Therefore, the staff finds the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program with the enhancements and exception acceptable. The staff concludes that by implementing the Bolting Integrity Program, which is consistent with the GALL Report with an exception, the aging effects on the bolting within the scope of license renewal including SR bolting, bolting for NSSS component supports, and bolting for other pressure-retaining components, will be adequately managed for the extended period of operation.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.36, the applicant indicated that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience related to the Bolting Integrity Program and is aware of the types of bolting issues that have been reported and documented in the industry. The applicant also indicated that the lessons learned from industry experiences have been incorporated into the NMPNS bolting practices such that this program has adequately detected bolting integrity issues and has been effective in correcting issues prior to the loss of intended function. This program is adjusted continually to account for industry experience and research. The applicant also indicated that with additional operating experience lessons learned will be used to adjust the Bolting Integrity Program as needed.

The applicant stated that the Bolting Integrity Program has been effective in managing the aging effects of bolting within the scope of license renewal including SR bolting, bolting for NSSS component supports, and bolting for other pressure-retaining components.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.38 and A2.1.37, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Bolting Integrity Program. The staff reviewed the following UFSAR and USAR supplement summary description for the Bolting Integrity Program:

The Bolting Integrity Program manages aging effects due to loss of preload, cracking and loss of material of bolting within the scope of license renewal including safety-related bolting, bolting for NSSS component supports, bolting for other pressure retaining components, and structural bolting. Program activities include periodic inspections of bolting for indication of loss of preload, cracking and loss of material due to corrosion, rust, etc.

This program is based on the guidelines of NUREG-1339 and the guidance of EPRI NP-5769 with exceptions noted in NUREG-1339 for safety-related bolting and EPRI TR-104213 for other bolting.

The Bolting Integrity Program is implemented through the ASME Section XI inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program, ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program, ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program, Structures Monitoring Program, Preventive Maintenance Program, and Systems Walkdown Program.

Enhancements to the Bolting Integrity Program include:

Establish an augmented inspection program for high-strength (actual yield strength  $\geq 150$  ksi) bolts. This augmented program will prescribe the examination requirements of Tables IWB-2500-1 and IWC-2500-1 of ASME Section XI for high-strength bolts in the Class 1 and Class 2 component supports, respectively.

The Structures Monitoring, Preventive Maintenance and Systems Walkdown Programs will be enhanced to include requirements to inspect bolting for indication of loss of preload, cracking and loss of material, as applicable.

Include in NMP administrative and implementing program documents references to the Bolting Integrity Program and industry guidance.

Enhancements will be completed prior to the period of extended operation.

The applicant stated that the exception to the NMP1 and NMP2 Bolting Integrity Program includes:

Add an exception to GALL Report Program XI.M18 for its reference to the 95-96 Addenda of the ASME Code.

The applicant's UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions for the Bolting Integrity Program appropriately describe the implementation of relevant programs that would enable the applicant to manage effectively the aging effect due to loss of material, cracking, and loss of preload of the bolts at the NMPNS units for the extended period of operation.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report



AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.24 BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.37, the applicant described the BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions, with GALL AMP XI.M6, "BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle." The NMP1 CRDRL Nozzle is examined according to ASME Code, Section XI, program which satisfies the requirements in GALL AMP XI.M1, "ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection, Subsections IWB, IWC and IWD." This program is updated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(a). Augmented examinations incorporated into the ISI program plan that implemented the requirements of NUREG-0619, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking," November 1980, have been superseded by ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems" (1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda). NMP2 cut and capped the CRD return nozzle prior to commercial operation. The capped NMP2 CRD return nozzle was therefore not subject to the augmented examination requirements described in NUREG-0619. The NMP2 CRDRL Nozzle Program is implemented through ASME Section XI, Subsection IWB, Table IWB 2500-1 (1989 edition no addenda) and ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Examination Systems" (1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda).

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M6 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's BWR CRDRL Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.M6 with exceptions.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M6 with an exception is to the Program Description in GALL AMP XI.M6 involving the ASME Code edition used as the basis for the Section XI requirements. GALL AMP XI.M6 identifies the 1995 Edition (including the 1996 Addenda) of ASME Section XI as the basis for the GALL CRDRL Nozzle Program. The NMP ISI Program will not comply with the edition and addenda of ASME Section XI cited in the GALL Report because the program is updated to the latest edition and addenda of ASME Section XI as mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a prior to the start of each inspection interval. The acceptability of the NMP1 CRDRL Nozzle Program in meeting the augmented inspection requirements established in NUREG-0619 is documented in NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated February 5, 1999.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the exceptions were found acceptable in the February 5,

1999, NRC Safety Evaluation Report. As mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a, UT examinations are performed according to the ASME Section XI Appendix VIII 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also noted that the applicant's ASME code of record for ASME Section XI ISI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) is valid for a 10-year inspection interval under the CLB. At present an ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWB, IWC, and IWD) program is approved for use on an ASME Code 10-year ISI interval-specific basis. However, the applicant will have to request 12 months prior to each interval approval to use the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsection IWB, IWC, and IWD) Program for the specific intervals during the period of extended operation under 10 CFR 50.55a. Therefore, the staff determined that the ASME Section XI Code Edition as referenced in 10 CFR 50.55a in effect 12 months prior to each inspection interval is acceptable for the period of extended operation and the staff found this exception acceptable.

In addition In the ALRA the applicant stated that it makes exceptions to the GALL Report "Detection of Aging Effects," "monitoring and trending," and "acceptance criteria" program elements. The three exceptions to GALL AMP XI.M6 are (1) the NMP ISI Program does not comply with the specified edition and addenda of ASME Section XI cited in the GALL Report because the program is updated to the latest edition and addenda of ASME Section XI as mandated by 10 CFR 50.55a prior to the start of each inspection interval, (2) the NMP program uses enhanced UT inspection techniques instead of PT inspections to satisfy the recommendations of NUREG-0619 (now superseded by Appendix VIII to ASME Section XI, Division 1, 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda), and (3) the NMP program uses an inspection frequency of every 10 years versus every sixth refueling outage or 90 startup/shutdown cycles specified in NUREG-0619.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that it has evaluated each of these exceptions and determined that its CRDRL Nozzle Program adequately manages the effects of aging on the CRDRL. The applicant evaluated each of these exceptions and determined that its CRDRL Nozzle Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M6. After review of operating experience for the applicant's BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program, the staff found this exception acceptable.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.37, the applicant explained that UT examinations of the Unit 1 CRDRL nozzle performed during refueling outages using automated test equipment qualified according to Appendix VIII to ASME Section XI, Division 1, 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda, found no indications. The UT examination using automated test equipment has been demonstrated to be capable of reliably detecting flaws greater than or equal to a 0.25 inch depth. No industry experience was identified that indicates that existing programs and practices will not be effective in the timely identification of CRDRL nozzle cracking.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel, the staff concluded that the applicant's BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR Supplement. In ALRA Sections A1.1.39, the applicant provided the UFSAR supplement for the BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program. The staff reviewed this section and determined that the information in the supplement provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.0.3.2.25 Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.38, the applicant described the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with exceptions and enhancements, with GALL AMP XI.S8, "Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program." The Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program is described in the NMP1 and NMP2 responses to GL 98-04, "Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling System and the Containment Spray System after a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment." The program was developed according to ANSI N101.4-1972 referenced in RG 1.54, June 1973, along with ANSI/ASME NQA-1-1983. The NMP program is a "comparable program" as described in GALL, Chapter XI, Program XI.S8, Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program, which is an acceptable AMP for license renewal. The program applies to Service Level 1 protective coatings inside the NMP1 primary containment and items within the torus [outside surface of the vent (ring) header and downcomer, inside surface of the vent piping, ring header, vent header junctions, and downcomers] and the NMP2 primary containment. The NMP2 suppression pool (wetwell) is not included because it is primarily stainless steel and does not have Service Level 1 coatings. Coating conditions monitored by this program include blistering, cracking, peeling, loose rust, and physical/mechanical damage. When localized degradation of a coating is identified, the affected area is evaluated by engineering and is scheduled for repair, replacement, or removal, as needed. The condition assessments and resulting repair, replacement, or removal activities ensure that the amount of coatings subject to detachment from the substrate during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is minimized to ensure post-accident operability of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) suction strainers.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the exceptions and enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the exceptions and enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.S8 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP XI.S8, "Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program," with exceptions and enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.S8 with an exception to the GALL Report "Preventive Actions" and "operating experience" program elements. The Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program is not credited in the ALRA for the prevention of corrosion of carbon steel components in the containment; however, the program monitors for rust not intact as a potential debris source for ECCS suction strainers. Therefore, as documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that operating experience pertaining to only the degradation of coatings and their potential clogging of the ECCS strainers is relevant to license renewal.

The staff found this exception acceptable because the applicant's Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program indeed is not credited in the amended license renewal application for the prevention of corrosion of carbon steel components in the NMP1 or NMP2 containment. Other NMP AMPs are credited in the ALRA for the detection of loss of material by corrosion of carbon steel components in the NMP1 or NMP2 containment. The applicant's Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program is credited in the ALRA only for ensuring that the amount of coatings subject to detachment from the substrate during a LOCA is minimized for post-accident operability of the ECCS suction strainers.

The applicant also stated in the ALRA that it makes exceptions to the GALL Report "parameters monitored/inspected," "Detection of Aging Effects," "monitoring and trending," and "acceptance criteria" program elements. The Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program will be enhanced following the guidance within ASTM D 5163-05a, "Standard Guide for Establishing Procedures to Monitor the Performance of Coating Service Level 1 Coatings Systems in an Operating Nuclear Power Plant," instead of ASTM D 5163-96 as specified in GALL AMP XI.S8.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the use of the guidance from ASTM D 5163-05a instead of ASTM D 5163-96 is acceptable because ASTM D 5163-05a is the most recently issued standard and incorporates the latest industry guidance on protective coatings. In addition, as documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that ASTM D 5163-05a will be utilized because this consensus standard was revised to correct previous errors embedded within the qualification standards. The newer standard provides guidance on the qualification of the individual(s) performing the actual coatings condition assessment while the GALL Report-referenced standard is silent on that qualification. The older standard recommends that inspectors and inspection coordinators be Level II Coatings Inspectors. This is an inappropriate recommendation for the inspection coordinator since the Level II inspector qualification requirement is invoked only for those enforcing compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion IX (Special Processes) by coating film thickness readings (required when performing qualitative follow-up inspections) and inspections while restoring a coating system but not by condition assessments which the coordinator facilitates.

The staff found this exception acceptable because other than the improvement changes between ASTM D 5163-05a and ASTM D 5163-96 discussed by the applicant the documents are essentially the same. A terminology paragraph has been added to ASTM D 5163-05a which

shifts the paragraph numbering scheme by one. The element referenced in GALL AMP XI.S8 to the paragraph numbers in ASTM D 5163-96 would have a different paragraph number referenced in ASTM D 5163-05a but there is little or no change to the content of the ASTM standard.

The applicant also stated In the ALRA that it takes exception to the GALL Report “acceptance criteria” program element. The Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program will vary the guidance of ASTM D 5163-05a paragraphs 10.2.2 and 10.2.3 on the measurement of cracks and peeling coating. Rather, the applicant will use visual methods to estimate the size of any defective areas. Once an area with cracks, peeling, or delaminated coating has been detected visual estimation will quantify the surface area. Conservative estimates will be made using known structural dimensions. This technique is acceptable for the purposes of quantifying the total amount of degraded coatings.

The staff found the applicant’s explanation for the exception acceptable in that taking definitive measurements of cracking, peeling, or delaminated coatings in the NMP1 and NMP2 containments is an unnecessary burden which adds no value. Once a coatings area has been identified as degraded an experienced coatings person can use visual estimation techniques to quantify the square footage. Conservative estimates of the size of these areas will result in a conservative total amount of degraded coatings that then can be compared to the total amount of permitted degraded coatings to ensure post-accident operability of the ECCS suction strainers. Conservative estimates of the amount of degraded coatings ensure actual margin for ECCS suction strainer operability. Should the conservative estimate of degraded coatings exceed the permitted amount more definitive measurements then could be taken or coating repairs immediately undertaken.

Because no credit for coatings is taken in the prevention of corrosion, ASTM D 5163-05a instead of ASTM D 5163-96 is used because of improvement changes, and visual estimation techniques are conservative the staff’s review of operating experience for the applicant’s Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program found these exceptions to be acceptable.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program is consistent with GALL AMP XI.S8 with an enhancement to meet the GALL Report “parameters monitored/inspected,” “detection of aging effects,” “monitoring and trending,” and “acceptance criteria” program elements. Program administrative controls will be enhanced to incorporate specific details consistent with requirements in ASTM D 5163-05a (NMP1 Commitment 34, NMP2 Commitment 32).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that its Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program administrative controls will be enhanced to specify the visual examination of coated surfaces for any visible defects including blistering, cracking, flaking, peeling, and physical or mechanical damage. Also program administrative controls will be enhanced to (1) inspect coatings every refueling outage versus every 24 months, (2) set minimum qualifications for inspection personnel, inspection coordinators, and inspection results evaluators, (3) perform thorough visual inspections in areas noted as deficient concurrently with general visual inspections, and (4) specify the types of instruments and equipment that may be used for inspections. In addition program administrative controls will be enhanced to require (1) reviews of the previous two monitoring reports before the condition assessment and (2) guidelines for

prioritization of repair areas to be monitored until they are repaired. Finally, program administrative controls will be enhanced to require inspection results evaluators to determine which areas are unacceptable and to initiate corrective action.

The staff determined that enhancement of the administrative controls for the applicant's Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program is consistent with the specific GALL Report referenced recommendations of ASTM D 5163-96 (now ASTM D 5163-05a after exception) and will ensure the amount of Service Level 1 coatings inside the NMP1 primary containment and on surfaces within the torus (outside surface of the vent (ring) header and downcomer, inside surface of the vent piping, ring header, vent header junctions, and downcomers) and inside the NMP2 primary containment subject to detachment from the substrate during a LOCA is minimized for post-accident operability of the ECCS suction strainers. In addition the staff determined that by revising the program administrative controls for these specific items the program will be consistent with the recommendations in GALL AMP XI.S8 considering the exception to the use of the 1996 Edition of ASTM D 5163. Because adding these specific administrative controls will make the applicant's program consistent with GALL AMP XI.S8 the staff found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant's program will provide assurance that the effects of aging will be adequately managed.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B2.1.38, the applicant explained that the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Programs are not credited in the ALRA for prevention of corrosion of carbon steel. NMP has implemented a Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program consistent with the response to GL 98-04. The response to GL 98-04 described program attributes, including design and licensing basis, procurement, control of coating application, quality assurance, monitoring, and maintenance of Service Level 1 coatings. Industry operating experience events pertaining to Service Level 1 coatings are evaluated for applicability to NMP. If determined to be applicable, these events are entered into the site corrective action program for determining any required corrective or preventive actions.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff also reviewed the summary of specific operating experience. The staff determined that the applicant's Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program has been effective in detecting degraded coatings at various areas within the NMP1 and NMP2 primary containments during refueling outages. To find some areas of degraded coatings in containments during refueling outages is typical of industry experience. Once the degraded coating areas were detected the applicant's corrective action program then either removed the degraded coatings, repaired the degraded coatings, or deferred repair while maintaining the total below the permitted amount subject to detachment from the substrate during a LOCA to ensure post-accident operability of the ECCS suction strainers.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.40 and A2.1.38, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. In addition the staff reviewed the exceptions and the associated justifications, and determined that the AMP, with the exceptions, is adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.26 Fatigue Monitoring Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B3.2, the applicant described the Fatigue Monitoring Program, stating that this is an existing program that is consistent, with enhancements, with GALL AMP X.M1, "Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary." The Fatigue Monitoring Program (FMP) manages the fatigue life of reactor coolant pressure boundary components by tracking and evaluating key plant events. Events were selected based upon plant-specific evaluations of the most fatigue-limited locations for critical components, including those discussed in NUREG/CR-6260. The FMP monitors operating transients to-date, calculates cumulative usage factors to-date, and directs performance of engineering evaluations to develop preventive and mitigative measures in order not to exceed the design limit on fatigue usage. The effects of reactor coolant environment will be considered through the evaluation of, as a minimum, those components selected in NUREG/CR-6260 using the appropriate environmental fatigue factors. The FMP provides an analytical basis for confirming that the number of cycles established by the analysis of record will not be exceeded before the end of the period of extended operation. In order to determine cumulative usage factors (CUFs) more accurately, the FMP will implement FatiguePro fatigue monitoring software.

Staff Evaluation. During its audit and review, the staff confirmed the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. Details of the staff's audit evaluation of this AMP are documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff reviewed the enhancements and the associated justifications to determine whether the AMP, with the enhancements, remains adequate to manage the aging effects for which it is credited.

The staff reviewed those portions of the FMP for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP X.M1 and found them consistent. The staff found the applicant's Fatigue Monitoring Program acceptable because it conforms to the recommended GALL AMP X.M1, "Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," with enhancements.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that FMP is consistent with GALL AMP X.M1 with an enhancement. As stated In the ALRA, the enhancement in meeting the GALL Report “Preventive Actions” program element revises applicable existing procedures to ensure that the procedures address the following:

The FMP will be enhanced with guidance for the use of the FatiguePro software package and updated methodology for environmental fatigue factors in establishing updated fatigue life calculations for components.  
(NMP1 Commitment 5, NMP2 Commitment 4)

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the FMP will provide guidance for the use of FatiguePro and methodology for calculation of environmental fatigue factors.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff evaluated the applicant’s existing FMP and noted that it had identified correctly the need for more sophisticated methods to determine adequate margin to fatigue limits. Improved calculation of environmental fatigue factors is also necessary. The staff determined that the use of FatiguePro is an appropriate method to improve monitoring and, taken together with improved methodology for calculation of environmental fatigue factors, will provide assurance that fatigue damage will be adequately managed and found this enhancement acceptable as such changes to the applicant’s program will provide assurance that the effects of aging will be adequately managed.

In addition In the ALRA the applicant stated that an enhancement in meeting the GALL Report “parameters monitored/inspected” program element revises procedures to address the following:

Safety relief valve actuations will be added to the list of key plant events (transients) that are monitored for NMP1 (NMP1 Commitment 9).

In the ALRA the applicant stated that safety relief valve actuations will be added to the list of key plant events monitored for NMP1. (Such actuations are already monitored for NMP2). The acceptability of this enhancement is discussed by the staff in SER Section 4 in the evaluation of RAI 4.6.2-1.

Operating Experience. In ALRA Section B3.2, the applicant explained that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the FMP. In instances where the potential existed to exceed CUFs before the end of plant life, the engineering analyses showed that actual margins were larger than initially estimated. A result of these fatigue evaluations was the recognition that the FMP could benefit from the use of analytical fatigue software such as FatiguePro. DERs written in 2003 identified opportunities for programmatic improvement. This led to the establishment of a comprehensive FMP document, additional reviews of cycle records with an emphasis on NMP1, and a proposal for the implementation of fatigue analysis software.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant’s technical personnel. At NMP there are components at or near the limit of the allowed cycle count established under the original TLAA. Evaluations confirm that for all locations, even the most limiting, significant margin remains to a CUF=1.0 and the proposed program will enable the applicant to keep within that limit.



After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel, the staff concluded that the applicant's Fatigue Monitoring Program will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.16 and A2.1.16, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Fatigue Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Fatigue Monitoring Program, the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff has reviewed the enhancements and confirmed that the implementation of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would result in the existing AMP being consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.2.27 Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables Program (NMP2 Only)

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application: In the NMP ALRA Appendix B, the applicant deleted Section B2.1.31, "Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables Program," which was submitted in the original LRA. In ALRA Table 3.6.1, "Summary of Aging Management Program for the Electrical and I&C Systems Components Evaluated In Chapter VI of NUREG-1801," the applicant stated that NMP1 has no inaccessible medium-voltage cables within scope of license renewal. It also stated that NMP2 has no inaccessible medium-voltage cables within the scope of license renewal, meeting the GALL Report program criteria requiring aging management.

Staff Evaluation: During its AMP and AM audits (weeks of September 19 and October 24, 2005) at NMPNS the staff reviewed engineering report NER-2E-032, "Identification of NMP2 Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables in the Scope of the License Renewal Program," and found at least one underground cable within the scope of license renewal requiring an AMP. Upon this finding the staff requested the applicant whether there are other medium voltage cables (e.g., 2kV to 35 kV) within the scope of license renewal for both NMP1 and NMP2 energized greater than 25 percent of the time and located underground. The staff also requested that the applicant specifically address in its response such cable installed for plant service water systems. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that NMP1 has no inaccessible medium-voltage cables within the scope of license renewal exposed to significant moisture simultaneously with significant voltage. The only medium-voltage cables at NMP1 installed underground and energized greater 25 percent of the time are used to power systems not within the scope of license renewal or to power equipment not related to any plant systems. The applicant stated that the normal service water system pump motors are powered via medium-voltage cables routed in cable trays, wall sleeves, or conduit installed inside the NMP1 turbine building and screen house, not underground. The emergency service water system

pump motors are powered via low-voltage (<2kV) cables and, therefore, these cables are not within the scope of the GALL XI.E3 program.

For NMP2 the applicant stated that it has inaccessible medium-voltage cables within the scope of license renewal as these cables are exposed to significant moisture simultaneously with significant voltage when energized. The applicant identified 18 NMP2 cables (including service water pump cables) within the scope of license renewal and thus requiring an AMP to manage aging effect. The service water system pump motors are powered via medium-voltage cables from the safety-related 4.16 kV switchgears. These cables are routed underground in duct lines. Because these cables are installed underground and the service water system pump motors are energized greater than 25 percent of the time these cables require aging management and thus are in the scope of the GALL XI.E3 program. In this letter the applicant also stated that it will revise NER-2E-032 to identify medium-voltage cables requiring aging management, develop an AMP and the plant-specific database for the GALL AMP XI.E3, and revise the ALRA to incorporate GALL AMP XI.E3. The staff found the applicant's response acceptable.

The applicant further stated in its letter dated December 1, 2005, that the Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables Program is credited with managing aging effects through periodic maintenance activities that minimize or prevent the exposure of in-scope cables to significant moisture or standing water. An adverse variation in environment would be significant if it could increase the rate of aging of a component appreciably or have an immediate adverse effect on operability. In this aging management program, periodic actions such as inspecting for water collection in cable manholes, are taken to prevent cables from being exposed to significant moisture. Additionally, in-scope medium-voltage cables exposed to significant moisture and significant voltage are tested for the condition of the conductor insulation. The specific type of test would be power factor, partial discharge, or other testing both state of the art and consistent with the latest industry guidance for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due to wetting as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2. This program considers the technical information and guidance of NUREG/CR-5643, IEEE Std. P1205, SAND96-0344, and EPRI TR-109619.

In the ALRA Section B2.1.30 the applicant stated that the Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Program will be consistent with GALL AMP XI.E3 and the most recent industry and regulatory precedence after enhancements are incorporated.

The specific testing for the in-scope medium-voltage cables associated with motors was detailed in procedure S-EPM-MPM-V080. Currently credited methods include polarization index and hi-pot testing. The specific testing associated with the cables supplying the auxiliary transformers will be detailed in an enhancement to procedure S-EPM-GEN-700. The staff reviewed procedure S-EPM-MPM-V080 and in discussion with the applicant the staff expressed a concern that hi-pot testing may affect the life of medium-voltage cables adversely. In response to the staff's concern in the letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will develop a new testing procedure specific to those cables requiring aging management under this program. The specific type of test will be a proven test for detecting deterioration of the insulation system as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2, power factor, partial discharge, or other testing state of the art and consistent with the latest industry guidance at the time the test is performed.

The applicant also made the following commitment:

Item 38: Enhance the Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements Program as follows: (1) Expand the scope of the existing procedure to provide for manhole inspections and water removal, (2) develop a new testing procedure specific to those cables requiring aging management under this program. The specific type of test performed will be a proven test for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due to wetting as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2, such as power factor, partial discharge, or other testing that is both state of the art and consistent with the latest industry guidance at the time the test is performed, (3) establish requirement to test cables subject to aging management prior to, and every 10 years during the period of extended operation, and (4) establish maintenance requirement to inspect and remove water, as necessary, from manholes serving cables subject to aging management. The inspection frequency will be based upon actual plant experience with water accumulation in the manhole, but in any event, will be at least once every two years. The first inspection will be completed prior to the period of extended operation.

The staff found the applicant's response and commitment acceptable because the testing methods, preventive actions taken, and the testing frequency are consistent with the updated GALL AMP XI.E3.

For the program elements of the Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Program stated by the applicant to be consistent with GALL AMP XI.E3 the staff determined that these conform to the corresponding GALL AMP XI.E3 program elements and acceptance criteria.

The applicant stated in December 1, 2005, letter that three enhancements to GALL Report AMP XI.E3 "preventive actions" and "detection of aging effects" program elements will be implemented: Expand the scope of the existing manhole inspection procedure to include cables within the scope of the program. Develop a new testing procedure specific to cables requiring aging management under this program. The specific type of test performed will be power factor, partial discharge, or other testing state of the art at the time the test is performed and consistent with the latest industry guidance for detecting deterioration of the insulation system as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2. Establish maintenance requirements to test cables subject to aging management prior to and every 10 years during the period of extended operation. Establish a maintenance requirement to inspect for and remove water as necessary from manholes serving cables subject to aging management. The inspection frequency will be based on actual plant experience with water accumulation in the manhole but in any event will be at least once every two years. The first inspection will be completed prior to period of extended operation.

The staff found the enhancements stated by the applicant acceptable because they will not adversely impact the ability of this AMP to manage the affects of aging as such periodic actions as inspecting for water collection in cable manholes and draining water as needed are taken to prevent cable exposure to significant moisture. These preventive actions are not sufficient to assure that water is not trapped elsewhere in the raceways. In addition in-scope, medium

voltage cables exposed to significant moisture and significant voltage are tested for the condition of the conductor insulation. The specific type of test will be power factor, partial discharge, polarization index as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2, or other state of the art proven test for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due to wetting. For these reasons the staff found the enhancements acceptable.

Operating Experience. The applicant stated in ALRA Section B2.1.31 that NMPNS has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables Program. Although infrequent there have been some failures of medium voltage cables at other plants due to moisture intrusion. There have been no such events at NMP2 but industry studies suggest that a regular cable testing program can detect degradation of non-EQ inaccessible medium voltage cables before there is an insulation failure.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of the above operating experience and on discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Program adequately manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

USAR Supplement. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant proposed its USAR supplement for the non-EQ inaccessible medium voltage cables program in ALRA Section A2.1.26 for NMP2. The applicant stated that the Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables Program provides reasonable assurance that the intended function of inaccessible medium-voltage cables not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 environmental qualification requirements and exposed to adverse localized environments caused by moisture while energized will be maintained consistent with the CLB through the period of extended operation. An adverse local environment is a condition in a limited plant area significantly more severe than the specified service environment for the cable. An adverse variation in environment is significant if it could appreciably increase the rate of aging of a component or have an immediate adverse effect on operability. In this aging management program such periodic actions as inspecting for water collection in cable manholes and draining water as needed are taken to prevent cable exposure to significant moisture. Additionally, in-scope medium-voltage cables exposed to significant moisture and significant voltage are tested for the condition of the conductor insulation. The specific type of test performed will be power factor, partial discharge as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2, or other state of the art testing at the time the test is performed proven for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due to wetting. The program considered the technical information and guidance provided in applicable industry publications.

Enhancements to the non-EQ inaccessible medium voltage cables program include:

- Expand the scope of the existing procedures to manhole inspection and water removal.
- Develop new testing procedures specific to those cables requiring aging management under this program. The specific type of test will be power factor, partial discharge, or other testing both state of the art and consistent with the latest industry guidance at the time the test is performed proven for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due

to wetting as described in EPRI-TR-103834-P1-2.

- Establish maintenance to test cables subject to aging management prior to and every 10 years during the period of extended operation.
- Establish maintenance requirement to inspect for and remove water as necessary from manholes serving cables subject to aging management. The inspection frequency will be based on actual plant experience with water accumulation in the manhole but in any event will be at least once every two years. The first inspection will be completed prior to the period of extended operation.

Enhancements will be implemented prior to entering the period of extended operation.

The staff reviewed these USAR supplements and confirmed that they provide an adequate summary description of the program as identified in the SRP-LR FSAR supplement table and as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its audit and review of the applicant's Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables program the staff determined that those program elements for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report are indeed consistent. In addition the staff reviewed the enhancements to the GALL Report and confirmed that the implementation of enhancements prior to the period of extended operation would make the AMP consistent with the GALL Report AMP to which it was compared. The staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function will be maintained consistently with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the proposed USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.0.3.3 AMPs That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

In ALRA Appendix B, the applicant identified that the following AMPs were plant-specific:

- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program
- Fuse Holder Inspection Program
- Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program
- Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program (NMP2 Only)
- Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program (NMP1 Only)

For AMPs that are not consistent with or not addressed by the GALL Report, the staff performed a complete review of the AMPs to determine if they were adequate to monitor or manage aging. The staff's review of these plant-specific AMPs is documented in the following sections of this SER.

#### **3.0.3.3.1 Preventive Maintenance Program**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.32, the applicant described the Preventive Maintenance Program, stating that this is an existing, plant-specific program. The Preventive Maintenance Program consists of the appropriate ten

elements described in SRP-LR Appendix A-1800. The Preventive Maintenance Program manages aging effects for SSCs within the scope of licence renewal. The program provides for performance of various maintenance activities on a specified frequency based on vendor recommendation and operating experience.

The key elements of aging management activities in the Preventive Maintenance Program are described. The applicant's evaluations of each key element against the appropriate ten elements defined in SRP-LR Appendix A also are provided.

The Preventive Maintenance Program manages aging effects of SSCs within the scope of license renewal not managed by other AMPs. The scope of the program includes but is not limited to valve bodies, heat exchangers, expansion joints, tanks, ductwork, fan/blower housings, dampers, and pump casings.

Additional details of the program scope are addressed in the basis document for the Preventive Maintenance Program kept onsite. With regard to the "Preventive Actions" element of the program the applicant stated that although routine maintenance is largely preventive only the condition monitoring aspects of Preventive Maintenance Program activities are credited for license renewal. For example, when a piping system is opened to conduct preventive maintenance on a valve a visual inspection of the valve body or piping may be specified. Such activities do not prevent aging effects but detect degraded conditions that affect the ability of the component to perform its intended function. Consequently, there are no specific preventive actions associated with this program.

The applicant states that aging effects of concern will be detected by visual inspection and examination of component surfaces for evidence of defects and age-related degradation.

With regard to acceptance criteria the applicant states that the Preventive Maintenance Program establishes specific acceptance criteria for each component inspected. The acceptance criteria are related to the aging effects requiring management and are dependent on each individual inspection or examination of the aging effect managed.

The program documentation has specific requirements for DERs in the corrective action program. The NMPNS Quality Assurance Program Topical Report documents a commitment to the corrective action criteria of 10 CFR Part 50. The corrective action program includes the detection and correction of conditions adverse to quality and the detection, cause determination, correction, and prevention of recurrence of conditions significantly adverse to quality.

The Quality Assurance Program Topical Report documents the confirmation process for NMPNS under the corrective action criterion. At NMPNS the confirmation process is implemented through corrective action effectiveness reviews and is performed for conditions significantly adverse to quality and selected hardware-related conditions adverse to quality. The corrective action program includes but is not limited to SR, NSR, and fire protection SSCs. Therefore, those SSCs within the scope of license renewal are addressed as part of the current corrective action program.

The applicant states that NMPNS has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Preventive Maintenance Program as part of a process to optimize maintenance practices. Review of plan-specific operating experience revealed DERs initiated

after Preventive Maintenance Program examinations. In cases where age-related degradation was detected the reported conditions (e.g., corrosion of motor-operated valves, piping, heat exchanger internals) were resolved through implementation of the work order process prior to loss of an intended function.

The Preventive Maintenance Program is adjusted continually to account for industry experience and research. As additional operating experience is obtained lessons learned are used to adjust this program as needed.

The applicant states that there are no exceptions to the SRP-LR and that the enhancements to the Preventive Maintenance Program encompass revisions to existing activities credited for license renewal to ensure that aging effects are discovered and evaluated. These enhancements expand the Preventive Maintenance Program to encompass activities for certain additional components requiring aging management and explicitly define the aging management attributes including systems and the component types and commodities.

Other elements are preventive actions which would be revised to list parameters specifically monitored. Similarly the elements "Detection of Aging Effects," "monitoring and trending," and "acceptance criteria" would be revised to be more specific.

According to the applicant the enhancements would be completed prior to the period of extended operation. The applicant stated that the Preventive Maintenance Program has been effective in maintaining the intended functions of long-lived passive SSCs. The effectiveness of the Preventive Maintenance Program is also reflected in the level of system/equipment availability documented by maintenance rule periodic assessments.

Staff Evaluation. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), the staff reviewed the information included in ALRA Section B2.1.32, regarding the applicant's demonstration of the Preventive Maintenance Program to ensure that the effects of aging, as discussed above, will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.

The staff reviewed the Preventive Maintenance Program against the AMP elements found in SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3 and SRP-LR Table A.1-1 and focused on how the program manages aging effects through the effective incorporation of 10 elements (i.e., program scope, preventive actions, parameters monitored or inspected, detection of aging effects, monitoring and trending, acceptance criteria, corrective actions, confirmation process, administrative controls, and operating experience).

The applicant indicated that the corrective actions, confirmation process, and administrative controls are parts of the site-controlled quality assurance program. The staff's evaluation of the quality assurance program is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4. The remaining seven elements are discussed below.

- (1) Scope of Program - The applicant stated in ALRA Section B2.1.32 that the Preventive Maintenance Program manages aging effects of many SSCs within the scope of license renewal not managed by other AMPs. The scope of the program includes but is not limited to valve bodies, heat exchangers, expansion joints, tanks, ductwork, fan/blower housings, dampers, and pump casings.

Additional details of the program scope are discussed in the basis document for the Preventive Maintenance Program. The applicant states that there are no exceptions to the SRP-LR and the enhancements to the Preventive Maintenance Program revise activities credited for license renewal to ensure detection and evaluation of aging effects. These enhancements would expand the Preventive Maintenance Program to activities for certain additional components requiring aging management and define the aging management attributes of systems and the component types and commodities included in the program.

The staff confirmed that the scope of the program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.1. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (2) Preventive Actions - The applicant stated in ALRA Section B2.1.32 that although routine maintenance is largely preventive in nature only the condition monitoring aspects of Preventive Maintenance Program activities are credited for license renewal. For example, when a piping system is opened to conduct preventive maintenance on a valve a visual inspection of the valve body or piping may be specified. Such activities do not prevent aging effects but will detect degraded conditions affecting the ability of the component to perform its intended function. Consequently, there are no specific preventive actions for this program. Enhancements to this element would revise the program to list parameters to be monitored. Additional details of this element are discussed in the basis document for the Preventive Maintenance Program

The staff confirmed that the preventive actions program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.2. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

In RAI B2.1.32-1 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the descriptions of several elements in the Preventive Maintenance Program were too brief and general for the staff to review the program's effectiveness and adequacy. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide more specific detailed information for the following four elements of the AMP according to the guidelines of SRP-LR Appendix A.

- (1) Element (3) - Parameters Monitored/Inspected
- (2) Element (4) - Detection of Aging Effects
- (3) Element (5) - Monitoring and Trending (specified schedule)
- (4) Element (6) - Acceptance Criteria

In addition the staff requested the applicant to provide specific information related to these four listed elements of the Preventive Maintenance Program for the management of aging effects of two specific components, (1) piping and fittings in the NMP2 Control Building HVAC System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-9) and (2) valves in the NMP1 Radioactive Waste System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-14), to demonstrate the effectiveness and adequacy of this Preventive Maintenance Program.

The applicant provided its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, and the staff's evaluation of elements (3) through (6) is as follows.

- (3) Parameters Monitored/Inspected - In the original LRA Section B2.1.32, the applicant



stated that inspection and testing activities monitor various parameters, including surface condition, for evidence of defects and age-related degradation.

In its response to the staff RAI B2.1.32-1 dated November 17, 2004, with regard to this element, the applicant stated that there are no prevention, mitigation, or performance monitoring activities in the Preventive Maintenance Program credited for license renewal. Rather, condition monitoring activities inspect for visual signs of degradation or test for leaks. Surface conditions of components are monitored through visual inspection and examination for evidence of defects and age-related degradation. Components in selected portions of systems are monitored through visual inspection. The inspections detect aging effects which if left unmanaged would lead to degradation of the components' intended functions. Examples of components, inspections, and parameters monitored under the Preventive Maintenance Program are as follow:

Unit	Component(s)	Inspection Type/Parameter	Parameter	Procedure
1	Fuel Pool heat exchanger tubes and tube sheets	Visual/ Condition	Evidence of various forms of corrosions	N1-MM-0054-405
1	Various carbon steel valve internals and externals	Visual/ Condition	Evidence of Various forms of internal and/or external corrosion	N1-MM-GEN-200
1	Reactor Building and Dry Well Sump Pump	Visual/ Condition	Evidence of various forms of internal corrosion	N1-MM-GEN-005
1	RX Building Emergency Ventilation and Control Room Emergency Ventilation Fan	Visual/ Condition	Evidence of corrosion of carbon steel; cracking, hardening shrinkage and loss of strength of polymers	N1-MM-GEN-551
1	Unit 1 Reactor Building Charcoal Filter Housing	Visual/ Condition	Evidence of general corrosion of housing internals	N1-TSP-202-001
1	13.8 & 4.16KV Motors	Visual/ Condition	Presence of motor cooler fouling	S-EMP-GEN-081
2	Ventilation Heaters	Visual/ Condition	Presence of general corrosion on heater internals	N2-EPM-GEN-V786
2	Condition and various forms of corrosion2Motor Operated Actuators and Dampers	Visual/ Condition	Internal inspection for general corrosion of damper and actuator	N2-EPM-GEN-V786

Unit	Component(s)	Inspection Type/Parameter	Parameter	Procedure
2	Air Handling Unit Cooling Coils	Visual/ Condition & Test/Refrigerant Leakage	Inspection of signs of fouling, and testing for leakage	NS-MPM-GEN-SA562 & N2-MPM-HVC-V554

Most Preventive Maintenance Program implementing procedures require enhancement to include/annotate parameters credited for aging management.

The applicant also provided the specific inspection methods for detection of aging effects related to two specific components, (1) piping and fittings in the NMP2 Control Building HVAC System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-9) and (2) valves in the NMP1 Radioactive Waste System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-14), to demonstrate the effectiveness and adequacy of this Preventive Maintenance Program.

The staff confirmed that after completion of the enhancements the “parameters monitored or inspected” program element will satisfy the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.3. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (4) Detection of Aging Effects - In the original LRA Section B2.1.32 the applicant stated that the aging effects of concern will be detected by visual inspection and examination of component surfaces for evidence of defects and age-related degradation.

In response to RAI B2.1.32-1 on this element the applicant stated that:

The aging effects requiring management for the components within the scope of the Preventive Maintenance Program are detected by visual inspection and examination of surfaces of components for evidence of defects and age-related degradation. The activities that are performed to detect aging effects requiring management are identified in the specific PM procedures that perform the PM. The procedures are developed based on vendor recommendations and operating experience that forms the basis for the inspections performed and the frequency of the inspections such that aging effects are detected prior to a loss of the components' intended functions. NMPNS administrative procedures provide for overall control of the Preventive Maintenance Program and identification of how PMs are to be established, documented, scheduled, and optimized for the benefit of equipment and system reliability. Most Preventive Maintenance Program procedures will require an enhancement to include/annotate the aging effect being detected.

The applicant also provided the specific inspection methods for detection of the aging effects related to two specific components, (1) piping and fittings in the NMP2 Control Building HVAC System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-9) and (2) valves in the NMP1 Radioactive Waste System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-14), to demonstrate the effectiveness and adequacy of this Preventive Maintenance Program.

The staff confirmed that after completion of the enhancements the “detection of aging

effects” program element will satisfy the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.4. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (5) Monitoring and Trending - In original LRA Section B2.1.32 the applicant stated that the Preventive Maintenance Program is condition-monitoring performed on a specified schedule. After inspection results are documented they are reviewed and evaluated.

In response to RAI B2.1.32-1 on this element the applicant stated:

The Preventive Maintenance Program is a condition-monitoring program executed on a specified schedule. Results of the tasks performed are documented in the corresponding implementing procedures. These procedures include a review and evaluation of the results. The Preventive Maintenance Program requires an enhancement to specifically include monitoring and trending, as appropriate, for age-related degradation.

The applicant also provided the specific monitoring and trending attributes for the management of aging effects related to the two specific components, (1) piping and fittings in the NMP2 Control Building HVAC System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-9) and (2) valves in the NMP1 Radioactive Waste System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-14), to demonstrate the effectiveness and adequacy of this Preventive Maintenance Program.

The staff confirmed that after completion of the enhancements the “monitoring and trending” program element will satisfy the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.5. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (6) Acceptance Criteria - In the original LRA Section B2.1.32 the applicant stated that the Preventive Maintenance Program establishes specific acceptance criteria for each component inspected. The acceptance criteria are related to the aging effects requiring management and dependent on each individual inspection and examination of the aging effect managed.

In its response to RAI B2.1.32-1, dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated:

Acceptance criteria for visual inspection and examination of components are provided in the Preventive Maintenance Program implementing procedures. The acceptance criteria are related to the aging effects requiring management and are dependent on each individual inspection and examination considering the aging effect being managed. Implementing procedures will be enhanced to include more specific and detailed acceptance criteria, as appropriate. This program attribute will be consistent with the generic attribute description in Appendix A of NUREG-1800 upon program enhancements.

The applicant also provided the acceptance criteria for the management of aging effects related to the two specific components, (1) piping and fittings in the NMP2 Control Building HVAC System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-9) and (2) valves in the NMP1 Radioactive Waste System (original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-14), to demonstrate the effectiveness and adequacy of this Preventive Maintenance Program.

The staff confirmed that after completion of the enhancements the “acceptance criteria” program element will satisfy the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.6. This information has been incorporated in the ALRA. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (10) Operating Experience - The applicant stated in ALRA Section B2.1.32 that it has reviewed both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the Preventive Maintenance Program as part of a process to optimize maintenance practices. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed DERs initiated after Preventive Maintenance Program examinations. Where age-related degradation was detected the reported conditions (e.g., corrosion of motor-operated valves, piping, heat exchanger internals) were resolved through implementation of the work order process prior to loss of an intended function.

The Preventive Maintenance Program is adjusted continually to account for industry experience and research. With additional operating experience lessons learned will be used to adjust this program as needed.

The staff confirmed that the “operating experience” program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.10. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

The applicant stated that enhancements to the Preventive Maintenance Program will be made to revise existing procedures. These enhancements would provide the level of detail and specificity needed for staff review of the Preventive Maintenance Program. They would affect the main program elements including “scope of program,” “preventive actions,” “parameters monitored,” “detection of aging effects,” “monitoring and trending,” and “acceptance criteria.” These enhancements are scheduled to be completed prior to the period of extended operation. The staff views these as major enhancements which would require review and approval prior to implementation of the Preventive Maintenance Program.

In RAI B2.1.32-2, dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide a commitment that these enhancements would be completed on a schedule of sufficient time for staff review and approval prior to the period of extended operation.

In its response, by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated that this staff concern also was raised during the review of the AMPs by the audit team and the audit question was documented as AMP Issue 30 of the Audit and Review Report. The applicant provided the response that was given to Issue 30 as follows:

As with any commitment NMPNS makes to the NRC, the resolution and/or implementation are subject to review by the NRC. Specifically for new aging management programs (AMP), the NRC can utilize Inspection Procedure 71003 Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal, to verify that outstanding commitments have been met. This procedure also includes specific wording whereby the assistance of NRR/DRIP/RLEP can be utilized to ensure the licensee commitments have been met. Currently there is no specific notification to the NRC required when a commitment has been satisfied. Consistent with the industry, NMP would prefer that any review of new AMPs be conducted as part of

the inspection process.

The applicant further stated that:

The commitment to enhance appropriate maintenance procedures that exist within the Preventive Maintenance Program is made commensurate with the inclusion of statements to that effect within Appendices A and B of the [original] LRA. Enhancements will be reviewed and approved using approved NMPNS administrative procedures. Once made, all maintenance activity enhancements will be readily available for review by the NRC prior to the period of extended operation.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that the applicant has provided adequate assurance for the completion as well as review and approval of the enhancements prior to the period of extended operation. Enhancements to the Preventive Maintenance Program are NMP1 Commitment 29 and NMP2 Commitment 27. Based on the review and information provided in the ALRA the staff concern in RAI B2.1.32-2 is resolved.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.30 and A2.1.30, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Preventive Maintenance Program, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.3.2 Systems Walkdown Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.33, the applicant described the Systems Walkdown Program, stating that this is an existing, plant-specific program. The Systems Walkdown Program manages aging effects for accessible external surfaces of systems and components within the scope of license renewal. The aging effects of concern are material degradation and loss of material from external surfaces of pumps, valves, piping, bolts, heat exchangers, tanks, HVAC components, and other components. The program also identifies adverse conditions that can lead to aggressive environments for systems or components within the scope of license renewal. Program activities include system engineer walkdowns (i.e., field evaluations of system components to assess material condition), documentation and evaluation of inspection results, and appropriate corrective actions.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the key elements of aging management activities used in the Systems Walkdown Program are the results of an evaluation of each key element against the appropriate ten elements described in SRP-LR Appendix A with enhancements that include revisions to existing activities credited for license renewal to ensure the applicable aging effects

are detected and evaluated. Enhancements are scheduled for completion prior to the period of extended operation.

The applicant stated that recording and reporting visually detectable degradation have been parts of good engineering practice at NMPNS for many years and will continue under the Systems Walkdown Program, which has been effective in maintaining the intended functions of long-lived passive SSCs. The applicant stated that the Systems Walkdown Program has been enhanced since its inception and further improvements will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

Staff Evaluation. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), the staff reviewed the information included in ALRA Section B2.1.33, regarding the applicant's demonstration of the Systems Walkdown Program to ensure that the effects of aging, as discussed above, will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.

In RAI B2.1.33-1 dated November 17, 2004, the staff noted that the applicant stated in the original LRA that this System Walkdown Program manages aging effects for accessible external surfaces of selected SSCs within the scope of license renewal. It was not clear to the staff whether all carbon steel components listed in the program or just the samples are covered by this AMP. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the reference to "selected SSCs" within the scope of license renewal. Furthermore, with respect to the program description paragraph of Section B2.1.33, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the phrase "other carbon steel components" and explain why "mechanical penetrations" are excluded from components listed in the program description.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant listed NMP1 and NMP2 systems which include components within the scope of license renewal and which credit the Systems Walkdown Program for managing the aging of external surfaces. The applicant stated that because not all components in a system may be in-scope the term "selected" is used to differentiate between those in-scope and those out-of-scope. For each of the systems listed the determination of which component types are "selected" is shown in the applicable original LRA aging management review section. The applicant also stated that there are no structures within the scope of license renewal that credit the Systems Walkdown Program for managing aging effects.

The applicant stated that the "Program Description" paragraph of the original LRA Section B2.1.33 includes the statement, "The specific aging effect of concern is loss of material from external surfaces of... other carbon steel components." This phrase is intended to capture generically system components or subcomponents not specifically listed. Examples of "other carbon steel components" are flanges, tees, reducers, and pipe caps. Mechanical penetrations at NMP1 and NMP2 are managed under the Structures Monitoring Program and the ASME Section XI ISI (Subsections IWE and IWL) Programs rather than by the Systems Walkdown Program.

The applicant noted that for the NMP1 Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System although the Systems Walkdown Program is credited correctly in original LRA Section 3.1.2.A.3 it was omitted inadvertently from original LRA Table 3.1.2.A-3 (page 3.1-54 of the revised Section 3.1 submitted by NMPNS letter NMP1L 1892 dated December 6, 2004). The correction to

Table 3.1.2.A-3 is provided in the applicant's December 17, 2004, submittal. The staff found the applicant's response acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI B2.1.33-1 is resolved.

The staff evaluated key elements of aging management activities of the Systems Walkdown Program against the appropriate ten elements described in SRP-LR Appendix A, including the enhancements to the existing activities. The staff reviewed the Systems Walkdown Program against the AMP elements found in SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3, and SRP-LR Table A.1-1 and focused on how the program manages aging effects through the effective incorporation of 10 elements (*i.e.*, "program scope," "preventive actions," "parameters monitored or inspected," "detection of aging effects," "monitoring and trending," "acceptance criteria," "corrective actions," "confirmation process," "operating experience," and "operating experience").

The applicant indicated that the "corrective actions," "confirmation process," "and "administrative controls," are parts of the site-controlled quality assurance program. The staff's evaluation of the quality assurance program is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4. The remaining seven elements are addressed here.

- (1) Scope of Program - In the original LRA Section B2.1.32, the applicant stated that the scope of the Systems Walkdown Program is accessible external surfaces of structures and components within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR. The inspections will look for loss of material, material degradation, and leakage.

In RAI B2.1.33-1 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant identify the systems and structures within the scope of license renewal to which this AMP applies at NMPNS.

In its December 17, 2004, response to RAI B2.1.33-1 the applicant listed NMP1 and NMP2 systems as follow:

#### NMP1 Systems

- Compressed Air System
- Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
- Control Rod Drive
- Core Spray System
- Condensate System
- Containment System
- Containment Spray
- City Water System
- Reactor Water Cleanup
- Emergency Diesel Generator
- Emergency Cooling
- Fire Detection and Protection
- Spent Fuel Pool Filtering and Cooling
- Feedwater/high Pressure Coolant Injection
- Hydrogen Water Chemistry
- Main Generator and Auxiliary System
- Main Steam

- Miscellaneous Non-contaminated Vents and Drains
- Neutron Monitoring
- Reactor Building HVAC
- Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling
- Radwaste Building Hvac
- Radwaste System
- Reactor Vessel Instrumentation
- Shutdown Cooling
- Sampling System
- Service Water
- Turbine Building Hvac
- Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling Water

### NMP2 Systems

- Alternate Decay Heat Removal System
- Compressed Air System
- Reactor Building Closed-loop Cooling Water
- Containment Atmosphere Monitoring
- Condensate System
- Main Condenser Air Removal
- Primary Containment Purge
- High-pressure Core Spray
- Low-pressure Core Spray
- Domestic Water System
- Air Startup - Standby Diesel Generator
- Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer
- Generator Standby Lube Oil System
- Standby Diesel Generator Protection (Generator) System
- Floor and Equipment Drains
- Engine-driven Fire Pump - Fuel Oil
- Fire Protection Halon
- Cardox Fire Protection - Low Pressure CO<sub>2</sub>
- Fire Protection - Water
- Feedwater System
- Standby Gas Treatment
- Design Basis Accident (DBA) Hydrogen Recombiner
- Control Building Air-conditioning
- Glycol Heating
- Hot Water Heating
- Auxiliary Service Building Air-conditioning
- Control Building Chilled Water
- Chilled Water - Ventilation
- Diesel Generator Building Ventilation
- Reactor Building Ventilation
- Yard Structure Ventilation
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
- Reactor Vessel Instrumentation
- Main Steam



- Moisture Separator and Reheater System
- Makeup Water System
- Reactor Recirculation System
- Residual Heat Removal
- Reactor Pressure Vessel
- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup
- Process Sampling System
- Service Water
- Seal Water System
- Reactor Water Cleanup

For the enhancement of this AMP the applicant stated in the original LRA that it will state the aging management attributes explicitly, including the systems and component types/commodities included in the program.

In the updated response to RAI B2.1.33-1 dated August 12, 2005, the applicant pointed out that portions in its previous response had been superseded by responses dated July 14, 2005, to staff RAIs 2.1-4, 2.2-3 and 3.1.2.C.4-1 dated February 23, 2005. The complete revised list of NMP1 and NMP2 systems that credit the System Walkdown Program for aging management is provided here and also has been incorporated in the ALRA section number (*italics* indicate added systems).

<u>NMP1 System:</u>	<u>ALRA Section</u>
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• Circulating Water	3.3.2.A.1
• City Water	3.3.2.A.2
• Compressed Air	3.3.2.A.3
• Condensate and Condensate Transfer	3.4.2.A.1
• Condenser Air Removal and Off-gas	3.4.2.A.5
• Containment Spray	3.2.2.A.1
• Containment System	3.3.2.A.4
• Control Rod Drive	3.1.2.A.5
• Control Room HVAC	3.3.2.A.5
• Core Spray	3.2.2.A.2
• Diesel Generator Building Ventilation	3.3.2.A.6
• Electric Steam Boiler	3.3.2.A.24
• Emergency Cooling	3.2.2.A.3
• Emergency Diesel Generator	3.3.2.A.7
• Feedwater/high Pressure Coolant Injection	3.4.2.A.2
• Fire Detection and Protection	3.3.2.A.8
• (Hydrogen Water Chemistry - deleted from list)	
• Liquid Poison	3.3.2.A.10
• Main Generator and Auxiliary	3.4.2.A.3
• Main Steam	3.4.2.A.4
• Main Turbine and Auxiliary	3.4.2.A.6
• Misc Non-contaminated Vents & Drains	3.3.2.A.11
• Moisture Separator Reheater Steam	3.4.2.A.7
• Neutron Monitoring	3.3.2.A.12
• Radwaste Building HVAC	3.3.2.A.13
• Radwaste System	3.3.2.A.14
• Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling	3.3.2.A.15
• Reactor Building HVAC	3.3.2.A.16
• Reactor Vessel Instrumentation	3.1.2.A.3
• Reactor Recirculation System	3.1.2.A.4
• Reactor Water Cleanup	3.3.2.A.17
• Sampling System	3.3.2.A.18
• Service Water	3.3.2.A.19
• Shutdown Cooling	3.3.2.A.20
• Spent Fuel Pool Filtering and Cooling	3.3.2.A.21
• Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling	3.3.2.A.22
• Turbine Building HVAC	3.3.2.A.23

<u>NMP2 Systems:</u>	<u>ALRA Section</u>
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• Air Startup – Standby Diesel Generator	3.3.2.B.1
• Alternate Decay Heat Removal	3.3.2.B.2
• Auxiliary Boiler	3.3.2.B.33
• Auxiliary Service Building Hvac	3.3.2.B.3
• Circulating Water	3.3.2.B.34
• (Chilled Water Ventilation - deleted from list)	
• Compressed Air	3.3.2.B.5

• Condensate System	3.4.2.B.2
• (Containment Atmosphere Monitoring - deleted from list)	
• Control Building Chilled Water	3.3.2.B.8
• Control Building HVAC	3.3.2.B.9
• Control Rod Drive	3.1.2.B.5
• Diesel Generator Building Ventilation	3.3.2.B.10
• Domestic Water	3.3.2.B.11
• Engine-driven Fire Pump Fuel Oil	3.3.2.B.12
• Extraction Steam & Feedwater Heater Drains	3.4.2.B.6
• Feedwater	3.4.2.B.3
• Fire Detection and Protection	3.3.2.B.13
• Floor and Equipment Drains	3.3.2.B.14
• Generator Standby Lube Oil	3.3.2.B.15
• (Glycol Heating - deleted from list)	
• High Pressure Core Spray	3.2.2.B.2
• Hot Water Heating	3.3.2.B.17
• Hydrogen Recombiner System	3.2.2.B.1
• Low Pressure Core Spray	3.2.2.B.3
• Main Condenser Air Removal	3.4.2.B.1
• Main Steam	3.4.2.B.4
• Makeup Water	3.3.2.B.18
• Moisture Separator and Reheater	3.4.2.B.5
• Primary Containment Purge	3.3.2.B.20
• (Process Sampling - deleted from list)	
• Radioactive Liquid Waste Management	3.3.2.B.36
• Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling	3.3.2.B.22
• Reactor Building HVAC	3.3.2.B.23
• Reactor Core Isolation Cooling	3.2.2.B.4
• (Reactor Pressure Vessel - deleted from list)	
• Reactor Pressure Vessel Instrumentation	3.1.2.B.3
• (Reactor Recirculation - deleted from list)	
• Reactor Water Cleanup	3.3.2.B.24
• Residual Heat Removal	3.2.2.B.5
• Roof Drainage System	3.3.2.B.37
• Sanitary Plumbing and Drains	3.3.2.B.38
• (Seal Water - deleted from list)	
• Service Water	3.3.2.B.26
• Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup	3.3.2.B.27
• Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil	3.3.2.B.28
• Standby Diesel Generator Protection	3.3.2.B.29
• Standby Gas Treatment	3.2.2.B.6
• Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling	3.3.2.B.40
• Turbine Main System	3.4.2.B.7
• Water Treatment	3.3.2.B.35
• Yard Structures Ventilation	3.3.2.B.31

The staff reviewed the amended information in the ALRA and considers the scope of the program to be defined clearly and acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI B2.1.33-1 is resolved.

The staff confirmed that the scope of the program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.1. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (2) Preventive Actions - In the original LRA Section B2.1.33 the applicant stated that the Systems Walkdown Program mitigates degradation through regular inspection of in-scope components and detection of degraded conditions that could affect the ability of components to perform intended functions. There are no specific preventive actions associated with this program other than the detection of the aging effects of concern before damage to a component or pressure boundary occurs. The staff concurred that no preventive actions are required for this condition monitoring program.

The staff also reviewed ALRA and confirmed that this "preventive actions" program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.2. The staff concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (3) Parameters Monitored/Inspected - In original LRA Section B2.1.33 the applicant stated that system engineers conduct visual inspections of assigned SSCs and document the presence of corrosion and other signs of deterioration.

In RAI B2.1.33-2 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that in the "parameters monitored/inspected" program element "other signs of deterioration" was not clear. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe those other aging effects and explain how they can be detected.

In its December 17, 2004, response to RAI B2.1.33-2 the applicant stated that the phrase "other signs of deterioration" is intended to encompass the condition of coatings (material degradation), leakage and indications of leakage as stated under the "Enhancements" heading of original LRA Section B2.1.33, as well as cracking, elastomer degradation, and weathering. The applicant stated that in incorporating this enhancement into the implementing procedure it intends to utilize the guidance of EPRI reports on identification of aging as part of the training of system engineers. These industry guidelines provide the basis for the identification of aging effects and will provide the system engineers with the necessary knowledge to identify "other signs of deterioration." (EPRI reports 1007932, "Identification and Detection of Aging Issues," 1007933, "Aging Assessment Field Guide," and 1009743, "Aging Identification and Assessment Checklist - Mechanical Components.")

In the updated response to RAI B2.1.33-2 dated August 12, 2005, the applicant pointed out that no change to RAI response is required. Thus AMP B2.1.33, Systems Walkdown Program, was modified after RAI response and Section B2.1.33 under the "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" heading of the ALRA has been reworded to state:

System engineers conduct visual inspections of accessible portions of credited systems and components WSLR. Visible degradation, anomalous indications, or adverse conditions are documented and evaluated. Adverse conditions that can lead to aggressive environments for in scope components, such as evidence of leakage, wetted insulation, or degraded non-safety related or out of scope piping or anchor points attached to in-scope portions, are also monitored.

The applicant stated that although the paragraph has been reworded for clarification the response to RAI B2.1.33-2 dated December 17, 2004, remains valid.

The staff found the parameters considered in the program implementation to be according to general industry practice and acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI B2.1.33-2 is resolved.

The staff confirmed that the parameters monitored/inspected program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.3 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (4) Detection of Aging Effects - In original LRA Section B2.1.33 the applicant stated that the aging effects of concern will be detected and documented through visual inspections during system walkdowns. The frequency of inspections is at least once per refuel cycle for each structure and system. This frequency is sufficient since the aging effects typically are caused by long-term degradation. The staff considers this approach to detection of aging effects for accessible external surfaces of selected SSCs within the scope of license renewal at NMPNS acceptable.

In RAI B2.1.33-4 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant discuss the basic approaches and programs used to manage aging effects for inaccessible external surfaces of SSCs within the scope of license renewal.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the Systems Walkdown Program relies on visual inspections of accessible external surfaces to detect aging effects. The evidence of aging, however, may apply to both accessible and inaccessible component surfaces depending on the material of the component and the environment to which it is exposed. The applicant further indicated that any evidence of aging on accessible external surfaces generally indicates the condition of inaccessible external surfaces and is considered an effective indicator for managing inaccessible surfaces. As part of the enhancement to the "parameters monitored/inspected" attribute described in original LRA Section B2.1.33 to "provide guidance for assessment of identified deterioration" the applicant confirmed that it will include direction to evaluate potentially susceptible inaccessible areas when evidence of aging is detected. The staff agreed with this enhancement procedure.

In the updated response to RAI B2.1.33-4 dated August 12, 2005, the applicant pointed out that no change to the RAI response was required because the Systems Walkdown Program was modified and incorporated into the ALRA after the RAI response with no change in intent. ALRA Section B2.1.33 under the program description heading has been reworded to state:

The Systems Walkdown Program is an existing plant-specific program that consists of the ten elements described in Appendix A of NUREG-1800 (Reference 1). The Systems Walkdown Program manages aging effects for accessible external surfaces of systems and components WSLR at NMPNS. The aging effects of concern are material degradation and loss of material from external surfaces of pumps, valves, piping, bolts, heat exchangers, tanks, HVAC components, and other

components. The program also identifies adverse conditions that can lead to aggressive environments for systems or components within the scope of LR. Program activities include system engineer walkdowns (i.e., field evaluations of system components to assess material condition), documentation and evaluation of inspection results, and appropriate corrective actions.

The applicant stated that although the paragraph has been reworded to provide clarification the response to RAI B2.1.33-4 dated December 17, 2004, remains valid.

The staff reviewed information in the ALRA and found the applicant's approaches to detecting and managing aging effects for accessible and inaccessible surfaces of SSCs within the scope of license renewal reasonable and acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI B2.1.33-4 is resolved.

The staff confirmed that the "detection of aging effects" program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.4 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (5) Monitoring and Trending - In the original LRA Section B2.1.33 the applicant stated that the Systems Walkdown Program describes the monitoring and assessment of SSCs but has no requirements for monitoring and trending of applicable parameters. The staff agreed that system engineers will document the aging effects of the assigned SSCs and that trending is not required.

The staff confirmed that the "monitoring and trending" program element satisfies the criteria of the Gall Report and SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.5 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (6) Acceptance Criteria - In original LRA Section B2.1.33 the applicant stated that the Systems Walkdown Program includes specific acceptance criteria for applicable parameters. A list of walkdown attributes is available to system engineers for use in developing walkdown checklists.

In RAI B2.1.33-3 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide more detailed information according to the guidelines delineated in SRP-LR Appendix A to describe the acceptance criteria for the program.

In its December 17, 2004, response to RAI B2.1.33-3 the applicant stated that the "acceptance criteria" program element in original LRA Section B2.1.33 states that, "A list of walkdown attributes is available to system engineers for use in developing walkdown checklists." This statement acknowledged that system engineers conduct walkdowns for a variety of reasons (i.e., maintenance rule assessments, system readiness reviews, pre-outage reviews, license renewal, et cetera). The system engineer adapts the general checklist to focus on attributes applicable to the walkdown. The applicant stated that the license renewal walkdown focuses on attributes applicable to aging. The applicant further stated that the current program administrative procedure (S-TDP-REL-0101, Systems Walkdown Program) states that "evidence of aging shall be documented on a DER and recorded on the System Walkdown Report" (DER is the NMPNS document for

entering issues into the corrective action program). The applicant stated that as part of the enhancement to the “acceptance criteria” attribute of original LRA Section B2.1.33 it intends to use EPRI reports on detection of aging issues to train system engineers to recognize evidence of (acceptance criteria for) various aging effects. These EPRI reports are listed above under “Parameters Monitored/Inspected.” The staff found the applicant’s approach to detection of evidence of aging and implementation of corrective measures reasonable.

In the updated response to RAI B2.1.33-3 dated August 12, 2005, the applicant stated that the original response to this RAI remains valid and unchanged by the ALRA reworded to state that incorporation of acceptance criteria into the program procedures is an enhancement and that the updated RAI response provides additional information for use.

The staff confirmed that the acceptance criteria program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.6 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable. Therefore, the staff’s concern described in RAI B2.1.33-3 is resolved.

- (10) Operating Experience - In ALRA Section B2.1.33, the applicant explained that the Systems Walkdown Program has relied upon system health reports to document the overall material condition of various plant systems. As such, operating experience has been incorporated into the system health reports and not directly into the Systems Walkdown Program. Enhancements will be made to this program to include previous operating experience and to ensure future operating experience is properly incorporated. A review of the corrective action history related to material condition demonstrates the past usefulness of walkdowns in identifying visually detectable age-related degradation (e.g., general corrosion of bolting, supports, and component surfaces). As additional operating experience is obtained, lessons learned will be used to adjust the System Walkdown Program as needed.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.35 and A2.1.35, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Systems Walkdown Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant’s Systems Walkdown Program, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.3.3 Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.34, the applicant described the Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program, stating that this is an existing, plant-specific program. The Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program inspects components and materials internal to the non-segregated bus ducts that connect the reserve auxiliary transformers to the 4160V buses required for the recovery of offsite power to both units

following an SBO event. Based upon the most recent industry and regulatory license renewal precedence, this program also includes bus ducts associated with power boards feeding components within the scope of license renewal. They are normally energized, and therefore, the bus duct insulation material will experience temperature rise due to energization, which may cause age-related degradation during the extended period of operation.

Staff Evaluation. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), the staff reviewed the information included in ALRA Section B2.1.34, regarding the applicant's demonstration of the Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program to ensure that the effects of aging, as discussed above, will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.

The staff reviewed the Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program against the AMP elements of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3 and SRP-LR Table A.1-1 and focused on how the program manages aging effects through the effective incorporation of 10 elements (*i.e.*, "program scope," "preventive actions," "parameters monitored or inspected," "detection of aging effects," "monitoring and trending," "acceptance criteria," "corrective actions," "confirmation process," "administrative controls," "and operating experience").

The applicant indicated that the corrective actions, confirmation process, and administrative controls are parts of the site-controlled quality assurance program. The staff's evaluation of the quality assurance program is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4. The remaining seven elements are discussed below.

- (1) Scope of Program - In ALRA Section B2.1.34, the applicant stated that this program applies to the bus ducts within the scope of license renewal, *i.e.*, nonsegregated bus ducts that connect the reserve auxiliary transformers to the 4160V buses required for the recovery of offsite power to both units following an SBO event as well those associated with power board feeding components within the scope of license renewal.

The staff confirmed that the scope of the program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.1 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (2) Preventive Actions - In ALRA Section B2.1.34 the applicant stated that in this inspection program and no actions are taken to prevent or mitigate aging degradation.

The staff confirmed that the "preventive actions" program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.2 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (3) Parameters Monitored/Inspected - In ALRA Section B2.1.34 the applicant stated that a sample of accessible bolted connections (bus joints and ending devices) for proper torque or the resistance of bolted joints will be checked using a micro-ohm meter of sufficient current capacity suitable for checking bus bar connections. This program also inspects the internal portions of accessible bus ducts for cracks, corrosion, foreign debris, dust buildup, and water intrusion. The bus insulation system is inspected for signs of embrittlement, cracking, melting, swelling, or discoloration which may indicate overheating or age-related degradation. The internal bus supports (insulators) will be inspected for structural integrity and cracking.



Generally vendors do not recommend re-torque of bolted connections unless the joint requires service or the bolted connections are clearly loose. The torque required to turn the fastener in the tightening directions (restart torque) is not a good indicator of the preload once the fastener is in service. After relaxation of the parts of the joint the final loads are likely to be lower than the installed loads and thus, as documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to justify technically how re-torquing of bolted connections indicates preload once the fastener is in service.

In response to this request the applicant informed the staff that it will revise ALRA Sections A1.1.27, A2.1.27, and B2.1.34 to delete the torque test/torque checks and include as an alternative to thermography or connection resistance measurement of bolted connection a visual inspection for the accessible bolted connections covered with heat sink tape, sleeving, insulating boots, et cetera (NMP1 Commitment 31, NMP2 Commitment 29). The staff found the applicant's response acceptable because thermography, resistance checks, or visual inspections of bolted connections covered with heat sink tape, sleeving, or insulating boots will provide reasonable assurance that bolted connections are not loosened by ohmic heating. The staff also determined that the six-year inspection frequency is adequate to prevent bus duct failures as industry experience shows that aging degradation is a slow process. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will revise the ALRA to incorporate the changes.

The staff confirmed that the "parameters monitored/inspected" program element satisfies the criterion of Gall Report and SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.3 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (4) Detection of Aging Effects - In ALRA Section B2.1.34 the applicant stated that visual inspections of internal portions of bus ducts detect cracks, corrosion, debris, dust, and evidence of water intrusion and that visual inspections of the bus insulating system detect embrittlement, cracking, melting, swelling, and discoloration. Visual inspections of bus supports (insulators) detect cracking and lack of structural integrity. Internal portions of bus ducts, the bus insulation system, and the bus supports (insulators) are inspected visually approximately every six years. A resistance test of the bus ducts or a torque test of a sample of accessible bolted connections will be performed approximately every six years. An initial inspection will be completed before the end of the initial 40-year license term. This period is adequate to identify failures of the bus ducts as experience shows that aging degradation is a slow process. A six-year inspection frequency will provide during a 20-year period up to three data points which can be used to characterize the degradation rate. If unacceptable degradation is found as indicated by either increased resistance or visual anomalies the inspections will be expanded to determine the extent of the condition.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18, 2006, the applicant agreed to address the staff's concern and remove the torque test/torque check options as reported in Element 3. The applicant will determine sample size by accepted industry practice or vendor recommendation.

The staff determined that this program element satisfies the criteria of Appendix A.1.2.3.4 of the SRP-LR. Visual inspection of the bus insulating system will

detect embrittlement, cracking, melting, swelling, and discoloration which are aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of insulation materials from heating. A resistance test of bolted connections will detect bolting loosening from thermal cycling. The staff also determined that the proposed frequency is acceptable because the expected aging degradation is a slow process.

The staff confirmed that the detection of aging effects program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.4 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (5) Monitoring and Trending - In ALRA Section B2.1.34 the applicant stated that monitoring and trending are not included as part of this program because the ability to trend inspection results is limited by available data; however, inspection results will be used to characterize degradation rates. This exception is consistent with latest industry and regulatory license renewal precedence. Existing inspection procedures will be enhanced to expand visual inspections of the bus duct support and insulation systems. Also, new provisions will be made for either periodic low-range resistance checks of the bus ducts or torque of a statistical sample of accessible bolted connections. The staff found that the absence of trending for testing is acceptable as the test is performed every six years and the staff saw no need for such activities.

The staff confirmed that the “monitoring and trending” program element satisfies the criteria of the Gall Report and SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.5 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (6) Acceptance Criteria - In ALRA Section B2.1.34 the applicant stated that bolted connections must meet the manufacturer’s minimum torque specifications or the low-resistance value of the bus ducts must be appropriate for the application. Bus ducts are to be free from unacceptable visual indications of surface anomalies that suggest conductor insulation degradation. Additional acceptance criteria include no indication of unacceptable corrosion, cracking, foreign debris, excessive dust buildup, or moisture intrusion. Any condition or situation that if not corrected could lead to a loss of intended function is considered unacceptable.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff expressed its concern during the staff audit about re-torquing of the bolted connections. The applicant informed the staff that it will revise the acceptance criteria to delete the torque test/torque check option and include as an alternative to thermography or connection resistance measurement of bolted connections a visual inspection of the accessible bolted connections covered with heat shrink tape, sleeving insulating, boots, et cetera. (NMP1 Commitment 31, NMP2 Commitment 29). In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will revise the ALRA to incorporate the changes as described. This revision resolved the staff’s concern.

The staff reviewed this program element to determine whether it satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Appendix A.1.2.3.6. The staff found the acceptance criteria acceptable as the low resistance value of the bus ducts must be appropriate for the application. Bus ducts are to be free from unacceptable visual indications of surface anomalies that suggest conductor insulation degradation. Additional acceptance criteria include no indication of

unacceptable corrosion, cracking, foreign debris, excessive dust buildup, or moisture intrusion.

The staff confirmed that the acceptance criteria program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.6 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (7) Corrective Actions - The staff's review of the adequacy of the applicant's 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Program associated with this program element is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4.

The staff reviewed other aspects of this program element to determine whether it satisfies the criteria of Appendix A.1.2.3.7 of the SRP-LR. The applicant stated that corrective actions are documented using the DER process. The Quality Assurance Program Topical Report (Appendix B to "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report (Updated)" and Appendix B to "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Updated Safety Analysis Report") documents the applicant's commitment to the corrective action criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants." The applicant's Corrective Action Program includes the detection and correction of conditions adverse to quality and the identification, cause determination, correction, prevention of recurrence of conditions significantly adverse to quality. GALL AMP XI.E4, which incorporated ISG-17, "Proposed Aging Management Program (AMP) XI.E4, 'Periodic Inspection of Bus Ducts,'" under corrective actions, states that further investigation and evaluation are performed when acceptance criteria are not met. Corrective actions may include but are not limited to cleaning, drying, increasing inspection frequency, replacing, or repairing the affected metal-enclosed bus components. If an unacceptable condition or situation is detected a determination is made whether the same condition or situation applies to other accessible or inaccessible areas. The applicant's Corrective Action Program does not address the specific requirement of GALL AMP XI.E4. As documented in the Audit and Review Report the staff requested that the applicant revise NMP AMP B2.1.34 to add specific requirements or justify why these corrective actions are not necessary. The applicant informed the staff that it will revise NMP AMP B2.1.34 by adding the following to the "corrective actions" program element:

Further investigation and evaluation are performed when the acceptance criteria are not met. Corrective actions may include but are not limited to cleaning, drying, increased inspection frequency, replacement, or repair of the affected bus duct components. If an unacceptable condition or situation is identified, a determination is made to whether the same condition or situation is applicable to other accessible or inaccessible bus duct/components.

The staff found the applicant's response acceptable it is consistent with corrective actions in GALL AMP XI.E4. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will revise the ALRA to incorporate the changes and on this basis the staff found the applicant's corrective actions acceptable.

- (8) Confirmation Process - The staff's review of the adequacy of the applicant's 10 CFR 50

Appendix B Program associated with this program element is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4.

The staff reviewed other aspects of this program element to determine whether it satisfies the criteria of Appendix A.1.2.3.8 of the SRP-LR. The staff found the applicant's confirmation process meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B.

- (9) Administrative Controls - The staff's review of the adequacy of the applicant's 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Program associated with this program element is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4.

The staff reviewed other aspects of this program element to determine whether it satisfies the criteria of Appendix A.1.2.3.9 of the SRP-LR. The staff found the applicant's administrative controls meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B.

- (10) Operating Experience - In ALRA Section B2.1.34 the applicant explained that inspections of the bus ducts within the scope of license renewal have not revealed any age-related degradation that could cause a loss of intended function.

The staff reviewed the operating experience stated in the ALRA and interviewed the applicant's technical personnel to confirm that the plant-specific operating experience revealed no degradation not bounded by industry experience.

After review of industry and plant-specific operating experience and discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff confirmed that the operating experience program element satisfies the criteria defined SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.10 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. The applicant provided its UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program in ALRA Appendix A Section A1.1.27 for NMP1 and A2.1.27 for NMP2 stating that its Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program manages aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for components and materials internal to the nonsegregated bus ducts that connect the reserve auxiliary transformer to the 4160V buses required for the recovery of offsite power following an SBO event. Based upon the most recent industry and regulatory license renewal precedence, this program also includes normally energized bus ducts associated with board-feeding components within the scope of license renewal. These normally-energized components are not subject to the environmental qualification requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 but can be affected by elevated temperatures prior to the end of the period of extended operation. Program activities include visual inspections of internal portions of the bus ducts to detect cracks, corrosion, debris, dust, and moisture; visual inspections of the bus insulating system to detect embrittlement, cracking, melting, swelling, and discoloration; visual inspections of bus supports (insulators) to detect cracking and lack of structural integrity; and a torque test or a resistance test of a sample of accessible bolted connections. The program incorporates applicable technical information and guidance from industry. Analytical trending is not included in this activity because the ability to trend inspection results is limited. This omission is an exception to the "monitoring and trending" element in Appendix A.1.2.3.5 of the SPR-LR. Enhancements to the applicant's Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program include expanded visual inspections of the bus ducts, their supports, and insulation systems as well as low range resistance checks of the bus ducts or torque checks

from a statistical sample of accessible bolted connections. Enhancements will be implemented prior to the period of extended operations.

Generally vendors do not recommend re-torque of bolted connections unless the joint requires service or the bolted connections are clearly loose. The torque required to turn the fastener in the tightening directions (restart torque) is not a good indicator of preload once the fastener is in service. After relaxation of the parts of the joint the final loads are likely to be lower than the installed loads. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant justify technically how re-torquing of bolted connections indicates preload once the fastener is in service. In response to this request the applicant informed the staff that it will revise ALRA Sections A1.1.27, A2.1.27, and B2.1.34 to delete the torque test/torque checks and include as an alternative to thermography or connection resistance measurement of bolted connections visual inspection of the accessible bolted connections covered with heat sink tape, sleeving, insulating boots, et cetera. (NMP1 Commitment 31, NMP2 Commitment 29). The staff found the applicant's response acceptable because thermography, resistance check, or visual inspection of bolted connections covered with heat sink tape, sleeving, or insulating boots will provide reasonable assurance that bolted connections are not loose from ohmic heating. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it had revised the ALRA to incorporate such changes.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.3.4 Fuse Holder Inspection Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.35, the applicant described the Fuse Holder Inspection Program, stating that this is a new, plant-specific program. Fuse holders/blocks are classified as a specialized type of terminal block because of the similarity in design and construction. The fuse holders are typically constructed of blocks of rigid insulating material, such as phenolic resins. Metallic clamps are attached to the blocks to hold each end of the fuse. The clamps can be spring-loaded clips that allow the fuse ferrules or blades to slip in, or they can be bolt lugs, to which the fuse ends are bolted. The clamps are typically made of copper. The aging of the fuse holder insulation material will be managed under the program for Electrical Cables and Connections Not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements. The Fuse Holder Inspection Program includes the following aging stressors: moisture, fatigue, ohmic heating, mechanical stress, vibration, thermal cycling, electrical transients, chemical contamination, oxidation, and corrosion. In-scope fuse holders are tested to provide a direct indication of the condition of the metallic clamps. Fuses may be tested using either thermography or contact resistance.

In the ALRA the applicant states that only fuse holders located outside active devices and not part of larger assemblies are included in the program. The applicant also stated that the fuse holders are typically constructed of blocks of rigid insulating material like phenolic resins. Metallic clamps are attached to the blocks to hold each end of the fuse. The clamps can be spring-loaded clips that allow the fuse ferrules or blades to slip in or they can be lugs to which

the fuse ends are bolted. The clamps are made typically of copper. In ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 the applicant categorized the fuse holder components into insulator materials and copper alloy clamps in the Material column. The applicant stated that the aging of the fuse holder insulation material will be managed under Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connection Program (ALRA Section B2.1.29), which was evaluated in SER Section 3.6.2.1. The metallic clamps of the fuse holders are evaluated in this Section. The applicant stated in Table 3.6.2.C-1 that the metallic clamps of the fuse holders are subject to the Fuse Holder Inspection Program. The applicant further identified in ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 loss of electrical continuity as the AERM.

The applicant stated that the aging of the fuse holder copper alloy clamps will be managed under a new program called Fuse Holder Inspection Program as addressed in this SER section 3.0.3.3.4

Staff Evaluation. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), the staff reviewed the information included in ALRA Section B2.1.35, regarding the applicant's demonstration of the Fuse Holder Inspection Program to ensure that the effects of aging, as discussed above, will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation. Details of staff evaluation AMP B2.1.35 are as follows:

The staff reviewed the Fuse Holder Inspection Program against the AMP elements found in SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3 and SRP-LR Table A.1-1 focusing on how the program manages aging effects through the effective incorporation of 10 elements (i.e., "program scope," "preventive actions," "parameters monitored or inspected," "detection of aging effects," "monitoring and trending," "acceptance criteria," "corrective actions," "confirmation process," "administrative controls," and "operating experience").

The applicant indicated that corrective actions, confirmation process, and administrative controls are part of the site-controlled quality assurance program. The staff's evaluation of the quality assurance program is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4. The remaining seven elements are addressed here:

- (1) Scope of Program - In ALRA Section B2.1.35 the applicant stated that this program applies to metallic clamps of fuse holders located outside active devices that have aging effects requiring aging management. This application is acceptable to the staff because it is consistent with the GALL Report and complements the information provided by the applicant for insulator material.

The staff confirmed that the "scope of the program" element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.1 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (2) Preventive Actions - In ALRA Section B2.1.35 the applicant stated that the Fuse Holder Inspection Program monitors conditions and requires regular inspection of the in-scope components and identification of degraded conditions that would affect the ability of the components to perform intended functions. Consequently, no specific preventive actions are associated with this program other than identification of the aging effects of concern before a loss of intended function occurs. The staff did not identify the need for any preventive action except condition monitoring including thermography or contact resistance checks.

The staff confirmed that the "preventive actions" program element satisfies the criterion

of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.2 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (3) Parameters Monitored/Inspected - In ALRA Section B2.1.35 the applicant stated that monitored parameters will include high resistance of the metallic clamp (or clip) portion of the fuse holder to detect fatigue caused by ohmic heating, thermal cycling, electrical transients, mechanical stress, chemical contamination, corrosion, and oxidation. The staff agreed that testing clamp resistance using thermography or contact resistance effectively ensures that the fuse holder clamps will perform their intended function for the extended period of operation.

The staff confirmed that the “parameters monitored or inspected” program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.3 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (4) Detection of Aging Effects - In ALRA Section B2.1.35 the applicant stated that the fuse holders will be tested at least every 10 years by thermography, contact resistance, or other appropriate testing methods. The initial inspection will be prior to the period of extended operation and thereafter a 10-year inspection frequency will be used to provide at least two data points during the 20-year period of extended operation. The staff agreed that the aging degradation of fuse holder clamps is a slow process and that a 10-year inspection frequency is adequate to prevent failures of fuse holder clamps.

The staff confirmed that the “detection of aging effects” program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.4 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (5) Monitoring and Trending - In ALRA Section B2.1.35 the applicant stated that monitoring and trending are not included in this program because the parameters monitored may vary depending upon the test method used. The staff concurred with this policy because thermography or connection resistance test will be performed at 10-year intervals, appropriate methods can be used for subsequent tests, and so long the test results confirm no loosening of the fuse holder clamps there is no need for monitoring and trending the test results.

The staff confirmed that the “monitoring and trending” program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.5 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (6) Acceptance Criteria - In ALRA Section B2.1.35 the applicant stated that the acceptance criteria for each fuse holder clamp will depend on the specific test performed and the specific fuse holder clamp tested. As explained in the “monitoring and trending” program element, the staff concurred that acceptance criteria should depend on the type of test and the type of clamp.

The staff confirmed that the “acceptance criteria” program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.6 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (10) Operating Experience - In ALRA Section B2.1.35 the applicant stated that the Fuse Holder Inspection Program is a new program at NMPNS and, therefore, no programmatic operating experience is available. However, the applicant stated that

operating experienced lessons learned will be used to adjust this program as needed. The applicant committed to develop the Fuse Holder Inspection Program with specifications stated in ALRA Section B2.1.35 (NMP1 Commitment 32 and NMP2 Commitment 30). The staff agreed that the proposed program will provide reasonable assurance of detection of loosening of fuse holder clamps prior to significant degradation.

The staff confirmed that the “operating experience” program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.10 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.21 and A2.1.21, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Fuse Holder Inspection Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant’s Fuse Holder Inspection Program, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.3.5 Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.39, the applicant described the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program, stating that this is a new, plant-specific program. Most electrical connections involve insulating material and metallic parts. This program will address the aging effects of the metallic parts used to connect cable conductors to other cables or electrical devices. The Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program will address the aging effects of the cable insulation material. The electrical connections used in nuclear power plants include: splices (butt or bolted), crimp-type ring lugs, and terminal blocks. The aging stressors to these connections addressed by this program include: thermal cycling, ohmic heating, electrical transients, vibration, chemical contamination, corrosion, and oxidation. The specific mechanism for each of these aging stressors is described in the most recent industry and regulatory license renewal precedence. The specific test performed will be determined prior to the initial test, and will be a proven test for detecting loose connections, such as thermography, contact resistance testing, or other appropriate testing.

Staff Evaluation. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), the staff reviewed the information included in ALRA Section B2.1.39, regarding the applicant’s demonstration of the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program against the AMP elements of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3 and SRP-LR Table A.1-1 focusing on how the program manages aging effects through the effective incorporation of 10 elements (i.e., “program scope,” “preventive actions,” “parameters monitored or inspected,” “detection of aging effects,” “monitoring and trending,” “acceptance criteria,” “corrective actions,” “confirmation process,” “administrative controls,” and “operating experience”).

The applicant indicated that corrective actions, confirmation process, and administrative



controls are parts of the site-controlled quality assurance program. The staff's evaluation of the quality assurance program is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4. The remaining seven elements are addressed here.

- (1) Scope of Program - In ALRA Section B2.1.39 the applicant stated that this program applies to the metallic portion of non-EQ electrical cable connections. The staff found the scope of the program acceptable as consistent with the GALL Report and complementary to the information provided by the applicant for conductor insulation for electrical cables and connectors.

The staff confirmed that the scope of the program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.1 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (2) Preventive Actions - In ALRA Section B2.1.39, the applicant stated that the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program requires regular inspection of in-scope components and detection of degraded conditions that would affect the ability of components to perform intended functions. No specific preventive actions are associated with this program except identification of the aging effects of concern before a loss of intended function occurs. The staff did not identify the need for any preventive action except the condition monitoring program.

The staff confirmed that the "preventive actions" program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.2 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (3) Parameters Monitored/Inspected - In ALRA Section B2.1.39 the applicant stated that monitored parameters will include testing representative samples for loosening of bolted connections. The sample will be assessed on application voltage (high, medium, and low voltage systems), circuit loading, and location (high temperature, high humidity, vibration, et cetera.). The staff agreed that testing of representative samples using thermography or contact resistance effectively ensures performance of conductor connector intended function for the extended period of operation.

The staff confirmed that the "parameters monitored or inspected" program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.3 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (4) Detection of Aging Effects - In ALRA Section B2.1.39 the applicant stated that loosening of the electrical connections can be caused by one or more aging stressors, namely, thermal cycling, ohmic heating, electrical transients, vibrations, chemical contamination, corrosion, and oxidation. The applicant stated that one or more of the proven tests, thermography, contact resistance, or other appropriate testing, will be performed case by case.

The applicant stated that the initial inspection of this program will be performed prior to the period of the extended operation and that thereafter a 10-year inspection frequency will be used to provide at least two data points during the 20-year period of extended operation. The applicant stated that for the slow degradation of the Non-EQ electrical cable connections the 10-year test frequency for this program is adequate. The staff agreed that industry experience shows that aging degradation of cable connections is a slow process and 10-year inspection frequency is adequate to prevent failures of cable

connections. The staff also agreed that thermography or connection resistance measurement is effective in detecting connection degradation.

The staff confirmed that the “detection of aging effects” program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.4 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (5) Monitoring and Trending - In ALRA Section B2.1.39 the applicant stated that monitoring and trending are not included in this program because the parameters monitored may vary depending upon the test method. The staff concurred with this because the thermography or connection resistance tests will be performed at 10-year intervals years, different methods can be used for subsequent tests, and so long as the test results confirm no loosening of bolted connections there is no need for monitoring and trending the test results.

The staff confirmed that the “monitoring and trending” program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.5 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (6) Acceptance Criteria - In ALRA Section B2.1.39 the applicant stated that the acceptance criteria for each conductor connector will depend on the specific test used and the specific conductor connector tested. The staff concurred that acceptance criteria should depend on the type of test and the type of the conductor connector.

The staff confirmed that the “acceptance criteria” program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.6 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (10) Operating Experience - In ALRA Section B2.1.39 the applicant stated that the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program is new at NMP; therefore, no programmatic operating experience is available. As operating experience is obtained lessons learned will be used to adjust this program as needed.

The staff confirmed that the “operating experience” program element satisfies the criteria of the Gall Report and SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.10 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

UFSAR and USAR Supplements. In ALRA Sections A1.1.41 and A2.1.39, the applicant provided the respective UFSAR and USAR supplements for the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program. The staff reviewed these sections and determined that the information in the supplements provide adequate summary descriptions of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. After review of the applicant’s Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.0.3.3.6 Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program (NMP2 Only)

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B2.1.40, the applicant described the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program for NMP2, stating that this is a new, plant-specific program. The Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program manages the aging of wooden power poles that are within the scope for license renewal because they provide structural support for the transmission lines in the recovery path for station blackout. Qualified personnel perform inspections, conducted prior to the period of extended operation and every 10 years thereafter, that manage material loss, degradation, and physical damage. Activities include visual inspections of the entire structure, including cross members and hardware, pole soundings, circumferential measurements, and below grade inspections. If necessary, core boring, application of preservatives, and pesticide treatments are performed if soundings suggest degradation has occurred. Corrective actions may include pole reinforcement or replacement. The program inspection activities ensure that in-scope electrical support structures retain their intended functions between inspection cycles.

Staff Evaluation. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), the staff reviewed the information included in ALRA Section B2.1.40, regarding the applicant's demonstration of the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program to ensure that the effects of aging, as discussed above, will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.

The applicant stated that the new plant-specific Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program (NMP2 Commitment 34) that will manage the aging of wooden power poles within the scope of license renewal because they provide structural support for the transmission lines in the SBO recovery path.

The staff understands that the applicant's Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program is a sub-program of its Structures Monitoring Program. In Appendices A and B of the ALRA for the applicant's Masonry Wall Program, also a Structures Monitoring Program sub-program, this relationship is addressed. In ALRA Section A2.1.40 for the Wooden Power Pole Program this relationship with the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program is not addressed. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested the applicant to explain the inconsistency.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that ALRA Section A2.1.40 had been modified at the end of the first paragraph by adding: "The Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program is implemented by the Structures Monitoring Program for managing specific aging effects." Also the applicant stated that the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program had been modified at the end of the program description paragraph by adding: "The Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program is implemented by the Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28) for managing specific aging effects."

The staff reviewed information provided in the ALRA and supplemental letters and found it acceptable. With the clarifying statements added by the applicant to ALRA Sections A2.1.40 and B2.1.40 the relationship between its Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program and its Structures Monitoring Program is addressed.

The staff reviewed the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program against the AMP elements of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3, and SRP-LR Table A.1-1 focusing on how the program will manage

aging effects through the effective incorporation of 10 elements (i.e., “program scope,” “preventive actions,” “parameters monitored or inspected,” “detection of aging effects,” “monitoring and trending,” “acceptance criteria,” “corrective actions,” “confirmation process,” “administrative controls,” “and “operating experience”) addressed here.

- (1) Scope of Program - In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that this program applies to wooden power poles relied upon for SBO recovery within the scope of license renewal and subject to and AMR. The program includes visual inspections of the entire structure, pole sounding and circumference measurements, below-grade inspections, any necessary core boring, preservative application, and pesticide treatments.

The staff confirmed that the “scope of the program” element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.1 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (2) Preventive Actions - In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that this program monitors conditions as described in SRP-LR Appendix A.1.1. The program provides for timely detection of loss of material and degradation and physical damage, not preventive or mitigating actions.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that at ALRA page B2-89 under Scope of Program for NMP AMP B2.1.40 the applicant states that the program includes visual inspections of the entire structure, pole sounding and circumference measurements, below-grade inspections, any necessary core boring, preservative application, and pesticide treatments. However, the applicant stated in the preceding paragraph that the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program monitors conditions and does not support preventive or mitigating actions. The staff requested the applicant to explain why preservative applications are not preventive actions and pesticide treatments are not mitigating actions.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that preservative applications and pesticide treatments will enhance the lives of the poles by minimizing their deterioration; however; the license renewal AMP is not based on these actions and does not credit them. The aging management monitors conditions. The inspection frequency, repair, and replacement of poles are based on the condition of the poles at the time of inspection.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s response and found it acceptable. Although application of preservatives and pesticides to the wooden power poles is part of the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program license renewal aging management is not based on these actions. For any one pole decreasing the inspection frequency to less than every ten years and repairing or replacing it depend on the condition of the pole at the time of the condition monitoring inspection. Application of preservatives or pesticides is relied upon to prevent aging effects/mechanisms of the wooden power poles under license renewal.

The staff determined that the “preventive actions” program element satisfies the criterion of Appendix A.1.2.3.2 of the SRP-LR and that inspections under the applicant’s Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program only monitor the condition of the wooden power poles and perform no preventive or mitigating action for aging effects and aging effects mechanisms . On this basis, the staff found the applicant's preventive actions

acceptable.

- (3) Parameters Monitored/Inspected - In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that wooden power poles will be inspected for material loss, degradation, and physical damage. Techniques include visual examinations of the entire structure including cross members and hardware, pole soundings, circumferential measurements, and below-grade inspections. If necessary core boring, preservative applications, and pesticide treatments are performed if soundings suggest degradation. Visual inspections check the pole for physical or mechanical damage that can affect the life of the pole (lean or tilt, splitting or cracked tops, changes to grade, and shell or butt rot and decay). Excavations will be performed to a depth of approximately 18 inches to detect loss of material or degradation or damage. Pole sounding will be performed by a qualified inspector at various pole locations to detect internal rot/decay, insect damage or infestations, or hollow areas. Core boring of the pole may be performed based on the inspection and sounding results to detect internal decay, insect infestation, or hollow areas. If insect infestation is found the area will be treated with a fumigant prior to plugging of the bored core region. Preservative treatment of the excavated surfaces (including moisture barrier/wrapping) also will be performed prior to recovering. Effective circumference measurements evaluate the pole-loading capacity.

The program also monitors proper pole tagging and labeling with treatment information and application dates.

The staff determined that the “parameters monitored/inspected” program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Appendix A.1.2.3.3 and that the applicant has identified clearly the parameters of wooden power poles that need inspection for aging effects and aging effects mechanisms affecting the ability of the wooden power poles to perform their intended function. Visual examinations of the entire wooden power pole structure with core boring and soundings as needed will check each pole for physical or mechanical damage that can affect the life of the pole. Parameters monitored include lean or tilt, splitting or cracked tops, changes to buried depth, shell or butt rot or decay, internal rot/decay, insect damage or infestations, circumferential measurements, and hollow areas. For these reasons the staff found the applicant's “parameters monitored or inspected” program element acceptable.

- (4) Detection of Aging Effects - In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that the inspections in the new program shall be by qualified personnel on components within the scope of license renewal within five years of the expiration of the current operating license. Subsequent visual inspections and testing for the wooden poles will be every ten years. This frequency is based on industry experience, which shows that although the typical wooden pole life is expected to be 30 to 40 years routine inspection and treatment can extend this life by 50 percent or more. Typical industry inspection frequencies for wooden poles currently range from 8 to 15 years.

