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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER

Docket: 70-0036

September 5, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor
Acting Executive Director for Operations

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Governmental and Public Affairs

FROM: Maria E. Lopez-Otin
Special Assistant to Commissioner Roberts

SUBJECT: PUBLIC MEETING IN HILLSBORO, MISSOURI

Commissioner Roberts would like information on the August 24, 1989 public meeting concerning the planned expansion of operations at the Combustion Engineering Nuclear Fuels Manufacturing facility near Hematite, Missouri. The Commissioner would like to have copies of the public statements or representative samples if these are too numerous, the list of participants and a synopsis of the major concerns voiced during the Q&A period.

cc: Chairman Carr
Commissioner Rogers
Commissioner Curtiss
SECY

W-7

1 of 3

EDO---004729

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commissioner Thomas Roberts

FROM: James . Taylor
Acting Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: PUBLIC MEETING IN HILLSBORO, MISSOURI

This memorandum is in response to your request concerning the public meeting conducted by the NRC staff on August 24, 1989, in Hillsboro, Missouri. The following enclosures are provided: (1) the meeting agenda, (2) the moderator's introductory remarks, (3) overheads for the Hematite Fuel Production Facility Plant Manager's presentation, (4) NRC overheads for the licensing presentation, (5) NRC overheads for the response to issues raised by State Senator Nixon and the Coalition for the Environment, and (6) a synopsis of major concerns raised during the question and answer period.

James M. Taylor
Acting Executive Director
for Operations

Enclosures: As stated

Tell him that full transcript is coming.

cc w/encls: Chairman Carr
Commissioner Rodgers
Commissioner Curtiss
Harold R. Denton, GPA
SECY

Contact:
LCRouse, NMSS
DAMcCaughey, NMSS

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Synopsis of Major Concerns Voiced During Q&A Period

State Senator Jeremiah J. Nixon - Expressed appreciation for the public meeting. Stated need for performance excellence by CE, not just compliance with limits.

Martha Dodson - Concerned that CE monitor all wastes. Asked if the NRC made unannounced inspections. Did not feel comfortable with terms such as "acceptable doses;" wanted to know "safe limits."

Karen Sisk - Concerned about air effluents, water contamination, and safety of the plant. Asked questions concerning when limits in 40 CFR 190 were established, whether the old pelletizing building would be upgraded for earthquake resistance, and whether there would be any plant inventory increase.

Dr. Greg ~~Pernot~~ Pernoud - As a dentist, concerned about fluoride releases. ~~Wanted~~ Questioned CE as to their knowledge of ~~to install~~ a "machine" that removes fluorides.

Herb Biehle - In favor of plant expansion to protect jobs.

Gary Surdyke - Presented an 80 signature petition favoring plant expansion.

Phillip ~~Skroy~~ Sgror - Member of Coalition for the Environment concerned about plant safety, the definition of low level waste, and NRC defending the industry.

Bill Scheifler - Questioned CE's liability for 20.304 burial pits which existed when CE bought the plant. Requested that a decommissioning plan for the pits be provided and that no plant expansion be granted prior to decommissioning of the burial pits. Asked about CE's drug testing policy.

Pete Papin - Questioned C.E's commitment to quality. Rebutted Mr. Surdyke's statements.

Pam Midgett - Wife of CE employee. In her opinion, CE treats employees well and did not hide expansion.

BKM

Final Marked Copy
C.E. Norelius
10/2/89

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~~HEARING~~ PUBLIC MEETING

AUGUST 24, 1989
JEFFERSON COLLEGE, HILLSBORO, MISSOURI

Present: Charles Norelius
Lee Rouse
George Bidinger
Jim Rode

MR. NORELIUS: Good evening ladies and gentlemen. My name is Charles Norelius. I'm the director of the division of radiation safety and safeguard in N.R.C.'s region three office near Chicago, Illinois. The purpose of our meeting tonight is to provide you with information regarding plan changes in the operation at Combustion Engineering's plant at Hematite and also information on the N.R.C. staff evaluation of the changes. I have with me tonight the following members of the N.R.C. staff. Sitting first here is Lee Rouse, who is the chief of the fuel cycle safety branch out of our headquarters in Washington. Next to him is George Bidinger. He's the leader of the uranium fuel section also out of N.R.C. Headquarters. Dave ~~McCowie~~ McCaughey, nuclear processing engineer and ~~Mary~~ Merri Horn environmental engineer both ~~at the base of staff~~ of headquarters, from our regional office, I have Dr. Bruce ~~Mallot~~ Mallett. He's the chief of our nuclear material safety branch and next to him is George ~~Franis~~ France who is the project inspector for the Hematite facility. In the front here is Russ Marbito who is our public affairs man and I might just say if there are anyone here, reporters who are here Russ should be your point of contact this evening. I would also note that Combustion Engineering is participating with us in this meeting and Mr. Jim Rode the manager of the Hematite plant is sitting back here and he will be addressing you

shortly. We also have Dave Bedan~~g~~ who is from the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. Dave, okay. And if there are questions pertaining to the state permit Dave will answer those. [Excuse me, would you please turn up your speaker a little more or whatever you do to make it louder?]

Okay. We'll try that. Is that better? The N.R.C. has a responsibility to show that ~~pr~~proposed uses of radioactive material can be carried out with due regard for public health and safety off site by the N.R.C. is accomplished through the review and approval of any planned activity proposed by an applicant and through subsequent field inspections of ongoing activities once they have been approved. In the case of Combustion Engineering at Hematite Mr. Rouse and his staff are responsible for licensing activities and I ~~in~~ and my staff are responsible for onsight inspection activities. Let me explain that ~~t~~o ~~t~~there is a difference between a public formal hearing as we are having here tonight and a hearing which is provided for under part two of our regulations. During this past June Senator Nixon and the coalition for the environment requested a hearing to address the proposed expansion of uranium processing activities by Combustion Engineering at the Hematite site. The request from the coalition was signed by Martha Dodson, Karen Sisk and Arlene Sandler. These requests have been evaluated according to ~~074~~ 10 CFR part two sub part ~~two~~ L of our

regulations. And on August 18, 1989, Judge Beckhoffer issued an order granting the request for a hearing to Martha Dodson and deferring action on the other petitions. The order also set out the time frame for continuing that proceeding. The N.R.C. staff has perceived our based on the previously mentioned letters input from the Missouri Department of Natural Resources and supporting letters from members of the U.S. Congress that a general meeting conducted by the N.R.C. staff and open to the public would be beneficial. Combustion Engineering also suggested that such a meeting be held. That is our purpose here tonight.

The management of Combustion Engineering Hematite plant has agreed to participate with us in describing the operations at the plant. And we, the N.R.C., plan to describe our evaluation of the safety of the operations. We hope that the information presented this evening addresses your concerns. In Judge Beckhoffer's order he acknowledged that this public formal hearing was planned. He also stated, and I quote, "that this meeting, of course, is separate and apart from the hearing sought by the petitioners in this proceeding. Attendance at the formal meeting would not affect a petitioner's opportunity to become a party to this proceeding. Or if a petitioner through this formal meeting determined that any or all of its concerns were not warranted it should so advise me."

That's quoting Judge Beckhoffer. I would also note that while this is not a hearing as provided for in the regulations it is being transcribed so that if there is a need to refer back to the statements by individuals at this meeting at a later time we will have a record of the comments made here tonight.

