

AGENDA

OPEN REGULATORY CONFERENCE

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

FEBRUARY 6, 2005

NRC REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GA.

- I. OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETING
INTENT
Mr. C. Casto, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
- II. NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE POLICY
Mr. M. Ernstes, Chief, Branch 1, DRP
- III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE WITH RISK PERSPECTIVES
Mr. M. Ernstes, Chief, Branch 1, DRP
- IV. SUMMARY OF APPARENT VIOLATIONS
Mr. M. Ernstes, Chief, Branch 1, DRP
- V. LICENSEE RISK PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION
- VI. LICENSEE RESPONSE TO APPARENT VIOLATION
- VII. BREAK/NRC CAUCUS
Mr. C. Casto, Director, DRP
- VIII. CLOSING REMARKS
Mr. C. Casto, Director, DRP

Draft Apparent Violation

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

10 CFR 50.59, Section (c) 2, requires the licensee to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a proposed change if the change would result in more than a minimal increase in occurrence of malfunction of a structure important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

UFSAR Section 3.5.1.3, Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena, and Table 3-23, Auxiliary Building Loads and Conditions, indicates that the control rooms would be designed to withstand tornado missiles of: (1) an 8-inch diameter X 12 foot long piece of wood, 200 pounds, 250 mph; and (2) a 2,000 pound automobile, 100 mph, 20 square foot impact area, at 25 feet above grade.

UFSAR Table 3-23 indicates that the Unit 3 control room would be designed to withstand normal dead and equipment loads plus tornado wind load due to 300 mph wind, as well as have blow out panels designed to relieve 3 psi differential pressure.

Contrary to the above, adequate corrective actions have not been taken to resolve a long-standing discrepancy between the Unit 3 control room and its tornado licensing basis specified in UFSAR Section 3.5.1.3 and UFSAR Table 3-23. More specifically:

- (a) As identified in the licensee's corrective action program in 1996 and 2001, the north wall of the Unit 3 control room is not designed and constructed within its licensing basis to withstand the specified effects (wind force, missiles, and differential pressure) of differing tornado intensities. However, as of December 2005, the licensee has not performed any modifications to the plant or taken appropriate licensing action to resolve the aforementioned discrepancy.
- (b) On December 11, 2003, the licensee failed to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to the UFSAR that resulted in more than a minimal increase in occurrence of a malfunction of the Unit 3 control room. The improper change, which effectively negated the Unit 3 control room tornado design criteria contained in UFSAR Section 3.5.1.3 and Table 3-23, added text that indicated the Unit 3 control room north wall met the specified missile strike mitigation capability based, in part, on the TORMIS probabilistic risk methodology.

Note: The apparent violation discussed at this Regulatory Conference is subject to further review and subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.