The 10-year visual inspections and testing will detect degradation and identify deficiencies before there is a loss of intended function. All inspections will provide the level of detail and examination necessary to ensure that intended functions are preserved through each subsequent inspection cycle.

The staff determined that this program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR

Appendix A.1.2.3.4 and that the applicant has identified the frequency of inspection of the wooden power poles as within five years of the expiration of the current operating license and every 10 years after based on industry experience. Every wooden power pole within the scope of license renewal will be inspected. Visual examinations of the entire wooden power pole structure with core boring and soundings as needed are adequate methods to gather data on the condition of the wooden power poles. For these reasons the staff found the applicant's "detection of aging effects" program element acceptable.

- (5) Monitoring and Trending - In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that this program shall retain all previous inspection records. These are plant records available for review during the subsequent inspection cycle. Reviews of previous inspection results will provide for trending of long-term degradation or deterioration. This information also could help in evaluating the potential for degradation before the next inspection.

Additionally, the program shall provide for appropriate engineering reviews of the inspection results. Although the inspections may be performed by an outside vendor or contractor or by the applicant's personnel in-house reviews of the results will confirm that the wooden poles are capable of continuing to perform their intended functions through the next inspection cycle.

The staff determined that for visual inspection this program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Appendix A.1.2.3.5. The staff found that the applicant intends to retain all inspection records under its Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program. Reviews of previous inspections will be done so that long-term degradation can be trended. In-house reviews of the results shall be performed to confirm that the wooden poles are capable of continuing to perform their intended functions through the next inspection cycle. For these reasons the staff found the applicant's "monitoring and trending" program element acceptable.

- (6) Acceptance Criteria - In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that this program will specify qualification and experience requirements in the inspection, treatment, and reinforcement of wooden power poles for personnel performing inspections. For inspections contracted to outside vendors or contractors all required qualifications including minimum years of experience, pesticide applicator licenses or certifications, and wood treatment and fumigant qualifications are specified. All work by the applicant or vendor/contractor shall be performed to the criteria or standards stated in the NMP activity and through site-specific procedures.

The program will detail the inspection methods with any applicable acceptance/rejection criteria. Any pole found to have loss of material, degradation, or physical damage will be assessed and treated. The capability of a degraded pole to continue performing load-carrying intended functions will be evaluated. Additionally, the program will identify and label wooden poles warranting immediate rejection due to dangerous conditions as well as those with serious but lesser defects requiring repair, reinforcement, or nonemergent replacement. All poles classified as rejected or dangerous will be labeled or tagged during the inspection denoting the degradation severity level.

The staff reviewed this program element to determine whether it satisfies the criteria of

SRP-LR Appendix A.1.2.3.6. The staff determined that the applicant intends under its Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program to specify the inspection methods and any applicable acceptance/rejection criteria. In addition detailed qualification and experience requirements will be developed for personnel performing the inspections. The inspection results will be used to evaluate the capability of a degraded pole to continue performing its load-carrying intended functions. For these reasons the staff found the applicant's acceptance criteria acceptable.

- (7) Corrective Actions - The adequacy of the applicant's 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Program associated with this program element reviewed by the staff is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4.

In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that the Quality Assurance Program Topical Report documents its commitment to the corrective action criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. The applicant's Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program will direct the use of the site corrective action program when conditions adverse to quality are identified. These actions include evaluations of adverse or degraded conditions and wooden pole reinforcement or replacement.

The staff reviewed other aspects of this program element to determine whether it satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Appendix A.1.2.3.7. The staff determined that the applicant intends to take action to correct conditions adverse to wooden power pole quality by performing evaluations for wooden pole reinforcement or replacement. For these reasons the staff found the applicant's corrective actions acceptable.

- (8) Confirmation Process - The adequacy of the applicant's 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Program associated with this program element reviewed by the staff is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4

In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that the Quality Assurance Program Topical Report documents the confirmation process for it under the corrective action criterion. The applicant's confirmation process is implemented through corrective action effectiveness reviews and is performed for selected hardware-related and other conditions significantly adverse to quality. The applicant's corrective action program includes but is not limited to SR, NSR, and fire protection SSCs. Therefore, those SSCs within the scope of license renewal are addressed as part of the applicant's current corrective action program.

The staff confirmed that the "confirmation process" program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.8 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (9) Administrative Controls - The adequacy of the applicant's 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Program associated with this program element reviewed by the staff is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4.

In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that its Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program will be implemented through procedures subject to the 10 CFR 50 Appendix B administrative controls program. The administrative controls for NMP are discussed in its Conduct of Operations description and the Quality Assurance Program Topical Report.

The staff reviewed other aspects of this program element to determine whether it satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Appendix A.1.2.3.9 and determined that the applicant's Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program has regulatory and administrative controls providing a formal review and approval process of the program. For these reasons the staff found the applicant's administrative controls acceptable.

- (10) Operating Experience - In ALRA Section B2.1.40 the applicant stated that the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program is defined and implemented for license renewal; thus, there is no plant-specific operating experience. Review of corrective action process reports yielded nothing applicable to wooden pole aging or degradation. Inspection scheduling and performance as discussed in the other SRP-LR attributes will provide plant-specific inspection data and experience prior to the end of the current operating period.

The staff recognized that the applicant's corrective action program which records internal and external plant operating experience will ensure that operating experience is reviewed and incorporated in the future for objective evidence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging are adequately managed.

After discussions with the applicant's technical personnel the staff concluded that the applicant's Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program (NMP2 Only) will manage adequately the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms identified in the ALRA for which this AMP is credited.

The staff confirmed that the "operating experience" program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.10 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

USAR Supplement. In ALRA Section A2.1.40, the applicant provided the USAR supplement for the Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program. The staff reviewed this section and determined that the information in the USAR supplement provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the USAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that they provide an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.0.3.3.7 Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program (NMP1 Only)

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section B3.3, the applicant described the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program for NMP1, stating that this is an existing, plant-specific program. The Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program credited for aging management of the NMP1 suppression chamber (torus). This program is based on a prior commitment to periodically monitor torus condition as described in an NRC SER dated August 11, 1994 (NUDOCS: 80615:233-244). The staff reviewed the ALRA to determine whether the applicant has demonstrated that the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program will manage adequately the aging effects of the NMP1 torus during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).



The applicant states in the ALRA that the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program manages corrosion of the NMP1 torus through inspection and analysis. This program is designed to ensure that the torus shell and support structure minimum thickness limits are met. This program provides for the following inspection and analysis methods:

- determination of torus shell thickness through UT measurement
- determination of corrosion rate through analysis of material coupons
- visual inspection of accessible external surfaces of the torus support structure for corrosion

Observations of the torus shell and support structure conditions ensure that timely action can be taken to correct degradation that could lead to loss of intended function. The minimum allowable torus wall thickness is established as 0.431 inches. This program requires in addition to wall thickness measurements continual determination of corrosion rates from inspection results and the remaining corrosion allowance. The aging evaluation that specifies minimum wall thickness for the NMP1 torus shell is a TLAA for license renewal. The Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program ensures that the NMP1 torus wall and support structure thickness limits are met. This program applies only to NMP1 because NMP2 is a Mark II containment with no torus.

Staff Evaluation. In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), the staff reviewed the information included in ALRA Section B3.3, regarding the applicant's demonstration of the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program to ensure that the effects of aging, as discussed above, will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.

The staff reviewed the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program against the AMP elements found in SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3 and SRP-LR Table A.1-1 focusing on how the program manages aging effects through the effective incorporation of 10 elements (i.e., "program scope," "preventive actions," "parameters monitored or inspected," "detection of aging effects," "monitoring and trending," "acceptance criteria," "corrective actions," "confirmation process," "administrative controls," "and "operating experience").

The applicant indicated that the corrective actions, confirmation process, and administrative controls are parts of the site-controlled quality assurance program. The staff's evaluation of the quality assurance program is addressed in SER Section 3.0.4. The remaining seven elements are discussed here.

- (1) Scope of Program - In ALRA Section B3.3 the applicant stated that the NMP1 Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program determines torus shell thickness through UT measurement, determination of corrosion rate through analysis of material coupons, and visual inspection of accessible external surfaces of the torus support structure for corrosion. The staff found the scope of the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program acceptable because it is comprehensive in its surveillance of the torus and its support structure.

The staff confirmed that the "scope of the program" element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.1 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (2) Preventive Actions - In ALRA Section B3.3 the applicant stated that the Torus Corrosion

Monitoring Program monitors conditions and requires no specific preventive actions. The staff agreed that the purpose of the program is to monitor material thickness and corrosion rate to ensure that the torus shell and support structure meet the qualification bases and that no preventive actions are required for this program.

The staff confirmed that the “preventive actions” program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.2 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (3) Parameters Monitored or Inspected - In ALRA Section B3.3 the applicant stated that the torus wall thickness is measured through UT measurements and torus coupon activities. The condition of the torus external supports is monitored by visual inspection. The staff found that the applicant has selected parameters to be inspected or monitored that can provide evidence of corrosion to ensure that timely action can be taken to correct degradation that could threaten the minimum material thickness requirement.

The staff confirmed that the “parameters monitored or inspected” program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.3 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (4) Detection of Aging Effects - In ALRA Section B3.3 the applicant stated that torus wall UT measurements are obtained at approximately six-month intervals over a predefined grid system and that corrosion sample coupons are analyzed during each refueling outage. Corrosion rates are determined through analysis of both data sets and the most conservative corrosion rate for a particular torus bay is used to evaluate aging of the structure. The staff found that monitoring in this manner ensures the torus shell material will meet the minimum required wall thickness and that any degradation is detected before a loss of intended function.

The staff confirmed that the “detection of aging effects” program element satisfies the criterion of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.4 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (5) Monitoring and Trending - In ALRA Section B3.3 the applicant stated that measurements are performed on a predefined schedule that allows for analysis of the corrosion and thickness data for the torus shell over time. The UT results and corrosion data are trended for future reference. Analysis determines the most conservative value for the corrosion rate. Visual inspection findings for the external support structure are compared to previous inspection results. The staff found that the overall monitoring and trending techniques proposed by the applicant manage the applicable aging effects effectively and are acceptable.

The staff confirmed that the “monitoring and trending” program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.5 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (6) Acceptance Criteria - In ALRA Section B3.3 the applicant stated that the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program establishes acceptance criteria for local thickness, average thickness, and corrosion rate of the torus wall. The minimum wall thickness and corrosion rate limits are defined to ensure that wall thickness meets its required value until the next scheduled inspection. The external support structures also are evaluated

to ensure that the intended functions are not lost prior to the next scheduled inspection. The staff found these criteria acceptable as consistent with the criteria of the staff's August 11, 1994, SER. The criteria ensure that the torus will continue to meet ASME code requirements that the average minimum wall thickness of the torus shell be not less than 0.431 inch.

The staff confirmed that the "acceptance criteria" program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.6 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

- (10) Operating Experience - In ALRA Section B3.3 the applicant stated that torus wall thinning was observed in the late 1980s following an extended plant shutdown. The applicant stated that the wall thinning was attributed to the layup conditions inside the torus during the extended shutdown. To cope with this plant-specific experience the staff approved the NMP1 Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program in the SER dated August 25, 1992. The program later was updated and the staff evaluation of the updated program was documented in the SER dated August 11, 1994. The applicant stated that review of plant-specific operating experience revealed no discrepancies in the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program examinations. The applicant also stated that the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program is adjusted continually to account for industry experience and research. The staff reviewed past inspection reports which indicate no significant changes in the torus wall corrosion rate. Following this review the staff found that this program will manage adequately aging effects on the torus wall and torus support structure.

The staff confirmed that the "operating experience" program element satisfies the criteria of SRP-LR Section A.1.2.3.10 and concluded that this program attribute is acceptable.

UFSAR Supplement. In ALRA Section A1.1.36, the applicant provided the UFSAR supplement for the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed this section and determined that the information in the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review and audit of the applicant's Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplement for this AMP and concluded that it provides an adequate summary description of the program, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.0.4 Quality Assurance Program Attributes Integral to Aging Management Programs**

Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3), a license renewal applicant is required to demonstrate that the effects of aging on structures and components subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that their intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation. SRP-LR, Branch Technical Position RLSB-1, "Aging Management Review - Generic," describes ten attributes of an acceptable AMP. Three of these ten attributes are associated with the quality assurance activities of corrective action, confirmation processes, and administrative controls. Table A.1-1, "Elements of an Aging Management Program for License Renewal," of Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 provides the following description of these quality attributes:

- corrective actions - including root cause determination and prevention of recurrence, should be timely
- confirmation process - should ensure that preventive actions are adequate and that appropriate corrective actions have been completed and are effective
- administrative controls - should provide a formal review and approval process

SRP-LR, Branch Technical Position IQMB-1, "Quality Assurance For Aging Management Programs," notes that those aspects of the aging management program that affect quality of safety-related structures, systems, and components are subject to the quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B. Additionally, for NSR structures and components subject to an AM the existing 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B QA program may be used by the applicant to address the elements of corrective actions, the confirmation process, and administrative controls. Branch Technical Position IQMB-1 provides the following guidance with regard to the quality assurance attributes of AMPs:

- SR structures and components are subject to 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requirements, which are adequate to address all quality-related aspects of an aging management program consistent with the CLB of the facility for the period of extended operation.
- For NSR structures and components that are subject to an AMR for license renewal, an applicant has an option to expand the scope of its 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B program to include these structures and components to address corrective actions, the confirmation process, and administrative controls for aging management during the period of extended operation. In this case, the applicant should document such a commitment in the NMP1 UFSAR and NMP2 USAR supplements according to 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **3.0.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In the original LRA and ALRA Appendix B.1.3, "Quality Assurance Program and Administrative Controls," the applicant described the quality attributes of the plant-specific AMPs. The applicant stated that the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B program provides corrective actions, confirmation processes, and administrative controls for LR AMPs. Additionally, the scope of the program includes both SR and NSR SSCs subject to an AM for license renewal. In the original LRA and ALRA Section B.1.3, the applicant provided the following generic description of the quality attributes common to all the plant-specific AMPs:

- **Corrective Actions** - A single corrective actions process is applied regardless of the safety classification of the structure or component. Corrective actions are implemented through the initiation of a DER according to plant procedures established under 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. Site documents that implement aging management activities for license renewal will direct that a DER be prepared according to those procedures whenever unacceptable conditions are found (i.e., the acceptance criteria are not met).  
Equipment deficiencies are corrected through the initiation of a Work Order (WO) according to plant procedures. Although equipment deficiencies may initially be documented by a WO the corrective action process specifies that a DER also be initiated if required.
- **Confirmation Process** - The focus of the confirmation process is on the follow-up actions

that must be taken to verify effective implementation of corrective actions. The measure of effectiveness is in correcting the adverse condition and preventing recurrence of conditions significantly adverse to quality. Plant procedures include provisions for timely evaluation of adverse conditions and implementation of any corrective actions required including root cause determinations and prevention of recurrence. These procedures provide for tracking, coordinating, monitoring, reviewing, verifying, validating, and approving effective corrective actions to ensure that they are taken. The DER process also monitors for potentially adverse trends. An adverse trend due to recurring adverse conditions will result in a DER. Aging management activities required for license renewal also would uncover any unacceptable condition due to ineffective corrective action.

- Administrative Controls - Administrative controls provide information on procedures and other forms of administrative control documents as well as guidance on classification documents into document types.

#### **3.0.4.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed the applicant's AMPs described in the original LRA and ALRA Appendices A, "Safety Analysis Report Supplement," and B, "Aging Management Programs and Activities." This review was to assure that the aging management activities were consistent with the staff's guidance of SRP-LR Section A.2, "Quality Assurance for Aging Management Programs (Branch Technical Position IQMB-1)," on quality assurance attributes of AMPs.

The staff's evaluation found the descriptions and applicability of the plant-specific AMPs and their associated quality attributes, provided in the original LRA and ALRA Section B.1.3, consistent with the staff's position on quality assurance for aging management. However, the applicant has not described sufficiently the use of the quality assurance program and its associated attributes (corrective action, confirmation process, and administrative controls) in the narrations of AMPs in the original LRA and ALRA Sections A.1, "NMP1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Supplement," and A.2, "NMP2 Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Supplement."

In RAI 2.1-8 dated November 22, 2004 the staff requested that the applicant supplement the descriptions in Sections A.1 and A.2 to include a description including references to pertinent guidance as necessary of the quality assurance program attributes credited for the programs described in the original LRA and ALRA Section B.1.3. The descriptions in ALRA Sections A.1 and A.2 should provide sufficient information for the staff to determine if the quality attributes for the ALRA Sections A.1 and A.2 AMPs are consistent with the review acceptance criteria of SRP-LR Section A.2, "Quality Assurance for Aging Management Programs (Branch Technical Position IQMB-1)."

In response to RAI 2.1-8 by letter dated December 22, 2004, the applicant stated, in part, that the original LRA Sections A.1.2 and A.2.5 were added to reflect the application of the quality assurance program to the attributes of corrective action, confirmation, and document control. Specifically, the additions in each section contained the following description along with descriptions of each of the elements.

The quality assurance program implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and is consistent with the summary in SRP-LR Appendix A.2, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of

License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants," published July 2001. The "corrective action," "confirmation process," and "administrative controls" elements of the quality assurance program are applicable to both SR and NSR SSCs subject to an AM.

Furthermore, the applicant provided the staff with an ALRA submittal dated July 14, 2005, with additional details on the application of the quality assurance program to these three attributes. The staff confirmed that the ALRA description was consistent with the prior response to the request for additional information and the results of the staff's audit of the scoping and screening methodology. On the basis of the supplemental information provided by the applicant in response to the staff's request for information and the incorporation of that information into the ALRA submittal the staff found that the applicant has addressed the request for additional information adequately. Therefore, the staff's concern is resolved.

#### **3.0.4.3 Conclusion**

The applicant described the quality attributes of the programs and activities for managing aging effects for both SR and NSR SSCs within the scope of license renewal and stated that the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B quality assurance program provides "corrective actions," "confirmation processes," and "administrative controls." The staff concluded that the quality attributes of the applicant's AMPs, as described in the original LRA and ALRA Appendices A and B, are consistent with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). Therefore, the applicant's quality assurance description for its AMPs is acceptable.

### **3.1 Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems**

#### **3.1A NMP1 Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components and component groups associated with the following NMP1 systems:

- reactor pressure vessel
- reactor pressure vessel internals
- reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system
- reactor recirculation system
- control rod drive system

##### **3.1A.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.1, the applicant provided AMR results for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, "NMP1 Summary of Aging Management Programs for the Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems Evaluated in Chapter IV of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

##### **3.1A.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.1 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.1A.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.1A.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.1A.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.1A.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the UFSAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components.

Table 3.1A-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP1 components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.1, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.1A-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP1 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Reactor coolant pressure boundary components (Item Number 3.1.1.A-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.3, Metal Fatigue Analysis
Steam generator shell assembly (Item Number 3.1.1.A-02)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Isolation condenser (Item Number 3.1.1.A-03)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection; water chemistry	Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32), ASME Sections XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1), Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL with exception, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.2.2)



Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Pressure vessel ferritic materials that have a neutron fluence greater than $10^{17}$ n/cm <sup>2</sup> (E > 1 MeV) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-04)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with Appendix G of 10 CFR 50 and RG 1.99	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.2, Reactor Vessel Neutron Embrittlement Analysis
Reactor vessel beltline shell and welds (Item Number 3.1.1.A-05)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement	Reactor vessel surveillance	Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program (B2.1.19)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.2.3)
Westinghouse and B&W baffle/former bolts (Item Number 3.1.1.A-06)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Small-bore reactor coolant system and connected systems piping (Item Number 3.1.1.A-07)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, intergranular SCC, and thermal and mechanical loading	Inservice inspection; water chemistry; one-time inspection	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1); Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2); One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.2.4)
Jet pump sensing line, and reactor vessel flange leak detection line (Item Number 3.1.1.A-08)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), or cyclic loading	Plant-specific	ASME Sections XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1), Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.2.4)
Isolation condenser (Item Number 3.1.1.A-09)	Crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) or cyclic loading	Inservice inspection; water chemistry	ASME Sections XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1), Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.2.4)
Vessel shell (Item Number 3.1.1.A-10)	Crack growth due to cyclic loading	TLAA		Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Reactor internals (Item Number 3.1.1.A-11)	Changes in dimension due to void swelling	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
PWR core support pads, instrument tubes (bottom head penetrations), pressurizer spray heads, and nozzles for the steam generator instruments and drains (Item Number 3.1.1.A-12)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and/or primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) reactor coolant system piping (Item Number 3.1.1.A-13)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Pressurizer instrumentation penetrations and heater sheaths and sleeves made of Ni-alloys (Item Number 3.1.1.A-14)	Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts (Item Number 3.1.1.A-15)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IASCC	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts (Item Number 3.1.1.A-16)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Steam generator feedwater impingement plate and support (Item Number 3.1.1.A-17)	Loss of section thickness due to erosion	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
(Alloy 600) Steam generator tubes, repair sleeves, and plugs (Item Number 3.1.1.A-18)	Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC), and/or intergranular attack (IGA) or loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion, and fretting and wear; or deformation due to corrosion at tube support plate intersections	Steam generator tubing integrity; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Tube support lattice bars made of carbon steel (Item Number 3.1.1.A-19)	Loss of section thickness due to FAC	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Carbon steel tube support plate (Item Number 3.1.1.A-20)	Ligament cracking due to corrosion	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Steam generator feedwater inlet ring and supports (Item Number 3.1.1.A-21)	Loss of material due to flow-corrosion	Combustion engineering (CE) steam generator feedwater ring inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel closure studs and stud assembly (Item Number 3.1.1.A-22)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and/or IGSCC	Reactor head closure studs	Reactor Head Closure Studs Program (B2.1.3)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1.1)
CASS pump casing and valve body (Item Number 3.1.1.A-23)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging embrittlement	Inservice inspection	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1)
CASS piping (Item Number 3.1.1.A-24)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging embrittlement	Thermal aging embrittlement of CASS		Not applicable (CASS piping does not exist)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
BWR piping and fittings; steam generator components (Item Number 3.1.1.A-25)	Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (B2.1.9)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1)  Not applicable for steam generator components
Reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) valve closure bolting, manway and holding bolting, and closure bolting in high pressure and high temperature systems (Item Number 3.1.1.A-26)	Loss of material due to wear; loss of preload due to stress relaxation; crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and/or SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1)  Not applicable for pressurizer bolting
Feedwater and control rod drive (CRD) return line nozzles (Item Number 3.1.1.A-27)	Crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading	Feedwater nozzle; CRD return line nozzle	BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program (B2.1.5), BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program (B2.1.37)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1.6)
Vessel shell attachment welds (Item Number 3.1.1.A-28)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC	BWR vessel ID attachment welds; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds (B2.1.4)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1)
Nozzle safe ends, recirculation pump casing, connected systems piping and fittings, body and bonnet of valves (Item Number 3.1.1.A-29)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC	BWR stress corrosion cracking; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program (B2.1.6)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Sections 3.1A.2.1)
Penetrations (Item Number 3.1.1.A-30)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, cyclic loading	BWR penetrations; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8), BWR Penetrations Program (B2.1.6)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1.3)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Core shroud and core plate, support structure, top guide, core spray lines and spargers, jet pump assemblies, control rod drive housing, nuclear instrumentation guide tubes (Item Number 3.1.1.A-31)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, IASCC	BWR vessel internals; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1A.2.1)
Core shroud and core plate access hole cover (welded and mechanical covers) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-32)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, IASCC	ASME Section XI inservice inspection; water chemistry	BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8), Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL with exceptions (access hole cover does not exist in NMP1) (See Section 3.1A.2.1)
Jet pump assembly castings; orificed fuel support (Item Number 3.1.1.A-33)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement	Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement	BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8)	Consistent with GALL (See Section 3.1A.2.1.5)  Not applicable for jet pump components
Unclad top head and nozzles (Item Number 3.1.1.A-34)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable (NMP1 does not have unclad top head enclosure and nozzles)
CRD nozzle (Item Number 3.1.1.A-35)	Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC	Ni-alloy nozzles and penetrations; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel nozzles safe ends and CRD housing; reactor coolant system components (except CASS and bolting) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-36)	Crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading, and/or SCC and PWSCC	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel internals CASS components (Item Number 3.1.1.A-37)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging, neutron irradiation embrittlement, and void swelling	Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement		Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
External surfaces of carbon steel components in reactor coolant system pressure boundary (Item Number 3.1.1.A-38)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion		Not applicable, PWR only
Steam generator secondary manways and handholds (CS) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-39)	Loss of material due to erosion	Inservice inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor internals, reactor vessel closure studs, and core support pads (Item Number 3.1.1.A-40)	Loss of material due to wear	Inservice inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Pressurizer integral support (Item Number 3.1.1.A-41)	Crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading	Inservice inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Upper and lower internals assembly (Westinghouse) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-42)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Inservice inspection; loose part and/or neutron noise monitoring		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel internals in fuel zone region [except Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) baffle bolts] (Item Number 3.1.1.A-43)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement, and void swelling	PWR vessel internals; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Steam generator upper and lower heads; tubesheets; primary nozzles and safe ends (Item Number 3.1.1.A-44)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, PWSCC, IASCC	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Vessel internals (except Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-45)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IASCC	PWR vessel internals; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Reactor internals (B&W screws and bolts) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-46)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Inservice inspection; loose part monitoring		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel closure studs and stud assembly (Item Number 3.1.1.A-47)	Loss of material due to wear	Reactor head closure studs		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor internals (Westinghouse upper and lower internal assemblies; CE bolts and tie rods) (Item Number 3.1.1.A-48)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Inservice inspection; loose part monitoring		Not applicable, PWR only

The staff's review of the NMP1 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.1A.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.1A.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.1A.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.1A.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.1.2.A, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Reactor Head Closure Studs Program
- BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program
- BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program
- BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program
- BWR Penetrations Program
- BWR Vessel Internals Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program

- Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program
- BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.1.2.A-1 through 3.1.2.A-5, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The



staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different aging management program is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 5, 2006. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.1A.2.1.1 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC and/or IGSCC

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-22, the applicant stated that loss of material due to general corrosion of closure head studs and nuts will be managed using the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-22 applies to managing the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of cracking and requested that the applicant provide clarification

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant responded revising the ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-22 discussion column by deleting the reference to managing loss of material and crediting the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of crack initiation and growth due to SCC. The staff found this change consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable.

In its review the staff found that the applicant had addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism appropriately as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.1A.2.1.2 Loss of Material Due to Wear; Loss of Preload Due to Stress Relaxation; Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Cyclic Loading and/or SCC

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-26 the applicant stated that loss of material due to wear; loss of preload due to stress relaxation, crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and/or SCC of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) valve closure bolting, manway and holding bolting, and closure bolting in high-pressure and high-temperature systems will be managed using the Bolting Integrity Program. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant why Note E is used in ALRA Tables 3.1.2.A-3 and 3.1.2.A-5 when closure bolting will be managed with the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program.

In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that Note E in ALRA Tables 3.1.2.A-3 and 3.1.2.A-5 will be changed to Note B. The staff found this change consistent with GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

In its review the staff found that the applicant had addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism appropriately as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.1A.2.1.3 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC, IGSCC, and/or Cyclic Loading

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-30 the applicant stated that crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, and/or cyclic loading of penetrations will be managed using the Water Chemistry Control Program and BWR Vessel Internals Program. The applicant also stated that aging of the CRD stub tube penetrations is managed according to BWRVIP-47, "BWR Lower Plenum Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," of the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program and plant-specific commitments contained in the NRC safety evaluation dated March 25, 1987.

In RAI 3.1.2-1 dated January 13, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant address the difference between the alternative repair roll/expansion techniques and acceptable ASME Code weld repair methods for NMP1 CRD stub tube penetrations experiencing leakage.

In its response by letter dated February 14, 2005, the applicant stated, "NMP committed to implement a strategy whereby during the period of extended operation a leaking control rod drive (CRD) stub tube penetration would be roll repaired. If following the roll repair, this stub tube was to leak within acceptable limits, then a weld repair would be effected no later than one operating cycle following discovery of the leakage." In the original LRA, the applicant stated that it will follow the status of the proposed ASME Code change as to roll/expansion techniques of CRD stub tubes and will implement the final code change or provide an alternative plan for the NMP1 period of extended operation at least one year prior to the expiration of the current operating license (NMP1 Commitment 36).

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the wording in ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-1 and in the applicant's response to RAI 3.1.2-1 imply that NMP1 will operate with CRD stub tube leakage for one operating cycle (two years). The staff did not consider this implication acceptable for the period of extended operation. The safety evaluation dated March 25, 1987, allowing NMP1 to operate with CRD stub tube leakage was acceptable only as a temporary repair. Specifically, Item (6) of the staff's conclusions in the safety evaluation stated, "The proposed leakage criteria provides sufficient time to complete the final development of the prototype mechanical seal and associated tooling and investigate other methods such as weld repair."

In a-RAI 3.1.2-1 dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant justify the CRD stub tube leakage repair operation.

In its response by letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant stated that it had removed the statement of plant-specific commitments contained in the NRC safety evaluation dated March 25, 1987, and replaced it with the following statements:

If the 10/19/05 draft of Code Case N-730 is approved by the ASME, NMP1 will implement the final code case as conditioned by the NRC. If the code case is not approved by the ASME, NMP1 will seek NRC approval of the 10/19/05 code case draft on a plant specific basis as conditioned by the NRC.

During the period of extended operation, should a CRD stub tube rolled in accordance with the provisions of the code case resume leaking, NMP will implement one of the following zero leakage permanent repair strategies prior to startup from the outage in which the leakage was detected:

1. A welded repair consistent with BWRVIP-58-A, "BWRVIP Internal

Access Weld Repair” and Code Case N-606-1, as endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.147.

2. A variation of the welded repair geometry specified in BWRVIP-58-A subject to the approval of the NRC using Code Case N-606-1.
3. A future developed mechanical/welded repair method subject to the approval of the NRC.

The staff reviewed the applicant’s response and found it consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1, the applicant stated that crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, and/or cyclic loading of penetrations will be managed using the Water Chemistry Control Program, BWR Penetrations Program, and BWR Vessel Internals Program. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify which components were managed by its BWR Vessel Internals Program. The applicant responded that the component type penetrations discussed on ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 include the CRD stub tube and flux monitor penetrations covered by BWRVIP-47.

The staff noted that GALL AMP XI.M8, “BWR Penetration Program,” covers BWRVIP-27, which addresses the standby liquid control system nozzle or housing, and BWRVIP-49, which provides guidance for instrument penetrations. As documented in the audit and review, the applicant responded that the CRD stub tube and flux monitor penetrations are managed by BWRVIP-47, which is part of the BWR Vessel Internals Program. The applicant also responded that its Water Chemistry Control Program is applicable to all vessel penetrations; therefore, the line in the ALRA crediting the applicant’s BWR Vessel Internals Program also should include the applicant’s Water Chemistry Control Program.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant supplemented its ALRA with the following changes: (1) the discussion column for ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-30 was revised to add the flux monitor penetrations managed by the applicant’s BWR Vessel Internals Program; (2) the line item entry for the BWR Vessel Internals Program for penetrations in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 was revised to include the Water Chemistry Control Program. The staff reviewed the applicant’s response and found it consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable. Therefore, the staff’s concern described in a-RAI 3.1.2-1 is resolved.

In its review the staff found that the applicant had addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism appropriately as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.1A.2.1.4 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC, IGSCC and/or IASCC

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-31 the applicant stated that crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, and/or IASCC of the core shroud and core plate, support structure, top guide, core spray lines and spargers, control rod drive housing, and nuclear instrumentation guide tubes will be managed using the Water Chemistry Control Program and BWR Vessel Internals Program. As documented in the Audit and Review Report,

the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2, for example, the applicant's use of Note D, which is credited for the control rod guide tube (CRGT), is not appropriate when comparing CRGTs with the GALL Report and asked the applicant to clarify why Note D is used.

The applicant responded that Note D should be replaced with Note B. Note B is used because the applicant makes an exception for its Water Chemistry Control Program. The latest version of the water chemistry guidelines will be implemented in lieu of the guideline provided in BWRVIP-29 (TR-103515), "BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines - Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry." The staff found this implementation acceptable as consistent with the definition of Note B as identified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 95-10.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 the applicant stated that core shroud head bolts and collars will be managed by its BWR Vessel Internals Program with Note D. The staff review found no specific BWR Vessel Internals Program report for this component type. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to provide additional information as to how its BWR Vessel Internals Program will manage this item along with details of how the applicant inspects core shroud head bolts based on operating experience. The applicant explained that its BWR Vessel Internals Program manages aging of core shroud head bolts and collars. The applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program includes inspection of NSR components that could impact plant operations. These inspections rely heavily on industry operating experience and such vendor information as GE Nuclear Energy SILs. Based on industry operating experience (SIL 433 and SIL 433 Supplement 1) the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program includes a UT inspection program for the shroud head bolts and collars susceptible to IGSCC. Additionally, plant-specific operating experience (SIL 554) already has found evidence of fretting wear of the locking pins and improperly locked shroud head bolts. For these reasons the applicant implemented its BWR Vessel Internals Program to manage aging of core shroud head bolts and collars. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's program basis document and determined that aging of core shroud head bolts and collars is adequately managed using the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 the applicant credited its BWR Vessel Internals Program for managing aging of the liquid poison spray line and sparger. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that there was no specific BWRVIP report for this component type and asked the applicant to clarify how BWRVIP manages the item with no report for it.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant stated that BWRVIP-27, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Standby Liquid Control System/Core Plate  $\Delta P$  Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," and BWRVIP-47-A, "BWR Lower Plenum Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," are in the basis documents for management of spray line and sparger aging. The basis for BWRVIP-27 aging management is that the spray line connection to the vessel requires inspection while the sparger does not. Both components, however, fall within BWRVIP-47-A baseline requirements. BWRVIP-47-A requires baseline inspection of all components located below the core plate when access is provided. In addition the NRC approval letter of BWRVIP-47-A required at a minimum visual inspection of 5 percent of all welds or components within the first six years of the period, including the liquid poison line and sparger below the core plates. The staff found this basis consistent with the recommendation of the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

In its review the staff found that the applicant had addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism appropriately as recommended by the GALL Report.

### 3.1A.2.1.5 Loss of Fracture Toughness Due to Thermal Aging and Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-33 the applicant stated that this item is not applicable for the jet pump components as NMP1 has no jet pumps. Aging management of the orificed fuel supports is conducted according to BWRVIP-47 using GALL AMP XI.M9, "BWR Vessel Internals Program."

The GALL Report recommends GALL AMP XI.M13, "Thermal Aging and Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement," to manage the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging and neutron embrittlement. In a letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant revised its AMP B2.1.8, "BWR Vessel Internals Program," to address the management of loss of fracture toughness due to neutron fluence and thermal embrittlement for CASS components. The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.6. The staff found the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program acceptable for managing the loss of fracture toughness because the applicant stated that it will meet the GALL AMP XI.M13 recommendations.

In its review the staff found that the applicant had addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism appropriately as recommended by the GALL Report.

### 3.1A.2.1.6 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Cyclic Loading

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-27 the applicant stated that NMP1 manages aging of feedwater nozzles with the BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program, consistently with GALL AMP XI.M5, "Feedwater Nozzle." The applicant also stated that GALL AMP XI.M5 is credited with managing cracking of feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves due to SCC. The absence of nozzle cracking proves that the thermal sleeve intended function is not degraded. In addition the applicant stated that for CRDRL nozzles NMP1 manages aging with the BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program, which is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M6, "BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle." The applicant also credited GALL AMP XI.M6 with managing CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves cracking due to SCC. The applicant stated that the absence of nozzle cracking proves that the thermal sleeve intended function is not degraded. In a letter dated September 15, 2005, the applicant stated that its BWR Feedwater Nozzle and BWR CRDRL Nozzle Programs had been removed as the programs credited for the feedwater nozzle and CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to address the aging management for the thermal sleeves. In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant responded that it will use inspections performed under the BWR Vessel Internals Program using surrogate components more readily accessible for examination. For NMP1 the surrogate components will be the feedwater sparger end bracket welds. In this letter the applicant also provided its basis for choosing the feedwater sparger end bracket welds:

The NMP1 feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves are fabricated from nickel-based Alloy 600 (Inconel 600). A full penetration weld joins the thermal sleeve to the outboard end of the carbon steel feedwater sparger. This weld was made with Alloy 82 and Alloy 182 weld fillers. The thermal-sleeve to sparger weld, or the heat affected zone in the Alloy 600 base material, is considered the most likely location for IGSCC in the thermal sleeve.

The applicant added that each feedwater sparger is supported by end brackets which provide a spring force that helps hold the thermal sleeve in place. The feedwater sparger end bracket welds consist of three welds, the sparger arm to sparger end plate welds (Weld #1), sparger end plate to bracket end plate weld (Weld #2), and the sparger bracket end plate to end bracket assembly welds (Weld #3), which are dissimilar metal welds that use Alloy 182 or 82 weld fillers.

In addition the applicant stated that SCC of the feedwater thermal sleeves or the associated welds is possible but is considered less likely than for other welds with the same weld filler as the feedwater sparger because the inconel-to-carbon steel welds are heat-treated shop welds and not creviced. Service experience has demonstrated that Alloy 82 is resistant to IGSCC in BWR coolant. Alloy 182 is less resistant to IGSCC than Alloy 82 but has performed acceptably with aggravating factors like lack of fusion or a creviced condition. These conditions are more likely in field welds. The Alloy 600-to-carbon steel welds in the thermal sleeve are full-penetration welds and do not create a creviced condition. Additionally, the thermal sleeve assembly was heat-treated after welding. The #1 end bracket welds use Alloy 182 filler metal in a mildly creviced condition, making them more susceptible to IGSCC than the thermal sleeve-to-sparger welds. Additionally, the #1 welds are exposed on the outer diameter to reactor coolant chemistry which has a higher ECP and thus is more likely to cause IGSCC than feedwater, which has a much lower ECP. Therefore, the applicant stated, if cracking is not found in the #1 welds inspection of the thermal sleeve-to-sparger welds is not necessary.

Furthermore, the applicant stated that the most susceptible of the three feedwater sparger end bracket welds (Weld #2) are subject to EVT-1 under BWRVIP. If cracking is found in these welds the other end bracket welds (#1 and #3) are inspected. If cracking is found in the less susceptible end bracket welds the necessity to inspect the thermal sleeve-to-sparger welds will be evaluated. The applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program will, therefore, be credited with managing cracking of the thermal sleeve as the susceptibility of the critical thermal sleeve weld to IGSCC is bounded by other welds inspected under the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant revised the ALRA to add an EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 feedwater sparger brackets as an enhancement to the BWR Vessel Internals Program to address this issue. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable because the applicant demonstrated that inspection of surrogate components bounds the feedwater thermal sleeve.

In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant also provided operating experience to address the CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves as follows:

The inspections of the CRDRL nozzle and safe-ends in 1978 identified IGSCC cracking of the safe-end material, but did not identify fatigue-related cracking. The CRDRL safe-end and the thermal sleeve were replaced in 1978 with design changes to improve resistance to both IGSCC and fatigue. The replacement thermal sleeve material is IGSCC resistant low carbon Type 316L stainless steel material. The thermal sleeve is welded to the safe-end with low carbon Type 308L weld filler. To reduce the probability of fatigue, the thermal sleeve pipe protrudes 7 inches out from the flow shield which promotes mixing away from the vessel wall thus preventing thermal cycling at the vessel wall and at the flow shield.

The applicant stated that as a result of industry operating experience from 2002 and 2003 it completed detailed thermal fatigue assessments and augmented inspections of the safe-end,

the thermal sleeve attachment weld to the safe-end, and the thermal sleeve weld to the flow shield. These inspections were performed in 2004 and 2005. The inspections to date have detected no IGSCC or thermal fatigue-related cracking. Because the 2003 operating experience identified cracking of the thermal shield flow baffle on the thermal shield additional EVT-1s of the thermal shield to flow shield weld from the vessel ID are planned for 2007 and at a 10-year frequency thereafter consistent with the ISI inspection interval. This EVT-1 examination of the CRDRL thermal sleeve flow shield weld visible from the vessel ID during each ISI interval is consistent with the frequency adopted for the feedwater nozzle surrogate weld location on the feedwater end brackets.

In addition the applicant stated that a one-time UT of the CRDRL safe-end base metal was performed in 2004 under the NMP augmented ISI program 26 years of operation after the 1978 replacement (three outages prior to the license renewal term). This inspection detected no IGSCC or thermal fatigue cracking of the safe-end location. The inspection was a manual performance demonstration initiative (PDI) qualified inspection and the PDI mockup included the thermal sleeve attachment weld to the safe-end. The exam records note the presence of the thermal sleeve attachment weld. This exam is considered sufficient to detect significant circumferential IGSCC cracking of the thermal sleeve at the thermal sleeve attachment weld; however, consistent with the surrogate weld inspection methodology employed for the feedwater nozzle thermal sleeve, the EVT-1 inspection of the thermal sleeve flow shield weld also will be used as a surrogate weld inspection location for the thermal sleeve to safe-end attachment weld.

In addition to the inspections, the applicant added, temperature monitoring for thermal cycling was performed to confirm that the CRD return flow rates were sufficient at NMP1 to ensure that no unstable thermal cycling from hot reactor water return flow occurs at NMP1. The testing and analyses confirmed the sufficiency of the CRD return flow for stable return line conditions with no reverse flow,

The overall assessment, according to the applicant, was that the safe-end and thermal sleeve replacement with IGSCC-resistant materials and the one-time UT of the thermal sleeve attachment weld after 26 years confirms that the thermal sleeve attachment weld is not a high-risk IGSCC location. In addition the thermal monitoring of this location and the inspection after 26 years of operation also confirmed that no high-cycle thermal fatigue conditions at this location could create high thermal cycle fatigue-related cracking.

Furthermore, the applicant continued, the analyses and one-time inspections in 2004-2005 are adequate to detect potential cracking from either IGSCC or fatigue of the CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeve to safe-end attachment weld. Even though IGSCC is considered a low probability for this location because of the materials of construction the BWRVIP program will include an enhancement starting in 2007. An EVT-1 inspection of the thermal shield to flow shield weld from the vessel ID will be performed at that time and at a 10-year frequency consistently with the ISI interval.

The applicant also stated that in addition to the condition of the flow shield weld this EVT-1 inspection of the thermal sleeve flow shield weld will be a surrogate inspection of the thermal sleeve to the safe-end attachment weld. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant revised its ALRA as follows:

1. ALRA Sections A1.1.12, A1.4, and B2.1.8 were revised to incorporate the

commitment [NMP1 Commitment 40] to perform the EVT-1 inspection of the thermal shield to flow shield weld starting in 2007 and proceeding at a 10-year frequency consistent with the ISI inspection interval thereafter.

2. ALRA Table 3.1.1.A-1, Item 3.1.1.A-27 and ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 were revised to reflect the changes.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable as the applicant's surrogate weld inspection, in addition to the results of its one-time inspections in 2004 to 2005, provide adequate aging management for the CRDRL thermal sleeve.

In its review the staff found that the applicant had addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism appropriately for NMP1 CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves to meet the recommendation of the GALL Report.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### ***3.1A.2.2 AMR Results That are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.1.2.C of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management, for NMPNS, as recommended by the GALL Report for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion
- loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement
- crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or stress corrosion cracking
- crack growth due to cyclic loading
- changes in dimension due to void swelling
- crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking or primary water stress corrosion cracking
- crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking or irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking
- loss of preload due to stress relaxation



- loss of section thickness due to erosion
- crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or intergranular attack or loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion or loss of section thickness due to fretting and wear or denting due to corrosion of carbon steel tube support plate
- loss of section thickness due to flow-accelerated corrosion
- ligament cracking due to corrosion
- loss of material due to flow-accelerated corrosion

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.1A.2.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In Section 3.1.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that on ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 fatigue damage of CRD assemblies (including drive mechanism and housing) will be managed through the TLAA but in ALRA Sections B.2.1-8 the applicant stated that there were no TLAA's. The staff asked the applicant to explain how the specified components are managed for NMP1. The applicant responded that the only reactor vessel internals components for NMP1 with calculations or analyses meeting TLAA criteria are the core shroud tie rod assemblies, the clamps, and the CRD assemblies (including drive mechanism and housing). The tie rod assemblies and clamps are repairs for horizontal and vertical core shroud welds which had ASME III-type stress and fatigue analyses performed during the design process. The pressure boundary portion of the CRD assemblies was evaluated for fatigue. A cumulative usage factor was determined for the CRD penetration including the stub tube, CRD housing, and the stub tube-to-vessel weld and housing-to-stub tube weld. The AMR for the stub tube is addressed in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A. The applicant also responded that for reactor vessel internals components where there is no analysis meeting TLAA criteria the AMP column of ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 will be modified to replace "TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)" with "None." A plant-specific note referencing the relevant BWRVIP inspection and evaluation guideline or other basis for not managing fatigue will be added to ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 for each component with "None" in the AMP column for the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of cumulative fatigue damage or where the TLAA is applicable only to a subset of the component type.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant responded by revising ALRA Tables 3.1.2.A-2 and 3.1.2.B-2 to address this issue. The staff determined that a high cumulative fatigue usage factor indicates a high potential for crack initiation. Although the applicant's response removed the aging effect of cumulative fatigue damage for those components identified in the December 1, 2005 letter the aging effect of cracking is adequately

managed through other AMPs.

The staff reviewed the response and found the applicant's action consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable.

#### 3.1A.2.2.2 Loss of Material Due to Pitting and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.2.

In Section 3.1.2.C.2 of a letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material of isolation condenser components due to general pitting and crevice corrosion.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.2.2 states that loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion could occur in BWR isolation condenser components. The existing program relies on control of reactor water chemistry to mitigate corrosion and on ASME Sections XI ISI. However, the existing program should be augmented to detect loss of material due to pitting or crevice corrosion. The GALL Report recommends an augmented program to include temperature and radioactivity monitoring of the shell-side water and eddy current testing of tubes to ensure that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

The applicant stated in Sections 3.1.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that NMP1 has emergency (isolation) condensers (ECs). The design of the emergency condensers features end bells welded to the EC shell that are not designed to be removed; therefore, eddy current testing of the tubing is not possible. Loss of material is managed by a combination of several programs. The Water Chemistry Control Program controls chemical contaminants in both the tube and shell side water to prevent conditions that would promote pitting and crevice corrosion. The EC tube side, which is ASME Class 2, is subject to a system inservice pressure test under the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program. The pressure test would detect a tube leak caused by pitting or crevice corrosion. The EC shell is ASME Class 3 and subject to a functional test under the applicant's Inservice Pressure Testing Program, which is part of its ASME Sections XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program. The functional test would detect loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion if the corrosion caused a through-wall leak of the EC shell.

In Sections 3.1.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for additional verification that a tube leak does not exist NMP1 will implement an online tube leakage test. The test will be performed by isolating the makeup and drain valves to the emergency condenser tube side and monitoring the shell side level for 24 to 48 hours for any increase in water level on the shell side indicating tube leakage. The online test will be incorporated as a new activity in the Preventive Maintenance Program and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

The staff's review and evaluations of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and ASME Sections XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI and Preventive Maintenance Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2, 3.0.3.2.1, and 3.0.3.3.1, respectively.

The applicant further stated in Section 3.1.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that its Preventive Maintenance Program is also credited for managing loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion because it includes the temperature monitoring of the emergency cooling

system including the heat exchangers. Continuous radiation monitoring of the EC shell side vents also would indicate a tube leak.

In addition in Section 3.1.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that because none of the activities would detect loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion before a leak occurred these activities will be supplemented by a visual inspection for cracking and loss of material of the accessible outer surfaces of the peripheral tubes, tube sheet, and emergency condenser shell. This activity also will be incorporated into the applicant's Preventive Maintenance Program.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18, 2006, the staff noted that inaccessibility alone cannot justify exemption from inspection where required for aging management and operating experience (documented in IEB 76-01, "BWR Isolation Condenser Tube Failure") indicates tube cracking as an issue. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to provide additional justification addressing this issue. The applicant responded that the aging management activities provide adequate assurance with no need for eddy current testing that any tube degradation in the isolation condensers will not lead to a loss of intended function. These activities include water chemistry control, temperature monitoring of the shell side and tube side water, continuous radioactivity monitoring of the condenser vent line, periodic performance testing, and a future on-line tube leakage test. NMP1 has experienced tube leakage previously and replaced the whole tube bundle with upgraded material in 1997. A keep-fill modification also was installed to eliminate the stressor which caused the tube failures. Therefore, the applicant continued because the original isolation condenser tubes lasted 28 years with an aging stressor the new tubes are expected to perform their intended function through the period of extended operation with improved material and upgraded system design and monitoring.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18, 2006, the staff during its audits in the week of September 19, 2005, asked the applicant to provide its basis for not performing eddy current testing. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant provided its basis as follows:

- 1) Condition and stresses that are precursors to SCC of tubes have been eliminated by:
  - a) Lowering temperature of the tubes primary and shell side water
  - b) Maintaining shell side water chemistry
  - c) Maintaining BWR primary water chemistry
- 2) The susceptibility of the tubes to SCC has been improved by design changes to:
  - a) Replace the tube bundle material with Type 316 stainless steel (low carbon)
  - b) Install a keep fill system to maintain steam water interface above top of tube bundle (no thermal cycles)
- 3) Monitoring and detection of conditions in the steam inlet (tube side) and shell side of the Isolation condensers ensures conditions will not re-occur.
  - a) Water temperature
  - b) Water chemistry (conductively, chloride, nitrates, sulfates)
- 4) A commitment has been made to perform a tube leak test at operating pressure

to detect small leaks (NMP1 Commitment 29 and NMP2 Commitment 27).

The staff reviewed the applicant's nuclear commitment tracking list to confirm that the online tube leakage test will be implemented as a new activity in the Preventive Maintenance Program as indicated in Commitment 29 of ALRA Sections A1.4. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and determined that NMP1 isolation condenser tube aging is adequately managed and that the tubes will be able to perform their intended function for at least an additional 32 years to the end of the period of extended operation.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.1.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.1A.2.2.3 Loss of Fracture Toughness due to Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3.

In Section 3.1.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement of the reactor vessel.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3 states that certain aspects of neutron irradiation embrittlement are TLAAs as defined in 10 CFR 54.3 and that TLAAs must be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.2 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLA.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3 states that a loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement could occur in the reactor vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program monitors neutron irradiation embrittlement of the reactor vessel.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant stated that loss of fracture toughness of vessel shells (beltline, lower shell, upper nozzle shell and upper RPV shell, and vessel shell welds including attachment welds) will be managed using its Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify which areas have neutron fluence exceeding  $1\text{E}17 \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1\text{MeV}$ ).

The applicant responded that vessel shells - beltline and vessel shells - lower and the beltline welds have a neutron fluence exceeding  $1\text{E}17 \text{ n/cm}^2$ . Aging of these components is managed by the applicant's Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. The component type, attachment welds, does not need to be managed by the applicant's Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program because even though these welds receive a neutron fluence greater than or equal to  $1\text{E}17 \text{ n/cm}^2$  they are not ferritic material. The applicant modified ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 to reflect those components managed through its Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. The staff found this management consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable. In a letter dated

December 1, 2005, the applicant revised its ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 to address this issue. The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.16.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3. For those line items that apply to Section 3.1.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.1A.2.2.4 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Thermal and Mechanical Loading or Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.

In Section 3.1.2.C.4 of a letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) that could occur in small-bore reactor coolant systems and connected system piping less than nominal pipe size (NPS) 4.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4 states that crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) could occur in small-bore reactor coolant systems and connected system piping less than NPS 4. The existing program relies on ASME Section XI ISI and on control of water chemistry to mitigate SCC. The GALL Report recommends that a plant-specific destructive examination or a nondestructive examination (NDE) that permits inspection of the inside surfaces of the piping be conducted to ensure that cracking has not occurred and that the component intended function will be maintained during the extended period. The AMPs should be augmented to verify that service-induced weld cracking is not occurring in the small-bore piping less than NPS 4 including pipe, fittings, and branch connections. A one-time inspection of a sample of locations is an acceptable method to ensure that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism is not occurring and that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

In the ALRA the applicant also stated that for NMP1 aging of the subject small-bore piping is managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program, Water Chemistry Control Program, and One-Time Inspection Program.

Additionally, the applicant stated in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for small-bore piping and fittings in the NMP1 CRD system not part of its ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program, it credits only its Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs for aging management.

The applicant further stated in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for the small-bore piping whether included in its ASME Sections XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program or not the inspections conducted under its One-Time Inspection Program will consist of either NDEs using methods with demonstrated capability to detect cracks on the inside surfaces of the piping or destructive examinations. Both nondestructive and destructive

examinations will be of a sample of the piping.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-5 the applicant stated that aging of CASS valves will be managed using its ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The intended functions of the CASS valve are leakage boundary (spatial) (LBS) and structural integrity attached (SIA). As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that LBS and SIA apply only to NSR components. The applicant was informed and replied that its statement was an editorial mistake. The applicant revised ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-5 to assign its ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs to manage aging of the pressure boundary valves and its One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs to manage aging of the LBS and SIA valves. In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant revised ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-5 to address this issue. The staff found this revision consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's ASME Sections XI (Subsection IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.1, 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

In addition the staff reviewed ALRA Sections 3.1.2.C.4 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.2.

Also in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) that could occur in BWR vessel flange leak detection lines and BWR jet pump sensing lines.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4 also states that crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) could occur in the BWR vessel flange leak detection line and the BWR jet pump sensing line. The GALL Report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated to mitigate or detect crack initiation and growth due to SCC of vessel flange leak detection lines.

The applicant stated in the letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP1 cracking of the vessel flange leak detection lines is managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program, One-Time Inspection Program, and Water Chemistry Control Program. The inspections conducted under the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program consist of either NDEs using methods with a demonstrated capability to detect cracks on the inside surfaces of the piping or destructive examinations. Both nondestructive and destructive examinations will be of a sample of the piping. A portion of the NMP2 vessel flange leak detection line is carbon steel not subject to cracking. The applicant stated that loss of material of the carbon steel portion is managed by its Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

The applicant also stated in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that NMP1 has no jet pump sensing line; therefore, the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of jet pump sensing lines cracking is not applicable to NMP.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A.1, the applicant stated that aging of wrought austenitic stainless steel (WASS) valves will be managed by its ASME Section XI (Subsection IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The intended functions of the component are LBS and SIA associated with NSR components. As documented in the Audit

and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to explain why NSR components are managed by ASME ISI and why ALRA Table 3.1.1.A, Item 3.1.1.A-08 was determined to belong to this component type if it is NSR. The applicant stated that small-bore valves associated with the vessel flange leak detection lines are NSR for NMP1. These lines/valves are, however, SR for NMP2 with an ISI pressure test performed on these lines when there is an RFO; hence, WASS valves are managed by the applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program. The staff found this management acceptable as consistent with the GALL Report.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.1, 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

In addition the staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.1.2.C.4 against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.3.

Also in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of the letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) that could occur in BWR isolation condenser components. SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.3 states that crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) could occur in BWR isolation condenser components. The program relies on control of reactor water chemistry to mitigate SCC and on ASME Section XI ISI; however, the program should be augmented to detect cracking due to SCC or cyclic loading. The GALL Report recommends an augmented program to include temperature and radioactivity monitoring of the shell-side water and eddy current testing of tubes to ensure that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

The applicant stated in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that NMP1 has ECs. The EC design features end bells welded to the EC shell not designed to be removed; therefore, eddy current testing of the tubing is not possible. Cracking is managed by several programs. The Water Chemistry Control Program controls chemical contaminants in both tube and shell side water to prevent conditions that would promote cracking. The EC tube side, which is ASME Class 2, is subject to a system inservice pressure test under the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program. The pressure test detects tube leaks caused by cracking. The EC shell is ASME Class 3 and subject to a functional test under the applicant's Inservice Pressure Testing Program which is part of its ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program. The functional test would detect cracking due to SCC or cyclic loading if the crack caused a through-wall leak of the EC shell.

In Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for additional confirmation of no tube leaks NMP1 will implement an online tube leakage test. The test will isolate the makeup and drain valves to the EC tube side and monitor the shell side water level for 24 to 48 hours. A water level rise on the shell side during the test would indicate tube leakage. The online test will be incorporated as a new activity in the Preventive Maintenance Program. The new activity will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

In addition the applicant stated in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that its Preventive Maintenance Program is also credited for detecting cracking because it includes the temperature monitoring of the emergency cooling system including the heat exchangers. Temperature monitoring can indicate tube leaks quickly. Continuous radiation monitoring of the

EC shell side vents also would detect a tube leak.

In Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that because none of these activities would detect crack initiation or SCC before a leak occurred they will be supplemented by a visual inspection for cracking from the accessible outer surfaces of the peripheral tubes, tube sheet, and EC shell. This inspection also will be incorporated into the applicant's Preventive Maintenance Program.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control, ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, and Preventive Maintenance Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2, 3.0.3.2.1 and 3.0.3.3.1, respectively.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18, 2006, the staff noted that inaccessibility alone cannot justify exemption from inspection required for aging management and operating experience (documented in Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) 76-01, "BWR Isolation Condenser Tube Failure") indicates cracking as an issue. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to provide additional justification to address this issue. The applicant responded that the aging management activities provide adequate assurance with no need for eddy current testing that any tube degradation in the isolation condensers will not lead to a loss of intended function. These activities include water chemistry control, temperature monitoring of the shell side and tube side water, continuous radioactivity monitoring of the condenser vent line, periodic performance testing, and a future on-line tube leakage test. NMP1 experienced tube leakage previously and replaced the whole tube bundle with upgraded material in 1997. A keep fill modification also was installed to eliminate the stressor which caused the tube failures. Therefore, the applicant continued in response, because the original isolation condenser tubes lasted 28 years with an aging stressor the new tubes are expected to perform their intended function through the period of extended operation with improved material, upgraded system design, and monitoring.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report dated January 18, 2006, the staff asked the applicant during its audits in the week of September 19, 2005, to provide its basis for not performing eddy current testing. In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant provided its basis:

- 1) Condition and stresses that are precursors to SCC of tubes have been eliminated by:
  - a) Lowering temperature of the tubes primary and shell side water
  - b) Maintaining shell side water chemistry
  - c) Maintaining BWR primary water chemistry
- 2) The susceptibility of the tubes to SCC has been improved by design changes to:
  - a) Replace the tube bundle material with Type 316 stainless steel (low carbon)
  - b) Install a keep fill system to maintain steam water interface above top of tube bundle (no thermal cycles)
- 3) Monitoring and detecting in the steam inlet (tube) side and shell side of the isolation condensers ensure that conditions will not recur



- a) Water temperature
  - b) Water chemistry (conductivity, chloride, nitrates, sulfates)
- 4) A commitment has been made to perform a tube leak test at operating pressure to detect small leaks.

The staff reviewed the applicant's nuclear commitment tracking list to confirm that the online tube leakage test will be implemented as a new activity in the Preventive Maintenance Program as stated in NMP1 Commitment 29 and NMP2 Commitment 27. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and determined that NMP1 isolation condenser tube aging is adequately managed and that the tubes will be able to perform their intended function at least an additional 32 years to the end of the period of extended operation.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4. For those line items that apply to Section 3.1.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.1A.2.2.5 Crack Growth due to Cyclic Loading (NMP1)

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.5.

In Section 3.1.2.C.5 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.5 states that crack growth due to cyclic loading could occur in the reactor vessel shell and the reactor coolant system piping and fittings. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

#### 3.1A.2.2.6 Changes in Dimension due to Void Swelling

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.6 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.6.

In Section 3.1.2.C.6 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.6 states that changes in dimension due to void swelling could occur in reactor internal components. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

#### 3.1A.2.2.7 Crack Initiation and Growth due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Primary Water

## Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.7.

In Section 3.1.2.C.7 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.7 states that crack initiation and growth due to SCC and PWSCC could occur: (1) in PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs), instrument tubes (bottom head penetrations), pressurizer spray heads, and nozzles for the steam generator instruments and drains; (2) in PWR CASS reactor coolant system piping and fittings and pressurizer surge line nozzles; and (3) in PWR pressurizer instrumentation penetrations and heater sheaths and sleeves made of Ni alloys. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

### 3.1A.2.2.8 Crack Initiation and Growth due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.8 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.8.

In Section 3.1.2.C.8 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.8 states that crack initiation and growth due to SCC or IASCC could occur in baffle/former bolts in Westinghouse and B&W reactors. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

### 3.1A.2.2.9 Loss of Preload due to Stress Relaxation

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.9 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.9.

In Section 3.1.2.C.9 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.9 states that loss of preload due to stress relaxation could occur in baffle/former bolts in Westinghouse and B&W reactors. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

### 3.1A.2.2.10 Loss of Section Thickness due to Erosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.10 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against

the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.10.

In Section 3.1.2.C.10 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.10 states that loss of section thickness due to erosion could occur in steam generator feedwater impingement plates and supports. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

#### 3.1A.2.2.11 Crack Initiation and Growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or Intergranular Attack or Loss of Material due to Wastage and Pitting Corrosion or Loss of Section Thickness due to Fretting and Wear or Denting due to Corrosion of Carbon Steel Tube Support Plate

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.11 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.11.

In Section 3.1.2.C.11 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.11 states that crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or IGA or loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion or deformation due to corrosion could occur in alloy 600 components of the steam generator tubes, repair sleeves and plugs. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

#### 3.1A.2.2.12 Loss of Section Thickness due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.12 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.12.

In Section 3.1.2.C.12 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.12 states that loss of section thickness due to flow-accelerated corrosion could occur in tube support lattice bars made of carbon steel. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

#### 3.1A.2.2.13 Ligament Cracking due to Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.13 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.13.

In Section 3.1.2.C.13 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.13 states that ligament cracking due to corrosion could occur in carbon steel components in the steam generator tube support plate. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

#### 3.1A.2.2.14 Loss of Material due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.14 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.14.

In Section 3.1.2.C.14 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.14 states that loss of material due to flow-accelerated corrosion could occur in feedwater inlet ring and supports. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP1.

### 3.1A.2.2.15 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 provides the staff's evaluation of the applicant's quality assurance program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.1A.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.1.2.A-1 through 3.1.2.A-5, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.1.2.A-1 through 3.1.2.A-5, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and AERM does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

The staff's review as provided in the following sections of this safety evaluation is limited to those components not consistent with or not addressed in the GALL Report for the following systems in the NMP1 reactor coolant system (RCS) group, the RPV, RPV internals, RPV instrumentation system, and CRD system. The assessment for the NMP1 RPV valves, reactor recirculation system components, and the CRD system valves are addressed in SER Sections 3.1A.2.3.4.

### 3.1A.2.3.1 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP1 Reactor Pressure Vessel – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1

The NMP1 RPV contains and supports the reactor core, reactor internals, and the reactor coolant/moderator. The RPV forms part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and serves as a barrier against leakage of radioactive materials to the drywell. The NMP1 RPV is a vertical, cylindrical pressure vessel with hemispherical heads. The cylindrical shell and hemispherical heads are fabricated from low-alloy carbon steel clad on the interior with stainless steel weld overlay. The top head secured to the vessel with studs and nuts includes two concentric seal-rings between the vessel head flange and the vessel flange to prevent reactor coolant leakage. The top head leak detection line taps off of the vessel head between the seal rings to detect leakage if the inner seal-ring fails. The top head also includes nine safety valves that prevent overpressurization of the RPV. The vessel shell and bottom head include penetration nozzles for the various systems that comprise the RCPB including CRD housing and in-core instrumentation thimbles. The RPV is supported by a steel skirt welded to the bottom head. The base of the skirt is supported circumferentially by a ring girder and sole plate fastened to a concrete foundation which carries the load of the reactor building foundation slab.

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the RPV components are given in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1. The specific RPV components for NMP1 that have AMR results not consistent with or not addressed in the GALL Report and within the scope of ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 include:

- RPV core differential pressure, CRD stub tube, flux monitor, instrumentation, and vessel drain penetrations
- RPV support skirt and attachment welds
- RPV top head closure studs and nuts
- RPV valves

The applicant identified the materials of fabrication for these RPV components as carbon steel and low alloy steel. The applicant identified the environments for these RPV components as containment air, non-borated water, and treated water (including steam).

The applicant credits the FAC Program with managing loss of material for the RPV core differential pressure, CRD stub tube, flux monitor, instrumentation, and vessel drain penetrations. The ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program is credited for the managing loss of material for the RPV support skirt and attachment welds. The Water Chemistry Control Program and the One-Time Inspection Program are credited for managing the loss of material for the RPV valves. The applicant credits the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program with managing loss of material for the RPV top head closure studs and nuts. In addition, the applicant credits TLAA 4.3, "Thermal Fatigue," with managing cumulative fatigue damage of the RPV top head closure studs and nuts. The applicant credits the Selective Leaching of Materials Program and the Water Chemistry Control Program with managing loss of material for the CRD system valves.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the RPV component groups. The staff's assessment of the RPV components not consistent with or not addressed in the GALL Report for NMP1 is provided in

this section. The assessment for the NMP1 RPV valves is provided in SER Section 3.1A.2.3.4.

*RPV Core Differential Pressure, CRD Stub Tube, Flux Monitor, Instrumentation, and Vessel Drain Penetrations*

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant indicated that loss of material due to FAC is an aging effect for the core differential pressure, CRD stub tube, flux monitor, instrumentation, and vessel drain penetrations fabricated from carbon or low-alloy steel and exposed to a treated water or steam high-temperature environment.

FAC is a phenomenon in which repetitive cycles of corrosion and erosion cause wall thinning of carbon or low-alloy steel components exposed to high temperature, high velocity water or water-steam environments. Normally FAC occurs only if the environmental temperatures are above 200 °F. The rate of metal loss depends on a complex interplay of many factors like water chemistry, material composition, and hydrodynamics.

The staff determined that the applicant indicated adequately that loss of material due to FAC is an AERM for the core differential pressure, CRD stub tube, flux monitor, instrumentation, and vessel drain penetrations exposed to these environments. This aging effect is not addressed in the GALL Report Volume 2 for these components, materials, and environments; therefore, the staff found the applicant's approach acceptable because it is conservative relative to the GALL Report Volume 2 and is consistent with the EPRI Report, "Recommendations for an Effective Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program."

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant credits the FAC Program with aging management of the core differential pressure, CRD stub tube, flux monitor, instrumentation, and vessel drain penetrations for loss of material due to FAC. Even though the GALL Report Volume 2 does not address an AMP for these components, materials, and environments it does recommend crediting the Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program with managing wall thinning of carbon steel piping and fitting components due to FAC; therefore, the staff found the applicant's proposal conservative relative to the GALL Report Volume 2, and acceptable. The applicant's FAC Program is an AMP entirely consistent with GALL AMP XI.M17. The staff's evaluation of the FAC Program is in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.3.

*RPV Support Skirt and Attachment Welds*

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant indicated that loss of material due to general corrosion is an aging effect for RPV support skirt and attachment welds fabricated from carbon or low-alloy steel and exposed to an environment of "air with thermal fatigue." The applicant definition of "air with thermal fatigue" is "this environment is applied to components exposed to air, that are also subject to thermal cycles of sufficient magnitude for thermal fatigue to be a concern." The air environment is the containment air surrounding the RPV and the support skirt.

GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify loss of material due to general corrosion as an aging effect in carbon and low-alloy steel when these materials are exposed to an environment of containment air; however, carbon and low-alloy steel may rust or corrode in air with elevated humidity. The staff concluded that the applicant has addressed this issue conservatively; therefore, the staff found the applicant's identification of this AERM acceptable for the RPV support skirt and attachment welds.

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant credits the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program with aging management of the RPV support skirt and attachment welds for loss of material due to general corrosion. By letter dated November 22, 2005, the staff indicated that it agreed with the applicant in crediting the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program with managing the RPV attachment welds for loss of material due to general corrosion; however, the staff requested that the applicant address why the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program was credited with managing the RPV support skirt for loss of material due to general corrosion. Instead, the staff recommended that this aging effect in the RPV support skirt be managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program because the RPV support skirt is an ASME Class MC support. By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant revised Table 3.1.2.A-1 to indicate that the AERM of loss of material of the RPV support skirt would be managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program. The staff found the applicant's response acceptable because the RPV support skirt is an ASME Class MC component and, therefore, is managed appropriately by the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program.

GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify AMPs for managing loss of material due to general corrosion for these components, materials, and environments. The staff found the applicant's proposal conservative relative to the GALL Report Volume 2 and, therefore, acceptable. The applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program is an AMP consistent with GALL AMP XI.M1 with exceptions. The staff's evaluation of the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program is in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.1. The applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) Program is an AMP consistent with GALL AMP XI.S3 with exceptions. The staff's evaluation of the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.19.

#### *RPV Top Head Closure Studs and Nuts*

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant indicated that loss of material due to general, crevice, and pitting corrosion is an aging effect applicable to the RPV top head closure studs and nuts fabricated from carbon or low-alloy steel and exposed to an environment of non-borated water systems with operating temperatures equal to or greater than 212°F leaking fluid (i.e., leakage of the reactor coolant).

GALL Report Volume 2 identifies crack initiation and growth, SCC and IGSCC as aging effects for RPV top head closure studs and nuts fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel exposed to air, leaking reactor coolant water, or steam at 288°C but does not identify loss of material due to crevice, general, and pitting corrosion as aging effects in carbon and low-alloy steel exposed to leakage of the non-borated reactor coolant or the steam environment. However, carbon and low-alloy steel may rust or corrode when exposed to aqueous liquids. The staff concluded that the applicant has conservatively addressed this issue; therefore, the staff found the applicant's identification of this AERM acceptable.

Also in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant indicated that cumulative fatigue damage is an aging effect applicable to the RPV top head closure studs and nuts because of thermal cycling of heatup and cooldown and other transient operating conditions of these components. The staff found this indication acceptable because it meets the provisions in SRP-LR Chapter 3.1-1800 Revision 1 Report for assessing cumulative fatigue damage in ASME Code Class 1 components. SER Section 4.3 discusses the staff's assessment of those plant components required to have thermal fatigue analyses for license renewal.



*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 the applicant credits the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program with aging management of loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion of the RPV top head closure studs and nuts. Even though the GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify an AMP for these components, materials, and environments the staff found the applicant's proposal conservative relative to the GALL Report Volume 2 and, therefore, acceptable. The applicant's Reactor Head Closure Studs Program is an AMP consistent with an exception with GALL AMP XI.M3. The staff's evaluation of the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.3.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1, the applicant proposed in ALRA Section 4.3 to use the TLAA for assessing cumulative fatigue damage of the RPV top head closure studs and nuts. This proposal is consistent with the GALL Report Revision 1 and is, therefore, acceptable. The staff's evaluation of the applicant's TLAA on thermal fatigue of ASME Code Class 1 components is in SER Section 4.3.

### RPV Valves

The review of the RPV valves is provided in SER Section 3.1A.2.3.4.

Conclusion. The staff has reviewed the applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the RPV components exposed to the containment air, non-borated water, and treated water (including steam) environments. For these AMRs the staff has determined that the applicant has identified the aging effects applicable for these components exposed to these environments. The staff has also determined that the applicant has credited either an appropriate inspection-based AMP, an appropriate mitigation-based AMP, a TLAA, or combination of these strategies to manage the aging effects applicable to the RPV components exposed to these environments. On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concludes that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the NMP1 RPV will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.1A.2.3.2 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2

The NMP1 RPV internals support the core and other internal components, maintain fuel configuration (coolable geometry) during normal operation and accident conditions, and maintain reactor coolant flow through the core. The RPV internals consist of the components internal to the RPV, mainly the reactor core, core shroud, core shroud stabilizers, core shroud support structures, top guide, CRD guide tubes, feedwater sparger, core spray spargers, liquid poison sparger, steam separator assembly, and the steam dryer assembly. All of the RPV internals except the shroud support assembly and springs in the fuel assemblies are fabricated from stainless steel. The shroud support plates, spacers, tie rods, head bolts, and associated welds are fabricated from nickel-based alloys. The shroud support essentially sustains all of the vertical weight of the core structure and the steam separator assembly. Each guide tube with its fuel support casing bears the weight of four fuel assemblies and rests on a CRD housing welded to the stub tube mounted on the vessel bottom head.

The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the RPV internal components are in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2. The staff determined that no RPV internal components for NMP1 have

AMR results not consistent with or addressed in the GALL Report. Therefore, in this review the staff did not perform an evaluation of the NMP1 RPV internal components.

### 3.1A.2.3.3 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP1 Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-3

The NMP1 RPV instrumentation system monitors and transmits information about key RPV operating parameters during normal and emergency operations. Instrumentation is installed to monitor reactor parameters and indicate these on meters, chart recorders, and hydraulic indicator units located in the control room, on remote shutdown panels, and in instrument rooms. The parameters monitored are RPV temperature, water level and pressure, core differential pressure, core spray sparger break (differential pressure), and reactor safety valve position. This system also provides control signals to various systems which in turn initiate appropriate actions required if a monitored parameter exceeds a desired set point. Systems receiving control signals from the RPV instrumentation system include the reactor protection, automatic depressurization, anticipated transient without scram (ATWS), feedwater/high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), and shutdown cooling systems. The top head leak detection line is addressed with the RPV (ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.1). The RPV instrumentation system consists of piping, valves, and excess flow check valves that provide a fluid path from the RPV to various instrumentation.

The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the RPV instrumentation system components are in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-3. The staff determined that no RPV instrumentation system components for NMP1 have AMR results not consistent with or not addressed in the GALL Report. Therefore, in this review the staff did not perform an evaluation of the NMP1 RPV instrumentation system components.

### 3.1A.2.3.4 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP1 Reactor Recirculation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-4

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. The description of the reactor recirculation system, recirculation flow control, and the control of the reactor recirculation pumps can be found in ALRA Section 2.3.1.A.4. The portion of the reactor recirculation system containing components subject to AMR includes the entire main reactor recirculation flow path which begins at the suction nozzle to and ends at the discharge nozzle of each recirculation loop for NMP1. SR instrument piping and associated components connected to the recirculation loops are also subject to AMR. The component types requiring an AMR for the reactor recirculation system and their intended functions are shown in ALRA Table 2.3.1.A.4-1. The AMR results for these components are provided in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-4. However, the staff has used in its evaluation the following information provided in the original LRA pertinent to the reactor recirculation system.

The materials of construction for NMP1 are carbon or low-alloy steel (yield strength <100 Ksi and >100 Ksi), cast austenitic stainless steel, and wrought austenitic stainless steel.

In the original LRA Section 3.1.2.A.4 the applicant lists the following environments to which the NMP1 Reactor Recirculation System components are exposed:

- air

- closure bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures equal to or greater than 212 °F
- treated water, temperature < 140 °F, low flow
- treated water or steam, temperature > 482 °F
- treated water or steam, temperature > 482 °F, low flow

The following AMPs manage these aging effects in the NMP1 reactor recirculation system components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Bolting Integrity Program
- BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- System Walkdown Program

Staff Evaluation. The applicant described its AMR for the reactor recirculation system in ALRA Section 3.1. The staff reviewed this section to determine whether the applicant had identified all aging effects applicable to components in these systems and demonstrated that the effects of aging on the components will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions adequately describe them.

The applicant identified the following aging effects for the reactor recirculation system:

- cracking
- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of fracture toughness
- loss of material
- loss of preload

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-4 the applicant identified cracking and cumulative fatigue damage as aging effects applicable to the recirculation system closure bolting, piping and fittings, recirculation pumps, and valves. Cumulative fatigue damage is evaluated in SER Section 4.3, "Metal Fatigue Analysis." The aging effect of loss of fracture toughness is associated with the pressure boundary materials in reactor recirculation pumps and in valves made of cast austenitic stainless steel and operating at or above 480 °F. Loss of material has been detected as an aging effect in carbon or low-alloy steel and austenitic stainless steel with treated water environment operating below 140 °F for such components as piping and fittings, valves, and restriction orifices in the reactor recirculation system. The loss of preload is an aging effect applicable to closure bolting for non-borated water systems operating at or above 212 °F. The staff notes that this assessment is consistent with the GALL Report.

The applicant identified cracking as an aging effect applicable to the recirculation system austenitic stainless steel components (piping and fittings, tubing, valve bodies, flow elements, thermowells, restricting orifices) and to the high-strength low-alloy steel primary pressure closure bolting exposed to reactor coolant water. The applicant also identified this aging effect for cast stainless steel components exposed to reactor coolant water. The applicant identified crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading as an aging effect applicable

to small-bore stainless steel piping and fittings and low-alloy steel pressure boundary closure bolting in the reactor recirculation system. The staff notes that this assessment is consistent with the GALL Report. The staff requested confirmation that the applicant had no flaws evaluated according to IWB-3600, "Analytical Evaluation of Flaws," under the ASME Code Section XI ISI Program as such an evaluation would require a TLAA under the regulation. The applicant's response indicated that the NMP1 Reactor Recirculation System contains five welds that had flaw evaluations performed according to IWB-3600. Re-inspection of each weld found no growth of the indication. The applicant's evaluation determined that each of the indications was related to the fabrication of the component and was not caused by IGSCC. The staff previously had accepted the applicant's evaluation. Therefore, there is no TLAA required for any of the subject flaw evaluations.

The applicant stated under item number 3.1.1.A-07 in ALRA Table 3.1.1.A that for small-bore reactor coolant system and connected systems piping a plant-specific destructive examination or an NDE of the inside surfaces will be conducted as part of a one-time inspection to verify that service-induced weld cracking has not occurred. Additionally, for small bore piping and fittings in the NMP1 CRD system not part of the ISI program NMP1 credits only the Water Chemistry and One-Time Inspection Programs. The applicant's One-Time Inspection AMP is described in ALRA Section B.2.1.20 and the applicant states that it is consistent with GALL Report AMP XI.M32, "One-Time Inspection," with exceptions (see ALRA Sections B2.1.1 and B2.1.2). The exceptions to the GALL Report were found acceptable in previous NRC SERs.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-1 applicable to the vessel drain line the applicant identified cumulative fatigue damage and cracking as aging effects requiring management. The applicant uses TLAA to manage cumulative fatigue damage and the BWR Penetration Program and Water Chemistry Control Program to manage cracking. Because of the size of the drain line volumetric examination is not required by ASME Code Section XI. In response to the staff's request for information about the adequacy of the AMP applicable to the reactor vessel drain line not volumetrically examined the applicant stated that the ASME Section XI pressure test is performed at every refueling outage. As a function of the pressure test a concurrent VT-2 examination is performed according to acceptance standards stated in Subsection IWB-3522. The source of any leakage detected during this examination is required to be located and evaluated according to Subsection IWA-5250 prior to return of the system to service. One source of leakage could be through-wall pitting or crevice corrosion as the loss of material mechanism applicable to stainless steel piping and components. Also performed at every inspection interval under the ISI program according to the acceptance standards stated in Subsection IWB-3517 is a VT-1 examination of all reactor vessel drain line bolting, studs, and nuts. The staff considers the AMPs of the reactor vessel drain line effective for the period of extended operation.

In ALRA Table 3.1.1.A item number 3.1.1.A-09 the applicant identified SCC and cyclic loading as aging effects for isolation condensers and credits the Preventive Maintenance Program for managing them. The isolation condensers are parts of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and, therefore, should be inspected according to ASME Code Section XI. The Preventive Maintenance Program does not require volumetric examination for structural integrity of pressure boundary material or welds. In response to the staff's request for information on the management of aging effects of cracking in stainless steel tubes and in shell welds the applicant stated that ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) and the Water Chemistry Control Programs are credited in addition to the Preventive Maintenance Program for managing the aging effect of cracking in stainless steel tubes and in shell welds.

Continuous radiation monitoring of the isolation condenser shell also is credited. These changes utilize detection methods in addition to visual inspection to ensure detection and correction of aging degradation prior to a loss of intended function. These revisions to ALRA Table 3.1.1.A bring the credited programs in line with the guidance of GALL Report Item IV.C1.4-a for the NMP1 isolation condensers.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-4 the applicant identified loss of material as an aging effect applicable to carbon steel valves below 140 °F and cracking as an aging effect for wrought austenitic stainless and CASS valves exposed to reactor coolant water or oxygenated water with temperature equal to or greater than 482 °F. The applicant's identification of loss of material as an aging effect is appropriate as pitting and crevice corrosion in carbon steel and cracking in stainless steel are likely in the presence of a minute amount of chloride generally found in BWR water and in a humid air environment. For carbon steel valves the applicant has proposed to manage the aging effect of loss of material by the One-Time Inspection Program and the Water Chemistry Control Program. For stainless steel valves cracking will be managed by the BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program and the Water Chemistry Control Program consistently with the GALL Report. Although the latter AMP makes some exceptions to that of the GALL Report the staff considered it acceptable. The applicant states that the BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program is based on industry guidelines approved by the staff.

The staff, however, requested that the applicant to submit information about its plant-specific experience with IGSCC of the reactor coolant pressure boundary piping, mitigative actions taken, and revised inspection schedules following the BWRVIP-75 guidelines. The staff requested that the applicant provide information on how its implementation of HWC and NMCA at NMP1 has affected monitoring of water chemistry parameters. In response the applicant stated that more recent plant-specific experience at NMP1 had detected indications in four reactor recirculation system welds during the 1999 refueling outage. The applicant performed its re-inspection evaluations, and determined that the indications were fabrication-related and not from IGSCC. The scope and schedule of inspection for IGSCC are according to GL 88-01 as modified by BWRVIP-75. The current inspection schedule except for Category A welds subsumed in the alternate Risk-Informed ISI Program is consistent with the revised inspection frequency allowed by BWRVIP-75 for normal water chemistry. In implementing HWC and NMCA NMP1 began treating the reactor vessel internals with noble metal chemicals in May 2000 and began injecting hydrogen into reactor water in June 2000. The impact for NMP1 operating under HWC versus normal water chemistry is that the electrochemical potential is monitored with a goal of < -0.23V SHE (standard hydrogen reference electrode) to verify the effectiveness of HWC.

The staff's review concludes that the applicant has identified appropriate aging effects for the components in the NMP1 reactor recirculation system.

Conclusion. The staff concluded that the applicant adequately identified the aging effects and the AMPs credited for managing them for the reactor recirculation system and that the components' intended functions will be maintained consistently with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate program description of the AMPs credited for managing aging in the reactor coolant system – recirculation system as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.1A.2.3.5 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP1 Control Rod Drive System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-5

The NMP1 CRD System is designed to change core reactivity by changing the position of control rods within the reactor core in response to manual control signals and to scram the reactor in response to manual or automatic signals. The system also provides high-pressure makeup to the RPV for a specified leakage of 25 gpm and provides core cooling in the case of a small line break (up to 0.003 ft<sup>2</sup>). The CRD system also provides water to the RPV level instrumentation reference leg backfill system and to the keep-fill system for the emergency cooling system.

The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the CRD system components are given in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-5. The staff determined that there were no CRD system components for NMP1 with AMR results not consistent with or not addressed in the GALL Report except for the CRD system valves, which are evaluated in SER Section 3.1A.2.3.4; therefore, in this review the staff did not perform an evaluation of the NMP1 CRD system components.

### 3.1A.3 Conclusion

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concludes that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the NMP1 RPV, RPV internals, and RCS components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

## 3.1B NMP2 Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components and component groups associated with the following NMP2 systems:

- reactor pressure vessel
- reactor pressure vessel internals
- reactor pressure vessel instrumentation system
- reactor recirculation system
- control rod drive system

### 3.1B.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 3.1, the applicant provided AMR results for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.1.1.B, "NMP2 Summary of Aging Management Programs for Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems Evaluated in Chapter IV of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with

appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### **3.1B.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.1 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.1B.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.1B.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.1B.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.1B.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the USAR supplement to ensure that they provide an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components.

Table 3.1B-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP2 components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.1, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

#### **Table 3.1B-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP2 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Reactor coolant pressure boundary components (Item Number 3.1.1.B-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.3, Metal Fatigue Analysis
Steam generator shell assembly (Item Number 3.1.1.B-02)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Isolation condenser (Item Number 3.1.1.B-03)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable (isolation condenser does not exist - See Section 3.1B.2.2.2)
Pressure vessel ferritic materials that have a neutron fluence greater than $10^{17}$ n/cm <sup>2</sup> (E > 1 MeV) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-04)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with Appendix G of 10 CFR 50 and RG 1.99	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.2, Reactor Vessel Neutron Embrittlement Analysis
Reactor vessel beltline shell and welds (Item Number 3.1.1.B-05)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement	Reactor vessel surveillance	Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program (B2.1.19)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.2.3)
Westinghouse and B&W baffle/former bolts (Item Number 3.1.1.B-06)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Small-bore reactor coolant system and connected systems piping (Item Number 3.1.1.B-07)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, intergranular SCC, and thermal and mechanical loading	Inservice inspection; water chemistry; one-time inspection	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1); Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2); One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.2.4)
Jet pump sensing line, and reactor vessel flange leak detection line (Item Number 3.1.1.B-08)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), or cyclic loading	Plant-specific	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1); Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2); One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (see Section 3.1B.2.2.4)



Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Isolation condenser (Item Number 3.1.1.B-09)	Crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) or cyclic loading	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable (isolation condenser does not exist - (see Section 3.1B.2.2.4))
Vessel shell (Item Number 3.1.1.B-10)	Crack growth due to cyclic loading	TLAA		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor internals (Item Number 3.1.1.B-11)	Changes in dimension due to void swelling	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
PWR core support pads, instrument tubes (bottom head penetrations), pressurizer spray heads, and nozzles for the steam generator instruments and drains (Item Number 3.1.1.B-12)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and/or primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) reactor coolant system piping (Item Number 3.1.1.B-13)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Pressurizer instrumentation penetrations and heater sheaths and sleeves made of Ni-alloys (Item Number 3.1.1.B-14)	Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts (Item Number 3.1.1.B-15)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IASCC	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts (Item Number 3.1.1.B-16)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Steam generator feedwater impingement plate and support (Item Number 3.1.1.B-17)	Loss of section thickness due to erosion	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
(Alloy 600) Steam generator tubes, repair sleeves, and plugs (Item Number 3.1.1.B-18)	Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC), and/or intergranular attack (IGA) or loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion, and fretting and wear; or deformation due to corrosion at tube support plate intersections	Steam generator tubing integrity; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Tube support lattice bars made of carbon steel (Item Number 3.1.1.B-19)	Loss of section thickness due to FAC	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Carbon steel tube support plate (Item Number 3.1.1.B-20)	Ligament cracking due to corrosion	Plant-specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Steam generator feedwater inlet ring and supports (Item Number 3.1.1.B-21)	Loss of material due to flow-corrosion	Combustion engineering (CE) steam generator feedwater ring inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel closure studs and stud assembly (Item Number 3.1.1.B-22)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and/or IGSCC	Reactor head closure studs	Reactor Head Closure Studs Program (B2.1.3)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1.1)
CASS pump casing and valve body (Item Number 3.1.1.B-23)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging embrittlement	Inservice inspection	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
CASS piping (Item Number 3.1.1.B-24)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging embrittlement	Thermal aging embrittlement of CASS		Not applicable (CASS piping does not exist)
BWR piping and fittings; steam generator components (Item Number 3.1.1.B-25)	Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program (B2.1.9)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)  Not applicable for steam generator components
Reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) valve closure bolting, manway and holding bolting, and closure bolting in high pressure and high temperature systems (Item Number 3.1.1.B-26)	Loss of material due to wear; loss of preload due to stress relaxation; crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and/or SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)  Not applicable for pressurizer bolting
Feedwater and control rod drive (CRD) return line nozzles (Item Number 3.1.1.B-27)	Crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading	Feedwater nozzle; CRD return line nozzle	BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program (B2.1.5), BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program (B2.1.37)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1.2)
Vessel shell attachment welds (Item Number 3.1.1.B-28)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC	BWR vessel ID attachment welds; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program (B2.1.4)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)
Nozzle safe ends, recirculation pump casing, connected systems piping and fittings, body and bonnet of valves (Item Number 3.1.1.B-29)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC	BWR stress corrosion cracking; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program (B2.1.6)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Penetrations (Item Number 3.1.1.B-30)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, cyclic loading	BWR penetrations; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Penetrations Program (B2.1.6)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)
Core shroud and core plate, support structure, top guide, core spray lines and spargers, jet pump assemblies, control rod drive housing, nuclear instrumentation guide tubes (Item Number 3.1.1.B-31)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, IASCC	BWR vessel internals; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)
Core shroud and core plate access hole cover (welded and mechanical covers) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-32)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, IGSCC, IASCC	ASME Section XI inservice inspection; water chemistry	BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8), Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL with exceptions  Access hole cover is managed through BWRVIP
Jet pump assembly castings; orificed fuel support (Item Number 3.1.1.B-33)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement	Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement	BWR Vessel Internals Program (B2.1.8)	Consistent with GALL (see Section 3.1B.2.1.3)
Unclad top head and nozzles (Item Number 3.1.1.B-34)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Inservice inspection; water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), ASME Section XI, Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program (B2.1.1)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.1B.2.1)
CRD nozzle (Item Number 3.1.1.B-35)	Crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC	Ni-alloy nozzles and penetrations; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel nozzles safe ends and CRD housing; reactor coolant system components (except CASS and bolting) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-36)	Crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading, and/or SCC and PWSCC	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Reactor vessel internals CASS components (Item Number 3.1.1.B-37)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging, neutron irradiation embrittlement, and void swelling	Thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement		Not applicable, PWR only
External surfaces of carbon steel components in reactor coolant system pressure boundary (Item Number 3.1.1.B-38)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion		Not applicable, PWR only
Steam generator secondary manways and handholds (CS) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-39)	Loss of material due to erosion	Inservice inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor internals, reactor vessel closure studs, and core support pads (Item Number 3.1.1.B-40)	Loss of material due to wear	Inservice inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Pressurizer integral support (Item Number 3.1.1.B-41)	Crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading	Inservice inspection		Not applicable, PWR only
Upper and lower internals assembly (Westinghouse) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-42)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Inservice inspection; loose part and/or neutron noise monitoring		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel internals in fuel zone region [except Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) baffle bolts] (Item Number 3.1.1.B-43)	Loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement, and void swelling	PWR vessel internals; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Steam generator upper and lower heads; tubesheets; primary nozzles and safe ends (Item Number 3.1.1.B-44)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC, PWSCC, IASCC	Inservice inspection; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Vessel internals (except Westinghouse and B&W baffle former bolts) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-45)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IASCC	PWR vessel internals; water chemistry		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor internals (B&W screws and bolts) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-46)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Inservice inspection; loose part monitoring		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor vessel closure studs and stud assembly (Item Number 3.1.1.B-47)	Loss of material due to wear	Reactor head closure studs		Not applicable, PWR only
Reactor internals (Westinghouse upper and lower internal assemblies; CE bolts and tie rods) (Item Number 3.1.1.B-48)	Loss of preload due to stress relaxation	Inservice inspection; loose part monitoring		Not applicable, PWR only

The staff's review of the NMP2 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.1B.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.1B.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.1B.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### ***3.1B.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.1.2.B, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Reactor Head Closure Studs Program

- BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program
- BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program
- BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program
- BWR Penetrations Program
- BWR Vessel Internals Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program
- BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.1.2.B-1 through 3.1.2.B-5, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different aging management program is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.1B.2.1.1 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC and/or IGSCC

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.B, Item 3.1.1.B-22 the applicant stated that the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program is credited for closure head studs and nuts that have an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to general corrosion. As documented in the audit and review report, the staff noted that ALRA Table 3.1.1.B, Item 3.1.1.B-22 applies to the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of cracking and asked the applicant to provide clarification.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant revised the ALRA Table 3.1.1.B, Item 3.1.1.B-22 discussion column by deleting the reference to managing loss of material and crediting the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of crack initiation and growth due to SCC. The staff found this revision consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.1B.2.1.2 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Cyclic Loading

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.B, Item 3.1.1.B-27, the applicant stated that for feedwater nozzles NMP2 manages aging with the BWR Feedwater Nozzle Program, which is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M5, "Feedwater Nozzle."

In the ALRA the applicant also stated that GALL AMP XI.M5 is credited also with managing cracking of feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves due to SCC. Verification of the absence of nozzle cracking provides proof that the thermal sleeve intended function is not degraded. For CRDRL nozzles NMP2 manages aging with the BWR CRDRL Nozzle Program, which is consistent with GALL AMP XI.M6, "BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle." GALL AMP XI.M6 is credited also with managing cracking of CRD return line nozzle thermal sleeves due to SCC. The



applicant stated that verification of the absence of nozzle cracking proves that the thermal sleeve intended function is not degraded. In its letter dated September 15, 2005, the applicant stated that its BWR Feedwater Nozzle and BWR CRDRL Nozzle Programs had been removed as credited programs for the feedwater nozzle and CRDRL nozzle thermal sleeves. As documented in the audit and review report, the staff asked the applicant to address the aging management for the feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves. The applicant responded that it will use inspections performed under the BWR Vessel Internals Program with surrogate components more readily accessible for examination. For NMP2, the surrogate components are the feedwater sparger end bracket welds. As documented in the audit and review report, the applicant also provided its basis for choosing the feedwater sparger end bracket welds as follows.

The applicant noted that a similar evaluation of the NMP1 feedwater sparger welds and the selection of surrogate welds accessible for inspection also would be acceptable for NMP2. These accessible welds would be used as a leading indicator of potential IGSCC cracking of the thermal sleeve. If cracking is found in these welds a supplemental evaluation of the thermal sleeve integrity would be required.

The applicant stated that review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeve and sparger had been completed and had confirmed that the thermal sleeve material is 316L with several hidden stainless steel welds. The fabrication method review, not complete, will determine the welding procedures. If the hidden welds were stress relieved they would not be considered susceptible to IGSCC and the aging effect of cracking would not be considered applicable to NMP2.

In addition, as documented in the audit and review report, the applicant stated that review of the NMP2 feedwater sparger installation details found field installation of a 20,000 lbf load creating a 0.125 inch cold spring to the sparger. The sparger end brackets were pinned, locking in the cold spring, and then final field-welded with a fillet weld. The applicant stated further that this installation detail is similar to that of NMP1. The result of the cold spring is a fit-up net tensile stress superimposed on the weld residual stress. The combination of the fit-up stress (cold spring) plus the residual stress of the field weld conditions and the fillet weld crevice geometry is more susceptible to IGSCC than the thermal sleeve welds. The corrosion potential of reactor water in the region of the feedwater sparger end bracket welds is equivalent to if not greater than that of the reactor water in contact with the outside diameter weld of the thermal sleeve. The applicant also stated that an EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 and NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be added to its BWR Vessel Internals Program as an enhancement. The inspection extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket vessel attachment welds. If the final fabrication review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeve concludes that the hidden welds are not IGSCC-susceptible the NMP2 inspections will be discontinued.