What we plan to do here this evening is first have a presentation by Mr. Jim Rode plant manager as to the changes they have made in or are planning to make in their operation at Hematite. He also will address ~~the specific~~, some of the specific questions raised by Senator Nixon in recent letters both to the plant and to the N.R.C.. Specifically questions one through five and A through E regarding waste storage. Secondly, Mr. George Bidinger will describe the N.R.C. licensing process and specifically the status of reviews as they relate to the Combustion Engineering request. He will respond to the remaining questions raised by Senator Nixon and to the issues raised by the coalition for the environment in their request for a hearing. After that time we will take statements by members of the public who are here. I will first give opportunity for statements from Senator Nixon and then from Martha Dodson and Karen Sisk and after that I will take statements from other people who are visiting here. We placed a pad of paper back on the chair. It's probably under the chair now

where that gentleman is sitting and one back there. And if you wish to make a statement tonight I would ask that you sign up and we believe in that way we will give everybody a fair and equitable time to make those statements. If we still have time available after the persons who indicate they would like to make statements we will then open the meeting for public questions and answers.

I believe we will proceed and I'll ask Mr. Jim Rode if he will come at this time and describe the operations currently under way at the plant.

MR. RODE: Good evening. My name is Jim Rode. I'm the plant manager for Combustion Engineering's operations in Hematite. The Hematite plant and the C.E. employees have been members of this community for fifteen years. I hope that we have been good neighbors and that we will continue to be. The efforts that we are making to modernize our plant are intended to make us even better members of the community than we have been in the past. I am pleased to be here this evening to talk to you about what we're doing to modernize our facility and consolidate our manufacturing operations. Our local applications for building permits and the documents we have submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have been publicly available for sometime but there is no substitute for face to face discussion. We welcome and support this meeting.

I would like to start by briefly describing in non-technical terms what we do at the Hematite plant and just as importantly some of the things that we don't do. Our plant performs some of the manufacturing steps in the process that transforms uranium or as it is mined from the ground into suitable fuel for use in nuclear power plants. We do what you might call the middle steps. The early step uranium mining and milling transforms the ore into uranium concentrate generally referred to as ~~yellow K~~ yellowcake. This part of the operation deals with daughter products and uranium refining plant and conversion to uranium hexaflouride removes the daughter products. The daughter products are somewhat hotter than the uranium that we process at our plant. That uranium has been purified then sent on to the gaseous diffusion plant where we enrich, where the uranium is enriched by the Department of Energy. Subsequently sent to our plant as a solid in cylinders under vacuum. This comes to us generally today from the ~~Port Smith~~ Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plant in Ohio. Occasionally we receive uranium, enriched uranium also from overseas enrichment plants. In a series of steps we transform this material into a powder. This powder is referred to as uranium dioxide. Some of this powder is pressed into small cylindral pellets about this big. We ship the pellets or the powder to the Connecticut plant where the manufacturing process is completed. In

recent years we have been producing considerably more pellets than we had in the past. Our plant has always however been converting the uranium hexaflouride to uranium dioxide. We've been doing this safely for over fifteen years and we have been pelletizing the uranium dioxide during that time as well. It's important to note that in our work we deal only with the forms of uranium that have very low levels of activity. Both the material coming in and the material going out. We handle it with appropriate caution and care. We continuously monitor the working environment inside the buildings. Contamination is controlled to levels well below those which might be hazardous to our employees. The air discharge from the manufacturing process areas of the plant are filtered by double high efficiency filters to remove traces of low level radioactive dust. The average releases from our plant through the filtering system are about currently four hundred milligrams per day. That is approximately the weight of an aspirin. We have always remained well below the conservative limits set by the federal and state regulations for release from our plant and we expect to continue.

Now let me emphasize some of the things we do not do. We do not handle highly radioactive fuel that has been in a nuclear power plant. As a matter of fact, we don't

even complete the manufacturing process for fuel assemblies. We only produce uranium oxide powder or pellets that I described. Our plant modernization does not anticipate anything beyond this. Because of this, because we do not handle highly radioactive material we do not need to take some of the extra nor extraordinary planning steps that are done at nuclear power plants such as plans for off site evacuation. We simply do not deal with that type of material. We do however make certain that we are prepared to deal with accidents at the facility should they occur. We maintain an emergency response plan. It's been discussed with the local sheriff, fire fighters, the local hospital personnel, Barnes Hospital, the State of Missouri Emergency Management Agency and the local civil defense office. We hold emergency drills once a year. We have our own site brigade that's been trained by the Hematite fire department. We have arrangements with local ambulance personnel and area hospitals to transport injured personnel if they have been contaminated by some of the low level radioactive material. I think it's fair to say that our emergency planning exceeds that of most comparable industrial facilities in the area.

Let me now talk briefly about the changes we are in the process of making in our facilities. Basically they fall into two catagories. We're installing more modern equipment. After all, some of our equipment is thirty years

old now. We are increasing our capabilities to produce and ship more pellets and less powder. As a result our plant will look somewhat larger. Our modernized facility will include additions in this central area. I would point out that the pelletizing building, this building here, has been designed to survive an earthquake of substantial magnitude. The design standards are those of institutional buildings such as hospitals in the same seismic zone in Missouri. Also our new buildings are at a higher elevation than the existing buildings and are above the hundred year flood level established by the Army Corps of Engineers.

Now I'll show you the general floor plan in somewhat more detail. This is the Hematite facility before the modernization. There are several points that I would like to make. One of them, you notice there is considerable open space between the buildings. At one time this made alot of sense when the plant was built in the '50's. The idea was to try and keep areas separated so that in case of an accident you would limit the injury to employees. It has alot of disadvantages. One of them is tracking of uranium out of doors between the plants. We have already a pellet facility and I'm not sure that you can see it very well. Right there this building is the pellet line and our expansion doubles the size of that building. The reason that we're doubling the size of the building is that plant

is currently in operation and is required to satisfy the requirements of our customers. We can't shut it down for construction. The phase two pelletizing building has been erected and we are in the process and have been for some while now of installing equipment in that building while we are continuing to produce in the pellet line. In order to accomplish this the dark area that you see in the new pellets building was our warehouse. This had to be removed to make way for the new pellet building. To accomplish that we had to have a new warehouse installed and the warehouse was installed then behind the existing building allowing us to continue operations, continue shipping oxide and pellets to the Connecticut plant. The warehouse is now operational. The pellet building is near operational and we are in the process of excavating and decontaminating the ground in the storage utility building area. It's a requirement that we decontaminate the land before we can put up new structures in the area. I would like to stress again the things that we are not doing. We are not changing the basic process that we have performed here over the years. And as a result we should not increase the risks of an industrial accident. We are not increasing the overall output of our facility. The total amount of uranium that we have on hand will remain about the same. There will not be an increase in traffic around the plant or a change in the traffic patterns. We

expect the results of this program will be ~~two~~ as follows: First a more modern facility. One that is more efficient and up to date and as a matter of fact this will be the first time that we have had as an example adequate women's locker facilities in the plant. This reflects the changing nature of the work force as well as the age of the facilities that we have been working with. We will continue to train our employees and inform them of any hazards associate with their work. We will continue to provide radiation monitoring and annuals for all of our employees to make sure that we continue to stay within all federal requirements. We'll be shipping more pellets and less powder. The pellets are easier to handle. They are not ~~responsible~~ readily dispersable. They are easier to transport and since the pellets will be produced here there will be a somewhat smaller quantity, about ten percent less shipments going to Connecticut. And the amount of material being shipped back from Connecticut to our plant in Missouri for rework will decrease.

I hope that these remarks have been useful and have provided you with some of the answers to your questions. Let me recount, though. We are installing more efficient air filtration systems to reduce emissions. Substituting indoor traffic patterns for outdoor traffic patterns and thereby reducing the spread of contamination

out of doors. We are decontaminating large areas of the site. We have enclosed the UF6 vaporizer area to minimize the consequences of release of UF6. We are improving the ventilation system to reduce work or exposure and installing continuous air monitors to detect deviations in the air concentration within the plant rapidly. Automating pelletizing equipment to reduce operator exposure to the uranium and we are reducing the shipping traffic. These improvements would not be possible without the modernization program which we have undertaken.

Now, I would like to address some of the questions that have been raised by Senator Nixon. First question is why is Combustion Engineering requested permission to handle fuel containing higher percentages of uranium than previously processed at Hematite? While the facility modernization has nothing to do with the increased enrichment level we have, in fact, we have been, in fact, handling the higher enrichment uranium up to five percent now for well over a year. The utilities, we're doing this because the utilities uses slightly higher enriched fuel at power plants to improve their fuel cycle economics. Other fuel manufacturers also have licenses which allow the use of five percent enriched uranium. Before we obtained our license amendment to use five percent enriched uranium we performed extensive analysis to show the adequacies of our equipment

and our procedures. And including criticality safety analysis. These analysis are based on conservative assumptions approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Question number two, the total discharged pollutants into the river and air have decreased by substantial percentage in the last decade. In view of this fact why is Combustion Engineering requesting permission to increase air emissions and water effluents? We were not requesting permission to increase air emissions or water effluents. Our plant does not release any significant amount of radioactive air emissions nor do we discharge radioactive liquid effluents from the production processes to the creeks. In fact, we have always stayed well below the federal limits for airborne radioactive releases stated in the federal regulations 10CFR20. After the plant modernization these limits will remain at the same low levels. But our ability to remain well within them utilizing our proposed state of the art improvements will be enhanced. It's expected that the nonradioactive sanitary and laundry waste water from the plant will increase about twenty percent. This is largely due to the additional jobs created by the modernization of the Hematite plant. The sanitary waste water from the plant passes through the plant sanitary treatment facility and is then discharged to the creek. The laundry waste water is filtered, held in a storage tank and sampled prior to

release and will be going through the sanitary systems as well. As a final point there will be no adverse effect on ground water quality since there are no plant activities related to plant modernization that will introduce foriegn substances into the ground water. The next question, has the State of Missouri given it's okay for any increased emissions? This question assumes an increase where there is none as I have stated earlier. The plant modernization will not significantly increase airborne releases and radioactive liquid discharges. What plans have been prepared to reduce emissions? Once the modernization is completed and put into operation the Hematite plant will use modern equipment and controls which will enhance our ability to remain well below the established federal limits. Has the state or national agency requested such a plan? The answer is no. The additional questions now deal with waste on site. It is my understanding that large amounts of waste are stored on site. If this is correct, how is the waste stored? All of our low level nuclear waste is put into N.R.C. approved shipping containers and sent to license burial grounds while awaiting shipment. The low level waste is placed in approved containers kept at the plant. What type of waste is stored? Low level nuclear waste, which generally is in the form of solid. Any liquids that we have are solidified before we store them. The present inventory is less than

fifteen hundred cubic feet of current operational waste. And a bit less than ten thousand cubic feet of decontamination waste. Primarily decontaminated or contaminated earth, which we have removed during decontamination of the retention pond behind the plant and excavation prior to N.R.C. release for construction on the site. Unless some of this material is found to meet the requirements for unrestricted release it will be shipped off site to burial. Additionally there are about two thousand to three thousand tons of spent limestone, a mixture of calcium flouride and calcium carbonate, which is stored on the site awaiting release from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This material contains about the same low level of radioactivity as flash from typical coal fired utility boilers. Do you consider this a temporary or permanent solution? At the present time we consider shipment of our low level nuclear waste to Barnwell, South Carolina to be a permanent solution. Are there plans to make a different permanent disposal of the waste? Yes, if our low level waste will not be accepted for burial at Barnwell we plan to ship to the Midwest Compact State Facility. At present we are in the planning stages to construct a temporary storage facility at the plant to hold the waste until the Midwest Compact State Facility is operational. Is there a clear record duplicable for state inspection of what and

where these wastes are buried? I presume this refers to the burial grounds on the site at Hematite. Prior owners of the Hematite site have recorded the burial of twenty-seven point four 0 five kilograms grams of U235 in thirty-nine on site burial pits. These pits were established in conformance with the A.E.C. regulatory requirements in existence between 1957 and 1970, ~~10CFR20 point three 0 four~~ 10 CFR 20.304 and appear to contain in the burial pit that is approximately two point five parts per million U235. There are burial logs available. The boundaries of the burial grounds are defined in maps provided by the prior owners but not the specific location of the individual burial pits. R.M.C. and N.R.C. contractors conducted tests of the burial grounds in 1983 and concluded that the buried material was essentially stable and that the burial pits had no detectable effect on the population or the surrounding environment. Subsequently we have determined that samples of water from wells on the periphery of the burial grounds are not only within the release requirements for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within the E.P.A. drinking water standards. There are currently no plans to decommission the burial pits.

MR. NORELIUS: Thank you, Mr. Rode. I believe we will proceed right on and ask Mr. Bidinger if he would come and describe the N.R.C. licensing evaluations?

MR. BIDINGER: Good evening, ladies and

gentlemen. I'm George Bidinger section leader in the fuel cycle safety branch. My section has the responsibility for preparing or for performing the environmental and safety reviews prior to our branch taking any ~~safety~~ licensing actions. Senator Nixon has invited us here this evening to discuss potential health and environmental impacts of the Combustion Engineering plant expansion and operation. Since protecting the public and the environment is the primary responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission I think it's more appropriate that we be here and discuss the proposed project with you people. Answer your questions, if we can. We're certainly going to try and do that. Let you know a bit about the Combustion Engineering license, The licensing process and the status on the current project, the expansion. I wish we could have rehearsed our performances, Mr. Rode and I could have rehearsed our performances together. Much of what he said I was prepared to say, you will see it on my view ~~draft~~ graph but I intend to skip over it where I agree with him and even though it's been said it's already been said, in the economy of time I'm not going to repeat it but you will see it on the view ~~draft~~ graph. After discussion of the licensing process I intend then to respond to the rest of the questions from Senator Nixon and take up the issues that have been raised by the coalition and the two Jefferson County residents in their request for a

hearing. That does not affect the hearing process at all but I want to speak to those issues so that we pass the information on to everybody ~~why we're~~ while here this evening. To understand what we were doing on the amendment process to approve or to consider approval of the project by an expansion.