Furthermore, the applicant concluded that overall inspection of the NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds represents conservative inspection of the material condition of the hidden thermal sleeve welds for potential IGSCC cracking. Therefore, consistent with the discussion between the staff and the applicant, as documented in the audit and review report, cracking of the NMP2 feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves will be managed by the applicant's BWR Feedwater Nozzle, BWR Vessel Internals, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will add an EVT-1 examination of the NMP2 feedwater sparger brackets as an enhancement to its BWR Vessel Internals Program to address this issue. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable because

the applicant's surrogate weld inspection manages aging adequately for the feedwater nozzle thermal sleeves.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.1B.2.1.3 Loss of Fracture Toughness Due to Thermal Aging and Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.1.1.B, Item 3.1.1.B-33 the applicant stated that loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging and neutron irradiation embrittlement of jet pumps is managed by BWRVIP-41, "BWR Jet Pump Assembly Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," of GALL AMP XI.M9, "BWR Vessel Internals Program." Aging management of the orificed fuel supports is conducted according to BWRVIP-47, "BWR Lower Plenum Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," of GALL AMP XI.M9.

GALL AMP XI.M13, "Thermal Aging and Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement of Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel," is credited for managing the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging and neutron embrittlement. In its letter dated November 17, 2005, the applicant revised its BWR Vessel Internals Program to address the management of fracture toughness due to neutron fluence and thermal embrittlement for NMP CASS components. The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.6. The staff found the applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program acceptable for managing the loss of fracture toughness because the applicant committed to meet the GALL AMP XI.M13 recommendation.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.1B.2.2 AMR Results That are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.1.2.C of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management for NMPNS as recommended by the GALL Report for the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion

- loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement
- crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or stress corrosion cracking
- crack growth due to cyclic loading
- changes in dimension due to void swelling
- crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking or primary water stress corrosion cracking
- crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking or irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking
- loss of preload due to stress relaxation
- loss of section thickness due to erosion
- crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or intergranular attack or loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion or loss of section thickness due to fretting and wear or denting due to corrosion of carbon steel tube support plate
- loss of section thickness due to flow-accelerated corrosion
- ligament cracking due to corrosion
- loss of material due to flow-accelerated corrosion

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.1B.2.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In Section 3.1.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's according to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

As documented in the audit and review report, the staff noted that for ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 (on page 3.1-51), the fatigue damage of CRD assemblies (including drive mechanism and housing) will be managed through the TLAA but that in ALRA Appendix B, Aging management program and activities (page B2-25), the applicant stated that there are no TLAA's. The staff asked the applicant to explain how the specified NMP1 components are managed. The applicant responded that the only NMP1 reactor vessel internals (RVI) components with calculations or analyses meeting TLAA criteria are the core shroud tie rod assemblies, the clamps, and the CRD assemblies (including drive mechanism and housing). The tie rod assemblies and clamps are repairs for horizontal and vertical core shroud welds on which ASME III-type stress and fatigue analyses were performed during the design process. The pressure boundary portion of the CRD assemblies was evaluated for fatigue. A cumulative usage factor was determined for

the CRD penetration including the stub tube, CRD housing, and the stub tube-to-vessel weld and housing-to-stub tube weld. The AMR for the stub tube is addressed in ALRA Table 3.1.2.A. The applicant also responded that for RVI components with no analysis meeting TLAA criteria the "Aging Management Program" column of ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 will be modified to replace "TLAA evaluated according to 10 CFR 54.21(c)" with "None." A plant-specific note referencing the relevant BWRVIP Inspection and Evaluation guideline or other basis for not managing fatigue will be added to ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 for each component with "None" in the AMP column for the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of cumulative fatigue damage or where the TLAA is applicable only to a subset of the component type.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant responded by revising ALRA Table 3.1.2.A-2 and Table 3.1.2.B-2 to address this issue. The staff determined that a high cumulative fatigue usage factor indicates a high potential for crack initiation. Although the applicant's response removed the aging effect of cumulative fatigue damage for those components identified in the December 1, 2005, letter, the aging effect of cracking is adequately managed through other AMPs. Therefore, the staff found the response acceptable.

The staff's review of the applicant's response found its action consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable.

#### 3.1B.2.2.2 Loss of Material Due to Pitting and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.2.

The applicant stated in Section 3.1.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005 that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of pitting and crevice corrosion are not applicable to the PWR steam generator shell assembly. The staff determined that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of PWR steam generator shell assembly pitting and crevice corrosion are not applicable to NMP.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP.

In addition the staff reviewed 10 CFR 3.1.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR 10 CFR 3.1.2.2.2.

In Section 3.1.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also addressed loss of material due to isolation condenser components due to general pitting and crevice corrosion. The applicant stated in the August 19, 2005, letter that NMP2 has no isolation condensers; therefore this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP2.

Because NMP2 has no isolation condensers the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.3 Loss of Fracture Toughness Due to Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3.

In Section 3.1.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement of the reactor vessel.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3 states that certain aspects of neutron irradiation embrittlement are TLAA's as defined in 10 CFR 54.3 and must be evaluated according to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.2 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3 states that loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement could occur in the reactor vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program monitors neutron irradiation embrittlement of the reactor vessel. The staff review and evaluation of the applicant's Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program are documented in SER 10 CFR 3.0.3.2.16.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant stated that loss of fracture toughness of vessel shells (beltline, lower shell, upper nozzle shell, and upper RPV shell and vessel shell welds (including attachment welds) will be managed by its Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. The staff asked the applicant to clarify which areas have neutron fluence exceeding  $1\text{E}17 \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1\text{MeV}$ ).

The applicant responded that vessel shells - beltline and vessel shells - lower and the beltline welds have a neutron fluence exceeding  $1\text{E}17 \text{ n/cm}^2$ . The applicant's Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program manages aging of these components. The component type attachment welds needs no management by the applicant's Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program because even though these welds receive a neutron fluence equal to or greater than  $1\text{E}17 \text{ n/cm}^2$  they are not ferritic material. The only carbon/low alloy steel attachment welds are the steam dryer holddown bracket attachment welds in the upper head which are low-fluence welds. The applicant modified ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 to show those components managed by the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant revised ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 to address this issue. The staff reviewed the applicant's letter and found this revision consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant stated that loss of fracture toughness of nozzles will be managed by its Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. The staff asked the applicant to clarify which nozzles will be managed by the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program.

As documented in the audit and review report, the applicant responded that LPCI/residual heat removal (RHR) nozzles and water level nozzle will be managed by the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. Activities of the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program include an analysis of these nozzles for pressure-temperature (P-T) limits considering the projected fluence for 54 effective full-power years (EFPYs) for them. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant added a plant-specific Note 76 to ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 to specify those components managed by the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. The staff found this note consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3 states that loss of fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation embrittlement and void swelling could occur in Westinghouse and B&W baffle/former bolts.

In Section 3.1.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this item pertains to PWR baffle/former bolts only and is not applicable to NMP.

Because NMP has no components in this group the staff found that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs have met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.3. For those line items addressed in Section 3.1.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the applicant has demonstrated consistent with the GALL Report that aging effects will be adequately managed so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.1B.2.2.4 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Thermal and Mechanical Loading or Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.

In Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) that could occur in small-bore reactor coolant systems and connected system piping less than NPS 4.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.1 states that crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) could occur in small-bore reactor coolant systems and connected system piping less than NPS 4. The program relies on ASME Section XI ISI and on control of water chemistry to mitigate SCC. The GALL Report recommends a plant-specific destructive examination or a NDE that permits inspection of the inside surfaces of the piping to ensure that cracking has not occurred and that component intended function will be maintained during the extended period. The AMPs should be augmented by confirming that service-induced weld cracking has not occurred in small-bore piping less than NPS 4 including pipe, fittings, and branch connections. A one-time inspection of a sample of locations is an acceptable method to ensure that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not occurring and that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

In Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for NMP2 aging of the subject small-bore piping is managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program, Water Chemistry Control Program, and One-Time Inspection Program.

Additionally the applicant stated in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP2 reactor vessel instrumentation, reactor recirculation, and CRD systems not part of its ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program NMP credits only its Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs to manage aging.

The applicant further stated in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for the small-bore piping included in the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program or not the inspections of the One-Time Inspection Program will use either NDE methods with a demonstrated capability to detect cracks on the inside surfaces of the piping or destructive examinations. Both nondestructive and destructive examinations will be performed on a piping sample.

The staff reviewed the applicant's ISI plan and One-Time Inspection Program and found them adequate to managed this cracking issue and consistent with the GALL Report recommendation. The staff's evaluations of the applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, Water Chemistry Control, and One-Time Inspection Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.1, 3.0.3.2.2, and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

In addition the staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.

Also in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) that could occur in the BWR reactor vessel flange leak detection line and BWR jet pump sensing line.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4 also states that crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) could occur in the BWR reactor vessel flange leak detection line and the BWR jet pump sensing line. The GALL Report recommends that a plant-specific aging management program be evaluated to mitigate or detect crack initiation and growth due to SCC of vessel flange leak detection line.

The applicant stated in its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP1 and NMP2 cracking of the vessel flange leak detection lines is managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program, One-Time Inspection Program, and Water Chemistry Control Program. The inspections conducted under the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program will use either NDE methods with a demonstrated capability to detect cracks on the inside surfaces of the piping or destructive examinations. Both nondestructive and destructive examinations will be performed on a piping sample. A portion of the NMP2 vessel flange leak detection line is carbon steel not subject to cracking. The applicant stated that loss of material of the carbon steel portion is managed by its Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs.

The applicant also stated in its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP2 the jet pump sensing lines are not within the scope of license renewal; therefore, the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of cracking for jet pump sensing lines is not applicable at NMP.

The staff reviewed the applicant's piping and instrument drawings (P&ID) and ISI plan to determine whether the applicant's program is adequate and consistent with the GALL Report recommendation.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.1, 3.0.3.2.2, and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

Furthermore, the staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4.

Also in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading or SCC (including IGSCC) that could occur in BWR isolation condenser components.

The applicant stated in its August 19, 2005, letter that NMP2 has no isolation condensers; therefore, this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is not applicable to NMP2.

Because NMP2 has no isolation condensers the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP2.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs have met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.4. For those line items addressed in Section 3.1.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the applicant has demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed consistent with the GALL Report and that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.1B.2.2.5 Crack Growth due to Cyclic Loading (NMP 2)

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.5.

In Section 3.1.2.C.5 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.5 states that crack growth due to cyclic loading could occur in the reactor vessel shell and the reactor coolant system piping and fittings. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.6 Changes in Dimension due to Void Swelling

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.6 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.6.

In Section 3.1.2.C.6 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.6 states that changes in dimension due to void swelling could occur in reactor internal components. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.7 Crack Initiation and Growth due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.7.

In Section 3.1.2.C.7 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.



SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.7 states that crack initiation and growth due to SCC and PWSCC could occur: (1) in PWR core support pads (or core guide lugs), instrument tubes (bottom head penetrations), pressurizer spray heads, and nozzles for the steam generator instruments and drains; (2) in PWR CASS reactor coolant system piping and fittings and pressurizer surge line nozzles; and (3) in PWR pressurizer instrumentation penetrations and heater sheaths and sleeves made of Ni alloys. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.8 Crack Initiation and Growth due to Stress Corrosion Cracking or Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.8 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.8.

In Section 3.1.2.C.8 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.8 states that crack initiation and growth due to SCC or IASCC could occur in baffle/former bolts in Westinghouse and B&W reactors. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff concurs that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.9 Loss of Preload due to Stress Relaxation

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.9 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.9.

In Section 3.1.2.C.9 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.9 states that loss of preload due to stress relaxation could occur in baffle/former bolts in Westinghouse and B&W reactors. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.10 Loss of Section Thickness due to Erosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.10 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.10.

In Section 3.1.2.C.10 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.10 states that loss of section thickness due to erosion could occur in steam generator feedwater impingement plates and supports. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

3.1B.2.2.11 Crack Initiation and Growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or Intergranular Attack or Loss of Material due to Wastage and Pitting Corrosion or Loss of Section Thickness due to Fretting and Wear or Denting due to Corrosion of Carbon Steel Tube Support Plate

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.11 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.11.

In Section 3.1.2.C.11 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.11 states that crack initiation and growth due to PWSCC, ODSCC, or IGA or loss of material due to wastage and pitting corrosion or deformation due to corrosion could occur in alloy 600 components of the steam generator tubes, repair sleeves and plugs. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

Based on the above review, the staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

3.1B.2.2.12 Loss of Section Thickness due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.12 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.12.

In Section 3.1.2.C.12 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.12 states that loss of section thickness due to flow-accelerated corrosion could occur in tube support lattice bars made of carbon steel. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.13 Ligament Cracking due to Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.13 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.13.

In Section 3.1.2.C.13 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.13 states that ligament cracking due to corrosion could occur in carbon steel components in the steam generator tube support plate. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.14 Loss of Material due to Flow-accelerated Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.1.2.C.14 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.14.

In Section 3.1.2.C.14 of letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

SRP-LR Section 3.1.2.2.14 states that loss of material due to flow-accelerated corrosion could occur in feedwater inlet ring and supports. SRP-LR Table 3.1-1 states that further evaluation for this aging effect is only applicable to PWR plants.

The staff found that this aging effect is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.1B.2.2.15 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 includes the staff's evaluation of the applicant's quality assurance program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### ***3.1B.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.1.2.B-1 through 3.1.2.B-5, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.1.2.B-1 through 3.1.2.B-5, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and AERM does not correspond to a

line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.1B.2.3.1 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP2 Reactor Pressure Vessel – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1

The NMP2 RPV contains and supports the reactor core, reactor internals, and the reactor coolant/moderator. The RPV forms part of the RCPB and serves as a barrier against leakage of radioactive materials to the drywell. The NMP2 RPV is a vertical, cylindrical pressure vessel with hemispherical bottom and top heads. The cylindrical shell and top and bottom heads of the RPV are fabricated from low-alloy steel, the interior of which is clad with stainless steel weld overlay except for the top head and nozzle and nozzle weld zones. The RPV top head is secured to the RPV by studs and nuts. The RPV flanges are sealed with two concentric metal seal rings designed to permit no detectable leakage through the inner or outer seal at any operating condition. The top head leak detection lines tap off of the vessel head between the seal rings to detect leakage should the inner seal-ring fail.

The RPV is penetrated by various nozzles and the CRD housings and in-core instrumentation thimbles are welded to the bottom head of the RPV. The concrete and steel vessel support pedestal is constructed as part of the building foundation. Steel anchor bolts set in the concrete extend through the bearing plate and secure the flange of the RPV support skirt to the bearing plate and thus to the support pedestal.

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the RPV components are in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1. The specific NMP2 RPV components with AMR results not consistent with or addressed in the GALL report and given in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 by letter dated December 5, 2005, include:

- RPV core differential pressure and liquid control, CRD stub tube, drain lines, in-core instruments, and instrumentation penetrations
- RPV support skirt and attachment welds
- RPV top head closure studs and nuts
- RPV top head leak detection lines
- RPV valves

The applicant identified materials of fabrication for these RPV components as carbon steel and low alloy steel. The applicant indicated that applicable environments for these RPV components include containment air, non-borated water, and treated water (including steam).

The applicant credited the FAC Program with managing loss of material for the RPV core differential pressure and liquid control, CRD stub tube, drain lines, in-core instruments, and instrumentation penetrations. The ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program is credited with the management of loss of material for the RPV support skirt and attachment welds. The applicant credited the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program with managing loss of material of the top head closure studs and nuts. The Water Chemistry Control Program and the One-Time Inspection Program are credited with managing the loss of material for the RPV top head leak detection lines and the RPV valves. In addition the applicant credited TLAA 4.3, "Thermal Fatigue," with managing cumulative fatigue damage of the top head closure studs and nuts and the top head leak detection lines.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the NMP2 RPV component groups. The staff's assessment of the RPV components not consistent with or addressed in the GALL report for NMP2 is provided below. The assessments of the NMP2 RPV top head leak detection lines and the RPV valves are in SER Section 3.1B.2.3.4.

*RPV Core Differential Pressure and Liquid Control, CRD Stub Tube, Drain Lines, In-core Instruments, and Instrumentation Penetrations*

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant identified loss of material due to FAC as an aging effect applicable to the RPV core differential pressure and liquid control, CRD stub tube, drain lines, in-core instruments, and instrumentation penetrations fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel exposed to a treated water or steam high-temperature environment.

FAC is a phenomenon in which repetitive cycles of corrosion and erosion cause wall thinning of carbon steel or low-alloy steel components exposed to high-temperature, high-velocity water or water/steam environments. Normally FAC occurs only with environmental temperatures above 200 °F. The rate of metal loss depends on a complex interplay of such parameters as water chemistry, material composition, and hydrodynamics.

The staff determined that the applicant adequately identified loss of material due to FAC as an AERM for the RPV core differential pressure and liquid control, CRD stub tube, drain lines, in-core instruments, and instrumentation penetrations exposed to these environments. This aging effect is not addressed in GALL Report Volume 2 for these component, material, and environment combinations; therefore, the staff concludes that this AERM is acceptable because it is conservative relative to GALL Report Volume 2 and consistent with the EPRI Report, "Recommendations for an Effective Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program."

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant credited the FAC Program with managing loss of material due to FAC for the RPV core differential pressure and liquid control, CRD stub tube, drain lines, in-core instruments, and instrumentation penetrations. Even though GALL Report Volume 2 does not address an AMP for such component, material, and environment combinations it does recommend crediting the FAC Program with managing FAC-induced wall thinning of carbon steel piping and fitting components. The staff found the

applicant's proposal conservative relative to GALL Report Volume 2 and, therefore, acceptable. The applicant's FAC Program (ALRA AMP B2.1.9) is entirely consistent with GALL AMP XI.M17. The staff's evaluation of the FAC Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.1.3.

#### RPV Support Skirt and Attachment Welds

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 and by letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant identified loss of material due to general corrosion as an applicable aging effect for the RPV support skirt and attachment welds fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel and exposed to an environment of "air with thermal fatigue." The applicant's definition of "air with thermal fatigue" is "this environment is applied to components exposed to air, that are also subject to thermal cycles of sufficient magnitude for thermal fatigue to be a concern." The air environment is the containment air surrounding the RPV and the support skirt.

GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify loss of material due to general corrosion as an aging effect in carbon and low alloy steel when these materials are exposed to an environment of containment air; however, carbon and low alloy steel may rust or corrode in the presence of air with an elevated humidity level. The staff found that the applicant has addressed this issue conservatively; therefore, the staff found the applicant's identification of this AERM acceptable for the RPV support skirt and attachment welds.

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant credited the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program with managing loss of material due to general corrosion for the RPV support skirt. By letter dated November 22, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant address why the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program was credited with managing loss of material due to general corrosion in the RPV support skirt. Instead, the staff recommended that this aging effect in the RPV support skirt be managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program because the RPV support skirt is an ASME Class MC support. By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant revised Table 3.1.2.B-1 to indicate that the AERM of loss of material of the RPV support skirt would be managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program. The staff found the applicant's response acceptable because the RPV support skirt is an ASME Class MC component, and, therefore, is managed appropriately by the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program.

By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant indicated that it credits The ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program with managing the loss of material due to general corrosion in the RPV attachment welds.

The GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify any AMPs for managing loss of material due to general corrosion for these component, material, and environment combinations. The staff found the applicant's proposal conservative relative to the GALL Report Volume 2 and, therefore, acceptable. The applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program is an AMP consistent with GALL AMP XI.M1 with exceptions. The staff's evaluation of The ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.1. The applicant's ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program is an AMP consistent with GALL AMP XI.S3 with exceptions. The staff's evaluation of the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWF) ISI Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.19.

#### RPV Top Head Closure Studs and Nuts

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant identified loss of material due to general, crevice, and pitting corrosion as an aging effect applicable to the RPV top head closure studs and nuts fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel and exposed to an environment of non-borated water systems with operating temperatures equal to or greater than 212 °F.

The GALL Report Volume 2 identifies crack initiation and growth, SCC and IGSCC as aging effects for RPV top head enclosure closure studs and nuts fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel exposed to air, leaking reactor coolant water, or steam at 288 °C but does not identify loss of material due to general, crevice, and pitting corrosion as aging effects in carbon and low alloy steel when exposed to leakage of non-borated reactor coolant or steam. However, carbon and low alloy steel may rust or corrode when exposed to aqueous liquids. The staff found that the applicant has addressed this issue conservatively; therefore, the staff found the applicant's identification of this AERM acceptable.

Also in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant identified cumulative fatigue damage as an aging effect applicable to the RPV top head closure studs and nuts because of thermal cycling from heatup and cooldown and other transient operating conditions of these components. The staff found this identification acceptable because it meets the provisions in of SRP-LR Revision 1 Chapter 3.1 for assessing cumulative fatigue damage in ASME Code Class 1 components. SER Section 4.3 contains the staff's assessment of those plant components requiring thermal fatigue analyses for license renewal.

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant credited the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program with management of loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for the RPV top head closure studs and nuts. Even though the GALL Report Volume 2 does not address an AMP for these component, material, and environment combinations the staff found the applicant's proposal conservative relative to GALL Report Volume 2 and, therefore, acceptable. The applicant's Reactor Head Closure Studs Program (ALRA AMP B2.1.3) is an AMP consistent with exception to GALL AMP XI.M3. The staff's evaluation of the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.3.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant proposed managing cumulative fatigue damage of the RPV top head closure studs and nuts with the TLAA. This proposal is consistent with SRP-LR Revision 1 and is, therefore, acceptable. The staff's evaluation of the applicant's TLAA on thermal fatigue of ASME Code Class 1 components is in SER Section 4.3.

### RPV Valves

The review of the RPV valves is in SER Section 3.1B.2.3.4.

**Conclusion.** The staff has reviewed the applicant's plant-specific AMRs for evaluating the RPV components exposed to the containment air, non-borated water, and treated water (including steam) environments. For these AMRs the staff has determined that the applicant has identified aging effects applicable to these components that are exposed to these environments. The staff also has determined that the applicant has credited either an appropriate inspection-based AMP, an appropriate mitigation-based AMP, a TLAA, or combination of these strategies with managing the aging effects applicable to the RPV components exposed to these environments. The staff's review concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the NMP2 RPV will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will

be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.1B.2.3.2 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2

The NMP2 RPV internals support the core and other internal components, maintain fuel configuration (coolable geometry) during normal operation and accident conditions, and provide reactor coolant flow through the core. The main NMP2 RPV internals components are the reactor core, core shroud, core shroud stabilizers, core shroud support structures, top guide, CRD guide tubes, feedwater sparger, core spray spargers, steam dryer, and the jet pumps. Except for the Zircaloy used in the fuel assemblies reactor internals are stainless steel or other corrosion-resistant alloys.

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the RPV internals components are in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2. The specific RPV components for NMP2 with AMR results not consistent with or addressed in the GALL Report and within the scope of ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2 include:

- core shroud head bolts
- core shroud support structures (bolts, brackets, cap screws, clamps, keepers, restraints, and supports)

The applicant identified the materials of fabrication for the core shroud head bolts and the core shroud support structures (including the bolts, brackets, clamps, keepers, restraints, and supports) as nickel-based alloys. The material of fabrication for the cap screws is carbon or low alloy steel. The applicant identified applicable environments for these RPV internals components as treated water (including steam) environments of temperatures  $\geq 482^\circ\text{F}$ , treated water or steam, high temperature with neutron fluences of  $< 5 \times 10^{20} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ), and treated water or steam high temperature with neutron fluences of  $\geq 1 \times 10^{17} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ).

The applicant credited the BWR Vessel Internals and the Water Chemistry Control Programs with managing cracking of the core shroud head bolts and core shroud support structures. In addition the applicant credited TLAA 4.3, "Thermal Fatigue," with managing cumulative fatigue damage of the core shroud support structures.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the NMP2 RPV internal components. The staff's assessment of the RPV internals components not consistent with or addressed in the GALL Report for NMP2 is provided here.



### RPV Internals - Core Shroud Head Bolts

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2 the applicant identified SCC or IGSCC as an aging effect applicable to the core shroud head bolts fabricated from nickel-based alloys and exposed to a treated water or steam temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$  environment.

GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify SCC or IGSCC as an AERM for the core shroud head bolts. However, as these components are made from materials identical to those of the nickel-alloy RPV internal components that have AMR Commodity Group line items on SCC/IGSCC in GALL Report Volume 2 the staff concluded that the applicant's determination is consistent with the GALL Report Volume 2 for other RPV internal components made from nickel-based alloy materials and acceptable.

Also in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2 the applicant identified cumulative fatigue damage as an aging effect applicable to the core shroud head bolts because of thermal cycling from heatup, cooldown, and other operating transient conditions of these components. The staff found this identification acceptable because it meets the provisions in the SRP-LR Section 3.1 Revision 1 Report for assessing cumulative fatigue damage in RPV internal components. Refer to SER Section 4.3 for the staff's assessment of plant components required to have thermal fatigue analyses for license renewal.

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2 the applicant credited the BWR Vessel Internals and the Water Chemistry Control Programs with aging management of SCC/IGSCC of the core shroud head bolts. Even though GALL Report Volume 2 does not address an AMP for such component, material, and environment combinations it does recommend crediting the BWR Vessel Internals and Water Chemistry Programs with managing SCC and IGSCC for stainless steel and nickel-alloy components (i.e., core shroud, core plate, core plate bolts, holdown beams, etc). Therefore, the staff found the applicant's proposal acceptable. The applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program is an AMP entirely consistent with GALL AMP XI.M9. The staff's evaluation of the BWR Vessel Internals Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.6. The applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program is an AMP entirely consistent with GALL AMP XI.M2. The staff's evaluation of the Water Chemistry Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.2.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2 in ALRA Section 4.3 the applicant proposed using the TLAA for managing cumulative fatigue damage of the core shroud head bolts. This proposal is consistent with the NUREG-1800 Revision 1 Report and is, therefore, acceptable. The staff's evaluation of the applicant's TLAA on thermal fatigue of RPV internal components is in SER Section 4.3.

### RPV Internals Core Shroud Support Structures (bolts, cap screws, and supports)

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2, the applicant identified SCC or IGSCC as an aging effect applicable to the core shroud support structures fabricated from carbon or low alloy steels and nickel-based alloys that are exposed to treated water or steam, high temperature with neutron fluences of  $< 5 \times 10^{20} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ).

The GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify SCC or IGSCC as an AERM for the RPV internals core shroud support structures. Industry experience has not indicated that carbon steel or low alloy steel materials are susceptible to SCC or IGSCC but that stainless steel and nickel-based alloy materials are. The applicant has identified conservatively SCC/IGSCC as an aging effect applicable to the carbon steel/low alloy steel core shroud support structures (i.e., the core

shroud support cap screws). Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant's determination is conservative relative to the AMR Commodity Group line items in the GALL Report Volume 2 for RPV internal components made from stainless steel.

The staff also concluded that the applicant's identification of SCC/IGSCC for the nickel-based core shroud support structures (i.e., the bolts and supports) is consistent with the AMR Commodity Group line items in the GALL Report Volume 2 for RPV internal components made from nickel-based alloy materials and acceptable.

Also in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2, the applicant identified cumulative fatigue damage as an aging effect applicable to the core shroud support structures because of thermal cycling from heatup, cooldown, and other operating transient conditions of these components. The staff found this identification acceptable because it meets the provisions in the SRP-LR Chapter 3.1 Revision 1 Report for assessing cumulative fatigue damage in RPV internal components. Refer to SER Section 4.3 for the staff's assessment of plant components required to have thermal fatigue analyses for license renewal.

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2 the applicant credited the BWR Vessel Internals and Water Chemistry Control Programs with aging management of SCC/IGSCC of the core shroud support structures. Even though the GALL Report Volume 2 does not address an AMP for such component, material, and environment combinations it does recommend crediting the BWR Vessel Internals and Water Chemistry Programs with managing SCC and IGSCC for RPV internal components (i.e., core shroud, core plate, core plate bolts, holddown beams, etc). Therefore, the staff found the applicant's proposal acceptable. The applicant's BWR Vessel Internals Program is an AMP entirely consistent with GALL AMP XI.M9. The staff's evaluation of the BWR Vessel Internals Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.6. The applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program is an AMP entirely consistent with GALL AMP XI.M2. The staff's evaluation of the Water Chemistry Control Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.2.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-2 in ALRA Section 4.3 the applicant proposed using the TLAA for managing cumulative fatigue damage of the RPV internals core shroud support structures. This proposal is consistent with the SRP-LR Revision 1 and, therefore, acceptable. The staff's evaluation of the applicant's TLAA on thermal fatigue of RPV internal components is in SER Section 4.3.

Conclusion. The staff reviewed the applicant's plant-specific AMRs for evaluating the RPV internals components exposed to the treated water (including steam) environments of temperatures  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , treated water or steam high temperature with neutron fluences of  $< 5 \times 10^{20} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ), and treated water or steam high temperature with neutron fluences of  $\geq 1 \times 10^{17} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ) environments. For these AMRs the staff determined that the applicant has identified the aging effects applicable to components that are exposed to these environments. The staff has also determined that the applicant credited either an appropriate inspection-based AMP, an appropriate mitigation-based AMP, a TLAA, or combination of these strategies with managing the aging effects applicable to the RPV internal components exposed to these environments. The staff's review concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects of NMP2 RPV internals will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.1B.2.3.3 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP2 Reactor Vessel Instrumentation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-3

The NMP2 RPV instrumentation system monitors and transmits information about key RPV operating parameters during normal and emergency operations. Instrumentation is installed to monitor reactor parameters and indicate them on meters, chart recorders and hydraulic indicator units located in the control room, on remote shutdown panels, and in instrument rooms. The parameters monitored are RPV temperature, water level and pressure, and core flow and core plate differential pressure. This system also provides control signals to various systems which in turn initiate the appropriate actions required if the monitored parameter exceeds its desired set point. Systems receiving control signals from the RPV instrumentation system include the reactor protection, primary containment isolation, automatic depressurization, feedwater control, reactor recirculation flow control, redundant reactivity control, and RHR (shutdown cooling mode) systems. The RPV instrumentation system consists of piping, valves, and restricting orifices that provide a fluid path from the RPV to various instrumentation.

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the RPV instrumentation system components are in Table 3.1.2.B-3 of the ALRA. The specific RPV components for NMP2 with AMR results not consistent with or addressed in the GALL Report and within the scope of ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-3 include:

- RPV instrumentation system closure bolting
- RPV instrumentation system piping and fittings

The applicant identified materials of fabrication for these RPV instrumentation components as martensitic, precipitation-hardenable, and superferritic stainless steels and carbon and low alloy steels. The applicant identified applicable environments for these RPV instrumentation system components as non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  and treated water or steam temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$  (high temperature) environments.

The applicant credited the Bolting Integrity Program with managing cracking, loss of material, and loss of preload of the RPV instrumentation system closure bolting. The applicant credited the One-Time Inspection and the Water Chemistry Control Programs with managing loss of material for the RPV instrumentation system piping and fittings.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-3, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the NMP2 RPV instrumentation system components. The staff's assessment of the RPV instrumentation system components not consistent with or addressed in the GALL Report for NMP2 is provided here. It should be noted that the assessment for the NMP2 RPV instrumentation system piping and fittings is in SER Section 3.1B.2.3.4.

#### RPV Instrumentation System Closure Bolting

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-3 the applicant identified SCC or IGSCC, loss of material due to wear, and loss of preload due to thermal effects, gasket creep, and self-loosening as aging effects applicable to RPV instrumentation system closure bolting fabricated from martensitic, precipitation-hardenable, and superferritic stainless steels and exposed to a non-borated water system with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  environment (i.e., the reactor coolant or its steam environment).

The GALL Report Volume 2 does not identify these aging effects as applicable AERMs for these components; however, as these components are made from materials similar to those for the stainless steel RCPB closure bolting in high-pressure and high-temperature environments identified in the GALL Report Volume 2 the staff concluded that the applicant's determination is consistent with the AERMs identified in GALL Report Volume 2 for RCPB closure bolting and found the applicant's determination acceptable.

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-3 the applicant credited the Bolting Integrity Program with aging management of SCC or IGSCC, loss of material due to wear, and loss of preload due to thermal effects. Even though the GALL Report Volume 2 does not address an AMP for such component, material, and environment combinations it does recommend crediting the Bolting Integrity Program with managing SCC, loss of material due to wear, loss of preload due to thermal effects, gasket creep, and self-loosening of stainless steel RCPB pump and valve closure bolting in high-pressure and high-temperature systems. Therefore, the staff finds the applicant's proposal acceptable. The applicant's Bolting Integrity Program is an AMP consistent with GALL AMP XI.M18 with exceptions. The staff's evaluation of the Bolting Integrity Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.23.

Conclusion. The staff reviewed the applicant's plant-specific AMRs for evaluating the RPV instrumentation system components exposed to non-borated water with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  and treated water or steam temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$  (high temperature) environments. For these AMRs the staff determined that the applicant has identified aging effects applicable to these components exposed to these environments. The staff also determined that the applicant has credited either an appropriate inspection-based AMP, an appropriate mitigation-based AMP, or combination of these strategies with managing aging effects applicable to the RPV instrumentation system components exposed to these environments. The staff finds that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the NMP2 RPV instrumentation system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.1B.2.3.4 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP2 Reactor Recirculation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-4

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. The description of the reactor recirculation system, recirculation flow control, and the control of the reactor recirculation pumps can be found in ALRA Section 2.3.1.B.4. Reactor recirculation system components subject to AMR include the entire main reactor recirculation flow path which begins at the suction nozzle and ends at the discharge manifold nozzles to the jet pump risers of each recirculation loop for NMP2. SR instrument piping and associated components connected to the recirculation loops are also subject to AMR. The component types requiring an AMR for the reactor recirculation system and their intended functions are shown in ALRA Table 2.3.1.B.4-1. The AMR results for these components are shown in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-4. The following information pertains to the reactor recirculation system provided in the ALRA which the staff has used in its evaluation.

The materials of construction are carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $<100\text{ Ksi}$  and  $>100\text{ Ksi}$ ), CASS, and wrought austenitic stainless steel including nickel-based alloys in piping and fittings.

In ALRA Section 3.1.2.B.4 the applicant listed the following environments to which NMP2 reactor recirculation system components are exposed:

- air
- closure bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures equal to or greater than 212 °F
- hydraulic fluid
- treated water, temperature < 140 °F
- treated water, temperature < 140 °F, low flow
- treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, but < 212 °F
- treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, but < 212 °F, low flow
- treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 482 °F
- treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 482 °F, low flow

The applicant identified the following aging effects associated with the NMP1 and NMP2 Reactor Recirculation System piping requiring management:

- cracking
- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of fracture toughness
- loss of material
- loss of preload

The following AMPs manage these aging effects in the NMP2 reactor recirculation system components:

- ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) ISI Program
- Bolting Integrity Program
- BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program

Staff Evaluation. The applicant described its AMR for the reactor recirculation system in ALRA Section 3.1. The staff reviewed this section to determine whether the applicant had identified all the applicable aging effects for components in these systems and demonstrated that the aging effects on the components will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions adequately describe the AMPs.

The applicant identified the following aging effects for the reactor recirculation system:

- cracking
- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of fracture toughness
- loss of material
- loss of preload

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-4 the applicant identified cracking and cumulative fatigue damage as aging effects applicable to the recirculation system closure bolting, piping and fittings, recirculation pumps, and valves. Cumulative fatigue damage is evaluated in SER Section 4.3, "Metal Fatigue Analysis." The aging effect of loss of fracture toughness is associated with the pressure boundary materials in reactor recirculation pumps and in CASS valves operating at or above 480 °F. The loss of material has been identified as an aging effect in carbon or low alloy steel or austenitic stainless steel with treated water environment operating below 140 °F for such components as piping and fittings, valves, and restriction orifices in the reactor recirculation system. The loss of preload is identified as the applicable aging effect in closure bolting for non-borated water system operating at or above 212 °F. The staff noted that this assessment is consistent with the GALL Report.

The applicant identified cracking as an aging effect applicable to the recirculation system austenitic stainless steel components (piping and fittings, tubing, valve bodies, flow elements, thermowells, restricting orifices) and to the high-strength low-alloy steel primary pressure closure bolting exposed to reactor coolant water. The applicant also identified this aging effect for CASS components exposed to reactor coolant water. The applicant identified crack initiation and growth due to thermal and mechanical loading as an aging effect applicable to small-bore stainless steel piping and fittings and low-alloy steel pressure boundary closure bolting in the reactor recirculation system. The staff noted that this assessment is consistent with the GALL Report. The staff requested confirmation that the applicant had no flaws evaluated according to IWB-3600 "Analytical Evaluation of Flaws" under the ISI program of ASME Code, Section XI as such an evaluation would require a TLAA under the regulation. The applicant's response indicated that the NMP2 Reactor Recirculation System has no weld evaluated according to IWB-3600.

The applicant stated under item number 3.1.1.B-07 in ALRA Table 3.1.1.B that for the small-bore reactor coolant system and connected systems piping a plant-specific destructive examination or an NDE of the inside surfaces of the piping will be conducted as part of a one-time inspection to verify that service-induced weld cracking is not occurring in the small-bore piping. The applicant's One-Time Inspection aging management program is described in ALRA Section B.2.1.20 and the applicant stated that it is consistent with GALL Report Chapter XI.M32, "One-Time Inspection," with exceptions (see Appendices B2.1.1 and B2.1.2). The exceptions to the GALL Report were found acceptable in previous NRC SERs.

In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-1 the applicant identified cumulative fatigue damage and cracking as AERMs applicable to the vessel drain line. The applicant uses TLAA to manage cumulative fatigue damage and the BWR Penetration Program and Water Chemistry Control Program to manage cracking. Because of the size of the drain line volumetric examination is not required by ASME Code Section XI. In response to the staff's request for information about the adequacy of the AMP applicable to the reactor vessel drain line which is not volumetrically examined the applicant stated that the ASME Section XI pressure test is performed every refueling outage. As a function of the pressure test a concurrent VT-2 examination is performed according to acceptance standards stated in Subsection IWB-3522. Any source of leakage detected during this examination must be located and evaluated according to Subsection IWA-5250 prior to return of the system to service. One source of leakage could be from through-wall pitting or crevice corrosion as the applicable loss of material mechanism for stainless steel piping and components. Also performed under the ISI program according to the Subsection IWB-3517 acceptance standards is a VT-1 examination of all reactor vessel drain line bolting, studs, and

nuts at every inspection interval. The staff considers the reactor vessel drain line AMPs effective for the period of extended operation.

The staff, however, requested, during the audit, that the applicant submit information about its plant-specific experience related to IGSCC of the reactor coolant pressure boundary piping, mitigative actions taken, and revised inspection schedules following the BWRVIP-75 guidelines. The staff requested that the applicant provide information about its implementation of HWC and NMCA at NMP2 and how implementation has affected monitoring of water chemistry parameters. In response the applicant stated that there have been two indications of potential IGSCC at NMP2. A mechanical stress improvement process was applied to one of the welds to improve the residual stress distribution in the region of the flaw to eliminate the potential for flaw growth. The weld has been classified as a GL 88-01 Category E weld and will be inspected once every six years. The second indication was repaired by weld overlay. The scope and the schedule of inspection for IGSCC are according to GL 88-01 as modified by BWRVIP-75. The current inspection schedule except for Category A welds subsumed in the alternate Risk-Informed ISI Program is according to the revised inspection frequency allowed by BWRVIP-75 for normal water chemistry. With respect to implementation of HWC and NMCA NMP2 treated the reactor vessel internals with noble metal chemicals in September 2000 and began injecting hydrogen into reactor water in January 2001. Under HWC versus normal water chemistry the electrochemical potential is monitored with a goal of  $< -0.23V$  standard hydrogen reference electrode (SHE) for the effectiveness of HWC. For NMP2 the significant change in water chemistry control when HWC is in operation is the addition of hydrogen-to-oxygen molar ratio monitoring as an indirect means of determining the electrochemical potential.

The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified appropriate aging effects for the components in the NMP2 reactor recirculation system.

Conclusion. The staff concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited for managing them for the reactor recirculation system and that the components' intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the USAR supplement adequately describes the AMPs credited for managing aging in the reactor coolant system – recirculation system as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.1B.2.3.5 Reactor Vessel, Internals, and Reactor Coolant System – NMP2 Control Rod Drive System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-5

The NMP2 CRD System is designed to change core reactivity by changing the position of control rods within the reactor core in response to manual control signals and to scram the reactor in response to manual or automatic signals. The system also provides water to the nuclear boiler instrumentation system reference leg backfill injection lines and the reactor water cleanup and reactor recirculation pump seals.

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. The applicant's plant-specific AMRs for the CRD system components are in ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-5. The specific NMP2 CRD system components with AMR results not consistent with or addressed in the GALL Report and within the scope of ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-5 include:

- CRD system accumulators

- CRD hydraulic control units
- CRD system piping and fittings
- CRD system valves

The applicant identified materials of fabrication for these CRD system components as including carbon and low alloy steels. The applicant identified applicable environments for these CRD system components as treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but less than  $482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environments (i.e., the reactor coolant or its steam environment).

The applicant credited the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs with managing loss of material for the CRD system accumulators, hydraulic control units, and valves. The applicant also credited the One-Time Inspection Program and the Water Chemistry Control Program with managing cracking of the CRD system piping and fittings.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-5, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the NMP2 CRD system components. The staff's assessment of the CRD system components not consistent with or addressed in the GALL Report for NMP2 is provided here. It should be noted that the assessments for the NMP2 CRD system piping and fittings and CRD system valves are in SER Section 3.0.3.

#### CRD System Accumulators and Hydraulic Control Units

*Identification of Aging Effects* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-5 the applicant identified loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion as an aging effect applicable to the CRD system accumulators and the CRD hydraulic control units fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel and exposed to an environment of treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but less than  $482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environments. These components are made from materials and exposed to environments similar to those for the steel and stainless steel isolation condenser components exposed to reactor coolant as identified in the SRP-LR Revision 1.

The applicant identified loss of material due to crevice, general, and pitting corrosion as aging effects in carbon and low alloy steel when these materials are exposed to the reactor coolant or its steam environment. The staff found the applicant's determination acceptable.

*Aging Management Programs* - In ALRA Table 3.1.2.B-5 the applicant credited the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs with aging management of loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for the CRD system accumulators and the CRD hydraulic control units. The SRP-LR Revision 1 does not address an AMP for these component, material, and environment combinations; however, the SRP-LR Revision 1 does address the AMPs (One-Time Inspection Program and the Water Chemistry Control Program) for this material and environment combination consistent with programs that the applicant identified with managing loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion. Therefore, the staff found the applicant's proposal acceptable. The applicant's One-Time Inspection Program is a new AMP consistent with GALL AMP XI.M32. The staff's evaluation of the One-Time Inspection Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4. The applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program is an AMP consistent with GALL AMP XI.M2. The staff's evaluation of the Water Chemistry Program is in Section 3.0.3.2.2.

Conclusion. The staff reviewed the applicant's plant-specific AMRs for evaluating the CRD system components exposed to the treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but less than



482 °F, low flow environments. For these AMRs the staff determined that the applicant had identified the aging effects applicable for components that are exposed to these environments. The staff also determined that the applicant had credited either an appropriate inspection-based AMP, an appropriate mitigation-based AMP, or combination of these strategies with managing the aging effects applicable to the CRD system components that are exposed to these environments. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the aging effects of the NMP2 CRD system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.1B.3 Conclusion**

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP2 reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplement program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing aging of the reactor vessel, internals, and reactor coolant systems, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

## **3.2 Aging Management of Engineered Safety Features**

### **3.2A NMP1 Aging Management of Engineered Safety Features**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the engineered safety features (ESF) systems components and component groups associated with the following systems:

- containment spray system
- core spray system
- emergency cooling system

#### **3.2A.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.2, the applicant provided AMR results for the ESF systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.2.1.A, "NMP1 Summary of Aging Management Programs for the Engineered Safety Features Systems Evaluated in Chapter V of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the ESF systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### 3.2A.2 Staff Evaluation

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.2 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the ESF systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.2A.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.2A.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.2A.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.2A.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the UFSAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the ESF systems components.

Table 3.2A-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP1 components, aging effects/mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.2, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.2A-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP1 Engineered Safety Features Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Piping, fittings, and valves in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.A-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.3, Metal Fatigue Analysis

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Piping, fittings, pumps, and valves in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.A-02)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.2.2)
Components in containment spray (PWR only), standby gas treatment (BWR only), containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.A-03)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Plant-specific	Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.10), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20), Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.2.2)
Piping, fittings, pumps, and valves in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.A-04)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.2.3)
Components in containment spray (PWR only), standby gas treatment (BWR only), containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.A-05)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Plant-specific	Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.10), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20), Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.2.3)
Containment isolation valves and associated piping (Item Number 3.2.1.A-06)	Loss of material due to MIC	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.2A.2.2.4)
Seals in standby gas treatment system (Item Number 3.2.1.A-07)	Changes in properties due to elastomer degradation	Plant-specific	Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32), Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.2.5)
High pressure safety injection (charging) pump miniflow orifice (Item Number 3.2.1.A-08)	Loss of material due to erosion	Plant specific	None	Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Drywell and suppression chamber spray system nozzles and flow orifices (Item Number 3.2.1.A-09)	Plugging of flow orifice and spray nozzles by general corrosion products	Plant specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.2A.2.2.7)
External surface of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.2.1.A-10)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Plant specific	Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.2.2)
Piping and fittings of CASS in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.A-11)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging embrittlement	Thermal aging embrittlement of CASS	None	Not applicable  There are no CASS piping and fittings with this aging effect/ mechanism in NMP1 ESF system
Components serviced by open-cycle cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.A-12)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling; buildup of deposit due to biofouling	Open-cycle cooling water system	None	Not applicable  Heat exchangers not serviced by open-cycle cooling system
Components serviced by closed-cycle cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.A-13)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Closed-cycle cooling water system	None	Not applicable  No components serviced by closed-cycle cooling water system
Emergency core cooling system valves and lines to and from HPCI and RCIC pump turbines (Item Number 3.2.1.A-14)	Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (B2.1.9)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.1)  Not applicable for HPCI lines and RCIC pump turbines
Pumps, valves, piping, and fittings in containment spray and emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.A-15)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Water chemistry	None	Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Pumps, valves, piping, and fittings in emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.A-16)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IGSCC	Water chemistry and BWR stress corrosion cracking	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program (B2.1.6), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.1.1)
Carbon steel components (Item Number 3.2.1.A-17)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion	None	Not applicable, PWR only
Closure bolting in high pressure or high temperature systems (Item Number 3.2.1.A-18)	Loss of material due to general corrosion; crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and/or SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.2A.2.1)

The staff's review of the NMP1 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.2A.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the ESF systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.2A.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the ESF systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.2A.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the ESF systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the ESF systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.2A.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.2.2.A, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the ESF systems components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.2.2.A-1 through 3.2.2.A-3, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the ESF systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different AMP is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified

AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.2A.2.1.1 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC and IGSCC

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.2.1.A Item 3.2.1.A-16 the applicant stated that for small-bore valves and piping the One-Time Inspection Program is used to manage this aging effect and aging effect mechanism. The GALL Report suggests using the BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program and Water Chemistry Control Program for managing SCC and IGSCC in pumps, valves, piping, and fittings in emergency core cooling systems.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that for ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-3 line item component type piping and fittings, material type wrought austenitic stainless steel, aging effect cracking, and the One-Time Inspection Program it was not clear whether these components also are age-managed by the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Programs. It was also not clear to which components the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program applied within this component type grouping. The staff requested the applicant to clarify this line item.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that for the components in the subject line item the BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program was not credited because this line item is for small bore piping. Piping and fittings in the emergency condenser system age- managed by the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program, are not included in its BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program either because they are small bore piping (<4 inches nominal diameter), they are in a low temperature environment, or they are not made from austenitic stainless steel material. However, the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program in addition to its One-Time Inspection Program should have been credited for this line item. The subject line item was revised to credit the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program in addition to its One-Time Inspection Program for managing cracking for this component group. Note 10 was also added to the "Notes" column.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and determined that after revision of the applicant's AMR line item as described the use of its Water Chemistry Control Program to manage cracking is consistent with the GALL Report. Because the line item component is small bore piping and fittings the applicant's BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program is not applicable and its One-Time Inspection Program is an adequate alternative.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the

GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### ***3.2A.2.2 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.2.2.C of the letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as recommended by the GALL Report for the ESF systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of material due to general corrosion
- local loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion
- local loss of material due to MIC
- changes in properties due to elastomer degradation
- local loss of material due to erosion
- buildup of deposits due to corrosion

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.



#### 3.2A.2.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In Section 3.2.2.C.1 of the letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's according to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### 3.2A.2.2.2 Loss of Material due to General Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.1.

In Section 3.2.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material at locations with stagnant flow conditions due to general corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings associated with some of the BWR emergency core cooling systems and with lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.1 states that the management of loss of material due to general corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings associated with some of the BWR emergency core cooling systems and with lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system should be evaluated further. The AMP relies on monitoring and control of primary water chemistry based on EPRI guidelines to mitigate degradation. However, control of primary water chemistry does not prevent loss of material due to general corrosion at locations of stagnant flow conditions. Therefore, the effectiveness of the applicant's Chemistry Control Program should be verified to ensure that corrosion does not occur.

The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage loss of material due to general corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program. A one-time inspection of select components at susceptible locations is an acceptable method to determine whether an aging effect and aging effect mechanism does not occur or progresses very slowly so the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

In its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that for NMP1 the containment spray, core spray, emergency cooling, and main steam (for automatic depressurization) systems are applicable. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff reviewed the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs and its evaluations are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

In addition the staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.2.

In Section 3.2.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also addressed loss of material due to general corrosion of components in the standby gas treatment, containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.2 also states that loss of material due to general corrosion could occur in the drywell and suppression chamber spray systems header and spray nozzle components, standby gas treatment system components, containment isolation valves and associated piping, the automatic depressurization system piping and fittings, emergency core cooling system header piping and fittings and spray nozzles, and the external surfaces of carbon steel components. The GALL Report recommends further plant-specific evaluation to ensure adequate aging effect and aging effect mechanism management.

In its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for NMP1 the applicable systems are the containment spray, core spray, emergency cooling, reactor building ventilation (for standby gas treatment), and main steam (for automatic pressurization) systems. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism for internal surfaces is managed by the One-Time Inspection Program, Preventive Maintenance Program, or Open-Cycle Cooling Water Program. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism for external surfaces of carbon steel components in the emergency core cooling system is managed by the Systems Walkdown Program.

The staff review and evaluations of the applicant's One-Time Inspection, Preventive Maintenance, Open-Cycle Cooling Water, and Systems Walkdown Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.3.1, 3.0.3.2.7, and 3.0.3.3.2, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.2.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2A.2.2.3 Local Loss of Material Due to Pitting and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.1.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material at locations with stagnant flow conditions due to pitting and crevice corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings associated with some of the BWR emergency core cooling systems and with lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.1 states that the management of local loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings associated with some of the BWR emergency core cooling system piping and fittings and with lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system should be evaluated further. The AMP relies on monitoring and control of primary water chemistry based on EPRI guidelines to mitigate degradation. However, control of coolant water chemistry does not prevent loss of material due to crevice and pitting corrosion at locations of stagnant flow conditions. Therefore, the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program should be verified to ensure that corrosion does not occur. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of

programs to manage the loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the containment spray, core spray, and emergency cooling systems are applicable for NMP1. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by a combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff's review and evaluations of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

In addition the staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.2.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also addressed loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion of components in the standby gas treatment, containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.2 states that local loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion could occur in the containment isolation valves and associated piping and automatic depressurization system piping and fittings. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure adequate aging effect and aging effect mechanism management.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the containment spray, core spray, emergency cooling, and main steam (for automatic depressurization) systems are applicable for NMP1. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the One-Time Inspection Program, the Preventive Maintenance Program, or the Open-Cycle Cooling Water Program.

The staff's review and evaluations of the applicant's One-Time Inspection, Preventive Maintenance, and Open-Cycle Cooling Water Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.3.1 and 3.0.3.2.7, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria in the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3. For those line items that apply to Section 3.2.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2A.2.2.4 Local Loss of Material Due to Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.4.

The applicant stated in Section 3.2.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of local loss of material due to microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) in containment isolation valves and associated piping is not applicable to NMP. The applicant considers MIC an aging effect and aging effect mechanism for systems with raw water as an environment. NMP1 has no raw water environment for containment isolation valves or the associated piping. Therefore, this issue is not applicable. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that the local loss of material due to MIC in containment isolation valves and associated piping is not applicable to NMP1.

Because NMP1 has no containment isolation valves subject to this aging effect and aging effect mechanism the staff determined that it is not applicable to NMP1.

#### 3.2A.2.2.5 Changes in Properties Due to Elastomer Degradation

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.5.

In Section 3.2.2.C.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed change in material properties of seals in the standby gas treatment system.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.5 states that changes in properties due to elastomer degradation could occur in seals associated with the standby gas treatment system ductwork and filters. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure adequate aging effect and aging effect mechanism management.

In the ALRA the applicant also stated the NMP1 reactor building ventilation system provides the equivalent function of a standby gas treatment system. For the internal surfaces of the system's seals (grouped with blowers) aging effects/mechanisms are managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. For external surfaces the aging effects/mechanisms are managed by the Systems Walkdown Program. The staff's review and evaluations of the applicant's Preventive Maintenance and Systems Walkdown Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.1 and 3.0.3.3.2.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.5. For those line items that apply to Section 3.2.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2A.2.2.6 Local Loss of Material Due to Erosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.6 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.6.

In Section 3.2.2.C.6 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

Because NMP is a BWR the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP.

#### 3.2A.2.2.7 Buildup of Deposits Due to Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.7.

In Section 3.2.2.C.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed the plugging of components due to general corrosion in the spray nozzles and flow orifices of the drywell and suppression chamber spray system.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.7 states that the plugging of components due to general corrosion could occur in the spray nozzles and flow orifices of the drywell and suppression chamber spray system. This aging effect and aging effect mechanism applies since the spray nozzles and flow orifices are wetted occasionally even though most of the time this system is on standby. The wetting and drying of these components can aid in the acceleration of this particular corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure adequate aging effect and aging effect mechanism management.

In Section 3.2.2.C.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the NMP1 containment spray system contains the subject spray nozzles and flow orifices. Plugging of spray nozzles due to general corrosion is not an applicable aging effect and aging effect mechanism as these components are stainless steel and not susceptible to general corrosion. The plugging of flow orifices due to general corrosion is not an applicable aging effect and aging effect mechanism because the lines containing these components are drained completely following each system operation in which they are wetted. The draining ensures that no corrosion products accumulate in the flow orifices. The flow orifices are located in the containment spray heat exchanger drain lines such that plugging would not be impact the intended safety function adversely.

The staff found that general corrosion of stainless steel spray nozzles is not an effect/mechanism requiring aging management. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that plugging of orifices has no adverse impact upon the intended function of the system.

### 3.2A.2.2.8 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 provides the staff's evaluation of the applicant's quality assurance program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.2A.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.2.2.A-1 through 3.2.2.A-3, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.2.2.A-1 through 3.2.2.A-3, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and AERM does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.2A.2.3.1 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP1 Containment Spray System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-1

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the containment spray system component groups.

The staff reviewed the following original LRA Table 3.2.2.A-1 line items for the NMP1 Containment Spray System.

- Wrought stainless steel bolting in an air environment where the applicant identified no aging effect.

- Loss of material of gray cast iron external surfaces in an air environment is managed by the Systems Walkdown Program. The applicant stated that this line item is for external surfaces of carbon steel components not in the GALL Report (Note F, 4).
- Loss of material for carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength <100 ksi) filters/strainers in a demineralized untreated water low flow environment is managed by the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment (Note H).
- Loss of material as an aging effect for gray cast iron pumps in a treated water, temperature <140 °F, low flow environment is managed by the One-Time Inspection, Water Chemistry Control, and Selective Leaching of Materials Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment (Note H).

As to the evaluation of no aging effects for wrought stainless steel bolting in an air environment, the staff requested the applicant, in RAI 3.2-1 dated November 17, 2004, to discuss how cracking and loss of pre-load resulting in loss of mechanical closure integrity are managed for these bolts. In addition, the staff requested that the applicant address how the aging effects are managed for inaccessible bolts.

In its response dated December 21, 2004, and as amended (ALRA) by attachment 1 to NMP1L-1960 letter dated July 14, 2005, the applicant stated:

The wrought austenitic stainless steel bolting in an air environment in [the original] LRA Table 3.2.2.A-1 is in the NMP1 Containment Spray System. Since the environment was identified in the aging management review (AMR) as air, cracking and loss of preload were not identified as aging effects for wrought austenitic stainless steel bolting. The maximum typical operating temperature (based on the internal environments assigned to components in this system) is < 140 °F. Loss of preload would not typically be an aging effect requiring management for bolting in low temperature systems. NUREG-1801 only specifies loss of preload as an aging effect requiring management for components in the reactor vessel and internals and reactor coolant pressure boundary. The only mechanisms for cracking affecting wrought austenitic stainless steel bolting are stress corrosion cracking and cyclic loading (fatigue). Stress corrosion cracking and thermal fatigue are not aging effects requiring management for wrought austenitic stainless steel at temperatures less than 140CF. Therefore, loss of mechanical closure integrity is not an aging effect requiring management for bolting in the NMP1 Containment Spray System.

With respect to inaccessible bolts, there are no bolts in the NMP1 Containment Spray System that are inaccessible for examination. The only aging effect requiring management for any bolting in the Containment Spray System is loss of material for carbon or low alloy steel bolting, yield strengths > 100 ksi, in an air environment. This aging effect is managed by the Systems Walkdown Program (described in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.33), which performs visual examinations of accessible surfaces for loss of material. The inspection criteria of the Systems Walkdown Program require that bolted joints be inspected for corrosion of external surfaces, and will be enhanced to add inspection for evidence of leakage, which does not require the bolted joints to be disassembled.

This enhancement is described in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.33 (page B-65), under the "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" heading.

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant justified the absence of aging effects of wrought austenitic bolting in an air environment in the NMP1 containment spray system. The applicant also satisfactorily explained managing the loss of material for carbon or low alloy steel bolting in an air environment in the NMP1 containment spray system, and thus the staff's concern in RAI 3.2-1 is resolved.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Systems Walkdown Program are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.2

As to the loss of material of gray cast iron external surfaces in an air environment managed by the Systems Walkdown Program the applicant stated that this line item is for external surfaces of carbon steel components not in the GALL Report (Note F, 4). The staff found the management of the aging effect for external surfaces of this material in an air environment reasonable and acceptable because the Systems Walkdown Program contains adequate provisions. The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Systems Walkdown Program are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.2.

As to the evaluation of loss of material for carbon and low alloy steel (yield strength <100 ksi), filters/strainers in a demineralized untreated water (<140 °F), low flow environment the applicant proposed to manage this aging effect by the One-Time inspection and the Water Chemistry Control Programs. The staff found these AMPs appropriate and acceptable for managing loss of material in this environment.

The applicant also stated in the ALRA:

This item applies to the four (4) Containment Spray Pump Discharge Strainers (STR-80-09, STR-80-10, STR-80-29, and STR-80-30). The internals of these strainers were removed as part of the modification to address NRC Bulletin 96-003, "Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in Boiling-Water Reactors." Additionally, the strainer bodies are made of carbon steel. These are ASME Section XI Class 2 components. As such, the bodies of the strainers are subject only to the VT-2 examination under examination category C-H, 'All Pressure Retaining Components.' The VT-2 examination is conducted during the system pressure test during each inspection period. VT-2 examinations are conducted to detect evidence of leakage only. The water source is torus water, so the environment for these strainers is demineralized untreated water, low flow. The chemistry action levels and sampling frequencies for the torus water are specified in NMP1 procedure S-CTP-V666, 'Auxiliary Systems Chemistry'.

The staff found these tests and inspections reasonable and acceptable because they conform to ASME Section XI requirements and industry practice.

The staff's review of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs is provided in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.



As to loss of material as an aging effect for gray cast iron pumps in a treated water, temperature <140 °F, low flow environment the applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the SRP-LR for this component, material, and environment (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. This aging effect is managed by the One-Time Inspection, Water Chemistry Control, and Selective Leaching of Materials Programs. The staff's initial evaluation of the management of the aging effects for this component is discussed in RAI 3.4-2.

In RAI 3.4-2, dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant discuss the following:

- Bases for visual, VT, or other inspection methods, frequency of inspections, and acceptance criteria
- Bases for sampling of the pumps to detect selective leaching and whether hardness tests will be performed.

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated:

The gray cast iron pumps with an internal environment of treated water (temperature <140 °F), are the two condensate transfer pumps. The aging effect requiring management is loss of material. The aging mechanisms to be managed by the One-Time Inspection Program and the Water Chemistry Control Program include crevice corrosion, general corrosion, and pitting corrosion. The One-Time Inspection Program is a new license renewal (LR) AMP commitment for NMP that is to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. This commitment was made in the original LRA submittal, as supplemented by NMPNS letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. As such, program documents or procedures specific to managing the aging mechanisms (i.e. crevice corrosion, general corrosion and pitting corrosion), specific inspection methods and acceptance criteria for the two condensate transfer pumps do not currently exist. The frequency of any future inspections for the aging mechanisms of crevice corrosion, general corrosion and pitting corrosion will be based on the findings of the One-Time Inspection Program. However, as stated in Appendix B2.1.20, the One-Time Inspection Program will be implemented consistent with NUREG-1801, Section XI.M32.

As presented in ALRA Sections A1.1.33 and B2.1.21, the implementation of the Selective Leaching of Materials Program is addressed in the program description for the One-Time Inspection Program (see ALRA Sections A1.1.28 and B2.1.20). The One-Time Inspection Program is a new LR AMP commitment for NMP to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation so program documents or procedures for managing the aging mechanism of selective leaching for the two condensate transfer pumps do not exist; however, as stated in ALRA Section B2.1.21, the Selective Leaching Program will be implemented consistent with GALL AMP XI.M33 (NMP1 Commitment 23 and NMP2 Commitment 21).

A determination of whether hardness tests are necessary will be made at the time of the One-Time Inspection Program implementation. This timing is consistent with ALRA Section B2.1.20, which states that inspection techniques may include a one-time visual inspection and hardness measurement. Hardness testing will be considered as a possible inspection technique if visual examination techniques alone cannot determine whether selective

leaching severe enough to affect the component intended function is occurring. The use of field hardness testing will also be contingent on the accessibility of the affected component surfaces.

Hardness testing on components susceptible to selective leaching may be appropriate if the component configuration and geometry allow. Tubing and other components like valves with complex internal geometry do not provide adequate access to internal surfaces requiring examination for accurate measurements.

This above information is reflected in its ALRA, and the staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant's tests and inspection methods are consistent with industry practice and the GALL Report guidelines.

The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment of the NMP1 containment spray system components.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the containment spray system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2A.2.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP1 Core Spray System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-2

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the core spray system component groups.

The staff reviewed the following original LRA Table 3.2.2.A-2 items in the NMP1 Core Spray System:

- Loss of material of gray cast iron external surfaces in an air environment is managed by the System Walkdown Program. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for carbon steel components to which this item applies (Note F,4).
- Cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel filters/strainers in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140$  °F but  $< 212$  °F, low flow environment is managed by the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).
- Cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel flow orifices in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140$  °F but  $< 212$  °F, low flow environment is managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsection IWB, IWC, IWD) ISI, Water Chemistry Control, and One-Time Inspection Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).
- Copper Alloy (Zinc  $> 15$  percent) and aluminum bronze heat exchangers in a lubricating oil environment for which the applicant has identified no aging effect. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).

- Loss of material of gray cast iron pumps in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environment is managed by One-Time Inspection, Selective Leaching of Materials, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The applicant stated that the loss of material of gray cast iron external surfaces in an air environment managed by the Systems Walkdown Program applies to external surfaces of carbon steel components not in the GALL Report (Note F, 4). The staff found the management of the aging effect for external surfaces of this material in an air environment reasonable and acceptable because the Systems Walkdown Program is adequate to manage this aging effect. The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Systems Walkdown Program are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.2. The staff agreed with the applicant's statement that this item applies to carbon steel components not in the GALL Report (Note F, 4).

The applicant stated that the cracking aging effect of wrought austenitic stainless steel filters/strainers in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs is not in the GALL Report for this component, material and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff's review of the aging management of this component is in RAI 3.2-7.

In RAI 3.2-7 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant address the specific tests and inspections, frequency of inspections, and acceptance criteria for the strainers and filters to ensure performance of their intended function in the identified environment.

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated that:

The components addressed by this AMR line item are the two core spray pump suction strainers located in the torus. Torus water is managed under the Water Chemistry Control Program, which is described in original LRA Section B2.1.2, as supplemented by NMPNS letter NMPIL 1880 dated October 29, 2004. The chemistry action levels and sampling frequencies for the torus water are provided in the response to RAI 3.2-2. These limits are identical to those specified in EPRI TR-103515-R2, 'BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines -2000 Revision.'

The One-Time Inspection Program is described in original LRA Section B2.1.20, as supplemented by NMPNS letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. The One-Time Inspection Program is a new program that will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, the procedures needed to answer this question have not yet been developed. However, the One-Time Inspection Program will be consistent with NUREG-1801, Section XI.M32 (One-Time Inspection) when implemented. The One-Time Inspection Program Attribute Assessment (PAA) addresses program implementation at NMPNS relative to the requirements of Appendix A of NUREG-1800. The One-Time Inspection PAA is available on-site at NMPNS for review.

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant's AMPs will be consistent with industry practice and GALL Report requirements.

The staff review and evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively. The staff agreed with the applicant's statement that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The staff review in RAI 3.2-7 applies also to the component, material, and environment combination of cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel flow orifices in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environment managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) ISI and Water Chemistry Control Programs.

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant's AMPs will be consistent with industry practice and GALL Report requirements; therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.2-7 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

The staff's reviews of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2 respectively. The staff agreed with the applicant's statement that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

In RAI 3.2-8 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant discuss its inspection and test activities for the copper alloy (zinc  $>15$  percent) and aluminum bronze heat exchangers in a lubricating oil environment for which the applicant has identified no aging effect to ensure that the lubricating oil remains free of contaminants and water content.

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated that, "Lube oil samples from the NMP1 core spray pump motor cooler (i.e., heat exchanger) oil subsystems are obtained on an annual basis according to site procedure N1-CTP-V520, 'Lube Oil Sampling,' and the oil sample results are evaluated and trended. Any indication of an anomalous condition or adverse trend will result in an investigation under the site corrective action program."

The staff found the response acceptable because the applicant's inspection and test activities ensure that the lubricating oil remains free of contaminants and water content. The staff also agreed with the applicant's statement that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).

In RAI 3.2-10, dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional details relating to test and inspection methods for the loss of material of gray cast iron pumps in a treated water temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environment managed by One-Time Inspection, Selective Leaching of Materials, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. Specifically the staff requested that the applicant provide (a) the basis for selecting a representative sample for the one-time inspection and (b) inspection methods to detect selective leaching. Also the applicant was requested to indicate whether hardness tests would be performed.

In its response by letter dated December 21 2004, the applicant stated:

The basis for selecting representative samples for the one-time inspection are stated in original LRA Section B2.1.20, supplemented by NMPNS letter NMP1 L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. The process for identifying the population of potentially affected components will be based upon common characteristics of the components, such as material of construction, fabrication process, operating environment, and aging effects. From the selected population, a sample size will be determined to provide a 90 percent confidence that 90 percent of the population does not have the degradation mechanism present. This terminology and methodology are consistent with EPRI TR107514, 'Age Related Degradation Inspection Method and Determination.'

The inspection methods used to detect selective leaching will be consistent with original LRA Section B2.1.20, which states that inspection techniques may include a one-time visual inspection and hardness measurement. Hardness testing will be considered as a possible inspection technique if visual examination techniques alone cannot determine that selective leaching is severe enough to affect the component's intended function. The use of field hardness testing will also be contingent on the accessibility of the affected component surfaces to perform the test. Hardness testing on components susceptible to selective leaching may be appropriate if the component configuration and geometry allows. Tubing and other components such as valves with complex internal geometry do not provide adequate physical access to internal surfaces requiring examination to allow accurate measurements to be made.

The One-Time Inspection Program is a new program that will be developed and implemented prior to the period of extended operation [NMP1 Commitment 23 and NMP2 Commitment 21]. The One-Time Inspection Program Attribute Assessment (PAA) addresses program implementation at NMPNS relative to the requirements of Appendix A of NUREG-1800.

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the inspection methods are according to industry practice and NRC requirements. The staff also agreed with the applicant that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). This information has been incorporated into the ALRA.

The staff's reviews of the Selective Leaching of Materials, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs are provided in the SER Sections 3.0.3.1.5, 3.0.3.1.4, and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment associated with the NMP1 core spray system components.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the core spray system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.2A.2.3.3 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP1 Emergency Cooling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-3

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-3, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the emergency cooling system component groups.

The staff reviewed the following ALRA Table 3.2.2.A-3 items in the NMP1 emergency cooling system:

- Cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) bolting in non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated according to 10 CFR 54.21(c). (By attachment 2 to NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)
- Cracking and loss of material of wrought austenitic stainless steel heat exchangers in a moist air, wetting, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) ISI and Preventive Maintenance Programs. The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material and component (Note G).
- Aluminum and aluminum alloyed with manganese, magnesium, and magnesium plus silicon tanks in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment for which the applicant has identified no aging effect.
- Cracking of aluminum alloy (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying element) valves in a treated water  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  environment managed by ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) ISI, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).

The staff found the deletion by attachment 2 to NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005, of the cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) bolting in non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated according to 10 CFR 54.21(c) acceptable because cumulative fatigue damage of this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

In its initial review in RAI 3.2-12 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide information as to cracking and loss of material of wrought austenitic stainless steel heat exchangers in moist air, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  environment managed by the ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) ISI and Preventive Maintenance Programs for these heat exchanger components:

- (a) parameters monitored or inspected
- (b) methods of detection of aging effects
- (c) frequency of inspections including monitoring and trending
- (d) acceptance criteria and their bases

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated that the subject wrought austenitic stainless steel heat exchangers in a moist air (temperature  $>140^{\circ}\text{F}$ ) environment

listed in the original LRA Table 3.2.2.A-3 consist of the four NMP1 emergency condensers and that the aging effects requiring management are cracking and loss of material.

By letter dated December 6, 2004, the applicant submitted supplemental information to the original LRA Section 3.1 including revisions to the AMPs for the NMP1 emergency condensers. Specifically the original LRA Table 3.1.1.A item numbers 3.1.1.A-03 and 3.1.1.A-09 were revised to indicate that the emergency condensers were managed by a combination of the Water Chemistry Control, ASME Section XI (Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD) ISI, and Preventive Maintenance Programs. The emergency condenser vent is monitored continuously in the control room for radioactivity, and a justification for not performing eddy current testing of the condenser tubes was provided. The applicant stated that because the Water Chemistry Control and ASME Section XI Programs are well established in the industry and credited in the GALL Report and because the applicant's programs are consistent with the GALL Report guidelines with justified exceptions the four categories of information requested were provided for the Preventive Maintenance Program only.

Regarding the Preventive Maintenance Program the applicant stated:

- (1) The Preventive Maintenance Program includes temperature monitoring of water in the emergency cooling steam and return lines adjacent to the emergency condensers and in the shell of the emergency condensers. The parameters monitored are water temperature at the inlet and outlet of the condensers and on the shell side of the condensers.
- (2) The methods of detection of cracking and loss of material aging effects are through the potential impacts on system temperatures consistent with GALL Report guidelines.
- (3) Temperature monitoring of the emergency condensers is conducted continuously through installed instrumentation with local indications and alarms in the control room. Twice a year the temperature data are collected and analyzed to determine if any detrimental effects have occurred.
- (4) The temperature monitoring procedure contains separate acceptance criteria for the steam inlet piping, emergency condenser shell water, and condensate return line piping. The acceptance criteria are based upon design analyses to prevent damage to the piping and condensers.

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the inspection methods described are according to ASME Section XI requirements and GALL Report guidelines.

The staff evaluation of aluminum and aluminum alloyed with manganese, magnesium, and magnesium plus silicon tanks in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  environment for which the applicant has identified no aging effect is in RAI 3.2-14.

In RAI 3.2-14 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide the following information about the aging management of the tanks:

- (1) ASTM designation or specific alloy content of the material
- (2) Bases for the conclusion of no aging effects in this environment (for example, EPRI, ASTM, or similar reference documents with supporting data)

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated:

There are two tanks in the NMP1 emergency cooling system that are made of aluminum alloy with magnesium in a treated water (temperature <140 °F) environment. These tanks (TANK-60-9 and TANK-60-10), provide the demineralized water make-up to the emergency condensers and are in-scope and subject to AMR.

- (1) The tanks are made of wrought-aluminum alloy 5052-H34, which is essentially pure aluminum with 2.5 percent magnesium and 0.25 percent chromium.
- (2) Aluminum alloyed with magnesium has good corrosion resistance in a treated water (temperature <140 °F ) environment and resists stress corrosion cracking. (Reference, Section 2.1.7 and Section 4 of Appendix A of EPRI TR-1 14882, Non-Class 1 Mechanical Implementation Guideline and Mechanical Tools, Revision 3.)

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant had provided the bases for the conclusion of no aging effects in the alloyed aluminum tanks.

The applicant stated as to cracking of aluminum alloy (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) valves in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140$  °F, environment managed by ASME Section XI, (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) ISI, One-Time Inspection, and Water Chemistry Control Programs that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). The staff concurred with this statement; therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.2-14 is resolved.

In RAI 3.2-15 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide the following information:

- a) ASTM designation or specific alloy content of the material
- b) Bases for the conclusion that cracking is the only aging effect in this environment and EPRI, ASTM, or similar supporting documentary references

In its response dated December 21, 2004 the applicant stated:

There are six valves in the NMP1 Emergency Cooling System that are made of aluminum alloy (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) in a treated water (temperature <140 °F ) environment. These valves (BV-60-01, BV-60-02, VLV-60-07, VLV-60-08, VLV-60-11 and VLV-60-12) are in-scope and subject to AMR.

- a) The valves are made of aluminum alloy SB-26 (no grade).
- b) Aluminum alloyed with copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements is resistant to general corrosion in a treated water (temperature <140 °F ) environment, but is susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, as discussed in EPRI TR-1 14882, "Non-Class 1 Mechanical Implementation Guideline and Mechanical Tools," Revision 3.



The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant had provided appropriate bases for the conclusion that stress corrosion cracking is the only AERM in this material-environment combination; therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.2-15 is resolved.

The staff found further that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment of the NMP1 emergency cooling system components and, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.2-15 is resolved. The above information is reflected in the ALRA.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the emergency cooling system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, the staff found that the applicant appropriately evaluated AMR results involving material, environment, AERMs, and AMP combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.2A.3 Conclusion**

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP1 ESF systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing aging of the ESF systems, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.2B NMP2 Aging Management of Engineered Safety Features**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the ESF systems components and component groups associated with the following NMP2 systems:

- hydrogen recombiner system
- high pressure core spray system
- low pressure core spray system
- reactor core isolation cooling system
- residual heat removal system
- standby gas treatment system

#### **3.2B.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.2, the applicant provided AMR results for the ESF systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.2.1.B, "NMP2 Summary of Aging Management Programs for the Engineered Safety Features Systems Evaluated in Chapter V of NUREG-1801," the

applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the ESF systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### **3.2B.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.2 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the ESF systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.2B.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.2B.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.2B.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.2B.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the USAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the ESF systems components.

Table 3.2B-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP2 components, aging effects/mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.2, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.2B-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP2 Engineered Safety Features Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Piping, fittings, and valves in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.B-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.3, Metal Fatigue Analysis
Piping, fittings, pumps, and valves in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.B-02)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.2.2)
Components in containment spray (PWR only), standby gas treatment (BWR only), containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.B-03)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Plant specific	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.2.2)
Piping, fittings, pumps, and valves in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.B-04)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.2.3)
Components in containment spray (PWR only), standby gas treatment (BWR only), containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.B-05)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Plant-specific	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.2.3)
Containment isolation valves and associated piping (Item Number 3.2.1.B-06)	Loss of material due to microbiologically influenced corrosion	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.2B.2.2.4)
Seals in standby gas treatment system (Item Number 3.2.1.B-07)	Changes in properties due to elastomer degradation	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.2B.2.2.5)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
High pressure safety injection (charging) pump miniflow orifice (Item Number 3.2.1.B-08)	Loss of material due to erosion	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable, PWR only
Drywell and suppression chamber spray system nozzles and flow orifices (Item Number 3.2.1.B-09)	Plugging of flow orifice and spray nozzles due to general corrosion products	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.2B.2.2.7)
External surface of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.2.1.B-10)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Plant-specific	Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.2.2)
Piping and fittings of CASS in emergency core cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.B-11)	Loss of fracture toughness due to thermal aging embrittlement	Thermal aging embrittlement of CASS	None	Not applicable  There are no CASS piping and fittings with this aging effect/mechanism in NMP2
Components serviced by open-cycle cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.B-12)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling; buildup of deposit due to biofouling	Open-cycle cooling water system	Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.10)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.1)
Components serviced by closed-cycle cooling system (Item Number 3.2.1.B-13)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Closed-cycle cooling water system	None	Not applicable  No ESF System components serviced by closed-cycle cooling water system
Emergency core cooling system valves and lines to and from HPCI and RCIC pump turbines (Item Number 3.2.1.B-14)	Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (B2.1.9)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.1)  Not applicable for lines to and from HPCI pump turbine

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Pumps, valves, piping, and fittings in containment spray and emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.B-15)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Water chemistry	None	Not applicable, PWR only
Pumps, valves, piping, and fittings in emergency core cooling systems (Item Number 3.2.1.B-16)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IGSCC	Water chemistry and BWR stress corrosion cracking	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program (B2.1.6), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.2B.2.1)  Not applicable for pumps in emergency core cooling systems
Carbon steel components (Item Number 3.2.1.B-17)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion	None	Not applicable, PWR only

The staff's review of the NMP2 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.2B.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the ESF systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.2B.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the ESF systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.2B.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the ESF systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the ESF systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.2B.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.2.2.B, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the ESF systems components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.2.2.B-1 through 3.2.2.B-6, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the ESF systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether

the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different AMP is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.2B.2.1.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.2.1.B Item 3.2.1.B-01 the applicant stated that piping, fittings, and valves in the emergency core cooling systems may be subject to cumulative fatigue damage and are subject to TLAA. In ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-4 the staff noted that a flexible hose had been included.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the applicant explained that the hose is a flexible bellows welded to end fittings of rigid pipe. A braided stainless steel sheath protects the outer diameter of the bellows. The component is designed to absorb movement, and no TLAA has been performed.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.2B.2.2 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.2.2.C of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as

recommended by the GALL Report for the ESF systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of material due to general corrosion
- local loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion
- local loss of material due to microbiologically influenced corrosion
- changes in properties due to elastomer degradation
- local loss of material due to erosion
- buildup of deposits due to corrosion

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.2B.2.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In Section 3.2.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### 3.2B.2.2.2 Loss of Material Due to General Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.1.

In Section 3.2.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material at locations with stagnant flow conditions due to general corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings of some of the BWR emergency core cooling systems and lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.1 states that the management of loss of material due to general corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings of some of the BWR emergency core cooling systems and of lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system should be evaluated further. The AMP relies on monitoring and control of primary water chemistry based on EPRI guidelines to mitigate degradation; however, control of primary water chemistry does not prevent loss of material due to general corrosion in stagnant flow conditions. Therefore, the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program should be verified to ensure that corrosion does not occur.

The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage loss of material due to general corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program. A one-time inspection of select components at susceptible locations is an acceptable method to determine whether an aging effect and aging effect mechanism is either not occurring



or progressing very slowly so that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

In the letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the applicable NMP2 systems are the high pressure core spray, low pressure core spray, reactor core isolation cooling and residual heat removal systems. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by a combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

In addition the staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.2.

In Section 3.2.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also addressed loss of material due to general corrosion of components in the standby gas treatment, containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.2 states that loss of material due to general corrosion could occur in the drywell and suppression chamber spray systems header and spray nozzle components, standby gas treatment system components, containment isolation valves and associated piping, the automatic depressurization system piping and fittings, emergency core cooling system header piping and fittings and spray nozzles, and the external surfaces of carbon steel components. The GALL Report recommends further plant-specific evaluation to ensure adequate management of the aging effect and aging effect mechanism.

In the letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that the applicable NMP2 systems are the hydrogen recombiner, reactor core isolation cooling, standby gas treatment, and main steam (for automatic depressurization) systems. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism for internal surfaces is managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism for external surfaces of carbon steel components in ECCS systems is managed by the Systems Walkdown Program.

The staff review and evaluations of the applicant's One-Time Inspection and Systems Walkdown Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.3.2, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs have met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.2. For those line items addressed in Section 3.2.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.2B.2.2.3 Local Loss of Material Due to Pitting and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.1.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material in stagnant flow conditions due to pitting and crevice corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings of some of the BWR emergency core cooling systems and of lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.1 states that the management of local loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion of pumps, valves, piping, and fittings of some of the BWR emergency core cooling system piping and fittings and of lines to the suppression chamber and to the drywell and suppression chamber spray system should be evaluated further. The AMP relies on monitoring and control of primary water chemistry based on EPRI guidelines to mitigate degradation; however, control of coolant water chemistry does not prevent loss of material due to crevice and pitting corrosion in stagnant flow conditions. Therefore, the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program should be verified to ensure that corrosion does not occur. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage the loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the applicable NM2 systems are the high pressure core spray, low pressure core spray, reactor core isolation cooling, and residual heat removal systems. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by a combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and the One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

In addition the staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.2.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also addressed loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion of components in the standby gas treatment, containment isolation, and emergency core cooling systems.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3.2 states that local loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion could occur in the containment isolation valves and associated piping and automatic depressurization system piping and fittings. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure adequate management of the aging effect and aging effect mechanism.

In Section 3.2.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the applicable NM2 system is the hydrogen recombiner system. The aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff reviewed the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program and its evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria in the SRP-LR.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs have met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.3. For those line items addressed in Section 3.2.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2B.2.2.4 Local Loss of Material Due to Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.4.

The applicant stated in Section 3.2.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for the local loss of material due to microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) in containment isolation valves and associated piping this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP. NMP considers MIC an aging effect and aging effect mechanism for systems with raw water environments. NMP2 has no raw water environment for containment isolation valves or associated piping; therefore, this issue is not applicable for NMP2. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that the local loss of material due to MIC in containment isolation valves and associated piping is not applicable to NMP2.

Because NMP2 has no containment isolation valves subject to this aging effect and aging effect mechanism the staff determined that it is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.2B.2.2.5 Changes in Properties Due to Elastomer Degradation

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.5.

In Section 3.2.2.C.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that for the seals in the standby gas treatment system this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP2. The NMP2 standby gas treatment system contains no seals. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that the standby gas treatment system contains no seals; therefore, this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP2.

Because NMP2 has no components subject to this aging effect and aging effect mechanism the staff determined that it is not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.2B.2.2.6 Local Loss of Material Due to Erosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.6 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.6.

In Section 3.2.2.C.6 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PARS only.

Because NMP is a BWR the staff found that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.2B.2.2.7 Buildup of Deposits Due to Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.2.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of Section 3.2.2.2.7.

In Section 3.2.2.C.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed the plugging of components due to general corrosion in the spray nozzles and flow orifices of the drywell and suppression chamber spray system.

SRP-LR Section 3.2.2.2.7 states that the plugging of components due to general corrosion could occur in the spray nozzles and flow orifices of the drywell and suppression chamber spray system. This aging effect and aging effect mechanism and effect will apply because spray nozzles and flow orifices are wetted occasionally even though most of the time this system is on standby. The wetting and drying of these components can accelerate this particular corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure adequate management of the aging effect and aging effect mechanism.

In Section 3.2.2.C.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that for NMP2 the containment spray cooling mode of the residual heat removal system contains the subject spray nozzles and flow orifices. The plugging of spray nozzles due to general corrosion is not an applicable aging effect and aging effect mechanism as these components are stainless steel not susceptible to general corrosion. The plugging of flow orifices due to general corrosion is not an applicable aging effect and aging effect mechanism because the lines containing these components are flushed during quarterly testing which prevents the buildup of deposits.

NMP2 spray nozzles are made of stainless steel and the orifices are periodically flushed; therefore; the staff found this aging effect not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.2B.2.2.8 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 includes the staff's evaluation of the applicant's quality assurance program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.2B.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.2.2.B-1 through 3.2.2.B-6, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.2.2.B-1 through 3.2.2.B-6, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and AERM does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.2B.2.3.1 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP2 Hydrogen Recombiner System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-1

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the hydrogen recombinder system component groups.

The staff reviewed the following ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-1 item for the NMP2 hydrogen recombinder system.

- Martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting in an air environment for which the applicant has identified no aging effect.

The staff found the applicant's assessment of no aging effect for this material, environment, and component combination acceptable as supported by industry data and operating experience. (Also refer to staff's evaluation in RAI 3.2-16 discussed in SER Section 3.2B.2.3.6, Standby Gas Treatment Systems, where the aging management in a similar component, material, environment combination is evaluated).

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the hydrogen recombinder system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2B.2.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP2 High Pressure Core Spray System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-2

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the high pressure core spray system component groups.

The staff reviewed the following ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-2 items in the NMP2 high pressure core spray system.

- Cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) closure bolting for non-borated water system with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^\circ\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). (By attachment 2 of NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)
- Cracking and loss of material of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel closure bolting for non-borated water systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^\circ\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by the Bolting Integrity Program. The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G).
- Cumulative fatigue damage in martensitic, precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^\circ\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)
- Cumulative fatigue damage of nickel-based alloy piping and fittings in a treated water or steam environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).
- Cracking of nicked based piping and fittings in a treated water or steam, temperatures  $> 482^\circ\text{F}$  low flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).
- Cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water or steam, temperature  $> 482^\circ\text{F}$ , low flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The applicant deleted cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) closure bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^\circ\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) from the table by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005. The staff found this deletion acceptable because the aging effect for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

The staff found the management of the aging effects of cracking and loss of material of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel closure bolting for non-borated water systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^\circ\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by the Bolting Integrity Program acceptable as discussed in the evaluation of the program in SER Section 3.0.3.2.23. The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). The staff concurred with this statement.

The applicant deleted cumulative fatigue damage in martensitic, precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^\circ\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) from the

table by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005. The staff found this deletion acceptable because the aging effect for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

The staff found the aging management of cumulative fatigue damage of nickel-based alloy piping and fittings in a treated water or steam environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) reasonable and acceptable. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff found the aging management of cracking of nickel-based piping and fittings in a treated water or steam, temperature >482 °F, low flow environment by One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs appropriate and acceptable in this environment. The staff evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2 respectively. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff's evaluation of the management of cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water or steam, temperature > 482 °F, low flow environment by One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs is in RAI 3.2-7 (SER Section 3.2A.2.3.2). The staff found these AMPs appropriate and acceptable for this environment. The staff's evaluations of One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2 respectively. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff's evaluations found that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment associated with the components in the NMP2 high pressure core spray system.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the high pressure core spray system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.2B.2.3.3 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP2 Low Pressure Core Spray System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-3

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-3, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the low pressure core spray system component groups.

The staff reviewed the following ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-3 items in the NMP2 low pressure core spray system

- Cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength ≥ 100 ksi) bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures ≥ 212 °F, leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)

- Cracking and loss of material in martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by the Bolting Integrity Program. The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G).
- Cumulative fatigue damage of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)
- Cracking in wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).
- Cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The applicant by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, deleted from the table cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA. The staff found this deletion acceptable because the aging effect for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

The staff found management of cracking and loss of material in martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment by the Bolting Integrity Program acceptable as discussed in the evaluation of the Bolting Integrity Program in SER Section 3.0.3.2.23. The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). The staff concurred with this statement.

The applicant by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, deleted from the table cumulative fatigue damage of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The staff found this deletion acceptable because the aging effect for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). The staff concurred with this statement.

The applicant stated that cracking in wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time inspection and Chemistry Control Programs is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff found these AMPs appropriate and acceptable for managing the aging effect in this



environment. The staff evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are provided in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The applicant stated that cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff evaluation of the management of the aging effects is in RAI 3.2-7 (SER Section 3.2A.2.3.2). The staff found these management programs appropriate and acceptable for the aging effect in this environment. The staff evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2 respectively.

The staff's evaluations found that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment associated with the above components in the NMP2 low pressure core spray system

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the low pressure core spray system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2B.2.3.4 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-4

The staff evaluated the following items in the NMP2 reactor core isolation cooling system

- Cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table.
- Cumulative fatigue damage of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)
- Cracking and loss of material of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel closure bolting for non-borated water systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by the Bolting Integrity Program. The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination. (Note G).
- Cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel condensing chambers in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

- Cumulative fatigue damage of nickel-based alloy piping and fittings in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated Dec 1, 2005, the applicant added note 10 stating that this item applies to small bore piping not included in the ISI Testing Program).
- Cracking and loss of strength of polymeric external surfaces in an air environment managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).
- Cracking in wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).
- Cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The applicant deleted cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005. The staff found the deletion acceptable because cumulative fatigue damage for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

The applicant deleted cumulative fatigue damage of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005. The staff found the deletion acceptable because cumulative fatigue damage for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

The applicant stated that cracking and loss of material of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel closure bolting for non-borated water systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by the Bolting Integrity Program, is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff found the management of the aging effects acceptable as stated in the evaluation of the Bolting Integrity Program in SER Section 3.0.3.2.23.

The applicant stated that cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel condensing chambers in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff evaluation of the management of the aging effects is in RAI 3.2-7 (SER Section 3.2A.2.3.2). The staff found these AMPs appropriate and acceptable for the aging effect in this environment. The staff evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2 respectively.

The applicant stated that cumulative fatigue damage of nickel-based alloy piping and fittings in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). The staff concurred with this statement. By NMPIIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant added note 10 stating that this item applies to small bore piping not included in the ISI Program. This component also is not evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3. The staff found the aging management of cumulative fatigue damage of small bore piping by TLAA in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) reasonable and acceptable.

The applicant stated that cracking and loss of strength of polymeric external surfaces in an air environment managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff requested additional information about the Preventive Maintenance Program tests and inspections to manage the aging effects for this component. In its response dated November 15, 2005, the applicant stated:

The polymer components in the NMP2 RCIC System are expansion joints between RCIC System Piping and the Condensate Storage Tank. They are fabricated of butyl rubber with polyester fabric and metal reinforcement. The PM Program methods of inspection associated with these expansion joints are visual, dimensional, and durometer readings as follows:

- Inspection of the expansion joints is performed every two years.
- Replacement of the components is scheduled for every 20 years.

The PM Program acceptance criteria for the inspections are the following:

#### Visual Inspection

- No excessive and deep cracking or cuts of outer cover exposing reinforcing wire, body rings or fabric.
- No blistering or local areas of deformation or ply separation.
- No leakage or weeping through bellows or at flange connections.
- No soft or gummy areas.
- No mechanical damage due to maintenance or operating activity.
- If expansion joint has a liner, liner is not damaged.
- Structural members and attachment hardware are not damaged and maintain structural integrity.

#### Dimensional Inspection

- Face to face dimensions are within design tolerances.
- Durometer readings between 50 - 80 (Shur scale).

The inspections and acceptance criteria for the expansion joints are based on approved vendor manuals.

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the Preventive Maintenance Program tests and inspections are consistent with industry practice and vendor recommendations. The staff found the management of the aging effects in polymeric components by the Preventive Maintenance Program acceptable.

The applicant stated that cracking in wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff review of the management of the aging effects is in RAI 3.2-7 (In SER Section 3.2A.2.3.2). The staff found these AMPs appropriate and acceptable for the aging effect in this environment. The staff evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The applicant stated that cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel restriction orifices in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff review of the management of the aging effects is in RAI 3.2-7 (In SER Section 3.2A.2.3.2). The staff found these AMPs appropriate and acceptable for managing the aging effect in this environment. The staff evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are provided in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The staff's evaluations found that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment associated with the NMP2 reactor core isolation cooling system components.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor core isolation cooling system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.2B.2.3.5 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP2 Residual Heat Removal System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-5

The staff reviewed the following ALRA items for the NMP2 residual heat removal system:

- Cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)
- Cracking and loss of material of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel closure bolting for non-borated water systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by the Bolting Integrity Program. The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G)

- Cumulative fatigue damage of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). (By NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005, the applicant deleted this item from the table)

The applicant deleted cumulative fatigue damage of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength  $\geq 100$  ksi) bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005. The staff found the deletion acceptable because cumulative fatigue damage for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3

The applicant stated that for cracking and loss of material of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel closure bolting for non-borated water systems with temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by the Bolting Integrity Program this environment is not in the GALL Report for this material-component combination (Note G). The staff concurred with this statement. The staff found the management of the aging effects acceptable as discussed in the evaluation of the Bolting Integrity Program in SER Section 3.0.3.2.23.

The applicant deleted cumulative fatigue damage of martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting for non-borated water systems with operating temperatures  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , leaking fluid environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) by NMPIL 2005 attachment 2 dated December 1, 2005. The staff found the deletion acceptable because cumulative fatigue damage for this component is evaluated in ALRA Section 4.3.