I wanted to spend a few minutes going back and discussing what was in the license at the time of the last renewal which occurred in 1983. In the renewal process we looked at all aspects of the Combustion Engineering operations here at Hematite. We performed an environmental assessment. We did a safety evaluation of their operations looking at their organization and administrative practices to protect people and the environment. We looked at their health physics, the radiation protection program. We looked at their nuclear safety ~~graft~~ criteria to see that they had criticality practices that were adequate in all respects in handling and processing enriched uranium. At that time the process as they are now consisted of processing the UF6 into UO2 powder and/or pellets at the site and shipping those products off to their sister plant in Connecticut. They would receive scrap material back from that Connecticut plant and ~~in the~~ process that scrap and the scrap that they themselves generated in their ~~scrap~~ plant. The enrichment, the uranium enrichment that they were handling at that time

was four point one weight percent, U235. Another feature of the license was that the environmental or excuse me, the E.P.A. offsite environmental limits for fuel facilities and reactors were reimposed on Combustion Engineering. At that time they were all subject to them and we reimposed those limits on Combustion Engineering. Those limits are very, very low. One of the limits is twenty-five millirems ~~kilograms~~. The whole body dose equivalent, sort of technical, but twenty-five millirems ~~kilograms~~ is a very small number. It was established by the Environmental Protection Agency and we have no choice but to impose that on our licensees. Licensees, all licensees in the fuel cycle ~~have no~~, have to live with that limit. In the process of type operations changed here we had to amend that license that was renewed in '83. There have been thirteen amendments. I'm only going to mention two or three of them this evening. Also over a year ago we amended the license to authorize uranium enriched five weight percent in the U235 isotope. This did not change their health physics program. It modified their criticality safety program slightly because the uranium is slightly more reactive than the four percent but their original responsibilities and administrator's responsibilities in the license remain unchanged. The plant manager was still responsible to see ~~if~~ that they operated with written procedures. He was responsible to see that their

people were trained in safety practices and processing practices. He was responsible to see that audits were performed to see that they were living up to their license. I might divert just a minute. When I talk about the license some of you may have no idea what we're talking by a license. The license consists when Combustion Engineering applied for the license back in 1982 they submitted thirty-five pages of committments. We took those thirty-five pages and incorporated them into the license. We added roughly twenty-five additional conditions. We imposed, you might say, twenty-five more committments on Combustion Engineering so our conditions and their own thirty-five pages of committments became their license. So when I talk about a license I'm talking about a big thick document. And periodically it does get amended. So at the time that this project started then we had basically a facility that looked like this. You have already seen it but the things that I want to point out here are that this little building right here, the little square building is the oxide building. That's where all of the powder is produced. That little building is not being changed by the revisions to the plant site. This building here is where the old pellet line was but then you notice that any scrap produced in these two buildings had to be taken out into the open over to the scrap building, an undesireable practice

because there is a chance for contamination spills, anything else. So at the time that we started this project there were four buildings, four main production buildings on site. As we, the first communication on this project came to us formal way in July of '88 so we have been working on it now for over a year. Since that time they asked us for permission to tear down those two buildings in the middle of the plant site. We required them to decontaminate the buildings and provide us with surveys that they were decontaminated. Our region three staff went out and conducted their own survey to make sure that the buildings were decontaminated. Then they were allowed to put up the shell of the building but they had to then, Combustion Engineering then had to survey the soil, remove the contaminated soil. And then our consultant, a contractor from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, went to the site and performed an independent soil sampling survey for ourselves. Once we were convinced that the soil had been, the contaminated soil had been removed they were allowed to pour the floor for the phase two building, the pellet line building. That same process is now going on in the phase three area. We will see that in just a minute. Our contractor has already been out and sampled the soil. We're waiting for the results but if the soil is properly or all of the contaminated soil is picked up we will then authorize the or we expect then to

authorize the pouring of the floor for the last phase. So we, okay. So then let's me move on then. Combustion Engineering then applied for a license amendment. That license amendment was to authorize them to operate the new pellet line building, the phase two building with depleted uranium. When we talk about depleted uranium we're talking about the uranium that's had the U235 removed from it. Most of the U235 removed from it. That U235 has been concentrated and will be used in reactors and what was left over was the uranium depleted. And U235 has, and it is being used, Combustion Engineering asked to use some depleted uranium to test the new plant by using depleted uranium to take away the risk of criticality safety. It's a reasonable approach for them, the building with uranium but not have any of the criticality concerns while you're testing it. I think there is also an economics incentive for Combustion Engineering to do it that way but that's their business. They also presented with us a second amendment application in May of '89. This was to operate the plant with the enriched uranium. Once we received these two applications we performed an enironmental assessment as required by the ~~the PAAC~~ National Environmental Protection Act and our own regulations. In performing this assessment we came to the conclusion that the doses that would be, let me change that slightly, the uranium that would be released by the operation of this

plant would result in doses to the public that would be well below the E.P.A. limits that have been mentioned before. We're talking in terms of less than a ~~kilogram~~ millirem to a real person here in the Hematite area. Again remember that I mentioned before the limit that E.P.A. has put out is a twenty-five ~~kilograms~~ millirems whole body dose. We're talking about less than one ~~kilogram~~ millirem dose ~~or kilogram~~ per year, ~~dose.~~ Because of this small increments in dose we made a finding of no significant impact and we published this in the federal register. Now when we published this in May we had to live with new rules which had been imposed on us by our own commission and this required that when we publish a finding of no significant impact in the federal register we also have to publish a notice of opportunity for a hearing. We published that notice of a hearing and we received two requests for a hearing from Senator Nixon and from the coalition and two residents here in the county. Discussions with Senator Nixon ~~it~~ lead to this public meeting and here we are tonight. Now, since that time we have gone ahead with our safety evaluation, our safety review of the first application for Combustion Engineering to test the plant with the depleted uranium and we have authorized Combustion Engineering to test their new plant with depleted uranium. That was, that amendment was issued in July. We ~~always~~ also are reviewing their application to use the new pellet line with

the enriched uranium. That review, that safety review is ongoing. We have developed some concerns. We have not communicated them formally to Combustion but we will do that as soon as we're away from this public meeting. So if we could look quickly at the view graft and you seen most of it before but again the important features are that the oxide area is still this small building. That's where all of the powder is produced and that really limits the through put to the plant. We're not changing the amount of uranium they can bring on site in the amendments. This old pellet line is still here. The two new pellet lines will be here when phase three is completed. Then there will be one, essentially one building and then all of the scrap from the oxide line, the pellet line can be transferred over to the scrap plant without going outdoors. It will be an enhancement of environmental concerns on site.

I'm going to move now to the questions the rest of the questions that Senator Nixon has posed to us. We have viewgraphs ~~view graft~~ here; the questions are here, the answers are here also. Some of them the answers are redundant with those that Mr. Rode have given you. He's already explained how their will be an increase in the volume of laundry and sanitary waste because you have more people flushing toilets and you have more clothes to be washed. All of that, the volume of water will increase, the concentration of uranium

is not expected to increase. There will be no other liquid released into the surface water here. All of the process wastes are solidified and sent to low level burial. We don't expect any significant increase in airborne activity except that again there is a larger building there is more air being released but all of the new exhausts are being filtered twice by very high efficient filters. We call them ~~hepas~~ HEPA's. If I refer to them tonight I apologize for that but they are very, very high efficiency filters at removing particles of dust that are in the respiration range. So there will be a very small increase in the amount of contaminated air going out of the building, contaminated material going out of the building in the very large volume of air being exhausted from the building but the amount of uranium going out is miniscule. The air and the liquid effluent, the air going up the stacks going into the surface streams are all well below the regulatory limits. Those limits that are imposed by the N.R.C. and by the Environmental Protection Agency. They are going to continue at less than the E.P.A.'s limits. So therefore, we have concluded that there are no significant impacts on the health, public health or the environment. Our next question deals with the effects of the approval of the application on water quality. The radioactive aspects of water quality are regulated ~~totally~~ by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The

state issues an ~~N.P.T.S.~~ NPDES permit. That's a National Pollutant ~~Elimination Test~~ Discharge Elimination System Permit, you can understand, but the state issues the permit for the chemical effluents going ~~from the~~ to Joachim Creek. Those limits remain unchanged.