The staff's evaluations found that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment associated with the above components in the NMP2 residual heat removal system.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the residual heat removal system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.2B.2.3.6 Engineered Safety Features Systems NMP2 Standby Gas Treatment System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.2.2.B-6

The staff reviewed the following ALRA items for the NMP2 standby gas treatment system

- Martensitic precipitation hardenable and super ferritic stainless steel bolting in an air environment for which the applicant has assigned no aging effect.
- Loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel heaters in an air with moisture or wetting temperature  $< 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

- Loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel piping and fittings in an air with moisture or wetting temperature <140 °F environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).
- Loss of material for aluminum and aluminum alloyed with manganese, magnesium plus silicon valves in an air with moisture or wetting temperature <140 °F environment managed by One-Time Inspection Program. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).
- Loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel valves in an air with moisture or wetting temperature <140 °F environment managed by One-Time Inspection Program. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The staff requested that the applicant justify assigning no aging effect to the martensitic precipitation hardenable and superferritic stainless steel bolting. As addressed in RAI 3.2.16 the applicant stated:

The material specification for the bolting corresponding to the ALRA line item for martensitic precipitation hardened and superferritic stainless steel bolting in air (temperature < 140 °F) environments is ASTM A193 Grade B6, which has a minimum specified tempering temperature of 1100 °F. Material with this heat treatment would have a yield strength of approximately 100 ksi. The material specification for the bolting corresponding to the ALRA line items for carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength >100 ksi) bolting in a moist air (temperature <140 °F) environment is ASTM A193 Grade B7, which has a minimum tempering temperature of 1100 °F. Yield strengths for Type 4140 steel bar, which is a steel grade that meets A193 chemical requirements, are below 150 ksi when tempered at 1100 °F. Therefore, for both material types, the material yield strengths will not exceed 150 ksi.

GALL Report Section XI.M18, Bolting Integrity, under the “parameters monitored/inspected” program element states that cracking must be monitored only for bolts with yield strengths exceeding 150 ksi. Therefore, that cracking is not identified as an aging effect for the subject bolts is not inconsistent with the GALL Report.

Loss of preload typically would not be an aging effect requiring management for bolting in low temperature systems. The GALL Report specifies only loss of preload as an aging effect requiring management for components in the reactor vessel and internals and reactor coolant pressure boundary. For closure bolting in ESF systems the GALL Report addresses only carbon and low alloy steel bolting in high-pressure or high temperature systems. The bolting with the material-environment combinations of carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength >100 ksi) and martensitic precipitation hardened and superferritic stainless steel bolting in air are not in high temperature or high pressure systems. Furthermore, the GALL Report does not identify loss of preload even for ESF bolts in high temperature, high pressure systems. Therefore, the determination that loss of preload does not apply to the subject bolts is consistent with the GALL Report.

The staff found the applicant’s assessment reasonable, acceptable, and consistent with the GALL Report.

In a-RAI 3.2.2.B-1 dated November 22, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide assurance that a one-time inspection alone is adequate to manage the aging effect of loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel heaters in an air with moisture or wetting temperature <140 °F environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. In addition the staff requested the applicant to discuss the specifics of the tests and inspections for these components.

In its response, letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant stated:

\_\_\_\_ As in the response to RAI 3.4.2.B-2, for the identified components fabricated of either stainless steel (SS) or alloyed aluminum (high aluminum, low alloy content) in a low temperature, moist air environment, it is considered unlikely that the loss of material aging effect will occur. SS in this mild air environment (containment environment) where any moisture would have extremely low concentrations of halides would not exhibit aging effects. Aluminum forms a protective passive layer in mild environments that protects the base metal from further corrosion. The One-Time Inspection Program activities will utilize visual, volumetric, and other inspection techniques consistent with industry practices to provide a means of verifying that aging management is not occurring or is progressing at such a slow rate that the intended function of the components would not be adversely affected.

The staff found the applicant's response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant explained that the aging effect is unlikely to occur in this environment for this component. The staff therefore considered the One-Time Inspection Program adequate for managing the aging effect in this environment. The staff's evaluation of the One-Time Inspection Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4. The staff also concurred with the applicant's assessment that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The staff found reasonable and acceptable as stated in a-RAI 3.2.2.B-1 management of loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel piping and fittings in an air with moisture or wetting temperature <140 °F environment by the One-Time Inspection Program. The staff's evaluation of the One-Time Inspection Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4. The staff also concurred with the applicant's assessment that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The staff found reasonable and acceptable as stated in a-RAI 3.2.2.B-1 management of loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel valves in an air with moisture or wetting temperature <140 °F environment by the One-Time Inspection Program. The staff's evaluation of the One-Time Inspection Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4. The staff also concurred with the applicant's assessment that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The staff's evaluation of loss of material for aluminum and aluminum alloyed with manganese, magnesium plus silicon valves in an air with moisture or wetting temperature <140 °F, environment managed by One-Time Inspection Program is in a-RAI 3.2.2.B-1. The staff's evaluation of the One-Time Inspection Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4. The staff found it reasonable and acceptable. The staff also concurred with the applicant's assessment that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component, material, and environment combination (Note H).

The staff's evaluations found that the applicant had identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment of the NMP2 standby gas treatment system components.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the standby gas treatment system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, the staff found that the applicant appropriately evaluated AMR results involving material, environment, AERMs, and AMP combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.2B.3 Conclusion**

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP2 ESF systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplement program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing aging of the ESF systems, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

## **3.3 Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems**

### **3.3A NMP1 Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the auxiliary systems components and component groups associated with the following NMP1 systems:

- circulating water system
- city water system
- compressed air systems
- containment systems
- control room HVAC system
- diesel generator building ventilation system
- emergency diesel generator system
- fire detection and protection system
- hydrogen water chemistry system
- liquid poison system
- miscellaneous non contaminated vents and drains system
- neutron monitoring system
- radioactive waste disposal building HVAC system
- radioactive waste system



- reactor building closed loop cooling water system
- reactor building HVAC system
- reactor water cleanup system
- sampling system
- service water system
- shutdown cooling system
- spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system
- turbine building closed loop cooling water system
- turbine building HVAC system
- electric steam boiler system
- makeup and demineralizer system

### **3.3A.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.3, the applicant provided AMR results for the auxiliary systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.3.1.A, "NMP1 Summary of Aging Management Programs for the Auxiliary Systems Evaluated in Chapter VII of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the auxiliary systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### **3.3A.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.3 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the auxiliary systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.3A.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.3A.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.3A.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the UFSAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the auxiliary systems components.

Table 3.3A-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP1 components, aging effects and mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.3, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.3A-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP1 Auxiliary Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Components in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup (Item Number 3.3.1.A-01)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.2.1)
Linings in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system; seals and collars in ventilation systems (Item Number 3.3.1.A-02)	Hardening, cracking and loss of strength due to elastomer degradation; loss of material due to wear	Plant specific	Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.2.2)
Components in load handling, chemical and volume control system (PWR), and reactor water cleanup and shutdown cooling systems (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.A-03)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	No TLAA for components in load handling systems- does not meet TLAA criteria (See Section 3.3A.2.1.1)
Heat exchangers in reactor water cleanup system (BWR); high pressure pumps in chemical and volume control system (PWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.A-04)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC or cracking	Plant specific	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.2.4)
Components in ventilation systems, diesel fuel oil system, and emergency diesel generator systems; external surfaces of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.3.1.A-05)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Plant specific	Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.11), Fire Water System Program (B2.1.17), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26), Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32), Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.2.5)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Components in reactor coolant pump oil collect system of fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.A-06)	Loss of material due to galvanic, general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	One-time inspection	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.3A.2.2.6)
Diesel fuel oil tanks in diesel fuel oil system and emergency diesel generator system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-07)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling	Fuel oil chemistry and one-time inspection	Fuel Oil Chemistry Program (B2.1.18), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.2.7)
Piping, pump casing, and valve body and bonnets in shutdown cooling system (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.A-08)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation. One-Time Inspection Program is used for further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.2.1)
Heat exchangers in chemical and volume control system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-09)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and cyclic loading	Water chemistry and a plant-specific verification program	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.3A.2.2.9)
Neutron absorbing sheets in spent fuel storage racks (Item Number 3.3.1.A-10)	Reduction of neutron absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion (Boral, boron steel)	Plant specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.3A.2.2.10)
New fuel rack assembly (Item Number 3.3.1.A-11)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Structures monitoring	None	Not applicable.  The new fuel rack assembly is not in scope.
Neutron absorbing sheets in spent fuel storage racks (Item Number 3.3.1.A-12)	Reduction of neutron absorbing capacity due to Boraflex degradation	Boraflex monitoring	Boraflex Monitoring Program (B2.1.12)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Spent fuel storage racks and valves in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup (Item Number 3.3.1.A-13)	Crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking	Water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Closure bolting and external surfaces of carbon steel and low-alloy steel components (Item Number 3.3.1.A-14)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion	Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33), Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1.7)
Components in or serviced by closed-cycle cooling water system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-15)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Closed-cycle cooling water system	Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.11)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Cranes including bridge and trolleys and rail system in load handling system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-16)	Loss of material due to general corrosion and wear	Overhead heavy load and light load handling systems	Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program (B2.1.13)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Components in or serviced by open-cycle cooling water systems (Item Number 3.3.1.A-17)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion, MIC, and biofouling; buildup of deposit due to biofouling	Open-cycle cooling water system	Open-Cycle Cooling Water Program (B2.1.10); One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20); Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Buried piping and fittings (Item Number 3.3.1.A-18)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Buried piping and tanks surveillance or Buried piping and tanks inspection	Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program (B2.1.22)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.2.11)
Components in compressed air system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-19)	Loss of material due to general and pitting corrosion	Compressed air monitoring	Compressed Air Monitoring Program (B2.1.14), Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Components (doors and barrier penetration seals) and concrete structures in fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.A-20)	Loss of material due to wear; hardening and shrinkage due to weathering	Fire protection	None	Not applicable.  The plant-specific environment for concrete structures in fire protection does not generate the listed aging effects.
Components in water-based fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.A- 21)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion, MIC, and biofouling	Fire water system	Fire Water System Program (B2.1.17)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Components in diesel fire system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-22)	Loss of material due to galvanic, general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Fire protection and fuel oil chemistry	None	Not applicable. Fuel oil supply lines do not have this aging effect.
Tanks in diesel fuel oil system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-23)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Aboveground carbon steel tanks	None	Not applicable. Diesel fuel oil tanks are not supported on earthen or concrete foundations
Closure bolting (Item Number 3.3.1.A-24)	Loss of material due to general corrosion; crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Components in contact with sodium pentaborate solution in standby liquid control system (BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.A-25)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Components in reactor water cleanup system (Item Number 3.3.1.A-26)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IGSCC	Reactor water cleanup system inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program (B2.1.15), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Components in shutdown cooling system (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.A-27)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	BWR stress corrosion cracking and water chemistry	BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking Program (B2.1.6), Water Chemistry Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Components in shutdown cooling system (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.A-28)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Closed-cycle cooling water system	Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Program (B2.1.11)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Components (aluminum bronze, brass, cast iron, cast steel) in open-cycle and closed-cycle cooling water systems, and ultimate heat sink (Item Number 3.3.1.A-29)	Loss of material due to selective leaching	Selective leaching of materials	Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Program (B2.1.11); Open-Cycle Cooling Water Program (B2.1.10); Selective Leaching of Materials Program (B2.1.21)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3A.2.1)
Fire barriers, walls, ceilings, and floors in fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.A-30)	Concrete cracking and spalling due to freeze-thaw, aggressive chemical attack, and reaction with aggregates; loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel	Fire protection and structures monitoring	None	Not applicable.  The plant-specific environment for concrete structures in fire protection does not generate the listed aging effects.

The staff's review of the NMP1 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.3A.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the auxiliary systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.3A.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the auxiliary systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.3A.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the auxiliary systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the auxiliary systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.3A.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.3.2.A, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the auxiliary systems components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Compressed Air Monitoring Program
- BWR Reactor Water Cleanup System Program
- Fire Protection Program
- Fire Water System Program
- Fuel Oil Chemistry Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.3.2.A-1 through 3.3.2.A-25, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the auxiliary systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material,



environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different aging management program is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.3A.2.1.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In ALRA Table 3.3.1.A Item 3.3.1.A-03 the applicant stated that cumulative fatigue damage is managed using a TLAA.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify the statement on Table 3.3.1.A (page 3.3-86) of the ALRA that NMP has no TLAA for components in load handling systems. The staff requested the applicant to justify technically why this aging effect and aging effect mechanism was not applied to NMP. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that this issue has been screened against the six criteria for a TLAA. Furthermore in this letter the applicant stated that the operating cycles for the cranes did not meet the criteria for a TLAA because (1) there were no actual calculations or analyses in the CLB projecting the number of operating cycles and (2) for cranes designed to CMAA-70 an estimate of the number of possible operating cycles in 60 years, a substantial fraction (40-95 percent) of the crane maximum rated load, was a very small percentage of the allowable number of cycles (for the NMP2 reactor building polar crane 1500 cycles versus a minimum allowable number of cycles of 100,000). Therefore, generating a formal calculation of operating cycles for 60 years would not result in any meaningful limitations on the use of the crane (i.e., the calculation would not meet criteria #4 for a TLAA from 10 CFR 54.3 which is, "Were determined to be relevant by the licensee in making a safety determination.")

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that it adequately justified having no TLAA for components in load handling systems.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3A.2.1.2 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC or Cracking

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.3.1.A, Item 3.3.1.A-04, the applicant stated that for stainless steel heat exchangers aging management is by the Water Chemistry Control Program and Preventive Maintenance Program; however, as documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant has applied ALRA Table 3.3.1, Item 3.3.1.A-04 to manage cracking in wrought austenitic stainless steel in a treated water or steam environment with temperatures equal to or greater than 140 °F or less than 212 °F using its Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program. The staff asked the applicant to identify the AMPs to be applied. In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that ALRA Table 3.3.1.A, Item 3.3.1.A-04 would be revised to state that further evaluation is documented in Appendices B2.1.2 (Water Chemistry Control Program) and B2.1.20 (One-Time Inspection Program).

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3A.2.1.3 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion, and MIC

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the applicant had cited ALRA Table 3.3.1.A, Item 3.3.1.A-15 a number of times and had assigned Notes A, B, C, or D even though no exception to GALL AMP XI.M21, "Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System," had been taken in NMP AMP B2.1.11, "Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program." The staff requested the applicant to clarify the basis for the assignment of Notes B and D. In a letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the notes are all A unless a GALL Report Item does not address a specific component type, in which case the Note is C. Also the applicant stated that the notes for pumps, tanks, and valves line items referencing ALRA Table 3.3.1.A-15 (three on pages 3.3-137, 3.3-138, and 3.3-139) had been revised from Note B to Note A. The applicant removed the GALL Report item and Table 1 item, and replaced Note E with Note H for gray cast iron pumps in ALRA Tables 3.2.2.A-1 (page 3.2-38) and 3.3.2.A-21 (page 3.3-197). Finally, the applicant stated in this letter that there is also reference to this Table 1 Item for GCI HXs in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-7 and that Note D should have been Note C because the component is a heat exchanger (HX) instead of a pump. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable because the applicant had assigned the appropriate notes to the AMR line items.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3A.2.1.4 Loss of Material Due to General Corrosion and Wear

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-4 (page 3.5-74) for component type refueling platform and aging effect and aging effect

mechanism loss of material the Table 1 line item shown is 3.3.1.B-16. The staff asked the applicant to explain why a NMP2 line item is shown with an NMP1 component type.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the reference is an error. For ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-4 with line item component type refueling platform and aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of material the Table 1 reference was changed from Item 3.3.1.B-16 to Item 3.3.1.A-16.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found the correction of the reference to ALRA Table 3.3.1.A, Item 3.3.1.A-16 acceptable.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3A.2.1.5 Loss of Material Due to Wear; Hardening and Shrinkage Due to Weathering

In ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-1 the applicant referenced ALRA Table 3.3.1.A, Item 3.3.1.A-20.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that for component type doors and aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of material the Note shown is C, indicating that the NMP AMP is consistent with the GALL Report AMP; however, the AMP shown is NMP AMP B2.1.16, "Fire Protection Program," for which the applicant takes some exceptions to the GALL AMP XI.M26, "Fire Protection." The staff asked the applicant to explain why a Note C was shown instead of a Note D. This request also applied to ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-6 (page 3.5-76), ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-7 and ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-11 for component type doors and aging effect/mechanism loss of material managed by the applicant's Fire Protection Program.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the note entry should be Note D instead of C. Note C was changed to Note D for ALRA Tables 3.5.2.A-11, 3.5.2.A-6, and 3.5.2.A-7 with AMR line item component doors and aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of material managed by the applicant's Fire Protection Program.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable because the correction of Note C to Note D assigned the proper note to these AMR line items.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3A.2.1.6 Loss of Material Due to General Corrosion; Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Cyclic Loading and SCC

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-10 (page 3.3-147) for component type bolting and aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material or cracking, the Note shown is B, which indicates that, for the NMP AMP shown, the applicant has taken an exception to the GALL Report AMP; however, the AMP shown is NMP AMP B2.1.36, "Bolting Integrity Program," for which the applicant claimed consistency with GALL AMP XI.M18, "Bolting Integrity." The staff asked the applicant to explain why a Note B was shown instead of a Note A. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that Note B is appropriate because its letter dated September 15, 2005, had declared an exception

for the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program. The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found the applicant correct and the appropriate note assigned to the AMR line items.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3A.2.1.7 Loss of Material Due to Boric Acid Corrosion

In reviewing ALRA Table 3.3.1.A, Item 3.3.1-14, the staff noted that the applicant had credited the Bolting Integrity Program and Systems Walkdown Program. These AMPs are different from the AMP recommended by the GALL Report, GALL AMP XI.M10, "Boric Acid Corrosion."

The staff review and evaluations of the applicant's Bolting Integrity and Systems Walkdown Programs are documented in Sections 3.0.3.2.23 and 3.0.3.3.2 of this SER, respectively. The staff found that the applicant's System Walkdown Program detects leakage and manages material degradation through visual inspection and that the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program monitors the potential leakage of sodium pentaborate solution on the liquid poison system component bolting. The staff concluded that these AMPs will ensure detection of leakage before a loss of intended function and manage adequately the loss of material due to boric acid corrosion.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the loss of material due to boric acid corrosion for closure bolting and external surfaces of carbon steel components.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.3A.2.2 AMR Results That are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.3.2.C of its supplemental letter to the ALRA, dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as recommended by the GALL Report for the auxiliary systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- hardening and cracking or loss of strength due to elastomer degradation or loss of material due to wear
- cumulative fatigue damage
- crack initiation and growth due to cracking or stress corrosion cracking
- loss of material due to general, microbiologically influenced, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- loss of material due to general, galvanic, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC and biofouling
- crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking and cyclic loading
- reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion

- loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.3A.2.2.1 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1.1.

In Section 3.3.2.C.1 of a letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for components in the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. For NMP1 components in the spent fuel pool cooling systems are managed by the combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1.1 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion could occur in the channel head and access cover, tubes, and tubesheets of the heat exchanger in the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. The Water Chemistry Program relies on monitoring and control of reactor water chemistry based on the EPRI guidelines of BWRVIP-29, (TR-103515), "BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines - Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry," to manage the effects of loss of material from general, pitting, or crevice corrosion; however, high concentrations of impurities at crevices and locations of stagnant flow conditions could cause general, pitting, or crevice corrosion. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Water Chemistry Control Program should be verified to ensure no corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage loss of material from general, pitting, and crevice corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program. A one-time inspection of select components at susceptible locations is an acceptable method to ensure no corrosion and that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

In addition the staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1.2.

In Section 3.3.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion of components in the spent fuel cooling and cleanup system and the shutdown cooling system of older BWRs.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1.2 states that loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion could occur in the piping, filter housing, valve bodies, and shell and nozzles of the ion exchanger in the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system and in the piping and pump casing in the shutdown cooling system (older BWR). The Water Chemistry Control Program relies on monitoring and control of reactor water chemistry based on EPRI guidelines of BWRVIP-29 (TR-103515), "BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines - Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry," to manage the effects of loss of material from pitting or crevice corrosion; however, high concentrations of impurities at crevices and locations of stagnant flow conditions could cause pitting or crevice corrosion. Therefore, the effectiveness of the chemistry control program should be verified to ensure no corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage loss of material from pitting and crevice corrosion to verify the effectiveness of The Water Chemistry Control Program. A one-time inspection of select components at susceptible locations is an acceptable method to ensure no corrosion and that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation.

In Section 3.3.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for NMP1 the reactor water cleanup and shutdown cooling systems are applicable. The aging effect/mechanism is managed by the combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff review and evaluation of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3A.2.2.2 Hardening and Cracking or Loss of Strength Due to Elastomer Degradation or Loss of Material due to Wear

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.2.

In Section 3.3.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed aging effects and aging effect mechanisms that could occur for the elastomer lining of some components exposed to the treated water environment of the spent fuel pool cooling system and elastomer seals and collars in the ductwork of certain ventilation systems exposed to a range of atmospheric conditions.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.2 states that hardening and cracking due to elastomer degradation could occur in elastomer linings of the filter, valve, and ion exchangers in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup systems. Hardening and loss of strength due to elastomer degradation could occur

in the collars and seals of the duct and in the elastomer seals of the filters in the control room area, auxiliary and radwaste area, and primary containment heating ventilation systems and in the collars and seals of the duct in the diesel generator building ventilation system. Loss of material due to wear could occur in the collars and seals of the duct in the ventilation systems. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms are adequately managed.

In Section 3.3.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that elastomers are not used in the lining of spent fuel pool system components within the scope of license renewal at NMP.

In addition the applicant stated in its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP1 ventilation systems the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for seals and collars are managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff reviewed the applicant's Preventive Maintenance Program and its evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3A.2.2.3 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In Section 3.3.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### 3.3A.2.2.4 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Cracking or Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.4.

In Section 3.3.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed cracking due to SCC for the stainless steel reactor water cleanup system regenerative and non-regenerative heat exchangers.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.4 states that crack initiation and growth due to SCC could occur in the regenerative and non-regenerative heat exchanger components in the reactor water cleanup system. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms are adequately managed.

In its August 19, 2005, letter the applicant also stated that for NMP1 this aging effect and aging effects mechanism for the reactor water cleanup system regenerative and non-regenerative



heat exchangers is managed by a combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria in the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.4. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3A.2.2.5 Loss of Material Due to General, Microbiologically Influenced, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.5.

In Section 3.3.2.C.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material from corrosion that could occur on internal and external surfaces of components exposed to a range of atmospheric conditions. Specifically included in the subsection are the ventilation systems, the diesel generator systems' fuel oil, starting air, and combustion air intake and exhaust subsystems, and auxiliary systems' external carbon steel surfaces within the scope of license renewal.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.5 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion could occur in the piping and filter housing and supports in the control room area, the auxiliary and radwaste area, the primary containment heating and ventilation systems, in the piping of the diesel generator building ventilation system, in the above-ground piping and fittings, valves, and pumps in the diesel fuel oil system, and in the diesel engine starting air, combustion air intake, and combustion air exhaust subsystems in the emergency diesel generator system. Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC could occur in the duct fittings, access doors and closure bolts, equipment frames, and housing of the duct; due to pitting and crevice corrosion could occur in the heating/cooling coils of the air handler; and due to general corrosion could occur on the external surfaces of all carbon steel structures and components, including bolting exposed to operating temperatures less than 212 °F in the ventilation systems. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms are adequately managed. Acceptance criteria are stated in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1.

In Section 3.3.2.C.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for NMP1 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism for the applicable systems and components is managed by the Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Program, Fire Water System Program, One-Time

Inspection Program, 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program, Preventive Maintenance Program, and Systems Walkdown Program.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Closed-Cycle Cooling Water, Fire Water System, One-Time Inspection, 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Preventive Maintenance and Systems Walkdown Programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.8, 3.0.3.2.14, 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.1.7, 3.0.3.3.1 and 3.0.3.3.2, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria in the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.5. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3A.2.2.6 Loss of Material Due to General, Galvanic, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.6 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.6.

In Section 3.3.2.C.6 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, galvanic, pitting, and crevice corrosion in the reactor recirculation pumps' oil collection system in fire protection.

The applicant stated in Section 3.3.2.C.6 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that this item is not applicable because NMP has no oil collection systems for its reactor recirculation pumps. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that loss of material due to general, galvanic, pitting, and crevice corrosion in the reactor recirculation pumps' oil collection system in fire protection is not applicable because NMP has no oil collection systems for its reactor recirculation pumps.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP.

#### 3.3A.2.2.7 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, Crevice, and Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion and Biofouling

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.7.

In Section 3.3.2.C.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC and biofouling for the internal surfaces of components in the diesel fuel oil system.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.7 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC and biofouling could occur in the internal surfaces of tanks in the diesel fuel oil system and due

to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC in the tanks of the diesel fuel oil system in the emergency diesel generator system. The existing AMP relies on the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program for monitoring and control of fuel oil contamination according to the guidelines of ASTM Standards D4057, D1796, D2709 and D2276 to manage loss of material due to corrosion or biofouling that may occur where contaminants accumulate. The effectiveness of the chemistry control program should be verified to ensure no corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage corrosion/biofouling to verify program effectiveness. A one-time inspection of selected components at susceptible locations is an acceptable method to ensure no corrosion and maintenance of the component's intended function during the period of extended operation.

The applicant also stated in the ALRA that for NMP1 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the combination of the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program and One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program and One-Time Inspection Program are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.15 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria in the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.7. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3A.2.2.8 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Non-Safety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 provides the staff's evaluation of the applicant's quality assurance program.

#### 3.3A.2.2.9 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cyclic Loading

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.9 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.9.

In Section 3.3.2.C.9 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that crack initiation and growth due to SCC and cyclic loading apply to PWRs only and that this aging effect/mechanism is not applicable to NMP. The staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that because this aging effect and aging effect mechanism applies to PWRs only it is not applicable to NMP.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff determined that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP.

#### 3.3A.2.2.10 Reduction of Neutron-Absorbing Capacity and Loss of Material Due to General Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.10 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.10.

In Section 3.3.2.C.10 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion in the neutron-absorbing (Boral or boron steel) sheets of the spent fuel storage racks are not applicable as it had identified no aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for these components. The staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that the reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion in the neutron-absorbing (Boral or boron steel) sheets of the spent fuel storage racks are not applicable because no aging effects and aging effects mechanisms were identified for these components.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found that this aging effect/mechanism not applicable.

#### 3.3A.2.2.11 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, Crevice, and Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.11 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.11.

In Section 3.3.2.C.11 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC for buried piping and fittings.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.11 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion and MIC could occur in the underground piping and fittings in the open-cycle cooling water system (service water system) and in the diesel fuel oil system. The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program relies on industry practice, frequency of pipe excavation, and operating experience to manage the effects of loss of material from general, pitting, crevice, and MIC. The effectiveness of the applicant's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program should be verified to evaluate an applicant's inspection frequency and operating experience with buried components and ensure no loss of material.

In Section 3.3.2.C.11 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program for NMP1 diesel generator systems.

The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.1.6.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify its position on opportunistic inspections prior to the period of extended operation. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the ALRA had been revised to include the following in its Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program:

Program activities will include visual inspections of external coatings and wrappings to detect damage and degradation. Prior to entering the period of extended operation, NMP will verify that there has been at least one opportunistic or focused inspection within the past ten years. Upon entering the period of extended operation, NMP will

perform a focused inspection within ten years, unless an opportunistic inspection occurred within this ten year period. All credited inspections will be performed in areas with the highest likelihood of corrosion problems, and in areas with a history of corrosion problems.

After a review of the applicant's clarification of its visual inspection position and its further evaluation the staff concluded that the program meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.11. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.11 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### ***3.3A.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report***

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. In the original LRA Tables 3.3.2.A-1 through 3.3.2.A-25, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the NMP1 AMRs for material, environment, aging effect requiring management, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or not addressed in the GALL Report.

In the original LRA Tables 3.3.2.A-1 through 3.3.2.A-25, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and aging effect requiring management does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicated that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicated that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicated that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicated that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicated that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

### 3.3A.2.3.0 General RAIs on AMR Issues

By letter dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information on issues described in the general RAI (a-RAI 3.3.2-1) for the ALRA applicable to more than one system in both NMP1 and NMP2. By letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant responded. The following describes a-RAI 3.3.2-1, the applicant's response, and the staff's evaluation of the applicant's response.

Adequacy of the Use of One-Time Inspection (a-RAI 3.3.2-1). One-time inspection is appropriate where either an aging effect is not expected to occur but there is insufficient data to rule it out completely or the aging effect is expected to occur very slowly and not affect the component intended function. The applicant proposed to use the One-Time Inspection Program to manage aging effects for various materials exposed to various environments for a majority of the components in two systems: (a) ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-14, NMP1 radioactive waste system and (b) ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-14, NMP2 floor and equipment drains system.

In a-RAI 3.3.2-1 dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant:

- (1) Explain from system characteristics why the One-Time Inspection Program rather than periodic inspections is proposed as the sole AMP for these two systems to manage aging effects of material-environment combinations
- (2) Justify the use of the One-Time Inspection Program for the following cases:
  - (a) In Table 3.3.2.A-14 AERM of cracking for wrought austenitic stainless steel (WASS) Heat Exchangers exposed to air, moisture, or wetting, temperature equal to or greater than 140° degree F and for WASS valves exposed to treated water temperature equal to or greater than 140°F but less than 212°F.
  - (b) In Table 3.3.2.A-14 AERM of loss of material (LOM) for carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 ksi) or WASS valves, piping, and fittings exposed to demineralized untreated water (DUW).
  - (c) In Table 3.3.2.A-14 AERM of LOM for carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 ksi) valves exposed to either DUW, low flow, or treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140°F but less than 212°F.
  - (d) In Table 3.3.2.B-14 AERM of cracking for WASS drainers exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140°F but less than 212°F.
  - (e) In Table 3.3.2.B-14 AERM of LOM for aluminum pump or carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 ksi) strainers exposed to raw water.

In its letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant responded:

(1) The NMP1 radwaste and NMP2 floor and equipment drains systems include the following subsystems:

- equipment drains in various building
- floor drains in various buildings

- the piping, pumps, tanks, and valves in these subsystems

The components in these systems are fabricated predominantly of carbon steel and the environment is generally water; however, exposure to water is not continuous. When tanks or sumps reach pre-set levels the pumps automatically start to empty them and expose the downstream components to water.

The applicant stated that for this non-continuous exposure the One Time Inspection Program was chosen to manage aging because the identified aging effects were judged to occur at such a slow rate that the component intended functions would not be impacted during the period of extended operation. After further evaluation, including review of the guidance from the most recent industry aging management documentation, the applicant concluded that the Preventative Maintenance Program manages the aging of the carbon steel and gray cast iron components in these systems more effectively than the One Time Inspection Program. The Preventive Maintenance Program was, therefore, substituted for the One Time Inspection Program to manage the aging of the carbon steel and gray cast iron components in these systems with the exception of the carbon steel piping and fittings and valves subjected to an internal fuel oil environment. As these components are exposed to fuel oil drainage loss of material from water contamination is possible. This possibility is considered unlikely because there would be an oil film on the inside of these components; however, the One Time Inspection Program will ascertain whether loss of material occurs. Through its corrective action program, the applicant will document and correct the anomaly. The cast and wrought austenitic stainless steel, nickel-based alloy, and copper alloy ( $Zn \leq 5$  percent) components will continue to be managed by the One Time Inspection Program.

The applicant further stated that an extent of condition review had been performed for the other NMP1 and NMP2 mechanical systems to determine if similar changes were needed in the application of the One Time Inspection Program for aging management. As a result of this review, there were two other changes identified: (1) for the NMP1 miscellaneous non-contaminated vents and drains system the AMP for managing the internals of the system components (carbon steel piping and fittings in a demineralized untreated water or raw water environment) was changed to the Preventive Maintenance Program and (2) for the NMP2 standby liquid control system the line item on Table 3.3.2.B-30 (page 3.3-288) of the ALRA for WASS valves in the air, moisture or wetting, temperature  $<140^{\circ}\text{F}$  environment was deleted (line with Note H). The valves identified as in that environment are actually wetted and covered by the other wetted WASS valve environments already included in the ALRA.

For the specific instances questioned the applicant provided the following response:

(2)(a) The heat exchangers that are addressed by the line item in the ALRA are associated with the Radwaste System Concentrator 12. This Concentrator, and hence its associated components, are infrequently (less than once per operating cycle) used since other preferable methods for liquid waste processing are normally utilized (see USAR Section XII.2.2. 1). As shown on Drawing LR- 18045-C, Sheet 5, the heat exchangers associated with Concentrator 12 are the Concentrator Heat Exchanger, the Concentrator Distillate Sub-Cooler, the Concentrator Vent Condenser, and the Concentrator Vapor Condenser. The One- Time Inspection Program is considered to be the appropriate aging management program for these components since they are normally exposed to air and the rate of aging is judged to be so slow that their intended functions would not be impacted during the period of extended operation.

The valves in this system that are WASS in Treated Water a 400 °F, but <212 °F are all 3/4" valves (mostly ball valves) in either instrument lines or drain lines. As such, the applicable AERM of cracking was considered to be unlikely since there is normally no flow through these lines and it is very improbable that the water temperature is sustained at the high end of the indicated range. For this reason, the One Time Inspection Program was considered to be adequate for aging management of these valves, so it was credited.

(2)(b-d) As discussed in the response to the first part of this RAI, the aging management of the carbon steel and gray cast iron components within the NMPI Radioactive Waste System is changed from the One Time Inspection Program to the PM Program. For the stainless steel components within the system, it is considered to be unlikely that they will experience the AERMs that have been identified for them. For this reason, the One Time Inspection Program is retained as the AMP.

(2)(e) These pumps are the sump pumps in the Control Building floor drain sump (see Drawing LR-66C-0). These pumps are non-safety-related pumps that are in scope for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) because they are located in the Control Building and there is safety-related equipment in the vicinity. Even though the Environment for these pumps has been identified as Raw Water, the water that enters the sump is treated or demineralized water that has leaked onto the floor and drained to the sump. Since there is no chemistry control of this water, it has been identified as Raw Water. The One Time Inspection Program has been credited for aging management since it is considered unlikely that the AERM of LOM would ever occur to the extent such that the loss of the intended function of the pumps would be lost.

For the carbon steel strainers, as discussed in the response to the first part of this RAI, the AMP is to be changed to the PM Program.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it reasonable and acceptable because the applicant has revised the aging management strategy for carbon steel components in the radioactive waste system, the auxiliary NMP2 floor and equipment drains system, and the other systems to ensure detection of aging effects prior to loss of intended function.



The staff's system-specific evaluations are discussed below.

#### 3.3A.2.3.1 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Circulating Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-1

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the circulating water system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Note F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-1 as revised in the applicant's letter NMP1L 1996 dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions adequately describe them.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.2-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, valves, and traveling screens and rakes.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to raw water subject to loss of material
- fiberglass exposed to raw water subject to cracking and loss of strength

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.2, Table 2.3.3.A.2-1, Section 3.3.2.A.1, and Table 3.3.2.A-1.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the circulating water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments associated with the above components in the circulating water system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the above components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement contains an adequate description of the program.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-1 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the circulating water system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.2.7, and 3.0.3.1.5.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the circulating water system components

will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.2 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 City Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-2

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the city water system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use note F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-2 as revised by the applicant's letters NMP1L 1996 dated November 17, 2005, and NMP1L 2007 dated December 5, 2005. The staff reviewed these supplemental letters and verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions adequately describe them.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.3-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, valves, and traveling screens and rakes.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of materia.
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.3, Table 2.3.3.A.3-1, Section 3.3.2.A.2, and Table 3.3.2.A-2. During its review the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. The general RAI applicable to this system is a-RAI 3.3.2-1

In a-RAI 3.3.2-1 dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information and by letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant responded The RAI, the applicant's response, and the staff's evaluation of the response are described in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.0.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information in the applicant's response to the RAI the staff found the aging effects of the city water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for

these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the city water system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement adequately describes the program.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-2 identifies the following AMPs for managing aging effects for the city water system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

In the applicant's response to general RAI a-RAI 3.3.2-1, as described in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.0, the applicant revised its management strategy for the aging effects of some components in this system by replacing the One-Time Inspection Program with the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff's detailed review of the Preventive Maintenance Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1.

The staff's detailed review of System Walkdown Program and Selective Leaching of Materials Program is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2 and 3.0.3.1.5.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the city water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d)

#### 3.3A.2.3.3 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Compressed Air Systems – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-3

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-3, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the compressed air systems component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-3 as revised by the applicant's letter NMP1L 1996 dated November 17, 2005. The staff reviewed this supplemental letter and verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.4-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL

Report for an AMR include drain traps, external surfaces, filters/strainers, heat exchangers, piping and fittings, separators, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to demineralized untreated water, or demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- polymers exposed to air subject to cracking, hardening and shrinkage, and loss of strength
- red brass cold worked exposed to air subject to cracking
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc greater than 15 percent) and aluminum bronze exposed to air subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc greater than 15 percent) and aluminum bronze exposed to demineralized untreated water or demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water or demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.4, Table 2.3.3.A.4-1, Section 3.3.2.A.3, and Table 3.3.2.A-3.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the compressed air systems component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the compressed air systems.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the program adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-3 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the compressed air systems components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- Compressed Air Monitoring Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.2.11, and 3.0.3.1.5.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the compressed air systems components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d)

#### 3.3A.2.3.4 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Containment Systems – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-4

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-4, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the containment systems component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-4. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.5-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include heat exchanger, piping and fittings, valves, and vaporizers.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs.

- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to air subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, subject to cracking
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.5, Table 2.3.3.A.5-1, Section 3.3.2.A.4 and Table 3.3.2.A-4.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the containment systems component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the containment systems.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-4 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the containment systems components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- One-Time Inspection Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.3.1, and 3.0.3.2.8.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the containment systems components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d)

#### 3.3A.2.3.5 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Control Room HVAC System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-5

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-5, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the control room HVAC system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-5. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.6-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include expansion tank, external surfaces, filters/strainers, flow elements, heat exchanger, piping and fittings, pumps, seals and gaskets, and valves and dampers.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to air subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of heat transfer
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- polymers exposed to air subject to loss of sealing
- gray cast iron exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.6, Table 2.3.3.A.6-1, Section 3.3.2.A.5, and Table 3.3.2.A-5.

In a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant clarify the Note “K” for heat exchangers and valves and dampers in Table 3.3.2.A-5 and explain why the LOM was not identified as an AERM for wrought austenitic stainless (WASS) steel heat exchangers exposed to demineralized untreated water (DUW) similar to the WASS heat exchangers in Table 3.3.2.A-14.

In its response by letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant stated that as part of the recovery effort which led to the submittal of the ALRA it chose to convert the lettered plant-specific notes to the standard industry-lettered notes. As discussed with the staff, the applicant agreed that Note H should be substituted for Note K. For those two cited locations in Table 3.3.2.A-5 each Note K is, therefore, changed to Note H.

The applicant further stated that there is a similar Notes anomaly in ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-6 (page 3.3-217). For the component type piping and fittings the indicated Notes column entry of ‘J’ should be ‘None’ consistent with the other Notes column entries in this table and is changed accordingly.

As to the second question in the RAI the applicant agreed that the AERM of LOM should be applied to the WASS heat exchangers in DUW environments. Therefore, the applicant made the following changes:

- (a) Consistent with Table 3.3.2.A-14, the HT and PB function for the WASS heat exchangers in Table 3.3.2.A-5 should have a line item for the AERM of LOM which is added. For this line item, the AMP is the Closed Cycle Cooling Water System Program with the Note of H. Additionally, the Note 9 for the LOHT AERM line item is removed.

(b) In Table 3.3.2.A-15, for the WASS heat exchangers with HT and PB intended functions in a DUW environment, a line item for the AERM of LOM is added. For this line item, the AMP is the Closed Cycle Cooling Water System Program with the Note of H. The Note 9 for the LOHT intended function line item is removed (additionally, for the LOHT line item, the One Time Inspection Program was removed in NMP letter NMP1L 1996, dated November 17, 2005).

(c) In Table 3.3.2.A-17, for the WASS heat exchangers in a DUW environment, the AERM is changed from None to LOM, the AMP is changed from None to the Closed Cycle Cooling Water System Program, and the Note is changed from None to H.

(d) In Table 3.3.2.A-21, for WASS heat exchangers in a DUW environment, a line item for the AERM of LOM is added with the AMP of the Closed Cycle Cooling Water System Program, and Note H. Additionally, the Note 9 in the LOHT AERM line item is removed.

(e) In Table 3.3.2.B-27, for the WASS heat exchangers with the HT and PB intended functions in a DUW environment, a line item for the AERM of LOM is added with the AMP of the Closed Cycle Cooling Water System Program, and Note H. Additionally, the Note 9 in the LOHT AERM line item is removed.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the RAI found the aging effects of the control room HVAC system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the control room HVAC system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-5 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the control room HVAC system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- System Walkdown Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.8, 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.3.1, 3.0.3.1.4, and 3.0.3.1.5.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the control room HVAC system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be



maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d)

#### 3.3A.2.3.6 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-6

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-6, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the diesel generator building ventilation system component groups.

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 diesel generator building ventilation system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3A.2.2.5

#### 3.3A.2.3.7 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Emergency Diesel Generator System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-7

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-7, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the emergency diesel generator system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-7. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.8-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, filters/strainers, heat exchangers, and pumps.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- gray cast iron exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to raw water subject to loss of heat transfer
- gray cast iron exposed to raw water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.8, Table 2.3.3.A.8-1, Section 3.3.2.A.7, and Table 3.3.2.A-7.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the emergency diesel generator system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The

staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the emergency diesel generator system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-7 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the emergency diesel generator system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.2.8, 3.0.3.2.7, and 3.0.3.1.5.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the emergency diesel generator system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.8 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Fire Detection and Protection System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-8

The staff reviewed the ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-8, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the fire detection and protection system component groups.

The staff initially reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 (only those line items that are not consistent with the GALL Report or component aging effects for material/environment was not listed in the GALL Report), which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system component groups.

In ALRA Section 3.3.2.A.8 and Table 3.3.2.A-8, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The materials identified include carbon steel or low alloy steel, concrete, copper alloy (zinc < 15%), copper alloy (zinc > 5%) and aluminum bronze, gray cast iron, and wrought austenitic stainless steel.

The applicant identified the environments to which these materials could be exposed as air, dried air or gas, exhaust, fuel oil without water contamination, lubricating oil, raw water low flow, soil above the water table, and soil below the water table as the environments associated with

the fire detection and protection system. The applicant identified AERMs from cracking and loss of material associated with the fire detection and protection system.

The applicant proposed to manage the fire protection system aging effects by using the Fire Protection Program, Fire Water System Program, Preventive Maintenance Program, Systems Walkdown Program, Bolting Integrity Program, One-Time Inspection Program, and Selective Leaching of Materials Program. The staff's evaluations of these programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.13, 3.0.3.2.14, 3.0.3.3.1, 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.3.23, 3.0.3.1.4, and 3.0.3.1.5 respectively.

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.3.2.A.8 and Table 3.3.2.A-8, to determine whether the applicant demonstrated that it will adequately manage the effects of aging for the fire protection system during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff conducted its review, described below, in accordance with SRP-LR Section 3.3 and the GALL Report.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-8 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment. ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 for the auxiliary systems for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, ALRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that the applicant will use another aging management program.

For the combination of fire hydrants, gray cast iron, raw water, low flow, a table note indicates that the Selective Leaching Program is being used in addition to the Fire Water System Program to manage loss of material.

To complete its review, the staff required further information regarding the use of the Selective Leaching Program to manage loss of material. Therefore, in the RAI 2.3.3.A.9-8, the staff requested that the applicant supply the portions of the Selective Leaching Program that are applicable to the combination of fire hydrants, gray cast iron, raw water, low flow. The staff also requested that the applicant include program documents and procedures credited for managing the loss of material for this combination.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that as presented in ALRA Sections A1.1.33 and B2.1.21, the implementation of the selective leaching of materials program is discussed in the program description for the One-Time Inspection Program (see ALRA Section B2.1.20). The One-Time Inspection Program is a new license renewal aging management program commitment for NMPNS (NMP1 Commitment 23 and NMP2 Commitment 21) that is to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. This commitment was made in the original LRA submittal, as supplemented by the NMP letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. As such, NMP does not currently have any program documents or procedures specific to managing selective leaching for fire hydrants

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-8 acceptable because it adequately describes how the Selective Leaching Program would be used to manage loss of material components in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-8 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-9 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes requirements for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 for the auxiliary systems for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of flow elements, wrought austenitic stainless steel, raw water, low flow, a table note indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage cracking in addition to loss of material.

Additionally, another note of the original LRA table indicates that flow elements are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

Therefore, to complete its review, the staff required further information regarding the use of the Fire Water System Program to manage cracking and loss of material. In the RAI, the staff requested that the applicant supply the Fire Water System Program documents and procedures that are applicable to the combination of flow elements, wrought austenitic stainless steel, raw water, low flow that are credited with managing cracking and loss of material.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the AERM of material cracking resulting from SCC for wrought austenitic stainless steel components (including the flow elements) in low flow, raw water will be reassigned to the One-Time Inspection Program for aging management. As presented in the original LRA Sections A1.1.28 and B2.1.20, the One-Time Inspection Program is a new AMP, documented as commitments (NMP1 Commitment 23 and NMP2 Commitment 21) to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. These commitments were made in the original LRA submittal, as supplemented by the NMP correspondence NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. As such, NMP does not currently have any program documents or procedures specific to managing selective leaching for flow elements.

The above flow elements are also susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and MIC mechanisms. The applicant credits fire system flow test and a site chemistry procedure are credited with managing the aging along with a new inspection activity yet to be generated. These credited activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement adds procedural guidance for performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and detect biofouling. This enhancement will include inspections for loss of material in the flow elements above and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing program documents or procedures implementing these inspections.
- Site procedure S-CTP-V632, "Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria," is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure provides guidance for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the

presence of bacteria. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. Additionally, as presented in the original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the fire water system program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.

- Site procedure N1-FST-FPW-3A001, "FPW System Flow Test," is credited with managing corrosion, biofouling, and MIC of the fire protection water distribution system. The testing activity provides full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure verifies the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or degraded by corrosion or fouling.

The applicant revised AMR original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 to replace Fire Water System Program with One-Time Inspection Program for the management of material cracking for wrought austenitic stainless steel components (flow elements and orifices) in a raw water, low flow environment.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-9 acceptable because it adequately describes how the aging effects requiring management of material cracking resulting from SCC for wrought austenitic stainless steel components, galvanic, general, pitting, MIC, and selective leaching would be managed for the components in question. The applicant also revised the AMR original LRA table for the component types in question to show the One-Time Inspection Program for the management of cracking. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-9 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-10 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 for the auxiliary systems for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system summarizes the aging management program for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of heat exchangers, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow, a table note indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage loss of material in heat exchangers which are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

To complete its review, the staff required further information regarding the use of the Fire Water System Program to manage loss of material for heat exchangers. The staff asked the applicant to supply the Fire Water System Program documents and procedures that are applicable to the combination of heat exchangers, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow that are credited with managing loss of material in heat exchangers.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the heat exchangers in question are susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and

microbiologically influenced corrosion mechanisms. A new inspection activity (see NMP1 Commitment 20 and NMP2 Commitment 18), for which a procedure must be generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system flow test are credited with managing aging. These activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in “Parameters Monitored/ Inspected” in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement adds procedural guidance for performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the heat exchangers in question and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.
- Site procedure S-CTP-V632, “Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria,” is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure provides guidance for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.
- Site procedure N1-FST-FPW-3A001, “FPW System Flow Test,” is credited with the possible discovery of corrosion, biofouling, and MIC of the fire protection water distribution system. The procedure provides for full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure verifies that the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or adversely affected by degradation such as corrosion or fouling.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-10 acceptable because it adequately describes how the aging effects requiring management of loss of material resulting from galvanic, general, pitting, and MIC mechanisms for carbon or low alloy steel and ductile/malleable cast iron combinations would be managed for the components in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-10 is resolved. The above information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-11 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 for the auxiliary systems for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system summarizes the aging management program for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of orifices, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow, a table note indicates that the Fire Water

System Program has been modified to manage loss of material in orifices which are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

Therefore, to complete its review, the staff required further information regarding the use of the Fire Water System Program to manage loss of material for orifices. The staff requested that the applicant supply the Fire Water System Program documents and procedures that are applicable to the combination of orifices, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow that are credited with managing loss of material in orifices.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the population of orifices satisfying the criteria above is limited to flow orifice FO<sub>R</sub>-100-509 (diesel fire pump to EDG cooling). This orifice is susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and microbiologically influenced corrosion mechanisms. A fire system flow test and a site chemistry procedure are credited with managing the aging along with a new inspection activity yet to be generated. As stated in the response by the applicant, these credited activities are as follows:

The new site activity (see NMP1 Commitment 20 and NMP2 Commitment 18) is identified as an enhancement in "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement adds procedural guidance for performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the above orifice and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.

Site procedure S-CTP-V632, "Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria," is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. This procedure provides guidance for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to include periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.

Site procedure N1-FST-FPW-3A001, "FPW System Flow Test," is credited with managing corrosion, biofouling, and microbiologically influenced corrosion of the fire protection water distribution system. The testing activity provides full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure verifies the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or degraded by corrosion or fouling.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-11 acceptable because it adequately describes how the aging effects requiring management for orifices would be managed for the combination in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-11 is resolved. The above information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-12 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 for the auxiliary systems for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA

table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of orifices, wrought austenitic stainless steel, raw water, low flow, a table note indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage cracking in addition to loss of material.

Another table note indicates that orifices are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

Therefore, to complete its review, the staff required further information regarding the use of the Fire Water System Program to manage cracking and loss of material. The staff requested that the applicant supply the Fire Water System Program documents and procedures that are applicable to the combination of orifices, wrought austenitic stainless steel, raw water, and low flow that are credited with managing cracking and loss of material.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that identification of the Fire Water System Program as the aging management program for cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel orifices in raw water with low flow (original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-8) was an error. The Fire Water System Program is focused on managing loss of material rather than cracking. The One-Time Inspection Program should have been designated as the aging management program for the subject flow orifices. Use of the One-Time Inspection Program to manage cracking is appropriate because the aging mechanism that can cause cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel in raw water with low flow is SCC. While SCC is possible in non-brackish fresh water, it is unlikely. Therefore, a one-time inspection is sufficient to verify that SCC is not occurring. As presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.28 and B2.1.20, the One-Time Inspection Program is a new AMP for NMP that is to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. Development of the new program is a commitment made with the original LRA submittal (see NMP1 Commitment 23 and NMP2 Commitment 21), as supplemented by NMP Nuclear Station letter (NMP1L 1880) dated October 29, 2004. As such, NMP does not currently have any program documents or procedures specific to managing cracking of flow orifices in the fire water system. The one-time inspection program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.

The subject orifices are also susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and microbiologically influenced corrosion mechanisms. A new inspection activity, for which a procedure must be generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system flow test are credited with managing aging. These credited activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in "Parameters Monitored/ Inspected" in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement adds procedural guidance for performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the subject orifices and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A of.



Site procedure S-CTP-V632, "Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria," is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure provides guidance for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.

Site procedure N1-FST-FPW-3A001, "FPW System Flow Test," is credited with the possible discovery of corrosion, biofouling, and MIC of the fire protection water distribution system. The testing activity provides full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA fire protection handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure, therefore, verifies the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or degraded by corrosion or fouling.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-12 acceptable because it adequately describes how the aging effects requiring management for orifices would be managed for the combination in question. The applicant also revised the original LRA AMR table for the component type in question to show the One-Time Inspection Program for the management of cracking. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-12 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-13 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

Original LRA Section 3.3.2.A-8 for the auxiliary systems for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of sluice gate for motor driven fire pump, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow, a table note indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage loss of material in the sluice gate for motor driven fire pump which is not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

Therefore, to complete its review, the staff required further information regarding the use of the Fire Water System Program to manage loss of material for the sluice gate for the motor driven fire pump. The staff requested that the applicant supply the Fire Water System Program documents and procedures that are applicable to the combination of sluice gate for motor driven fire pump, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow that are credited with managing loss of material in the sluice gate for motor driven fire pump.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the sluice gate for the motor-driven fire pump is susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and MIC mechanisms. A new inspection activity (see NMP Commitment 20 and NMP2 Commitment 21), for which a procedure must be generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system

flow test are credited with managing aging. These activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in “Parameters Monitored/Inspected” in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement includes performing visual inspections to monitor component corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the sluice gates identified above and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.
- Site procedure S-CTP-V632, “Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria,” is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure includes sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.
- Site procedure N1-FST-FPW-3A001, “FPW System Flow Test,” is credited with the possible discovery of corrosion, biofouling, and microbiologically influenced corrosion of the fire protection water distribution system. The procedure provides for full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA fire protection handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure verifies that the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or adversely affected by degradation such as corrosion or fouling.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-13 acceptable because it adequately describes how the aging effects requiring management for sluice gates would be managed for the combination in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-13 is resolved. The above information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 2.3.3.A.9-14 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.A-8 for the auxiliary systems for the NMP1 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of spray nozzles, copper alloys (zinc  $\leq$  15%), raw water, low flow, a table note indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage loss of material in the spray nozzles which are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

To complete its review, the staff required further information regarding the use of the Fire Water System Program to manage loss of material for spray nozzles. The staff asked the applicant to supply the Fire Water System Program documents and procedures that are applicable to the

combination of spray nozzles, copper alloys (zinc  $\leq$  15%), raw water, low flow, that are credited with managing loss of material in spray nozzles.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the spray nozzles fabricated from copper alloys (zinc  $\leq$  15%), in an environment of raw water and low flow, are susceptible to loss of material. A new inspection activity (NMP1 Commitment 20 and NMP2 Commitment 18), for which a procedure must be generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system functional test are credited with managing aging. These activities are discussed below:

The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in "Parameters Monitored/Inspected" in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement includes performing visual inspections to monitor component corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the sluice gates identified above and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.

Site procedure S-CTP-V632, "Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria," is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure includes sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.

Site procedure N1-FST-FPW-C003, "Fire Protection Preaction, Deluge and Automatic Sprinkler Test," verifies the operability of the fire protection preaction, deluge, and automatic systems by performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and a visual inspection of the sprinkler heads and system piping to verify their integrity and verify no blockage. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.A.9-14 acceptable because it adequately describes how the aging effects requiring management for spray nozzles would be managed for the combination in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.A.9-14 is resolved.

#### 3.3A.2.3.9 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Hydrogen Water Chemistry System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-9

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-9, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the hydrogen water chemistry system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-9. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.10-1 lists individual system components within the scope of

license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include flow element, piping and fittings, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 212 °F but less than 482 °F, subject to cracking

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.10, Table 2.3.3.A.10-1, Section 3.3.2.A.9, and Table 3.3.2.A-9.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the hydrogen water chemistry system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the hydrogen water chemistry system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-9 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the hydrogen water chemistry system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is found in Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2 of this SER.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the hydrogen water chemistry system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.10 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Liquid Poison System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-10

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-10, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the liquid poison system component groups.

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the

NMP1 liquid poison system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3A.2.2.5

#### 3.3A.2.3.11 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Miscellaneous Non Contaminated Vents and Drains System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-11

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-11, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the miscellaneous non contaminated vents and drains system of those AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-11. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.12-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include piping and fittings.

For these component types, the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.12, Table 2.3.3.A.12-1, Section 3.3.2.A.11, and Table 3.3.2.A-1. During its review the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. The general RAI applicable to this system is a-RAI 3.3.2-1

In a-RAI 3.3.2-1 dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information on the system aging effects. By letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant responded. The RAI, the applicant's response, and the staff's evaluation of the response are described in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.0.

There are no relevant system-specific RAIs associated with this system.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information in the applicant's response to the RAI found the aging effects of the miscellaneous noncontaminated vents and drains system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the miscellaneous noncontaminated vents and drains system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-11 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the miscellaneous noncontaminated vents and drains system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- One-Time Inspection Program

In the applicant's response to general RAI a-RAI 3.3.2-1, dated November 30, 2005, as described in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.0 the applicant revised its management strategy for the aging effects of some components in this system by replacing the One-Time Inspection Program with the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff's detailed review of the Preventive Maintenance Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the miscellaneous non contaminated vents and drains system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.12 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Neutron Monitoring System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-12

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 neutron monitoring system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3A.2.2.5

#### 3.3A.2.3.13 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Radioactive Waste Solidification and Storage Building HVAC System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-13

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 radioactive waste solidification and storage building HVAC system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3A.2.2.5

#### 3.3A.2.3.14 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Radioactive Waste System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-14

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-14, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the radioactive waste system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-14 as revised in the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.16-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, filters/strainers, flow element, heat exchangers, piping and fittings, pumps, separator, tanks, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- nickel based alloys exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- cast austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to cracking

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.16, Table 2.3.3.A.16-1,

Section 3.3.2.A.14, and Table 3.3.2.A-14. During its review, the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. The general RAI applicable to this system is a-RAI 3.3.2-1 as discussed below:

By letter dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information on the issue addressed in a-RAI 3.3.2-1. By letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant responded. The RAI, the applicant's response, and the staff's evaluation of the response are described in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.0.

There are no relevant system-specific RAIs for this system.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the RAI found the aging effects of the radioactive waste system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the radioactive waste system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-14 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the radioactive waste system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- System Walkdown Program

In the applicant's response to general RAI a-RAI 3.3.2-1 as described in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.0, the applicant revised its strategy for managing the aging effects of some components in this system by replacing the One-Time Inspection Program with the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff's detailed review of the Preventive Maintenance Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1.

The staff's detailed review of Selective Leaching of Materials Program and System Walkdown Program is in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.5 and 3.0.3.3.2.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the radioactive waste system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for



managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.3A.2.3.15 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-15

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-15, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor building closed loop cooling water system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-15 as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996 dated November 17, 2005, the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 dated November 30, 2005, and the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.17-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, filters/strainers, flow elements, heat exchangers, orifices, piping and fittings, pumps, temperature elements, and valves.

For these component types, the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to experiences loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to demineralized untreated water, or demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc greater than 15 percent) and aluminum bronze exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc greater than 15 percent) and aluminum bronze exposed to raw water, low flow, subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc greater than 15 percent) and aluminum bronze exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of heat transfer
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to raw water subject to loss of heat transfer
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater

than 482 °F, subject to cracking

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to raw water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to air, Moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (Yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.17, Table 2.3.3.A.17-1, Section 3.3.2.A.15, and Table 3.3.2.A-15. During its review the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. There are no general RAIs associated with this system. System-specific a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is applicable to this system. The staff's detailed review of the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.5.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the RAI found the aging effects of the reactor building closed loop cooling water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the reactor building closed loop cooling water system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the program adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-15 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the reactor building closed loop cooling water system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.2.8, 3.0.3.1.5, 3.0.3.1.4, and 3.0.3.2.2.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor building closed loop cooling water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.16 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Reactor Building HVAC System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-16

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-16, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor building HVAC system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-16. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.18-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces and flow elements.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- polymers exposed to air subject to cracking, hardening and shrinkage, and loss of strength

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.18, Table 2.3.3.A.18-1, Section 3.3.2.A.16, and Table 3.3.2.A-16.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the reactor building HVAC system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the reactor building HVAC system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-16 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the reactor building HVAC system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2 and 3.0.3.1.4.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor building HVAC system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.17 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Reactor Water Cleanup System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-17

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-17, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor water cleanup system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-17 as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996 dated November 17, 2005, the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 dated November 30, 2005, and the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.19-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include bolting, heat exchangers, piping and fittings, and pumps.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 212 °F but less than 482 °F, subject to cumulative fatigue damage and loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- gray Cast iron exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 ° F, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in Section 2.3.3.A.19, Table 2.3.3.A.19-1, Section 3.3.2.A.17,

and Table 3.3.2.A-17 of the ALRA. During its review the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. There are no general RAIs associated with this system. System-specific a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is applicable to this system. The staff's detailed review of the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.5.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the RAI found the aging effects of the reactor water cleanup system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the reactor water cleanup system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the program adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-17 identifies TLAA and the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the reactor water cleanup system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

The staff's evaluation of the TLAA is in SER Section 4.3. The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.8, 3.0.3.13, 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.2.2, and 3.0.3.1.5.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor water cleanup system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.3A.2.3.18 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Sampling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-18

Staff Evaluation: The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-18, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the sampling system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-18 as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.20-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include heat exchangers, piping and fittings, and rupture disc.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- elastomer exposed to raw water subject to hardening and shrinkage
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 482 °F, low flow, subject to cracking

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.20, Table 2.3.3.A.20-1, Section 3.3.2.A.18, and Table 3.3.2.A-18.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the RAI found the aging effects of the sampling system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the sampling system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the program adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-18 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the sampling system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program

The staff's detailed review of the above AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.2.2, and 3.0.3.3.1.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the sampling system

component components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.19 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Service Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-19

Staff Evaluation: The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-19, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the service water system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-19. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.21-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces and filters/strainers.

For these component types, the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- copper alloys (zinc greater than 15 percent) and aluminum bronze exposed to air subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to raw water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.21, Table 2.3.3.A.21-1, Section 3.3.2.A.19, and Table 3.3.2.A-19.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the service water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the service water system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-19 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the service water system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- System Walkdown Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.2.7, and 3.0.3.1.5.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the service water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.20 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Shutdown Cooling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-20

Staff Evaluation: The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-20, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the shutdown cooling system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-20. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.22-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include heat exchangers.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 degree F, subject to loss of heat transfer

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.22, Table 2.3.3.A.22-1, Section 3.3.2.A.20, and Table 3.3.2.A-20.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the shutdown cooling system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the shutdown cooling system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing them. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-20 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the



shutdown cooling system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of this AMP is in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.7.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the shutdown cooling system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.21 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Spent Fuel Pool Filtering and Cooling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-21

Staff Evaluation: The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-21, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-21 as revised by the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 dated November 30, 2005 and the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.23-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, filters/strainers, heat exchangers, pump, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, oxygenated, subject to loss of material
- wrought Austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to treated water, temperature less than °F, oxygenated, subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, oxygenated, subject

to loss of material

- aluminum alloys containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, oxygenated, subject to cracking
- aluminum alloys containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, low flow, oxygenated, subject to cracking
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, low flow, oxygenated, subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, low flow, oxygenated, subject to loss of material
- aluminum, and aluminum alloyed with manganese, magnesium, and magnesium plus silicon exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, oxygenated, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.23, Table 2.3.3.A.23-1, Section 3.3.2.A.21, and Table 3.3.2.A-21. During its review the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. There are no general RAIs associated with this system. System-specific a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is applicable to this system. The staff's detailed review of the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.5.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information in the applicant's response to the RAI found the aging effects of the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-21 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.2.2, and 3.0.3.2.8.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the

applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the spent fuel pool filtering and cooling system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.22 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-22

Staff Evaluation: The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-22, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the turbine building closed loop cooling water system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-22 as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996, dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.25-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include heat exchangers, piping and fittings, pumps, strainers, tanks, and valves.

For this component type the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.25, Table 2.3.3.A.25-1, Section 3.3.2.A.22, and Table 3.3.2.A-22.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the turbine building closed loop cooling water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the turbine building closed loop cooling water system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-22 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the turbine building closed loop cooling water system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- One-Time Inspection Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program

The staff's detailed review of this AMP is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.3.1, and 3.0.3.2.2.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the turbine building closed loop cooling water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.23 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Turbine Building HVAC System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-23

Staff Evaluation: The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-23, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the turbine building HVAC system component-material-environment AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J in ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-23 as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996 dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs with managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.A.26-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include ducting, external surfaces, and valves and dampers.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMs:

- fiberglass exposed to air with vibratory motion subject to cracking, loss of material, and loss of strength
- fiberglass exposed to air subject to cracking and loss of strength
- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.A.26, Table 2.3.3.A.26-1, Section 3.3.2.A.23, and Table 3.3.2.A-23.

On the basis of its review, the staff found the aging effects of the turbine building HVAC system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for

these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the components in the turbine building HVAC system.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-23 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the turbine building HVAC system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- Preventive Maintenance Program
- System Walkdown Program
- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of these AMPs is in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.1, 3.0.3.3.2, and 3.0.3.1.4.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the turbine building HVAC system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3A.2.3.24 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Electric Steam Boiler System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-24

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 electric steam boiler system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3A.2.2.2

#### 3.3A.2.3.25 Auxiliary Systems NMP1 Makeup and Demineralizer System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.A-25

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 makeup and demineralizer system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3A.2.2.5.

### 3.3A.3 Conclusion

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP1 auxiliary systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these auxiliary systems, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.3B NMP2 Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the auxiliary systems components and component groups associated with the following NMP2 systems:

- air startup standby diesel generator system
- alternate decay heat removal system
- auxiliary service building HVAC system
- compressed air systems
- containment atmosphere monitoring system
- containment leakage monitoring system
- control building chilled water system
- control building HVAC system
- diesel generator building ventilation system
- domestic water system
- engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system
- fire detection and protection system
- floor and equipment drains system
- generator standby lube oil system
- hot water heating system
- makeup water system
- neutron monitoring system
- primary containment purge system
- process sampling system
- reactor building closed loop cooling water system
- reactor building HVAC system
- reactor water cleanup system
- service water system
- spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
- standby diesel generator fuel oil system
- standby diesel generator protection (generator) system
- standby liquid control system
- yard structures ventilation system
- radiation monitoring system
- auxiliary boiler system
- circulating water system
- makeup water treatment system
- radioactive liquid waste management system
- roof drainage system
- sanitary drains and disposal system
- service water chemical treatment system
- turbine building closed loop cooling water system

### **3.3B.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.3, the applicant provided AMR results for the auxiliary systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.3.1.B, "NMP2 Summary of Aging Management Programs for the Auxiliary Systems Evaluated in Chapter VII of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the auxiliary systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### **3.3B.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.3 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the auxiliary systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.3B.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.3B.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.3B.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the USAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the auxiliary systems components.

Table 3.3B-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP2 components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.3, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.3B-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP2 Auxiliary Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Components in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup (Item Number 3.3.1.B-01)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20), Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Program (B2.1.11)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.2.1)
Linings in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system; seals and collars in ventilation systems (Item Number 3.3.1.B-02)	Hardening, cracking and loss of strength due to elastomer degradation; loss of material due to wear	Plant-specific	Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.2.2)
Components in load handling, chemical and volume control system (PWR), and reactor water cleanup and shutdown cooling systems (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.B-03)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.3, Metal Fatigue Analysis
Heat exchangers in reactor water cleanup system (BWR); high pressure pumps in chemical and volume control system (PWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.B-04)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC or cracking	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.3B.2.2.4)



Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Components in ventilation systems, diesel fuel oil system, and emergency diesel generator systems; external surfaces of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.3.1.B-05)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Plant-specific	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), Fire Protection Program (B2.1.16), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20), Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32), Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33), Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.2.5)
Components in reactor coolant pump oil collect system of fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.B-06)	Loss of material due to galvanic, general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	One-time inspection	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.3B.2.2.6)
Diesel fuel oil tanks in diesel fuel oil system and emergency diesel generator system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-07)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling	Fuel oil chemistry and one-time inspection	Fuel Oil Chemistry Program (B2.1.18), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.2.7)
Piping, pump casing, and valve body and bonnets in shutdown cooling system (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.B-08)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	None	Not applicable (no shutdown cooling system)
Heat exchangers in chemical and volume control system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-09)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and cyclic loading	Water chemistry and a plant-specific verification program	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.3B.2.2.9)
Neutron absorbing sheets in spent fuel storage racks (Item Number 3.3.1.B-10)	Reduction of neutron absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion (Boral, boron steel)	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.3B.2.2.10)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
New fuel rack assembly (Item Number 3.3.1.B-11)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Structures monitoring	None	Not applicable The new fuel storage racks are addressed in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-7.
Neutron absorbing sheets in spent fuel storage racks (Item Number 3.3.1.B-12)	Reduction of neutron absorbing capacity due to Boraflex degradation	Boraflex monitoring	None	Not applicable  Boraflex panels to be replaced with Boral
Spent fuel storage racks and valves in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup (Item Number 3.3.1.B-13)	Crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking	Water chemistry	None	Not applicable The new fuel storage racks are addressed in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-7.
Closure bolting and external surfaces of carbon steel and low-alloy steel components (Item Number 3.3.1.B-14)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion	None	Not applicable  This aging effect/ mechanism does not exist at NMP2 because NMP2 has no liquid poison system
Components in or serviced by closed-cycle cooling water system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-15)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Closed-cycle cooling water system	Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program (B2.1.11), Selective Leaching of Materials Program (B2.1.21)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1)
Cranes including bridge and trolleys and rail system in load handling system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-16)	Loss of material due to general corrosion and wear	Overhead heavy load and light load handling systems	None	Not applicable  Addressed in ALRA Section 3.5
Components in or serviced by open-cycle cooling water systems (Item Number 3.3.1.B-17)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion, MIC, and biofouling; buildup of deposit due to biofouling	Open-cycle cooling water system	Open-Cycle Cooling Water Program (B2.1.10), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20), Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Buried piping and fittings (Item Number 3.3.1.B-18)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Buried piping and tanks surveillance or Buried piping and tanks inspection	Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program (B2.1.22)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.2.11)
Components in compressed air system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-19)	Loss of material due to general and pitting corrosion	Compressed air monitoring	Fire Protection Program (B2.1.16), Fire Water System Program (B2.1.17), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1.5)
Components (doors and barrier penetration seals) and concrete structures in fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.B-20)	Loss of material due to wear; hardening and shrinkage due to weathering	Fire protection	None	Not applicable  The plant-specific environment for concrete structures in fire protection is not conducive to the listed aging effects
Components in water-based fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.B-21)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion, MIC, and biofouling	Fire water system	Fire Water System Program (B2.1.17), Selective Leaching of Materials Program (B2.1.21)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1)
Components in diesel fire system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-22)	Loss of material due to galvanic, general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Fire protection and fuel oil chemistry	None	Not applicable  Fuel oil supply lines do not have this aging effect
Tanks in diesel fuel oil system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-23)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion	Aboveground carbon steel tanks	Preventive Maintenance Program (B2.1.32)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1.6)
Closure bolting (Item Number 3.3.1.B-24)	Loss of material due to general corrosion; crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Components in contact with sodium pentaborate solution in standby liquid control system (BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.B-25)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1)
Components in reactor water cleanup system (Item Number 3.3.1.B-26)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC and IGSCC	Reactor water cleanup system inspection	None	Not applicable  RWCU system components with this aging effect/mechanism are evaluated in row 3.1.1.B-07 (See Section 3.1B.2.2.4)
Components in shutdown cooling system (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.B-27)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	BWR stress corrosion cracking and water chemistry	None	Not applicable  NMP Unit 2 has no shutdown cooling system
Components in shutdown cooling system (older BWR) (Item Number 3.3.1.B-28)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion, and MIC	Closed-cycle cooling water system	None	Not applicable  NMP Unit 2 has no shutdown cooling system
Components (aluminum bronze, brass, cast iron, cast steel) in open-cycle and closed-cycle cooling water systems, and ultimate heat sink (Item Number 3.3.1.B-29)	Loss of material due to selective leaching	Selective leaching of materials	Selective Leaching of Materials Program (B2.1.21)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.3B.2.1)
Fire barriers, walls, ceilings, and floors in fire protection (Item Number 3.3.1.B-30)	Concrete cracking and spalling due to freeze-thaw, aggressive chemical attack, and reaction with aggregates; loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel	Fire protection and structures monitoring	None	Not applicable  The plant-specific environment for concrete structures in fire protection does not generate the listed aging effects

The staff's review of the NMP2 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.3B.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the auxiliary systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER

Section 3.3B.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the auxiliary systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.3B.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the auxiliary systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the auxiliary systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.3B.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.3.2.B, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the auxiliary systems components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Fire Protection Program
- Fire Water System Program
- Fuel Oil Chemistry Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.3.2.B-1 through 3.3.2.B-40, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the auxiliary systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component,

material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different aging management program is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.3B.2.1.1 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion, and MIC

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-5 for component type bolting the applicant manages the aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of material with the Bolting Integrity Program. In its letter dated September 15, 2005, the applicant identified an exception to this program based upon the ASME code edition in use. The staff asked the applicant to clarify why a Note A was assigned to this line item.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the assignment was an error. The ALRA will be revised for each AMR line item crediting the applicant's Bolting Integrity Program to change the note from Note A to Note B.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable because with the correction of Note A to Note B the proper note is assigned to these AMR line items.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3B.2.1.2 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion, MIC, and Fouling

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-28 for component type tanks the applicant manages the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material with the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program. The staff asked the applicant to clarify why a Note A was assigned to this line item as its Fuel Oil Chemistry Program takes an exception to GALL AMP XI.M30, "Fuel Oil Chemistry."

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the assignment was an error. The ALRA will be revised so that for this AMR line item the note will be changed from Note A to Note B.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it acceptable because, with the correction of Note A to Note B, the proper note is assigned to the AMR line item.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3B.2.1.3 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion, and MIC

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-29 for component type heat exchangers and aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material, the applicant manages this aging effect and aging effect mechanism with Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program. The staff asked the applicant to clarify why ALRA Table 3.3.1.B, Item 3.3.1.B-15 was applied which is for closed-cycle cooling water environments.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the occurrence is an error. The ALRA will be revised so that the Table 1 reference will be changed from ALRA Table 3.3.1.B, Item 3.3.1.B-15 to ALRA Table 3.3.1.B, Item 3.3.1.B-17.

The staff's review of the applicant's response found the correction of the Table 1 reference acceptable because it is for an open-cycle cooling water environment.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3B.2.1.4 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-28 (page 3.3-279) for component type tanks the applicant manages the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material with the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff asked the applicant to confirm that all surfaces of the tank are accessible for visual inspection. The applicant provided documentation confirming that all external surfaces of the tank are accessible for visual inspection. Furthermore, in response to this question the applicant noted that this line item should have been removed from the ALRA.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the ALRA had been revised to delete the line item for loss of material addressed by its Preventive Maintenance Program. The applicant further stated in this letter that ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-28 has a carbon steel component type of external surfaces aging management line item managed by the Systems Walkdown Program and the references to its Preventive Maintenance Program should have been removed. The staff reviewed the applicant's Systems Walkdown Program and its evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.2.

On the basis of the staff reviewed the applicant's response, the staff found it consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

On the basis of the staff's review, the staff found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.3B.2.1.5 Loss of Material Due to General and Pitting Corrosion

In reviewing ALRA Table 3.3.1.B, Item 3.3.1-19 the staff noted that the applicant credited the Fire Protection, Fire Water System, One-Time Inspection, and Appendix J Programs. These AMPs are different from the AMP recommended by the GALL Report GALL AMP XI.M24, "Compressed Air Monitoring."

The staff reviewed the applicant's Fire Protection, Fire Water System, One-Time Inspection, and Appendix J Programs and its evaluations are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.13, 3.0.3.2.14, 3.0.3.1.4, and 3.0.3.1.7, respectively. The staff found that the applicant's Fire Protection and Fire Water System Programs manage loss of material degradation by visual inspection of piping and valves in the fire detection and protection system. Also the staff found that the applicant's One-Time Inspection and Appendix J Programs manage loss of material degradation through visual inspection of carbon steel piping and valves in the compressed air system. The staff concluded that these AMPs will assure detection of material degradation before the loss of intended function and that these AMPs will manage the loss of material due to general and pitting corrosion adequately.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the loss of material due to general and pitting corrosion for carbon steel piping and fitting and valves exposed to an air environment.



#### 3.3B.2.1.6 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

In reviewing ALRA Table 3.3.1.B, Item 3.3.1-23 the staff noted that the applicant credited the Preventive Maintenance Program. This AMP is different from the AMP recommended by the GALL Report GALL AMP XI.M29, "Aboveground Carbon Steel Tanks."

The staff reviewed the applicant's Preventive Maintenance Program and its evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1. The staff found that the applicant's Preventive Maintenance Program manages material degradation by visual inspection and examination of component surfaces for evidence of defects and age-related degradation. The staff concluded that this AMP will assure detection of material degradation before the loss of intended function and that this AMP will manage the loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion adequately.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for the external surfaces of carbon steel tanks in the diesel fuel oil system.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.3B.2.2 AMR Results That are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.3.2.C of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as recommended by the GALL Report for the auxiliary systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- hardening and cracking or loss of strength due to elastomer degradation or loss of material due to wear
- cumulative fatigue damage
- crack initiation and growth due to cracking or stress corrosion cracking
- loss of material due to general, microbiologically influenced, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- loss of material due to general, galvanic, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC and biofouling
- crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking and cyclic loading
- reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion

- loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.3B.2.2.1 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1.1.

In Section 3.3.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system components.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1.1 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion could occur in the channel head and access cover, tubes, and tubesheets of the heat exchanger in the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup. The Water Chemistry Program relies on monitoring and control of reactor water chemistry based on EPRI guidelines of BWRVIP-29 (TR-103515), "BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines - Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry," to manage the effects of loss of material from general, pitting, or crevice corrosion. However, high concentrations of impurities at crevices and stagnant flow locations could cause general, pitting, or crevice corrosion. Therefore, the effectiveness of the chemistry control program should be verified to ensure no corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage loss of material from general, pitting, and crevice corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Program. A one-time inspection of select components at susceptible locations is an acceptable method to ensure no corrosion and maintenance of the component's intended function during the period of extended operation.

In Section 3.3.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that NMP2 spent fuel pool cooling systems components are managed by the combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and the One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff reviewed the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs and its evaluations are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

In addition the staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1.2.

In Section 3.3.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system components is not applicable to NMP2 because it has no shutdown cooling system. Therefore, the staff agreed that this aging effect and aging

effect mechanism is not applicable to NMP2.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.1. For those line items addressed by Section 3.3.2.C.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application was consistent with the GALL Report and that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3B.2.2.2 Hardening and Cracking or Loss of Strength Due to Elastomer Degradation or Loss of Material due to Wear

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.2.

In Section 3.3.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed aging effects and aging effects mechanisms that could occur for the elastomer lining of some components exposed to the treated water environment of the spent fuel pool cooling system and elastomer seals and collars in the ductwork of certain ventilation systems exposed to a range of atmospheric conditions.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.2 states that hardening and cracking due to elastomer degradation could occur in elastomer linings of the filter, valve, and ion exchangers in spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup systems. Hardening and loss of strength due to elastomer degradation could occur in the collars and seals of the duct and in the elastomer seals of the filters in the control room area, auxiliary and radwaste area, and primary containment heating ventilation systems and in the collars and seals of the duct in the diesel generator building ventilation system. Loss of material due to wear could occur in the collars and seals of the duct in the ventilation systems. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms are adequately managed.

In Section 3.3.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that elastomers are not used in the lining of spent fuel pool system components within the scope of license renewal.

In addition the applicant stated that for NMP2 ventilation systems the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for seals and collars are managed by the NMP AMP B2.1.32, "Preventive Maintenance Program." The staff reviewed the applicant's Preventive Maintenance Program and its evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application was consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately

managed so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3B.2.2.3 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In Section 3.3.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### 3.3B.2.2.4 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Cracking or Stress Corrosion Cracking

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.4.

In Section 3.3.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed cracking due to SCC for the stainless steel reactor water cleanup system regenerative and nonregenerative heat exchangers.

In the ALRA the applicant states that for NMP2 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to the reactor water cleanup system regenerative and nonregenerative heat exchangers because only the carbon steel shells are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR cracking is not an applicable aging effect and aging effect mechanism for this material in the system environment. The staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that this aging effect or aging effect mechanism is (1) not applicable to NMP2 based on the use of carbon steel in the heat exchanger shells and (2) not susceptible to SCC.

Because NMP2 has no regenerative or nonregenerative heat exchanger reactor water cleanup system components susceptible to SCC within the scope of license renewal the staff found these aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.3B.2.2.5 Loss of Material Due to General, Microbiologically Influenced, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.5.

In Section 3.3.2.C.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material from corrosion that could occur on internal and external surfaces of components exposed to a range of atmospheric conditions. Specifically included were the ventilation systems, the diesel generator systems' fuel oil, starting air, and combustion air intake and exhaust subsystems, and auxiliary systems' external carbon steel surfaces within the scope of license renewal.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.5 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion could occur in the piping and filter housing and supports in the control room area, the auxiliary and radwaste area, the primary containment heating and ventilation systems, in the piping of the diesel generator building ventilation system, in the aboveground piping and fittings, valves, and pumps in the diesel fuel oil system, and in the diesel engine starting air, combustion air intake, and combustion air exhaust subsystems in the emergency diesel generator system.

Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC could occur in the duct fittings, access doors, and closure bolts, equipment frames, and housing of the duct; loss due to pitting and crevice corrosion could occur in the heating/cooling coils of the air handler heating/cooling; and loss due to general corrosion could occur on the external surfaces of all carbon steel structures and components, including bolting exposed to operating temperatures less than 212 °F in the ventilation systems. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms are adequately managed.

In Section 3.3.2.C.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that for NMP2 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the Fire Water System Program, One-Time Inspection Program, Preventive Maintenance Program, Systems Walkdown Program, and Bolting Integrity Program for the applicable systems and components.

The staff reviewed the applicant's Fire Water System, One-Time Inspection, Preventive Maintenance, Systems Walkdown, and Bolting Integrity Programs and its evaluations are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.14, 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.3.1, 3.0.3.3.2, and 3.0.3.2.23, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria in the SRP-LR.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.5. For those line items addressed by Section 3.3.2.C.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application was consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3B.2.2.6 Loss of Material Due to General, Galvanic, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.6 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.6.

The applicant stated in the ALRA that loss of material due to general, galvanic, pitting, and crevice corrosion in the reactor recirculation pumps' oil collection system in fire protection is not applicable because NMP has no oil collection systems for its reactor recirculation pumps. The staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that loss of material due to general, galvanic, pitting, and crevice corrosion in the reactor recirculation pumps' oil collection system in fire protection is not applicable because NMP has no oil collection systems for its reactor recirculation pumps.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable.

#### 3.3B.2.2.7 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, Crevice, and Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion and Biofouling

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.7.

In Section 3.3.2.C.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC and biofouling for the internal surfaces of diesel fuel oil system components.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.7 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling could occur in the internal surface of tanks in the diesel fuel oil system and due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC in the tanks of the diesel fuel oil system in the emergency diesel generator system. The existing AMP relies on the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program for monitoring and control of fuel oil contamination according to the guidelines of ASTM Standards D4057, D1796, D2709 and D2276 to manage loss of material due to corrosion or biofouling that may occur where contaminants accumulate. The effectiveness of the chemistry control program should be verified to ensure no corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage corrosion/biofouling to verify effectiveness. A one-time inspection of selected components at susceptible locations is an acceptable method to ensure no corrosion and maintenance of the component's intended function during the period of extended operation.

The applicant stated in Section 3.3.2.C.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP2 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the combination of the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program and the One-Time Inspection Program.

The staff reviewed the applicant's Fuel Oil Chemistry Program and One-Time Inspection Program and its evaluations are documented in Sections 3.0.3.2.15 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluation and concluded that it meets the criteria of the SRP-LR.

The staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.7. For those line items that apply to Section 3.3.2.C.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application was consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3B.2.2.8 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Non-Safety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 includes the staff's evaluation of the applicant's quality assurance program.

#### 3.3B.2.2.9 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cyclic Loading

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.9 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.9.

In Section 3.3.2.C.9 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that because crack initiation and growth due to SCC and cyclic loading apply to PWRs only this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP. The staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism applies to PWRs only and not to NMP.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging

effect mechanism not applicable.

#### 3.3B.2.2.10 Reduction of Neutron-Absorbing Capacity and Loss of Material Due to General Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.10 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.10.

In Section 3.3.2.C.10 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion in the neutron-absorbing (Boral or boron steel) sheets of the spent fuel storage racks are not applicable as NMP identified no aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for these components. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that the reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion in the neutron-absorbing (Boral or boron steel) sheets of the spent fuel storage racks are not applicable at NMP because no aging effects or aging effects mechanisms identified for these components.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable.

#### 3.3B.2.2.11 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, Crevice, and Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.3.2.C.11 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.11.

In Section 3.3.2.C.11 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC for buried piping and fittings.

SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.11 states that loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion and MIC could occur in the underground piping and fittings in the open-cycle cooling water system (service water system) and in the diesel fuel oil system. The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program relies on industry practice, frequency of pipe excavation, and operating experience to manage the effects of loss of material from general, pitting, crevice and MIC. The effectiveness of the applicant's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program should be verified to evaluate inspection frequency and operating experience with buried components to ensure no loss of material.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program for NMP2 fire detection and protection systems. The staff reviewed the applicant's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program and its evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.1.6.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to clarify its position on opportunistic inspections prior to the period of extended operation. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the ALRA will be revised to include the following in its Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program:

Program activities will include visual inspections of external coatings and wrappings to

detect damage and degradation. Prior to entering the period of extended operation, NMPNS will verify that there has been at least one opportunistic or focused inspection within the past ten years. Upon entering the period of extended operation, NMPNS will perform a focused inspection within ten years, unless an opportunistic inspection occurred within this ten year period. All credited inspections will be performed in areas with the highest likelihood of corrosion problems, and in areas with a history of corrosion problems.

The staff reviewed the applicant's clarification of its visual inspection position and the applicant's further evaluation and staff concluded that they met the criteria of the SRP-LR.

The staff concluded that the applicant's programs met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.3.2.2.11. For those line items addressed in Section 3.3.2.C.11 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application was consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### ***3.3B.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.3.2.B-1 through 3.3.2.B-40, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the NMP2 AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.3.2.B-1 through 3.3.2.B-40, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and aging effect requiring management does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicated that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicated that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicated that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicated that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicated that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of



extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.3B.2.3.1 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Air Startup Standby Diesel Generator System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-1

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the air startup standby diesel generator system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.1-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include piping and fittings and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to exhaust environment subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.1, Table 2.3.3.B.1-1, Section 3.3.2.B.1, and Table 3.3.2.B-1.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the air startup standby diesel generator system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments associated with the air startup standby diesel generator system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the UFSAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-1 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the air startup standby diesel generator system components that are not addressed by the GALL Report:

- Preventive Maintenance Program

The staff's detailed review of this AMP is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.1.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the air startup standby diesel generator system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.3B.2.3.2 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Alternate Decay Heat Removal System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-2

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 alternate decay heat removal system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.1

#### 3.3B.2.3.3 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Auxiliary Service Building HVAC System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-3

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 auxiliary service building HVAC system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5

#### 3.3B.2.3.4 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Chilled Water Ventilation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-4

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. This system has been removed from the scope of license renewal by the applicant in its ALRA dated July 14, 2005.

#### 3.3B.2.3.5 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Compressed Air Systems – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-5

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 compressed air systems are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5

#### 3.3B.2.3.6 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Containment Atmosphere Monitoring System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-6

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 containment atmosphere monitoring system are consistent with the GALL Report. The environment is air and therefore there is no AMP that requires staff evaluation.

#### 3.3B.2.3.7 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Containment Leakage Monitoring System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-7

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 containment leakage monitoring system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5

#### 3.3B.2.3.8 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Control Building Chilled Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-8

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-8, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the control building chilled water system component-material-environment-AERM combinations

not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.8-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include chillers and external surfaces.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to raw water subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.8, Table 2.3.3.B.8-1, Section 3.3.2.B.8, and Table 3.3.2.B-8.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the control building chilled water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the control building chilled water system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-8 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the control building chilled water system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- System Walkdown Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.7, 3.0.3.2.8 and 3.0.3.3.2.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the control building chilled water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.9 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Control Building HVAC system – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-9

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-9, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the control building HVAC system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.9-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, heat exchangers, and valves and dampers (including fire dampers).

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of heat transfer

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.9, Table 2.3.3.B.9-1, Section 3.3.2.B.9, and Table 3.3.2.B-9.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the control building HVAC system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the control building HVAC system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-9 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the control building HVAC system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- System Walkdown Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.3.1, 3.0.3.2.8, and 3.0.3.1.4.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the control building HVAC system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.3B.2.3.10 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-10

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-10, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the diesel generator building ventilation system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. Table 2.3.3.B.10-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include unit coolers.

For this component type the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to raw water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.10, Table 2.3.3.B.10-1, Section 3.3.2.B.10, and Table 3.3.2.B-10.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the control building HVAC system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the control building HVAC system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for the component the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-10 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the control building HVAC system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of this AMP is found in SER Section 3.0.3.2.7.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the diesel generator building ventilation system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.11 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Domestic Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-11

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-11, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the domestic water system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996 dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.11-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include piping and fittings, tanks, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.11, Table 2.3.3.B.11-1, Section 3.3.2.B.11, and Table 3.3.2.B-11.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the domestic water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the domestic water system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-11 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the domestic water system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMP is found in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the domestic water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.12 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Engine-Driven Fire Pump Fuel Oil System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-12

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 engine-driven fire pump fuel oil system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5.

#### 3.3B.2.3.13 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Fire Detection and Protection System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-13

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 fire detection and protection system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5.

The staff reviewed original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-13 (only those line items that are not consistent with GALL or component aging effects for material/environment was not listed in GALL), which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the NMP2 fire detection and protection system component groups.

In original LRA Section 3.3.2.B.13 and Table 3.3.2.B-13, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The materials identified include brass, carbon steel or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi), carbon steel or low alloy steel (yield strength > 100 Ksi) polymers, copper alloy (zinc < 15%), copper alloy (zinc > 15%) and aluminum bronze, gray cast iron, and wrought austenitic stainless steel.

The applicant identified the environments to which these materials could be exposed as air, air moisture or wetting temperature < 140 °F, dried air or gas, exhaust, liquid foam concentrate,

liquid foam concentrate/raw water/low flow, raw water low flow, soil above the water table and soil below the water table as the environments associated with the fire detection and protection system. The applicant identified aging effects requiring management from cracking, harding and shrinkage, loss of material, and loss strength associated with the fire water system.

The applicant proposed to manage the fire protection system aging effects by using the Fire Protection Program, Fire Water System Program, Preventive Maintenance Program, Systems Walkdown Program, Bolting Integrity Program, One-Time Inspection Program, Selective Leaching of Materials Program, and Buried Piping and Tank Inspection Program. The staff's evaluations of these programs are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.13, 3.0.3.2.14, 3.0.3.3.1, 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.3.23, 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.1.5, and 3.0.3.1.6, respectively.

The staff reviewed original LRA Section 3.3.2.B-13 and Table 3.3.2.2-13, to determine whether the applicant demonstrated that it will adequately manage the effects of aging for the fire protection system during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff conducted its review, described below, in accordance with SRP-LR Section 3.3 and the GALL Report.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-28 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-13 for the NMP2 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of flow elements, gray cast iron, raw water, low flow, Note Q indicates that the Selective Leaching Program is being used in addition to the Fire Water System Program to manage loss of material.

Additionally, Note 11 indicates that flow elements are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe how the Selective Leaching Program would be used to manage loss of material.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that for the combination of flow elements, gray cast iron, raw water, and low flow, the applicable portion of the Selective Leaching Program is a new activity for inspection for selective leaching of fire protection water system components. The Selective Leaching Program for NMP is implemented under the One-Time Inspection Program. The details of the inspections to be performed for particular components have not been determined. As presented in original LRA Sections A2.1.28 and B2.1.20, the One-Time Inspection Program is a new AMP for NMP, which are commitments (NMP1 Commitment 23 and NMP2 Commitment 21) made with the original LRA submittal, as supplemented by the NMP letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. As such, NMP does not currently have any program documents or procedures specific to managing selective leaching of fire protection water system components.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-28 acceptable because it adequately describes how the Selective Leaching Program would be used to



manage loss of material components in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-28 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-29 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-13 for the NMP2 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of heat exchangers, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow, Note 6 indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage loss of material in heat exchangers which are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe how the Fire Water System Program would be used to manage loss of material for heat exchangers.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that heat exchangers fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength <100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, in an environment of raw water and low flow, are susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and MIC mechanisms. A new inspection activity, for which a procedure must be generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system flow test are credited with managing aging. These credited activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in "Parameters Monitored/ Inspected" in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement includes performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the subject heat exchangers and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.
- Site procedure S-CTP-V632, "Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria," is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure provides for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.
- Site procedure N2-FSP-FPW-5Y001, "FPW System Flow Test," is credited with the possible discovery of corrosion, biofouling, and microbiologically influenced corrosion of the fire protection water distribution system. The procedure provides for full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA fire protection handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not

met. The procedure verifies that the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or adversely affected by degradation such as corrosion or fouling.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-29 acceptable because it adequately describes how the Fire Water System Program would be used to manage loss of material for the heat exchangers in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-29 is resolved.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-30 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

Original LRA Table 3.3.1.B-13 for the NMP2 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another aging management program is being used.

For the combination of manifold, carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, raw water, low flow, Note 26 indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage loss of material in manifolds which are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

The staff requested the applicant to describe how the Fire Water System Program would be used to manage loss of material for manifolds.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that manifolds fabricated from carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength <100 Ksi) and ductile/malleable cast iron, in an environment of raw water and low flow, are susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and microbiologically influenced corrosion mechanisms. A new inspection activity, for which a procedure must be generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system flow test are credited with managing aging. These credited activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in "Parameters Monitored/ Inspected" in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement includes performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the manifolds identified above and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.
- Site procedure S-CTP-V632, "Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria," is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure provides for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.

- Site procedure N2-FSP-FPW-5Y001, "FPW System Flow Test," is credited with the possible discovery of corrosion, biofouling, and MIC of the fire protection water distribution system. The procedure provides for full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA fire protection handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure verifies that the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or adversely affected by degradation such as corrosion or fouling.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-30 acceptable because it adequately describes how the Fire Water System Program would be used to manage loss of material for the manifolds in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-30 is resolved. The above information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-31 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.2.3.2.B-13 for the NMP2 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another aging management program is being used.

For the combination of orifices, copper alloys (zinc  $\leq$  15%), raw water, low flow, Note "7" indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage loss of material in manifolds which are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe how the Fire Water System Program would be used to manage loss of material for manifolds.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that orifices fabricated from copper alloys (zinc  $\leq$  15%), in an environment of raw water and low flow, are susceptible to loss of material. A new inspection activity, for which a procedure must be generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system flow test are credited with managing aging. These credited activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in "Parameters Monitored/ Inspected" in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement includes performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the subject orifices and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.
- Site procedure S-CTP-V632, "Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria," is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure provides guidance for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the

presence of bacteria. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.

- Site procedure N2-FSP-FPW-5Y001, "FPW System Flow Test," is credited with the possible discovery of corrosion, biofouling, and MIC of the fire protection water distribution system. The procedure provides for full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA fire protection handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure verifies that the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or adversely affected by degradation such as corrosion or fouling.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-31 acceptable because it adequately describes how the Fire Water System Program would be used to manage loss of material for the orifices in question. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-31 is resolved. The above information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 2.3.3.B.13-32 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the GALL Report describes recommendations for aging management of the fire protection water system based on the combination of component type, material, and environment.

The original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-13 for the NMP2 fire detection and protection system summarizes the AMP for each of the combinations mentioned above. When the combinations do not exactly match the requirements of the GALL Report, the original LRA table includes a note indicating that the prescribed AMP has been modified for use or that another AMP is being used.

For the combination of orifices, wrought austenitic stainless steel, raw water, low flow, Note H indicates that the Fire Water System Program has been modified to manage cracking in addition to loss of material.

Additionally, Note 7 indicates that orifices are not specifically identified in GALL Report Chapter VII for the fire protection system.

The staff requested the applicant to describe how the Fire Water System Program would be used to manage cracking and loss of material.

In its response by letter dated December 17, 2004, the applicant stated that the aging effect requiring management of material cracking resulting from SCC for wrought austenitic stainless steel components (including the orifices) in low flow, raw water is reassigned to the One-Time Inspection Program for aging management. As presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.28 and B2.1.20, the One-Time Inspection Program is a new AMP for NMPNS that is to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. This commitment (NMP1 Commitment 23 and NMP2 Commitment 21) was made in the original LRA submittal, as supplemented by NMPNS letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. As such, there are no existing program procedures specific to the one-time inspection program. The One-Time Inspection Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A. The subject orifices are also susceptible to loss of material from galvanic, general, pitting, and MIC mechanisms. A new inspection activity, for which a procedure must be

generated, a site chemistry procedure, and a fire system flow test are credited with managing aging. These credited activities are discussed below:

- The new site activity is identified as an enhancement in “Parameters Monitored/ Inspected” in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17. The enhancement includes performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and to detect biofouling. This new activity will include inspections for loss of material in the orifices identified above and will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, there are no existing procedures implementing these inspections at this time. The Fire Water System Program attribute assessment addresses program implementation at NMP relative to the requirements of SRP-LR Appendix A.
- Site procedure S-CTP-V632, “Sampling and Analysis of Water Systems for Bacteria,” is credited with managing loss of material as a result of microbiological activity. The procedure provides for sampling and analysis of raw water systems for the presence of bacteria. Additionally, as presented in original LRA Sections A1.1.18 and B2.1.17, the Fire Water System Program will be enhanced prior to the period of extended operation to add specific requirements for periodic sampling of water-based fire protection systems.
- Site procedure N2-FSP-FPW-5Y001, “FPW System Flow Test,” is credited with the possible discovery of corrosion, biofouling, and MIC of the fire protection water distribution system. The procedure provides for full flow testing of the system in accordance with the NFPA fire protection handbook. Acceptance criteria are defined and the site corrective action process is utilized when the criteria are not met. The procedure verifies that the system is capable of retaining pressure and is not obstructed or adversely affected by degradation such as corrosion or fouling.

The applicant revised original LRA Table 3.3.2.B-13 (pages 3.3-218 and 3.3-222) to replace Fire Water System Program with One-Time Inspection Program for the management of material cracking for wrought austenitic stainless steel components (valves and orifices) in a raw water, low flow environment.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 2.3.3.B.13-32 acceptable because it adequately describes how the one-time inspection and Fire Water System Programs would be used to manage cracking and loss of material, respectively, for the components in question. The applicant also revised the original LRA AMR table for the component types in question to show the One-Time Inspection Program for the management of cracking. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 2.3.3.B.13-32 is resolved. The above information is reflected in the ALRA.

#### 3.3B.2.3.14 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Floor and Equipment Drains System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-14

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-14, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the floor and equipment drains system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant identified all applicable AERMs and credited appropriate AMPs for managing them.

The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.14-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include drain tanks, external surfaces, flow elements, heat exchanger, piping and fittings, pumps, orifices, spray nozzle, stainers, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to cracking
- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to raw water subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to fuel oil subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, low flow, subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- aluminum exposed to raw water subject to loss of material
- cast austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to cracking
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water, temperature less than 140 °F, low flow, subject to loss of material

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material
- cast austenitic stainless steel exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.14, Table 2.3.3.B.14-1, Section 3.3.2.B.14, and Table 3.3.2.B-14. During its review the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. The general RAI that is applicable to this system is a-RAI 3.3.2-1.

By letter dated November 2, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information on the issue addressed in a-RAI 3.3.2-1. By letter dated November 30, 2005, the applicant responded to this RAI. The RAI, the applicant's response, and the staff's evaluation of the response are described in Section 3.3.2.3.0.

There are no other relevant system-specific RAIs associated with this system.

On the basis of its review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the above RAI, the staff found the aging effects of the floor and equipment drains system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the floor and equipment drains system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-14 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the floor and equipment drains system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- One-Time Inspection Program
- System Walkdown Program
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program

In the applicant's response to General a-RAI 3.3.2-1, as described in SER Section 3.3.2.3.0, the applicant revised its strategy for managing the aging effects of some components in this system by replacing the One-Time Inspection Program with the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff's detailed review of the Preventive Maintenance Program is found in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1.

The staff's detailed reviews of the System Walkdown Program and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J Program are found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2 and 3.0.3.1.7, respectively.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the floor and equipment drains system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.15 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Generator Standby Lube Oil System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-15

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-15, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the generator standby lube oil system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.15-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces and heat exchangers.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to cracking

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.15, Table 2.3.3.B.15-1, Section 3.3.2.B.15, and Table 3.3.2.B-15.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the generator standby lube oil system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the generator standby lube oil system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-15 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the generator standby lube oil system components not addressed by the GALL Report :



- System Walkdown Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2 and 3.0.3.2.8, respectively.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the generator standby lube oil system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.16 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Glycol Heating System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-16

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The applicant removed the NMP2 glycol heating system has been removed from the scope of license renewal in the ALRA dated July 14, 2005.

#### 3.3B.2.3.17 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Hot Water Heating System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-17

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 hot water heating system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5

#### 3.3B.2.3.18 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Makeup Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-18

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 makeup water system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5

#### 3.3B.2.3.19 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Neutron Monitoring System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-19

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 neutron monitoring system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5.

#### 3.3B.2.3.20 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Primary Containment Purge System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-20

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 primary containment purge system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5

#### 3.3B.2.3.21 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Process Sampling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-21

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 process sampling system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Section 3.3B.2.2.5.

#### 3.3B.2.3.22 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-22

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-22, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor building closed loop cooling water system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.23-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include flow elements, heat exchangers, piping and fittings, unit coolers, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength greater or equal to 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength greater or equal to 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength greater or equal to 100 Ksi) exposed to air subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water, low flow, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.23, Table 2.3.3.B.23-1, Section 3.3.2.B.22, and Table 3.3.2.B-22.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the reactor building closed loop cooling water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the reactor building closed loop cooling water system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are

appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-22 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the reactor building closed loop cooling water system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.8 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor building closed loop cooling water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.23 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Reactor Building HVAC System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-23

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-23, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor building HVAC system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996 dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.24-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, piping and fittings, and unit coolers.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- fiberglass exposed to air subject to cracking and loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to air subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to raw water subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to raw water, low flow, subject to loss of heat transfer

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.24, Table 2.3.3.B.24-1, Section 3.3.2.B.23, and Table 3.3.2.B-23.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the reactor building HVAC system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the reactor building HVAC system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-23 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the reactor building HVAC system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.1 and 3.0.3.2, respectively.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor building HVAC system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.24 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Reactor Water Cleanup System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-24

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-24, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor water cleanup system relating to those component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.25-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include bolting, heat exchanger, piping and fittings, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 482 °F, subject to cumulative fatigue damage
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 482 °F, low flow, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.25, Table 2.3.3.B.25-1, Section 3.3.2.B.24, and Table 3.3.2.B.24.

On the basis of its review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the RAI the staff found the aging effects of the reactor water cleanup system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the reactor water cleanup system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-24 identifies TLAA and the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the reactor water cleanup system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program

The staff's evaluation of the TLAA is addressed in SER Section 4.3. The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor water cleanup system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

3.3B.2.3.25 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Seal Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-25

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The NMP2 process sampling system has been removed from the scope of license renewal by the ALRA dated July 14, 2005.

#### 3.3B.2.3.26 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Service Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-26

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 service water system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.3B.2.2.5 and 3.3B.2.1

#### 3.3B.2.3.27 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-27

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-27, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996 dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.28-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include heat exchangers.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to demineralized untreated water, subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.28, Table 2.3.3.B.28-1, Section 3.3.2.B.27, and Table 3.3.2.B-27. During its review the staff determined that additional information was needed.

The RAIs are organized in two groups, general and system-specific. There are no general RAIs associated with this system. System-specific a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is applicable to this system. The staff's detailed review of the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.3.2.A-5-1 is found in SER Section 3.3A.2.3.5.

On the basis of its review of the information provided in the ALRA and the additional information included in the applicant's response to the RAI the staff found the aging effects of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-27 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMP is found in SER Section 3.0.3.2.8.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.28 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-28

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-28, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the standby diesel generator fuel oil system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.29-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include piping and fittings.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to air subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.29, Table 2.3.3.B.29-1, Section 3.3.2.B.28, and Table 3.3.2.B-28.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the standby diesel generator fuel oil system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the

appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the standby diesel generator fuel oil system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-28 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the standby diesel generator fuel oil system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMP is found in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the standby diesel generator fuel oil system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.3B.2.3.29 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Standby Diesel Generator Protection (Generator) System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-29

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-29, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.30-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, heat exchangers, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to raw water subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material



- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, subject to cracking

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.30, Table 2.3.3.B.30-1, Section 3.3.2.B.29, and Table 3.3.2.B-29.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components, the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-29 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.2.7, and 3.0.3.2.8, respectively.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the standby diesel generator protection (generator) system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.3B.2.3.30 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Standby Liquid Control System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-30

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 standby liquid control system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.3B.2.2.1, 3.3B.2.2.2, and 3.3B.2.2.5

### 3.3B.2.3.31 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Yard Structures Ventilation System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-31

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-31, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the yard structures ventilation system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.32-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include unit coolers.

For this component type the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of heat transfer
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to raw water subject to loss of heat transfer and loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.32, Table 2.3.3.B.32-1, Section 3.3.2.B.31, and Table 3.3.2.B-31.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the yard structures ventilation system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the yard structures ventilation system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for the component the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-31 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the yard structures ventilation system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Open-Cycle Cooling Water System Program

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the yard structures ventilation system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.32 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Radiation Monitoring System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-32

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 radiation monitoring system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.3B.2.1 and 3.3B.2.2.5.

#### 3.3B.2.3.33 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Auxiliary Boiler System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-33

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-33, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the auxiliary boiler system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.33-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces, filters, pumps, tanks, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to treated water or steam, temperature equal to or greater than 212 °F but less than 482 °F, subject to cracking
- gray cast iron exposed to treated water, temperature equal to or greater than 140 °F but less than 212 °F, low flow, subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to disodium phosphate solution, sodium sulfite solution, subject to loss of material
- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to disodium phosphate solution, sodium sulfite solution, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.33, Table 2.3.3.B.33-1, Section 3.3.2.B.33, and Table 3.3.2.B-33.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the auxiliary boiler system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the auxiliary boiler system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-33 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the auxiliary boiler system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- System Walkdown Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Selective Leaching of materials Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.1.4, 3.0.3.2.2, and 3.0.3.1.5.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the auxiliary boiler system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.34 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Circulating Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-34

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 circulating water system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.3B.2.1 and 3.3B.2.2.5.

#### 3.3B.2.3.35 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Makeup Water Treatment System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-35

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 makeup water treatment system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.3B.2.2.2 and 3.3B.2.2.5

#### 3.3B.2.3.36 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Radioactive Liquid Waste Management System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-36

This auxiliary system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP2 radioactive liquid waste management system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.3B.2.2.2 and 3.3B.2.2.

#### 3.3B.2.3.37 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Roof Drainage System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-37

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-37, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the roof drainage system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 2005 dated December 1, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.37-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include piping and fittings.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to air, moisture or wetting, temperature less than 140 °F, subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.37, Table 2.3.3.B.37-1, Section 3.3.2.B.37, and Table 3.3.2.B-37.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the roof drainage system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the roof drainage system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-37 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the roof drainage system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of this AMP is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the roof drainage system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### 3.3B.2.3.38 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Sanitary Drains and Disposal System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-38

Staff Evaluation: The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-38, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the sanitary drains and disposal system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996 dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.38-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include external surfaces and piping and fittings.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- gray cast iron exposed to air subject to loss of material
- copper alloys (zinc less than or equal to 15 percent) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material
- gray cast iron exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.38, Table 2.3.3.B.38-1, Section 3.3.2.B.38, and Table 3.3.2.B-38.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the sanitary drains and disposal system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the sanitary drains and disposal system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-38 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the sanitary drains and disposal system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- System Walkdown Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.2, 3.0.3.1.4, and 3.0.3.1.5, respectively.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the sanitary drains and disposal system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.39 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Service Water Chemical Treatment System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-39

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-39, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the service water chemical treatment system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.39-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include piping and fittings and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to service water chemical treatment water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.39, Table 2.3.3.B.39-1, Section 3.3.2.B.39, and Table 3.3.2.B-39.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the service water chemical treatment system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the service water chemical treatment system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.

ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-39 identifies the following AMP for managing the aging effects for the service water chemical treatment system components not addressed by the GALL Report :

- One-Time Inspection Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMP is found in SER Section 3.0.3.1.4.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the service water chemical treatment system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### 3.3B.2.3.40 Auxiliary Systems NMP2 Turbine Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-40

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-40, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the turbine building closed loop cooling water system component-material-environment-AERM combinations not addressed in the GALL Report. These combinations use Notes F through J as revised by the applicant's letter NMPIL 1996, dated November 17, 2005. The staff verified that the applicant had identified all applicable AERMs and had credited appropriate AMPs for managing them. The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplements for the AMPs to ensure that the program descriptions describe them adequately.

Aging Effects. ALRA Table 2.3.3.B.40-1 lists individual system components within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The component types that do not rely on the GALL Report for an AMR include heat exchangers, piping and fittings, and valves.

For these component types the applicant identified the following materials, environments, and AERMS:

- carbon or low alloy steel (yield strength less than 100 Ksi) exposed to demineralized untreated water subject to loss of material

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 2.3.3.B.40, Table 2.3.3.B.40-1, .3.2.B.40, and Table 3.3.2.B-40.

The staff's review of the information provided in the ALRA found the aging effects of the turbine building closed loop cooling water system component types not addressed by the GALL Report consistent with industry experience for these combinations of materials and environments. The staff did not identify any omitted aging effects. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging effects for the materials and environments of the turbine building closed loop cooling water system components.

Aging Management Programs. After evaluating the applicant's identification of aging effects for each of the components the staff evaluated the AMPs to determine whether they are appropriate for managing the identified aging effects. The staff also verified that the USAR supplement describes the programs adequately.



ALRA Table 3.3.2.B-40 identifies the following AMPs for managing the aging effects for the turbine building closed loop cooling water system components not addressed by the GALL Report:

- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program

The staff's detailed review of the AMPs is found in SER Sections 3.0.3.3.1 and 3.0.3.2.2.

Conclusion: On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the turbine building closed loop cooling water system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program descriptions and concluded that the UFSAR supplement provides an adequate description of the AMPs credited for managing aging these components, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.3B.3 Conclusion**

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP2 auxiliary systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplement program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing aging of the auxiliary systems, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.4 Aging Management of Steam and Power Conversion Systems**

#### **3.4A NMP1 Aging Management of Steam and Power Conversion Systems**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the steam and power conversion systems components and component groups associated with the following NMP1 systems:

- condensate and condensate transfer system
- feedwater/high pressure coolant injection system
- main generator and auxiliary system
- main steam system
- condenser air removal and off-gas system
- main turbine and auxiliary system
- moisture separator reheater steam system

##### **3.4A.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.4, the applicant provided AMR results for the steam and power conversion systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.4.1.A, "NMP1 Summary of Aging Management Programs for the Steam and Power Conversion Systems Evaluated in Chapter VIII or NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the steam and power conversion systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

##### **3.4A.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.4 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the steam and power conversion systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.4A.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further

evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.4A.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.4A.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.4A.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the UFSAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the steam and power conversion systems components.

Table 3.4A-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP1 components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.4, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.4A-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP1 Steam and Power Conversion Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Piping and fittings in main feedwater line, steam line and AFW piping (PWR only) (Item Number 3.4.1.A-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.3, Metal Fatigue Analysis
Piping and fittings, valve bodies and bonnets, pump casings, tanks, tubes, tubesheets, channel head and shell (except main steam system) (Item Number 3.4.1.A-02)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.4A.2.2.2)
Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) piping (Item Number 3.4.1.A-03)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable, PWR only

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Oil coolers in AFW system (lubricating oil side possibly contaminated with water (Item Number 3.4.1.A-04))	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion and MIC	Plant specific		Not applicable, PWR only
External surface of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.4.1.A-05)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Plant specific	Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.4A.2.2.4)
Carbon steel piping and valve bodies (Item Number 3.4.1.A-06)	Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (B2.1.9)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.4A.2.1)
Carbon steel piping and valve bodies in main steam system (Item Number 3.4.1.A-07)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.4A.2.1.1)
Closure bolting in high-pressure or high-temperature systems (Item Number 3.4.1.A-08)	Loss of material due to general corrosion; crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and/or SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.4A.2.1)
Heat exchangers and coolers/condensers serviced by open-cycle cooling water (Item Number 3.4.1.A-09)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling; buildup of deposit due to biofouling	Open-cycle cooling water system	None	Not applicable (condenser hotwell evaluated in 3.4.1.A-02 and all other heat exchangers do not have this aging effect/mechanism (See Section 3.4A.2.3.1)
Heat exchangers and coolers/condensers serviced by closed-cycle cooling water (Item Number 3.4.1.A-10)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion	Closed-cycle cooling water system	None	Not applicable (condenser hotwell evaluated in 3.4.1.A-02 and all other heat exchangers do not have this aging effect/mechanism (See Section 3.4A.2.3.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
External surface of aboveground condensate storage tank (Item Number 3.4.1.A-11)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion	Aboveground carbon steel tanks	None	Not applicable (external surfaces of carbon steel components evaluated in 3.4.1.A-05)
External surface of buried condensate storage tank and AFW piping (Item Number 3.4.1.A-12)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion and MIC	Buried piping and tanks surveillance  or  Buried piping and tanks inspection	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.4A.2.2.5)   Not applicable (See Section 3.4A.2.2.5)
External surface of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.4.1.A-13)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion		Not applicable, PWR only

The staff's review of the NMP1 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.4A.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the steam and power conversion systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.4A.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the steam and power conversion systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.4A.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the steam and power conversion systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the steam and power conversion systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.4A.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.4.2.A, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the steam and power conversion systems components:

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program
- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Selective Leaching of Materials Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program

- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.4.2.A-1 through 3.4.2.A-7, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the steam and power conversion systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different AMP is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.4A.2.1.1 Loss of Material Due to Pitting and Crevice Corrosion

In the discussion section of ALRA Table 3.4.1.A Item 3.4.1.A-07 the applicant stated that for main steam carbon steel piping and valve bodies in a treated water environment the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion will be managed by the Water Chemistry Control Program. For small-bore piping and valves in a treated water environment an additional program, the One-Time Inspection Program, will be used.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff questioned the applicant why the small-bore piping and its One-Time Inspection Program were not included in the AMP discussion for ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-4. The applicant stated that the NMP1 main steam system has small-bore carbon steel drain line piping, fitting, and valves. These components were not reflected accurately in ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-4. In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that this deficiency was corrected by revising ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-4 to include the small-bore carbon steel piping, fittings, and valves.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.4A.2.1.2 Loss of Material due to General Corrosion; Crack Initiation and Growth due to Cyclic Loading and/or SCC

In reviewing ALRA Tables 3.4.2.A-1 through 3.4.2.A-7 the staff noted that the applicant did not appear to list the AMR results for the extraction steam system. The GALL Report lists the extraction steam system components exposed to an environment of steam with aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of wall thinning (due to FAC) and loss of material (due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion). For managing this component, material, environment, and aging effect and aging effect mechanism combination the GALL Report AMPs listed are GALL AMP XI.M17, "Flow-Accelerated Corrosion," and GALL AMP XI.M2, "Water Chemistry," in some cases augmented by GALL AMP XI.M32, "One-Time Inspection." As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to explain this difference. The applicant responded that the AMR results for the NMP1 extraction steam system are included as part of the feedwater system; however, the applicant acknowledged that in ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-2 for the feedwater system it did not identify specifically which piping, fittings, and valves were

applicable to the extraction steam system by references to items in GALL Report Chapter VIII, Table C.

In its supplemental letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that to correct this difference ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-2 had been revised to identify specifically the components for the extraction steam system.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found it consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

**3.4A.2.1.3 Loss of Material Due to General (Carbon Steel Only), Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion, MIC, and Biofouling, Buildup of Deposit Due to Biofouling for Open-Cycle Cooling System and Loss of Material Due to General (Carbon Steel Only), Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion for Closed-Cycle Cooling System.**

In RAI 3.4.1.A-1 dated December 23, 2005, the staff stated that in NMP ALRA Table 3.4.1.A Items 3.4.1.A-09 and 3.4.1.A-10 the applicant stated that these items are not applicable because, "All other heat exchangers are of a different material (copper alloys or stainless steel) and do not have this aging effect and aging effect mechanism." However, both copper alloy and stainless steel are subject to the aging effect of pitting and crevice corrosion. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify why both items were not applicable for NMP1.

In its response by letter dated January 11, 2006, the applicant stated that none of the in-scope heat exchangers in the NMP1 steam and power conversion systems are cooled by open or closed-cycle cooling water systems. The applicant stated that the "Discussion" column entries for these two Table 3.4.1.A items would be revised to indicate that "these components are not subject to an AMR in the NMP1 Steam and Power Conversion Systems."

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.4.2.A-1 acceptable because for these two items there are no Table 2 entries. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.4.1.A-1 is resolved.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### ***3.4A.2.2 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.4.2.C of its supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as recommended by the GALL Report for the steam and power conversion



systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling
- general corrosion
- loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it had adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.4A.2.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage

In Section 3.4.2.C.1 of its supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### 3.4A.2.2.2 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.2 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.2.

In Section 3.4.2.C.2 of its supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for various carbon steel components.

SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.2 states that the management of loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion should be evaluated further for carbon steel piping and fittings, valve bodies and bonnets, pump casings, pump suction and discharge lines, tanks, tubesheets, channel heads, and shells except for main steam system components and for loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion for stainless steel tanks and heat exchanger/cooler tubes. The Water Chemistry Control Program relies on monitoring and control of water chemistry based on the guidelines in BWRVIP-29 (EPRI TR-103515), "BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines - Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry," to manage the effects of loss of material due to general, pitting, or crevice corrosion. However, corrosion may occur in stagnant flow conditions. Therefore, the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program should be verified to ensure no corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program. A one-time inspection of select components and susceptible locations is an acceptable method to ensure that corrosion

does not occur and that the component's intended function is maintained during the period of extended operation.

In Section 3.4.2.C.2 of its supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for NMP1 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are managed by the combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and One-Time Inspection Program for applicable systems and components.

The staff reviewed the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs and its evaluations are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The AMPs recommended by the GALL Report are GALL AMP XI.M2, "Water Chemistry" and GALL AMP XI.M32, "One-Time Inspection," for management of this aging effect and aging effect mechanism. The applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program mitigates the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms on component surfaces exposed to water as the process fluid; chemistry programs are used to control water chemistry for impurities (e.g., chloride and sulfate) that accelerate corrosion and that cause loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion. This program relies on monitoring and control of water chemistry to keep peak levels of various contaminants below system-specific limits. The applicant's One-Time Inspection Program is a new AMP; its scope includes verification of the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program. Implementation of the applicant's One-Time Inspection Program in conjunction with its Water Chemistry Control Program to manage the aging effect and aging effect mechanism provides added assurance that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism does not occur at locations of stagnant or low flow or that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism progresses very slowly and the component's intended function is maintained during the period of extended operation. The staff concluded that with these two programs the applicant appropriately evaluated AMR results of management of the loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for steam and power conversion systems components as recommended in the GALL Report.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.4.2.C.2 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.4A.2.2.3 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion, Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion, and Biofouling

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.3 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.3.

In Section 3.4.2.C.3 of its supplemental letter August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

Because NMP is a BWR the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable to NMP.

#### 3.4A.2.2.4 General Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.4 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.4.

In Section 3.4.2.C.4 of its supplemental letter August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general corrosion on the external surfaces of all carbon steel structures and components including closure bolting exposed to operating temperatures less than 212°F.

SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.4 states that loss of material due to general corrosion could occur on the external surfaces of all carbon steel structures and components including closure boltings exposed to operating temperature less than 212°F. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is adequately managed.

In Section 3.4.2.C.2 of its supplemental letter August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for NMP1 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is managed by the Systems Walkdown Program. The staff reviewed the applicant's Systems Walkdown Program and its evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.2.

The staff found this program acceptable for managing loss of material due to general corrosion as visual inspection of external surfaces is performed during various systems walkdown. In addition the NMP plant-specific operating experience also indicated that this program is effective in identifying aging effects and aging effects mechanisms that have been observed in the applicant's plant. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant appropriately evaluated AMR results of management of the loss of material due to general corrosion for steam and power conversion systems components as recommended in the GALL Report.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.4. For those line items that apply to Section 3.4.2.C.4 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.4A.2.2.5 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, Crevice, and Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.5 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.5.

The applicant stated in Section 3.4.2.C.5 of its supplemental letter August 19, 2005, that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC is not applicable to NMP1. This discussion applies to PWR systems only and is therefore not applicable to NMP1. The staff determined that for loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is not applicable to NMP1 because it applies to PWR systems only.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff determined that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is not applicable.

#### 3.4A.2.2.6 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 provides the staff's evaluation of the applicant's Quality Assurance Program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.4A.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.4.2.A-1 through 3.4.2.A-7, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.4.2.A-1 through 3.4.2.A-7, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and AERM does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

##### 3.4A.2.3.1 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP1 Condensate and Condensate Transfer System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-1

The staff initially reviewed the following ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-1 items in the original LRA for the NMP1 condensate and condensate transfer system.

- Loss of material for gray cast iron external surfaces in an air environment managed by the Systems Walkdown Program.
- Cracking and loss of strength of polymeric external surfaces managed by the Systems Walkdown Program.
- Cracking and loss of strength of polymeric piping and fittings in a treated water, temperature <140 °F, environment managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program.

The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).

- Cracking of aluminum alloys (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) piping and fittings in a treated water, <140 °F environment, managed by One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).
- Loss of material of gray cast iron pumps in a treated water, temperature < 140 °F, environment managed by One-Time Inspection, Selective Leaching of Materials, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination (Note H).
- Cracking of aluminum alloy (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) valves in a treated water, temperature < 140 °F, environment managed by One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component. (Note F)
- Loss of material of gray cast iron valves in a treated water, temperature < 140 °F, environment managed by One-Time Inspection, Selective Leaching of Materials, and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).
- Cracking of aluminum alloys (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) valves in a treated water <140 °F, low flow environment managed by One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F).

The staff evaluation of the cracking and loss of strength of polymeric piping and fittings in a treated water, temperature < 140 °F, environment managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program is provided in RAI 3.4-1.

In RAI 3.4-1 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested the applicant to identify (a) the specific polymeric materials for these components, (b) the basis for concluding that no other aging effects occur in this environment, (c) specific tests and inspection methods for these components including the frequency of inspections, and (d) acceptance criteria and their bases for determining loss of strength of the polymers.

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated that:

There are three components in the NMP1 Condensate System that are made of an elastomer material and subject to a treated water (temperature <140°F) environment. These components are expansion joints (EXJBJ-49-08, EXJBJ-49-09 and EXJBJ-49-10) located at the suction of the Condensate Pumps.

- a. The expansion joints are made of rubber (Chlorobutyl elastomer with polyester fabric and metal reinforcement.)
- b. Rubber in a treated water (temperature <140 °F) environment is very resistant to wear and hardening, but is susceptible to cracking and loss of strength. Treated water can cause elastomer degradation, and hardening can occur when the water temperature increases above 130°F. This

conclusion is based upon industry reports EPRI TR-1 14882, "Non-Class 1 Mechanical Implementation Guideline and Mechanical Tools," Revision 3, and EPRI TR-1 14881, "Aging Effects for Structures and Structural Components (Structural Tools)," Revision 1.

- c. The expansion joints are currently visually inspected periodically and replaced on a five-year frequency.
- d. The Preventive Maintenance Program does not include specific acceptance criteria for the loss of strength parameter since the expansion joints are replaced on a five-year frequency. The replacement frequency, however, was determined by considering the operating conditions and environment. These same factors also contribute to loss of strength. Therefore, the current replacement frequency ensures that the expansion joints are replaced prior to their loss of intended function.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.4-1 acceptable because the applicant provided appropriate tests and inspection methods for these components including the frequency of inspections and acceptance criteria and their bases for determining loss of strength of the polymers. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.4-1 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff found the AMPs for the cracking of aluminum alloy (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) valves in a treated water, <140 °F environment, managed by One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs in this environment acceptable. As discussed in RAI 3.4.2B-2, the Water Chemistry Control program controls the chemistry to maintain low concentration of halides so cracking of aluminum alloys (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) piping and fittings in a treated water <140 °F environment would be unlikely. Aluminum in mild environments forms a protective passive layer that protects the base metal from further corrosion.

In RAI 3.4-4 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant discuss both the basis for not including selective leaching as an aging effect and the operating history of these valves.

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated:

The basis for not including the aging effect of “selective leaching” for the material “Aluminum alloys containing copper or zinc as primary alloying elements” in an environment of treated water (temperature <140°F) is the zinc content of the valves involved. These particular valves have a zinc content of less than 15%. As such, any copper-zinc alloy material with <15% zinc is not susceptible to selective leaching. Since these valves are an aluminum alloy, however, they still would not be susceptible to selective leaching even if the zinc content was >15%.

Industry operating experience and the plant operating experience database were reviewed for instances where components of this aluminum alloy might have experienced failures due to corrosion. No such applicable failures were found in the industry information reviewed or in the plant database. A keyword search of the corrective action program database was also performed. Again, no failures due to corrosion of components fabricated of this aluminum alloy were found.

The staff’s review found the applicant’s response to RAI 3.4-4 acceptable because the applicant provided a justification for not considering selective leaching as an aging mechanism for aluminum alloys containing copper or zinc as primary alloying elements in an environment of treated water (temperature < 140 °F). Therefore, the staff’s concern described in RAI 3.4-4 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

The One-Time Inspection Program activities will utilize visual, volumetric, and other inspection techniques consistent with industry practice to verify that aging effect does not occur or progresses at such a slow rate that the intended function of the component would not be affected adversely. The staff’s evaluations of One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff’s evaluation of loss of material of gray cast iron pumps in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by One-Time Inspection, Selective Leaching of Materials, and Water Chemistry Control Programs is in RAI 3.4-2

In RAI 3.4-2 dated November 17, 2004, the staff requested the applicant to discuss:

- visual, VT, or other inspection methods, frequency of inspections, acceptance criteria and their bases
- bases for sampling of the pumps to detect selective leaching

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2005, the applicant stated:

- a. For the gray cast iron pumps with an internal environment of treated water (temperature <140 °F) (i.e., the two Condensate Transfer pumps), the aging effect requiring management is loss of material. The aging mechanisms to be managed by the One-Time Inspection Program and the Water Chemistry Control Program include crevice corrosion, general corrosion, and pitting corrosion. The One-Time Inspection Program is a

new license renewal (LR) AMP commitment for NMP that is to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. This commitment was made in the original LRA submittal, as supplemented by NMPNS letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. As such, program documents or procedures specific to managing the aging mechanisms (i.e. crevice corrosion, general corrosion, and pitting corrosion) that specify inspection methods and acceptance criteria for the two Condensate Transfer pumps do not currently exist. The frequency of any future inspections for the aging mechanisms of crevice corrosion, general corrosion, and pitting corrosion will be based on the findings of the One-Time Inspection Program. However, as stated in [the original] LRA Appendix B2.1.20, the One-Time Inspection Program will be implemented consistent with NUREG-1801, Section XI.M32.

- b. As presented in [the original] LRA Sections A1.1.33 and B2.1.21, the implementation of the Selective Leaching of Materials Program is discussed in the program description for the One-Time Inspection Program (see [the original] LRA Sections A1.1.28 and B2.1.20). As stated above, the One-Time Inspection Program is a new LR AMP commitment for NMP that is to be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, program documents or procedures specific to managing the aging mechanism of selective leaching for the two Condensate Transfer pumps do not currently exist. However, as stated in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.21, the Selective Leaching Program will be implemented consistent with NUREG-1801, Section XI.M33.
- c. A determination of whether hardness tests are necessary will be made at the time of the One-Time Inspection Program implementation. This is consistent with [the original] LRA Section B2.1.20, which states: "Inspection techniques may include a one-time visual inspection and hardness measurement."

Hardness testing will be considered as a possible inspection technique if visual examination techniques alone cannot determine if selective leaching severe enough to affect the component intended function is occurring. The use of field hardness testing will also be contingent on the accessibility of the affected component surfaces to perform the test. Hardness testing on components susceptible to selective leaching may be appropriate if the component configuration and geometry allows. Tubing and other components such as valves with complex internal geometry do not provide adequate physical access to internal surfaces requiring examination to allow accurate measurements to be made.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.4-2 acceptable because the applicant's tests and inspection methods are consistent with industry practice and the GALL Report guidelines. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.4-2 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

The applicant stated in its ALRA that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination (Note H). The staff concurred with this statement.



The staff found the aging management of cracking of aluminum alloy (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) valves in a treated water, temperature <140 °F, environment managed by One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs in this environment acceptable. As discussed in RAI 3.4.2B-2, the Water Chemistry Control Program controls the chemistry to maintain low concentration of halides so cracking of aluminum alloys (containing copper or zinc as the primary alloying elements) piping and fittings in a treated water <140 °F environment would be unlikely. Aluminum in mild environments forms a protective passive layer that protects the base metal from further corrosion. The One-Time Inspection Program utilizes visual, volumetric, and other inspection techniques consistent with industry practice to verify that aging effect does not occur or progresses at such a slow rate that the intended function of the component would not be affected adversely. The staff's evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively. (This evaluation is also applicable for valves of the same material with a pressure boundary function in a similar environment).

The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff found the aging management of loss of material of gray cast iron valves in a treated water, temperature < 140 °F, environment managed by One-Time Inspection, Selective Leaching of Materials, and Water Chemistry Control Programs acceptable as discussed in RAI 3.4-2.

The applicant stated that this material is not in the GALL Report for this component (Note F). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff's evaluations found that the applicant identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment of the NMP1 condensate and condensate transfer system components.

#### 3.4A.2.3.2 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP1 Feedwater/High Pressure Coolant Injection System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-2

The staff reviewed the following ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-2 items for the NMP1 feedwater/high pressure coolant injection system:

- Cracking in wrought austenitic stainless steel feedwater heaters in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140$  °F but <212 °F, environment managed by the One-Time inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).
- Cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel feedwater heaters in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212$  °F but <482 °F, environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).
- Cumulative fatigue damage of wrought austenitic stainless steel feedwater heaters in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212$  °F but <482 °F, environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c). The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).

- Loss of material for copper alloy (zinc<15 percent) oil coolers in a demineralized untreated water low flow environment managed by Closed -Cycle Cooling Water Systems Program. The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).
- Loss of material in carbon steel or low alloy steel (yield strength<100 ksi) piping and fittings in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination. This line item is for components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary portion of the main steam or feedwater system (Note H,16).
- Loss of material in carbon steel, low alloy steel (yield strength<100 ksi) valves in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination. This row is for components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary portion of the main steam or feedwater system (Note H,16).
- Loss of material in carbon steel or low alloy steel (yield strength<100 ksi) valves in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination. This line item is for components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary portion of the main steam or feedwater system (Note H,16).

The staff requested during its audit that the applicant discuss the specific tests and inspections, frequency of inspections, and acceptance criteria for cracking in wrought austenitic stainless steel feedwater heaters in a treated water, temperature  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs to assure that the components will perform their intended functions. In its response the applicant stated:

The One-Time Inspection Program is described in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.20, as supplemented by NMPNS letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. The One-Time Inspection Program is a new program that will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, the procedures needed to answer this question have not yet been developed. However, the One-Time Inspection Program will be consistent with the GALL Report, Section XI.M32 (One-Time Inspection) when implemented. The One-Time Inspection Program Attribute Assessment (PAA) addresses program implementation at NMPNS relative to the requirements of Appendix A of NUREG-1800. The One-Time Inspection PAA is available on-site at NMPNS for review.

The staff's review found the response acceptable because the applicant's AMPs will be consistent with industry practice and requirements of the GALL Report.

The staff's evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in Sections SER 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff requested that the applicant discuss the specific tests and inspections, frequency of inspections, and acceptance criteria for cracking of wrought austenitic stainless steel feedwater heaters in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time Inspection and Chemistry Control Programs to assure that the components perform their intended function. In its response the applicant stated:

The One-Time Inspection Program is described in ALRA Section B2.1.20, as supplemented by NMPNS letter NMP1L 1880 dated October 29, 2004. The One-Time Inspection Program is a new program that will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation. As such, the procedures needed to answer this question have not yet been developed. However, the One-Time Inspection Program will be consistent with the GALL Report, Section XI.M32 (One-Time Inspection) when implemented. The One-Time Inspection Program Attribute Assessment (PAA) addresses program implementation at NMPNS relative to the requirements of Appendix A of NUREG-1800. The One-Time Inspection PAA is available on-site at NMPNS for review.

The staff found the response reasonable and acceptable because the applicant's AMPs will be consistent with industry practice and requirements of the GALL Report.

The staff's evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff found the aging management of cumulative fatigue damage of wrought austenitic stainless steel feedwater heaters in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by TLAA evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c) reasonable and acceptable. This item is not evaluated in the original LRA Section 4.3.

The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J). The staff concurred with this statement.

The applicant stated as to the loss of material for copper alloy (zinc  $< 15$  percent) oil coolers in a demineralized untreated water low flow environment managed by Closed -Cycle Cooling Water Systems Program that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J). The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff found the aging management of the aging effects for this component by the Closed-Cycle Cooling Water Systems Program reasonable and acceptable. The staff reviewed this AMP. The staff evaluation is in SER Section 3.0.3.2.8.

The applicant stated that loss of material in carbon steel or low alloy steel (yield strength  $< 100$  ksi) piping and fittings in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , environment managed by the One-Time inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination (Note H). The

staff concurred with this statement. The applicant also stated that this line item applies to components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary portion of the main steam or feedwater system (Note 16).

The staff found the One-Time inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs appropriate AMPs to manage the aging effects for this component in this environment. The staff's evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The applicant stated that loss of material in carbon steel or low alloy steel (yield strength < 100 ksi) valves in a treated water or steam, temperature  $\geq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  but  $< 482^{\circ}\text{F}$ , low flow environment is managed by the One-Time inspection and Chemistry Control Programs. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this "component-material-environment" combination. This row in Table 3.4.2.A-2 is for components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary portion of the main steam or feedwater system (Note H,16). The staff concurred with this statement. The information provided by the applicant is reflected in the ALRA.

The staff found the One-Time inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs appropriate AMPs to manage the aging effects for this component in this environment. The staff's evaluations of the One-Time Inspection and Water Chemistry Control Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.4 and 3.0.3.2.2, respectively.

The staff's evaluations found that the applicant has identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment associated with the NMP1 feedwater/high pressure coolant injection system components. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

#### 3.4A.2.3.3 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP1 Main Generator and Auxiliary System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-3

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 main generator and auxiliary system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.4A.2.1.1 and 3.4A2.2.4.

#### 3.4A.2.3.4 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP1 Main Steam System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-4

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 main steam system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.4A.2.1.1, 3.4A.2.2.2, and 3.4A2.2.4

#### 3.4A.2.3.5 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP1 Condenser Air Removal and Off-Gas System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-5

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 condenser air removal and off-gas system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.4A.2.1, 3.4A.2.1.1, 3.4A.2.2.2, and 3.4A2.2.4

#### 3.4A.2.3.6 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP1 Main Turbine and Auxiliary Systems – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-6

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 main turbine and auxiliary systems are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.4A.2.1, 3.4A.2.2.2, and 3.4A2.2.4.

#### **3.4A.2.3.7 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP1 Moisture Separator Reheater Steam System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.A-7**

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the NMP1 moisture separator reheater steam system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.4A.2.1, 3.4A.2.2.2, and 3.4A2.2.4.

### **3.4A.3 Conclusion**

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP1 steam and power conversion systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing aging of the steam and power conversion systems, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.4B NMP2 Aging Management of Steam and Power Conversion Systems**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the steam and power conversion systems components and component groups associated with the following NMP2 systems:

- main condenser air removal system
- condensate system
- feedwater system
- main steam system
- moisture separator and reheater system
- extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system
- turbine main system

#### **3.4B.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.4, the applicant provided AMR results for the steam and power conversion systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.4.1.B, "NMP2 Summary of Aging Management Programs for the Steam and Power Conversion Systems Evaluated in Chapter VIII of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the steam and power conversion systems components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating

experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### **3.4B.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.4 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the steam and power conversion systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.4B.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.4B.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.4B.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.4B.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the USAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the steam and power conversion systems components.

Table 3.4B-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP2 components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.4 that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.4B-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP2 Steam and Power Conversion Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Piping and fittings in main feedwater line, steam line and AFW piping (PWR only) (Item Number 3.4.1.B-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.3, Metal Fatigue Analysis
Piping and fittings, valve bodies and bonnets, pump casings, tanks, tubes, tubesheets, channel head and shell (except main steam system) (Item Number 3.4.1.B-02)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry and one-time inspection	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.4B.2.2.2)
Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) piping (Item Number 3.4.1.B-03)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling	Plant specific		Not applicable, PWR only
Oil coolers in AFW system (lubricating oil side possibly contaminated with water) (Item Number 3.4.1.B-04)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion and MIC	Plant specific		Not applicable, PWR only
External surface of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.4.1.B-05)	Loss of material due to general corrosion	Plant specific	Systems Walkdown Program (B2.1.33)	Consistent with GALL, further evaluation recommended (See Section 3.4B.2.2.4)
Carbon steel piping and valve bodies (Item Number 3.4.1.B-06)	Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-accelerated corrosion	Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program (B2.1.9)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.4B.2.2.4)
Carbon steel piping and valve bodies in main steam system (Item Number 3.4.1.B-07)	Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion	Water chemistry	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), One-Time Inspection Program (B2.1.20)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.4B.2.1)
Closure bolting in high-pressure or high-temperature systems (Item Number 3.4.1.B-08)	Loss of material due to general corrosion; crack initiation and growth due to cyclic loading and/or SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.4B.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Heat exchangers and coolers/condensers serviced by open-cycle cooling water (Item Number 3.4.1.B-09)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion, MIC, and biofouling; buildup of deposit due to biofouling	Open-cycle cooling water system	None	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.4B.2.1)
Heat exchangers and coolers/condensers serviced by closed-cycle cooling water (Item Number 3.4.1.B-10)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion	Closed-cycle cooling water system	None	Not applicable (components not subject to an aging management review)
External surface of aboveground condensate storage tank (Item Number 3.4.1.B-11)	Loss of material due to general (carbon steel only), pitting, and crevice corrosion	Aboveground carbon steel tanks	None	Not applicable (external surfaces of carbon steel components evaluated in 3.4.1.B-05)
External surface of buried condensate storage tank and AFW piping (Item Number 3.4.1.B-12)	Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion and MIC	Buried piping and tanks surveillance or Buried piping and tanks inspection	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.4B.2.2.5)  Not applicable (See Section 3.4B.2.2.5)
External surface of carbon steel components (Item Number 3.4.1.B-13)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion		Not applicable, PWR only



The staff's review of the NMP2 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.4B.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the steam and power conversion systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.4B.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the steam and power conversion systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.4B.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the steam and power conversion systems that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the steam and power conversion systems components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### ***3.4B.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Section 3.4.2.B, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the steam and power conversion systems components:

- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- Preventive Maintenance Program
- Systems Walkdown Program
- Bolting Integrity Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.4.2.B-1 through 3.4.2.B-7, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the steam and power conversion systems components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been

reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different aging management program is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.4B.2.1.1 Loss of Material Due to Pitting and Crevice Corrosion

In the discussion section for Item 3.4.1.B-07 of ALRA Table 3.4.1.B the applicant stated that for main steam carbon steel piping and valve bodies in a treated water environment loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion is managed by the Water Chemistry Program. For small-bore piping and valves in a treated water environment an additional AMP, the One-Time Inspection Program, is used.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant why small-bore piping and the One-Time Inspection Program were not included in the AMP discussion for ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-4. The applicant stated that the main steam system has small-bore carbon steel drain line piping, fitting, and valves. These components were not reflected accurately in ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-4. By letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated to correct this deficiency ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-4 had been revised to include the small-bore carbon steel piping, fittings, and valves.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### ***3.4B.2.2 AMR Results That are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.4.2.C of its supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as recommended by the GALL Report for the steam and power conversion systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- cumulative fatigue damage
- loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion
- loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion, microbiologically influenced corrosion, and biofouling
- general corrosion
- loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and microbiologically influenced corrosion

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

##### **3.4B.2.2.1 Cumulative Fatigue Damage**

In Section 3.4.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's according to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.3 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

##### **3.4B.2.2.2 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion**

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.2 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.2.

In Section 3.4.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for various carbon steel components.

SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.2 states that the management of loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion should be evaluated further for carbon steel piping and fittings, valve bodies and bonnets, pump casings, pump suction and discharge lines, tanks, tubesheets, channel heads, and shells except for main steam system components and for loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion for stainless steel tanks and heat exchanger/cooler tubes.

The Water Chemistry Program relies on monitoring and control of water chemistry based on the guidelines in BWRVIP-29 (EPRI TR-103515), "BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines - Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry," to manage the effects of loss of material due to general, pitting, or crevice corrosion. However, corrosion may occur at in stagnant flow conditions. Therefore, the effectiveness of the applicant's Chemistry Control Program should be verified to ensure no corrosion. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of programs to manage loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion to verify the effectiveness of the applicant's Water Chemistry Program. A one-time inspection of select components and susceptible locations is an acceptable method to ensure no corrosion and maintenance of the component's intended function during the period of extended operation.

In Section 3.4.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that for NMP2 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is managed by the combination of the Water Chemistry Control Program and the One-Time Inspection Program for the applicable systems and components.

The staff reviewed the applicant's Water Chemistry Control and One-Time Inspection Programs; the staff's evaluations are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.2 and 3.0.3.1.4, respectively.

The AMPs recommended by the GALL Report for management of this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are GALL AMPs XI.M2 and XI.M32. The applicant's Water Chemistry Control Program mitigates the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms on component surfaces exposed to water as the process fluid. Chemistry Programs control water chemistry for impurities (e.g., chloride and sulfate) that accelerate and cause loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion. This program relies on monitoring and control of water chemistry to keep peak levels of various contaminants below system-specific limits. The One-Time Inspection Program's scope includes verification of the effectiveness of the Water Chemistry Control Program. Implementation of the One-Time Inspection Program in conjunction with the Water Chemistry Control Program to manage this aging effect and aging effect mechanism provides added assurance that (a) the aging effect and aging effects mechanism does not occur at stagnant or low-flow locations or (b) that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism progresses so slowly that the component's intended function will be maintained during the period of extended operation. The staff found that the applicant appropriately evaluated AMR results involving management of the loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion for steam and power conversion systems components as recommended in the GALL Report.

The staff concluded that the applicant met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.2. For those line items addressed by Section 3.4.2.C.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the

intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.4B.2.2.3 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, and Crevice Corrosion, Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion, and Biofouling

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.3 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.3.

In Section 3.4.2.C.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to PWRs only.

Because NMPNS is a BWR design the staff found this aging effect not applicable to NMP2.

#### 3.4B.2.2.4 General Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.4 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.4.

In Section 3.4.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to general corrosion on the external surfaces of all carbon steel structures and components including closure bolting exposed to operating temperatures less than 212 °F.

SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.4 states that loss of material due to general corrosion could occur on the external surfaces of all carbon steel structures and components including closure boltings exposed to operating temperature less than 212 °F. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to ensure that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is adequately managed.

In the ALRA the applicant also stated that for NMP2 this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is managed by the Systems Walkdown Program. The staff reviewed the applicant's Systems Walkdown Program. The staff's evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.2.

The staff found this program acceptable for managing loss of material due to general corrosion by visual inspection of external surfaces performed during various systems walkdowns. In addition the NMP2 plant-specific operating experience also indicated that this program is effective in identifying aging effects and aging effects mechanisms in the applicant's plant. Therefore, the staff finds that the applicant appropriately evaluated AMR results of management of the loss of material due to general corrosion for steam and power conversion systems components as recommended in the GALL Report.

The staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.4. For those line items addressed by Section 3.4.2.C.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.4B.2.2.5 Loss of Material Due to General, Pitting, Crevice, and Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion

The staff reviewed Section 3.4.2.C.5 of the applicant's supplemental letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.4.2.2.5.

The applicant stated in Section 3.4.2.C.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC is not applicable to NMP2 because this aging effect and aging effect mechanism applies to PWR systems only and is therefore not applicable to NMP2.

The staff determined that the loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and MIC aging effect and aging effect mechanism is not applicable to NMP2 as it applies to PWR systems only.

Because NMP2 does not have any components from this group the staff determined that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is not applicable.

#### 3.4B.2.2.6 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 provides the staff's evaluation of the applicant's Quality Assurance Program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant had claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.4B.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.4.2.B-1 through 3.4.2.B-7, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.4.2.B-1 through 3.4.2.B-7, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and AERM does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed

so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.4B.2.3.1 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP2 Main Condenser Air Removal System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-1

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the steam and power conversion system NMP2 main condenser air removal system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is presented in SER Sections 3.4B.2.1 and 3.4B2.2.2

#### 3.4B.2.3.2 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP2 Condensate System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-2

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-2 for the following items:

- Cracking and loss of strength of elastomer external surfaces in an air environment managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).
- Cracking and loss of strength of elastomer piping and fittings in a treated water, temperature <140 °F, environment managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).
- Cracking and loss of strength of fiberglass tanks in a treated water, temperature <140 °F, environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. The applicant states that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report (Note J).

The staff found management of cracking and loss of strength of elastomer external surfaces in an air environment by the Preventive Maintenance Program reasonable and acceptable. The staff's evaluation of the Preventive Maintenance Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1. The staff requested additional information about tests and inspections in the Preventive Maintenance Program to manage the aging effects for this material and environment. In its response by letter dated, November 15, 2005, the applicant provided the information, which is evaluated in SER Section 3.2B.2.3.4.

The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report. The staff concurred with this statement.

The staff's evaluation of the aging management of cracking and loss of strength of elastomer piping and fittings in treated water, temperature <140 °F, environment managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program is in RAI 3.4-9. The staff found the aging management of this component in this environment acceptable. The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report. The staff concurred with the applicant's statement.

In RAI 3.4-9 dated November 17, 2004, the staff stated that the original LRA Table 3.4.2.B-2 states that cracking and loss of strength of polymeric piping and fittings in a treated water,

temperature <140 °F, low-flow environment will be managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. The staff requested that the applicant provide the following information:

- composition and/or mechanical and chemical properties of the polymer
- methods of inspection
- frequency of inspections and acceptance criteria and bases thereof
- operating history of these components

In its response by letter dated December 21, 2004, the applicant stated:

The subject elastomeric piping and fittings in a treated water (temperature <140 °F), low flow environment contained in the [original] LRA Table 3.4.2.B-2, consist of expansion joints associated with piping connected to the two Condensate Storage Tanks.

- (a) The composition of the elastomeric expansion joints is rubber.
- (b) The methods of inspection associated with these expansion joints are visual, dimensional and durometer readings.
- (c) Inspection of the expansion joints is performed every two years. Replacement of the components is scheduled for every 20 years. The acceptance criteria for the various methods are as follows.

#### Visual Inspection

- No excessive and deep cracking or cuts of outer cover exposing reinforcing wire, body, rings or fabric.
- No blistering or local areas of deformation or ply separation.
- No leakage or weeping through bellows or at flange connections.
- No soft or gummy areas.
- No mechanical damage due to maintenance or operating activity.
- If expansion joint has a liner, liner is not damaged.
- Structural members and attachment hardware is not damaged and maintains structural integrity.

#### Dimensional Inspection

- Face to face dimensions are within design tolerances.



#### Durometer Reading

- Reading between 50 -80 (Shur scale).

The inspections and acceptance criteria for the expansion joints are based upon approved vendor manuals.

(d) The license renewal operating experience database was reviewed for failures of any of the expansion joints associated with the two Condensate Storage Tanks. No such failures were found in this database.

In addition, the site corrective action program database was reviewed for any occurrences of non-conforming conditions associated with the expansion joints of the two Condensate Storage Tanks. One corrective action report was written as a result of the latest inspection (January 2004). This report identified signs of aging occurring but not to the extent that immediate action was necessary. The expansion joints were found to be leak-free and structurally intact.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.4-9 acceptable because it provided methods of inspection, frequency of inspections, and acceptance criteria including their bases. These are consistent with industry practice and vendor recommendations. In addition the operating history of these components supports the proposed AMPs. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.4-9 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

The staff's evaluation of the aging management of cracking and loss of strength of fiberglass tanks in a treated water, temperature <140°F, environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program is in a-RAI 3.4.2.B-1.

In a-RAI 3.4.2.B-1 dated November 22, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide assurance that a one-time inspection alone is adequate to manage the aging effects identified. Because the tank nozzles were connected to rubber expansion joints or flanges the staff requested that the applicant discuss how the aging effects of these joints or flanges would be managed. In addition the staff requested that the applicant provide the NMPNS operational experience with these tanks and the bases for identifying the aging effects for the specific fiberglass (Atlac 382 resin) in this environment.

In its response by letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant stated:

The tanks included in ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-2 are the NMP2 Condensate Storage Tanks 2CNS-TK1A and 2CNS-TK-1B.

The external surfaces of these tanks are inspected periodically under the Systems Walkdown Program and NMPNS has not observed any age-related degradation. The operational experience relative to these tanks relative to aging is that no issues have been raised. The Atlac 382 resin is a propoxylated bisphenol A fumarate unsaturated polyester resin which has been used for many years in industrial applications. In particular, the cured resin has excellent high-temperature properties with outstanding resistance against a broad range of aqueous acids, salts, and alkaline solutions. Its resistance to strong inorganic acids and oxidizing media is superior. Manufacturer chemical resistance data for Atlac 382 indicates the resin resists degradation by de-ionized water, distilled

water, and sea water at service temperatures up to 210 °F. A specific example for a severe industrial application in which a fiberglass tank constructed with Atlac 382 resin has been used is a chlorine chill and filtration tower that has been in service for at least 25 years. Therefore, low-temperature treated water is a very benign environment for these tanks. Based on this information, the One-Time Inspection Program alone has been determined to be adequate to manage aging of the internal surfaces of these tanks. Since the GALL Report and the EPRI Tools documents do not address fiberglass material, the aging effects of cracking and loss of strength were obtained from industry information sources on the internet that are dedicated to fiberglass material.

Rubber expansion joints and flanges are included under the ALRA line item for piping and fittings with the Material of Elastomer and the Environment of Treated Water, Temperature 140 °F. Cracking and loss of strength of these components is managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. External surfaces of these components are included under the ALRA line item of External Surfaces, with the Material of Elastomer and the Environment of Air. Cracking and loss of strength of the elastomer external surfaces are also managed by the Preventive Maintenance Program. Visual inspection is performed for cracking and other evidence of degradation, and Durometer Hardness Testing is performed that will detect any hardening or loss of strength.

The staff's review of the tests and inspections and operational experience with these tanks and the bases for identifying the aging effects for the specific fiberglass Atlac 382 resin) in this environment found that the applicant had provided an adequate justification for the management of the aging effects for this component. Therefore, the staff's concern described in a-RAI 3.4.2.B-1 is resolved.

The applicant stated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report. The staff concurred with the applicant's statement.

The staff's above evaluations staff found that the applicant identified the appropriate AMPs for the materials and environment of the condensate system components.

#### 3.4B.2.3.3 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP2 Feedwater System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-3

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the steam and power conversion system NMP2 feedwater system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.3B.2.1, 3B.2.2.2, 3.3B.2.2.4.

#### 3.4B.2.3.4 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP2 Main Steam System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-4

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-4 for the following items:

- Loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel piping and fittings in demineralized untreated water low-flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination. The applicant also stated that this item is applicable

to components that have an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to MIC (Note H,14).

- Loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel "T" quenchers in demineralized untreated water low-flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. The applicant stated that this aging effect is not in the GALL Report for this component-material-environment combination. The applicant also stated that this item is applicable to components that have an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to MIC (Note H,14).

The staff's evaluation of loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel piping and fittings in demineralized untreated water low-flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program is in a-RAI 3.4.2.B-2. The staff's evaluation of loss of material for wrought austenitic stainless steel "T" quenchers in demineralized untreated water low-flow environment managed by the One-Time Inspection Program is also in a-RAI 3.4.2.B-2.

In a-RAI 3.4.2.B-2 dated November 22, 2005, the staff stated that ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-4 indicates that loss of material in wrought austenitic stainless steel "T" quenchers, piping, and fittings exposed to demineralized untreated water low-flow environment would be managed by the One-Time Inspection Program. The staff requested that the applicant provide assurance that a one-time inspection alone is adequate to manage the aging effect.

In its response by letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant changed the environment for these components to treated water and added the Water Chemistry Control Program to the management for the aging effect.

The staff's review staff concurred that with this change the aging management is now consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, the staff found the applicant's response to a-RAI 3.4.2.B-4 acceptable and the staff's concern described in a-RAI 3.4.2.B-4 is resolved.

The staff's evaluations staff found that the applicant had identified the appropriate aging management for the materials and environment of the main steam system components.

#### 3.4B.2.3.5 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP2 Moisture Separator and Reheater System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-5

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the steam and power conversion system NMP2 moisture separator and reheater system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.3B.2.1, 3.3B.2.2.2.

#### 3.4B.2.3.6 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP2 Extraction Steam and Feedwater Heater Drain System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-6

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the Steam and power conversion system NMP2 extraction steam and feedwater heater drain system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.3B.2.1, 3.3B.2.2.2, 3.3B.2.2.4.

#### 3.4B.2.3.7 Steam and Power Conversion System NMP2 Turbine Main System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.4.2.B-7

This system is listed here for information and completeness. The AMR results for the steam and power conversion system NMP2 turbine main system are consistent with the GALL Report. The staff's evaluation of these results is in SER Sections 3.3B.2.1, 3.3B.2.2.2, 3.3B.2.2.4.

### 3.4B.3 Conclusion

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP2 steam and power conversion systems components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplement program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing aging of the steam and power conversion systems, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

## 3.5 Aging Management of Structures and Component Supports

### 3.5A NMP1 Aging Management of Structures and Component Supports

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the structures and component supports components and component groups associated with the following NMP1 systems, structures, and commodities:

- primary containment structure
- reactor building
- essential yard structures
- fuel handling system
- material handling system
- offgas building
- radwaste solidification and storage building
- screen and pump house building
- turbine building
- vent stack
- waste disposal building
- component supports commodity
- fire stops and seals commodity

#### 3.5A.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

In ALRA Section 3.5, the applicant provided AMR results for the structures and component supports components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, "NMP1 Summary of Aging Management Programs for Structures and Component Supports Evaluated in Chapter II and III of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the structures and component supports components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### **3.5A.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.5 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the structures and component supports components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.5A.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.5A.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.5A.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.5A.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the UFSAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the structures and component supports components.

Table 3.5A-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP1 components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.5, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.5A-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP1 Structures and Component Supports in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
<b>Common Components of All Types of PWR and BWR Containment</b>				
Penetration sleeves, penetration bellows, and dissimilar metal welds (Item Number 3.5.1.A-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage (CLB fatigue analysis exists)	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.6, Containment Liner Plate, Metal Containments, and Penetrations Fatigue Analysis
Penetration sleeves, bellows, and dissimilar metal welds (Item Number 3.5.1.A-02)	Cracking for cyclic loading & crack initiation and growth from SCC	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)
Penetration sleeves, penetration bellows, and dissimilar metal welds (Item Number 3.5.1.A-03)	Loss of material due to corrosion	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1)
Personnel airlock and equipment hatch (Item Number 3.5.1.A-04)	Loss of material due to corrosion	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1)
Personnel airlock and equipment hatch (Item Number 3.5.1.A-05)	Loss of leak tightness in closed position due to mechanical wear of locks, hinges and closure mechanism	Containment leak rate test and Plant Technical Specifications	10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1.1)
Seals, gaskets, and moisture barriers (Item Number 3.5.1.A-06)	Loss of sealant and leakage through containment due to deterioration of joint seals, gaskets, and moisture barriers	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
<b>BWR Concrete (Mark II and III) Containment and Steel (Mark I, II and III) Containment</b> (Note: NMP1 has a Mark I Containment)				
Concrete elements: foundation, walls, dome (Item Number 3.5.1.A-07)	Aging of accessible and inaccessible concrete areas due to leaching of calcium hydroxide, aggressive chemical attack, and corrosion of embedded steel	Containment ISI	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)
Concrete elements: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.A-08)	Cracks, distortion, and increases in component stress level due to settlement	Structures Monitoring	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)
Concrete elements: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.A-09)	Reduction in foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation	Structures Monitoring	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)
Concrete elements: foundation, dome, and wall (Item Number 3.5.1.A-10)	Reduction of strength and modulus due to elevated temperature	Plant specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)
Prestressed containment: tendons and anchorage components (Item Number 3.5.1.A-11)	Loss of prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep, and elevated temperature	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)
Steel elements: liner plate, containment shell (Item Number 3.5.1.A-12)	Loss of material due to corrosion in accessible and inaccessible areas	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2), ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26) Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program (B3.3)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Steel elements: vent header, drywell head, torus, downcomers, pool shell (Item Number 3.5.1.A-13)	Cumulative fatigue damage (CLB fatigue analysis exists)	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.6, Containment Liner Plate, Metal Containments, and Penetrations Fatigue Analysis
Steel elements: protected by coating (Item Number 3.5.1.A-14)	Loss of material due to corrosion in accessible areas only	Protective coating monitoring and maintenance	None	Not applicable (no credit for coatings taken)
Prestressed containment: tendons and anchorage components (Item Number 3.5.1.A-15)	Loss of material due to corrosion of prestressing tendons and anchorage components	Containment ISI	None	Not applicable (PWR only)
Concrete elements: foundation, dome, and wall (Item Number 3.5.1.A-16)	Scaling, cracking, and spalling due to freeze-thaw; expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregate	Containment ISI	None	Not applicable ( Mark I Containment)
Steel elements: vent line bellows, vent headers, downcomers (Item Number 3.5.1.A-17)	Cracking due to cyclic loads or Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.2.1)
Steel elements: Suppression chamber liner (Item Number 3.5.1.A-18)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	None	Not applicable (Mark I Containment)
Steel elements: drywell head and downcomer pipes (Item Number 3.5.1.A-19)	Fretting and lock up due to wear	Containment ISI	None	Not applicable (No fretting or wear for these components)
<b>Class I Structures</b>				



Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
All Groups except Group 6: accessible interior/exterior concrete & steel components (Item Number 3.5.1.A-20)	All types of aging effects	Structures Monitoring	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Sections 3.5A.2.1 and 3.5A.2.2.2)
Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9: inaccessible concrete components, such as exterior walls below grade and foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.A-21)	Aging of inaccessible concrete areas due to aggressive chemical attack, and corrosion of embedded steel	Plant specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.2)
Group 6: all accessible/ inaccessible concrete, steel, and earthen components (Item Number 3.5.1.A-22)	All types of aging effects, including loss of material due to abrasion, cavitation, and corrosion	Inspection of Water-Control Structures or FERC/US Army Corps of Engineers dam inspection and maintenance	None	Not applicable (No water-control structures)
Group 5: liners (Item Number 3.5.1.A-23)	Crack initiation and growth from SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion	Water Chemistry Program and Monitoring of spent fuel pool water level	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1.2)
Groups 1-3, 5, 6: all masonry block walls (Item Number 3.5.1.A-24)	Cracking due to restraint, shrinkage, creep, and aggressive environment	Masonry Wall	Masonry Wall Program (B2.1.27)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1)
Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.A-25)	Cracks, distortion, and increases in component stress level due to settlement	Structures Monitoring	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.2)
Groups 1-3, 5-9: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.A-26)	Reduction in foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation	Structures Monitoring	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.2)
Groups 1-5: concrete (Item Number 3.5.1.A-27)	Reduction of strength and modulus due to elevated temperature	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5A.2.2.2)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Groups 7, 8: liners (Item Number 3.5.1.A-28)	Crack Initiation and growth due to SCC; Loss of material due to crevice corrosion	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (No tank liners within scope)
<b>Component Supports</b>				
All Groups: support members: anchor bolts, concrete surrounding anchor bolts, welds, grout pad, bolted connections, etc. (Item Number 3.5.1.A-29)	Aging of component supports	Structures Monitoring	Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Sections 3.5A.2.1.3 and 3.5A.2.2.3)
Groups B1.1, B1.2, and B1.3: support members: anchor bolts, welds (Item Number 3.5.1.A-30)	Cumulative fatigue damage (CLB fatigue analysis exists)	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4
All Groups: support members: anchor bolts, welds (Item Number 3.5.1.A-31)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion	None	Not applicable, PWR only
Groups B1.1, B1.2, and B1.3: support members: anchor bolts, welds, spring hangers, guides, stops, and vibration isolators (Item Number 3.5.1.A-32)	Loss of material due to environmental corrosion; loss of mechanical function due to corrosion, distortion, dirt, overload, etc.	ISI	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program (B2.1.25)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1)
Group B1.1: high strength low-alloy bolts (Item Number 3.5.1.A-33)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5A.2.1)

The staff's review of the NMP1 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.5A.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the structures and component supports that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.5A.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the structures and component supports that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.5A.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the structures and component supports that the applicant indicated are not

consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the structures and component supports components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.5A.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Sections 3.5.2.A and 3.5.2.C, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the structures and component supports components:

- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Boraflex Monitoring Program
- Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program
- Fire Protection Program
- One-Time Inspection Program
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program
- Masonry Wall Program
- Structures Monitoring Program
- Bolting Integrity Program
- Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program
- Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.5.2.A-1 through 3.5.2.A-11 and Tables 3.5.2.C-1 and 3.5.2.C-2, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the structures and component supports components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant had claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the

applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different AMP is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.5A.2.1.1 Loss of Leak Tightness in Closed Position Due to Mechanical Wear of Locks, Hinges and Closure Mechanisms

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-1 for component type equipment hatches (including stabilizers) and aging effect and aging effect mechanisms loss of leak tightness Table 1 line item 3.5.1.B-05 is shown. During the audit the staff requested that the applicant explain why an NMP2 line item is shown with a NMP1 component type.

In its response by letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the line item was an error. For NMP ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-1 (page 3.5-64) for component type equipment hatches (including stabilizers) for aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of leak tightness the Table 1 reference was changed from Item 3.5.1.B-05 to Item 3.5.1.A-05.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found the correction of the reference to ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-05 as is the proper NMP1 line item.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.5A.2.1.2 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC; Loss of Material Due to Crevice Corrosion

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-2 for component type liners and aging effect and aging effect mechanism cracking the GALL Report Volume 2 line item shown is Item III.A5.2-b with ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-23. The Note D shown states that the component is different from the GALL Report line item. During the audit the staff requested that the applicant explain how this AMR line item component differs from the GALL Report when GALL Report Item III.A5.2-b is also for the component type liners.

In its response by letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the note referenced should be Note B instead of Note D. The reference would be to Note A except the AMP shown takes exceptions to the GALL Report AMP. The applicant revised ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-2 to change Note D to Note B for all AMR line item component liners with the aging effect/mechanism of cracking.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found the correction of Note D to Note B acceptable because it assigned the proper note to this AMR line item.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effects mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

#### 3.5A.2.1.3 Aging of Component Supports

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-1 for component type expansion/grouted anchors and aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of anchor capacity the GALL Report Volume 2 line items shown are Items III.B1.1.4-a and III.B1.2.3-a with ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-29. The environment shown is concrete and the note states that it is consistent with the GALL Report. During the audit the staff requested that the applicant explain how this AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report when the two GALL Report line items have a component type of concrete surrounding anchor bolts, a material of concrete, an environment of inside containment, and an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of reduction in anchor capacity. The logic of this AMR line item was not consistent with the GALL Report. Such inconsistency also applied to ALRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2, 3.5.2.A-6, 3.5.2.A-8, and 3.5.2.A-9 for component type expansion/grouted anchors. These four additional AMR line items are shown in the ALRA as associated with the GALL Report Volume 2 Item III.B1.2.3-a only.

In its response by letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it had made the ALRA consistent with the GALL Report for all of its expansion/grouted anchor AMR line items listed above. The ALRA line item for carbon steel in concrete was revised. In its place the component type was changed to concrete surrounding anchor bolts, the carbon steel was replaced with concrete (new line with the current line that starts with concrete), the environment of concrete was replaced with air, and the rest of the lines remained as displayed. The applicant used the AERM of loss of anchor capacity instead of reduction in anchor capacity as per the GALL Report but intended these terms to have exactly the same meaning.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found after revision of the applicant's AMR line items for the component expansion/grouted anchor (component type concrete surrounding anchor bolts after revision) are consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-11 for component type expansion/grouted anchors and aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of anchor capacity the GALL Report Volume 2 line item shown is Item III.B1.2.3-a with ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-19. The environment shown is concrete and the note states that it is consistent with the GALL Report. During the audit the staff requested that the applicant explain how this AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report when the GALL Report line item has a component type of concrete surrounding anchor bolts, a material of concrete, an environment of inside or outside containment, and an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of reduction in anchor capacity. The logic of this AMR line item was not consistent with the GALL Report. The staff asked the applicant to explain why the ALRA Table 3.5.1.A line item shown was Item 3.5.1.A-19 instead of Item 3.5.1.A-29.

In its response by letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it had made the ALRA consistent with the GALL Report for the expansion/grouted anchor AMR line item. The ALRA line for carbon steel in concrete was revised. In its place the component type was changed to concrete surrounding anchor bolts, the material of carbon steel was replaced with concrete (new line with the current line that starts with concrete), the environment of concrete was replaced with air, and the rest of the line remained as displayed. The applicant used the AERM of loss of anchor capacity instead of reduction in anchor capacity per the GALL Report; however it is intended that these items have exactly the same meaning. The ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-19 listed in error was revised to ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-29.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that after revision the applicant's AMR line item for the component expansion/grouted anchor (now component type, concrete surrounding anchor bolts, after revision) is consistent with the GALL Report and therefore acceptable. The staff also found the correction of the reference to ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-29 appropriate.

The staff's review found that the applicant appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### ***3.5A.2.2 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.5.2.C of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as

recommended by the GALL Report for the structures and component supports components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

BWR Containment:

- aging of inaccessible concrete areas
- cracking, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement; reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations, if not covered by structures monitoring program
- reduction of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperature
- loss of material due to corrosion in inaccessible areas of steel containment shell or liner plate
- loss of prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep, and elevated temperature
- cumulative fatigue damage
- cracking due to cyclic loading and SCC

Class I Structures:

- aging of structures not covered by structures monitoring program
- aging management of inaccessible areas

Component Supports:

- aging of supports not covered by structures monitoring program
- cumulative fatigue damage due to cyclic loading

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant had claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

3.5A.2.2.1 PWR and BWR Containments

The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1, which addresses several areas discussed below.

Aging of Inaccessible Concrete Areas. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.1. In Section 3.5.2.C.1.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the aging of inaccessible concrete areas in BWR containments effect and aging effect mechanism is not applicable to NMP1, a BWR with a Mark I containment. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that the aging of inaccessible concrete areas in BWR containments is not applicable because NMP1 is a BWR with a Mark I containment.

Because NMP1 has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable.

Cracking, Distortion, and Increase in Component Stress Level due to Settlement; Reduction of Foundation Strength due to Erosion of Porous Concrete Subfoundations, if Not Covered by Structures Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.2.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism cracking, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement; and reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations in BWR containments is not applicable because NMP1 is a BWR with a Mark I containment. The staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism does not apply because NMP1 is a BWR with a Mark I containment.

Because NMP1 has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effects mechanism not applicable.

Reduction of Strength and Modulus of Concrete Structures due to Elevated Temperature. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.3.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism reduction of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperature in BWR containments is not applicable to NMP1. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism is not applicable because NMP1 is a BWR with a Mark I containment.

Because NMP1 has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effects mechanism not applicable.

Loss of Material due to Corrosion in Inaccessible Areas of Steel Containment Shell or Liner Plate. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.4.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to corrosion in inaccessible areas of steel containment shell or liner plate in BWR containments.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.4 states that loss of material due to corrosion could occur in inaccessible areas of the steel containment shell or the steel liner plate for all types of BWR containments. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of plant-specific programs to manage this aging effect and aging effect mechanism for inaccessible areas if specific conditions defined in the GALL Report cannot be satisfied.

For NMP1 the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program is credited with managing aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to corrosion of accessible primary containment structure carbon steel components comprising the containment pressure boundary.



Inaccessible areas are compared to accessible areas with similar environments. If warranted additional inspections are performed.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant also stated that NMP1 credits the Water Chemistry Control Program and Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program with managing aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to corrosion of primary containment structure carbon steel components in demineralized untreated water.

The staff reviewed the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE), Water Chemistry Control, and Torus Corrosion Monitoring Programs and its evaluations are in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.1, 3.0.3.2.2, and 3.0.3.3.7, respectively.

The staff noted in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.4 that the GALL Report recommends further evaluation of plant-specific programs to manage this aging effect and aging effect mechanism for inaccessible areas if specific conditions defined in the GALL Report cannot be satisfied.

GALL Report Item B1.1.1-a states that for inaccessible areas (embedded containment steel shell or liner), loss of material due to corrosion is not significant if the following four specific conditions are satisfied:

- (1) Concrete meeting the requirements of ACI 318 or 349 and the guidance of 201.2R was used for the containment concrete in contact with the embedded containment shell or liner.
- (2) The concrete is monitored to ensure that it is free of penetrating cracks that provide a path for water seepage to the surface of the containment shell or liner.
- (3) The moisture barrier, at the junction where the shell or liner becomes embedded, is subject to aging management activities in accordance with IWE requirements.
- (4) Borated water spills and water ponding on the containment concrete floor are not common and when detected are cleaned up in a timely manner.

The GALL Report recommends a plant-specific AMP for corrosion if any of the four conditions cannot be satisfied. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff asked the applicant to explain how each of the four conditions is satisfied at NMP1. The applicant addressed the four conditions:

- (1) NMP1 was designed and constructed with equivalent codes as specified in the GALL Report.
- (2) The concrete is monitored in accordance with the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) and Structures Monitoring Programs.
- (3) This condition is not applicable to the NMP design.
- (4) This condition is not applicable to a BWR design.

The staff's audit and review determined that all of the conditions identified in the GALL Report are satisfied. The applicant stated that the NMP1 containment was designed and constructed with codes equivalent to those specified in the GALL Report. Accessible concrete of the containment structure is monitored for penetrating cracks by the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) and Structures Monitoring Programs. Operating

experience demonstrates that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to corrosion has not been significant for the NMP1 steel containment shell. The staff found that no additional plant-specific AMP is required to manage inaccessible areas of the steel containment shell.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.4. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.1.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Loss of Prestress due to Relaxation, Shrinkage, Creep, and Elevated Temperature. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.5.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that this aging effect applies to Mark II BWR containments only.

The applicant stated in Section 3.5.2.C.1.5 of the letter dated August 19, 2005, that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep, and elevated temperature in BWR containments is not applicable to NMP1. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel that because NMP1 is a BWR with a Mark I containment this aging effect and aging effect mechanism does not apply.

Because NMP has no components from this group the staff found this aging effect and aging effect mechanism not applicable.

Cumulative Fatigue Damage. In Section 3.5.2.C.1.6 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.6 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

Cracking due to Cyclic Loading and SCC. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.7.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed cracking due to cyclic loading and SCC in BWR containments.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.7 states that cracking of containment penetrations (including penetration sleeves, penetration bellows, and dissimilar metal welds) due to cyclic loading or SCC could occur in all types of PWR and BWR containments. Cracking could occur also in vent line bellows, vent headers, and downcomers due to SCC for BWR containments. A visual VT-3 examination would not detect such cracks. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of the inspection methods implemented to detect these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program are credited with managing cracking due to cyclic loading and SCC of primary containment structure steel components. In addition an augmented VT-1 visual examination will be performed on containment bellows using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC.

The staff reviewed the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Programs and its evaluations are in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.17 and 3.0.3.1.7, respectively.

The staff found that after further evaluation as recommended by the GALL Report for detecting cracking due to SCC the applicant had elected to perform augmented VT-1 visual examinations on containment bellows using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC. The staff found this election consistent with the GALL Report and, therefore, acceptable.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.7. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5A.2.2.2 Class I Structures

The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2, which addresses several areas discussed below.

Aging of Structures Not Covered by Structures Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1.

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed the aging of all Class I structures not covered by the Structures Monitoring Program.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1 states that the GALL Report recommends further evaluation of certain structure-aging effect combinations if not covered by the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program, including (1) scaling, cracking, and spalling due to repeated freeze-thaw for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; (2) scaling, cracking, spalling and increased porosity and permeability due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and aggressive chemical attack for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; (3) expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregates for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; (4) cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; (5) cracks, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; (6) reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation for Groups 1-3, 5-9 structures; (7) loss of material due to corrosion of structural steel components for Groups 1-5, 7-8 structures; (8) loss of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperatures for Groups 1-5; and (9) crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion of stainless steel liner for Groups 7 and 8 structures. Further

evaluation is necessary only for structure-aging effect combinations not covered by the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1 further states that technical details of the aging management issue are presented in Subsection 3.5.2.2.1.2 for Items (5) and (6) and Subsection 3.5.2.2.1.3 for Item (8).

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that there are no Group 6 structures (water control structures) at NMP1.

In addition the applicant stated in Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that aging management of components in accessible areas of Class I structures will be by general visual inspections of its Structures Monitoring Program. Aging management is performed for the following aging effect and aging effect mechanisms: freeze-thaw, leaching of calcium hydroxide, aggressive chemical attack, reaction with aggregates, corrosion of embedded steel, and corrosion of structural steel.

Further, the applicant stated in Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP1 cracking, distortion, and an increase in component stress level due to settlement for Group 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures is not significant. Class I structures are founded on impervious rock. Although evaluated as not significant, the applicant credited its Structures Monitoring Program with monitoring for settlement. NMP1 does not utilize a dewatering system.

The applicant also stated in Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP1 reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation for Group 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures is not applicable. Porous concrete is not utilized in the construction of Class I structures.

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that for NMP1 loss of material due to corrosion of structural steel components for Group 1-5, 7-8 structures is managed by its Structures Monitoring Program. Although NMP1 vent stack steel components are not identified in the GALL Report these components are also managed using the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program. Additionally, the applicant credited the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program in lieu of its Structures Monitoring Program with managing loss of material due to corrosion of high-strength structural fasteners in demineralized untreated water.

The staff review and evaluations of the applicant's Structures Monitoring and ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Programs are in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.21 and 3.0.3.2.17, respectively.

In addition the applicant stated in its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP1 loss of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperatures for Group 1-5 structures is not significant. In Class I structures where general area temperatures do not exceed 150°F and local area temperatures do not exceed 200°F. These temperatures are not sufficient to cause this aging effect and aging effect mechanism of the applicable components.

Furthermore, the applicant stated in its letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP1 crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion of stainless steel

liners for Group 7 and 8 structures is not applicable. No tank liners were identified as subject to an AMR.

The staff's audit and review found that scaling, cracking, and spalling due to repeated freeze-thaw for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; scaling, cracking, spalling and increase in porosity and permeability due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and aggressive chemical attack for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregates for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; cracks, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; and loss of material due to corrosion of structural steel components for Groups 1-5, 7-8 structures are within the scope of license renewal and will be adequately managed by the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff interviewed members of the applicant's technical personnel and reviewed relevant operating experience to confirm that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms have not been observed or when observed, corrective action was taken under the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program. The staff found that the recommendations of the GALL Report have been satisfied and a plant-specific AMP for these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of Class I structures is not required.

The staff's audit and review found that reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations of Groups 1-3, 5, and 7-9 structures is an absent and implausible aging effect and aging effect mechanism. The applicant stated that porous concrete subfoundations were not utilized below the building foundations for Groups 1-3, 5, and 7-9 structures. The staff determined that no AMP is required because this aging effect and aging effect mechanism does not occur at NMP1.

The staff found the applicant's further evaluation for elevated temperatures acceptable because change in material properties due to elevated temperatures is an aging effect and aging effect mechanism requiring no management for the NMP1 Groups 1-5 Class I structures.

The applicant stated in Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion of stainless steel liners for NMP1 Group 7 and 8 structures are not applicable because no tank liners were identified as subject to AMR. The staff's audit and review determined that no AMP is required for aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for stainless steel liners for Group 7 and 8 structures.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Aging Management of Inaccessible Areas. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.2.

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed aging management of inaccessible areas of Class I structures.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.2 states that cracking, spalling, and increases in porosity and permeability due to aggressive chemical attack and cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel could occur in below-grade inaccessible concrete areas. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to manage these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms in inaccessible areas of Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures if specific conditions defined in the GALL Report cannot be satisfied.

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that for NMP1 cracking, spalling, and increases in porosity and permeability due to aggressive chemical attack and cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel are not significant. Ground water tests confirm that no below-grade aggressive environment exists. The applicant evaluated aggressive chemical attack and corrosion of embedded steel as not significant but credits the Structures Monitoring Program with monitoring for them. A regularly scheduled ground water monitoring program will ensure maintenance of a benign environment. The staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program are in SER Section 3.0.3.2.21.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical personnel and review of the ALRA that the recommendations of the GALL Report had been satisfied and that a plant-specific AMP for inaccessible concrete of Class I (Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9) structures was not required for these locally insignificant aging effect and aging effect mechanisms.

Because NMP has a regularly scheduled ground water monitoring to ensure that the below-grade environment remains non-aggressive and has no cracking, spalling, increases in porosity and permeability, loss of bond, or loss of material for inaccessible concrete the staff determined that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms are not applicable to NMP Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 Class I structures.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5A.2.2.3 Component Supports

The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3, which addresses several areas discussed below.

Aging of Supports Not Covered by Structures Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3.1.

In Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed aging of component supports not covered by the Structures Monitoring Program.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3.1 states that the GALL Report recommends further evaluation of certain component support-aging effect and aging effect mechanism combinations not covered by the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program including (1) reduction in concrete anchor capacity due to degradation of the surrounding concrete for Groups B1-B5 supports, (2) loss of material due to environmental corrosion for Groups B2-B5 supports, and (3) reduction/loss of isolation function due to degradation of vibration isolation elements for Group B4 supports. Further evaluation is necessary only for structure-aging effect combinations not covered by the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program.

In Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that aging management of component supports will be performed through general visual inspections of its Structures Monitoring Program. Aging management is performed for reduction in concrete anchor capacity due to degradation of the surrounding concrete, loss of material due to environmental corrosion, and reduction/loss of isolation function due to degradation of vibration isolation elements.

The staff found that the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program covers reduction in concrete anchor capacity due to degradation of the surrounding concrete for Groups B1 through B5 supports, loss of material due to environmental corrosion for Groups B2 through B5 supports, and reduction/loss of isolation function due to degradation of vibration isolation elements for Group B4 supports. As per the GALL Report no further evaluation is required and, therefore, has not been provided.

The staff found that the applicant included the aging effect and aging effect mechanism combinations within the scope of its Structures Monitoring Program and agreed that no further evaluation is required. The staff review and evaluation of the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program are in SER Section 3.0.3.2.21. The staff found the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program acceptable for managing the aging effect and aging effect mechanism combinations of component supports for the GALL Report component support Groups B1 through B5 as those combinations are applicable.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3.1. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Cumulative Fatigue Damage due to Cyclic Loading. Fatigue is a TLAA as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### 3.5A.2.2.4 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 includes the staff's evaluation of the applicant's Quality Assurance Program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant had claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.5A.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. In ALRA Tables 3.5.2.A-1 through 3.5.2.A-11 and Tables 3.5.2.C-1 and 3.5.2.C-2, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, aging effect requiring management, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.5.2.A-1 through 3.5.2.A-11 and Tables 3.5.2.C-1 and 3.5.2.C-2, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and aging effect requiring management does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicated that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicated that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicated that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicated that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicated that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### **3.5A.2.3.1 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Primary Containment Structure – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-1**

The staff initially reviewed the original LRA Table 3.5.2.A-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the primary containment structure component groups.

In RAI 3.5.A-1 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that in items 3.5.1.A-3 and 3.5.1.A-17 of original LRA Table 3.5.1.A, the applicant had asserted AMR results consistent with the GALL Report with the exceptions described in AMP B.2.1.23. The GALL Report under item B1.1.1-d recommends further evaluation of the stress corrosion cracking of containment bellows. In the discussion of these items with the staff the applicant asserted that crack initiation and growth due to SCC are not applicable to NMP1 vent line bellows. The staff further noted that in similar environmental conditions NRC IN 92-20 reports thermal growth SCC of pressure boundary bellows. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information to



address the effectiveness of the applicable AMP(s) to detect degradation of vent line as well as other containment penetration bellows.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following answer:

Although the vent line bellows, vent line headers, and downcomers at NMP1 are not normally subjected to conditions that cause cracking due to cyclic loading and crack growth due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC), the [original] LRA will be revised to reflect the recommendations in NUREG- 1611, Table 2, Item 12. The recommendations in NUREG-1611 identify stress corrosion cracking as an aging effect requiring management by examination categories E-B and E-F of the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.23) and by the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.26). In addition, per NUREG-1611, an augmented VT-1 visual examination will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC. This augmented inspection will be included as an enhancement to the IWE inspection program.

The applicant proposed the following revisions to its original LRA:

In Section A1.1.2 the applicant added the following paragraph:

The NMP1 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program is being enhanced to add an augmented VT-1 visual examination of the NMP1 containment penetration bellows. This inspection will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC per NUREG-1611, Table 2, Item 12.

In Section A2.1.2 the applicant added the following paragraph:

The NMP2 ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program is being enhanced to add an augmented VT-1 visual examination of the NMP2 containment penetration bellows. This inspection will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC per NUREG-1611, Table 2, Item 12.

In Section B2.1.23 under the "Enhancements" heading the applicant replaced "None" with the following:

An augmented VT-1 visual examination of the NMP1 and NMP2 containment penetration bellows will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC, per NUREG-1611, Table 2, Item 12.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-1 acceptable. A review of the ALRA indicated that the applicant had incorporated the enhancements stated in the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-1. The staff found the applicant's proposed revision of the original LRA to incorporate the augmented inspection of the containment pressure retaining bellows acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-1 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-2 dated December 9, 2004, the staff asked the applicant to justify the Type B leak rate testing frequency for monitoring aging degradation of containment pressure boundary mechanical and electrical penetrations with seals and gaskets, noting that item number 3.5.1.A-06 of the original LRA Table 3.5.1.A states that containment ISI (AMP B.2.1.23) and containment leak rate test (AMP B.2.1.26) are programs for managing aging of seals, gaskets, and moisture barriers. Original LRA Table 3.5.2.A addresses these components under a generic category of "polymer in air." However, based on an exception taken in AMP B.2.1.23 this AMP will not be applicable to containment seals and gaskets. The staff requested the applicant to explain this discrepancy.

In the RAI the staff further noted that the leak rate testing program would monitor aging degradation of seals and gaskets of equipment hatches and air-locks at NMP1 as they are leak rate tested after each opening. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify Type B leak rate testing frequency for adequately monitoring aging degradation of containment pressure boundary penetrations (mechanical and electrical) with seals and gaskets.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following explanation:

The inspection of the component type "Polymer in Air" is included in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.23). The exception described in [original] LRA Section B2.1.23 identifies that the Subsection IWE inservice inspection (ISI) program for NMP1 is based on the 1998 Edition of ASME Section XI, rather than the 1992/1995 editions and addenda. This was found acceptable by the NRC in a safety evaluation report dated August 17, 2000. There is no exception taken to the performance of examinations for the subject polymeric components.

The aging management of the electrical penetrations and their associated polymeric components is addressed in the NMPNS LRA supplemental letter NMP1L 1912, dated January 10, 2005. These components are managed by the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.23) and the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.26). The mechanical primary containment penetrations for NMP1 are seal-welded to the containment shell and do not utilize polymeric seals or gaskets for pressure retention.

NMP1 uses Option B for testing of the containment under 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Type B testing of containment penetrations follows the guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.163 and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 94-01. The testing frequency for these components is at least once per 30 months. However, under Option B, the test frequency may be extended to 60 months and then 120 months based upon component testing performance, service conditions and environment, penetration design, and safety impact of penetration failure. For those components with extended testing frequencies, an approximately even distribution is tested during each interval (i.e., 30 months) to minimize the impact of unanticipated random failures and increase the likelihood of detecting common-mode failures. Based on the above attributes, there is reasonable assurance that the Type B testing frequency is adequate for

monitoring aging degradation of containment penetrations with seals and gaskets.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-2 acceptable. The applicant asserted that there are no containment pressure boundary mechanical penetrations with resilient seals and that approximately 25 percent of the pressure boundary electrical penetrations are Type B tested every 30 months to assure that each electrical penetration is Type B tested every 120 months. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-2 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-3 dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested information about activities and programs for ensuring the integrity of seals, gaskets, and bolting of the containment pressure boundary joints, noting that the applicant took exceptions in the containment ISI program (AMP B.2.1.23) to examinations of seals, gaskets, and bolting of pressure boundary joint points. The staff further noted that occasional SRV discharges, sustained elevated temperatures (may be less than 150°F), and high humidity could contribute to degradation of containment pressure boundary. Only Type A leak rate testing and associated visual examination requirements of the Appendix J Program (AMP B.2.1.26) could detect defects and degradation of containment pressure boundary joint points reliably. The test interval for Type A leak rate testing could be 10 to 15 years. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide information about activities and programs used for aging management for the functional integrity of these pressure boundary joints for NMP1 primary containment.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant explained:

The exceptions noted by the NRC for the Containment ISI program ([original] LRA Section B.2.1.23) do not preclude examinations of seals, gaskets, and bolting of pressure boundary joint points. By letter dated October 28, 1999, NMP submitted a relief request (RR-IWE/IWL-1) to the NRC which proposed the use of the 1998 Edition of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE, in lieu of the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda of Subsection IWE. The use of the 1998 Edition provides more practical requirements for the performance, training, qualification, and scheduling of examinations and provides a uniform set of requirements that eliminates the need for multiple relief requests. The NRC approved the relief request in a safety evaluation report (SER) dated August 17, 2000. As noted in the NRC SER, Examination Category E-D (Seals, Gaskets, and Moisture Barriers) and Examination Category E-G (Pressure Retaining Bolting) were eliminated from the 1998 Code. However, the examination of the pressure retaining bolting and moisture barriers is now included in Examination Category E-A, footnote (1)(d) and Item E1.30, respectively. The NRC also determined that the verification of containment leak-tight integrity through 10 CFR 50, Appendix J testing provides an adequate method to verify the pressure integrity of bolted connections, seals, and gaskets.

Containment pressure boundary joint points are examined and leak tested every two years in accordance with NMP1 instrument surveillance procedure N1-ISP-LRT-TYB. This procedure measures leakage of Type B Appendix J Containment boundaries, which include Containment penetrations whose design incorporates resilient seals, gaskets or sealing compounds, piping penetrations fitted with expansion bellows, electrical penetrations fitted with flexible metal seal

assemblies, air lock door seals, and doors with resilient seals or gaskets. This surveillance verifies that the leakage through resilient seals, gaskets, sealant compounds, piping penetrations, and electrical penetrations is maintained within specified values in accordance with the NMP1 Technical Specifications and the NMP1 Appendix J Testing Program Plan.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-3 acceptable because the examination process used by the applicant provides assurance that the containment pressure boundary joints will retain their integrity during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-3 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-4 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.A did not address load resisting reinforced concrete structures within the drywell shell likely to be subject to temperatures higher than the established threshold of 150°F. Original LRA item 3.5.1.A-27 indicates that the operating temperatures are not sufficient to cause aging effects and aging effects mechanism for these components. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information to address the following questions related to these structures:

Are these structures kept within the threshold temperature 150°F by a cooling system? If yes, please provide a summary of the operating experience related to the reliability of the cooling ventilation system. If no, provide the method of monitoring the temperatures of these structures.

In addition, please provide a summary of the results of the last inspections performed on (1) RPV pedestal supports, (2) the foundation and floor slabs, and (3) the sacrificial shield wall under the existing Structural Monitoring Program.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following information:

Load resisting reinforced concrete structures within the drywell shell are not subjected to temperatures higher than the established threshold of 150°F. NMP1 UFSAR Section VI.E.1.2 states that 150°F is the design basis maximum temperature limit for the drywell bulk ambient temperature under normal operation. The reinforced concrete primary containment structure is addressed in [original] LRA Table 3.5.2.A-1 in the component type "Concrete in Air."

Drywell temperatures are maintained by the safety-related Primary Containment Area Cooling System which is in-scope for LR and is described in [original] LRA Section 2.3.3.A.5. The system must be in service to support plant operation; there is no acceptable unavailability. There are six containment cooling units of which five must be in operation to maintain the containment below its temperature limits. All six units in operation maintain the containment at or below 135°F.