The volume of the water will increase again because of ~~more of, increase again because of~~ more employees. But again no process liquids, those coming out of the scrap plant which are the only wet process in the building, no process liquids are being released to the environment. They are all being solidified. The solids are being sent to waste burial. The conclusion is that water quality is not being impacted by this proposed action. Will there be any change in transportation patterns. Mr. Rode again has talked about the ten percent less material that's being shipped to Windsor and less material being shipped up there and possibly becoming scrap. There will be less scrap coming back from the Windsor Connecticut plant. There will be some additional chemicals associated with pellet production shipped to the site for the operation of the ~~cincering~~ sintering furnaces, for example. But overall there is going be no significant change in the transportation patterns, ~~so be~~ perhaps a slight decrease from the number of radioactive material ~~shipped~~ shipments, a slight increase from the chemical material shipments. Our next two questions concern the volume of waste produced at the plant and where would the

waste be taken for disposal. The waste that we're talking about here consists of the solidified process, residue filters, air filters that are contaminated with uranium. We were told by Combustion Engineering people that they produce about two thousand cubic feet of this waste a year. That's equivalent to two hundred seventy fifty-five gallon drums and it contains about eighty kilograms of uranium, not uranium 235 but uranium. That's a hundred and seventy-six pounds that's shipped over to a licensed commercial burial site. Each year this volume of waste is going to increase slightly. They have more filters, for example, in the plant. Those filters end up as being waste and be shipped off but they have estimated that waste at about one percent. We don't have any reason to challenge it. All of the waste, this kind of waste is disposed of at a licensed burial site so whether it increases by one percent or ten percent it's only more expensive for them to ship ten percent more but there is space available now for them to ship the waste. There is an issue on the limestone. They have requested that it be declared nonradioactive or that they be authorized to dispose of it as nonradioactive waste. They have done some studies that we have requested. We have not made a decision yet on that request. Will the facility have capacity to store the waste if it is unable to use the usual disposal site? Well, when you are talking about two

thousand cubic feet per year of solid waste and the big warehouses that we saw in their drawings and our drawings it's not, it's easy to store that volume of waste for several years in their warehouses or bring trailers on site to store it. We don't see it as a problem. I think some of you may know that there are some of the waste disposal issues are changing from day to day with waste compacts and all that maybe the basis for the question, I'm not sure. But even if they can't send it to Barneswell until the Missouri compact is available they can store the waste for two, three, four years at those volumes. It's not a difficult problem. Okay. The next two questions deal with is there going to be more production on site? Is there a danger of increased accidents with the increased capacity and are the accidents likely to be more serious? First of all, in our response, our consideration of these questions the possession limits the amount of material that they were authorized to have on site does not change by and will not change by this amount processed. When you think about it as a production plant the way they want to make money is convert the uranium hexaflouride into truck load quantities of powder or pellets and ship it off to the next site and get paid for it. So it's, we're not changing the possession limit. I don't think ~~their~~ they want~~ing~~ to run up the inventory in the plant but even if they run up their inventory we have

already established a maximum limit they can have in the plant. So the possession limits, at least, do not change. As far as ~~acting~~ accidents, emergency planning already considers ~~first or explanation~~, nuclear criticality reactions, uranium releases, chemical releases and off site transportation events. We haven't been able to think of any other accident senarios that need to be considered in this, any other accidents of this magnitude that need to be considered. And there are no changes in the types, as far as we're concerned then there are no changes in types or consequences of accidents for emergency planning.

The next question deals with emergency procedures being revised. Combustion Engineering already has an emergency plan and procedures backing that plan~~t up~~ in place. This is a document of something like a hundred and fifty pages. I mentioned thirty-five page notice the rest of their license. It's a big thick document. It deals with the on site emergency organization. It deals with training of people, the on site people and the off site people who would respond to any emergency at the plant. It deals with drills so that the people are not only trained, but they get to exercise their training so that the N.R.C. and Combustion Engineering management can see that the training is effective. It deals with arrangements for off site support by the local police, hospitals, fire departments, ambulance

services. The plan also provides for dedicated emergency equipment on site that can be used in the event of an accident. Now, there are going to have to be some emergency procedures revisions. They have got, you know, new egress door, doors where people leave the buildings. New equipment that has to be shut down as people leave but these are all minor procedural revisions that have to be made so we don't see any significant changes having to be made in their emergency procedures. Will the modifications require changes in the local emergency response capability? Again the local emergency response capabilities will remain the same, okay. That includes the existing fire department, hospitals, sheriff department and ambulance arrangements. These are all part of the plan. We don't see any ~~accident new~~ type senarios or new types of accidents that need to be protected against so we don't see that there are any changes needed in the off site response capabilities. I now want to go through the issues that have been raised by the coalition for the environment Mrs. Dodson and Mrs. Sisk. This first issue really deals with changing from four point one percent uranium to five percent uranium. From a criticality safety standpoint this is really a small change. Granted it's my opinion when I say that but I have worked in this field for the last thirty years. I compare it to someone coming home with eighty-nine octane gasoline and telling their children

not to strike a match around the gasoline. Don't pour it down the drain, don't drink it. And the next week they come home with ninety-one octane gasoline. The safety programs for your children are the same. You still don't strike matches, you don't pour it down the drain, you don't drink it. It's more powerful gasoline but it's not significantly different. And going from four percent uranium to five percent enriched uranium is about the same. It's more powerful uranium. It makes the reactor run a little longer but it does not change the basic rules for handling enriched uranium in the plant. But if they jump up to ninety-three percent enriched uranium like the plant used to handle many, many years ago before it was Combustion Engineering's plant that would be a major change and we would require a much longer time to review their proposed safety limits. But when you go a small change from four percent to five percent it's not a big change from a criticality safety standard. But in our safety evaluation review of the nuclear criticality safety principal the safety controls and the limits were adjusted so that the same margins of safety were maintained in the plant. They already were used to dealing with like two to four percent. They had safely maintained in their plant for two percent, three percent, four percent material and when they added the five percent they added another line to safe ~~mack quality~~ mass quantity to their table. They already had a

standard in place. When they were dealing with two percent they used the two percent limits. When they were dealing with three percent they were dealing with the three percent limits. ~~But all they had to do to establish effluent by the process of imposing that limit on material and process remaining the same so by the nature of five percent enriched uranium and the control at four percent.~~ The modifications in going ~~at~~ To five percent were not ~~see~~ seen as a significant increase in the potential to criticality accidents when we authorized that amendment of June, '88. The next question is rather long and it's going to appear on two slides. This has to do with the lack of adequate emergency response capabilities of Jefferson County and other counties within the state in the event of radiological accidents. Talking about inadequate roads for evacuation, ~~of emergency~~ responders to plant ~~our~~ or transport routes, inadequate emergency health care facility. First of all, the response requirements are not affected by this plant modification. The quantity of uranium at the plant is the same. The processes are the same. The responsible capability of the plant staff remains the same so the basic response capabilities do not change. As far as the evacuation route goes really very little need for evacuation. Even the potential for evacuation is very small to begin with by any accident that would happen would be basically a localized event much as a truck event where the

local police would isolate the accident but you would not consider that to be an evacuation. The accidents that we're dealing with here don't have the potential impact like you have with a reactor where you do evacuate over miles. We're talking about evacuation over meters or yards, hundreds of feet. And Combustion Engineering does have the on site capability. We have already been through that so there really is not a great deal of change there. As far as the local emergency response capabilities we both have touched on that. Combustion Engineering has arrangements with two different hospitals, the ambulance, the sheriff and the fire departments, two of them, so that the local response capabilities of their own emergency responses and the local support governmental agencies and service agencies are adequate for the, deemed adequate for the current plant and the changes to the plant as well. As far as the off site response to transport the shipping containers that Combustion Engineering are allowed to use are designed to withstand severe accident. If there is an accident, a truck overturned the local police are equipped and qualified to isolate the truck accident until there is assistance at the site by either Combustion Engineering or while the federal radiological assistant deals are ready to move. Frankly if there was a truck accident in the state we would expect Combustion Engineering to be on the way to lend radiological

assistance before we even heard about it back in Washington. The next issue is the potential to increase in the plant an unplanned release was of radioactive and ~~un~~non radioactive dust, liquid and gasses. We have already covered water. We have covered the air going out of the plant. The one thing I want to address is ra~~x~~don. I think we all know that the uranium that is in the ground is put there by mother nature does decay through a series of different elements and it ends up with radium and finally ra~~x~~don. And in some places in the United States that is a problem. The uranium, though, that we are dealing with here in the plant does not have a ra~~x~~don problem associated with it. If you remember the first view ~~draft~~ graph that Mr. Rode put up he showed the uranium coming out of the ground and going through a uranium mill and then it goes on to a UF6 production plant before it ever goes to the D.O.E. enrichment plant, before it goes to the Combustion Engineering plant. ~~And enriched UF6~~, The radium that is associated with that uranium ore coming out of the ground is essentially left in the first two chemical processing steps up there at the uranium mill, And then at the UF6 production plant. About ninety percent of it stays at the mill and that's why the mill talings are sources of ra~~x~~don. Because all of the radium has been dropped out of the process and left on the talings pile. So that the uranium that arrives at this plant has had all of the radium

remove from it, all of the daughter product radium removed from it. It takes something like, what is it, sixteen hundred, sixteen thousand, sixteen thousand. The decaying of the radium to radon has a half life, this is sort of technical but I have to do a little bit of that, has a half life of sixteen thousand years, sixteen hundred is the half life, okay, excuse me. Sixteen hundred years of half life. So that means that for that equilibrium stage to develop where there is radium and radon equilibrium takes something like ten half lives or sixteen thousand years. That uranium is not going to be in this plant that long so if it is they're out of business. So radium is not an issue. They're going to have, perhaps have more ammonia on site. That could be a significant issue if they had an ammonia release. It can be knocked down by water and they have it. The next issue the importing of radioactive and hazardous material in. The only materials that they are importing is uranium and the chemicals we have mentioned. There are no other hazardous materials being imported. The next issue is the impact of the expanded operations on the health and safety of employees. The N.R.C. safety standards are going to be in place for the new employees as well as the existing ones. Combustion Engineering radiation protection program will apply for the expanded operations, new employees, new uranium handling and combination techniques to improve the

employee's environment inside the plant. Our inspection findings in the past since the renewal for that in health and ~~staff~~ safety, in the area Combustion Engineering has had four violations. That inspection program is going to continue during the testing program and if we get around to it during the operation with the enriched uranium. I'm not, the impacts of floods and earthquakes have already been used by Mr. Rode so I'm going to call it at this point. Thank you very much. I hope that this answers some of your questions and all of your questions and all of your concerns.

MR. NORELIUS: Okay. We will try to move quickly into the statements and, Senator Nixon, welcome you to start, if you care to make a statement. I would ask again that for those of you making statements we would appreciate if you could limit them somewhat hopefully to about five minutes to start with so that anyone who wishes to make a statement to do so. And we ask that you sign up on one of our sheets if you would like to make a statement. There is one back there and there is one here. So why don't we go right to that. Senator Nixon, you're first. Would those of you who make statements would you please state your names and home town locations so we can have a record of that, please.

SENATOR NIXON: My name is Jay Nixon. I reside in Hillsboro, Missouri. I'm a State Senator

representing the 22nd District which includes the plant location of Combustion Engineering. I also like to give Mr. Norelius a copy of the letter I sent on August 17th. This is the questions that they referred to and ask that it be marked Exhibit A and be made part of the record. I want to thank very much the members of the N.R.C. ~~and P.R.C.~~ staff who have come down from Chicago and Washington and other places around the country tonight to bequest us to answer the questions. I would also like to thank Morris Case and people from the Environmental Protection Agency who have answered the questions that have been posed to them. I would like to thank the Department Of Natural Resources State of Missouri which has worked with us as representatives here tonight and has answered also separately in writing and I have available for anybody who would like those the sixteen questions that I presented for the hearing this evening and answer to those in writing to me yesterday. I would also like to give special thanks to the union stewart and fine workers of Combustion Engineering who were very helpful in helping me to secure a tour and going with me in the tour of the facility. Martha Dodson and I spent the better part of four hours walking through everything and frankly we were taken wherever we wanted to go, I should note, and answered questions by workers as well as members of management of Combustion Engineering as we

toured that particular facility. They were very courteous and answered each and every question that we had at that time. I would like to just very briefly indicate to everybody why I instituted the request for a hearing in this matter and it all comes back to the May 24th publication in the Federal Register. I would like to read very quickly three sentences from that. One is under the environmental impact of proposed action and it says trace amounts of radioactivity entered the system from sinks and showers control liquid for the liquid effluent radioactivity remains the same. However the volume increase would be approximately twenty percent the impact from this liquid discharge is expected to be minimal. Secondarily it said Combustion Engineering's objective is to increase pellet production with no significant increase to existing raise in effluent release. Our radioactive releases are expected to increase. With these statements being made in the public record I felt it was essential as a State Senator representing this area that we got the questions about these things answered in open forum and I thank the folks for being here tonight to help us with that. I wish that everybody had the opportunity that I have had to review the records that I have done and spent the hours looking at the facility as well as take the record and tour it. It's a going facility. It has the capability of holding over fifty

tons of product worth in excess of fifty million dollars. One of my major worries when we began this process was the burial pits that had been referred to before containing the waste from the ninety percent pure uranium that was used there in years past not recently. I am very proud of the State Department of Natural Resources in they answered my questions concerning that issue, which is not directly affected by what we're doing tonight. But I would like to treat the two sentences of Tracy Mehan's letter to me yesterday concerning that material. It indicates the material may apply to this waste as well as the Missouri Department of Natural Resources' position is that the buried waste should be investigated under these laws and regulation to determine what further action, if any, is required. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources will pursue this issue with the N.R.C. and E.P.A.. I think that's an allowable standard of their's and I think it's an important step forward to move this thing forward in a very quick and effective manner. The Joachim Creek valley is very important to me. My grandmother lived within sight of the Joachim Creek at Victoria before World War One. My father's family grew up in Hematite. My grandfather and cousin who was killed in the Vietnam war are buried in a cemetary overlooking the nuclear plant. I have floated and fished every inch of the Joachim Creek in Jefferson County in my

life. I am not here to, my purpose is to set the highest standards of cleanliness not merely compliances but complete cleanliness. I am an environmentalist and want to fight to protect our environment. I know we can and must do better. Meeting in hearings like this show we are interested. We demand the best of Combustion Engineering, the N.R.C. and the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. D.N.R. as I had indicated promised me continuing inspections. Hopefully we will get the same treatment from the N.R.C.. We don't want series of the types that has caused so much environmental nightmares and fears of the past. Not just compliance cleanliness, not secrecy but open cooperation. Not just permissable levels but improving limits of waste throughout this system. Our county ranges thirty-second in the entire country of all counties in toxic waste and I was elected to fight that and I'll continue to fight that and try to clean up the best we can and tonight is not for me it is for you to ask the questions that you have concerning this process. And I thank you for coming and look forward to you getting the answers to the questions that you need. Thank you.