The results of the last inspections performed on (1) RPV pedestal supports, (2) the foundation and floor slabs, and (3) the sacrificial shield wall under the existing Structural Monitoring Program show the structures to be in good to excellent condition.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-4 acceptable. As the cooling system is managed programmatically the staff maintains that the affected concrete structures will not experience temperatures above the threshold limits. Also, the aging of these structures will be managed under the applicant's structural monitoring program during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff found the applicant's methods of controlling the temperatures of these structures and of managing their aging acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-4 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-5 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 did not address aging effects and AMPs for fasteners and structural steel made of martensitic precipitation hardenable material. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant address the stress corrosion potential of these fasteners and structural steel, considering the hardness of these materials and the fact that the fasteners are subject to constant moisture and occasional water due to pipe or valve leakage. The staff requested the applicant to provide the operating experience with these items at NMP1.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant explained:

[Original] LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 identifies fasteners (precipitation hardenable) in air (for NMP1 only) with no aging effect requiring management. The material for these fasteners is A-193, Grade B-6 (AISI Type 410). Martensitic stainless steels are hardened by quenching and tempering similar to high strength carbon and low alloy stainless steels, but have better corrosion resistance than carbon and low alloy steels. Precipitation hardenable stainless steels are typically used for parts requiring high strength applications. The minimum specified tempering temperature for A-193, Grade B-6 (AISI Type 410) is 1100°F, resulting in a yield strength of approximately 100 ksi. Throughout NMP1, these fasteners are

in-scope due to two intended functions: (1) structural support for NSR and (2) structural/functional support. For stress corrosion cracking to occur, significant moisture must be present. Martensitic, precipitation hardenable stainless steels are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking in most waters. However, stress corrosion cracking will not occur at temperatures <140°F even in a moist or occasionally wet environment. Many of the component supports are for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment, with these fasteners exposed to indoor air in the Turbine Building, the Waste Disposal Building, and the Offgas Building, which do not see sustained temperatures >140°F. In addition, susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking increases with increasing yield strength, with most failures occurring at yield strengths >140 ksi. Since the yield strength of A-193, Grade B-6 (AISI Type 410) is approximately 100 ksi, it is very unlikely that stress corrosion cracking will occur. NUREG-1801, Section XI.M18, "Bolting Integrity," states that cracking must be monitored for bolts with yield strengths exceeding 150 ksi. Therefore, the fact that stress corrosion cracking is not identified as an aging effect requiring management for the fasteners is consistent with NUREG-1801. A review of the operating experience for NMP1 for the stress corrosion cracking of martensitic precipitation hardenable stainless steels found no instances of this occurring.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-5 acceptable as the staff agreed that (1) SCC of the components made from the martensitic precipitation hardenable stainless steels used at NMP1 is unlikely and (2) the applicant's position is consistent with the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-5 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.A-6 dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that applicant justify not including aging management of Class MC supports in original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 and in AMP B2.1.25, noting that Table 3.5.2.C-1 and AMP B2.1.25 did not address any AMR of Class MC supports. The GALL Report, Section XI.S3, recommends Subsection IWF for examination of supports of MC components. The staff requested the applicant to provide information on the results of the aging management review for (1) MC component supports within the NMP1 containment (including the supports submerged in water), (2) MC component supports outside the containments (i.e., drywell and torus), and (3) supports for piping penetrating through the containments designated as MC piping (if any). Furthermore, the staff requested the applicant to summarize the programs to be used for managing the aging effect of these supports, including sample size, inspection frequency, personnel qualifications, et cetera.

In the response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant explained:

Class MC supports are addressed in [the original] LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1. Several line items in the table correspond to NUREG-1801, Volume 2, Item III.B1.3.1-a, which is for loss of material for carbon steel ASME Class MC supports. The description of the scope of the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.25 inadvertently omitted Class MC supports. The [original] LRA will be corrected to include Class MC supports in the scope description.

All NMP1 Class MC supports are included in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program. Class MC supports fall into three component types: (1) "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air;"

(2) "Structural Steel (Wrought Austenitic Stainless Steel) in Air;" and (3) "Wrought Stainless Steel in Treated Water." Therefore, the only aging effect is loss of material due to general corrosion, applicable only to the carbon/low alloy steel supports.

All component supports at NMP1 are examined in accordance with the requirements of Code Case N-491-1. The sample size and inspection frequency are as specified in Table 2500-1 of Code Case N-491-1, which requires 100 percent of Class MC supports to be examined each inspection interval, except that for multiple components other than piping, within a system of similar design, function, and service, the supports of only one of the multiple components are required to be examined. The examination method is a visual VT-3 examination.

Nondestructive examination personnel at NMP1 are qualified by examination, and so certified, in accordance with SNT-TC-1A, per ASME Section XI. Level I and Level II personnel are recertified by qualification examinations every 3 years. Level III personnel are recertified by qualification examinations once every 5 years.

The applicant proposed the following revisions to the original LRA:

The first sentence of [the original] LRA Sections A1.1.3 (page A1-2) and A2.1.3 (page A2-2) is revised as follows:

"The ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program (referred to herein as the IWF ISI Program) manages aging of carbon steel component and piping supports, including ASME Class MC supports, due to general corrosion and wear."

In [the original] LRA Section B2.1.25 (page B-49), under the "Program Description" heading, the first sentence is revised as follows:

"The ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program (referred to herein as the IWF ISI Program) is an existing program that manages aging of carbon steel component and piping supports, including ASME Class MC supports, due to general corrosion and wear."

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-6 acceptable. A review of the ALRA indicates that the applicant had incorporated such provisions in the original LRA sections. The staff found that the applicant had corrected the errors. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-6 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.A-10 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that Item 3.5.1.A-21 in the original LRA Table 3.5.1.A states under its discussion column that "ground water test data confirm that a below grade aggressive environment does not exist." Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide a quantitative summary of NMP1's past ground water test data to support the noted statement. The staff also requested the applicant provide, if available, both the phosphate and phosphoric acid contents of the NMP1 ground water.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant indicated that NMP1 and NMP2 are situated adjacent to a very large inland fresh water lake with ground water testing every six months for the site. The applicant stated that no evidence of aggressive ground water (pH<5.5, >550 ppm chlorides or sulfates >1500 ppm) has been found at NMP and that ground water test data is consistently within the acceptable ranges for nonaggressive ground water as defined by the GALL Report. The applicant further noted that results from the ground water tests performed in April and October of 2003 from the two site test wells were pH 6.79-7.83, chloride 7.7-49 ppm, and sulfate 28-60 ppm. The applicant also noted that due to the nonaggressive nature of the subsurface conditions phosphate and phosphoric acid concentrations have not been parts of the chemical analysis.

The staff's review found the applicants response to RAI 3.5.A-10 acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-10 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-12 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that Item 3.5.1.A-12 of the original LRA Table 3.5.1.A states in the discussion column that inaccessible areas are compared against accessible areas and where warranted additional inspections are performed. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide related examples of past NMP1 operating/inspection experience and address the deficiencies found and how additional inspections were relied upon to resolve them.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that the AERMs for the original LRA Table Item 3.5.1.A-12, Primary Containment (BWR), are managed by the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program described in the original LRA Section B2.1.23, which states that both industry and plant-specific operating experience relating to the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program were reviewed. Review of plant-specific operating experience revealed no identified deficiencies warranting further evaluation for applicability to adjacent inaccessible areas.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-12 acceptable because no identified deficiencies warranted further evaluation for applicability to adjacent inaccessible areas. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-12 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 primary containment structure components not addressed by the GALL Report and that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5A.2.3.2 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Reactor Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-2

The staff reviewed the original LRA Table 3.5.2.A-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor building component groups.

Staff Evaluation. In RAI 3.5.A-8, dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that In the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2, 3.5.2.A-6, 3.5.2.A-8, 3.5.2.A-9, and 3.5.2.A-11, the Structures Monitoring Program is credited with monitoring loss of anchor capacity of expansion/grouted anchors (carbon and low alloy steel) in air. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant address the methods used for checking anchor bolt torque or bolt tightness to assure that there is no loss of



anchor capacity and to ensure that the Structures Monitoring Program will stipulate clearly methods for monitoring the anchor capacity of expansion/grouted anchors.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that in the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2, 3.5.2.A-6, 3.5.2.A-8, 3.5.2.A-9, and 3.5.2.A-11 the Structures Monitoring Program is credited with monitoring the loss of anchor capacity of expansion/grouted anchors (carbon and low alloy steel) in air. Two AERMs are identified in the original LRA and the GALL Report for carbon steel expansion or grouted anchors: (1) loss of material due to general corrosion and (2) loss of anchor capacity due to local concrete aging mechanisms. The inspection method to determine potential for loss of anchor capacity of an expansion or grouted anchor is the identification of local concrete degradation. If local concrete degradation is identified additional inspections may be required as evaluated under the NMPNS Corrective Action Program. Anchor bolt torque or bolt tightness checks are not routine unless the potential for loss of anchor capacity due to local concrete aging mechanisms is detected. The staff found the applicant's performance-based approach to ensure no loss of anchor capacity acceptable and RAI 3.5.A-8 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-9 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2 and 3.5.2.A-4 state that no AMP is needed for fasteners/structural steel (wrought austenitic stainless steel) exposed to low flow treated water with temperature less than 140 °F. Item A.5.2.b of Section III of GALL Report recommends the use of an appropriate Water Chemistry Control Program to manage aging of stainless steel liners exposed to water. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the meaning of the "treated water" referred to above and explain the NMP1's criteria (e.g., a Water Chemistry Control Program or equivalent) used in quality control of the treated water. The staff also requested that the applicant provide information to justify the NMP1's finding that no AMP is needed for the listed items subject to the above stipulated environment.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that NMP will revise the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2 and 3.5.2.A-4 to include crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion as an AERM for the following component types, (1) fasteners (wrought austenitic stainless steel) exposed to low flow treated water with temperature less than 140 °F and (2) structural steel (wrought austenitic stainless steel) exposed to low flow treated water with temperature less than 140 °F, and will credit the Water Chemistry Control Program described in the original LRA Section B2.1.2. The applicant stated that NMP1 also monitors the spent fuel pool water level; therefore, NMP1 will be consistent with GALL Report Item III.A5.2-b. The applicant further stated that the supplemental letter it had committed to submit by February 28, 2005 (reference NMPIL 1902 dated December 21, 2004) will include such table changes. The applicant also clarified that "treated water" is defined in the original LRA Table 3.0-1 (footnote on page 3.0-9) as demineralized water chemically treated to remove oxygen. Corrosion inhibitors can be added to the water. Administrative limits are placed on dissolved oxygen, contaminants, and in some cases suspended solids. The concentration of contaminants is controlled by a combination of filtration, ion exchangers, or feed-and-bleed (dilution) operations.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-9 acceptable with the proposed revision to the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2 and 3.5.2.A-4 and clarification of the definition of "treated water." Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-9 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-11 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2, 3.5.2.A-3, 3.5.2.A-6, 3.5.2.A-7, 3.5.2.A-9, 3.5.2.A-10, and 3.5.2.A-11, state that the Structures Monitoring Program is credited with managing aging of concrete in soil both above and below the ground water table (GWT) and concrete lean fill in soil below the GWT. Because these concrete elements are inaccessible because of the presence of soil, the staff requested that the applicant discuss the specific Structures Monitoring Program provisions or methods to be used to inspect or manage aging effect of such inaccessible concrete.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant indicated that in the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2, 3.5.2.A-3, 3.5.2.A-6, 3.5.2.A-7, 3.5.2.A-9, 3.5.2.A-10, and 3.5.2.A-11, the Structures Monitoring Program is credited with managing aging of concrete in soil (both above and below the GWT) and of concrete lean fill in soil below the GWT. Although no AERMs are expected due to the design of the reinforced concrete and the nonaggressive condition of the ground water and soil the Structures Monitoring Program implementing procedure provides instructions for the performance of inspections of opportunity when the inaccessible surface(s) of a buried structure is excavated or exposed. In addition to these inspections of opportunity, the inspections of similar accessible surfaces or accessible surfaces in the vicinity of the inaccessible surfaces are used to gauge the condition of the inaccessible surfaces.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-11 acceptable because the applicant's position was consistent with the staff's position for managing aging of concrete in soil (both above and below the GWT) and of concrete lean fill in soil below the GWT. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-11 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.A-14 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2 and 3.5.2.C-2 list aluminum alloys exposed to either air or treated water as items having no aging effects and no AMP credited with managing their aging. Because cable trays, conduits, ducts, and tube tracks made of aluminum alloys might be exposed to a chemically aggressive or acidic environment causing aging of these components the staff requested that the applicant provide past operating/inspection experience with aging management of the components and justify the position that no AMP is needed during the period of extended operation.

In its response letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that cable trays, conduits, ducts, and tube tracks are not constructed of aluminum alloys at NMP1, where "Aluminum Alloy in Air" is the component type for fire stops and seals. Review of the NMP plant-specific operating experience identified no degradation of aluminum alloy components in air or treated water. Therefore, no specific AMP is required.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-14 acceptable because review of plant-specific operating experience by the applicant identified no occurrences of degradation of aluminum alloy components in air or treated water. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-14 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 reactor building components not addressed by the GALL Report so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

### 3.5A.2.3.3 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Essential Yard Structures – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-3

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-3, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the essential yard structures component groups.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A -3 and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 essential yard structures components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 Essential Yard Structures components acceptable.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 essential yard structures components not addressed by the GALL Report so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

### 3.5A.2.3.4 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Fuel Handling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-4

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-4, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the fuel handling system component groups.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-4 and agreed with the applicant's assertion that there are no aging effects requiring AMPs for license renewal for the NMP1 Fuel Handling System components. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 Fuel Handling System components acceptable.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, the staff therefore, concluded that the applicant had adequately identified no aging effects and no AMPs required for NMP1 Fuel Handling System components. The staff concluded that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3)

### 3.5A.2.3.5 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Material Handling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-5

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-5, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the material handling system component groups.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A -5 and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 material handling system components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 Material Handling System components acceptable.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately no aging effects requiring AMPs to manage them for the NMP1 material handling system components not addressed by the GALL Report and that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

### 3.5A.2.3.6 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Offgas Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-6

The staff initially reviewed the original LRA Table 3.5.2.A-6, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the offgas building component groups.

Staff Evaluation. In RAI 3.5.A-15 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.A-1 lists structural steel (wrought austenitic stainless steel) exposed to air as having no aging effect and thus requiring no AMP. Original LRA Tables 3.5.2.A-2, 3.5.2.A-6, and 3.5.2.A-11 also list fasteners (wrought austenitic stainless steel) exposed to air as having no aging effect, thus requiring no AMP. However, because sustained exposure to a chemically aggressive or acidic outside air environment might age these components the staff requested that the applicant provide the past operating/inspection experience with aging management of the components and justify the applicant's position that no AMP is needed during the period of extended operation.

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that the review of NMP plant-specific operating experience for degradation of wrought austenitic stainless steel structural steel and fasteners in air identified no such degradation; thus, there have been no events identifying AERMs for wrought austenitic stainless steel in air requiring an AMP for their management. The applicant further stated that because there is no environment to which the stainless steel components in question could be exposed for extended periods of time that would result in an AERM and because such an environment, if one could be postulated, would be abnormal and very short-term compared to the current licensing period and the period of extended operation its consideration for license renewal would not be warranted. The applicant asserted that for these reasons the exclusion of any AERMs for these material/environment combinations is justified.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-15 acceptable based on operating experience justification. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-15 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately no aging effects requiring no AMPs to manage them for the NMP1 offgas building components not addressed by the GALL Report and that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

### 3.5A.2.3.7 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Radwaste Solidification and Storage Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-7

The staff initially reviewed the original LRA Table 3.5.2.A-7, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the radwaste solidification and storage building component groups.

Staff Evaluation. In RAI 3.5.A-13 dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that Tables 3.5.2.A-1, 3.5.2.A-2, and 3.5.2.A-7 list the AMR results for polymers in air and treated water. Both the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program and the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection Program (Subsection IWE) are credited with managing the aging effects of polymers. For NMP1 Category I structures the original LRA does not indicate that polymers (e.g., compressive joints and seals, elastomer sealer or caulking material, fibre, forms, and resin sealing compound, et cetera.) exposed to soil, ground water or other aggressive environments are within the scope of

license renewal requiring aging effect management during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide a basis for their exclusion and also the AMR results for these polymer materials exposed to the soil, ground water, or other aggressive environments.

In its letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant responded that there are no in-scope polymers (e.g., compressive joints and seals, elastomer sealer or caulking material, fiber, forms and resin sealing compound, et cetera.) in the NMP1 primary Containment, Reactor Building, or Radwaste Building exposed to soil, ground water, or aggressive environments requiring aging management during the period of extended operation. This is reflected in the original LRA Sections 2.4.A.1, 2.4.A.2, 2.4.A.8, 3.5.2.A.1, 3.5.2.A.2, and 3.5.2.A.7 and in Tables 2.4.A.1-1, 2.4.2.A.2-1, 2.4.A.8-1, 3.5.2.A-1, 3.5.2.A-2, and 3.5.2.A-7.

The staff's review found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-13 acceptable because of the assertion that there are no in-scope polymers in the NMP1 primary containment, reactor building, or radwaste building exposed to soil, ground water, or aggressive environments. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.A-13 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, the staff therefore, concluded that the applicant had identified adequately no aging effects and no AMPs required to manage them for the NMP1 radwaste solidification and storage building components not addressed by the GALL Report and that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)

#### 3.5A.2.3.8 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Screen and Pump House Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-8

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-8, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the screen and pump house building component groups.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A -8 and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 screen and pump house building components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 Screen and Pump House Building components acceptable.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 screen and pump house building components not addressed by the GALL Report so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

#### 3.5A.2.3.9 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Turbine Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-9

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-9, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the turbine building component groups.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A -9 and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 turbine building components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 turbine building components acceptable.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 turbine building components that are not addressed by the GALL Report so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

#### 3.5A.2.3.10 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Vent Stack – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-10

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-10, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the vent stack component groups, and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 vent stack components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 Vent Stack components acceptable.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 vent stack components not addressed by the GALL Report so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

#### 3.5A.2.3.11 Structures and Component Supports NMP1 Waste Disposal Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-11

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.A-11 and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 waste disposal building components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 Waste Disposal Building components acceptable.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 waste disposal building components not addressed by the GALL Report so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

#### 3.5A.2.3.12 Structures and Component Supports: Component Supports – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1

The staff initially reviewed the original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the component supports component groups for both NMP1 and NMP2.

Staff Evaluation. In RAI 3.5.A-6 dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant justify not including aging management of Class MC supports in Table 3.5.2.C-1 and in AMP B2.1.25, noting that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 and AMP B2.1.25 did not address AMR of Class MC supports. The GALL Report, Section XI.S3, recommends the use of Subsection IWF for examination of MC component supports. The staff requested the applicant to provide

information on the results of the AMR for (1) MC component supports within the NMP1 containment (including the supports submerged in water), (2) MC component supports outside the containments (i.e., drywell and torus), and (3) supports for piping penetrating through the containments designated as MC piping (if any). Furthermore, the staff asked the applicant to summarize the programs to be used for managing the aging effect of these supports, including sample size, inspection frequency, personnel qualifications, et cetera.

The applicant's response to RAI 3.5.A-6, dated January 10, 2005, and its resolution are provided in SER Section 3.5A.2.3.1.

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 component supports component groups components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 Waste Disposal Building components acceptable.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 component supports component groups components not addressed by the GALL Report so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

#### 3.5A.2.3.13 Structures and Component Supports Fire Stops and Seals – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-2

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the fire stops and seals component groups.

Staff Evaluation. The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-2 and determined that the applicant had identified adequately applicable aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 fire stops and seals component groups components not addressed by the GALL Report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP1 fire stops and seals component groups components acceptable.

Conclusion. The staff's review concluded that the applicant had identified adequately the aging effects and the AMPs credited with managing them for the NMP1 fire stops and seals component groups components not addressed by the GALL Report so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a).

### 3.5A.3 Conclusion

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP1 structures and component supports components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR supplement program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited with managing aging of the structures and component supports as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.5B NMP2 Aging Management of Structures and Component Supports**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the structures and component supports components and component groups associated with the following NMP2 systems, structures, and commodities:

- primary containment structure
- reactor building
- auxiliary service building
- control room building
- diesel generator building
- essential yard structures
- fuel handling system
- main stack
- material handling system
- radwaste building
- screenwell building
- standby gas treatment building
- turbine building
- component supports commodity
- fire stops and seals commodity

#### **3.5B.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 3.5, the applicant provided AMR results for the structures and component supports components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.5.1.B, "NMP2 Summary of Aging Management Programs for Structures and Component Supports Evaluated in Chapter II and III of NUREG-1801," the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the structures and component supports components and component groups.

The applicant's AMRs incorporated applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

#### **3.5B.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.5 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the structures and component supports components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).



The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit evaluation are documented in the Audit and Review Report, dated January 18, 2006, and are summarized in SER Section 3.5B.2.1.

In the onsite audit, the staff also selected AMRs that were consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.5B.2.2.

In the onsite audit, the staff also conducted a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The audit and technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's audit evaluations are documented in the Audit and Review Report and are summarized in SER Section 3.5B.2.3. The staff's evaluation of its technical review is also documented in SER Section 3.5B.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the USAR supplement to ensure that they provided an adequate description of the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the structures and component supports components.

Table 3.5B-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of NMP2 components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.5, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.5B-1 Staff Evaluation for NMP2 Structures and Component Supports in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
<b>Common Components of All Types of PWR and BWR Containment</b>				
Penetration sleeves, penetration bellows, and dissimilar metal welds (Item Number 3.5.1.B-01)	Cumulative fatigue damage (CLB fatigue analysis exists)	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.6, Containment Liner Plate, Metal Containments, and Penetrations Fatigue Analysis
Penetration sleeves, bellows, and dissimilar metal welds (Item Number 3.5.1.B-02)	Cracking for cyclic loading; crack initiation and growth from SCC	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)
Penetration sleeves, penetration bellows, and dissimilar metal welds (Item Number 3.5.1.B-03)	Loss of material due to corrosion	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)
Personnel airlock and equipment hatch (Item Number 3.5.1.B-04)	Loss of material due to corrosion	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)
Personnel airlock and equipment hatch (Item Number 3.5.1.B-05)	Loss of leak tightness in closed position due to mechanical wear of locks, hinges and closure mechanism	Containment leak rate test and Plant Technical Specifications	10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)
Seals, gaskets, and moisture barriers (Item Number 3.5.1.B-06)	Loss of sealant and leakage through containment due to deterioration of joint seals, gaskets, and moisture barriers	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)  ISI not required, no moisture barriers
<b>BWR Concrete (Mark II and III) Containment and Steel (Mark I, II, and III) Containment (Note: NMP2 has a Mark II Containment)</b>				

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Concrete elements: foundation, walls, dome (Item Number 3.5.1.B-07)	Aging of accessible and inaccessible concrete areas due to leaching of calcium hydroxide, aggressive chemical attack, and corrosion of embedded steel	Containment ISI	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program (B2.1.24)	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)  However, applicant chose to monitor with ISI Program
Concrete elements: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.B-08)	Cracks, distortion, and increases in component stress level due to settlement	Structures Monitoring	Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)  However, applicant chose to monitor with Structures Monitoring Program
Concrete elements: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.B-09)	Reduction in foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation	Structures Monitoring	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)
Concrete elements: foundation, dome, and wall (Item Number 3.5.1.B-10)	Reduction of strength and modulus due to elevated temperature	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)
Prestressed containment: tendons and anchorage components (Item Number 3.5.1.B-11)	Loss of prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep, and elevated temperature	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)
Steel elements: liner plate, containment shell (Item Number 3.5.1.B-12)	Loss of material due to corrosion in accessible and inaccessible areas	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)
Steel elements: vent header, drywell head, torus, downcomers, pool shell (Item Number 3.5.1.B-13)	Cumulative fatigue damage (CLB fatigue analysis exists)	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.6, Containment Liner Plate, Metal Containments, and Penetrations Fatigue Analysis
Steel elements: protected by coating (Item Number 3.5.1.B-14)	Loss of material due to corrosion in accessible areas only	Protective coating monitoring and maintenance	None	Not applicable  No credit for coatings taken

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Prestressed containment: tendons and anchorage components (Item Number 3.5.1.B-15)	Loss of material due to corrosion of prestressing tendons and anchorage components	Containment ISI	None	Not applicable. PWR only
Concrete elements: foundation, dome, and wall (Item Number 3.5.1.B-16)	Scaling, cracking, and spalling due to freeze-thaw; expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregate	Containment ISI	None	Not applicable  NMP2 primary containment is enclosed (protected) by reactor building and does not have an independent foundation
Steel elements: vent line bellows, vent headers, downcomers (Item Number 3.5.1.B-17)	Cracking due to cyclic loads or Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (B2.1.23), 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (B2.1.26)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.2.1)
Steel elements: Suppression chamber liner (Item Number 3.5.1.B-18)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Containment ISI and Containment leak rate test	None	Not applicable  No SCC environment
Steel elements: drywell head and downcomer pipes (Item Number 3.5.1.B-19)	Fretting and lock up due to wear	Containment ISI	None	Not applicable  No fretting or wear for these components
<b>Class I Structures</b>				
All Groups except Group 6: accessible interior/exterior concrete & steel components (Item Number 3.5.1.B- 20)	All types of aging effects	Structures Monitoring	Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Sections 3.5B.2.1 and 3.5B.2.2.2)
Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9: inaccessible concrete components, such as exterior walls below grade and foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.B-21)	Aging of inaccessible concrete areas due to aggressive chemical attack, and corrosion of embedded steel	Plant-specific	Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.2)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Group 6: all accessible/ inaccessible concrete, steel, and earthen components (Item Number 3.5.1.B-22)	All types of aging effects, including loss of material due to abrasion, cavitation, and corrosion	Inspection of Water-Control Structures or FERC/US Army Corps of Engineers dam inspection and maintenance	Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)  Inspections of water control structures is part of the Structures Monitoring Program
Group 5: liners (Item Number 3.5.1.B-23)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC; loss of material due to crevice corrosion	Water Chemistry Program and Monitoring of spent fuel pool water level	Water Chemistry Control Program (B2.1.2)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1.1)
Groups 1-3, 5, 6: all masonry block walls (Item Number 3.5.1.B- 24)	Cracking due to restraint, shrinkage, creep, and aggressive environment	Masonry Wall	Masonry Wall Program (B2.1.27)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)
Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.B-25)	Cracks, distortion, and increases in component stress level due to settlement	Structures Monitoring	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.2)
Groups 1-3, 5-9: foundation (Item Number 3.5.1.B-26)	Reduction in foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation	Structures Monitoring	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.2)
Groups 1-5: concrete (Item Number 3.5.1.B-27)	Reduction of strength and modulus due to elevated temperature	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable (See Section 3.5B.2.2.2)
Groups 7, 8: liners (Item Number 3.5.1.B-28)	Crack Initiation and growth due to SCC; Loss of material due to crevice corrosion	Plant-specific	None	Not applicable  No tank liners within scope

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
<b>Component Supports</b>				
All Groups: support members: anchor bolts, concrete surrounding anchor bolts, welds, grout pad, bolted connections, etc. (Item Number 3.5.1.B-29)	Aging of component supports	Structures Monitoring	Structures Monitoring Program (B2.1.28)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Sections 3.5B.2.1.2 and 3.5B.2.2.3)
Groups B1.1, B1.2, and B1.3: support members: anchor bolts, welds (Item Number 3.5.1.B-30)	Cumulative fatigue damage (CLB fatigue analysis exists)	TLAA, evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4
All Groups: support members: anchor bolts, welds (Item Number 3.5.1.B-31)	Loss of material due to boric acid corrosion	Boric acid corrosion	None	Not applicable, PWR only
Groups B1.1, B1.2, and B1.3: support members: anchor bolts, welds, spring hangers, guides, stops, and vibration isolators (Item Number 3.5.1.B-32)	Loss of material due to environmental corrosion; loss of mechanical function due to corrosion, distortion, dirt, overload, etc.	ISI	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program (B2.1.25)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)
Group B1.1: high strength low-alloy bolts (Item Number 3.5.1.B-33)	Crack initiation and growth due to SCC	Bolting integrity	Bolting Integrity Program (B2.1.36)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.5B.2.1)

The staff's review of the NMP2 component groups followed one of several approaches. One approach, documented in SER Section 3.5B.2.1, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the structures and component supports that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in SER Section 3.5B.2.2, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the structures and component supports that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in SER Section 3.5B.2.3, discusses the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the structures and component supports that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the structures and component supports components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.5B.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Sections 3.5.2.B and 3.5.2.C, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and AERMs. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the structures and component supports components:

- Water Chemistry Control Program
- Boraflex Monitoring Program
- Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load Handling Systems Program
- Fire Protection Program
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWL) Program
- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program
- Masonry Wall Program
- Structures Monitoring Program
- Bolting Integrity Program
- Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Tables 3.5.2.B-1 through 3.5.2.B-13 and Tables 3.5.2.C-1 and 3.5.2.C-2, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the structures and component supports components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant had claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes indicate how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A through E, which indicate that the AMR is consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note B indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified that the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is

consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note D indicates that the component for the AMR line item, although different from, is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP takes some exceptions to the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff verified whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review. The staff verified whether the identified exceptions to the GALL AMPs had been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The staff also determined whether the AMP identified by the applicant was consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

Note E indicates that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect, but a different aging management program is credited. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the identified AMP would manage the aging effect consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the Audit and Review Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs. The staff's evaluation is discussed below.

#### 3.5B.2.1.1 Crack Initiation and Growth Due to SCC; Loss of Material Due to Crevice Corrosion

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-2, for the liners component type and cracking aging effect and aging effect mechanism, the GALL Report, Volume 2 line item shown is Item III.A5.2-b with ALRA Table 3.5.1.B, Item 3.5.1.B-23. In the table, Note D indicates that the component is different from the GALL Report line item. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant explain how this AMR line item component is different from the GALL Report when GALL Report Item III.A5.2-b is also for the component liners.

By letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that the note referenced should be Note B instead of Note D. The reference would be to Note A, except that the AMP shown takes exceptions to the GALL Report AMP. The applicant further stated that ALRA Table 3.5.3.B-2 was revised to change Note D to Note B for all AMR line item component liners with a cracking aging effect and aging effect mechanism.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that the correction of Note D to Note B is acceptable because the proper note was assigned to this AMR line item.

On the basis of its review, the staff found that the applicant had appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.



### 3.5B.2.1.2 Aging of Component Supports

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-2, for the expansion/grouted anchors component type and the loss of anchor capacity aging effect and aging effect mechanism, the GALL Report, Volume 2 line item shown is Item III.B1.2.3-a with ALRA Table 3.5.1.B, Item 3.5.1.B-29. The environment shown is concrete and the note states that it is consistent with the GALL Report. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant to explain how this AMR line item was consistent with the GALL Report when the GALL Report line item has a component type of concrete surrounding anchor bolts, a material of concrete, an environment of inside or outside containment, and an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of reduction in anchor capacity. The logic of this AMR line item was not consistent with the GALL Report. This also applies to ALRA Tables 3.5.2.B-4, 3.5.2.B-5, 3.5.2.B-6, 3.5.2.B-8, 3.5.2.B-10, 3.5.2.B-11, and 3.5.2.B-13 for the component type of expansion/grouted anchors. The staff also requested that the applicant explain why, for ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-11 component type expansion/grouted anchors (wrought austenitic stainless steel) in raw water, ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-29 was shown with a NMP2 component.

By letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it made the ALRA consistent with the GALL Report for all of the expansion/grouted anchor AMR line items listed above. For all the AMR line items above, except in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-11, the ALRA current line for carbon steel in concrete was revised. In its place, the component type is changed to concrete surrounding anchor bolts, the material of carbon steel was replaced with concrete (new line with the current line that starts with concrete), the environment of concrete is replaced with air and the rest of the lines will remain as they are currently displayed. For ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-11, the ALRA current line for wrought austenitic stainless steel in concrete was revised. In its place, the component type was changed to concrete surrounding anchor bolts, the material of wrought austenitic stainless steel is replaced with concrete (new line with the current line that starts with concrete), the environment of concrete is replaced with raw water and the rest of the line will remain as currently displayed except for the GALL Report item note and Table 1 line item. The ALRA Table 3.5.1.A, Item 3.5.1.A-29 was an error and the applicant revised the cell in the table to be blank. The cell for the GALL Report item is also blank and the note is changed to Note G. The applicant used the AERM of loss of anchor capacity instead of reduction in anchor capacity, per the GALL Report; however, it is intended that these terms have the same meaning.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that, after revision of the applicant's AMR line items as described above, these line items for the component expansion/grouted anchor (now component type, concrete surrounding anchor bolts, after revision) are consistent with the GALL Report and are, therefore, acceptable.

On the basis of its review, the staff found that the applicant had appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-11, for component type expansion/grouted anchors (carbon and low alloy steel in air) and aging effect and aging effect mechanism loss of anchor capacity, the GALL Report, Volume 2 line item shown is Item III.B1.2.3-a with Table 3.5.1.B, Item 3.5.1.A-29. However, no environment was shown and the note states that it is consistent with the GALL Report. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant explain how this AMR line item was consistent with the GALL Report when the GALL Report line item had a component type of

concrete surrounding anchor bolts, a material of concrete, an environment of inside or outside containment and an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of reduction in anchor capacity. The logic of this AMR line item was not consistent with the GALL Report. Also, the staff requested that the applicant explain why the ALRA Table 3.5.1.B line item shown is Item 3.5.1.A-29 instead of Item 3.5.1.B-29.

By letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it made the ALRA consistent with the GALL Report for the expansion/grouted anchor AMR line item listed above. The ALRA current line for carbon steel with no environment shown was revised. In its place, the component type was changed to concrete surrounding anchor bolts, the material of carbon steel is replaced with concrete (new line with the current line that starts with concrete), the missing environment was replaced with air and the rest of the line remains as currently displayed, except the Table 1 entry. The applicant used the AERM of loss of anchor capacity instead of reduction in anchor capacity per the GALL Report; however, it is intended that these terms have the same meaning. The Table 1 entry of Item 3.5.1.A-29 was an error and was revised to Item 3.5.1.B-29.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that after revision of the applicant's AMR line item as described above, this line item for the component expansion/grouted anchor (now component type, concrete surrounding anchor bolts, after revision) is consistent with the GALL Report and is therefore acceptable. The staff also found the correction of the reference to ALRA Table 3.5.1.B, Item 3.5.1.B-29 appropriate.

On the basis of its review the staff found that the applicant had appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that in ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1, for the component type expansion/grouted anchors (carbon and low alloy steel in air) and aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of anchor capacity, the GALL Report, Volume 2 line item shown is Item III.B1.2.3-a with the Table 1 line items shown as Items 3.5.1.A-29 and 3.5.1.B-29. The environment shown is concrete and the note states that it is consistent with the GALL Report. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant explain how this AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report, when the GALL Report line item has a component type of concrete surrounding anchor bolts, a material of concrete, an environment of inside or outside containment and an aging effect and aging effect mechanism of reduction in anchor capacity. The logic of this AMR line item was not consistent with the GALL Report. This also applies to ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 for component type expansion/grouted anchors (wrought austenitic stainless steel in air).

By letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it made the ALRA consistent with the GALL Report for all of its expansion/grouted anchor AMR line items listed above. For the AMR line item for expansion/ grouted anchors on Table 3.5.2.C-1 (Page 3.5-126) above, the ALRA current line for carbon steel in concrete was revised. In its place, the component type was changed to concrete surrounding anchor bolts, the material of carbon steel is replaced with concrete (new line with the current line that starts with concrete), the environment of concrete is replaced with air and the rest of the line remains as currently displayed. For the AMR line item for expansion/ grouted anchors on Table 3.5.2.C-1 (Page 3.5-127) above, the ALRA current line for wrought austenitic stainless steel in concrete was revised. In its place, the component type was changed to concrete surrounding anchor bolts, the material of wrought austenitic stainless steel was replaced with concrete (new line with the current line that starts with concrete), the

environment of concrete was replaced with air and the rest of the line remains as currently displayed except the Table 1 line items. The Table 1 item should be Item 3.5.1.B-29 only since the line is for NMP2 only. The lines for aging management by the ASME Section XI IWF remain as they are currently entered on ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 (Pages 3.5-126 and 3.5-127). The applicant used the AERM of loss of anchor capacity instead of reduction in anchor capacity per the GALL Report; however, the applicant intended that these terms have exactly the same meaning.

The staff reviewed the applicant's response and found that after revision of the applicant's AMR line items, as described above, these line items for the component expansion/grouted anchor are consistent with the GALL Report and are therefore acceptable.

On the basis of its review, the staff found that the applicant had appropriately addressed the aging effect and aging effect mechanism, as recommended by the GALL Report.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### ***3.5B.2.2 AMR Results That are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Recommended***

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.5.2.C of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as recommended by the GALL Report for the structures and component supports components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

#### **BWR Containment:**

- aging of inaccessible concrete areas
- cracking, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement; reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations, if not covered by structures monitoring program
- reduction of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperature
- loss of material due to corrosion in inaccessible areas of steel containment shell or liner plate
- loss of prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep, and elevated temperature
- cumulative fatigue damage
- cracking due to cyclic loading and SCC

#### **Class I Structures:**

- aging of structures not covered by structures monitoring program
- aging management of inaccessible areas

#### Component Supports:

- aging of supports not covered by structures monitoring program
- cumulative fatigue damage due to cyclic loading

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant had claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.5B.2.2.1 BWR Containments

The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1, which addresses several areas discussed below.

Aging of Inaccessible Concrete Areas. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.1.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed aging of inaccessible concrete areas in BWR containments.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.1 states that cracking, spalling, and increases in porosity and permeability due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and aggressive chemical attack; and cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel could occur in inaccessible areas of PWR concrete and steel containments; BWR Mark II concrete containments; and Mark III concrete and steel containments. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of plant-specific programs to manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for inaccessible areas if specific conditions defined in the GALL Report cannot be satisfied.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, the aging of inaccessible concrete areas due to leaching of calcium hydroxide, aggressive chemical attack, and corrosion of embedded steel are not significant for concrete components of the primary containment structure. The concrete was designed in accordance with ACI 318-71 and ACI 318-77 and constructed in accordance with ACI 301, which meets the intent of ACI 201.2R-77. This ensures a durable concrete that is dense, well-cured, has low permeability, and for which cracking is well controlled. Additionally, NMP2 is not exposed to aggressive ground water. As part of the Structures Monitoring Program, a regularly scheduled ground water monitoring will be implemented to ensure that a benign environment is maintained.

In addition, in letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that, although evaluated as not significant, NMP2 credits the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (IWL) Program to monitor for aging of inaccessible concrete areas. Inaccessible concrete areas are compared against

accessible concrete areas with similar environments. If warranted, additional inspections are performed. The staff reviewed the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (IWL) Program; the staff's evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.18.

On the basis of its audit and review, the staff found that cracking, spalling and increases in porosity and permeability of inaccessible containment concrete due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and aggressive chemical attack; and cracking, spalling, loss of bond, loss of material of inaccessible containment concrete due to corrosion of embedded steel are not plausible aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to the nonexistence of these aging effect and aging effect mechanisms in accordance with the GALL Report. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, through interviews with the applicant's technical staff and review of applicable documentation, the staff found that the NMP2 concrete containment is designed in accordance with ACI 318 and constructed of concrete using ingredients conforming to ACI and ASTM standards, in accordance with the recommendations of the GALL Report. In addition, ground water sample testing monitoring has demonstrated that an aggressive environment does not exist at NMP2 for inaccessible concrete. NMPNS has demonstrated that aggregates used for containment concrete were in accordance with ACI 301, which meets the intent of ACI 201.2R-77 for good quality concrete. The staff determined that the recommendations of the GALL Report have been satisfied and a plant-specific AMP for inaccessible containment concrete is not required.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant has met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.1. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.1.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Cracking, Distortion, and Increase in Component Stress Level due to Settlement; Reduction of Foundation Strength due to Erosion of Porous Concrete Subfoundations, if Not Covered by Structures Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.2.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed cracking, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement; and reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations in BWR containments.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.2 states that cracking, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement could occur in PWR concrete and steel containments and BWR Mark II concrete containments and Mark III concrete and steel containments. Also, reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations could occur in all types of PWR and BWR containments. Some plants may rely on a de-watering system to lower the site ground water level. If the plant's CLB credits a de-watering system, the GALL Report recommends verification of the continued functionality of the de-watering system during the period of extended operation. The GALL Report recommends no further evaluation if this activity is included within the scope of the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.2 letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, cracking, distortion, and an increase in component stress level due to settlement is not

significant. The primary containment structure is founded on impervious rock. Although evaluated as not significant, NMP2 credits the Structures Monitoring Program to monitor for settlement. NMP2 does not utilize a de-watering system. The staff reviewed the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program; the staff's corresponding evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.21.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant further stated that, for NMP2, reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation is not applicable. Porous concrete is not utilized in the construction of the primary containment structure.

On the basis of its audit and review, the staff found that cracking, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to containment settlement and reduction of containment foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations are not plausible aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to the nonexistence of these aging effect and aging effect mechanisms. The applicant stated that the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to settlement are not expected at NMP2 for the containment structure since it is founded on impervious rock. In addition, porous concrete was not utilized in the construction of the primary containment structure. The staff determined that an AMP is not required since these aging effect and aging effect mechanisms do not occur at NMPNS. However, the applicant conservatively elected to use its Structures Monitoring Program to monitor for settlement, which the staff found acceptable.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.1.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Reduction of Strength and Modulus of Concrete Structures due to Elevated Temperature. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.3 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.3.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed reduction of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperature in BWR containments.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.3 states that reduction of strength and modulus of elasticity due to elevated temperatures could occur in PWR concrete and steel containments and BWR Mark II concrete containments and Mark III concrete and steel containments. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation if any portion of the concrete containment components exceeds specified temperature limits [i.e., general area temperature 66 °C (150 °F) and local area temperature 93 °C (200 °F)].

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.3 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, reduction of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperature is not significant. In the primary containment structure, general area temperatures do not exceed 150 °F and local area temperatures do not exceed 200 °F. These temperatures are not sufficient to result in this aging effect or aging effect mechanism for the applicable components.

The applicant stated, in letter dated August 19, 2005, that, for the NMP2 primary containment, this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMPNS. The applicant stated that during normal operation, all areas within the containment building do not experience elevated temperatures greater than 150 °F general and greater than 200 °F local. Therefore, change in material properties (reduction of strength and modulus of concrete) due to elevated temperature is not an aging effect or aging effect mechanism requiring management for the NMPNS containment concrete. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical staff that operating experience indicates that the containment concrete has never experienced any aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to elevated temperatures.

On the basis that NMPNS does not have a containment concrete elevated temperature aging effect and aging effect mechanism, the staff found that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMPNS.

Loss of Material due to Corrosion in Inaccessible Areas of Steel Containment Shell or Liner Plate. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.4.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.4 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed loss of material due to corrosion in inaccessible areas of steel containment shell or liner plate in BWR containments.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.4 states that loss of material due to corrosion could occur in inaccessible areas of the steel containment shell or the steel liner plate for all types of BWR containments. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of plant-specific programs to manage this aging effect and aging effect mechanism for inaccessible areas if specific conditions defined in the GALL Report cannot be satisfied.

For NMP2, the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (IWE) Program is credited for managing aging effects and aging effects mechanisms due to corrosion of accessible primary containment structure carbon steel components comprising the containment pressure boundary. Inaccessible areas are compared against accessible areas with similar environments. If warranted, additional inspections are performed. The staff reviewed the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (IWE) Program; the staff's evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.17.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff noted that the GALL Report recommends further evaluation of plant-specific programs to manage this aging effect and aging effect mechanism for inaccessible areas if specific conditions defined in the GALL Report cannot be satisfied. In the GALL Report, Item B1.1.1-a states that, for inaccessible areas (embedded containment steel shell or liner), loss of material due to corrosion is not significant if the following four specific conditions are satisfied:

- (1) Concrete meeting the requirements of ACI 318 or 349 and the guidance of 201.2R was used for the containment concrete in contact with the embedded containment shell or liner.
- (2) The concrete is monitored to ensure that it is free of penetrating cracks that provide a path for water seepage to the surface of the containment shell or liner.

- (3) The moisture barrier, at the junction where the shell or liner becomes embedded, is subject to aging management activities in accordance with IWE requirements.
- (4) Borated water spills and water ponding on the containment concrete floor are not common and when detected are cleaned up in a timely manner.

The GALL Report states that if any of the four conditions cannot be satisfied, a plant-specific AMP for corrosion is recommended. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff requested that the applicant provide an explanation for how each of the four conditions are satisfied at NMP2. The applicant addressed the four conditions as follows:

- (1) NMP2 was designed and constructed with equivalent codes as specified in the GALL Report.
- (2) The concrete is monitored in accordance with the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (IWE) and Structures Monitoring Programs.
- (3) This condition is not applicable to the NMPNS design.
- (4) This condition is not applicable to a BWR design.

On the basis of its audit and review, the staff determined that all of the conditions identified in the GALL Report are satisfied. The applicant stated that the NMP2 containment was designed and constructed with equivalent codes as those specified in the GALL Report. Accessible concrete of the containment structure is monitored for penetrating cracks under the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (IWE) and Structures Monitoring Programs. Operating experience demonstrates that the aging effect and aging effect mechanism of loss of material due to corrosion has not been significant for the NMP2 steel containment shell. The staff found that no additional plant-specific AMP is required to manage inaccessible areas of the steel containment shell.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.4. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.1.4 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Loss of Prestress due to Relaxation, Shrinkage, Creep, and Elevated Temperature. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.5 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.5.

The applicant stated, in Section 3.5.2.C.1.5 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, that, for the loss of prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep and elevated temperature in BWR containments, this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP2. Prestressed tendons were not utilized in the construction of the primary containment structure for NMP2. As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined through discussions with the applicant's technical staff that the loss of prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep and elevated temperature in BWR containments does not apply to NMP2 since its primary containment does not contain prestressed tendons.



On the basis that NMP2 does not have any components from this group, the staff found that this aging effect and aging effect mechanism are not applicable to NMP2.

Cumulative Fatigue Damage. In Section 3.5.2.C.1.6 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that fatigue is a TLAA, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.6 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

Cracking due to Cyclic Loading and SCC. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.7.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed cracking due to cyclic loading and SCC in BWR containments.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.7 states that cracking of containment penetrations (including penetration sleeves, penetration bellows, and dissimilar metal welds) due to cyclic loading or SCC could occur in all types of PWR and BWR containments. Cracking could also occur in vent line bellows, vent headers and downcomers due to SCC for BWR containments. A visual VT-3 examination would not detect such cracks. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation of the inspection methods implemented to detect these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms.

In Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program are credited for managing cracking due to cyclic loading and SCC of primary containment structure steel components. In addition, an augmented VT-1 visual examination will be performed on containment bellows using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC.

The staff reviewed the applicant's ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program; the staff's evaluations are documented in SER Sections 3.0.3.2.1 and 3.0.3.1.7, respectively.

Based on the applicant's further evaluation, as recommended in the GALL Report for detecting cracking due to SCC, the staff found that the applicant had elected to perform augmented VT-1 visual examinations on containment bellows using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC. The staff found that this is consistent with the GALL Report and is therefore acceptable.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.1.7. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.1.7 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.2.2 Class I Structures

The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2, which addresses several areas discussed below.

Aging of Structures Not Covered by Structures Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1.

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed the aging of all Class I structures which are not covered by the Structures Monitoring Program.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1 states that the GALL Report recommends further evaluation of certain structure/aging effect combinations if they are not covered by the applicant's structures monitoring program. This includes: (1) scaling, cracking, and spalling due to repeated freeze-thaw for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; (2) scaling, cracking, spalling and increase in porosity and permeability due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and aggressive chemical attack for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; (3) expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregates for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; (4) cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; (5) cracks, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; (6) reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation for Groups 1-3, 5-9 structures; (7) loss of material due to corrosion of structural steel components for Groups 1-5, 7-8 structures; (8) loss of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperatures for Groups 1-5; and (9) crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion of stainless steel liner for Groups 7 and 8 structures. Further evaluation is necessary only for structure/aging effect combinations not covered by the applicant's structures monitoring program.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1 further states that technical details of the aging management issue are presented in Subsection 3.5.2.2.1.2 for items (5) and (6) and Subsection 3.5.2.2.1.3 for item (8).

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that there are no Group 6 structures (water control structures) at NMP2.

In addition, in letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that aging management of components in accessible areas of Class I structures will be performed through general visual inspections of its Structures Monitoring Program. Aging management is performed for the following aging effect and aging effect mechanisms: freeze-thaw, leaching of calcium hydroxide, aggressive chemical attack, reaction with aggregates, corrosion of embedded steel, and corrosion of structural steel. The staff reviewed the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program; the staff's corresponding evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.21.

In the letter, the applicant further stated that, for NMP2, cracking, distortion, and an increase in component stress level due to settlement for Group 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures is not significant. Class I structures are founded on impervious rock. Although evaluated as not significant, NMP2 credits the Structures Monitoring Program for monitoring settlement. NMP2 does not utilize a de-watering system.

In the letter, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundation is not applicable since the Class I structures were designed

and analyzed to ACI 318-71 and ACI 318-77. Nonetheless, NMP2 manages the aging of these components with the Structures Monitoring Program.

In the letter, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, loss of material due to corrosion of structural steel components for Group 1-5, 7-8 structures is managed by its Structures Monitoring Program. Although the NMP2 vent stack steel and reactor cavity plug liner components are not identified in the GALL Report, these components are also managed by the Structures Monitoring Program.

In addition, the applicant stated in the letter dated August 19, 2005, that for NMP2, loss of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperatures for Group 1-5 structures is not significant. In Class I structures, general area temperatures do not exceed 150°F and local area temperatures do not exceed 200 °F. These temperatures are not sufficient to result in this aging effect and aging effect mechanism for the applicable components.

Furthermore, in its letter, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion of stainless steel liners for Group 7 and 8 structures is not applicable. No tank liners were identified as subject to an AMR.

On the basis of its review, the staff found that scaling, cracking, and spalling due to repeated freeze-thaw for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; scaling, cracking, spalling and increase in porosity and permeability due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and aggressive chemical attack for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; expansion and cracking due to reaction with aggregates for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel for Groups 1-5, 7-9 structures; cracks, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement for Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures; and loss of material due to corrosion of structural steel components for Groups 1-5, 7-8 structures are within the scope of license renewal and will be adequately managed by the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff interviewed members of the applicant's technical staff and reviewed relevant operating experience to confirm that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms have not been observed or, when observed, corrective action was taken under the Structures Monitoring Program. The staff determined that the recommendations of the GALL Report have been satisfied and that a plant-specific AMP for these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for Class I structures is not required.

On the basis of its audit and review, the staff found that reduction of foundation strength due to erosion of porous concrete subfoundations of Groups 1-3, 5, and 7-9 structures is not a plausible aging effect and aging effect mechanism due to the nonexistence of the aging effect and aging effect mechanism. The applicant stated that porous concrete subfoundations were not utilized below the building foundations for Groups 1-3, 5, and 5-9 structures. The staff determined that an AMP is not required since this aging effect and aging effect mechanism does not occur at NMP2. However, the applicant conservatively elected to manage the aging of these components with its Structures Monitoring Program.

The staff found the applicant's further evaluation for elevated temperatures acceptable since change in material properties due to elevated temperatures is an aging effect and aging effect mechanism that does not require management for NMP2 Groups 1-5 Class I structures.

In letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion of stainless steel liners for NMP2 Group 7 and 8 structures are not applicable since no tank liners were identified as subject to an AMR. On the basis of its audit and review, the staff determined that no AMP is required for the above aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for stainless steel liners for Group 7 and 8 structures.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.1. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.2.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Aging Management of Inaccessible Areas. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.2.

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed aging management of inaccessible areas of Class I structures.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2.2 states that cracking, spalling, and increases in porosity and permeability due to aggressive chemical attack and cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel could occur in below-grade inaccessible concrete areas. The GALL Report recommends further evaluation to manage these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms in inaccessible areas of Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 structures, if specific conditions defined in the GALL Report cannot be satisfied.

In Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that, for NMP2, cracking, spalling, and increases in porosity and permeability due to aggressive chemical attack; and cracking, spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel are not significant. Ground water tests confirm that a below-grade aggressive environment does not exist. Although evaluated as not significant, the applicant credited the Structures Monitoring Program to monitor for aggressive chemical attack and corrosion of embedded steel. A regularly scheduled ground water monitoring program will be implemented to ensure that a benign environment is maintained. The staff reviewed the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program; the staff's corresponding evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.21.

As documented in the Audit and Review Report, the staff determined, through discussions with the applicant's technical staff and review of the ALRA, that the recommendations of the GALL Report have been satisfied and a plant-specific AMP for inaccessible concrete of Class I (Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9) structures is not required for these nonexistent aging effect and aging effect mechanisms.

On the basis that NMPNS does not currently have an aggressive environment aging effect or aging effect mechanism for inaccessible concrete, with regularly scheduled ground water monitoring to be implemented to ensure the below-grade environment remains nonaggressive, the staff determined that these aging effects and aging effects mechanisms (cracking, spalling, increases in porosity and permeability, loss of bond, loss of material) are not applicable to NMPNS Groups 1-3, 5, 7-9 Class I structures.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.2. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.2.2 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.5B.2.2.3 Component Supports

The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.3 of its letter the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3, which addresses several areas discussed below.

Aging of Supports Not Covered by Structures Monitoring Program. The staff reviewed Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005 against the criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3.1.

In Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant addressed aging of component supports not covered by the Structures Monitoring Program.

SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3.1 states that the GALL Report recommends further evaluation of certain component support aging effect and aging effect mechanism combinations if they are not covered by the applicant's structures monitoring program. This includes: (1) reduction in concrete anchor capacity due to degradation of the surrounding concrete, for Groups B1-B5 supports; (2) loss of material due to environmental corrosion, for Groups B2-B5 supports; and (3) reduction/loss of isolation function due to degradation of vibration isolation elements, for Group B4 supports. Further evaluation is necessary only for structure/aging effect combinations not covered by the applicant's structures monitoring program.

In Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of its letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that aging management of component supports will be performed through general visual inspections of its Structures Monitoring Program. Aging management is performed for the following aging effect and aging effect mechanism combinations: reduction in concrete anchor capacity due to degradation of the surrounding concrete, loss of material due to environmental corrosion, and reduction/loss of isolation function due to degradation of vibration isolation elements.

The staff found that the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program covers reduction in concrete anchor capacity due to degradation of the surrounding concrete, for Groups B1 through B5 supports; loss of material due to environmental corrosion, for Groups B2 through B5 supports; and reduction/loss of isolation function due to degradation of vibration isolation elements, for Group B4 supports. In accordance with the GALL Report, no further evaluation is required by the applicant and, therefore, no further evaluation has been provided.

The staff found that the applicant included the above aging effect and aging effect mechanism combinations within the scope of the Structures Monitoring Program and agreed that no further evaluation is required. The staff reviewed the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program; the staff's corresponding evaluation is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.2.21. The staff found that the applicant's Structures Monitoring Program is acceptable for managing the above aging

effect and aging effect mechanism combinations of component supports for the GALL Report component support Groups B1 through B5, as those combinations are applicable.

Based on the programs identified above, the staff concluded that the applicant had met the criteria of SRP-LR Section 3.5.2.2.3.1. For those line items that apply to Section 3.5.2.C.3.1 of the applicant's letter dated August 19, 2005, the staff determined that the information in the application is consistent with the GALL Report and the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Cumulative Fatigue Damage due to Cyclic Loading. Fatigue is a TLAA, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.6 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### 3.5B.2.2.4 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Nonsafety-Related Components

SER Section 3.0.4 provides the staff's evaluation of the applicant's Quality Assurance Program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determined that the applicant had adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.5B.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent with or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.5.2.B-1 through 3.5.2.B-13 and Tables 3.5.2.C-1 and 3.5.2.C-2, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, aging effect requiring management, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.5.2.B-1 through 3.5.2.B-13 and Tables 3.5.2.C-1 and 3.5.2.C-2, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and aging effect requiring management does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.5B.2.3.1 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Primary Containment Structure – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-1

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the primary containment structure component groups.

The staff's initial review of the original LRA Table 3.5.2.B-1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 3.5.B-1, dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide information regarding the aging management of pressure boundary bellows by noting that in item 3.5.1.B-17 of the original LRA Table 3.5.1.B, the applicant identifies that the AMR results are consistent with the GALL Report, with the exceptions described in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program. The GALL Report, under Item B1.1.1-d recommends further evaluation regarding the SCC of containment bellows. In the discussion of these items with the staff, the applicant asserted that crack initiation and growth due to SCC is not applicable to the NMP2 vent line bellows. The staff also noted that the NMP2 containment does not have vent line bellows. However, in similar environmental conditions, IN 92-20 indicates the existence of thermal growth and SCC of pressure boundary bellows. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information to address the effectiveness of the applicable aging management program(s) that detect (or would detect) degradation of stainless steel bellows in drywell and suppression chamber of the NMP2 containment.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that although the penetration sleeves, penetration bellows, and dissimilar metal welds at NMP2 are not normally subjected to conditions that cause cracking due to cyclic loading and crack growth due to stress corrosion cracking, the original LRA will be revised to reflect the recommendations in NUREG-1611, Table 2, Item 12. The recommendations in NUREG-1611 identify stress corrosion cracking as an AERM by examination categories E-B and E-F of the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (AMP B2.1.23) and by the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program (AMP B2.1.26). In addition, per NUREG-1611, an augmented VT-1 visual examination will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC. This augmented inspection will be included as an enhancement to the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program. The associated revisions to the original LRA are shown in the response to RAI 3.5.A-1, dated January 10, 2005.

The applicant's proposal for revising the original LRA sections is documented in its response to RAI 3.5.A-1. The staff found the applicant's approach of revising the original LRA to incorporate the augmented inspection of the containment pressure retaining bellows in the NMP2 containment acceptable as proposed. A review of the ALRA indicates that the applicant had incorporated the proposed additions. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-1 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-2, dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that item number 3.5.1.B-06 of original LRA Table 3.5.1.B states that the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program are programs for manage aging of seals, gaskets, and moisture barriers. The original LRA Table 3.5.2.B discusses these components under a generic category of polymer in air. However, based on exception taken to the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program, this AMP will not be applicable for aging management of containment seals and gaskets. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the discrepancy.

Furthermore, the staff noted that, for seals and gaskets of equipment hatches and air-locks at NMP2, the leak rate testing program would monitor the aging degradation of seals and gaskets, as they are leak rate tested after each opening. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant justify that Type B leak rate testing frequency is adequate for monitoring aging degradation of containment pressure boundary penetrations (mechanical and electrical) with seats and gaskets.

In response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following information:

The inspection of the component type "Polymer in Air" is included in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.23). The exception described in [original] LRA Section B2.1.23 identifies that the Subsection IWE inservice inspection (ISI) program for NMP2 is based on the 1998 Edition of ASME Section XI, rather than the 1992/1995 editions and addenda. This was found acceptable by the NRC in a safety evaluation report dated August 17, 2000. There is no exception taken to the performance of examinations for the subject polymeric components.

The aging management of the electrical penetrations and their associated polymeric components is addressed in the NMPNS [original] LRA supplemental letter NMP1L 1912, dated January 10, 2005. These components are managed by the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.23) and the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Program ([original] LRA Section B2.1.26). The mechanical primary containment penetrations for NMP2 are seal-welded to the liner and do not utilize polymeric seals or gaskets for pressure retention.

NMP2 uses Option B for testing of the containment under 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Type B testing of containment penetrations follows the guidance provided in RG 1.163 and NEI 94-01. The testing frequency for these components is at least once per 30 months. However, under Option B, the test frequency may be extended to 60 months and then 120 months based upon component testing performance, service conditions and environment, penetration design, and safety impact of penetration failure. For those components with extended testing frequencies, an approximately even distribution is tested during each interval (i.e., 30 months) to minimize the impact of unanticipated random failures and increase the likelihood of detecting common-mode failures. Based on the above attributes, there is reasonable assurance that the Type B testing frequency is adequate for monitoring aging degradation of containment penetrations with seals and gaskets.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.B-2 acceptable. The applicant stated that there are no containment pressure boundary mechanical penetrations with



resilient seals and approximately 25 percent of the pressure boundary electrical penetrations are Type B tested every 30 months in a way that would assure that each electrical penetration is Type B tested every 120 months. This is consistent with NEI 94-01 (as endorsed by RG 1.163) allows for 10-year interval for Type B testing, if they meet specific performance criteria. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-2 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.B-3, dated December 9, 2004, the staff identified that the applicant is taking exceptions in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program to preclude examinations of seals, gaskets, and bolting of pressure boundary joint points. Occasional SRV discharges, sustained elevated temperatures (may be less than 150 °F), and high humidity, could contribute to degradation of containment pressure boundary. Only Type A leak rate testing and associated visual examination requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Program could be relied upon to detect defects and degradation of containment pressure boundary joint points. The test interval for Type A leak rate testing could be 10 to 15 years. Based on the above information, the staff requested that the applicant provide information regarding the activities and programs that are used for aging management and functional integrity of these pressure boundary joints for the NMP2 primary containment.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following information:

The exceptions noted by the NRC for the Containment ISI program ([original] LRA Section B.2.1.23) do not preclude examinations of seals, gaskets, and bolting of pressure boundary joint points. By letter dated October 28, 1999, NMP submitted a relief request (RR-IWE/IWL-1) to the NRC which proposed the use of the 1998 Edition of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE, in lieu of the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda of Subsection IWE. The use of the 1998 Edition provides more practical requirements for the performance, training, qualification, and scheduling of examinations and provides a uniform set of requirements that eliminates the need for multiple relief requests. The NRC approved the relief request in a safety evaluation report (SER) dated August 17, 2000. As noted in the NRC SER, Examination Category E-D (Seals, Gaskets, and Moisture Barriers) and Examination Category E-G (Pressure Retaining Bolting) were eliminated from the 1998 Code. However, the examination of the pressure retaining bolting and moisture barriers is now included in Examination Category E-A, footnote (1)(d) and Item E1.30, respectively. The NRC also determined that the verification of Containment leak-tight integrity through 10 CFR 50, Appendix J testing provides an adequate method to verify the pressure integrity of bolted connections, seals, and gaskets.

Containment pressure boundary joint points are examined and leak tested every two years in accordance with an NMP2 instrument surveillance procedure. This procedure measures leakage of Type B Appendix J Containment boundaries, which include Containment penetrations whose design incorporates resilient seals, gaskets or sealing compounds, piping penetrations fitted with expansion bellows, electrical penetrations fitted with flexible metal seal assemblies, air lock door seals, and doors with resilient seals or gaskets. This surveillance verifies that the leakage through resilient seals, gaskets, sealant compounds, piping penetrations, and electrical penetrations is maintained within specified values in

accordance with the NMP2 Technical Specifications and the NMP2 Appendix J Testing Program Plan.

Based on its review, the staff found the examination process used by the applicant acceptable, as it provides assurance that the containment pressure boundary joints will retain their integrity during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-3 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-4, dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide information regarding the aging management of primary containment liner and inaccessible areas by noting that the NMP2 primary containment structure is a steel lined reinforced concrete structure. The original LRA item 3.5.1.B-12, related to the primary containment liner, states that "Inaccessible areas are compared against accessible areas and where warranted, additional inspections are performed." Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant: (1) describe the operating experience related to the liner corrosion in the accessible, as well as inaccessible areas; (2) provide acceptance criteria used when the liner is left without repair; and (3) provide information regarding any augmented inspections that had been implemented as required by IWE-1240. Furthermore, the staff requested that the applicant provide this information for containment wall liner in drywell and suppression chamber, barrier slab liners, and for the liners above the insulation concrete.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following information:

The NMP2 primary containment liner is comprised of the drywell and suppression pool liners. The AERM associated with [the original] LRA Table Item 3.5.1.B-12, "Primary Containment (BWR)," is addressed in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE) Program (original LRA Section B2.1.23). As stated in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.23, both industry and NMP plant-specific operating experience relating to the IWE ISI Program was reviewed.

- (1) The review of plant-specific operating experience revealed no deficiencies adjacent to inaccessible areas that warranted further evaluation. As a result of the latest inspection, the liner was found to be in good to excellent condition. The IWE inspections noted the existence of minor areas of surface corrosion and degraded coatings on the liner. Since the noted corrosion was very minor in nature, there was no structural integrity impact as a result of the corrosion. The degraded coatings were addressed via the NMPNS corrective action program.
- (2) For acceptance for continued service, components must comply with the rules of Article IWE-3000, which provides acceptance standards for components of steel containments and liners of concrete containments. For the containment steel shell or liner, material loss exceeding 10 percent of the nominal containment wall thickness, or material loss that is projected to exceed 10 percent of the nominal containment wall thickness before the next examination, must be documented. Such areas where conditions exceed this acceptance criteria are either: (1) subjected to a further detailed visual examination, (2) submitted to engineering for an

acceptance evaluation, or (3) corrected by repair or replacement, in accordance with IWE-3000, IWE-3122, and 10 CFR 50.55a.

- (3) Containment surface areas requiring augmented examination are identified in Table IWE-2500-1, Examination Category E-C, which are those required by IWE-1240. When required, augmented ultrasonic examinations will be performed on Class MC components. These augmented exams will be performed and accepted to the requirements of the 1998 Edition of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE. Detailed visual examinations of surface areas are identified by IWE-1242. The extent of examination shall be 100 percent for each inspection period until the areas examined remain essentially unchanged for the next inspection period. No augmented examinations have been identified for NMP2.
- (4) A general inspection of the suppression pool from the platform found the area to be in excellent condition. Platform beams located above the drywell floor were found to be in excellent condition. The containment liner, reactor pedestal liner, and pre-cast concrete beam liner appeared to be in excellent condition.

Based on description of the process used by the applicant in identifying corrosion of liner and areas of augmented inspection, the staff found that the aging management of the NMP2 primary containment is acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-4 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-5 dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide information regarding the aging management of the concrete and steel structures inside the primary containment. The staff noted that original LRA Table 3.5.2.B does not address load resisting reinforced concrete and steel structures within the drywell and suppression pool. These structures are likely to be subjected to high temperatures, water environment, and very limited accessibility (it is not clear, if the inside surfaces of pedestals are accessible). Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the following information related to these structures:

- the range of actual temperatures recorded in the drywell, inner suppression pool, and outer suppression pool
- a summary of the results of the last inspections performed on the RPV pedestal (inside and outside), the star truss, and the reactor support skirt and its anchorages in the pedestal concrete

In its response by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following information:

The normal operating temperature for the drywell is less than 150 °F. The average drywell air temperature is maintained between 100 °F and 150 °F by the Drywell Cooling System.

The normal operating temperature for the suppression pool is less than 111 °F. The suppression pool air temperature is maintained less than 111 °F and the water temperature is maintained less than 85 °F. If either of these values is reached, suppression pool cooling is placed in service.

The results of the last inspections performed on (1) the RPV pedestal (inside and outside), (2) the star truss, and (3) the reactor support skirt and its anchorages in the pedestal concrete, under the existing Structures Monitoring Program, show the structures to be in good condition. There were no instances of degradation reported for these components.

The staff found that the applicant's approach in controlling the drywell and suppression chamber and managing the aging of the structures inside the primary containment acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-5 is resolved. This information is reflected in the ALRA.

In RAI 3.5.B-6, dated December 9, 2004, the staff requested that the applicant provide justification for not managing the aging of the fasteners and structural steel made of martensitic precipitation hardenable material. The staff indicated that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 does not address aging effects and AMPs for fasteners and structural steel that are made of martensitic precipitation hardenable material. The staff requested that the applicant discuss the stress corrosion potential of these fasteners and structural steel, considering the hardness of these materials, and that the fasteners are subjected to 100 percent moisture or occasional water environment due to pipe or valve leakage. In addition, the staff requested that the applicant provide the operating experience related to these items at NMP2.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following information:

[Original] LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 identifies structural steel (precipitation hardenable) in air (for NMP2 only) with no aging effect requiring management. The structural steel material is SA-564, Grade 630 (17-4PH). Precipitation hardened stainless steels contain alloying elements that form strengthening precipitates (particles) when heat treated for a specified time period, allowing these alloys to be hardened by heat treatment. Alloy 17-4PH is strengthened by forming martensite and by precipitation hardening. For nuclear applications, the typical minimum specified tempering temperature for SA-564, Grade 630 (17-4PH) is 1100°F, resulting in a yield strength of approximately 115 ksi. Throughout NMP2, the structural steel is in-scope for LR due to two intended functions: (1) structural support for NSR and (2) structural/functional support. The structural steel provides no safety-related functions for NMP2. For stress corrosion cracking to occur, significant moisture must be present. Martensitic, precipitation hardenable stainless steels are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking in most waters. However, stress corrosion cracking will not occur at temperatures <140 °F even in a moist or occasionally wet environment. Many of the component supports are for HVAC equipment with the structural steel exposed to indoor air in various plant buildings, which will not see temperatures  $\geq 140^{\circ}\text{F}$ . In addition, susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking increases with increasing yield strength, with most failures occurring at yield strengths  $\geq 140$  ksi. Since the yield strength of SA-564, Grade 630 (17-4PH) is approximately 115 ksi, it is very unlikely that stress corrosion cracking will occur. A review of the operating experience for NMP2 for the stress corrosion cracking of martensitic, precipitation hardenable stainless steels found no instances of this occurring.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.B-6 acceptable as the staff agrees that SCC of the components made from the martensitic precipitation hardenable stainless steels used at NMP2 is unlikely and that the applicant's position is consistent with the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-6 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-7, dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 and the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program do not address aging management review related to Class MC supports. GALL Report Section XI.S3 recommends the use of Subsection IWF for examination of supports of MC components. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the results of the aging management review for: MC component supports within the NMP2 containment (including the supports submerged in water) and supports for piping penetrating through the containments designated as MC piping (if any). Furthermore, the staff requested that the applicant provide a summary of AMPs that will be used for managing the aging of these supports, including sample size, inspection frequency, and personnel qualification, etc.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant provided the following information:

Class MC supports are addressed in [the original] LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1. Several line items in the table correspond to NUREG-1801, Volume 2, Item III.B1.3.1-a, which is for loss of material for carbon steel ASME Class MC supports. The description of the scope of the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.25 inadvertently omitted Class MC supports. The [original] LRA will be revised to include Class MC supports in the scope description. The [revisions to the original] LRA are provided in the response to RAI 3.5.A-6 above.

All NMP2 Class MC supports are included in the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program. Class MC supports fall into two component types: (1) "Structural Steel (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel) in Air," and (2) "Structural Steel (Wrought Austenitic Stainless Steel) in Air." Therefore, the only aging effect is loss of material due to general corrosion applicable only to the carbon/low alloy steel supports. NMP2 has no submerged Class MC supports.

All component supports at NMP2 are examined in accordance with the requirements of Code Case N-491-1. The sample size and inspection frequency are as specified in Table 2500-1 of Code Case N-491-1, which requires 100 percent of Class MC supports to be examined each inspection interval, except that for multiple components other than piping, within a system of similar design, function, and service, the supports of only one of the multiple components are required to be examined. The examination method is a visual VT-3 examination.

Nondestructive examination personnel at NMP2 are qualified by examination and so certified, in accordance with SNT-TC-1A, per ASME Section XI. Level I and Level II personnel are recertified by qualification examinations every 3 years. Level III personnel are recertified by qualification examinations once every 5 years.

The staff found the applicant's proposal to incorporate the aging management of NMP2 Class MC supports in ALRA Sections A1.1.13, and in B2.1.5 acceptable. A review of the these

ALRA sections indicate that the applicant had incorporated the provisions as noted in its response to RAI 3.5A-6. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-7 is resolved.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the primary containment structure components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.2 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Reactor Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-2

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the reactor building component groups.

The staff's review of the original LRA Table 3.5.2.B-2 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 3.5.B-11, dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Item 3.5.1.B-21 in Table 3.5.1.B and Item 3.5.1.B-07 in Table 3.5.1.B state in the discussion columns that "ground water test data confirm that a below grade aggressive environment does not exist." Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide a quantitative summary of NMP2's past ground water test data to support the above assertion and to also to provide, if available, both the phosphate and phosphoric acid contents of the NMP2 ground water.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated:

NMP1 and NMP2 are situated adjacent to a very large inland fresh water lake. Groundwater testing is currently performed every six (6) months for the NMP site. No evidence of aggressive ground water (pH<5.5, > 550 ppm chlorides, or sulfates >1500 ppm) has been found at NMP. Groundwater test data is consistently within the acceptable ranges for non-aggressive ground water as defined by NUREG-1801. Results from the ground water tests performed in April and October of 2003 from the two site test wells were as follows: pH 6.79-7.83; chloride 7.7-49 ppm; and sulfate 28-60 ppm. Due to the non-aggressive nature of the subsurface conditions, phosphate and phosphoric acid concentrations have not been part of the chemical analysis.

Based on its review, the staff found the applicant's response to RAI 3.5.B-11 acceptable because the ground water test data fully verify that NMPNS ground water is nonaggressive. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-11 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-8, dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that in the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.B-2, 3.5.2.B-3, 3.5.2.B-4, 3.5.2.B-5, 3.5.2.B-6, 3.5.2.B-8, 3.5.2.B-10, 3.5.2.B-11, 3.5.2.B-12 and 3.5.2.B-13, the Structures Monitoring Program is credited to manage aging of concrete, concrete lean fill and treated wood in soil (both above and below the GWT), and polymer in soil below the GWT. Since these concrete elements and treated wood are inaccessible because of the presence of soil, the staff requested that the applicant discuss the specific provisions or methods stipulated in the Structures Monitoring Program that will be used to inspect or manage aging of these inaccessible components.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated:

NMP [original] LRA Tables 3.5.2.B-2, 3.5.2.B-3, 3.5.2.B-4, 3.5.2.B-5, 3.5.2.B-6, 3.5.2.B-8, 3.5.2.B-10, 3.5.2.B-11, 3.5.2.B-12, and 3.5.2.B-13 credit the Structures Monitoring Program (SMP) to manage aging of concrete, concrete lean fill and treated wood in soil (both above and below the GWT), and polymer in soil below the GWT.

The SMP implementing procedure provides instructions for the performance of inspections of opportunity when the inaccessible surface(s) of a buried structure is excavated or exposed. The use of NMP site-specific characteristics, industry experience data, and/or testing records of items under similar conditions is also employed.

Inspections of accessible areas adjacent to inaccessible areas are also utilized. As an example, the inspection of interior areas below grade can provide indications of degradation for polymer sealing materials if ground water in-leakage is starting to occur. As stated in [the original] LRA Section B2.1.28, enhancements to the SMP will include water tight penetration inspections.

Based on the information provided in the ALRA that no evidence of aggressive ground water has been found at NMPNS and that groundwater test data is consistently within the acceptable ranges for non-aggressive ground water as defined by the GALL Report, the staff found that the applicant's position for managing aging of concrete, concrete lean fill and treated wood in soil and polymer in soil below the GWT is consistent with the applicable staff position and is acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-8 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-13, dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.B-2 and 3.5.2.B-6 list aluminum alloys exposed to either air or treated water as items having no aging effects and no AMP is credited to manage their aging. Items such as cable trays, conduits, ducts, and tube tracks that are made of aluminum alloys might be exposed to a chemically aggressive or acidic outside environment resulting in aging of these components. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant discuss past operating/inspection experience with respect to aging management of the above listed components and justify the NMP2 conclusion that no AMP is needed during the period of extended operation.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated:

Cable trays, conduits, ducts, and tube tracks are not constructed of aluminum alloys at NMP2. For NMP2, Aluminum Alloy in Air" is the component type for overpressurization vent panels in the Reactor Building and the phase bus duct enclosure, which is part of Essential Yard Structures. A review of the NMP plant-specific operating experience did not identify any occurrences of degradation of aluminum alloy components in air or treated water. Therefore, no specific aging management program is required.

The staff found that the NMPNS plant-specific operating experience described in the applicant's response is adequate and acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-13 is resolved.

Information provided by the applicant to the above staff RAIs has been incorporated in the ALRA submitted by letter dated July 14, 2005.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the reactor building components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.5B.2.3.3 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Auxiliary Service Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-3

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-3, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the auxiliary service building component groups.

The staff's initial review of the original LRA Table 3.5.2.B-3 identified areas in which additional information was necessary. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 3.5.B-9, dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that in the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.B-2, 3.5.2.B-4, 3.5.2.B-5, 3.5.2.B-6, 3.5.2.B-8, 3.5.2.B-10, 3.5.2.B-11, 3.5.2.B-13 and 3.5.2.C-1, the Structures Monitoring Program (SMP) is credited to monitor the loss of anchor capacity of expansion/grouted anchors (carbon and low alloy steel) in air. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant discuss the methods used for checking of anchor bolt torque or bolt tightness to assure that there is no loss of anchor capacity for the above anchors and to ensure that the Structures Monitoring Program will clearly stipulate methods for monitoring the anchor capacity of expansion/grouted anchors.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that:

With respect to [original] LRA Tables 3.5.2.B-2, 3.5.2.B-4, 3.5.2.B-5, 3.5.2.B-6, 3.5.2.B-8, 3.5.2.B-10, 3.5.2.B-11, 3.5.2.B-13, and 3.5.2.C-1, the SMP is credited with monitoring the loss of anchor capacity of expansion/grouted anchors (carbon and low alloy steel) in air. Two AERMs are identified in the [original] LRA and NUREG-1801 for carbon steel expansion or grouted anchors: (1) loss of material due to general corrosion and (2) loss of anchor capacity due to local concrete aging mechanisms. The inspection method to determine if there is a potential for loss of anchor capacity of an expansion or grouted anchor is the identification of concrete degradation local to the anchor. If local concrete degradation is identified, additional inspections may be required as determined by evaluations performed under the NMPNS corrective action program.

Checking of anchor bolt torque or bolt tightness is not routinely performed unless the potential for loss of anchor capacity due to local concrete aging mechanisms is identified.

The staff found that the methods described in the applicant's response above, for checking of NMPNS expansion anchor bolt to assure that there is no loss of anchor capacity for the anchors, is consistent with the applicable staff position and is acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-9 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-10, dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that the original LRA Tables 3.5.2.B-2, 3.5.2.B-7 and 3.5.2.C-1 indicate that no AMP is needed for fasteners/structural steel (wrought austenitic stainless steel exposed to low flow treated water



with temperature less than 140 °F. GALL Report Section III, Item A5.2.b recommends the use of an appropriate water chemistry program to manage aging of stainless steel liners exposed to water. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain the meaning of the “treated water” referred to above and explain the NMP2 criteria (e.g., a water chemistry control program or equivalent used in quality control of the treated water). The staff also requested that the applicant provide information to justify the NMP2 conclusion that no AMP is needed for the listed items subject to the environment stipulated above.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated:

NMP will revise [the original] LRA Tables 3.5.2.B-2, 3.5.2.B-7, and 3.5.2.C-1 to include crack initiation and growth due to SCC and loss of material due to crevice corrosion as an AERM for the following component types: (1) "fasteners (wrought austenitic stainless steel) exposed to low flow treated water with temperature less than 140 °F," and (2) "structural steel (wrought austenitic stainless steel) exposed to low flow treated water with temperature less than 140 °F," and will credit the Water Chemistry Control Program described in [original] LRA Section B2.1.2. The supplemental letter that NMPNS has previously committed to submit by February 28, 2005 (reference NMPNS letter NMP1L 1902 dated December 21, 2004) will include the above-described table changes.

"Treated water" is defined in the original LRA Table 3.0-1 (footnote on page 3.0-9), as follows:

The water source is demineralized water that is chemically treated to remove oxygen. Corrosion inhibitors can be added to the water. Administrative limits are placed on dissolved oxygen and contaminants, and in some cases suspended solids. The concentration of contaminants is controlled by a combination of filtration, ion exchangers, or feed-and bleed (dilution) operations.

The staff found that with the applicant's proposed revisions to the affected tables, as discussed above, are adequate and acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-10 is resolved.

In RAI 3.5.B-12, dated December 9, 2004, the staff stated that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.B-6 credits NMP2's Structures Monitoring Program to manage aging of polymers situated in soil below the ground water table (GWT). Since these polymers are inaccessible, the staff requested that the applicant explain how, and at what frequency, the Structures Monitoring Program is used to manage both the cracking and the loss of strength aging effects of the polymers in soil below the GWT.

In its response, by letter dated January 10, 2005, the applicant stated that:

The SMP is designed to perform periodic inspections of station structures and structural components to identify degradation and correct conditions prior to loss of function. The periodic inspections are performed on the accessible portions of the structures and structural components. Inspections of accessible areas adjacent to inaccessible areas provide an indirect assessment of the condition of the inaccessible areas. For example, if the inspection of interior areas below grade identifies ground water in-leakage, this condition could be an indication of degradation of polymer sealing materials. In this case, the evaluation of the in-leakage condition would include both the accessible and inaccessible areas and corrective actions would be taken as appropriate.

The SMP also has a specific requirement to inspect inaccessible areas when the opportunity presents itself. When the inaccessible area becomes exposed or excavated, an inspection is performed under the SMP. The parameters monitored and

acceptance criteria applied to the inaccessible area are the same as those applied to the accessible areas.

Based upon the above, the SMP provides reasonable assurance that the intended functions of the inaccessible portions of structures and structural components, including polymers below the ground water table, are maintained within the current licensing basis requirements.

The staff found that the applicant's response is consistent with the applicable staff position covering aging management of polymers situated in soil below the GWT and, as such, is acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 3.5.B-12 is resolved.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the auxiliary service building components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.4 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Control Room Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-4

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-4, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the control room building component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-4, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Control Room Building components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Control Room Building components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the control room building components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.5 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Diesel Generator Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-5

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-5, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the diesel generator building component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in Table 3.5.2.B -5 of the ALRA, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Diesel Generator Building components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Diesel Generator Building components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the diesel generator building components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.6 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Essential Yard Structures – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-6

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-6, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the essential yard structures component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in Table 3.5.2.B -6 of the ALRA, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Essential Yard Structures components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Essential Yard Structures components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the essential yard structures components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.7 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Fuel Handling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-7

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-7, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the fuel handling system component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-7, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Fuel Handling System components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Fuel Handling System components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the fuel handling system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.8 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Main Stack – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-8

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-8, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the main stack component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in Table 3.5.2.B -8 of the ALRA, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Main Stack components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Main Stack components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the main stack component components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.9 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Material Handling System – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-9

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-9, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the material handling system component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in Section 3.5.2.B.9 and Table 3.5.2.B -9 of the ALRA, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Material Handling System components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Material Handling System components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the material handling system components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.10 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Radwaste Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-10

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-10, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the radwaste building component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-10, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Radwaste Building components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Radwaste Building components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the radwaste building components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.11 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Screenwell Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-11

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-11, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the screenwell building component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B -11, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Screenwell Building components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Screenwell Building components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the screenwell building components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.12 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Standby Gas Treatment Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-12

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-12, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the standby gas treatment building component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-12, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 standby gas treatment building components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Standby Gas Treatment Building components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the applicant has adequately identified the aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 standby gas treatment building components that are not addressed by the GALL report, so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.13 Structures and Component Supports NMP2 Turbine Building – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-13

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.B-13, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the turbine building component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in ALRA Table 3.5.2.B -13, and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Turbine Building components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Turbine Building components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the turbine building components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.5B.2.3.14 Structures and Component Supports Component Supports – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-1, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the Component Supports component groups.

The staff's review of original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 identified an area in which additional information was necessary. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

The staff initial review in RAI 3.5.B-7, dated December 9, 2004, the staff noted that the original LRA Table 3.5.2.C-1 and the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWF) Program do not address AMR related to Class MC supports. The GALL Report, Section XI.S3 recommends the use of Subsection IWF for examination of supports of MC components. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant provide the results of the AMR for MC component supports within the NMP2 containment (including the supports submerged in water)

and supports for piping penetrating through the containments designated as MC piping (if any). Furthermore, the staff requested that the applicant provide a summary of program(s) that will be used for managing the aging of these supports, including sample size, inspection frequency, and personnel qualification, etc.

The applicant's response and the staff's resolution to RAI 3.5.B-7 are provided in SER Section 3.5B.2.3.1.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the component supports components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### **3.5B.2.3.15 Structures and Component Supports Fire Stops and Seals – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-2**

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.5.2.C-2, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the Fire Stops and Seals component groups.

The staff reviewed the information provided in Table 3.5.2.C-2 of the ALRA and determined that the applicant has adequately identified applicable aging effects, and the AMPs credited for managing the aging effects for the NMP2 Fire Stops and Seals components that are not addressed by the GALL report. The staff found the applicant's AMR results for NMP2 Fire Stops and Seals components acceptable.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects associated with the fire stops and seals components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.5B.3 Conclusion**

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the NMP2 structures and component supports components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable USAR supplement program summaries and concludes that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing aging of the structures and component supports, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

## **3.6 Aging Management of Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls**

This section of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's AMR results for the electrical and instrumentation and controls (I&C) components and component groups associated with the following NMPNS commodities:

- cables and connectors
- non-segregated/switchyard bus

- containment electrical penetrations
- switchyard components

### **3.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Application**

In ALRA Section 3.6, the applicant provided AMR results for the electrical and I&C systems components and component groups. In ALRA Table 3.6.1, Summary of Aging Management Evaluations in Chapter VI of NUREG-1801 for Electrical Components, the applicant provided a summary comparison of its AMRs with the AMRs evaluated in the GALL Report for the electrical and I&C components and component groups.

The applicant incorporated the applicable operating experience in the determination of AERMs. These reviews included evaluation of plant-specific and industry operating experience. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The plant-specific evaluation included reviews of condition reports and discussions with appropriate site personnel to identify AERMs. The applicant's review of industry operating experience included a review of the GALL Report and operating experience issues identified since the issuance of the GALL Report.

### **3.6.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 3.6 to determine if the applicant provided sufficient information to demonstrate that the effects of aging for the electrical and I&C components that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

During the weeks of September 19, and October 24, 2005, the staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs, to confirm the applicant's claim that certain identified AMRs were consistent with the GALL Report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL AMRs. The staff's evaluations of the AMPs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3. Details of the staff's audit are described in its Audit and Review report for the NMPNS ALRA, dated January 18, 2006.

The staff confirmed that the applicant's further evaluations were consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP-LR Section 3.6.2.2 summarized in SER Section 3.6.2.2.

The staff also performed a technical review of the remaining AMRs that were not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The technical review included evaluating whether all plausible aging effects were identified and evaluating whether the aging effects listed were appropriate for the combination of materials and environments specified. The staff's evaluations are summarized in SER Section 3.6.2.3.

Finally, the staff reviewed the AMP summary descriptions in the Unit 1 UFSAR and Unit 2 USAR supplements to ensure that they adequately described the programs credited with managing or monitoring aging for the electrical and instrumentation and controls components.



Table 3.6-1 below provides a summary of the staff's evaluation of components, aging effects and aging effects mechanisms, and AMPs listed in ALRA Section 3.6, that are addressed in the GALL Report.

**Table 3.6-1 Staff Evaluation for Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls Systems Components in the GALL Report**

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Electrical equipment subject to 10 CFR 50.49 environmental qualification (EQ) requirements (Item Number 3.6.1-01)	Degradation due to various aging mechanisms	Environmental qualification of electric components	TLAA	This TLAA is evaluated in Section 4.4, Environmental Qualification (EQ)
Electrical cables and connections not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 EQ requirements (Item Number 3.6.1-02)	Embrittlement, cracking, melting, discoloration, swelling, or loss of dielectric strength leading to reduced insulation resistance (IR); electrical failure caused by thermal/thermooxidative degradation of organics; radiolysis and photolysis [ultraviolet (UV) sensitive materials only] of organics; radiation-induced oxidation; moisture intrusion	Aging management program for electrical cables and connections not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 EQ requirements	Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program (B2.1.29)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.6.2.1)
Electrical cables used in instrumentation circuits not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 EQ requirements that are sensitive to reduction in conductor insulation resistance (IR) (Item Number 3.6.1-03)	Embrittlement, cracking, melting, discoloration, swelling, or loss of dielectric strength leading to reduced IR; electrical failure caused by thermal/thermooxidative degradation of organics; radiation-induced oxidation; moisture intrusion	Aging management program for electrical cables used in instrumentation circuits not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 EQ requirements	Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections used in Instrumentation Circuits Program (B2.1.30)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (See Section 3.6.2.1)

Component Group	Aging Effect/ Mechanism	AMP in GALL Report	AMP in ALRA	Staff Evaluation
Inaccessible medium-voltage (2 kV to 15 kV) cables (e.g., installed in conduit or direct buried) not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 EQ requirements (Item Number 3.6.1-04)	Formation of water trees; localized damage leading to electrical failure (breakdown of insulation), caused by moisture intrusion and water trees	Aging management program for inaccessible medium-voltage cables not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 EQ requirements	Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Program (B2.1.31)	Consistent with GALL, which recommends no further evaluation (see Section 3.6.2.1)
Electrical connectors not subject to 10 CFR 50.49 EQ requirements that are exposed to borated water leakage (Item Number 3.6.1-05)	Corrosion of connector contact surfaces caused by intrusion of borated water	Boric acid corrosion		Not applicable, PWR only

The staff's review of the NMPNS component groups follows one of several approaches. One approach, as documented in Section 3.6.2.1, involved the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the electrical and instrumentation and controls that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and do not require further evaluation. Another approach, documented in Section 3.6.2.2, involved the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the electrical and I&C systems that the applicant indicated are consistent with the GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended. A third approach, documented in Section 3.6.2.3, involved the staff's review of the AMR results for components in the electrical and instrumentation and controls that the applicant indicated are not consistent with, or not addressed in, the GALL Report. The staff's review of AMPs that are credited to manage or monitor aging effects of the electrical and I&C components is documented in SER Section 3.0.3.

### **3.6.2.1 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation is Not Recommended**

Summary of Technical Information in the Application. In ALRA Section 3.6.2.1, the applicant identified the materials, environments, and aging effects requiring management. The applicant identified the following programs that manage the aging effects related to the electrical and I&C components:

- Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Program
- Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuits Program
- Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Program

Staff Evaluation. In ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 through 3.6.2.C-4, the applicant provided a summary of AMRs for the electrical and I&C components, and identified which AMRs it considered to be consistent with the GALL Report.

For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report does not recommend further evaluation, the staff performed an audit and review to determine whether the plant-specific components contained in these GALL Report component groups were bounded by the GALL Report evaluation.

The applicant provided a note for each AMR line item. The notes (A through F) described how the information in the tables aligns with the information in the GALL Report. For ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 through 3.6.2.C-4, the applicant provided Notes A and C. The staff audited those AMRs with Notes A and C, which indicated that the AMR was consistent with the GALL Report.

Note A indicated that the AMR line item is consistent with the GALL Report for component, material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified in the GALL Report. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report and the validity of the AMR for the site-specific conditions.

Note C indicated that the component for the AMR line item is different, but consistent with the GALL Report for material, environment, and aging effect. In addition, the AMP is consistent with the AMP identified by the GALL Report. This note indicates that the applicant was unable to find a listing of some system components in the GALL Report. However, the applicant identified a different component in the GALL Report that had the same material, environment, aging effect, and AMP as the component that was under review. The staff audited these line items to verify consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also determined whether the AMR line item of the different component was applicable to the component under review and whether the AMR was valid for the site-specific conditions.

The staff conducted an audit and review of the information provided in the ALRA, as documented in the NMPNS audit and review report. The staff did not repeat its review of the matters described in the GALL Report; however, the staff did verify that the material presented in the ALRA was applicable and that the applicant had identified the appropriate GALL Report AMRs.

The staff reviewed the ALRA to confirm that the applicant: (1) provided a brief description of the system, components, materials, and environment; (2) stated that the applicable aging effects were reviewed and evaluated in the GALL Report; and (3) identified those aging effects for the electrical and I&C systems components that are subject to an AMR. On the basis of its audit and review, the staff determined that, for AMRs not requiring further evaluation, as identified in ALRA Table 3.6.1, the applicant's references to the GALL Report are acceptable and no further staff review is required.

Conclusion. The staff evaluated the applicant's claim of consistency with the GALL Report. The staff also has reviewed information pertaining to the applicant's consideration of recent operating experience and proposals for managing associated aging effects. On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the AMR results, which the applicant claimed to be consistent with the GALL Report, are consistent with the AMRs in the GALL Report. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the effects of aging for these components will be adequately managed so that their intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR54.21(a)(3).

### **3.6.2.2 AMR Results That Are Consistent with the GALL Report, for Which Further Evaluation Is Recommended**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In Section 3.6.2.C of a letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant provided further evaluation of aging management as recommended by the GALL Report for the electrical and I&C systems components. The applicant provided information concerning how it will manage the following aging effects:

- electrical equipment subject to environmental qualification

Staff Evaluation. For component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff audited and reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether it adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. In addition, the staff reviewed the applicant's further evaluations against the criteria contained in SRP-LR Section 3.6.2.2. Details of the staff's audit are documented in the staff's Audit and Review Report. The staff's evaluation of the aging effects is discussed in the following sections.

#### **3.6.2.2.1 Electrical Equipment Subject to Environmental Qualification**

In Section 3.6.2.C.1 of a letter dated August 19, 2005, the applicant stated that environmental qualification is a TLAA, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Applicants must evaluate TLAA's in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). SER Section 4.4 documents the staff's review of the applicant's evaluation of this TLAA.

#### **3.6.2.2.2 Quality Assurance for Aging Management of Non-Safety-Related Components**

SER Section 3.0.4 provides the staff's evaluation of the applicant's quality assurance program.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, for component groups evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant has claimed consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL Report recommends further evaluation, the staff determines that the applicant adequately addressed the issues that were further evaluated. The staff found that the applicant has

demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.6.2.3 AMR Results That Are Not Consistent With or Not Addressed in the GALL Report**

Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application. In ALRA Tables 3.6.2.C-1 through 3.6.2.C-4, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations that are not consistent with the GALL Report, or that are not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.6.2.C-1 through 3.6.2.C-4, the applicant indicated, via Notes F through J, that the combination of component type, material, environment, and AERM does not correspond to a line item in the GALL Report, and provided information concerning how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically, Note F indicates that the material for the AMR line item component is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note G indicates that the environment for the AMR line item component and material is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note H indicates that the aging effect for the AMR line item component, material, and environment combination is not evaluated in the GALL Report. Note I indicates that the aging effect identified in the GALL Report for the line item component, material, and environment combination is not applicable. Note J indicates that neither the component nor the material and environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report.

Staff Evaluation. For component type, material, and environment combinations that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation is discussed in the following sections.

#### **3.6.2.3.1 Electrical and I&C Systems Cables and Connectors – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1**

In ALRA Tables 3.6.2.C-1 through Table 3.6.2.C-4, the staff reviewed additional details of the results of the AMRs for material, environment, AERM, and AMP combinations not consistent with the GALL Report or not addressed in the GALL Report.

In ALRA Tables 3.6.2.C-1 through Table 3.6.2.C-4 the applicant indicated via Note J that neither the identified component nor the material-environment combination is evaluated in the GALL Report and provided information for how the aging effect will be managed. Specifically Note J indicated that neither the component nor the material-environment combination for the line item is evaluated in the GALL Report. For component type and material-environment combination not evaluated in the GALL Report the staff reviewed the applicant's evaluation to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB during the period of extended operation.