MR. NORELIUS: Thank you, Senator Nixon. Martha Dodson, would you like to come up here and make a statement?

MS. DODSON: May I speak from here?

MR. NORELIUS: Why don't you try it and if we can't hear we'll do something else.

MS. DODSON: I'm Martha Dodson. I am one of the requesters for a hearing this evening as others. I am very pleased that you called and I thank you from Jefferson County. I have very little knowledge of nuclear fuel production and rely heavy upon your expertise. I have no complaint against Combustion Engineering but I do know that they are in the business of business and therefore it is essential to me as a citizen living in close proximity to the plant to have someone who is not in the business and hasn't been in the business for thirty years guarding me. That's what I understand your role to be. I am fully convinced that it is essential to me as a citizen that experts not in the business inspect the plant regularly with and without notification and monitor all of the emissions waste and products of the operation. Does the N.R.C., you are people that I can really shake ~~house~~ hands with and talk to. Do you make those on site inspections? If you have not been able to do so it would seem to me that common sense would dictate that expansion permit would be withheld until existing facilities were determined to be safe. That is to say if ~~air~~ error must exist it must exist on the safe side as what is done in Hematite cannot be undone. Do you agree? It was with great dismay that I read last week that Jefferson

County ranks number thirty-two among the nation's approximately four thousand counties in toxic chemical release. It is impossible for Jefferson countians not to wonder why we have achieved this dubious distinction and perhaps make more serious demands upon our protective agencies to say enough is enough. Is that not reasonable? In much of my reading and much of what I have heard this evening I am struck by phrases acceptable permissable regulation levels. Permissable levels of radiation, permissable levels of toxic releases to air, permissable levels of water pollutants. I can't understand permissable but must concentrate on safe. Safe levels of radiation, safe levels of toxics, safe levels of water pollution. Can you tell me that the air and water emissions and the waste on site above and below ground at Combustion Engineering and surrounding areas are safer?

MR. NORELIUS: Let me, let us try quickly to respond to those questions before we go to the neck speaker. Since I'll deal with this subject of inspections we have and continue to make routine unannounced inspections at the plant. We get there two to three times each year and the areas that we have covered include radiation protection, nuclear criticality safety, management organization, controls operations, training and operator retraining, maintenance and surveillance activity at the plant, the

transportation of radioactive materials and environmental activities, emergency preparedness, the management of liquid and solid waste and emergency preparedness. We do those sometimes separately sometimes with a team so those are the issues that we have covered. Mr. Franks here, who I introduced as our project inspector, you asked for a person who you could shake and he's our head inspector. We have our specialists who come from time to time. Mr. Rouse will address the second part of your questions.

MR. ROUSE: Thank you. Lee Rouse. I wanted to add one thing. By the way part of your question Mrs. Dodson had to do with are the inspections announced or unannounced. Most of those inspections are unannounced. The plant does not know that George ~~Franks~~ France is here until he shows up at the gate. I certainly appreciate the second question. ~~In a~~ The world of radiation protection and alot of other scientific areas you will hear people say permissable and acceptable and I suppose we are guilty of that tonight and in some of our documents certainly you have seen that. I don't set the limits for this plant. ~~As you indicate or~~ As I think George indicated, the limits in the nuclear fuel cycle including the reactors are established by the environmental protection agency ~~in~~ which the federal agencies including the N.R.C. have to implement. The limits that we're talking about as opposed to some of the ones in the

older days. The limits ~~tonight~~ today are based on a risk approach. I can't tell you honestly that the risk is zero but I can say honestly in my view the emissions from this plant, C.E., are safe. When you compare them with the other risks that we face each and everyday and I'm only going to give you one comparison I'm not going to throw out alot of numbers, I just note that the radiation that we have projected from this plant even with the expansion of the pelletizing lines will be less than one ~~millogram~~ millirem for the residents in Hematite. The closest residents are less than one ~~millogram~~ millirem per year. The background radiation on the average throughout the United States and I assume it's about the same here in Hematite, is about three hundred ~~millograms~~ millirems per year. That's a whole body equivalent. That's the only comparison I'm going to give you but I consider the levels at this plant as operated and emissions we project for the expansion to be safe. Thank you.

MR. NORELIUS: Karen Sisk, would you like to come next? We would appreciate you coming up here.

MS. SISK: Hi, my name is Karen Sisk. I'm from Imperial, Missouri. I'm a registered nurse. I have two kids five and seven who have allergies and my concern basically living in Imperial is air effluent. I have a past history of contaminated ground water from wells that have affected my children so I'm also concerned with the water

quality. I have basically been involved with organic waste as far as the water is concerned. I don't have resources to test for chemicals. I do have a few questions as far as the one thing I'm concerned is basically the safety of the plant. Like Mrs. Dodson I am not that familiar with the plant I'm just learning about it. I wondered when the E.P.A. limits were originally set what year as to when these were actually set and to what amounts. My other question was as far as the old pellet building is that going to be utilized and that is this state of the art as the new one is is it earthquake resistant. And as Jay Nixon also discovered the decontamination of the previous evacuation pond and such is concerned with also and contaminating the ground water. And the other question was there was a statement that there would be no change in the increase of the products brought to the plant but it was also mentioned that there would be a maximum amount of the product that was going to be allowed unless I misunderstood. And I was curious as to what the maximum amount was going to be allowed. And other than that that's basically all I have to say and I appreciate everybody coming in.

MR. NORELIUS: Would you run through your questions quickly again. I think we can address them quickly.

MS. SISK: The first one was when the E.P.A.

limits were set what year and how did they come about these limits. The other one was is the old pellet building that they were originally using is it as state of the art as the new one, is it earthquake resistant as these are. The decontamination I already mentioned and what is the maximum amount of the product that's going to be allowed to be brought to the plant. Right now there is not going to be a change but what is the maximum amount that will be allowed?

MR. ~~NORELIUS~~ ROUSE: Jim, you don't get off the hook here. Come on down, Jim, I would rather have you speak to the old pellet plant. Wait a minute, Jim Rode the plant manager is coming down to help us out. Let me answer the first question, when were these E.P.A. limits that we were referring to set? The particular limits we're talking about, uranium fuel cycle standards were put into application by the environmental protection agency (EPA), in 1979, became effective in ~~December, 1979~~ December, 1979. In January of ~~1983~~ 1980 N.R.C. issued an order to C.E. here at the Hematite plant with an evaluation and some action levels to assure that they were well within that limits. So it's been since 1980 that that particular limit was established. Before I turn it over to Jim I wasn't quite sure of the question about decontamination of the ponds. I may have missed that. Did you get it? The question related to decontamination of the ponds?

MS. SISK: When I talked to Martha Dodson and Jay Nixon when they had viewed the plant the evaporation ponds were still present with the sludge and I was wondering how and when they were going to evacuate all of that. I thought that was taken care of in 1979 as far as getting rid of the contaminated sludge.