The staff's evaluation is addressed in the following sections.

### Electrical and I&C Systems Cables and Connectors

The staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1, which summarizes aging management evaluations for cables and connectors categorized into component types: (1) conductor insulation for electrical cables and connectors, (2) conductor insulation for electrical cables in circuits sensitive to reduction in conductor insulation resistance, (3) conductor connectors, and (4) fuse holders. The conductor insulation for electrical cables and connectors, electrical cables in circuits sensitive to reduction in conductor insulation resistance, and fuse holders excluding metallic clamps are evaluated in Section 3.6.2.1. The staff evaluations for conductor connectors and metallic clamps of fuse holders are provided in this section.

#### Conductor Connectors

*Technical Information in Application* - In the ALRA the applicant stated that conductor connectors include splices (butt or bolted), crimp-type lugs, and terminal blocks connecting cable conductors to other cables or electrical devices. The applicant credited the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program with managing the aging effects of the conductor connectors.

*Aging Effect* - In ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 the applicant identified loosening of bolted connections as the AERM.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant credited the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program with managing the potential aging effect for conductor connectors.

#### Staff Evaluation.

*Aging Effect* - In ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 the applicant identified loosening of bolted connections as the AERM. The staff agreed that the applicant in the ALRA correctly identified the aging effects of conductor connectors. Loosening of the bolted connections can be caused by thermal cycling, ohmic heating, electrical transients, vibrations, chemical contamination, corrosion, and oxidation

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant will credit the Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program to manage the potential aging effect for conductor connectors. The staff evaluation of this AMP is in SER Section 3.0.3.3.5.

The staff's review concluded that the applicant adequately identified the aging effects and that its inspection program adequately detects loosening of conductor connectors to ensure that the component's intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### Fuse Holders

*Technical Information in Application.* In the ALRA the applicant stated that only fuse holders located outside active devices and not parts of larger assemblies are included in the program. The applicant also stated that the fuse holders typically are constructed of blocks of rigid

insulating material like phenolic resins. Metallic clamps are attached to the blocks to hold each end of the fuse. The clamps can be spring-loaded clips that allow fuse ferrules or blades to slip in or they can be bolted lugs to which fuse ends are bolted. The clamps typically are made of copper. In the ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 Material column the applicant categorized the fuse holder components into insulator materials and copper alloy clamps. The applicant stated that the aging of the fuse holder insulation material will be managed under Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connection Program (Section B2.1.29) evaluated in Section 3.6.2.1. The metallic clamp parts of the fuse holders are evaluated in this section. The applicant stated in Table 3.6.2.C-1 that the metallic clamps of the fuse holders are subject to Fuse Holder Inspection Program.

#### Staff Evaluation.

*Aging Effect* - In ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-1 the applicant identified loss of electrical continuity as the AERM. The staff agreed that the applicant in the ALRA correctly identified the aging effects for fuse holder metallic clamps.

The loss of electrical continuity in the fuse holder metallic clamps can be caused by one or more of the following aging stressors: moisture, fatigue, ohmic heating, mechanical stress, vibration, thermal cycling, electrical transients, chemical contamination, oxidation, and corrosion.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant stated that fuse holder metallic clamps may be tested using either thermography or contact resistance. The staff evaluation of this Fuse Holder Inspection Program is in SER Section 3.0.3.3.4

The staff's review concluded that the applicant adequately identified the aging effects and that its adequate AMP for fuse holder clamps reasonably assures maintenance of the component's intended functions consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.6.2.3.2 Electrical and I&C Systems Non-Segregated/ Switchyard Bus – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-2

The ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-2 summarizes aging management evaluation for (1) Non-segregated Bus Insulators, (2) Non-Segregated Bus, (3) Non-Segregated Bus Connectors, (4) Non-Segregated Bus Insulation, (5) Switchyard Bus Conductors, (6) Switchyard Bus Connectors, (7) Containment Electrical Penetrations, (8) High Voltage Insulators, (9) Transmission Conductors, and (10) Transmission Conductor Connections.

The staff evaluation of these items is as follows:

- electrical and I&C systems non-segregated phase bus
- switchyard bus conductors
- switchyard bus connectors
- high voltage insulators
- transmission conductors
- transmission conductor connections
- electrical and I&C systems containment electrical penetrations

Electrical and I&C Systems Non-Segregated Phase Bus. The phase bus is used to connect two or more elements (equipment like switchgear and transformers) of an electrical circuit. The isolated phase bus is an electrical bus in which each phase conductor is enclosed by an

individual metal housing separated from an adjacent conductor housing by an air space. A non-segregated phase bus is an electrical bus constructed with all phase conductors in a common enclosure without barriers (only air space) between the phases.

In the ALRA the applicant stated that the materials of construction for the phase bus components are:

- aluminum
- cement
- metal
- porcelain
- steel
- various organic polymers

The applicant also stated in the ALRA that phase bus components are exposed to an air environment.

In ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-2 the applicant identified loss of insulation resistance and loosening of bolted connections as aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of phase bus components requiring aging management.

The applicant credited the Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program with managing the potential aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for the phase bus components. The staff evaluation of this AMP is in SER Section 3.0.3.3.3

Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)-17, "Proposed Aging Management Program (AMP) XI.E4, 'Periodic Inspection of Bus Ducts,'" includes enclosed bus and enclosure assemblies as the structure and/or component of the metal enclosed bus. During the audit and review the staff noted that ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-2 does not include this component. The staff requested that the applicant provide justification for not including the enclosure assembly in the structure and/or component category.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that it will revise ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-2 to include the component types bus duct enclosure and seals and gaskets. The applicant stated that the intended function for both components is shelter/protection with the materials of aluminum for the enclosure and polymers for the seals and gaskets both in an environment of air. The applicant also stated in this letter that there are no aging effects and aging effects mechanisms requiring management for the aluminum enclosure and the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of the seals and gaskets are cracking, hardening, and shrinkage to be managed by the Structures Monitoring Program. There are no notes for the bus duct enclosure. Note H is for the seals and gaskets.

The staff performed an onsite audit of AMRs during the weeks of September 19 and October 24, 2005, for Non-Segregated Bus items and confirmed that the applicant had identified the applicable aging effects and aging effects mechanisms and listed the appropriate combination of material, environments, and AMPs that will manage the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms adequately. The staff agreed that the applicant correctly identified the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of phase bus components. In addition the staff found that there are no aging effects and aging effects mechanisms requiring management for the aluminum enclosure. The staff also found cracks, foreign debris, excessive dust build-up, and evidence of



water intrusion as additional aging effects and aging effects mechanisms adequately managed by the Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program. The applicant credited its Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program with aging management of the in-scope non-segregated phase bus and its Structures Monitoring Program with managing the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of the enclosure seals and gaskets. The staff's review and evaluations of these programs are documented in SER Section 3.0.3.3.3.

The staff performed other evaluations in reviewing the ALRA:

#### Switchyard Bus Conductors

*Technical Information in the Application.* The applicant identified aluminum as the component and air as environment for switchyard bus conductors.

*Aging Effect* - The applicant stated "None" in the AERM column for switchyard bus conductors.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant stated "None" in the AMP column for switchyard bus conductors.

#### Staff Evaluation.

*Aging Effect* - By letter dated November 29, 2005, the staff requested additional information for the statement "None" in the AERM column for switchyard bus conductors. By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant stated that the switchyard bus conductors are made of aluminum. The NMPNS environment is nonaggressive with little air pollution and no heavy industry or saltwater. In a nonaggressive environment aluminum forms a passive oxide layer which arrests further oxidation/corrosion and loss of material (LOM) does not occur. NMPNS operating experience indicates no wind-induced abrasion and fatigue failure of the switchyard bus conductors. Tubular conductors are used at NMPNS and the wind speed encountered at NMPNS is not high enough to degrade them. The staff agreed that there is no AERM for switchyard bus conductors.

*Aging Management Program* - By letter dated November 29, 2005, the staff requested additional information for the statement "None" in the AMP column for switchyard bus conductors. By letter dated December 2005, the applicant stated that (1) there are no corrosion-related AMPs because aluminum forms an oxide layer which arrests further oxidation, (2) in the operating experience at NMPNS no wind-induced abrasion or fatigue failure of these conductors has been observed, and (3) because of the design of the tubular conductors significantly higher wind conditions than those that typically occur at NMPNS would be needed to cause wind-related degradation.

*Conclusion.* The staff agrees that based on the justifications provided by the applicant, no AMP is required for the switchyard bus conductor line item in Table 3.6.2.C-2.

### Switchyard Bus Connectors

*Technical Information in the Application.* The applicant identified aluminum and steel as materials and air as environment for switchyard bus connectors.

*Aging Effect* - The applicant stated "Loosening of Bolted Connections" in the AERM column for switchyard bus connectors.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant stated "Preventive Maintenance Program" in the AMP column for switchyard bus connectors.

### Staff Evaluation.

*Aging Effect* - The staff agreed that the applicant in the ALRA correctly identified the aging effect of the switchyard bus connectors.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant's current Preventive Maintenance Program does not address maintenance of electrical components. By letter dated November 29, 2005, the staff requested additional information for inspections of electrical components in the Preventive Maintenance Program. By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant stated that under the Preventive Maintenance Program the transmission conductor connections undergo visual inspections, thermography testing, and corona measurement to detect loosened connections so they can be retightened or otherwise corrected as necessary.

With the commitment (NMP1 Commitment 31 and NMP2 Commitment 29) from the applicant that under the Preventive Maintenance Program, as discussed in SER Section 3.0.3.3.1, the transmission conductor connections undergo visual inspections, thermography testing, and corona measurement the staff found that the Preventive Maintenance Program is an adequate AMP for switchyard bus connectors.

*Conclusion.* On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects of the non-segregated/switchyard bus components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### 3.6.2.3.3 Switchyard Components – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-3

In the ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-4 the applicant summarized aging management evaluations for Switchyard Components categorized into component types (1) High Voltage Insulators, (2) Transmission Conductors, and (3) Transmission Conductor Connections.

### High Voltage Insulators

*Technical Information in the Application.* The applicant identified cement, porcelain, and metal as materials and air as the environment for high voltage insulators.

*Aging Effect* - The applicant stated "None" in the AERM column for all three materials.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant stated "None" in the AMP column for all three materials.

*Staff Evaluation.*

*Aging Effect* - By letter dated November 29, 2005, the staff requested additional information for the statement "None" in the AMP column for cement, porcelain, and metal. By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant stated that to be conservative it would revise Table 3.6.2.C-4 for consistency with Gall Report Revision 1. The three line items for high voltage insulators at the top of Table 3.6.2.C-4 were revised to include 2 AERM line items, one with the AERM column entry "Loss of Insulation Resistance" and the other with the AERM column entry "Loss of Material."

IN 93-95 documents degradation of insulator performance and ultimate loss of power due to salt build-up on the insulators for plants located in saltwater marine environments. The applicant stated that NMPNS is located on a lake, not in a saltwater marine environment. Further, the applicant stated that its periodic inspections of its Preventive Maintenance Program indicate no loss of material (LOM) or mechanical wear on transmission conductors due to wind. The staff found this revision consistent with the GALL Report Revision and acceptable.

*Aging Management Program* - By letter dated November 29, 2005, the staff requested additional information for the statement "None" in the AMP column for cement, porcelain, and metal. By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant stated that to be conservative it would revise Table 3.6.2.C-4 to state "Preventive Maintenance Program" in the AMP column. The applicant stated that its Preventive Maintenance Program includes visual inspections, thermography, and corona measurement.

*Conclusion.* On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects of the switchyard components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

*Transmission Conductors*

*Technical Information in the Application.* The applicant identified aluminum conductor, steel reinforced as the material and air as the environment for transmission conductors.

*Aging Effect* - The applicant stated "None" in the AERM column for transmission conductors.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant stated "None" in the AMP column for transmission conductors.

*Staff Evaluation.*

*Aging Effect* - By letter dated November 29, 2005, the staff requested additional information for the statement "None" in the AMP column for transmission conductors. By letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant stated that plant operating experience and the design of these conductors indicate no loss of conductor strength due to corrosion to the extent necessary to affect the

ability of the conductors to perform their intended function. They are fabricated of stranded aluminum wound around a steel stranded core with no organic insulating material around them. For aluminum core steel reinforced conductors any degradation would begin as a loss of zinc from the galvanized steel core wire strands. Corrosion rates depend on suspended particle chemistry, sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) concentration in air, precipitation, fog chemistry, and meteorological conditions, a very slow process even slower in rural areas with less concentration of suspended particles and SO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere than urban areas. NMPNS is in a rural area.

The National Electric Safety Code (NESC) requires that tension on installed conductors be a maximum of 60 percent of the ultimate conductor strength. The NESC also sets the maximum tension to which a conductor can be subject under heavy load requirements including wind, ice, and temperature. Ontario Hydroelectric performed tests of 80-year old transmission conductors that showed a 30 percent loss of conductor strength. These were typical transmission conductors that can reach 1000 feet in length. With 30 percent loss there is still significant margin between the NESC requirement and the actual tested conductor strength. At NMPNS transmission conductor runs are shorter than those included in the Ontario Hydroelectric test. The longest transmission conductor run at NMPNS is approximately 515 feet. Because NMPNS is located in a rural area, the tension of these shorter runs would be less than what is typical in transmission conductor runs, and the Ontario Hydroelectric tests for 80-year old conductors demonstrated significant margins between NESC requirements and test results the applicant's opinion is that for the period of extended operation the AERM of loss of conductor strength would not affect the intended function of these conductors significantly.

Based on the applicant's site-specific data the staff concluded that corrosion of transmission conductors is a very slow aging process even slower in rural areas with generally fewer suspended particles and lower sulphur dioxide concentration in the air than urban areas; therefore, loss of conductor strength due to transmission conductor corrosion is not an AERM.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated the transmission conductors have no AERM. The staff concluded that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### Transmission Conductor Connections

Technical Information in the Application. The applicant identified aluminum and steel as materials and air as the environment for transmission conductor connections.

*Aging Effect* - The applicant stated "Loosening of Bolted Connections" in the AERM column for transmission conductor connections.

*Aging Management Program* - The applicant stated "Preventive Maintenance Program" in the AMP column for transmission conductor connections.

### Staff Evaluation.

*Aging Effect* - The staff agreed that the applicant in the ALRA correctly identified the aging effect of the transmission conductor connections.

*Aging Management Program* - By letter dated November 29, 2005, the staff requested additional information for the statement "Preventive Maintenance Program" in the AMP column. By letter dated December 2005, the applicant stated that under the Preventive Maintenance Program the transmission conductor connections undergo visual inspections, thermography testing, and corona measurement to detect loosened connections so they can be retightened or otherwise corrected as necessary.

Based on the applicant's information that its Preventive Maintenance Program includes visual inspections and thermography or corona measurement the staff concluded that the applicant's AMP is adequate for transmission conductor connections.

Conclusion. On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects of the transmission conductors connections components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

#### 3.6.2.3.4 Electrical and I&C Systems Containment Electrical Penetrations – Summary of Aging Management Evaluation – ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-4

During the staff audit and review during the weeks of September 19 and October 24, 2005, the staff reviewed ALRA Table 3.6.2.C-3, which summarizes the results of AMR evaluations for the containment electrical penetrations component groups.

The applicant stated in ALRA Section 3.6.2.1.3 that the construction materials for the containment electrical penetration are various organic polymers. The containment electrical penetrations are exposed to an adverse local environment of heat or radiation and air. The aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of the containment electrical penetration requiring management are loss of insulation resistance and loss of tightness. The applicant credited the ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (Subsection IWE), Non-EQ Cables and Connections, and 10 CFR Appendix J Programs with managing the aging effects and aging effects mechanisms for the containment penetrations.

In ALRA Section 3.6.2.1.3 the applicant stated that the penetration assembly primary insulation materials are various organic polymers. During the audit and review it was not clear to the staff why the metals and inorganic materials (cable fillers, epoxies, potting compounds, connector pins, plugs, and facial grommets) of non-EQ electrical/I&C penetration assemblies did not require an AMR.

In its letter dated December 1, 2005, the applicant stated that electrical penetrations at NMP contain no cable fillers, epoxies, potting compounds, connector pins, plugs, or facial grommets within the steel sleeve and that nitrogen is inserted into the penetration interior.

The applicant further stated that aging of inaccessible seal material on the ends of the sleeves is managed by its 10 CFR Appendix J Program. The staff found the applicant's response

acceptable because containment electrical penetrations at NMP contain no organic materials and the potential aging effects and aging effects mechanisms of penetration wiring insulation will be addressed by the Non-EQ Cables and Connections Program. In addition the leak test performed as required by the applicant's Appendix J Program will test the boundary function of the non-EQ electrical and I&C penetrations. The applicant's Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connections and 10 CFR Appendix J Programs are evaluated in SER Sections 3.0.3.1.8 and 3.0.3.1.7, respectively.

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects of the containment electrical penetrations components will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

### **3.6.3 Conclusion**

The staff concluded that the applicant provided sufficient information to determine that the effects of aging for the electrical and instrumentation and controls components, that are within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR, will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

The staff also reviewed the applicable UFSAR and USAR supplemental program summaries and concluded that they adequately describe the AMPs credited for managing of the electrical and instrumentation and controls required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **3.7 Conclusion for Aging Management Review Results**

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 3, "Aging Management Review Results," and Appendix B, "Aging Management Programs and Activities." On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated that the aging effects will be adequately managed so that intended functions will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3). The staff also reviewed the applicable NMP1 UFSAR and NMP2 USAR supplements program summaries and concluded that the supplements adequately describe the AMPs credited with managing aging, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

The staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed licenses will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB, and any changes made to the CLB, for compliance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3) are in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and NRC regulations.

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## SECTION 4

### TIME-LIMITED AGING ANALYSES

#### 4.1 Identification of Time-Limited Aging Analyses

This section discusses the identification of time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs). Constellation Energy Group, LLC (CEG or the applicant) discusses the TLAAAs in Sections 4.2 through 4.7 of its amended license renewal application (ALRA). Safety evaluation report (SER) Sections 4.2 through 4.8 document the review of the TLAAAs conducted by the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff).

TLAAAs are certain plant-specific safety analyses that involve time-limited assumptions defined by the current operating term. Pursuant to Title 10, Section 54.21(c)(1), of the *Code of Federal Regulations* [10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)], the applicant for license renewal must provide a list of TLAAAs, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3.

In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(2), an applicant must provide a list of plant-specific exemptions granted under 10 CFR 50.12 that are based on TLAAAs. For any such exemptions, the applicant must provide an evaluation that justifies the continuation of the exemptions for the period of extended operation.

##### 4.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application

To identify the TLAAAs, the applicant evaluated calculations for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) against the six criteria specified in 10 CFR 54.3. The applicant indicated that it had identified the calculations that met the six criteria by searching the current licensing basis (CLB). The CLB includes the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) updated safety analysis report (UFSAR), Nine Mile Nuclear Point Unit 2 (NMP2) updated safety analysis report (USAR), engineering calculations, technical reports, engineering work requests, licensing correspondence, and applicable vendor reports. In ALRA Table 4.1-1, "Time-Limited Aging Analyses Applicable to NMPNS," the applicant listed the applicable TLAAAs in the following categories:

- reactor vessel neutron embrittlement analysis
- metal fatigue analysis
- environmental qualification (EQ)
- containment liner plate, metal containments, and penetrations fatigue analysis
- other plant-specific TLAAAs

Pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(2), the applicant stated that it did not identify any exemptions granted under 10 CFR 50.12 that were based on a TLAA, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3.



#### **4.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

In ALRA Section 4.1, the applicant identified the TLAAAs applicable to NMP1 and NMP2. The staff reviewed the information to determine if the applicant had provided adequate information to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1) and 10 CFR 54.21(c)(2).

As defined in 10 CFR 54.3, TLAAAs are analyses that meet the following six criteria:

- (1) involve systems, structures, and components that are within the scope of license renewal, as delineated in 10 CFR 54.4(a),
- (2) consider the effects of aging,
- (3) involve time-limited assumptions defined by the current operating term (40 years),
- (4) are determined to be relevant by the applicant in making a safety determination,
- (5) involve conclusions, or provide the basis for conclusions, related to the capability of the system, structure, and component to perform its intended functions, as delineated in 10 CFR 54.4(b),
- (6) are contained or incorporated by reference in the current licensing basis (CLB).

The applicant provided a list of common TLAAAs from NUREG-1800, "Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants" (SRP-LR), dated July 2001. The applicant listed those TLAAAs applicable to NMP1 and NMP2 in ALRA Table 4.1-1, "Time-Limited Aging Analyses Applicable to NMPNS."

As required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(2), an applicant must provide a list of all the exemptions granted under 10 CFR 50.12 that are based on a TLAA and evaluated and justified for continuation through the period of extended operation. In its ALRA, the applicant stated that each active exemption was reviewed to determine whether the exemption was based on a TLAA. The applicant did not identify any TLAA-based exemptions. On the basis of the information provided by the applicant with regard to the process used to identify TLAA-based exemptions, as well as the results of the applicant's search, the staff concluded that the applicant identified no TLAA-based exemptions that are justified for continuation through the period of extended operation, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(2).

#### **4.1.3 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that the applicant has provided an acceptable list of TLAAAs, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). The staff has also confirmed that no exemptions to 10 CFR 50.12 have been granted on the basis of a TLAA, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(2).

### **4.2 Reactor Vessel Neutron Embrittlement Analysis**

During plant service, neutron irradiation reduces the fracture toughness of ferritic steel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) beltline region of light-water nuclear power reactors. Areas of review to ensure that the RPV has adequate fracture toughness to prevent ductile or brittle failure during normal and off-normal operating conditions for NMP1 and NMP2 are

(1) upper-shelf energy (USE), (2) pressure-temperature (P-T) limits/adjusted reference temperature (ART), (3) Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP)-05

analysis for elimination of circumferential weld inspection, and (4) analysis of the axial weld failure probability. The adequacy of the analyses for these four areas is reviewed for the period of extended operation.

The ART is defined as the sum of the initial (unirradiated) reference temperature (initial  $RT_{NDT}$ ), the mean value of the adjustment in reference temperature caused by irradiation (delta  $RT_{NDT}$ ), and a margin term. The delta  $RT_{NDT}$  is the product of a chemistry factor (CF) and a fluence factor. The CF is dependent upon the amount of copper and nickel in the material and may be determined from the tables in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials," or from surveillance data. The fluence factor is dependent upon the neutron fluence. The margin term is dependent upon whether the initial  $RT_{NDT}$  is a plant-specific or a generic value and whether the CF was determined using the tables in RG 1.99, Revision 2, or surveillance data. The margin term is used to account for uncertainties in the values of the initial  $RT_{NDT}$ , the copper and nickel contents, the fluence, and the calculation methods. Revision 2 of RG 1.99 describes the methodology to be used in calculating the margin term. The mean  $RT_{NDT}$  is the sum of the initial  $RT_{NDT}$  and the delta  $RT_{NDT}$  without the margin term. The delta  $RT_{NDT}$  and ART calculations meet the criteria of 10 CFR 54.3(a); therefore, they are considered as TLAAs.

The ART values are used in the analysis for the ART for the RPV material due to neutron embrittlement and the P-T limits analysis. The mean  $RT_{NDT}$  values are used in the analysis of the circumferential weld examination relief and the axial weld failure probability.

Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 provides the staff's criteria for maintaining acceptable levels of USE for the RPV beltline materials of operating reactors throughout the licensed lives of the facilities. The rule requires RPV beltline materials to have a minimum USE value of 75 ft-lbs in the unirradiated condition and to maintain a minimum USE value above 50 ft-lbs throughout the life of the facility, unless it can be demonstrated through analysis that lower values of USE would provide an acceptable margin of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section XI, Appendix G. The rule also mandates that the methods used to calculate USE values must account for the effects of neutron irradiation on the material's USE values and must incorporate any relevant RPV surveillance capsule data that are reported through implementation of a plant's 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, RPV material surveillance program.

RG 1.99, Revision 2, provides an expanded discussion regarding the calculation of Charpy USE values and describes two methods for determining Charpy USE values for RPV beltline materials, depending on whether or not a given RPV beltline material is represented in the plant's RPV material surveillance program. If surveillance data are not available, the Charpy USE is determined in accordance with Position 1.2 in RG 1.99, Revision 2. If surveillance data are available, the Charpy USE should be determined in accordance with Position 2.2 in RG 1.99, Revision 2. These methods refer to RG 1.99, Revision 2, Figure 2, which indicates that the percentage drop in Charpy USE is dependent on the amount of copper in the material and the neutron fluence. Since the analyses performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G are based on a flaw with a depth equal to one-quarter of the vessel wall thickness (1/4t), the neutron fluence used in the Charpy USE analysis is the neutron fluence at the 1/4t depth location.

The applicant described its evaluation of this TLAA in ALRA Section 4.2, "Neutron Embrittlement of the Reactor Vessel and Internals." In order to demonstrate that neutron

embrittlement does not significantly impact RPV and vessel internals integrity during the license renewal term, the applicant included discussion of the following topics related to neutron embrittlement in the ALRA:

- Upper-Shelf Energy (Section 4.2.1),
- Pressure-Temperature Limits/Adjusted Reference Temperatures (Section 4.2.2),
- Elimination of Circumferential Weld Inspection (NMP1 only) (Section 4.2.3),
- Axial Weld Failure Probability (Section 4.2.4).

#### **4.2.1 Upper-Shelf Energy**

##### ***4.2.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

In ALRA Section 4.2.1, the applicant summarized the evaluation of the USE calculations for the period of extended operation. RPV materials undergo a transition in fracture behavior from brittle to ductile as the temperature of the material increases. Charpy V-notch tests are conducted in the nuclear industry to monitor changes in the fracture behavior during irradiation. Neutron irradiation to fluences above approximately  $1 \times 10^{17}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> causes an upward shift in the ductile-to-brittle transition temperature and a drop in USE. To satisfy the acceptance criteria for USE contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, the RPV beltline materials must have a Charpy USE of no less than 50 ft-lbs throughout the life of the RPV unless it can be demonstrated that lower values of Charpy USE will provide margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by the ASME Code Section XI, Appendix G. Appendix B of BWRVIP-74-A, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," presents an equivalent margin analysis establishing the minimum USE limits for beltline materials used in boiling water reactor (BWR)/2 through BWR/6 RPV designs, as well as the plant applicability verification form for equivalent margin analysis corresponding to irradiation for 54 effective full power years (EFPY). The minimum USE values, equivalent margin analysis USE limit criteria, and bounding criteria for decrease in Charpy USE were accepted by the NRC in the safety evaluation (SE) for BWRVIP-74-A.

##### ***4.2.1.2 Staff Evaluation***

Section IV.A.1.a, Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 requires, in part, that the RPV beltline materials have Charpy USE values in the transverse direction for base metal and along the weld for weld material of no less than 50-ft-lbs, unless it is demonstrated in a manner approved by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, that lower values of Charpy USE will ensure margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by ASME Code Section XI, Appendix G.

By letter dated April 30, 1993, the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) submitted NEDO-32205-A, "Equivalent Margin Analysis for Low Upper Shelf Energy in BWR/2 Through BWR/6 Vessels," to demonstrate that BWR RPVs could meet margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by ASME Code Section XI, Appendix G for Charpy USE values less than 50 ft-lbs. In a letter dated December 8, 1993, the staff concluded that the topical report demonstrated that the evaluated materials have margins of safety against fracture equivalent to ASME Code Section XI, Appendix G, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. In that report, the BWROG derived through statistical analysis the unirradiated USE values for

materials that originally did not have documented unirradiated Charpy USE values. Using these statistically-derived Charpy USE values, the BWROG predicted the USE values through 40 years of operation in accordance with RG 1.99, Revision 2. According to this RG, the decrease in USE is dependent upon the amount of copper in the material and the neutron fluence predicted for the material. The BWROG analysis determined that the minimum allowable Charpy USE value in the transverse direction for base metal and along the weld for weld material was 35 ft-lbs.

General Electric (GE) performed an update to the USE equipment margin analysis (EMA), which is documented in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) TR-1008872, "BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," BWRVIP-74-A, June 2003. The staff's approval of EPRI TR-1008872 was documented in a letter from Mr. W. H. Bateman to Mr. C. Terry, dated September 16, 2003. The analysis in EPRI TR-1008872 determined the reduction in the unirradiated Charpy USE resulting from neutron irradiation using the methodology in RG 1.99, Revision 2. Using this methodology and a correction factor of 65 percent for conversion of the longitudinal properties to transverse properties, the lowest Charpy USE at 54 EFPY for all BWR/3-6 plates was projected to be 45 ft-lbs. The correction factor for specimen orientation in plates is based on NRC Branch Technical Position MTEB 5-2. The EMA acceptance criteria specified in the staff-approved report for BWRVIP-74-A, are based on the percent reduction in the unirradiated Charpy USE values resulting from neutron radiation using the methodology in RG 1.99, Revision 2. The acceptance criteria that are specified in the BWRVIP-74-A report indicate that the maximum allowable reduction in USE value is 23.5 percent for the plates and 39 percent for the welds.

Staff's Assessment of the NMP1 USE Evaluation. Since the analysis in the BWRVIP-74-A report is a generic analysis, the applicant submitted plant-specific information in ALRA Table 4.2-1a for NMP1. In addition, its letter dated March 22, 2004, demonstrates in greater detail that the limiting beltline materials of the NMP1 RPV will meet the criteria in the BWRVIP-74-A report at the end of the license renewal period.

The applicant, in ALRA Section 4.2 and in the March 22, 2004, letter (as referenced in the ALRA), demonstrated compliance with all the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, related to the USE (determined by Charpy impact tests) for all RPV beltline materials. The staff's safety evaluation (SE) dated April 26, 1994, concluded that the NMP1 RPV plates have an adequate margin of safety against fracture until a projected end of license of 25 EFPY for all levels of conditions (A, B, C, and D) and meet the criteria in ASME Section XI, Code Case N-512. Since the predicted USE for the limiting plate will fall below 50 ft-lbs before the end of the current license, and during the period of extended operation, the applicant used an EMA in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI Code Case N-512 to demonstrate that the RPV has margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by ASME Section XI, Appendix G, to support operation beyond 25 EFPYs and operation during the period of extended operation. The applicant proposed to use the staff-approved generic EMA analysis (BWRVIP-74-A) for the evaluation of the USE values of the beltline plate and weld materials of the NMP1 RPV.

In order to demonstrate that the BWRVIP-74-A methodology is applicable to the NMP1 RPV, the applicant, by letter dated March 22, 2004, provided a comparison of the results of the BWRVIP-74-A and the MPM Technology Inc. EMA analyses in relation to the initial USE values,

the material joule-resistance (J-R) curves, the stresses, and the  $J_{\text{applied}}$  values, and it identified the difference in the results of the two analyses. These attributes are discussed below:

- (1) The initial USE values, as discussed above, will affect the projected USE values of the irradiated beltline materials. The initial USE values that were used in the BWRVIP-74-A report and in the MPM analyses are 49 ft-lbs and 52 ft-lbs, respectively. Based on these values, the staff concluded that the initial USE value that was used in the BWRVIP-74-A EMA analysis would provide more conservative results than the MPM EMA analysis.
- (2) The applicant compared the USE- $J_{\text{IC}}$  correlations shown in the two analyses. The staff previously determined in its SE dated April, 26, 1994, that a USE value of 40 ft-lbs, would provide an acceptable  $J_{0.1}$  (the J value at 0.1 inch of crack extension) value for the RPV material, whereby the material would have an adequate margin of safety against fracture. The  $J_{0.1}$  values for the BWRVIP-74-A and MPM analyses that correspond to 40 ft-lbs are 222 in-lb/in<sup>2</sup> and 298 in-lb/in<sup>2</sup>, respectively. Based these, the staff concluded that the MPM  $J_{0.1}$  value is less conservative than the BWRVIP-74-A analysis. Therefore, the staff agreed with the applicant that the BWRVIP-74-A J-R curves bound the MPM J-R curves. This conclusion justifies the use of the BWRVIP-74-A EMA analysis for the evaluation of the USE of the NMP1 RPV beltline materials.
- (3) Since both the analyses used the same transient (100 °F/hr cooling rate) in calculating the stresses under service loadings A and B, the staff agreed with the applicant's conclusion that the stress calculations did not affect the difference in the EMA values of the BWRVIP-74-A and MPM analyses for service loadings A and B. In the SE, dated April 26, 1994, the staff established that the calculated stresses under service loadings C and D were not limiting. Therefore, the applicant did not perform stress calculations for service loadings C and D.
- (4) The staff reviewed the  $J_{\text{applied}}$  values of the limiting beltline materials of NMP1 and determined that the minor difference (4.2 percent) between the results from the BWRVIP-74-A and MPM analyses is acceptable.

The staff reviewed the submitted calculations related to the aforementioned attributes and found that the application of the BWRVIP-74-A methodology in the assessment of USE for NMP1 RPV beltline materials is comparable MPM's methodology. Therefore, the staff concluded that the evaluation, described below, of USE for the RPV beltline materials at NMP1 using the BWRVIP-74-A EMA is acceptable.

The staff reviewed the applicant's projections of the NMP1 USE values for the RPV beltline materials that are provided in ALRA Table 4.2-1a. The staff noted that the USE values are based on irradiation for 54 EFPY, which corresponds to an average capacity factor of 90 percent over 60 years. This is consistent with the bounding analyses in the BWRVIP-74-A report and is conservative with respect to the NMP1 operating history to date. The applicant projected that the peak vessel fluence at the inside surface for NMP1 at the end of 54 EFPY would be  $5.21 \times 10^{18}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> (E > 1.0 MeV) and the vessel fluence at the 1/4t location (i.e., at a location 1/4 of the way through the RPV wall from the clad-to-base metal boundary) would be  $3.39 \times 10^{18}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup> (E > 1.0 MeV). The staff also noted that neutron transport modeling was carried out in (r- $\theta$ ) and (r-z) geometry using the DORT two-dimensional discrete ordinates code and the BUGLE-96 cross section library. In addition, the staff noted that NMP1 uses an NRC

staff-approved fluence methodology. In its SE dated October 27, 2003, the staff concluded that the applicant used a staff-approved method that includes the attributes described in RG 1.190. Therefore, the staff found the proposed vessel fluence at the inside surface as well as at the 1/4t location to be acceptable for the calculation of the USE at 54 EFPY.

The projections of USE for the NMP1 RPV's limiting beltline plates and weld materials were made based on percentage decrease in USE as determined by RG 1.99, Revision 2, at 1/4t of the vessel wall. The acceptable USE (measured in transverse orientation) value for BWR/2 plates and weld materials based on the BWRVIP-74-A analysis is 35 ft-lbs. The application of the staff-approved BWRVIP-74-A methodology for projecting the USE values entails the use of the following variables:

- copper content of the beltline plate and weld materials
- neutron fluence at 1/4t of the vessel at the beltline region
- initial USE values of the beltline materials
- percent of decrease from initial USE value for the extended period of operation (54 EFPY)
- projected USE value at 54 EFPY
- acceptable USE values at 54 EFPY, in accordance with the BWRVIP-74-A criteria

These values are listed in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 of the March 22, 2004, letter, as referenced in the ALRA, and in ALRA Table 4.2-1a. The staff has confirmed the validity of these values and concluded that the NMP1 limiting beltline will remain above 50 ft-lbs through 54 EFPY. Therefore, the staff determined that the NMP1 limiting beltline weld USE value will meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, through the period of extended operation.

However, the USE values for both of the NMP1 limiting RPV beltline plates are projected to fall below 50 ft-lbs before the end of the period of extended operation. Table 4.3 of the March 22, 2004, letter indicates that the projected values for both of the NMP1 limiting beltline plates (G-8-1 and G-307-4) will remain above the BWRVIP-74-A minimum allowable USE of 35 ft-lbs through the period of extended operation) and, therefore, have margins equivalent to those of ASME Section XI, Appendix G. The projected USE value for the NMP1 beltline plate G-8-1 for 54 EFPY is 40 ft-lbs, which exceeds the minimum value of 35 ft-lbs specified in the BWRVIP-74-A EMA analysis. The projected USE value for the NMP1 beltline plate G-307-4 is 37.2, which exceeds the minimum required value of 35 ft-lbs by 5.9 percent.

The applicant stated that there is a difference of 4.2 percent in predicting the USE values between the EMA analyses using BWRVIP-74-A and those using the MPM Technology methodologies. This difference in value falls within the margin of 5.9 percent for the predicted USE value of the most limiting beltline plate material. Therefore, the staff concluded that applicability of the BWRVIP-74-A EMA analysis to the NMP1 beltline materials is acceptable. In addition, the staff found that this analysis provides reasonable assurance that these materials have margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G.

Staff's Assessment of the NMP2 USE Evaluation. ALRA Table 4.2-2a includes the projected USE values for the RPV beltline materials for NMP2. The applicant based these values on irradiation for 54 EFPY, which corresponds to an average capacity factor of 90 percent over 60 years and is consistent with the bounding analyses in BWRVIP-74-A. The applicant indicated that the projected USE values for the limiting beltline weld materials and the limiting beltline

plate materials for NMP2 will remain above 50 ft-lbs throughout the period of extended operation, based on a projected fluence value of  $9.70 \times 10^{17} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ) at the 1/4t location. The staff compared the initial USE values and the percentage of copper for all the plates and weld metals in the beltline region of NMP2 to those values in the reactor vessel integrity database (RVID) and confirmed that the values were conservative or consistent with the values in the RVID.

The staff noted that in NMP2 the most limiting beltline material, Plate C-3147-1, has a projected USE value of 62.3 ft-lbs, which is above the 50 ft-lb criterion. Since the USE value for the limiting beltline material at the expiration of the extended license is projected to be above 50 ft-lbs, the USE values for the NMP2 limiting beltline materials comply with the criteria of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. Therefore, the staff found that the USE values for NMP2 are acceptable.

#### **4.2.1.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of USE calculations in ALRA Sections A1.2.1.1 and A2.2.1.1, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the USE calculations are adequate.

#### **4.2.1.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii), that for the USE TLAA, the analyses have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the USE TLAA evaluation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.2.2 Pressure-Temperature (P-T) Limits**

#### **4.2.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 4.2.2, the applicant summarized the evaluation of the P-T limits for the period of extended operation. Appendix G of 10 CFR 50 requires that the RPV be operated within established P-T limits during heatup and cooldown. These limits specify the maximum allowable pressure as a function of reactor coolant temperature. NMP1 and NMP2 technical specifications (TSs) contain P-T limit curves for heatup, cooldown, inservice leakage testing, and hydrostatic testing, and they limit the maximum rate of change of reactor coolant temperature. The P-T limit curves are periodically revised to account for changes in fracture toughness of the RPV components due to anticipated neutron embrittlement effects for higher accumulated fluences. Calculation of P-T limit curves using the projected fluence at the end of the period of extended operation would result in unnecessarily restrictive operating curves; however, projection of the ART, which is used in development of the curves, to the end of the period of extended operation provides assurance that development of P-T limit curves will be feasible up to the maximum predicted EFPY. There are no regulatory requirements for the maximum ART for BWRs. The need to minimize the ART is driven by operational considerations.

Calculations that project ART values at NMP satisfy the criteria of 10 CFR 54.3(a). As such, any related analysis is a TLAA. Projections of ART values for beltline materials, based on

extrapolation using the most recent fluence results and fracture toughness data from surveillance capsule and P-T operating curve reporting, are found in ALRA Tables 4.2-3 and 4.2-4 for NMP1 and NMP2, respectively. The NMP1 values were computed for 46 EFPY, based on adding irradiation corresponding to an average capacity factor of 90 percent during the 20-year period of extended operation to the 28 EFPY exposure currently projected for the end of the original license term. The NMP2 values are based on irradiation for 54 EFPY, which corresponds to an average capacity of 90 percent over 60 years.

By letter dated October 27, 2003, the staff concluded that the supporting fluence calculations were performed using methods consistent with RG 1.190. For NMP1 and NMP2, projections of the ART values for the beltline materials have been made for the period of extended operation, providing reasonable assurance that it will be possible to prepare P-T curves that will permit continued plant operation. The P-T curves (and the related technical specifications) will continue to be updated either as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G to assure that the operational limits will remain valid at the current cumulative neutron fluence levels, or on an as-needed basis to provide appropriate operational flexibility. Therefore, re-evaluation of the P-T limits to consider the period of extended operation by using 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G will be performed by the applicant in accordance with 10 CFR Part 54.21(c)(1)(iii), as clarified by the applicant's response dated December 5, 2005.

#### **4.2.2.2 Staff Evaluation**

By letters dated November 15, 2002, and August 15, 2003, the applicant submitted its current P-T limit curves for NMP1 and NMP2, respectively, that were calculated for exposures within the 32 EFPY operating period anticipated during the original 40-year plant licenses. The staff approved the P-T limit curves for NMP1 and NMP2 by SEs dated October 27, 2003, and January 27, 2004, respectively. The applicant plans to update its P-T limit curves, either as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, to assure the operational limits remain valid at the current cumulative neutron fluence levels, or on an as-needed basis to provide appropriate operational flexibility. The staff found the applicant's plan to manage the P-T limits acceptable because the change in P-T curves will be implemented by the license amendment process (i.e., modifications of technical specifications) and will meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.60 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. This is consistent with SRP-LR Section 4.2.2.1.3; therefore, the staff found this acceptable.

#### **4.2.2.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of P-T limits in ALRA Sections A1.2.1.2 and A2.2.1.2, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the P-T limits are adequate.

#### **4.2.2.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), that for the P-T limits TLAA the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the P-T limits TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).



### **4.2.3 Elimination of Circumferential Weld Inspection (NMP1 Only)**

#### **4.2.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 4.2.3, the applicant summarized the evaluation of the elimination of circumferential weld inspections for the period of extended operation. Relief from RPV circumferential weld examination requirements under GL 98-05, "Boiling Water Reactor Licensees Use Of The BWRVIP-05 Report To Request Relief From Augmented Examination Requirements On Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Welds," is based on probabilistic assessments that predict an acceptable probability of failure per reactor operating year. The analysis is based on RPV metallurgical conditions as well as flaw indication sizes and frequencies of occurrence that are expected at the end of the licensed operating period. By letter dated April 7, 1999, the NRC granted such relief to NMP1 for the remainder of its current 40-year license term. NMP2 has not submitted a relief request for the remainder of its 40-year licensed operating period. Therefore, the supporting evaluation applies only to NMP1. The associated circumferential weld examination relief analysis for NMP1 satisfies the criteria of 10 CFR 54.3(a); as such, this analysis is considered a TLAA.

The applicant provided the following disposition with respect to the conditional probability of vessel failure:

Appendix E of the Final Safety Evaluation of the BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWRVIP-05 Report, documented an evaluation of the impact of plant life extension from 32 EFPY to 64 EFPY on the conditional probability of vessel failure, P(FIE). This assessment reported that combining the P(FIE) due to circumferential weld failure with the frequency of cold overpressurization events results in a total vessel failure frequency as high as  $5 \times 10^{-7}/\text{yr}$  at 64 EFPY. In the SER for BWRVIP-74-A, the NRC staff determined that the analysis provides a technical basis for relief from the current inservice inspection requirements of ASME Section XI for volumetric examination of circumferential welds as they may apply for the license renewal period.

Assumptions made in accepting the analysis discussed above are: (1) that the applicable neutron fluence is the end-of-life mean fluence, and (2) that the applicable chemistry values are mean values based on vessel types. The results of a scoping evaluation using comparable plant-specific parameters (presented in Table 4.2-5) indicate that projected values of mean and upper bound  $RT_{NDT}$  for the limiting circumferential weld at NMP1 is below the bounding mean  $RT_{NDT}$  determined by the NRC staff. Thus, there is reasonable assurance the P(FIE) due to NMP1 RPV circumferential weld failure is bounded by the NRC analysis.

#### **4.2.3.2 Staff Evaluation**

The technical basis for relief is discussed in the staff's final SE concerning the BWRVIP-05 report, which is enclosed in a July 28, 1998, letter from Mr. G. C. Lainas, NRC, to Mr. C. Terry, BWRVIP Chairman. In this letter, the staff concluded that since the failure frequency for circumferential welds in BWR plants is significantly below the criterion specified in RG 1.154, "Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for

Pressurized Water Reactors,” the continued inspection would result in a negligible decrease in an already acceptably low value of RPV failure. Therefore, elimination of the inservice inspection (ISI) for RPV circumferential welds is justified.

The staff’s letter indicated that BWR applicants may request relief from ISI requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) for the volumetric examination of circumferential RPV welds by demonstrating that (1) at the expiration of the license, the circumferential welds satisfy the limiting conditional failure probability for circumferential welds in the staff’s July 28, 1998, SE, and (2) the applicants have implemented operator training and established procedures that limit the frequency of cold over-pressure events to the frequency specified in the staff’s July 28, 1998, SE. The letter indicated that the requirements for inspection of circumferential RPV welds during an additional 20-year license renewal period would be re-assessed, on a plant-specific basis, as part of any BWR LRA. Therefore, the applicant must request relief from inspection of circumferential welds during the license renewal period per 10 CFR 50.55a.

Section A.4.5 of the BWRVIP-74-A report indicates that the staff’s SE for the BWRVIP-05 report conservatively evaluated the BWR RPVs to 64 EFPY, which is 10 EFPY greater than what is realistically expected for the end of the license renewal period. The staff used the mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value for materials to evaluate failure probability of BWR circumferential welds at 32 and 64 EFPY in the staff’s SE dated July 28, 1998. The neutron fluence used in this evaluation was the neutron fluence at the weld inside surface.

Since the staff’s analysis discussed in the BWRVIP-74-A report is a generic analysis, the applicant submitted plant-specific information to demonstrate that the NMP1 beltline materials meet the criteria specified in the report. To demonstrate that the NMP1 vessel has not become embrittled beyond the basis for the relief, the applicant, in ALRA Table 4.2-5, supplied material data at 64 EFPY for the limiting NMP1 circumferential welds so that the staff could compare it with the material data of the 64 EFPY reference case. The reference case can be found in Appendix E of the staff’s SE of the BWRVIP-05 report.

The NMP1 material data included amounts of copper and nickel, CF, the neutron fluence, delta  $RT_{NDT}$ , initial  $RT_{NDT}$ , and mean  $RT_{NDT}$  values of the limiting circumferential weld at 64 EFPY. The staff has verified the data for the copper and nickel content and the initial  $RT_{NDT}$  values for NMP1 beltline materials by comparing them with the corresponding data in the RVID maintained by the NRC. The 64 EFPY mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value for NMP1 is 22.3 °F. The staff has checked the applicant’s calculations for the 64 EFPY mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value for the NMP1 circumferential weld using the data presented in ALRA Table 4.2-5 and found them accurate. The 64 EFPY mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value for NMP1 is less than the 64 EFPY mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value of 113.2 °F used by the NRC for determining the conditional failure probability of a circumferential weld. It should be noted that the 64 EFPY mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value from the staff’s SE dated July 28, 1998, is for a Combustion Engineering weld, which is applicable to NMP1, since Combustion Engineering welded the circumferential welds in the NMP1 vessel. Since the NMP1 64 EFPY mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value is less than the 64 EFPY value from the staff SE dated July 28, 1998, the staff concluded that the NMP1 RPV conditional failure probabilities are bounded by the staff analysis.

The applicant stated that the procedures and training used to limit cold over-pressure events will be the same as those approved by the NRC when NMP1 requested the relief for the current license period, by letter dated December 10, 1998, “Proposed Alternatives for Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Welds.” The applicant stated that the procedures and training

requirements identified in the NMP1 request to use the BWRVIP-05 report are provided in the document, "Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Alternatives for Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Welds, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1," (attached to NRC letter to Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation dated April 7, 1999). The applicant further stated that the original LRA Section 4.2.3, and the associated UFSAR supplement Section A1.2.1.3, reference the SE letters identified above. The staff found this acceptable because the applicant identified the requested references and will include them in ALRA Section 4.2.3 and the associated UFSAR supplement Section A1.2.1.3.

The applicant indicated in the ALRA (Commitment Item 3 for NMP1) that it will apply for relief from circumferential weld inspections for the period of extended operation. In addition, the applicant indicated that supporting analyses, procedural controls, and operator training will be completed prior to the period of extended operation to confirm that the RPV circumferential weld failure probability remains acceptable for the period of extended operation.

The staff found that the applicant's evaluation for this TLAA is acceptable because the NMP1 64 EFPY conditional failure probabilities for the RPV circumferential welds are bounded by the NRC analysis in the staff's SE dated July 28, 1998, and the applicant will be using procedures and training to limit cold over-pressure events during the period of extended operation. This analysis satisfies the evaluation requirements of the staff's SE dated July 28, 1998; however, the applicant is still required to request relief for the circumferential weld examination for the extended period of operation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a.

#### **4.2.3.3 UFSAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a UFSAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of the elimination of circumferential weld inspections in ALRA Section A1.2.1.3. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the elimination of circumferential weld inspection is adequate.

#### **4.2.3.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii), that for the elimination of circumferential weld inspection TLAA, the analyses have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the elimination of circumferential weld inspection TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.2.4 Axial Weld Failure Probability**

#### **4.2.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 4.2.4, the applicant summarized the evaluation of the axial weld failure probability for the period of extended operation. In the safety evaluation (SE) presented in the "Supplement to Final Safety Evaluation of the BWR Vessel and Internals Project BWRVIP-05 Report," the staff indicated that the RPV failure frequency due to failure of the limiting axial welds in the BWR fleet at the end of 40 years of operation is less than  $5 \times 10^{-6}$  per reactor year, given the assumptions on flaw density, distribution, and location described in the SE.

#### **4.2.4.2 Staff Evaluation**

In its July 28, 1998, letter to Mr. C. Terry, the BWRVIP Chairman, the staff identified a concern about the failure frequency of axially-oriented welds in BWR RPVs. In response to this concern, the BWRVIP supplied evaluations of axial weld failure frequency in letters dated December 15, 1998, and November 12, 1999. The staff's SE on these analyses is enclosed in a March 7, 2000, letter from Mr. J. Strosnider, NRC, to Mr. C. Terry, BWRVIP Chairman. By letter dated October 18, 2001, the staff issued "Acceptance for Referencing of EPRI Proprietary Report TR-113596, 'BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (BWRVIP-74-A)' and Appendix A, 'Demonstration of Compliance with the Technical Information Requirements of the License Renewal Rule (10 CFR 54.21),' " which endorsed the axial weld failure probability analysis for the period of extended operation.

The staff noted that the NMP1 and NMP2 RPVs are fabricated by Combustion Engineering. The staff performed a generic analysis for Combustion Engineering-fabricated RPVs using the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant as a model. The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant model demonstrated that a mean  $RT_{NDT}$  of 114 °F resulted in a failure frequency of  $5 \times 10^{-6}$  per reactor-year of operation. The applicant calculated, and the staff confirmed, that the limiting axial weld mean  $RT_{NDT}$  value for NMP1 and NMP2 at 64 EFPY is 114 °F. The results of these calculations support the conclusion that the failure frequencies for NMP1 and NMP2 will be less than  $5 \times 10^{-6}$  per reactor-year of operation at the end of their period of extended operation. Therefore, this analysis is acceptable.

#### **4.2.4.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of axial weld failure probability in ALRA Sections A1.2.1.4 and A2.2.1.3, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the axial weld failure probability are adequate.

#### **4.2.4.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii), that for the axial weld failure probability TLAA, the analyses have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the axial weld failure probability TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.3 Metal Fatigue Analysis**

A metal component subjected to cyclic loading at loads less than the static design load may fail due to fatigue. Metal fatigue of components is evaluated based on an assumed number of transients or cycles for the current operating term. The validity of such metal fatigue analysis is reviewed for the period of extended operation.

The applicant discussed the fatigue design of NMPNS components in ALRA Section 4.3. The applicant indicated that designated plant events used for the fatigue design of components were

counted and categorized. ALRA Table 4.3-1 lists NMP1 design transients and Table 4.3-2 lists NMP2 design transients. A linear projection of transient cycles indicated that the number of some events, such as heatup and cooldowns, may exceed the number used for the design of the components during the period of extended operation. The applicant indicated that locations with a design baseline fatigue usage greater than 0.4 would require additional evaluation. The applicant committed to implement FatiguePro fatigue monitoring software for locations that require additional evaluation to demonstrate acceptable fatigue usage prior to the period of extended operation.

#### **4.3.1 Reactor Vessel Fatigue Analysis**

##### ***4.3.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

The applicant discussed the design of the NMP1 and NMP2 reactor vessels in ALRA Section 4.3.1. The NMP1 reactor vessel was designed to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section I-1962; and the NMP2 reactor vessel was designed to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1971 Edition through Winter 1972 Addenda. The applicant indicated that the fatigue usage of the pressure boundary components of both units was evaluated using ASME Section III methods. ALRA Table 4.3-3 lists the limiting design cumulative usage factors (CUFs) for the NMP1 vessel components, and Table 4.3-4 lists the limiting design CUFs for the NMP2 vessel components. The applicant indicated that transients contributing to fatigue usage of these vessel components will be monitored by the NMPNS Fatigue Monitoring Program (FMP). The FMP is described in ALRA Appendix B. The applicant concluded that the effects of fatigue on the intended function(s) of RPV components will be adequately managed by the FMP in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

##### ***4.3.1.2 Staff Evaluation***

Components of the NMP2 reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB), including the RPV, were designed to the Class 1 requirements of the ASME Code. The Class 1 requirements contain explicit criteria for the fatigue analysis of components. In addition, fatigue of the NMP1 reactor pressure vessel was evaluated using ASME Section III fatigue criteria.

The specific design criterion for fatigue analysis of RCPB components involves calculating the CUF. The fatigue damage in the component caused by each thermal or pressure transient depends on the magnitude of the stresses caused by the transient. The CUF sums the fatigue damage resulting from each transient. The design criterion requires that the CUF not exceed 1.0.

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 4.3.1 identified areas in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the reactor vessel fatigue analysis. The applicant responded to the staff's RAIs as discussed below.

In RAI 4.3.1-3, dated November 10, 2004, the staff stated that the original LRA Table 4.3-1 lists the design transients for NMP1 and confirmed that these design transients are the same as the design transients listed in NMP UFSAR Table V-5. In the RAI, the staff stated that Note 2 to the original LRA Table 4.3-1 indicated that a number of the transients were not counted/monitored prior to 2000. The note contained the statement: "Data listed for allowable design transients are incremental values for the balance of the original license term." Therefore, the staff requested

that the applicant clarify the intent of that statement. The staff also requested that the applicant indicate the method used to estimate the number of cycles prior to the year 2000 for those design transients identified by Note 2.

The applicant's response, by letter dated December 6, 2004, has been subsequently incorporated in the ALRA as discussed below.

The applicant modified the footnotes to the original LRA Table 4.3-1 in its ALRA submittal. Note 4 to the revised table indicates that only transients affecting the feedwater nozzle were originally monitored because the feedwater nozzle was considered the bounding fatigue usage location for the NMP1 RPV. The applicant's July 14, 2005, revised response to RAI 4.3.1-3 stated that the transients not monitored prior to the year 2000 involve operation of the shutdown cooling and emergency cooling systems that affect the reactor recirculation nozzles. The applicant discovered, in the year 2000, that these shutdown cooling and emergency cooling transients had not been accounted for in the original fatigue calculations. According to the applicant, only the transients associated with the emergency condenser (EC) initiation on an isolated loop and EC initiation on an idle loop produced any significant fatigue usage. The applicant indicated that an evaluation of the nozzles for these EC initiation transients resulted in CUFs below 0.1. The applicant further indicated that a review of the NMP1 operating history found that the number of EC initiations listed in ALRA Table 4.3-1, used for the fatigue evaluation, is conservative for 40 years of plant operation. The applicant concluded that the fatigue usage of recirculation nozzles will remain well within the allowable limit during the period of extended operation. On the basis of the information provided by the applicant, the staff agreed that the fatigue usage of the reactor recirculation nozzles will remain well within the allowable limit during the period of extended operation. The staff found the applicant had adequately demonstrated that the analyses of the recirculation nozzles remain valid for the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.3.1-3 is resolved.

In RAI 4.3.1-4, dated November 10, 2004, the staff stated that the original LRA Table 4.3-2 lists the design transients for NMP2. The table does not list the 75 percent power reduction that is listed in USAR Table 3.9B-1. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant explain why this transient was not included in the original LRA Table 4.3-2 of the application.

In its response, by letter dated December 6, 2004, the applicant indicated that the daily reduction to 75 percent power was combined with weekly reduction to 50 percent power for counting purposes. The combined transients are listed as power changes greater than or equal to 25 percent in the original LRA Table 4.3-2. The applicant listed the smallest number of cycles for either transient (2000 cycles for the reduction to 50 percent power) as the allowable number for the combined transients. Therefore, the staff concluded that the applicant used a conservative value for the number of allowable cycles for the combined transients. The staff found that the applicant's FMP adequately addresses the NMP2 design transients listed in USAR Table 3.9B-1. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.3.1-4 is resolved.

In RAI 4.3.1-1, dated November 10, 2004, the staff stated that in the original LRA Section 4.3.1, the applicant indicated that the fatigue usage of RPV components will be monitored at critical locations for NMP1 and NMP2. The applicant stated that the transients contributing to the fatigue usage will be monitored by the FMP. The applicant further indicated that these locations would include the components identified in NUREG/CR-6260. Original LRA Tables 4.3-3 and 4.3-4 list the RPV locations that will be monitored by the FMP. These tables do not list all of the locations identified in NUREG/CR-6260. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant clarify

that all locations identified in NUREG/CR-6260 will be monitored by the FMP. The staff also requested that the applicant provide a complete list of all locations that will be monitored by the FMP for NMP1 and NMP2.

In its response, by letter dated December 6, 2004, the applicant stated that Tables 1 and 2 contain a comparison of the NMP1 and NMP2 locations monitored by the FMP with those listed in NUREG/CR-6260. The applicant indicated that some of the monitored locations for NMP1 are described in the original LRA Section 4.3.4. The applicant stated that NMP1 does not have a residual heat removal (RHR) system; therefore, the NMP1 shutdown cooling return line was selected as an alternative line for the environmental fatigue assessment. The staff found the shutdown cooling return line an acceptable alternative to the RHR line listed in NUREG/CR-6260. The staff concluded that the applicant's FMP monitors the NUREG/CR-6260 locations or acceptable alternatives at NMP1.

Table 2 of the applicant's response lists the NUREG/CR-6260 locations for a newer vintage BWR. The applicant indicated that most of the NUREG/CR-6260 locations that will be monitored for NMP2 are listed in the original LRA Table 4.3-4 or discussed in Section 4.3.4. The applicant also indicated that the NMP2 feedwater line Class 1 piping is listed in the original LRA Table 4.3-5. The staff noted that the NMP2 RHR locations are actually discussed in the original LRA Section 4.3.2 and not Section 4.3.4. The staff review of the original LRA Section 4.3.2 and Tables 4.3-4 and 4.3-5 confirmed that all of the NUREG/CR-6260 locations have been addressed by the applicant. The staff found that the applicant's FMP monitors the locations listed in NUREG/CR-6260 at NMP2. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.3.1-1 is resolved.

In RAI 4.3.1-2, dated November 10, 2004, the applicant stated that the original LRA Tables 4.3-3 and 4.3-4 indicate that stress-based fatigue monitoring will be used to track the fatigue usage for the NMP1 and NMP2 feedwater nozzles. Therefore, the staff requested that the applicant describe the method used to estimate the fatigue usage of these nozzles prior to implementation of the stress-based fatigue monitoring.

In its response, by letter dated December 6, 2004, the applicant indicated that a baseline fatigue usage value would be established from a calculation using the number of cycles accumulated to date. The fatigue usage developed from the stress-based monitoring will be added to this baseline value. The applicant also indicated that the results from the stress-based monitoring will be used to confirm the conservatism of the baseline fatigue usage value. Based on industry experience with stress-based fatigue monitoring, the staff expected that stress-based fatigue monitoring would confirm the conservatism of the applicant's baseline fatigue usage value. The staff found the applicant's method of estimating the fatigue usage of the feedwater nozzles prior to implementation of the stress-based fatigue monitoring acceptable. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.3.1-2 is resolved.

#### **4.3.1.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of reactor vessel fatigue analysis in ALRA Sections A1.2.2.1 and A2.2.2.1, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the reactor vessel fatigue analysis are adequate.

#### **4.3.1.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), that for the RPV fatigue TLAA, the effects of aging on the intended functions will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR and USAR supplements contain an appropriate summary description of the RPV fatigue TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.3.2 ASME Section III Class 1 Piping and Components Fatigue Analysis (NMP2 Only)**

#### **4.3.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The applicant discussed the design of the remaining NMP2 RCPB components in ALRA Section 4.3.2. These components were evaluated using the ASME Section III Class 1 fatigue criteria. The applicant indicated that the bounding piping locations would be monitored by the FMP. The bounding locations are listed in ALRA Table 4.3-5. The applicant stated that the effects of fatigue on the intended functions of ASME Class 1 piping and components will be adequately managed by the FMP in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.3.2.2 Staff Evaluation**

The NMP2 RCPB (ASME Section III, Class 1) piping components were explicitly evaluated for fatigue. As discussed in the previous section of this SER, the applicant monitors critical fatigue locations with the FMP. The applicant indicated that, in addition to meeting the ASME criterion that the CUF remain less than 1.0, pipe breaks were postulated at locations where the CUF exceeds 0.1. In ALRA Table 4.3-5, the applicant listed the limiting locations for fatigue usage, including the limiting locations for postulated pipe breaks. The applicant indicated that the FMP will monitor these locations. The applicant also indicated that piping components equivalent to those identified in NUREG/CR-6260 would also be monitored by the FMP. The applicant's selection of the NUREG/CR-6260 locations is discussed in the previous section of this SER. The staff found that these locations, combined with the locations listed in ALRA Table 4.3-4, including the additional NUREG/CR-6260 locations discussed ALRA Section 4.3.2, provide an acceptable sample of critical components to monitor the fatigue usage of the NMP2 RCPB during the period of extended operation.

#### **4.3.2.3 USAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a USAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis in ALRA Section A2.2.2.2. On the basis of its review of the USAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis is adequate.

#### **4.3.2.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), that, for the ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis TLAA, the effects of aging on the intended functions will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the



UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.3.3 Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line (CRDRL) Nozzle Fatigue and Cracking Analyses**

#### **4.3.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The applicant discussed the feedwater (FW) nozzle and the control rod drive return line (CRDRL) nozzle fatigue and cracking analyses in ALRA Section 4.3.3. Cracking has occurred in FW and CRDRL nozzles at several BWRs. NUREG-0619, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking," identified actions to address the problem. The applicant indicated that the NMP1 FWS was modified to meet requirements of NUREG-0619 because of cracking detected in 1977. The applicant stated that no reportable indications were identified during subsequent inspections. The applicant also indicated that revised fatigue and crack growth analyses were performed in 1999 based on updated plant data. An annual fatigue usage of 0.003 was calculated. The applicant stated that no cracking was found in the NMP1 CRDRL nozzle.

The applicant indicated that the NMP2 FW nozzles employ the improved interference fit sparger design discussed in NUREG-0619. The improved design is less susceptible to fatigue cracking. However, linear projections of the number of startup and shutdown cycles indicate that the CUF could exceed 1.0 prior to the period of extended operation. Additionally, the applicant stated that indications detected in dissimilar welds associated with the NMP2 FW nozzles had been repaired by a weld overlay process. The applicant indicated that a conservative number of startup and shutdown cycles was assumed for the crack growth analysis. The applicant stated that the CRDRL nozzle was cut and capped at NMP2 eliminating the fatigue cracking concern for NMP2.

The applicant indicated that transients contributing to the fatigue usage of the NMP1 and NMP2 FW nozzles would be tracked by the NMPNS FMP and, if necessary, that corrective actions would be implemented. The applicant concluded that the effects of fatigue on the intended function(s) of FW and CRDRL nozzles will be adequately managed by the FMP in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.3.3.2 Staff Evaluation**

The applicant performed evaluations to address generic industry and plant-specific concerns related to FW and CRDRL nozzle cracking described in NUREG-0619. FW nozzle cracking was detected at NMP1 in 1977. The applicant implemented several modifications to minimize potential cracking, including incorporation of an improved thermal sleeve/feedwater sparger design. The evaluation of the new design included fatigue and flaw growth analyses. The applicant updated these analyses in 1999. The applicant relies on the FMP to track the transients associated with these analyses. The staff found the applicant's FMP will adequately manage the fatigue and flaw growth analyses of the NMP1 thermal sleeve/feedwater sparger design during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

The applicant indicated that the annual fatigue usage of the CRDRL nozzle was calculated to be 0.003 per year based on the anticipated number of startups and shutdowns. Therefore, the applicant projected that the fatigue usage of the NMP1 CRDRL nozzle will remain significantly

below 1.0 during the period of extended operation. On the basis of the annual fatigue usage cited by the applicant, the staff concluded that the fatigue usage of the CRDRL nozzle will remain within the allowable limit during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff found that the fatigue usage of the CRDRL nozzle had been adequately projected to the end of the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii).

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 4.3.3 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the feedwater nozzle and control rod drive return line (CRDRL) nozzle fatigue and cracking analyses. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 4.3.3, dated February 22, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant explain how the flaw growth analysis of the FW and CRDRL nozzles was dispositioned for the period of extended operation.

The applicant's July 14, 2005, response to RAI 4.3.3, indicated that the crack growth analysis, using estimated transient cycles, predicted that the postulated flaw would not grow to an unacceptable value during the period of extended operation. The applicant performed a crack growth analysis of the NMP1 CRDRL nozzle in 1994 to demonstrate that small surface flaws would not grow to unacceptable values within the original 40-year license period. The staff also found that the applicant had adequately projected the NMP1 CRDRL crack growth analysis to the end of the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii). In addition, the applicant indicated that it would rely on its enhanced ultrasonic inspections performed at each 10-year inservice inspection interval to detect CRDRL nozzle cracking. The applicant's inspection program is described in ALRA Section B2.1.37. The applicant's CRDRL nozzle inspection program will provide assurance that small surface flaws in the CRDRL nozzle will not grow to unacceptable values during the period of extended operation.

The applicant stated that a linear projection of the NMP2 startup/shutdown cycles to date indicates that the number assumed in the original design may be exceeded prior to the period of extended operation. As a consequence, the fatigue usage of the FW nozzles may exceed the allowable limit during the period of extended operation. The applicant also stated that indications in the dissimilar metal weld associated with the NMP2 FW nozzles had been repaired by a weld overlay process. The applicant will track the fatigue usage of the FW nozzle with the FMP, and will reassess the original fatigue crack growth calculation if necessary. The staff found that the applicant's FMP, which tracks the number of startup/shutdown cycles, will adequately manage the fatigue and crack growth analyses of the NMP2 FW nozzles during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

The applicant indicated that the NMP2 CRDRL nozzle was cut and capped, thus eliminating the fatigue concern with the NMP2 CRDRL nozzle. The staff agreed with the applicant's assessment.

The applicant indicated that transients contributing to the fatigue usage of NMP1 and NMP2 FW nozzles will be tracked by the NMPNS FMP during the period of extended operation. It was indicated that the FMP will be consistent with GALL Report, Section X.M.1, "Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," prior to the period of extended operation. The applicant also stated that corrective actions such as reanalysis, enhanced inspection, or repair/replacement will be implemented if fatigue trending shows that acceptable fatigue usage cannot be maintained during the period of extended operation.

GALL Report, Section X.M.1 recommends that the applicant take appropriate corrective actions to prevent the CUF, including reactor coolant environmental effects, from exceeding the design Code limit during the period of extended operation. Acceptable corrective actions include a more rigorous analysis of the component to demonstrate that the design Code limit will not be exceeded, and repair or replacement of the component. However, the recommendations of the GALL Report, Section X.M.1 does not specify enhanced inspection as an acceptable corrective action. The staff noted that the use of an enhanced inspection program, in lieu of meeting the design fatigue usage evaluation, will require prior staff review and approval. An AMP using enhanced inspection would be a departure from the design basis CUF evaluation, described in the UFSAR and, therefore, would require a separate license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.

On the basis of the above discussion, the staff found the applicant's FMP will adequately manage the fatigue usage and crack growth of the NMP1 and NMP2 FW nozzles during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). However, the staff notes that enhanced inspection would be a departure from the design basis CUF evaluation, described in the UFSAR and, therefore, would require a NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The staff's concern described in RAI 4.3.3 is resolved.

#### ***4.3.3.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements***

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of FW nozzle and CRDRL nozzle fatigue and cracking analysis in ALRA Sections A1.2.2.2 and A2.2.2.3, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the FW nozzle and CRDRL nozzle fatigue and cracking analysis are adequate.

#### ***4.3.3.4 Conclusion***

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the NMP1 and NMP2 FW nozzle fatigue and cracking analyses TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff further concluded that the applicant has provided an acceptable evaluation to demonstrate that the NMP1 CRDRL nozzle fatigue and cracking has been adequately projected to the end of the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii). The staff also concluded that the UFSAR and USAR supplements contain appropriate summary descriptions of the FW nozzle and the CRDRL nozzle fatigue and cracking analyses TLAA evaluations for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.3.4 Non-ASME Section III Class 1 Piping and Components Fatigue Analysis**

#### ***4.3.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

Non-ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components were designed to ASA B31.1 and ASME Section III Class 2 and 3 criteria. The piping components require that a stress reduction factor be applied to the allowable thermal bending stress range if the number of full range cycles exceeds 7,000. The B31.1 criteria were used in the design of the NMP1 RCPB piping. The applicant identified several NMP1 systems for further detailed fatigue analyses. These include

locations listed in NUREG/CR-6260, "Application of NUREG/CR-5999 Interim Fatigue Curves to Selected Nuclear Power Plant Components." The applicant committed to develop baseline CUFs for these systems prior to the period of extended operation.

The applicant indicated that, if fatigue monitoring of ASME Class 1 piping at NMP2 indicates higher fatigue usage than expected, then the non-ASME Class 1 piping will be evaluated for possible fatigue concerns. The applicant concluded that the effects of fatigue on the intended function(s) of non-ASME Class 1 piping and components included in the FMP will be adequately managed by the FMP in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.3.4.2 Staff Evaluation**

The applicant indicated that the NMP1 RCPB piping was designed to the ASA B31.1-1955 piping code, which did not require an explicit fatigue analysis of piping system components. The applicant committed to develop baseline fatigue usage factors for the following selected portions of the following NMP1 systems prior to the period of extended operation:

- feedwater/high pressure coolant injection system,
- core spray system,
- reactor water cleanup system,
- reactor recirculation system and associated shutdown cooling lines

The staff found the applicant's commitment to develop baseline fatigue usage factors for the systems listed above acceptable. The applicant indicated that locations where the baseline fatigue usage factor exceeds 0.4 would be monitored by the NMPNS FMP during the period of extended operation. As discussed in SER Section 4.3.1.2, the applicant selected the NUREG/CR-6260 locations or acceptable alternatives for fatigue monitoring at NMP1. Therefore, the staff found that the locations listed above, combined with the reactor vessel locations listed in ALRA Table 4.3-3, provide an acceptable sample of critical components to monitor the fatigue usage of the NMP1 RCPB components during the period of extended operation.

The staff found that the applicant's FMP will adequately manage the fatigue usage of the NMP1 RCPB components during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

The design of the remaining NMP1 and NMP2 non-ASME Section III Class 1 piping systems are governed by criteria that limit the number of full range stress cycles due to thermal bending to 7000 cycles. The applicant indicated that if the fatigue monitoring of Class 1 piping indicates higher fatigue usage than expected, the non-Class 1 piping will be evaluated for possible fatigue concerns. The staff noted that the applicant's program monitors locations of high fatigue usage. The staff found that these locations provide a reasonable sample to monitor the potential fatigue usage of the non-ASME Class 1 piping systems at NMP1 and NMP2 because the monitored locations include the expected plant thermal transient cycles, including plant startup/shutdown cycles. The staff found that the applicant's FMP, which tracks the number of expected thermal transient cycles, will adequately manage the fatigue of the NMP1 and NMP2 non-ASME Section III Class 1 piping during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.3.4.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of non-ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis in ALRA Sections A1.2.2.3 and A2.2.2.4, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the non-ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis are adequate.

#### **4.3.4.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the non-ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR and USAR supplements contain appropriate summary descriptions of the non-ASME Section III Class 1 piping and components fatigue analysis TLAA evaluation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **4.3.5 Reactor Vessel Internals Fatigue Analysis**

##### **4.3.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The applicant discussed the fatigue analysis of the reactor vessel internals (RVI) in ALRA Section 4.3.5. The applicant indicated that fatigue analysis was not a design requirement for the RVI at NMPNS. However, fatigue analyses were performed for the core shroud repair at NMP1 and certain locations in the NMP2 RVI. ALRA Table 4.3-6 lists the CUFs associated with these locations. The applicant committed to further evaluation of those locations where the CUF exceeds 0.4 prior to the period of extended operation and to take appropriate correctives actions if necessary. The applicant concluded that the effects of fatigue on the intended function(s) of the RVI will be adequately managed by the FMP in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

##### **4.3.5.2 Staff Evaluation**

Even though fatigue analysis of the RVI is not a design requirement at NMPNS, the applicant evaluated certain locations at NMP1 and NMP2. These locations are listed in ALRA Table 4.3-6. The NMP1 locations include the core shroud vertical weld repair clamps and the core shroud stabilizer tie-rod assemblies. The applicant reported a relatively low fatigue usage (less than 0.1) for repair clamps for the 40-year design life. The staff concluded that the fatigue usage will remain within the allowable limit for the period of extended operation. The applicant also indicated that the tie-rods were designed for a 25-year design life.

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 4.3.6 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the reactor vessel internals fatigue analysis. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 4.3.6, dated February 22, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide additional information regarding the disposition after the 25-year design life.

In its response, by letter dated July 14, 2005, the applicant indicated that the 25-year design life was based on the original license expiration plus 10 years. The applicant also indicated that the 25-year design life was not based on a design limitation relative to any specific component of the tie-rod assembly. The applicant stated that the projected fatigue usage of the tie-rods would remain well within the allowable limit of 1.0 during the period of extended operation. The staff concluded that the applicant has demonstrated that the NMP1 RVI fatigue analyses will remain valid for the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff found that the fatigue usage of the tie-rods has been adequately projected to the end of the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii). In addition, the applicant indicated that potential for cracking of the RVI components will be managed by the BWRVIP. The BWRVIP is described in ALRA Section B2.1.8.

The applicant indicated that the controlling loading for the NMP2 RVI locations is flow-induced vibrations and other dynamic loads. The applicant committed, as stated in Commitment Item 6 in the ALRA, dated July 14, 2005, to evaluate all locations where the 40-year design CUF exceeds 0.4 prior to the period of extended operation. The applicant indicated that corrective actions would be taken if the RVI evaluation does not demonstrate acceptable fatigue usage. Corrective actions acceptable to the staff are part of the NMPNS FMP. The staff found the applicant's commitment to further evaluation of the limiting NMP2 RVI internal locations prior to the period of extended operation acceptable. In addition, the applicant indicated that the potential for RVI cracking is managed by the BWRVIP described in ALRA Section B2.1.8. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.3.6 is resolved.

#### ***4.3.5.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements***

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of RVI fatigue analysis in ALRA Sections A1.2.2.4 and A2.2.2.5, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the RVI fatigue analysis are adequate.

#### ***4.3.5.4 Conclusion***

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the RVI fatigue analysis TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR and USAR supplements contain appropriate summary descriptions of the RVI fatigue analysis TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.3.6 Environmentally Assisted Fatigue**

#### ***4.3.6.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

The applicant indicated that NMP1 and NMP2 will assess the impact of the reactor coolant environment on a sample of components, including locations equivalent to those listed in NUREG/CR-6260. The applicant indicated that the evaluation would be completed prior to the period of extended operation. The applicant concluded that the effects of environmentally assisted fatigue will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.3.6.2 Staff Evaluation**

The applicant indicated that the FMP will continue during the period of extended operation and will assure that design cycle limits are not exceeded. The applicant's FMP tracks transients and cycles of RCS components that have explicit design transient cycles to assure that these components remain within their design basis. Generic safety issue (GSI)-166, "Adequacy of the Fatigue Life of Metal Components," raised concerns regarding the conservatism of the fatigue curves used in the design of the RCS components. Although GSI-166 was resolved for the current 40-year design life of operating components, the staff identified GSI-190, "Fatigue Evaluation of Metal Components for 60-year Plant Life," to address license renewal. The NRC closed GSI-190 in December, 1999, concluding:

The results of the probabilistic analyses, along with the sensitivity studies performed, the iterations with industry (NEI and EPRI), and the different approaches available to the licensees to manage the effects of aging, lead to the conclusion that no generic regulatory action is required, and that GSI-190 is closed. This conclusion is based primarily on the negligible calculated increases in core damage frequency in going from 40 to 60 year lives. However, the calculations supporting resolution of this issue, which included consideration of environmental effects, and the nature of age-related degradation indicate the potential for an increase in the frequency of pipe leaks as plants continue to operate. Thus, the staff concludes that, consistent with existing requirements in 10 CFR 54.21, licensees should address the effects of coolant environment on component fatigue life as aging management programs are formulated in support of license renewal.

The applicant committed to assess the impact of the reactor coolant environment on a sample of critical component locations, including the locations equivalent to those identified in NUREG/CR-6260 prior to the period of extended operation as part of the NMPNS FMP. The applicant indicated that the FMP will be consistent with NUREG-1801, Section X.M.1, "Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," prior to the period of extended operation. The guidance of GALL Report, Section X.M.1 is that the applicant should take appropriate corrective actions to prevent the CUF, including reactor coolant environmental effects, from exceeding the design Code limit during the period of extended operation. Acceptable corrective actions include a more rigorous analysis of the component to demonstrate that the design Code limit will not be exceeded, and repair or replacement of the component. The staff discussed the applicant's selection of the NUREG/CR-6260 locations in SER Section 4.3.1.2. The staff found the applicant's commitment to assess the impact of the reactor coolant environment on a sample of critical NMP1 and NMP2 components prior to the period of extended operation acceptable.

#### **4.3.6.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of environmentally assisted fatigue in ALRA Sections A1.2.2.5 and A2.2.2.6, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address environmentally assisted fatigue are adequate.

#### **4.3.6.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), that, for the environmentally assisted fatigue TLAA, the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the environmentally assisted fatigue TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **4.3.7 Fatigue of the Emergency Condenser (NMP1 Only)**

##### **4.3.7.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The applicant discussed the fatigue analysis of the NMP1 emergency condenser in ALRA Section 4.3.7. The applicant indicated that a fatigue analysis of the emergency condenser was performed after tubing failures attributed to thermal cycling were identified in 1997. The applicant listed the fatigue usage for the limiting locations in Table 4.3-7. The applicant indicated that the NMPNS FMP will track the transients specific to the emergency condensers. The applicant concluded that the effects of fatigue on the intended function(s) of the NMP1 emergency condensers will be adequately managed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

##### **4.3.7.2 Staff Evaluation**

The applicant indicated that the NMP1 emergency condensers were designed in accordance with ASME Section III Class 2 and 3 criteria, which do not require an explicit fatigue analysis for thermal transients. However, tubing failures in 1997 were attributed to thermal fatigue resulting from leakage past the condensate return line. As part of its corrective action, the applicant identified applicable thermal transients and performed a fatigue analysis of the condensers. The limiting locations are shown in ALRA Table 4.3-7. The applicant indicated that these locations would be monitored by the NMPNS FMP. The staff found that the applicant's FMP will adequately manage the fatigue usage of the NMP1 condensers during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

##### **4.3.7.3 UFSAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a UFSAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of fatigue of the emergency condenser in ALRA Section A1.2.2.6. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the fatigue of the emergency condenser is adequate.

##### **4.3.7.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding fatigue of the emergency condenser TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the emergency condenser TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).



## **4.4 Environmental Qualification**

### **4.4.1 Electrical Equipment EQ**

The NRC has established nuclear station EQ requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 4, and 10 CFR 50.49, which specifically require that an EQ program be established to demonstrate that certain electrical components located in "harsh" plant environments (i.e., those areas of the plant that could be subject to the harsh environmental effects of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), high-energy line breaks (HELBs), or post-LOCA radiation) are qualified to perform their safety function in those harsh environments after the effects of in-service aging. Section 50.49 of 10 CFR requires that the effects of significant aging mechanisms be addressed as part of environmental qualification. For the purpose of license renewal, only those components with a qualified life of 40 years or greater would be TLAAAs.

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 4.4.1, "Electrical Equipment EQ," in which the applicant described the technical bases and justification for the NMPNS EQ Program, together with other plant programs and processes that adequately manage the effects of aging on the intended function(s) of electrical components for the period of extended operation. The staff reviewed this section of the ALRA to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) of the electrical equipment will be adequately managed through the NMPNS EQ Program, together with other programs and processes, during the period of extended operations as required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.4.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 4.4.1, the applicant summarized the evaluation of electrical equipment EQ for the period of extended operation. Section 50.49 of 10 CFR requires that certain SR and NSR electrical equipment remain functional during and after identified DBEs. To establish reasonable assurance that this equipment can function when exposed to postulated harsh environmental conditions, applicants are required to determine the equipment's qualified life and to develop a program that maintains the qualification of that equipment. Determination of qualified life is an ongoing activity that considers both normal and accident operating environments.

#### **4.4.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 4.4.1 to determine whether the applicant had submitted adequate information to meet the requirement of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). For the electrical equipment identified in ALRA Table 4.1-1, the applicant used 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii) in its TLAA evaluation to demonstrate that the aging effects of EQ equipment will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation. The staff reviewed the EQ Program to determine whether it will assure that the electrical and I&C components covered under this program will continue to perform their intended functions consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation of the components' qualification focused on how the EQ Program manages the aging effects to meet the requirements delineated in 10 CFR 50.49.

The applicant's program activities establish, demonstrate, and document the level of qualification, qualified configuration, maintenance, surveillance, and replacement requirements necessary to meet 10 CFR 50.49. Qualified life is determined for equipment within the scope of the EQ Program and appropriate actions, replacement or refurbishment, are taken prior to or at

the end of qualified life of the equipment so that aging limits or acceptable margins are not exceeded.

#### **4.4.1.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of electrical equipment EQ in ALRA Sections A1.2.3.1 and A2.2.3.1, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address electrical equipment EQ are adequate.

#### **4.4.1.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the electrical equipment EQ TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR and USAR supplements contain appropriate summary descriptions of the electrical equipment EQ TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **4.4.2 Mechanical Equipment EQ (NMP2 Only)**

The staff has established nuclear station EQ requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 4, which require that an EQ Program be established to demonstrate that nonmetallic subcomponents comprising SR mechanical equipment located in "harsh" plant environments (i.e., those areas of the plant that could be subject to the harsh environmental effects of a LOCA, HELB, or post-LOCA radiation) are qualified to perform their safety function in those harsh environments after the effects of in-service aging. For the purpose of license renewal, only those components with a qualified life of 40 years or greater would be TLAAs.

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 4.4.2, "Mechanical Equipment EQ (NMP 2 Only)," in which the applicant described the technical bases and justification for the NMPNS EQ Program, together with other plant programs and processes that adequately manage the effects of aging on the intended function(s) of mechanical components for the period of extended operation. The staff reviewed this section of the ALRA to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) of the mechanical equipment will be adequately managed through the NMPNS EQ Program, together with other programs and processes, during the period of extended operations as required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

##### **4.4.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Application**

The applicant stated the NMPNS EQ Program has been established to designate equipment, demonstrate qualification, and ensure that the correct preventive and corrective maintenance activities are conducted to maintain equipment qualification (refer to Appendix B3.1). Furthermore, when required by ongoing analyses of updated or revised test data, accident profiles, or normal operating environments, re-evaluation of qualified life determinations are conducted in accordance with EQ Program requirements.

The applicant confirmed that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. For components within the scope of the NMPNS

EQ Program, analyses of thermal exposure, radiation exposure, and mechanical cycle aging that cannot be shown to remain valid for the period of extended operation will be reviewed as part of the ongoing EQ Program to extend the qualification of components before reaching the aging limits established in the applicable evaluation, or the components will be refurbished or replaced. Therefore, the effects of aging on components included in the EQ Program will be adequately managed in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.4.2.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff reviewed ALRA Section 4.4.2 to determine whether the applicant submitted adequate information to meet the requirement of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1). For the mechanical equipment identified in ALRA Table 4.1-1, the applicant used 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii) in its TLAA evaluation to demonstrate that the aging effects of EQ equipment will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation. The staff reviewed the EQ Program to determine whether it will assure that the nonmetallic materials used in SR mechanical equipment covered under this program will continue to perform their intended functions consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation. The staff's evaluation of the components' qualification focused on how the EQ Program manages the aging effects to meet the requirements delineated in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

The applicant's program activities establish, demonstrate, and document the level of qualification, qualified configuration, maintenance, surveillance, and replacement requirements necessary to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. Qualified life is determined for equipment within the scope of the EQ Program and appropriate actions, replacement or refurbishment, are taken prior to or at the end of qualified life of the equipment so that aging limits or acceptable margins are not exceeded.

The staff also reviewed the USAR supplement for this TLAA and concluded that it provided an adequate summary description of the TLAA to satisfy 10 CFR 54.21(d).

The staff concluded that the applicant has provided an acceptable demonstration, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1), that, for the environmental qualification of electrical equipment TLAA, the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation.

#### **4.4.2.3 USAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a USAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of mechanical equipment EQ in ALRA Section A2.2.3.2. On the basis of its review of the USAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address mechanical equipment EQ is adequate.

#### **4.4.2.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the mechanical equipment EQ TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the USAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the mechanical equipment EQ TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

## **4.5 Concrete Containment Tendon Prestress Analysis**

The NMP1 and NMP2 containments do not employ prestressed concrete designs; therefore, this TLAA is not applicable to NMPNS.

## **4.6 Containment Liner Plate, Metal Containments, and Penetrations Fatigue Analysis**

### **4.6.1 Torus Shell and Vent System Fatigue Analysis (NMP1 Only)**

NMP1 is a BWR with a Mark I containment. The Mark I containment consists of a freestanding steel containment drywell, vent system, and steel pressure suppression chamber (torus). Large-scale testing of the Mark III containment and in-plant testing of Mark I primary containment systems identified additional hydrodynamic loads that were not considered in the original design of the NMP1 containment. The Mark I Owners Group initiated the Mark I Containment Program to develop a generic load definition and structural analysis techniques. The staff evaluation of the generic load definition and structural assessment techniques is contained in NUREG-0661, "Safety Evaluation Report, Mark I Containment Long Term Program, Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-7," July 1980. The Mark I Containment Long Term Program evaluation of hydrodynamic loads included fatigue analyses of the torus and vent system and fatigue analyses of the torus attached piping.

NMP2 is a BWR with a Mark II containment. The Mark II containment is a reinforced concrete structure consisting of a drywell chamber located above a pressure suppression chamber. Except at various penetrations, the primary containment liner is a continuous membrane that functions as a leak-tight barrier to the release of fission products. The liner is attached to the concrete wall. The design process assumes that the liner does not carry any loads.

The containment liner plates, penetration sleeves (including dissimilar metal welds), and penetration bellows may be designed in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Section III. If a plant's code of record requires a fatigue analysis, then this analysis may be a TLAA and must be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1) to ensure that the effects of aging on the intended functions will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation.

The adequacy of the fatigue analyses of the metal containment, containment liner plates (including welded joints), penetration sleeves, dissimilar metal welds, and penetration bellows is reviewed for the period of extended operation. The fatigue analyses of the pressure boundary of process piping are reviewed in SER Section 4.3, following the guidance in SRP-LR Section 4.3.

#### ***4.6.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application***

The applicant discussed the NMP1 torus shell and vent system fatigue analysis in ALRA Section 4.6.1. The applicant indicated that a fatigue evaluation was performed for the torus shell and external support structure and vent header system for hydrodynamic loads associated with LOCA and safety relief valve (SRV) discharge events. The applicant indicated that the evaluations were performed in accordance with ASME Section III, Division I (with addenda through 1977) and Code Case N-197. ALRA Table 4.6-1 provides the bounding fatigue usage factors for the NMP1 torus shell. The applicant concluded that the fatigue analyses either (1)

remain valid for the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i), or (2) have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii).

#### **4.6.1.2 Staff Evaluation**

The applicant indicated that the NMP1 torus shell and vent header system were evaluated as part of the Mark I Containment Program. The evaluation included fatigue analyses of the torus shell and vent header system. These analyses were summarized in the NMP1 Mark I containment plant-unique analysis report (PUAR). The applicant indicated that the design-basis accident (DBA) was the major load contributing to the high stresses in the vent header system. The applicant indicated that the controlling fatigue usage factor was 0.76 at the vent header support. Since the DBA is a one-time event, the applicant concluded that the vent system analysis remains valid for the period of extended operation. The staff concurred with the applicant that the DBA should be considered a one-time event for the period of extended operation. As discussed in ALRA Section 4.6.2, the number of SRV actuations may exceed the number assumed in the Mark I program evaluation during the period of extended operation (520 estimated versus 500 used in the evaluation). On the basis of the applicant's statement that most of the fatigue usage is due to the DBA loading, the staff concluded that additional SRV actions during the period of extended operation will not have a significant impact on the controlling usage factor for the vent header system. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant has demonstrated that the vent header system analysis remains valid for the period of extended operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i).

The applicant indicated that the fatigue usage for the torus shell was insignificant. The applicant provided 60-year CUF values for the limiting locations on the torus shell. The applicant increased the fatigue usage resulting from normal operations by a factor of 1.5 to account for the period of extended operation. The maximum 60-year CUF is less than 0.1. The staff concluded that the applicant performed an adequate evaluation to demonstrate that the fatigue usage will not exceed its allowable limit during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant has projected the torus shell analysis for the period of extended operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii).

#### **4.6.1.3 UFSAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a UFSAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of the torus shell and vent system fatigue analysis in ALRA Section A1.2.4.1. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the torus shell and vent system fatigue analysis is adequate.

#### **4.6.1.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i), regarding the vent header system fatigue analysis TLAA, that the analyses remain valid for the period of extended operation. The applicant has also provided an acceptable demonstration, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii), regarding the torus shell, that the analyses have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the vent header system fatigue analysis TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).



## **4.6.2 Torus Attached Piping Analysis (NMP1 Only)**

### **4.6.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The applicant discussed the NMP1 torus attached piping (TAP) fatigue evaluation in ALRA Section 4.6.2. The applicant indicated that fatigue analysis of TAP was performed as part of the generic Mark I Containment Program. The applicant indicated that the bounding CUF was less than 0.5 for the plant design life; therefore, the CUF would remain less than 1.0 for the period of extended operation. The applicant stated that the generic analysis considered SRV actuations, operating basis earthquakes, and accident conditions. The applicant indicated that the number of SRV actuations assumed for the analysis may be exceeded during the period of extended operation. The applicant committed to monitor the number of SRV actuations with the NMPNS FMP. The applicant concluded that the TAP fatigue analysis will be managed by the FMP during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

### **4.6.2.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 4.6.2 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the torus attached piping analysis. The applicant responded to the staff's RAI as discussed below.

In RAI 4.6.2-1, dated November 10, 2004, the staff stated that the applicant indicated that the existing fatigue usage factors for the NMP1 TAP are less than 0.5 and that, therefore, the fatigue usage factors will remain less than 1.0 for 60 years of plant operation. The staff requested that the applicant identify the location containing the bounding fatigue usage for the TAP and that the applicant list the design transients, including the number used in the fatigue analysis and associated fatigue usage, for this bounding location. In addition, the staff requested that the applicant provide the number of these design transients that have been experienced since initial plant operation.

In its response, by letter dated December 6, 2004, the applicant indicated that a bounding analysis of TAP applicable to all BWRs was documented in MPR-751, "Augmented Class 2/3 Fatigue Evaluation Method and Results for Typical Torus Attached and SRV Piping Systems," November 1982. The applicant indicated that two NMP1 piping systems were included in the evaluation. The applicant reported relatively low 40-year CUFs ( $< 0.1$ ) for these two systems. The applicant stated that a conservative extrapolation of the CUFs to 60 years still yields a relatively low CUF.

The above response did not explain why the estimated fatigue usage for NMP1 TAP is conservative given that the number of past SRV actions is unknown. Therefore, in a follow-up to RAI 4.6.2-1, dated February 22, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant explain why the number of design transients have been experienced and why the number assumed in the fatigue evaluation is bounding given that SRV actuations have not been tracked.

The applicant's July 14, 2005, response and revised ALRA provided additional TAP details. The TAP was designed for SRV actuations, operating basis earthquakes, and accident conditions. The applicant's FMP did not monitor the number of past SRV actuations. The applicant reviewed records pertaining to SRV actuations to estimate the number of past actuations. On the basis of its estimation of past SRV actuations, the applicant indicated that the projected number of SRV actuations may exceed the number assumed in the TAP fatigue analysis during

the period of extended operation (520 estimated versus 500 used in the evaluation). The applicant indicated that the FMP will monitor the number of SRV actuations during the period of extended operation to ensure that the fatigue usage of the TAP remains within its design limits. The staff found that the applicant's FMP, which tracks the number of SRV actuations, will adequately manage the fatigue usage of the TAP during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.6.2-1 is resolved.

#### **4.6.2.3 UFSAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a UFSAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of the TAP analysis in ALRA Section A1.2.4.2. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the TAP analysis is adequate.

#### **4.6.2.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the TAP analysis TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the TAP analysis evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.6.3 Torus Wall Thickness (NMP1 Only)**

#### **4.6.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 4.6.3, the applicant discussed the corrosion allowance for the NMP1 torus wall thickness. The NMP1 torus suppression chamber is constructed of Grade B steel plates with a certified minimum thickness of 0.460 inches. The original corrosion allowance of 0.0625 inches was reduced based on the addition of hydrodynamic loads resulting from LOCA and SRV actuation. The revised minimum wall thickness is 0.431 inches. NMP1 is required to monitor the torus wall thickness and corrosion rate in order to establish reasonable assurance that the minimum wall thickness is not reached. The applicant indicated that the NMP1 Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program monitors the torus shell thickness to ensure that it is maintained within acceptable limits. The applicant stated that the effects of loss of material on the intended function(s) of the torus shell will be adequately managed in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.6.3.2 Staff Evaluation**

The NMP1 Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program has been developed to monitor the torus shell material thickness and ensure it is maintained within acceptable limits. This program is based on a commitment to periodically monitor torus condition as described in an NRC SE dated August 11, 1994 (reference 4.8-63 in the ALRA). The corrosion monitoring activity included in this TLAA is completed through the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program described in ALRA Section B3.3. The staff found that the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program will adequately manage the aging effects such that there is reasonable assurance that the intended function(s) of the torus shell and support structure will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period



of extended operation. The staff evaluation of the Torus Corrosion Monitoring Program is contained in SER Section 3.0.3.3.7

#### **4.6.3.3 UFSAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a UFSAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of the torus wall thickness in ALRA Section A1.2.4.3. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the torus wall thickness is adequate.

#### **4.6.3.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the torus wall thickness TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the torus wall thickness TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **4.6.4 Containment Liner Analysis (NMP2 Only)**

##### **4.6.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The applicant discussed the NMP2 containment liner analysis in ALRA Section 4.6.4. The applicant indicated that the fatigue analysis of the NMP2 containment liner was performed in accordance with ASME Section III. The applicant projected the fatigue analysis of the liner to the end of the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii).

##### **4.6.4.2 Staff Evaluation**

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 4.6.4 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the containment liner analysis. The staff's RAI and the applicant's response thereto are discussed below.

RAI 4.6.4-1, dated November 10, 2004, stated that the original LRA Section 4.6.4 stated that a revised analysis performed prior to the period of extended operation would demonstrate that the 60-year CUF values for all controlling locations would remain less than 1.0. The staff requested that the applicant provide the current design CUF values for the controlling containment liner locations. The staff also requested that the applicant explain the basis for the statement that the revised analysis would demonstrate that the 60-year CUF values for all controlling locations would remain less than 1.0, given that the revised analysis had not been completed.

In its response, by letter dated December 6, 2004, the applicant indicated that SRV actuation is the primary contributor to fatigue usage of the containment liner. The applicant indicated that SRV actuations are occurring at a much slower rate than assumed in the liner analysis. The applicant multiplied the 40-year CUF by 1.5 to obtain an estimate for 60 years of plant operation. The projected CUF is well below the allowable limit of 1.0. The ALRA reflects this evaluation. The staff found the applicant's evaluation conservative since the SRV actuations are occurring at a much lower rate than was assumed in the liner fatigue evaluation. The staff found that the applicant had projected the containment liner analysis for the period of extended

operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.6.4-1 is resolved.

#### **4.6.4.3 USAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a USAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of containment liner analysis in ALRA Section A2.2.4.1. On the basis of its review of the USAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the containment liner analyses is adequate.

#### **4.6.4.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii), regarding the containment liner analyses TLAA, that the analyses have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the USAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the containment liner analyses TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.6.5 Fatigue of Primary Containment Penetrations**

#### **4.6.5.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The applicant discussed the evaluation of the primary containment penetrations in ALRA Section 4.6.5. The applicant indicated that the NMP1 drywell was designed as a Class B vessel in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, 1965 Edition. Therefore, a fatigue analysis of the drywell and its penetrations was not required. However, the NMP1 TAP penetrations were evaluated for fatigue as part of the Mark 1 Containment Program. The applicant projected the NMP1 TAP penetration fatigue analysis to the end of the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii).

The applicant indicated that the ASME Class 1 and Class MC portions of the NMP2 penetrations were evaluated for fatigue. The applicant identified bounding penetration fatigue locations in ALRA Table 4.6-4. The applicant indicated that the fatigue usage of these locations would be managed by the NMPNS FMP. The applicant stated that fatigue of the NMP2 primary containment penetrations would be adequately managed for the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.6.5.2 Staff Evaluation**

The applicant indicated that the Mark I containment PUAR did not report a fatigue usage factor for the NMP1 TAP penetrations. The PUAR contained an assessment of the bounding TAP locations and concluded the penetrations were acceptable for fatigue. Since the PUAR did not report the fatigue usage factors, the applicant estimated the fatigue usage for these penetrations using loads and stress cycles reported in the PUAR. The resulting fatigue usages were well within the allowable limit of 1.0. The applicant then estimated the 60-year fatigue usage for the TAP penetrations by multiplying the calculated 40-year fatigue usage by 1.5. The staff concluded that the applicant performed an adequate evaluation to demonstrate that the fatigue usage would not exceed its allowable limit during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff found that the applicant had projected the PUAR torus penetration analysis

for the period of extended operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii).

The applicant's December 20, 2005, submittal identified that additional fatigue analyses had been performed for 26 TAPs. The applicant indicated that the fatigue analyses assumed 10,000 stress cycles at the maximum stress level to account for all loading conditions. The applicant stated that the stresses caused by the SRV actuations were only a fraction of the maximum stress that was used for the fatigue evaluation. The applicant then stated that the TAP fatigue evaluations remain valid for the period of extended operation. The staff agreed with the applicant's conclusion that a small increase in the number of SRV actuations during the period of extended operation would not have a significant impact on the fatigue usage of the TAPs if the actual stresses caused by the SRV actuations was only a fraction of the total stress used for the evaluation. On the basis of the applicant's assertion that the stresses due to the SRV actuations are only a fraction of the maximum stress that was used in the fatigue evaluation, the staff found that the applicant has adequately demonstrated that the analyses remain valid for the period of extended operation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i).

The applicant indicated that the NMP2 Class 1 and Class MC penetration assemblies were evaluated for fatigue. The applicant indicated that the fatigue usage for the majority of the penetration assemblies was bounded by the attached piping. The bounding piping locations are monitored by the NMPNS FMP. The applicant identified six penetrations, in ALRA Table 4.6-4, that were not bounded by the attached piping. The applicant indicated that these penetrations would be monitored by the NMPNS FMP. The staff found that the applicant's FMP, which tracks the number of expected thermal transient cycles, will adequately manage the fatigue of the NMP2 containment penetrations during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.6.5.3 UFSAR and USAR Supplements**

The applicant provided UFSAR and USAR supplement summary descriptions of its TLAA evaluation of fatigue of primary containment penetrations in ALRA Sections A1.2.4.4 and A2.2.4.2, respectively. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR and USAR supplements, the staff concluded that the summary descriptions of the applicant's actions to address the fatigue of primary containment penetrations are adequate.

#### **4.6.5.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii), regarding the fatigue of the NMP1 primary containment penetrations TLAA, that the analyses either would remain valid for the period of extended operation or had been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. The applicant has also provided an acceptable demonstration, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) of the NMP2 primary containment penetrations will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR and USAR supplements contain appropriate summary descriptions of the NMP1 primary containment penetrations evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

## 4.7 Other Plant-Specific TLAAs

In ALRA Section 4.7, the applicant provided its evaluation of plant-specific TLAAs. The TLAAs evaluated include the following:

- RPV biological shield (NMP2 only),
- main steam isolation valve corrosion allowance (NMP2 only),
- stress relaxation of core plate hold-down bolts (NMP2 only),
- reactor vessel and reactor vessel closure head weld flaw evaluations (NMP1 only).

### 4.7.1 RPV Biological Shield (NMP2 Only)

#### 4.7.1.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Application

In ALRA Section 4.7.1, the applicant identified the fracture mechanics analysis (FMA) for the biological shield wall (BSW) at NMP2 as a time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) that meets the definition for a TLAA in 10 CFR 54.3.

The accumulation of high energy neutrons on nuclear reactor materials is a time-dependent parameter. Inspections of the BSW performed by the applicant revealed the presence of weld fabrication defects (cracks) in the BSW's ferritic steel shell. The applicant performed a dynamic crack growth FMA of the defects to determine whether the BSW was acceptable for continued service or whether the cracks would require repair (Refer to ADAMS Legacy Library Accession Number 8008050458). The results of the FMA demonstrated that the majority of the flaws were acceptable, although a small number of flaws were unacceptable and subsequently repaired by the applicant. A supporting calculation was performed to estimate the amount of neutron fluence exposure to the BSW's cylindrical shells and to re-evaluate the conclusions of the original FMA for flaws left in service using the estimated neutron fluence exposure. Since the acceptability of the FMA is dependent on the accumulated neutron fluence dose exposure, the applicant concluded that the FMA was a TLAA for the NMP2 ALRA.

#### 4.7.1.2 Staff Evaluation

The applicant's original FMA was docketed in a letter from Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC)<sup>1</sup> to NRC's Region I Office dated August 1, 1980. The FMA was based on the evaluation of dynamic loading on a limiting 0.215 inch flaw in the BSW. The applicant calculated that the dynamic stress intensity factor ( $K_I$ ) was  $33.2 \text{ ksi(in)}^{0.5}$  for the limiting flaw. The staff reviewed the applicant's FMA and concluded that the applicant had conservatively demonstrated that  $K_I$  was less than the dynamic fracture toughness criterion ( $K_{ID}$ ) of  $48.8 \text{ ksi(in)}^{0.5}$ , as based on a Charpy-V (Cv) impact energy of 20 ft-lb for the structural steel. Thus, the staff concurs with the applicant that the original FMA demonstrated that the limiting flaw in the BSW was structurally stable for the remainder of the current operating term.

However, since the  $K_{ID}$  value was based on a Cv impact energy of 20 ft-lb and since Cv impact energies may decrease with increasing neutron fluence exposure, the applicant concluded that the effects of increasing neutron fluence in the BSW over a 60-year licensed life (i.e., through

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<sup>1</sup> The owner of Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station prior to its acquisition by Constellation Energy.

54 EFPY) must be assessed for its impact relative to the original FMA. Thus, the staff concludes that the applicant made a conservative conclusion in identifying that the fracture mechanics evaluation for the BSW was a TLAA for NMP2 as stated in the ALRA.

Neutron irradiation embrittlement can reduce the ability of ferritic steels (i.e., carbon steel or low alloy steel materials) to resist catastrophic crack growth (i.e. fast fracture). Typically, the staff assesses neutron irradiation embrittlement in ferritic steel materials (i.e., the impact of neutron irradiation on the fracture toughness properties of ferritic steel materials) based on the accumulated fluence exposure (in units  $\text{n/cm}^2$ ,  $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ) of the materials to high energy neutrons. The staff has established, in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, a neutron fluence value of  $1 \times 10^{17} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ) as its threshold for the initiation of neutron irradiation embrittlement in ferritic steel materials.

The applicant estimated that the neutron fluence of the BSW inside cylinder surface will be  $2.54 \times 10^{17} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ) at 54 EFPY. This value is greater than the staff's threshold for initiation of neutron irradiation embrittlement in ferritic steel materials. Therefore, the applicant used an alternate justification to demonstrate that a neutron fluence exposure of  $2.54 \times 10^{17} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ) would not invalidate (i.e., reduce) the  $C_v$  and  $K_{ID}$  values (20 ft-lb and 48.8 ksi-inch<sup>0.5</sup>, respectively) that were used as the criteria for the original FMA.

The applicant stated that more recent low-temperature irradiation data for the structural carbon steels from the Shippingport neutron shield tank (NST) and high flux isotope reactor (HFIR) provide a more accurate estimation of embrittlement for the BSW (Refer to SANDIA Report SAND 92-2420, "Accelerated 54 °C Irradiated Test of Shippingport Neutron Shield Tank and HFIR Vessel Materials," dated January 1993). The SANDIA report provides the 30 ft-lb  $C_v$  impact test results for ferritic steel test specimens taken from the Shippingport NST and HFIR (Shippingport test specimens). The Shippingport test specimens were irradiated to a neutron fluence exposure of  $5.07 \times 10^{17} \text{ n/cm}^2$  ( $E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}$ ) at a controlled test temperature of 130 °F prior to  $C_v$  impact testing. 130 °F is approximately equal to the normal service temperature for the NST and HFIR vessels.

The SANDIA results projected a maximum shift (increase) of 35 °F in the 30 ft-lb reference transition temperature for the Shippingport test specimens and a reduction of approximately 6 ft-lb in the upper shelf energy (USE) value. The applicant concluded that, since the projected fluence for the NMP2 BSW is less than the value used in the SANDIA Report analysis, it would be justified to use the SANDIA results as a basis for re-estimating the projected neutron fluence exposure on the BSW through 54 EFPY.

The staff determined that the methodology in SANDIA Report SAND 92-2420 is not an NRC-approved methodology. Therefore the staff issued a-RAI 4.7.1B-1, dated December 23, 2005, and requested that the applicant provide an updated neutron fluence calculation for the BSW, performed using NRC-approved neutron fluence methodology, to ensure that conclusions of the original FMA would remain valid for the period of extended operation. As an alternative, the staff stated that the applicant could place a commitment in the NMP2 ALRA to submit an updated neutron fluence calculation for the BSW for the staff's review and approval at least two years prior to entering the period of extended operation.

The applicant provided the following response to a-RAI 4.7.1B-1 in a letter to the NRC dated January 11, 2006:

NMPNS will perform a fluence analysis for the period of extended operation (PEO) using plant specific methodology that is consistent with Reg. Guide 1.190. This methodology has been approved by the NRC as part of the NMP1 and NMP2 Pressure-Temperature Curve analysis review. The fluence analysis will establish whether or not the maximum fluence at the Biological Shield Wall or the fluence at the shield wall flaws, on which the ALRA Section 4.7.1 is based, is below the threshold value above which neutron embrittlement is considered to be an issue ( $10^{17}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup>). NMPNS will submit the summary of this analysis to the NRC for review and approval not later than two years prior to entry into the PEO. Based on the results of this analysis, the submittal will also include revised ALRA Sections 4.7.1 and A.2.2.5.1, and any other supporting analysis, as applicable.

The applicant's response to a-RAI 4.7.1B-1 also stated that the USAR Supplement would include an updated summary description for TLAA 4.7.1 and a commitment in the NMP2 ALRA to submit an updated BSW fluence evaluation for the staff's review and approval at least two years prior to entering the Period of extended operation. The applicant has included this commitment as Commitment Item #39 to the NMP2 ALRA. The staff's evaluation of the USAR Supplement summary description for TLAA 4.7.1 is provided in Section 4.7B.1.3 below and includes the staff's assessment for using Commitment Item #39 on the NMP2 ALRA as the basis for accepting TLAA 4.7.1.

#### **4.7.1.3 USAR Supplement**

The applicant's USAR supplement summary description of TLAA 4.7.1, "RPV Biological Shield (NMP2 Only)" is contained in NMP2 ALRA Section A.2.2.5.1. The USAR Supplement summary description appropriately describes the applicant's methodology for re-evaluating the fracture toughness of the NMP2 BSW. As part of the applicant's response to a-RAI 4.7.1B-1, the applicant provided Commitment Item 39 on the NMP2 ALRA, as follows:

ALRA Section	ALRA Commitment #	Commitment Text	New or Revised	Due Date
A.2.4	39	No later than two years prior to entry into the PEO, NMP will submit, for NRC review and approval, the summary of the Reg. Guide 1.190 based analysis that determines the maximum neutron fluence at the NMP2 Biological Shield Wall or at the wall flaw locations that are the basis for the ALRA Section 4.7.1 TLAA. The submittal will include revised ALRA Sections 4.7.1 and A.2.2.5.1, and any other supporting analysis, as applicable.	New	October 31, 2024

When the updated neutron fluence calculation for the BSW is submitted to the staff in accordance with Commitment Item #39 on the NMP2 ALRA, the staff will use the following basis to review the updated neutron fluence calculation for the BSW and TLAA 4.7.1 against the TLAA acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i):

- (1) The staff will review the updated neutron fluence methodology for the BSW for acceptability against the staff's recommendations in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.190,

“Calculational and Dosimetry Methods for Determining Pressure Vessel Neutron Fluence [March 2001],” for performing neutron fluence calculations of ASME Code Class 1 and other safety related components.

- (2) The staff will review the updated 54 EPFY neutron fluence value and other necessary supporting evaluation for the BSW to determine whether the original FMA for the BSW remains valid for the period of extended operation, or whether a new 54 EPFY-based FMA or augmented inspection program has to be submitted under 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii) or (iii) for the staff’s review and approval to ensure continued aging management of the component during the period of extended operation.

However, since the NMP2 ALRA is currently under review by the staff, the staff requests that the applicant submit an updated 54 EPFY neutron fluence calculation for the BSW, using an NRC-approved neutron fluence methodology conforming to RG 1.190, for the staff’s review and approval during the NRC’s allocated review period for the application. This is designated as Open Item (OI) 4.7B.1-1.

Pending acceptable resolution of OI 4.7B.1-1, the staff concludes that USAR Supplement Section A.2.2.5.1 is acceptable.

#### **4.7.1.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, pending acceptable resolution of OI 4.7.B1-1, the staff concludes that the applicant has provided an acceptable demonstration, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i), that TLAA 4.7.1, “RPV Biological Shield (NMP2 Only),” remains valid for the Period of extended operation. Pending acceptable resolution of OI 4.7.B1-1, the staff also concludes that the USAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of this TLAA evaluation, as required pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(d).

#### **4.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valve Corrosion Allowance (NMP2 Only)**

This TLAA applies only to NMP2. The NMP1 licensing basis did not specify a corrosion allowance for the NMP1 main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). Therefore NMPNS did not evaluate the NMP1 MSIV corrosion allowance as a TLAA. However, the NMP1 MSIVs are evaluated under the NMP Flow-Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Program and a manufacturer-specified corrosion allowance has been applied to the NMP1 MSIVs to create assurance that unacceptable wall thinning will either not occur or be detected and corrected in a timely manner.

##### **4.7.2.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

The MSIV bodies were fabricated from low-alloy steel. During normal plant operation the MSIVs are exposed to a dry steam environment; however, during refueling outages, they are exposed to treated water and air. To support a 40-year service life in the environments described above, a corrosion allowance of 0.120 inches was imposed in addition to the minimum MSIV wall thickness required by applicable codes. The calculation used to determine this corrosion allowance is a TLAA.

Summing the predicted values for corrosion of the MSIVs in the treated water environment, the air environment, and the steam environment results in a total loss in wall thickness of 0.0256 inches over 60 years.

#### **4.7.2.2 Staff Evaluation**

The predicted reduction in MSIV wall thickness is calculated based on the projected exposure of the valve bodies to water, air, and dry steam environments for the period of extended operation. Under normal plant operating conditions the MSIVs are exposed to a dry steam environment. During RPV flood-up at the start of a refueling outage, the MSIVs are flooded with treated water. For the remainder of the refueling outage the valves are exposed to an air environment. In order to build conservatism into the corrosion calculation, the exposure times of MSIVs to the water and air environments are doubled from the typical exposure times during a refueling outage. The reduction of MSIV wall thickness caused by exposure to each environment is calculated based on exposure time and the appropriate corrosion rate. The applicant's calculation used the following corrosion rates and exposure times: 0.0033 inches per year for 4.6 years of exposure to air, 0.0050 inches per year for 0.66 years of exposure to treated water; and, 0.00013 inches per year for 54.7 years due to FAC.

In letters dated, January 14, 2005 and July 14, 2005, the applicant responded to staff RAIs 4.7.2-1 and 4.7.2-2 regarding the flow accelerated corrosion calculations performed for the dry steam environment. These RAIs requested clarifying information about the applicant's predictive model for FAC. The applicant's response indicated that the 0.00013 inches per year corrosion rate is based on piping upstream of the MSIVs, as modeled by the FAC Program predictive computer model (CHECWORKS). The upstream piping measurements are used for the MSIVs because non-parallel inner and outer surfaces throughout the MSIV body, and surface irregularities due to casting, make accurate and repeatable measurements of MSIV wall thickness difficult. The NMP FAC Program is consistent with industry practice in that representative components are periodically measured and trended to predict wear in the main steam system. Thickness measurements of the main steam system piping components for NMP1 and NMP2 were taken during the most recent refueling outage and did not identify any significant wall thinning.

The amount of wall thinning based on maximum expected corrosion rates of MSIV bodies remains bounded by the corrosion allowance assumed in the valve design. Based on the applicant's conservative analysis of the predicted loss of material, the staff concludes that the corrosion allowance identified, in conjunction with monitoring performed under the FAC Program, will ensure MSIVs are capable of performing their intended function for 60 years of operation.

#### **4.7.2.3 USAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a USAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of the MSIV corrosion allowance in ALRA Section A2.2.5.2. On the basis of its review of the USAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the MSIV corrosion allowance is adequate.

#### **4.7.2.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding the MSIV corrosion allowance TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the USAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the MSIV corrosion allowance TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).



### **4.7.3 Stress Relaxation of Core Plate Hold-Down Bolts (NMP2 Only)**

#### **4.7.3.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In the original LRA Section 4.7.3, the applicant summarized the evaluation of stress relaxation of core plate hold-down bolts for the period of extended operation. Hold-down bolts located around the rim of the core plate are subcomponents of the core plate assembly that ensure the core plate safety function. Preload in these bolts could be reduced over time by the effects of IGSCC and fluence; therefore, the staff's SE dated December 7, 2000, determined that loss of preload should be evaluated as a potential TLAA. In BWR/2 through BWR/5 RPV designs without core plate wedges installed, these bolts are required to provide lateral restraint of the core plate in the event of a worst-case weld failure. For plants with this configuration, BWRVIP-25 recommends visual or ultrasonic examination of 50 percent of the hold-down bolts. NMP1 has core plate wedges installed; therefore, examination of the core plate hold-down bolts is not required. However, an analysis to justify deferral of the recommended examination until refueling outage 10 (RFO10) for NMP2 satisfies the criteria of 10 CFR 54.3(a); therefore, this analysis is a TLAA.

In its ALRA, the applicant provides the following analysis:

NMP2 has implemented all relevant BWRVIP-required inspections as augmented inservice inspections in accordance with applicable ASME Code requirements. The existing analysis of loss of preload in the NMP2 hold-down bolts determined that sufficient preload remains to justify deferral of the recommended examination until RFO10.

Disposition: 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii) - The effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation.

The subject analysis considered loss of preload caused by both IGSCC and fluence. A review of the associated calculations and the design basis loads indicates the following:

The predicted amount of stress relaxation due to IGSCC is insignificant through the end of the period of extended operation.

When the effect of fluence through the period of extended operation is considered, the remaining preload is sufficient to withstand all normal and upset condition loadings, but insufficient to withstand the faulted condition loading. Even with no loss of preload due to fluence, the calculation showed very little margin between the initial preload and the required preload under faulted conditions. The conclusion to the calculation indicates that reconciliation is necessary in determining why so little margin exists between required and applied preload.

Due to the difficulty encountered by the industry in performing the recommended inspections, the BWRVIP is also pursuing an analytical solution to the issue of stress relaxation of core plate hold-down bolts that may demonstrate sufficient remaining preload to withstand all design loadings until the end of extended life.

The potential for cracking of components comprising the reactor vessel internals due to IGSCC is managed by the BWR Vessel Internals Program at NMP2, which incorporates

comprehensive inspection and evaluation guidelines issued by the BWRVIP and approved by the NRC. Prior to the end of the current license period, NMP2 will either:

(1) install core plate wedges (as part of a proposed core shroud tie-rod repair) to eliminate the need for the enhanced inspections of the core plate hold-down bolts as recommended by BWRVIP-25; or

(2) perform an analysis (incorporating detailed flux/fluence analyses and improved stress relaxation correlations) to demonstrate that the core plate hold-down bolts can withstand all normal, emergency, and faulted loads considering the effects of stress relaxation, until the end of the period of extended operation.

The applicant indicated further that these activities would provide assurance that any stress relaxation of the NMP2 core plate hold-down bolts will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.7.3.2 Staff Evaluation**

Per 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1), applicants for license renewal must demonstrate that TLAA's for license renewal have been projected through the end of the period of extended operation for their facilities, remain valid for the period of extended operation, or demonstrate that the effects of aging that are applicable to the components evaluated by the TLAA's will be managed during the period of extended operation.

The staff's review of the original LRA Section 4.7.3 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the stress relaxation of core plate hold-down bolts.

In an RAI regarding "Part II - Core Plant Hold-Down Bolts (Unit 2)," dated November 22, 2005, the staff requested additional information from the applicant as relevant to its commitment for submitting the analysis on the core plate hold-down bolts to the staff for review and approval. In its response, by letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant included in its commitment that the analysis would be submitted for staff review and approval two years prior to entering the license renewal period.

The applicant's commitment regarding the core plate hold-down bolts, as stated in Appendix A of the ALRA and supplemented by letter dated December 5, 2005, is that NMPNS will either: (1) install core plate wedges (as part of a proposed core shroud tie-rod repair) to eliminate the need for the enhanced inspections of the core plate hold-down bolts recommended by BWRVIP-25; or (2) two years prior to entering the period of extended operation, submit an analysis that incorporates detailed flux/fluence analyses and improved stress relaxation correlations, in accordance with BWRVIP-25, to demonstrate that the core plate hold-down bolts and the core plate can withstand all normal, emergency, and faulted loads and effects of stress relaxation for the period of extended operation. This is Commitment No. 12 in the NMP2 ALRA, as amended in the December 5, 2005, letter from the applicant.

Therefore, based on the review of the ALRA and the applicant's response to the above RAI Part II, the staff found that the applicant's commitment would provide assurance that any stress relaxation of the NMP2 core plate hold-down bolts would be adequately managed for the period

of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI Part II is resolved.

#### **4.7.3.3 USAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a USAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of stress relaxation of core plate hold-down bolts in ALRA Section A2.2.5.3 and it was supplemented by letter dated December 5, 2005. On the basis of its review of the USAR supplement, and as supplemented by letter dated December 5, 2005, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address stress relaxation of core plate hold-down bolts is adequate.

In addition, by letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant provided a revised Commitment No. 12 in Table A2.4 of the NMP2 ALRA, which is identified below:

NMPNS will either: (1) install core plate wedges (as part of a proposed core shroud tie-rod repair) to eliminate the need for the enhanced inspections of the core plate hold-down bolts recommended by BWRVIP-25; or (2) perform an analysis (incorporating detailed flux/fluence analyses and improved stress relaxation correlations) in accordance to BWRVIP-25 to demonstrate that the core plate hold-down bolts and the core plate can withstand all normal, emergency, and faulted loads and effects of stress relaxation for the period of extended operation, and submit it for staff review and approval 2 years prior to entering the period of extended operation.

The staff finds that the applicant has adequately included its commitment regarding the core plate hold-down bolts in Table A2.4 of the NMP2 ALRA and, therefore concludes that the USAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of Commitment No. 12 for NMP2.

#### **4.7.3.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding stress relaxation of the core plate hold-down bolts TLAA, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) would be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the USAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the core plate hold-down bolts TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.7.4 Reactor Vessel and Reactor Vessel Closure Head Weld Flaw Evaluations (NMP1 Only)**

#### **4.7.4.1 Summary of Technical Information in the Amended Application**

In ALRA Section 4.7.4, the applicant summarized the evaluation of the reactor vessel and reactor vessel closure head weld flaw evaluations for the period of extended operation. During RFO15, augmented examinations identified unacceptable flaw indications in two RPV shell welds, as indicated in NMPC's letter dated September 14, 1999. During RFO17, UT examinations identified an unacceptable flaw indication in a closure head meridional weld, as stated in NMPC's letter dated September 19, 2003. Structural evaluations for these flaws (performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, Subsection IWB-3600) indicated that the flaw characteristics are within the pre-determined acceptability criteria to justify continued operation without repair of

the flaw. Since the acceptability criteria were applicable only through the original 40-year license term, the subject evaluations satisfy the criteria of 10 CFR 54.3(a). As such, these analyses are TLAAs.

In its ALRA, the applicant provides the following analysis:

Unacceptable indications in the RPV shell are located in axial weld RVWD-140 and shell-to-flange circumferential weld RVWD-099. The detected flaws are subsurface planar flaws located parallel to the centerline of the weld (i.e., the indications in RVWD-140 were axially-oriented and the indications in RVWD-099 were circumferentially-oriented). The flaw evaluations considered fatigue crack growth and irradiation embrittlement (only applicable for the beltline weld, RVWD-140) to 28 EFPY, as indicated in NMPC's letter dated September 14, 1999. The NRC reviewed the original evaluations and concurred that continued operation with these flaws is acceptable through 28 EFPY, the end of the current license term, as stated in the NRC SE dated May 5, 2000. In 2002, these evaluations were reconciled to the pressure test conditions associated with the updated P-T limit curves; the previously detected flaws remain acceptable when compared to the updated (lower) allowable flaw sizes at 28 EFPY.

The unacceptable indication in the closure head is located in weld RVWD-005 and characterized as a subsurface planar flaw. The flaw evaluation, as described in NMPC's letter dated September 19, 2003, considered fatigue crack growth due to 240 startup/shutdown cycles (the number of design startup/shutdown cycles for the original 40-year operating term) and determined the flaw to be acceptable for continued service.

#### Disposition:

The number of cycles from the time of inspection to the end of the evaluation period is used to determine crack growth as discussed in NMPC's September 19, 2003. With the addition of the period of extended operation (20 years), the NMP1 RPV can be expected to accumulate fatigue usage for no more than 25 additional years. During this interval, it is unlikely that 240 startup/shutdown cycles will occur. Therefore, the RPV closure head weld flaw evaluation remains valid for the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i).

Evaluation, re-examination, and repairs associated with identified flaw indications are controlled under the NMP1 ASME Inservice Inspection (Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD) Program, which manages aging of all Class 1, 2, and 3 pressure-retaining components and their integral attachments. Prior to the period of extended operation, the RPV weld flaw calculations will be revised to consider additional fatigue crack growth and the effects of additional irradiation embrittlement for beltline materials associated with operation for an additional 20 years (i.e., out to at least 46 EFPY). If the revised calculation shows the identified flaws cannot meet the applicable acceptance criteria, the indications will be re-examined in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements. These activities provide assurance that the potential growth of identified flaws in the RPV welds will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).

#### **4.7.4.2 Staff Evaluation**

The applicant's original flaw evaluation for the flaw located in one of the RPV closure head meridional welds was provided in NMPC letter (NMP 1L-1776), dated September 19, 2003, and was approved in the NRC safety evaluation to NMPC dated December 21, 2004. The original flaw evaluation considered fatigue crack growth due to 240 startup/shutdown cycles (the number of design startup/shutdown cycles for the 40-year operating term) and determined the flaw to be acceptable for continued service.

In ALRA Section 4.7.4, the applicant stated that the number of cycles from the time of inspection to the end of the evaluation period is used to determine crack growth. In addition, the applicant indicated that with the addition of the period of extended operation (20 years), the NMP1 RPV can be expected to accumulate fatigue usage for no more than 25 additional years.

The staff's review of ALRA Section 4.7.4 identified an area in which additional information was necessary to complete the review of the reactor vessel and reactor vessel closure head weld flaw evaluations.

In RAI 4.7.4-1, dated November 22, 2005, the staff requested that the applicant provide a commitment to state that the analysis is to be submitted for staff review and approval no later than two years prior to the period of extended operation.

In its response, by letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant clarified that from the date of the inspection (March 2003) through the end of the period of extended operation, it is unlikely that the number of startup/shutdown cycles that occur will exceed the 240 additional startup/shutdown cycles that were the bases for the evaluation. Therefore, the staff agreed with the applicant that the RPV closure head weld flaw evaluation remains valid for the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i).

The applicant's original flaw evaluation for the two flaws located in the RPV shell welds was provided in Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) Letter NMP 1L-1467, dated September 14, 1999, and approved in the NRC safety evaluation to NMPC dated May 5, 2000. The flaw evaluations considered fatigue crack growth and irradiation embrittlement to 28 EFPY, and the staff concurred that continued operation with these flaws was acceptable only through 28 EFPY, the end of the current license term. Therefore, to address the impact of license renewal on these flaw evaluations, the applicant, in ALRA Section A1.4 and as supplemented by its letter dated December 5, 2005, revised Commitment No. 12 for NMP1 regarding the RPV shell weld flaws:

The RPV weld flaw evaluation will be revised to consider additional fatigue crack growth and the effects of additional irradiation embrittlement (for beltline materials) associated with operation for an additional 20 years (i.e., out to at least 46 EFPY) and submitted for NRC review and approval no later than 2 years prior to the period of extended operation. If the revised calculation shows the identified flaws cannot meet the applicable acceptance criteria, the indications will be reexamined in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements.

The applicant's commitment requires the applicant to submit the renewed flaw evaluations for the flaws in the RPV shell welds to the NRC for staff review and approval at least two years prior to entering the period of extended operation. The applicant's commitment will ensure that the staff

will have sufficient time to assess the renewed flaw evaluations for acceptability. Based on this evaluation and the applicant's revision of Commitment 12, the staff concluded that the applicant will adequately address that the structural integrity of the NMP-1 RPV shell will be maintained during the period of extended operation. Therefore, the staff's concern described in RAI 4.7.4-1 is resolved.

#### **4.7.4.3 UFSAR Supplement**

The applicant provided a UFSAR supplement summary description of its TLAA evaluation of the reactor vessel and reactor vessel closure head weld flaw evaluations in ALRA Section A1.2.5.1, which was supplemented by letter dated December 5, 2005. On the basis of its review of the UFSAR supplement, the staff concluded that the summary description of the applicant's actions to address the reactor vessel and reactor vessel closure head weld flaw evaluations is adequate.

In addition, by letter dated December 5, 2005, the applicant provided a revised Commitment No. 12, as stated above.

The staff found that the applicant had adequately included its commitment regarding the RPV weld flaw evaluations in Table A1.4 of the NMP1 ALRA, and therefore concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of Commitment No. 12 for NMP1.

#### **4.7.4.4 Conclusion**

On the basis of its review, as discussed above, the staff concluded that the applicant had demonstrated, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i), regarding the RPV closure head weld flaw evaluation, that the analyses remain valid for the period of extended operation. The applicant has also provided an acceptable demonstration, pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii), regarding potential growth of identified flaws in the RPV welds, that the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation. The staff also concluded that the UFSAR supplement contains an appropriate summary description of the reactor vessel and reactor vessel closure head weld flaw evaluations TLAA evaluation for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(d).

### **4.8 Conclusion for Time-Limited Aging Analyses**

The staff reviewed the information in ALRA Section 4, "Time-Limited Aging Analyses." On the basis of its review, the staff concluded that, subject to resolution of Open Item 4.7B.1-1, the applicant had provided an adequate list of TLAAs, as defined in 10 CFR 54.3. Further, the staff concluded that the applicant demonstrated that: (1) the TLAAs will remain valid for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(i); (2) the TLAAs have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii); or (3) that the aging effects will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation, as required by 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). The staff also reviewed the UFSAR and USAR supplements for the TLAAs and found that the supplements contain descriptions of the TLAAs sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(d). In addition, the staff concluded that no plant-specific exemptions are in effect that are based on TLAAs, and that, thus, the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(2) are satisfied.

With regard to these matters, the staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed licenses will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB, and that any changes made to the CLB, in order to comply with 10 CFR 54.29(a), are in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the NRC's regulations.

## **SECTION 5**

### **REVIEW BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS**

In accordance with Title 10, Part 54, of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will review the amended license renewal application (ALRA) for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The ACRS Subcommittee on Plant License Renewal will continue its detailed review of the ALRA after this safety evaluation report (SER) is issued. The applicant and the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the staff) will meet with the subcommittee and the full committee to discuss issues associated with the review of the ALRA.

After the ACRS completes its review of the ALRA and the SER, the full committee will issue a report discussing the results of the review. An update to this SER will include the ACRS report. This update will also include the staff's response to any issues and concerns identified in the ACRS report.



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## SECTION 6

### CONCLUSION

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) reviewed the original license renewal application (LRA) and the amended license renewal application (ALRA) for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the NRC regulations and NUREG-1800, "Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants," dated July 2001. Title 10, Section 54.29, of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 54.29) provides the standards for issuance of a renewed license.

On the basis of its evaluation of the original LRA and ALRA, the staff determined that upon favorable resolution of the open items identified in SER Section 1.5 it will be able to conclude that the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29(a) have been met.

The staff notes that any requirements of Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51 are documented in draft Supplement 24 to NUREG-1437, "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Regarding Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Draft Report for Comment," dated September, 2005.

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## **APPENDIX A**

### **COMMITMENTS FOR LICENSE RENEWAL OF NMPNS UNITS 1 AND 2**

During the review of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, original license renewal application (LRA) and amended license renewal application (ALRA) by the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the applicant made commitments related to aging management programs to manage aging effects of structures and components prior to the period of extended operation. The following table lists these commitments, along with the implementation schedules and the sources of the commitment.

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 1				
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
3	Apply for relief from reactor vessel circumferential weld inspections for the period of extended operation. Supporting analyses, procedural controls, and operator training will be completed prior to the period of extended operation to support and confirm that the RPV circumferential weld failure probability remains acceptable for the period of extended operation.	A1.2.1.3	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.2.3
8	Develop a baseline Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF) for the specified portions of the following systems: (1) Feedwater / High Pressure Coolant Injection (2) Core Spray (3) Reactor Water Cleanup (piping inside the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary) and (4) Reactor Recirculation (and associated Shutdown Cooling Systems Lines). If the baseline CUF for a specified portion of a system exceeds 0.4, the limiting locations may require additional monitoring to demonstrate compliance over the period of extended operation.	A1.2.2.3	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.7
10	The Fatigue Monitoring Program will track transients specific to the Emergency Cooling System with additional usage added to the baseline Cumulative Usage Factor for the emergency condensers as described in Section 4.3 of the LRA.	A1.2.2.6	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.7
11	Enhance the Fatigue Monitoring Program to (1) ensure that fatigue usage of the torus attached piping and other torus locations does not exceed the design limits, add ERV lifts as a transient to be counted by the Fatigue Monitoring Program and (2) add the two highest usage torus attached piping locations, the 12-inch core spray suction line for Core Spray Pump 111 that enters the torus at penetration XS-337 and the 3-inch containment spray line that enters the torus at penetration XS-326 as fatigue monitoring locations.	A1.2.4.2	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.6.2 and Appendix B3.2

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 1				
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
12	The RPV weld flaw evaluations will be revised to consider additional fatigue crack growth and the effects of additional irradiation embrittlement (for beltline materials) associated with operation for an additional 20 years (i.e., out to at least 46 EFY) and submitted for NRC review and approval no later than 2 years prior to the period of extended operation. If the revised calculation shows the identified flaws cannot meet the applicable acceptance criteria, the indications will be reexamined in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements.	A1.2.5.1	August 22, 2007	ALRA Section 4.7.4 As supplemented By NMP1L 2007 Dated 12/5/05
13	Enhance the BWR VIP to address the following: (1) BWRVIP-18 open item regarding the inspection of inaccessible welds for core spray system. As such, NMPNS will implement the resolution of this open item as documented in the BWRVIP response and reviewed and accepted by the NRC; (2) The inspection and evaluation guidelines for steam dryers are currently under development by the BWRVIP committee. Once these guidelines are documented, and reviewed and accepted by the NRC, the actions will be implemented in accordance with the BWRVIP program; (3) The baseline inspections recommended in BWRVIP-47 for the BWR lower plenum components will be incorporated into the appropriate program and implementing documents; and (4) The reinspection scope and frequency for the grid beam going forward will be based on BWRVIP-26A guidance for plant specific flaw analysis and crack growth assessment. The maximum reinspection interval for the grid beam will not exceed 10 years consistent with standard BWRVIP guidance for the core shroud. The reinspection scope will be equivalent to the UT baseline 2005 inspection scope. In addition, the reinspection scope will include an EVT-1 sample inspection of at least 2 locations with accessible indications within the initial 6 years of the 10 year interval. The intent of the EVT-1 is to monitor the known cracking to confirm flaw analysis crack growth assumptions.	A1.1.12	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.8 As supplemented By NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 1				
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
16	The Boraflex Monitoring Program will be enhanced to (1) Require periodic neutron attenuation testing and measurement of boron areal density to confirm the correlation of the conditions of test coupons to those of Boraflex racks that remain in use during the period of extended operation; and (2) Establish monitoring and trending instructions for in-situ test results, silica levels, and coupon results.	A1.1.5	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.12 As supplemented By NMP1L 1996 Dated 11/17/05
18	Enhance the Compressed Air Monitoring Program to (1) Develop new activities to manage the loss of material, stress corrosion cracking, and perform periodic system leak checks;(2) Expand the scope, periodicity, and inspection techniques to ensure that the aging of certain sub-components of the dryers and compressors (e.g., valves, heat exchangers) are managed; (3) Develop and implement activities to address the failure mechanism of stress corrosion cracking in unannealed red brass piping; (4) Establish activities that manage the aging of the internal surfaces of carbon steel piping and that require system leak checks to detect deterioration of the pressure boundaries; and (5) Expand the acceptance criteria to ensure that the aging of certain sub-components of the dryers and compressors (e.g., valves, heat exchangers) are managed.	A1.1.14	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.14

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 1				
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
21	Enhance the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program to (1) Establish specifications to perform quarterly trending of water and sediment; (2) Provide guidelines for the appropriate use of biocides, corrosion inhibitors, and/or fuel stabilizers to maintain fuel oil quality; (3) Add specifications to periodically inspect the interior surfaces of the emergency diesel fuel oil storage tanks for evidence of significant degradation, including a specific requirement that the tank bottom thickness be determined by UT or other industry recognized methods; (4) Add specifications for quarterly trending of particulate contamination analysis results; (5) Ensure acceptance criteria are specified in the implementing procedures for the applicable indications of potential degradation; (6) Establish specifications for periodic opening of the diesel fire pump fuel oil day tank drain; and (7) Establish specifications to remove water, if found.	A1.1.20	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.16 As supplemented By NMP1L 1996 Dated 11/17/05 and NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05
26	Enhance the Structures Monitoring Program to (1) Expand the program to include the following activities or components in the scope of License Renewal but not within the current scope of 10 CFR 50.65: (a) the steel electrical transmission towers required for the SBO and recovery paths; (2) Expand the parameters monitored during structural inspections to include those relevant to aging effects identified for structural bolting; and (3) Implement regularly scheduled ground water monitoring to ensure that a benign environment is maintained.	A1.1.34	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.28



APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 1				
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
36	<p>As acknowledged by the NRC in the referenced RAI, the ASME Code Committee is evaluating the acceptability of roll/expansion techniques as a permanent repair for CRD stub tubes via Code Case N-730. NMP will continue to follow the status of the proposed ASME code case and will implement the final code case, as conditioned by the NRC, once it has been approved. If the code case is not approved by the ASME, NMP1 will seek NRC approval of the 10/19/05 code case draft on a plant specific basis as conditioned by the NRC.</p> <p>During the period of extended operation, should a CRD stub tube rolled in accordance with the provisions of the code case resume leaking, NMP will implement one of the following zero leakage permanent repair strategies prior to startup from the outage in which the leakage was detected:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A welded repair consistent with BWRVIP-58-A, "BWRVIP Internal Access Weld Repair" and Code Case N-606-1, as endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.147.</li> <li>2. A variation of the welded repair geometry specified in BWRVIP-58-A subject to the approval of the NRC using Code Case N-606-1.</li> <li>3. A future developed mechanical/welded repair method subject to the approval of the NRC.</li> </ol>	A1.1.12	August 22, 2009	ALRA Appendix B2.1.8 As supplemented By NMP1L 2004 Dated 11/30/05
38	An EVT-1 examination of the NMP1 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be added to the BWR Vessel Internals Program. The inspection extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket vessel attachment welds.	A1.1.12	Prior to NMP1 Period of Extended Operation	NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 1				
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
39	The Masonry Wall Program (as managed by the Structures Monitoring Program) will be enhanced to provide guidance for inspecting NMP1 non-reinforced masonry walls that do not have bracing and are within scope of license renewal more frequently than the reinforced masonry walls.	A1.1.23, A1.1.34	Prior to NMP1 Period of Extended Operation	NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05
40	NMP1 will perform an EVT-1 inspection of the thermal shield to flow shield weld starting in 2007 and proceeding at a 10 year frequency thereafter consistent with the ISI inspection interval.	A1.1.12	Prior to NMP1 Period of Extended Operation	NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 2				
NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
6	For the bounding locations for ASME Class 1 systems, transients contributing to fatigue usage will be tracked by the Fatigue Monitoring Program (FMP) with additional usage added to the baseline Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF) using the design Cycle Based Fatigue (CBF) method described in Section 4.3 of the LRA. If a bounding location with a current CUF value less than or equal to 0.1 could have its CUF value exceed 0.1 before the end of the period of extended operation, then the impact on the original break postulation calculations will be assessed.	A2.2.2.2	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.2
8	If fatigue monitoring of ASME Class 1 piping (described in LRA Section 4.3.2) indicates higher fatigue usage than expected, non-ASME Class 1 piping will be evaluated for possible fatigue concerns.	A2.2.2.4	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.4
9	Revise or evaluate the Cumulative Usage Factor evaluations for the shroud, core support plate and studs, and jet pumps to remove conservatism and/or encompass the period of extended operation (e.g., a more extensive fatigue analysis of the jet pumps will be performed).	A2.2.2.5	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.5
11	For penetrations listed in Table 4.6-4 of the LRA, transients contributing to fatigue usage will be tracked by the NMPNS FMP with additional usage added to the baseline Cumulative Usage Factor using the design Cycle Based Fatigue method described in Section 4.3 of the LRA.	A2.1.16	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.6.5

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 2				
NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
12	NMPNS will either:(1) Install core plate wedges (as part of a proposed core shroud tie-rod repair) to eliminate the need for the enhanced inspections of the core plate hold-down bolts recommended by BWRVIP-25; or (2) Perform an analysis (incorporating detailed flux/fluence analyses and improved stress relaxation correlations) in accordance with BWRVIP-25 to demonstrate that the core plate hold-down bolts can withstand all normal, emergency, and faulted loads considering the effects of stress relaxation, until the end of the period of extended operation and submit it for staff review and approval 2 years prior to entering the period of extended operation.	A2.2.5.3	October 31, 2024	ALRA Section 4.7.3 As supplemented By NMP1L 2007 Dated 12/5/05 And NMP1L 2008 Dated 12/13/05

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 2				
NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
13	<p>Enhance the BWR VIP to address (1) BWRVIP-18, 41 and 42 open items regarding the inspection of inaccessible welds for core spray, jet pump and low pressure coolant injection components, respectively. As such, NMPNS will implement the resolution of these open items as documented in the BWRVIP response and reviewed and accepted by the NRC; (2) The inspection and evaluation guidelines for steam dryers and access hole covers are currently under development by the BWRVIP committee. Once these guidelines are documented, and reviewed and accepted by the NRC, the actions will be implemented in accordance with the BWRVIP program; (3) The baseline inspections recommended in BWRVIP-47 for the BWR lower plenum components will be incorporated into the appropriate program and implementing documents; and (4) NMPNS will perform inspections of the guide beams similar (in inspection methods, scope and frequency of inspection) to the inspections specified in BWRVIP-47, "BWR Lower Plenum Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," for the control rod guide tube components. The extent of examination and its frequency will be based on a ten percent sample of the total population, which includes all grid beam and beam-to-crevice slots, being inspected within 12 years of entry into the period of extended operation with five percent of the population being inspected within the first six years. The sample locations selected for examination will be in areas that are exposed to the highest neutron fluence. The top guide grid beam reinspection requirements will depend on the inspection results; however, at a minimum, the NMP BWRVIP program will follow the same guidance for the subsequent 12 year interval as defined for the initial 12 year baseline."</p>	A2.1.13	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	<p>ALRA Appendix B2.1.8</p> <p>As supplemented By NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05 And NMP1L 2008 Dated 12/13/05</p>

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 2				
NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
19	Enhance the Fuel Oil Chemistry Program to (1) Provide guidelines for the appropriate use of biocides, corrosion inhibitors, and/or fuel stabilizers to maintain fuel oil quality; (2) Add a requirement to sample the diesel fuel oil storage tanks for water and sediment at least quarterly per the ASTM standard; (3) Add requirements to periodically inspect the interior surfaces of the fuel oil storage tanks for evidence of significant degradation, including a specific requirement that the tank bottom thickness be determined by UT or other industry recognized methods; (4) Add a requirement for quarterly trending of particulate contamination analysis results; (5) Ensure acceptance criteria are specified in the implementing procedures for the applicable indications of potential degradation; (6) Establish a requirement to perform quarterly trending of water and sediment; and (7) Establish a requirement to remove water, if found.	A2.1.20	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.18  As supplemented By NMP1L 1996 Dated 11/17/05 And NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05
24	Enhance the Structures Monitoring Program to (1) Expand the program to include the following activities or components in the scope of License Renewal but not within the current scope of 10 CFR 50.65: (a) Fire Rated Assemblies & Watertight Penetration Visual Inspections (b) masonry walls in the Turbine Building and Service Water Tunnel serving a fire barrier function (c) the steel electrical transmission towers required for the SBO and recovery paths; (2) Expand the parameters monitored during structural inspections to include those relevant to aging effects identified for structural bolting; and (3) Implement regularly scheduled ground water monitoring to ensure that a benign environment is maintained.	A2.1.34	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.2.27 and B2.1.28
34	Develop and implement a Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program.	A2.1.40	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.40

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 2					
NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE	
36	The spent fuel rack design that currently utilizes Boraflex for reactivity control in the spent fuel pool will be replaced by a design that utilizes Boral for this function.	NA	Prior to NMP2 Period of Extended Operation	NMP1L 1996 Dated 11/17/05	
37	An EVT-1 examination of the NMP2 feedwater sparger end bracket welds will be added to the BWR Vessel Internals Program as a program enhancement. The inspection extent and frequency of the end bracket weld inspection will be the same as the ASME Section XI inspection of the feedwater sparger bracket vessel attachment welds. If the final fabrication review of the NMP2 feedwater thermal sleeve concludes that the thermal sleeve hidden welds are not IGSCC susceptible, the NMP2 inspections will be discontinued.	A2.1.13	Prior to NMP2 Period of Extended Operation	NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05	
38	Enhance the Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements Program as follows: (1) Expand the scope of the existing procedures to provide for manhole inspections and water removal, (2) Develop a new testing procedure specific to those cables requiring aging management under this Program. The specific type of test performed will be a proven test for detecting deterioration of the insulation system due to wetting as described in EPRI TR-103834-P1-2, such as power factor, partial discharge, or other testing that is both state-of-the-art and consistent with the latest industry guidance at the time the test is performed. (3) establish requirement to test cables subject to aging management prior to, and every 10 years during, the period of extended operation, and (4) establish maintenance requirement to inspect and remove water, as necessary, from manholes serving cables subject to aging management. The inspection frequency will be based upon actual plant experience with water accumulation in the manhole, but in any event, will be at least once every two years. The first inspection will be completed prior to the period or extended operation.	A2.1.39	Prior to NMP2 Period of Extended Operation	NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05	

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – UNIT 2				
NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
39	No later than two years prior to entry into the PEO, NMP will submit, for NRC review and approval, the summary of the Reg. Guide 1.190 based analysis that determines the maximum neutron fluence at the NMP2 Biological Shield Wall or at the wall flaw locations that are the basis for the ALRA Section 4.7.1 TLAA. The submittal will include revised ALRA Sections 4.7.1 and A2.2.5.1, and any other supporting analysis, as applicable.	A2.2.5.1	October 31, 2024	NMP1L 2015 Dated 1/11/06



APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
1	1	Incorporate Appendix A1 into the NMP1 UFSAR and Appendix A2 into the NMP2 USAR.	A0 A0	Following the issuance of the renewed Operating License	ALRA Section A0
2	2	In accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(b), during NRC review of this application, provide an annual update to the application to reflect any change to the current licensing basis that materially affects the contents of the License Renewal Application (LRA).	NA	December 31, 2005	ALRA Section 1.2.1
4	3	Supporting analyses will be completed prior to the period of extended operation to confirm that the failure probabilities for the limiting RPV axial welds remain bounded for the period of extended operation.	A1.2.1.4 A2.2.1.3	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.2.4
5	4	For those locations where additional fatigue analysis is required to take advantage of the implicit margin, and to more accurately determine cumulative usage factor (CUFs), the EPRI FatiguePro fatigue monitoring software will be implemented prior to the period of extended operation.	A1.2.2 A2.2.2	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3 and Appendix B3.2
6	5	For the critical reactor vessel component locations, shown in Tables 4.3-3 and 4.3-4 of the LRA, additional usage will be added to the baseline Cumulative Usage Factor using one of the methods described in Section 4.3 of the LRA.	A1.2.2.1 A2.2.2.1	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.1
7	7	Transients contributing to fatigue usage of the FWS nozzles will be tracked by the Fatigue Monitoring Program (FMP) with additional usage added to the baseline Cumulative Usage Factor using the Stress Based fatigue method described in Section 4.3 of the LRA.	A1.2.2.2 A2.2.2.3	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.3

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
9	10	Assess the impact of the reactor coolant environment on a sample of critical component locations, including locations equivalent to those identified in NUREG/CR-6260, as part of the Fatigue Monitoring Program. These locations will be evaluated by applying environmental correction factors ( $F_{en}$ ) to existing and future fatigue analyses.	A1.2.2.5 A2.2.2.6	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Section 4.3.6 and Appendix B3.2
14	14	Enhance the Open Cycle Cooling Water System (OCCWS) Program to (1) Ensure that the applicable commitments made for GL 89-13, and the requirements in NUREG-1801, Section XI.M20 are captured in the implementing documents for GL 89-13; (2) Incorporate into the OCCWS program, the requirements of the NUREG-1801, Section XI.M20 that are more conservative than the GL 89-13 commitments; and (3) Revise the preventive maintenance and heat transfer performance test procedures to incorporate specific inspection criteria, corrective actions, and frequencies.	A1.1.29 A2.1.29	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.10

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
15	15	Enhance the Closed Cycle Cooling Water System (CCCWS) Program to (1) Expand periodic chemistry checks of the systems consistent with the guidelines of EPRI TR-107396;(2) Implement a program to use corrosion inhibitors in the Reactor Building Closed Loop (RBCL) Cooling Systems and Control Room HVAC System in accordance with the guidelines given in EPRI TR-107396; (3) Direct periodic inspections to monitor for loss of material in the piping of the CCCWS; (4) Implement a corrosion monitoring program for larger bore CCCW piping not subject to inspection under another program; (5) Establish the frequencies to inspect for degradation of components in CCCWS, including heat exchanger tube wall thinning; (6) Perform a heat removal capability test for the Control Room HVAC System at least every 5 years; (7) Establish periodic monitoring, trending, and evaluation of performance parameters for the RBCL cooling and Control Room HVAC; (8) Provide the controls and sampling necessary to maintain water chemistry parameters in CCCWS within the guidelines of EPRI Report TR 107396; and (9) Ensure acceptance criteria are specified in the implementing procedures for the applicable indications of degradation.	A1.1.13 A2.1.14	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.11
17	16	Revise applicable procedures related to the Crane Inspection Program to add specific direction for performance of corrosion inspections, with acceptance criteria, for certain hoist lifting assembly components.	A1.1.22 A2.1.22	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.13 As supplemented By NMP1L 1996 dated 11/17/05 and NMP1L 2005 dated 12/1/05

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
19	17	Enhance the Fire Protection Program to (1) Incorporate periodic visual inspections of piping and fittings located in a non-water environment such as Halon and Carbon Dioxide fire suppression systems components, to detect evidence of corrosion and any system mechanical damage that could affect its intended function; (2) Expand the scope of periodic functional tests of the diesel-driven fire pump to include inspection of engine exhaust system components to verify that loss of material is managed; (3) Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the plant specific inspection periodicity of fire doors; and (4) Revise Halon and Carbon Dioxide functional test frequencies to semi-annual.	A1.1.17 A2.1.17	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.16 As supplemented By NMP1L 1996 Dated 11/17/05

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
20	18	Enhance the Fire Water System Program by revising applicable existing procedures to (1) incorporate inspections to detect and manage loss of material due to corrosion into existing periodic test procedures; (2) specify periodic component inspections to verify that loss of material is being managed; (3) add procedural guidance for performing visual inspections to monitor internal corrosion and detect biofouling; (4) periodically check the water-based fire protection systems for microbiological contamination; (5) measure fire protection system piping wall thickness using non-intrusive techniques (e.g., volumetric testing) to detect loss of material due to corrosion; (6) establish an appropriate means of recording, evaluating, reviewing, and trending the results of visual inspections and volumetric testing; (7) define acceptance criteria for visual inspections and volumetric testing; and (8) Develop new procedures and PM tasks to implement sprinkler head replacements and/or inspections to meet National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 25, "Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems," Section 5.3.1 (2003 Edition) requirements.	A1.1.18 A2.1.18	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.17 As supplemented By NMP1L1996 dated 11/17/05

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
22	20	Enhance the Reactor Vessel Surveillance program to (1) Incorporate the requirements and elements of the Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP), as documented in BWRVIP-116 and approved by NRC, or an NRC approved plant-specific program into the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program, and include a requirement that if NMPNS surveillance capsules are tested, the tested specimens will be stored in lieu of optional disposal. When the NRC issues a final safety evaluation report (SER) for BWRVIP-116, NMPNS will address any open items and complete the SER Action Items. Should BWRVIP-116 not be approved by the NRC, a plant specific reactor vessel surveillance program will be submitted to the NRC two years prior to commencement of the period of extended operation and (2) Project analyses of upper shelf energy and pressure temperature limits to 60 years using methods prescribed by Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, and include the applicable bounds of the data, such as operating temperature and neutron fluence.	A1.1.32 A2.1.32	U1 - August 22, 2007 U2 - October 31, 2024	ALRA Appendix B2.1.19
23	21	Develop and implement a One-Time Inspection Program, which also includes the attributes for a Selective Leaching of Materials Program.	A1.1.28, A1.1.33 A2.1.28, A2.1.33	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendices B2.1.20 and B2.1.21
24	22	Develop and implement a Buried Piping and Tank Inspection Program which includes a requirement that before entry into the period of extended operation, if an opportunistic inspection has not occurred, NMPNS will excavate NMP1 and NMP2 degradation susceptible areas to perform focused inspections.	A1.1.6 A2.1.7	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.22, as supplemented By NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05
25	23	An augmented VT-1 visual examination of the containment penetration bellows will be performed using enhanced techniques qualified for detecting SCC, per NUREG-1611, Table 2, Item 12.	A1.1.2 A2.1.2	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.23

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
27	25	Develop and implement a Non-EQ Electrical Cables and Connection Program.	A1.1.24 A2.1.24	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.29
28	26	Enhance the Non-EQ Electrical Cable and Connections Used in Instrumentation Circuit Program to (1) Implement reviews of calibration or surveillance data for indications of aging degradation affecting instrument circuit performance. The first reviews will be completed prior to the period of extended operation and every ten years thereafter; and (2) In cases where a calibration or surveillance program does not include the cabling system in the testing circuit, or as an alternative to the review of calibration results described above, provide requirements and procedures to perform cable testing to detect deterioration of the insulation system, such as insulation resistance tests or other testing judged to be effective in determining cable insulation condition. The first test will be completed prior to the period of extended operation. The test frequency of these cables shall be determined based on engineering evaluation, but the test frequency shall be at least once every ten years.	A1.1.25 A2.1.25	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.30 as supplemented By NMP1L 2005 Dated 12/1/05
29	27	Enhance the Preventive Maintenance Program to (1) Expand the PM Program to encompass activities for certain additional components, identified as requiring Aging Management. Explicitly define the aging management attributes, including the systems and the component types/commodities included in the program; (2) specifically list those activities credited for aging management; (3) specifically list parameters monitored (4) specifically list the aging effects detected; (5) establish a requirement that inspection data be monitored and trended; and (6) establish detailed parameter-specific acceptance criteria.	A1.1.30 A2.1.30	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.32

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
30	28	Enhance the System Walkdown Program to (1) Train all personnel performing inspections in the Systems Walk-down Program to ensure that age related degradation is properly identified and incorporate this training into the site training program; and (2) Specify acceptance criteria for visual inspections to ensure aging related degradation is properly identified and corrected.	A1.1.35 A2.1.35	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.33
31	29	Enhance the Non-Segregated Bus Inspection Program to (1) expand visual inspections of the bus ducts, their supports and insulation systems; (2) Create new provisions to perform as an alternative to either thermography or periodic low range resistance checks of a statistical sample of the bus ducts accessible bolted connections, a visual inspection for the connections that are covered with heat shrink tape, sleeving, insulating boots, etc; and (3) Define acceptance criteria for inspection of the bus ducts, their support and insulation systems, and the low range ohmic checks of connections.	A1.1.27 A2.1.27	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.34 as supplemented By NMP1L 1996 dated 11/17/05 NMP1L 2005 dated 12/1/05 NMP1L 2007 dated 12/5/05
32	30	Develop and implement a Fuse Holder Inspection Program.	A1.1.21 A2.1.21	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.35



APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
33	31	Enhance the Bolting Integrity Program to (1) The Structures Monitoring, Preventive Maintenance and Systems Walk-down Programs will be enhanced to include requirements to inspect bolting for indication of loss of preload, cracking, and loss of material, as applicable; (2) Include in NMP administrative and implementing program documents references to the Bolting Integrity Program and Industry guidance; and (3) Establish an augmented inspection program for high-strength (actual yield strength $\geq$ 150 ksi) bolts. This augmented program will prescribe the examination requirements of Tables IWB-2500-1 and IWC-2500-1 of ASME Section SI for high-strength bolts in the Class 1 and Class 2 component supports, respectively.	A1.1.38 A2.1.37	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.36
34	32	Enhance the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program to (1) specify the visual examination of coated surfaces for any visible defects includes blistering, cracking, flaking, peeling, and physical or mechanical damage; (2) perform periodic inspection of coatings every refueling outage versus every 24 months; (3) set minimum qualifications for inspection personnel, the inspection coordinator, and the inspection results evaluator; (4) perform thorough visual inspections in areas noted as deficient concurrently with the general visual inspection; (5) specify the types of instruments and equipment that may be used for the inspection; (6) pre-inspection reviews of the previous two monitoring reports before performing the condition assessment; (7) establishment of guidelines for prioritization of repair areas and monitoring these areas until they are repaired; and (8) to require that the inspection results evaluator determine which areas are unacceptable and initiate corrective action.	A1.1.40 A2.1.38	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.38

APPENDIX A - NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION LICENSE RENEWAL COMMITMENTS – COMMON FOR NMP1 and NMP2					
NMP1 (ALRA Table A1.4 Items)	NMP2 (ALRA Table A2.4 Items)	COMMITMENT	UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) SUPPLEMENT LOCATION	IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE	SOURCE
35	33	Develop and implement a Non-EQ Electrical Cable Metallic Connections Inspection Program.	A1.1.41 A2.1.39	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.39
37	35	Enhance the program to evaluate component susceptibility to loss of fracture toughness. Assessments and inspections will be performed, as necessary, to ensure that intended functions are not impacted by the aging effect.	A1.1.12 A2.1.13	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Appendix B2.1.8 as supplemented By NMP1L 1996 Dated 11/17/05
38	36	NRC review of BWRVIP-76 is not yet complete. When NRC review of BWRVIP-76 is complete, NMPNS will evaluate the NRC SER and complete SER Action Item, as appropriate.	A1.1.12 A2.1.13	Prior to Period of Extended Operation	ALRA Sections A1.1.12 A2.1.13 B2.1.8

## APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGY

This appendix contains a chronological listing of routine licensing correspondence between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and Constellation Energy Group, LLC (CEG). This appendix also contains other correspondence regarding the NRC staff's review of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (under Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410).

May 26, 2004	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG submitted its application to renew the operating license of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS), Units 1 and 2. In its submittal, CEG provided an original signed hard copy of the application, with additional electronic copies of the application on CDs. Cover Page Through Chapter 4 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML041490223), Appendix A (Accession No. ML041490224), Appendix B (Accession No. ML041490225), Appendix C (Accession No. ML041490227), Appendix D (Accession No. ML041490229), LR Boundary Drawings. (Accession No. ML041540072)
May 28, 2004	NRC Press Release-04-065: NRC Announces Availability of LRA For NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML041490358)
June 01, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), the NRC acknowledged receipt and availability of the License Renewal Application (LRA) for NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML041540092)
June 02, 2004	Notice of June 16, 2004 Meeting (signed by R. Auluck) With CEG Regarding License Renewal For The NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML041540386)
June 16, 2004	Slides of June 16, 2004 Meeting Presentation on NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 - LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML041900140)
June 25, 2004	Notice of July 08, 2004 Meeting (signed by R. Auluck) With CEG Regarding License Renewal For The NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 to inform the public of the Forthcoming Public Information Session For The U.S. NRC Staff To Describe Its License Renewal Process. (ADAMS Accession No. ML041770243)
July 02, 2004	Summary of June 16, 2004 Meeting Between the U.S. NRC Staff and CEG, Inc Representatives to Discuss the NMPNS, Units 1 & 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML041840412)
July 08, 2004	Summary of Public Information Session for the U.S. NRC Staff to Describe Its License Renewal Process (Enclosure 3 - Slides for NMPNS). (ADAMS Accession No. ML042240058)
July 15, 2004	In the <i>Federal Register</i> , a "Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the Application and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-63 and DPR-69 for an Additional 20 Year Period" is published, concerning the NMPNS LRA. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML041980375)

July 21, 2004	NRC Press Release-04-088: NRC Announces Opportunity For Hearing On Application To Renew NMP Operating Licenses. (Accession No. ML042030444)
July 28, 2004	Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the Application and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69 - Correction. (Accession No. ML042240564)
July 29, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo) to Mr. Jim Spina of CEG, the NRC provided Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Scoping Process under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 51, to implement the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) for License Renewal for NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 (Accession No. ML042160074)
August 2, 2005	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), the NRC notified CEG that the staff has prepared a notice of intent advising the public that the NRC intends to gather information necessary to prepare a plant-specific supplement to the Commission's "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants," (NUREG-1437) in support of the review of the applications for the renewal of the NMP operating licenses. for License Renewal for NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 (Accession No. ML042160153)
August 9, 2005	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), the NRC provided a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Scoping Process for License Renewal for NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML042230182)
August 11, 2004	In a Meeting Summary (signed by N Le), the NRC staff issued a summary of the Public Meeting conducted on July 8, 2004, to describe the NRC license renewal process to the public living near (ADAMS Accession Number: ML042240038)
August 11, 2004	In the Federal Register, (Volume 69, Number 154, pages 48900-48901), a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Scoping Process in support of the review of the application for renewal of the NMPNS operating licenses for an additional 20 years (No ADAMS Accession No. )
August 11, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo) to Ms. B. Castro, New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation, to notify a site-specific Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) to its "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants" (GEIS), NUREG-1437, will be prepared under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 51, the NRC rules that implement the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) regarding NMP Units 1 and 2 License Renewal Review (Project Review OPRHP No. 03PR0532). (ADAMS Accession No. ML042250207)

August 11, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Leo R. Henry, Tuscarora Nation, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042250372)
August 11, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Emerson Webster, Tonawanda Band of Senecas, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042250412)
August 11, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Ricky L. Armstrong, Seneca Nation of Indians, regarding the US NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042250437)
August 11, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Irving Powless, Jr., Onondaga Nation, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042260213)
August 11, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Clint Half Town, Cayuga Nation of New York, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042260230)
August 11, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Raymond Halbritter, Oneida Indian Nation of New York, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042260238)
August 12 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Jim Ransom, St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042260408)
August 12 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable M. Terrance, St. Regis Band Of Mohawk Indians, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042260460)
August 12 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to The Honorable Barbara Lazore, St. Regis Band Of Mohawk Indians, regarding the U.S. NRC Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042260489)
August 20, 2004	In a Meeting Notice (signed by Leslie Field), the NRC staff issued Notice of forth coming meeeting to dicuss Environmental Scoping Prosess for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML042330412)
September 1, 2004	Revision of August 20, 2005, Notice Meeting to Discuss the Environmental Scoping Process for NMPNS, Units 1 and 2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042450141)

September 9, 2004	In an NRC Press release, the NRC announced seeking public input on Environmental Impact statement for NMPNS operating licenses (ADAMS Accession Number: ML042530638)
September 13, 2004	Notice of Exit Meeting on October 1, 2004 with CEG to Discuss the Audit of the Methodology for the Scoping & Screening for the LRA for NMPNS Units 1 & 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042570112)
September 15, 2004	In a report (signed by Leslie field), the NRC provided a list of the references obtained during the site audit to support review of the LRA for NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050540665)
September 16, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), NRC, to Ms. Natalie Roy, Oswego County Health Department, regarding the NMP, Units 1 and 2, License Renewal Review. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042610263)
September 18, 2004	E-Mail from Farouk Baxter to NRC Regarding Comments on NMP License Renewal. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050040016)
September 22, 2004	NMPNS Responses to U.S. NRC Requests for Additional Information from NRC Environmental Site Audit Conducted September 22, 2004. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043230144)
September 24, 2004	Letter (signed by L. Michael Treadwell), Executive Director, Operation Oswego County, to William L. Dam, NRC, Regarding NMPNS LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042860212)
October 4, 2004	In a letter (signed by State Senator Jim Wright, Chairman, the NY Stae Energy Committee) expressed strong support for the relicensing of NMPNS (ADAMS Accession Number: ML0428901600)
October 5, 2004	In a Meeting Notice (signed by N. Le), the NRC staff issued Notice of forth coming meeting to dicuss results of NRC audit and review of AMPs and AMRs for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML042800149), and revised October 25, 2004 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML042990305) to change meeting date to November 5, 2004
October 11, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052850264)
October 12, 2004	In a letter (signed by William A. Barclay), Assemblyman 12 <sup>th</sup> District, NY, to NRC supporting renewal of the operating licenses of NMP Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050050455)
October 20, 2004	In a letter (signed by Leslie Fields), the NRC staff issued RAIs regarding Severe Accident Mitigation Alternative (SAMA) for the NRC's review of the NMPNS LRA. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML042940508)

October 21, 2004	Transmittal Note from Dennis Vandeputte, NMPNS, to NRC Forwarding Requested Materials from Site Audit. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043100591)
October 25, 2004	Revised Notice (signed by N Le) of November 5, 2004 Meeting With CEG To Discuss The Aging Management Programs And Review For The LRA For NMPNS Units 1 & 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML042990305)
October 26, 2004	Posted Revision 1 to "Audit and Review Plan for Plant Aging M ADAMS anagement Reviews and Programs for the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2." (Accession No. ML043000333)
October 29, 2004	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG submitted supplemental information, resulting from the NRC audits of Aging Management Programs, to its NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML043140293)
November 4, 2004	Summary of Meeting (signed by Leslie C. Fields) to provide the public information that was discussed in a Public Scoping Meetings to Support Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA held 09/21/2004. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043130425)
November 7, 2004	In a letter (signed by P T Kuo), NRC, to Mr. Michael Stoll, US Fish and Wildlife regarding LRA For NMPNS Units 1 & 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043140284)
November 9, 2004	In a Audit Trip Report (signed by Dale Thatcher), the NRC staff provide a summary of scoping audit and review of NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML043150211)
November 10, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043170655)
November 10, 2004	NMP Units 1 and 2, Response to NRC Request for Information Regarding the Offsite Power System. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043280420)
November 11, 2004	In a Meeting Summary (signed by N. Le) the staff provided a summary of discussion between the NRC staff and Constellation applicant regarding reactor vessel fatigue analysis, containment liner plate, metal containment and penetration fatigue analysis. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML043270634)
November 15, 2004	Re-posted Audit And Review Plan For Plant Aging Management Reviews And Programs For The NMPNS, Units 1 And 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML043210580)
November 15, 2004	Docketing of Responses to Requests for Additional Information Regarding the Environmental Site Audit Conducted in Support of the Environmental Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043340314)

November 15, 2004	Docketing of References Obtained During Site Audit Conducted in Support of Environmental Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (ADAMS Accession No. ML050540665)
November 17, 2004	NRC Request for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043220665)
November 17, 2004	NRC Request for Add ADAMS itional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (Accession No. ML043220678)
November 17, 2004	NRC Request for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043220679)
November 17, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043270617)
November 17, 2004	Summary of Meeting (signed by N Le) held on October 28, 2004, Between the U.S. NRC and the CEG to further clarifying the intent of the staff's questions and the applicant's proposed responses, concerning the Review for the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043270634)
November 18, 2004	Email from P. Tam, NRC, to Gregory Cwalina, regarding Consideration of Allegation (TAC MC5106, MC5107). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043240017)
November 19, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. ADAMS(Accession No. ML043280670)
November 19, 2004	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG submitted supplemental information, resulting from the NRC audits and ongoing review of Aging Management Programs, to its NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML043600531)
November 22, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043280683)
November 22, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML053290143)
December 3, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC Nos. MC3272 AND MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043420049)
December 06, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG submitted supplemental information resulting from the NRC Audit of Aging Management Reviews. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043490370)
December 06, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession No. ML043490360)



December 06, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Time-Limited Aging Analyses (A ADAMS ccession No. ML04327064)
December 06, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession No. ML043490360)
December 7, 2004	In a letter (signed by P. T. Kuo), the NRC notified CEG that their support of the staff audits activities and CEG's response to the review of the draft requests for additional information (RAIs) has been less than timely and requested CEG to discuss plan to provide adequate resources to support the established review schedule for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML043450440)
December 8, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC NOS. MC3272 AND MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043450450)
December 9, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC NOS. MC3272 AND MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043490666)
December 10, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC NO. MC3272 AND MC3273). ADAMS(Accession No. ML043500176)
December 17, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Fire Detection and Protection Systems (TAC Nos. MC0691 and MC0692). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043630355)
December 17, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information from the Reactor Systems Branch Review (TACs MC0691 and MC0692). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043650311)
December 17, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Ad ADAMS ditional Information Regarding the Systems Walkdown Program (Accession No. ML043650328)
December 21, 2004	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043570368)
December 21 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and B2. 1.32. (Accession No. ML050040315)
December 22, 2004	NRC Request for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA, (TAC Nos. MC3272 AND MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043650003)

December 22, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Scoping and Screening Methodology of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050040332)
December 22, 2004	In a letter (signed by James Spina), CEG, provided Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Sections 2.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.4 of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA(TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050060182)
December 27, 2004	NRC Request for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA, (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043650006)
December 29, 2004	Email from P. Tam, NRC, to Peter Farouk Baxter, regarding concerns with the NMP Offsite Power System. (ADAMS Accession No. ML043650417)
December 30, 2004	Acknowledgment of receipt of letter for renewal of operating licenses for NMP, Units 1 and 2 addressed to J. Wright, NY State Senator. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051680395)
January 3, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided its response to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding the Reactor Recirculation Systems of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (ADAMS Accession No. ML050110235)
January 3, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided its response to the staff letter dated 12/7/2004 regarding the status of the NRC review schedule for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050120217)
January 5, 2005	In a letter (signed by N. Le), NRC, to J. Spina, NMP, regarding Revision of Schedule for the Conduct of Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050060421)
January 5, 2005	In a letter (signed by Leslie Fields), the NRC staff issued an Environmental Scoping Summary Report associated with the staff's review of the applications by CEG for renewal of the operating licensees for NMP Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050060373)
January 7, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided its response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the NMP Unit 1 Containment System (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050190296)
January 10, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided its response to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Aging Management of Electrical and Instrumentation and Control Systems. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050190295)

January 10, 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2, LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Structures (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050190292)
January 12, 2005	In a Meeting Notice (signed by N. Le), the NRC staff issued Notice of forth coming meeting with CEG to discuss the milestone for the NRC review schedule of NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML0501300420)
January 13, 2005	In a Note to File (signed by N Le) the staff docketed additional information regarding the staff's follow-up questions after having reviewed CEG letters NMP1I 1899, 1 NMP1I 1900, dated December 17, 2004, and NMP1I 1905, dated 12, 22,2004 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050270496)
January 13, 2005	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, License Renewal Application (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050130283)
January 14, 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2 LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding the Time-Limited Aging Analysis for Main Steam Isolation Valve Corrosion Allowance and the Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050250188)
January 20, 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2, LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Aging Management of Bolting. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050330463)
January 26, 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2. LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050390370)
January 31 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2, LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding Sections 2.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.4, and Scoping and Screening Methodology. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050460233)
January 31, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG submitted supplemental information to revise and supplement its response to the staff RAI on SAMA for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050460312)
January 31, 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2, LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding RAI for Section 2.3.3 for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession No. ML050460233)
February 2, 2005	A public meeting was held in Rockville, Maryland at the NRC Headquarters office between the NRC staff and CEG staff to discuss the review status and its impact on the NRC review schedule for the NMPNS LRA. This is documented in a Meeting Summary issued on March 3, 2005 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML0506620124)

February 4, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG submitted supplemental information resulting from the NRC audit and review of AMRs for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050450485)
February 10, 2005	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050410428)
February 11, 2005	In a summary of a telephone conference conducted on February 11, 2005 (signed by N. Le), the NRC described the discussion between NRC staff and CEG staff concerning the staff RAIs for NMPNS (ADAMS Accession Number ML050420328)
February 11, 2005	Summary of January 27, 2005 Conference Call Between the U.S. NRC and the CEG, Inc. Concerning the Review for the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050420328)
February 11, 2005	Summary of the January 25, 2005 Conference Call Held with CEG Inc. Concerning the Review of the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, License Renewal. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050420387)
February 11, 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2, LRA - Submittal of Supplemental Information for Review of the LRA (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050560199)
February 14, 2005	In a summary of a telephone conference conducted on February 14, 2005 (signed by N. Le), the NRC described the discussion between NRC staff and CEG staff concerning the staff follow-up questions related to CEG supplemental information provided in CEG letter of 11/19/04 and 12/6/04 for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number ML050460138)
February 14, 2005	NMP Units 1 and 2, LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding the Reactor Vessel and Reactor Vessel Internal Components. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050610059)
February 17, 2005	In a Meeting Notice (signed by R. Lorson), the NRC/ Region I staff issued Notice of forthcoming meeting with CEG to discuss NRC's team inspection covering the scoping and aging management portions of the NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050480487)
February 22, 2005	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050540196)
February 23, 2005	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050540263)
February 23, 2005	NRC Press Release-I-05-008: NRC, Company To Discuss License Renew Inspection Conducted At NMP Nuclear Power Plant. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050540439)

February 28, 2005	In an NRC Press Release, the NRC announced the postponement of of the proposed March 3, 2005 public meeting to be held in Scriba, New York (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050590308)
March 1, 2005	Revision - Notice of March 3, 2005 Meeting with Constellation Generation Group to Discuss NRC's Team Inspection Covering the Scoping and Aging Management Portions of NMPNS's Application for a Renewed License. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050600423)
March 3, 2005	Summary of Meeting held on February 2, 2005, between the U.S. NRC Staff and NMPNS, LLC Representatives to discuss NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050620124)
March 3, 2005	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050620591)
March 3, 2005	In a letter (signed by T O'Connor), CEG requested a 90-day grace period to revcover the quality of the NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050680270)
March 3, 2005	The staff posted audit data base resulting from the staff initial audit and review of the original NMLNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050660380)
March 7, 2005	In a letter (signed by P. Kuo), the NRC acknowledged CEG's March 3, 2005, request and its commitment to address quality issues, including those items the staff have discussed on the telephone [and listed in the letter]. The NRC stopped its review in response to CEG's request. As a result of this delay, the staff will not meet the standard 22 month review schedule for NMPNS LRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050660147)
March 7, 2005	The staff forwarded to CEG the remaining back-logged RAIs for CEG regarding NMPNS LRA Section 2.0 Tables - Scoping and Screening, LRA Section 2.3.4.A.5 - T-quenchers, LRA Section 3.1 Tables, LRA Tables 3.1.2.A-4 and 3.1.2.B-4, and LRA section 4.7.2 MSIV Corrosion Allowance (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050680323)
March 8, 2005	NRC Press Release-05-045: NRC Extends Review Schedule For NMP Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Request. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050670508)
March 10, 2005	Summary of a Conference Call Held on February 28, 2005, Between the U.S. NRC and the CEG Inc. Concerning the Review for the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML050690308)
March 11, 2005	In a letter (signed by N Le), the NRC staff revised the staff's review schedule for the NMPNS (ADAMS Accession Number: ML05050700134)

March 18, 2005	In a letter (signed by N Le) the staff issued a Meeting Notice to inform the public a proposed meeting on March 30, 2005 to provide time for CEG to discuss with NRC Management about their approach to the Recovery Plan for NMPNS LR activities. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050770042)
March 25, 2005	Email from N. Le, NRC, to P. Mazzzaferro, NMP, regarding Back-logged follow-up RAIs for the Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems for NMP1 and NMP2 LRA - Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051010073)
April 19, 2005	Summary of Meeting Held on March 30, 2005, Between the NRC Staff and the CEG, Inc. Representatives to Discuss the Status of Their Recovery Effort for NMP, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051090540)
May 13, 2005	In a letter (signed by T. O'Connor), CEG provided a 60-day Notice and informed the NRC that CEG inted to complete the recovery tasks of the NMPNS LRA and will re-submit the information by July 15, 2005 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML051440459)
May 20, 2005	Notice of June 9, 2005 Meeting with CEG Regarding the Recovery Plan of the License Renewal for NMP Units 1 & 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051420002)
June 9, 2005	License Renewal IR 05000220-05-006 & 05000410-05-006, on 02/14-18/2005, 02/28/2005 - 03/04/2005 & 04/04/2005 - 04/08/2005, NMP Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 & Unit 2; Interim report of inspection of the proposed aging management procedures and compliance. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051610037)
June 9, 2005	Presentation Slides, NMP, Units 1 and 2, LRA Status Update. (Accession No. ML051650086)
June 16, 2005	Summary of Meeting held on June 9, 2005, between the U.S. NRC Staff and the CEG, Inc. Representatives to discuss the status of their recovery effort, NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051670446)
June 16, 2005	Email from N. Le, NRC, to D. Dellario, regarding NMP backlogged follow-up RAIs for the Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems for NMP1 and NMP2 LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051730318)
June 17 2005	Docketing of Additional Information pertaining to LRA of the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML051750247)
July 14, 2005	Letter from J. Spina, NMP, to NRC regarding Recovery of NMP LRA Quality. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052000163)

July 14, 2005	In a letter, NMP1I 1962, (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided an amended LRA (ALRA) which is an enhancement to the original NMPNS LRA which now has a more refined level of detail of information (ADAMS Accession Number: ML051440459)
July 14, 2005	Amended LRA for NMPNS provided with CEG letter NMP1I 1962 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML051440459)
July 14, 2005	Section 3.0 thru Appendix D, Amended LRA for NMPNS provided with CEG letter NMP1I 1962 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML051440459)
July 14, 2005	In a letter, NMP1I 1963, (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided amended LRA (ALRA) reference boundary drawings used in re-scoping and screening phase (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052000143)
July 14, 2005	In a letter, NMP1I 1958, (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided CEG's responses to the previously unanswered RAIs from NRC (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052000147)
July 14, 2005	In a letter, NMP1I 1960, (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided CEG's clarification to the previously answered RAIs from NRC (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052000175)
July 14, 2005	NMP LRA - Clarification to Responses to Previously Answered NRC Requests for Additional Information. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052000173)
July 14, 2005	NMP - Amended LRA, July 2005, Technical Information. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052000186)
July 15, 2005	NRC Briefing for Delivery of the NMP Amended LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052080213)
July 26, 2005	Note to file, docketing of additional information pertaining to LRA of the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052120003)
August 5, 2005	Letter from William Holston of NMPNS to Ms. Alyse Peterson regarding Application for Renewal of Operating Licenses. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052310317)
August 12, 2005	Docketing of Additional Information Pertaining to LRA of the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052240223)
August 12, 2005	Note to File: Docketing of Additional Information Pertaining to LRA of the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052270151)
August 19, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided supplemental letter for reformatting Sections 3.1.2, 3.2.2, 3.3.2, 3.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.6.2 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML0525005723)

September 12, 2005	The staff forwarded a copy of the NRC Audit and Review Plan for Plant Management Programs and Reviews for NMPNS ALRA. NRC Audit scheduled for weeks of September 19 and October 24, 2005 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052780304)
September 15, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided responses to staff RAIs and a table of clarification to its in a section by section (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052700377), Subsequently this information was superadded by new information by letter dated November 17, 2005 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML053320201)
September 30, 2005	In a letter (signed by PT Kuo), NRC issued the NRC's Draft NUREG-1437, "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 24, Regarding NMPNS, Units 1 and 2." (ADAMS Accession Number ML052720075)
October 7, 2005	Docketing of additional information (signed by N Le) for NMP ALRA Review (ADAMS Accession Number ML05052970005)
October 11, 2005	NRC Requests for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML052850264)
October 13, 2005	In a letter (signed by N Le) the staff issued a revised schedule for the staff review of the NMPNS ALRA and other audit & review activities. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052870573)
October 13, 2005	In a letter (signed by N Le) the staff issued a Meeting Notice to inform the public a proposed meeting on November 18, 2005 to discuss results of the NRC audits and reviews of AMPs and AMRs for NMPNS ALRA activities. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052850010)
October 13, 2005	Docketing of additional information (signed by N Le) for NMP ALRA Review (ADAMS Accession Number ML052940233)
October 13, 2005	In a letter (signed by L. Fields) the staff issued a Meeting Notice to inform the public a proposed meeting on November 17, 2005 to discuss the draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for NMPNS ALRA activities. (ADAMS Accession Number: ML052900180)
October 15, 2005	NRC posted the data base for NMPNS LRA and ALRA NRC audits and reviews (ADAMS Accession Number: ML050660384)
October 24, 2005	Docketing of additional information (signed by N Le) for NMP ALRA Review (ADAMS Accession Number ML05052970005)
October 28, 2005	NMP, Units 1 and 2, LRA - Responses to the NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding LRA Sections 2.3 and 2.4. (ADAMS Accession No. ML053120311)
November 2, 2005	NRC Request for Additional Information for the review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, Amended LRA. (Accession No. ML053070131)



November 16, 2005	In a letter (signed by Marvin Sykes), the staff provided CEG wit its inspection plan for the staff inspection of the NMPNS ALRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML05053200262)
November 17, 2005	In a letter (signed by T. O'Connor), CEG provided new information to supersede in its entirety the tabular clarification of information in CEG letter dated 9/15/2005 to the previously answered RAIs from NRC (ADAMS Accession Number: ML053320201)
November 22, 2005	NRC Request for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, Amended LRA (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (Accession No. ML053290143)
November 23, 2005	NRC Audit of Aging Management Programs and Aging Management Reviews for NMP Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Database. (ADAMS Accession No. ML053470313)
November 25, 2005	Comments (1) of Nancy Herter on Relicensing for NMPNS, Units 1 & 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML053430114)
November 29, 2005	NRC Request for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 & 2, Amended LRA (TAC Nos. MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML053340117)
November 30, 2005	NMP Units 1 & 2, Amended LRA (ALRA) - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding ALRA Parts 1,2, & 3 (TAC Nos. MC3272 & MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML053480196)
December 1, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided resolutions to NRC audit items and a Table of resultant changes to the NMPNS ALRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML053460458)
December 5, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided three editorial changes and table replacement to the NMPNS ALRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML053480197)
December 8, 2005	Note to File - Docketing of Additional Information pertaining to LRA of the NMPNS, Units 1 and 2. (ADAMS Accession No. ML053420477)
December 12, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CGG provided comments on the NRC's Draft NUREG-1437, "Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 24, Regarding NMPNS, Units 1 and 2." (ADAMS Accession Number ML053630304)
December 13, 2005	In a letter (signed by James A. Spina), CEG provided three changes to previously submitted information in CEG letters dated Decemebr 01, 2005 and letter dated December 05, 2005 to the NMPNS ALRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML053630052)

December 21 2005	NMP, Units 1 and 2, LRA - Responses to the NRC Requests for Additional Information Regarding LRA Section 3.4 (A ADAMS ccession No. ML050040315)
December 22, 2005	NRC Requests for Additional Information for Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML043650003)
December 23, 2005	NRC Request for Additional Information for the Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, Amended LRA. (ADAMS Accession No. ML053570337)
January 5, 2006	Audit and Review Report for Plant Aging Management Reviews and Programs, NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos: 50-220 and 50-410, January 5, 2006. (ADAMS Accession No. ML060110119)
January 11, 2006	NMP Units 1 and 2, Amended LRA - Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information - Sections 3.4 and 4.7. (ADAMS Accession No. ML060130197)
January 11, 2006	In a meeting notice (signed by Marvin Sykes), the NRC provided notice to the public of a proposed meeting on January 26, 2006, with CEG, to dicuss results of the NRC regioanl inspection regarding the NMPNS ALRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML0060100030)
January 13, 2006	NRC Requests for Additional Information for Review of NMPNS, Units 1 and 2, LRA (TAC MC3272 and MC3273). (ADAMS Accession No. ML050130283)
January 18, 2006	In a memorandum (signed by Kenneth Chang), the staff provided a resultant report of its audit and review activities in determinating wheter the AMPs and AMRs for the NMPNS ALRA are in compliance with 10 CFR Part 54 (ADAMS Accession Number: ML060180205)
January 18, 2006	In a meeting summary (signed by N Le) the staff provided a summary of information that was discussed, with the applicant, concerning the results of the staff audits and reviews of the AMPs and AMRs for the NMPNS ALRA (ADAMS Accession Number: ML060220009)
January 19, 2006	NRC Press Release-I-06-003: NRC, Constellation To Discuss License Renewal Inspection Conducted At NMP Nuclear Power Plant. (ADAMS Accession No. ML060190560)

## APPENDIX C: PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>
H. Ashar	Civil Engineering
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J. Burns	Reactor Systems
M. Case	Management Oversight
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T. Chan	Management Oversight
K. Chang	Mechanical Engineering
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G. Galletti	Quality & Vendor
F. Gillespie	Management Oversight
Q. Gan	General Engineer
R. Goel	Containment Systems
K. Gruss	Management Oversight
J. Hannon	Management Oversight
P. Hiland	Management Oversight
R. Hsu	GALL Audit and Review
E. Imbro	Management Oversight
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D. Jeng	Civil Engineering
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A. Stubbs	Balance of Plant
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### **CONTRACTORS**

<b><u>CONTRACTOR</u></b>	<b><u>TECHNICAL AREA</u></b>
Information Systems Laboratories	GALL Audit
Information Systems Laboratories	Balance of Plant
Legin Group, Inc.	SER Support

## APPENDIX D: REFERENCES

This appendix contains a listing of references used in the preparation of the Safety Evaluation Report prepared during the review of the license renewal application for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Numbers 50-325 and 50-324, respectively.

- (1) NUREG-1800, "Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants," April 2001
- (2) NEI 95-10, "Industry Guideline for Implementing the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 - The License Renewal Rule, Revision 3," August 2001
- (3) NUREG-1801, "Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report (GALL)," April 2001
- (4) Letters From NRC to Mr. James A. Spina, "Request For Additional Information (RAI) Regarding The License Renewal Application For The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2"
- (5) NMP Technical Report, LR\_PBD-IWBCD, "AMSE Section XI Inservice Inspection, Sub Sections IWB IWC, and IWD (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/9/2005
- (6) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-WCHEM, "Water Chemistry (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/14/2005
- (7) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-HDSTUDS, "Reactor Head Closure Studs Program," Revision 1, 9/7/2005
- (8) Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dated October 5, 2000, Subject: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 – Reliefs for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Program Plan, Revision 1 (TAC No. MA7129)
- (9) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-VIDWELDS, "BWR Vessel ID Attachment Welds Program (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/15/2005
- (10) NUREG-1544, "Status Report: Intergranular SCC of BWR Core Shroud and Other Internal Components," March 1996
- (11) NRC Regulatory Guide 1.65, "Materials and Inspections for Reactor Vessel Closure Studs," October 1973
- (12) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-FWNZL, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle," Revision 0, 9/7/2005
- (13) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-SCC, "BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/7/2005
- (14) NMP1-RI-ISI-003, "Alternative Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Plan and Schedule," Revision 01, 12/4/2003. NMP2-RI-ISI-006, "Alternative Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Plan and Schedule," Revision 00, 12/5/2003

- (15) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-VSSLPENS, "BWR Penetrations (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/15/2005
- (16) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-RVI, "BWR Vessel Internals (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/15/2005
- (17) ECPN-N1-HE-001, "NMP Unit 1 Erosion Corrosion Program Carbon Steel Piping Review Program High Energy Systems," Revision 5. ECPR-N2-HE-003, "NMP Unit 2 Carbon Steel and Low Alloy Piping Systems Erosion Corrosion (E/C) Review Program," Revision 0
- (18) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-U1OCCW, "Open-Cycle Cooling Water System (Unit 1)," Revision 0, 9/14/2005. NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-U1CCCW, "Closed-Cycle Cooling Water System (Unit 1)," Revision 0, 9/14/2005
- (19) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-RVI, "BWR Vessel Internals (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/15/2005
- (20) NMP-AMP BFX01, Rev 0, "NMP1 Program Plan for Spent Fuel Rack Boraflex Degradation Monitoring Program"
- (21) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-OHLOAD, "Inspection of Overhead Heavy Load and Light Load (Related to Refueling) Handling Systems (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/12/2005
- (22) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-COMPAIR, "Compressed Air Monitoring (Unit 1 only)," Revision 0, 9/13/2005
- (23) NMP Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Water Cleanup System (GALL XI.M25) Program Attribute Assessment, Revision 1, 8/5/2004
- (24) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-FIREPRO, "Fire Protection," Revision 0, 9/12/2005
- (25) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-FIREWATER, "Fire Water," Revision 0, 9/12/2005
- (26) N2-FSP-FPW-R001, "Electric/Diesel Fire Pump Functional Test," Revision 06, 10/23/2003. N1-PM-C3, "Electric and Diesel Fire Pump Performance Tests," Revision 05, 8/29/2003
- (27) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-U1FOCHEM, "Fuel Oil Chemistry (Unit 1)," Revision 0, 9/14/2005
- (28) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-OTINSP, "One-Time Inspection," Revision 0, 9/9/2005
- (29) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-IWE, "ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 2, 9/20/2005
- (30) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-IWF, "ASME Section XI, Subsection IWF (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 1, 9/7/2005

- (31) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-APPJ, "Program Attribute Assessment: Unit 1 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Program and Unit 2 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Program"
- (32) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-STRUCMON, "Structures Monitoring Program (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 0, 9/12/2005
- (33) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBP-ELECT1, "Aging Management Program for Electrical Cables and Connections not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirement," Revision 0, 9/14/2005
- (34) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-ELECT2, "Electrical Cables and Connections Not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements Used in Instrumentation Circuits," Revision 2, 9/16/2005
- (35) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-ELECT3, "Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cable not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements (Unit 2 Only)," Revision 0, 10/10/2005
- (36) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-ELECT4, "Aging Management Program for Bus Duct," Revision 0, 9/9/2005
- (37) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-CRDRL, "BWR Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle (Units 1 and 2)," Revision 1, 9/7/2005
- (38) NMP Technical Report, LR-PBD-ELECTPOLE, "Wooden Power Pole Inspection Program," Revision 0, 9/9/2005
- (39) NIP-REL-06, Revision 02, "Fatigue Monitoring Program," 7/20/2004
- (40) NER-1S-035, "Report on System Review and Recommendations for a Transient and Fatigue Monitoring System at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station," Revision 0, 2/10/2004

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