MR. ROUSE: I'm going to have to turn that one over to Jim also. Let me answer one question and then I may help him out. The maximum amount, ~~of~~ the possession limit~~s~~ of the license is eight thousand kilograms of uranium 235, ~~as contained in the uranium process~~. Jim, you want to go?

MR. RODE: Martha, do you understand what her question is about the ponds? I'm not quite sure I understand that.

MS. SISK: Evaporation ponds, what do you expect to do with the evaporation ponds?

MR. ~~RODE~~: Okay. The sludge has generally been removed from the ponds. We have surveys of the ponds that have been completed. The submission of the data on the ponds I believe is at present incomplete. We are putting together the plans for finalizing, that is dedicating the ponds at this point. We have among the ~~burials~~ waste that we listed the less than ten thousand cubic feet of decontamination materials. Among that is the remaining

earth that was removed from the ponds. Martha, did you see the ponds when you were there?

MS. DODSON: I did in fact see the ponds when I was there, yes.

MR. RODE: The depth of the original pond was about three feet as I recall below grade. We are quite some distance below that at this point and have achieved levels which will allow us to make it a dedicated site within the regulations. The old pellet building is not designed for any special earthquake requirements. That's one of the advantages that we have for modernizing the facilities. One that will accrue to us. It is not a state of the art plant. It was a state of the art plant in 1959.

MR. NORELIUS: Let me just add that we will continue to monitor the activity regarding those ponds and the sludge material that is there. Okay. I have some other people who have signed up and I may do damage to your names so I would ask that you again repeat your name and say it right and give the location of your home. Greg Pernoud.

MR. PERNOUD: Okay. I'm Dr. Greg Pernoud and I'm a practicing oral maxillofacial surgeon in the community so I kind of represent the dental community as well and I have a couple of questions to ask Combustion Engineering. Certainly Mr. Rode has presented us with fine answers to many questions. At least we have certainly met alot of

standards here tonight I think. Whether those standards are appropriate or not we don't really know. Years will test that. But my question has to deal with another chemical that hasn't been mentioned tonight. If you look at the original slide we have a chemical hexaflouride going to a dioxide. Now if my chemistry serves me correctly there is about two and a half molecules of flouride produced for every molecule of U232 or whatever. 235, excuse me. And there has been no question or no answer either raised to what happens with all of this flouride. In this community as a dentist I have seen quite a bit of flourisis. Now, I am not making any accusations here but it does exist and it does exist other places as well. I would like to know what exactly happens to the flouride that is produced. I also know that many states have regulations regarding the output of flouride in their state. Missouri does not. There is also a machine that will take flouride out of the air discharged by these types of plants. I would like to know if this modernization that we have heard about tonight does include this machine to take the flouride out of the air. So my questions are that as well as how many hundreds of pounds of flouride maybe discharged from the plant currently and how much will it increase and if you have any studies on the environment from flouride and what exactly happens to it and does not end up in our drinking water.

MR. RODE: Give me a moment to get my data together. I do happen to have some of the environmental monitoring data which we do routinely. I'm relatively certain that the data is kind of data that you want. I'll have to find the specific samples, the sample results. The first answer that you are looking for is really do we scrub the off gasses from the plant to remove the flouride from those gasses. The answer is yes. They are passed through crushed calcium carbonate limestone rock. The calcium carbonate reacts with the gasses which are systic hydrogen flouride producing calcium flouride which is an extremely insoluable form of flouride. We subsequently do monitor both the soil and we monitor the run off water for flouride levels. It is all drained with the water from the plant, put out into a pond and we sample at the exit from the pond and I'm trying to locate that flouride level. Do you have that information, Harold?

MR. ~~ESTRIGE~~ ESKRIDGE: I'm Harold ~~Estrige~~ Eskridge, manager of licensing and safety at the plant. As Jim said we routinely monitor the storm water and drain water run off absorbing any flouride emissions from the plant. This is required also by our N.P.D.E.S. permit any levels generally run less than one part per mill which I understand is quite acceptable.

MR. PERNOUD: You didn't answer my other

question. How many hundreds of pounds is put out the calcium carbonate that you use? Is not the standard of care as you might say to reduce of flouride emissions out of smoke stacks? The machine I'm talking about does not run on calcium chloride or calcium carbonate and do you plan on modernizing it with this machine?

MR. ROUSE: Well, when Jim comes back up to respond to the quantities which he's going to know alot better than I. I would like to make one comment. For the environmental assessment the N.R.C. did for the license renewal back in 1983, we did make an assessment of the quantity of flouride being released. Even after being treated with the calcium carbonate we recognized that the state and we were looking at the gaseous emissions where most of it would be released, the State of Missouri does not have a standard, at least at that time. We compared ~~it~~ the releases against the standards that the state of Washington established. The State of Washington had established and I'm not, I don't know the numbers, you know, but the state of Washington was very sensitive to flouride releases because of the aluminum plants up there, which because of the nature of the process were releasing large quantities of flourides. So we compared it against that standard, and we concluded ~~arrived at~~ that very close ~~in~~ to the plant, very close in essentially within the site perimeter, you might see something ~~pulled~~ in the vegetation. I don't know that

it was below ~~this amount by amount~~ the referenced standards. We compared it with the state of Washington standard, subsequently ~~to that then~~ when they did do some sampling of the vegetation. I'm not sure they still do it.

MR. RODE: Yes, we do.

MR. ROUSE: And the results ~~have been~~ were ~~obviously~~ lower than we projected because they ~~don't~~ didn't see IT in the vegetation as much as we projected. Go ahead, Jim.

MR. RODE: I'M not sure what I can say about a system for scrubbing the flouride out that you don't know what the system is or any information about it. The use of calcium carbonate is something that we have developed we have used and to our knowledge it has been more effective and a better system than waste used more broadly. Now, you may be discussing or thinking in terms of the aluminum industry which put out several orders of magnitude higher quantity of flouride than our small plant does. Their flouride emissions in many cases are larger than our plant through put of all material and I can't answer a question without something a little more specific, I'm sorry.

MR. PERNOUD: Well, how many pounds are you talking, hundreds of pounds, are you talking about a day.

MR. RODE: The scrubbing efficiency AS I recall is rated to be about ninety percent we are putting out in the course of a year. In the course of a month

somewhere in the neighborhood of one to two thousand pounds.

MR. NORELIUS: Next we have Herb Biehle.

MR. BIEHLE: Herb Biehle and I live in the DeSoto area. I am chief shop steward at Combustion Engineering in Hematite. I'm also a Jefferson countian and concerned Jefferson countian. I have worked for C.E. for eight years and during those years I have seen alot of changes. The changes I speak of are improvements to the plant, some of them required by the ~~National~~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission and all have been to improve the health and welfare of the employees and the surrounding community. Our safety record with the N.R.C. has been outstanding. As I look around I see a lot of fellow employees. The reason for their attendance is of concern. Concern for the expansion of their plant. The Hematite plant has been a small arm of the nuclear power submission of C.E.. We at Hematite feel that this expansion is a definite security of our jobs and also improves the environmental impact on the community as well as the safety at the work site. I also see some of the residents of Hematite. Some of these are employees who would not have moved or built so close to the plant had they felt there were hazardous conditions. Their knowledge of the safety at the plant as well as the safety factor employed by the plant as set by the N.R.C. are reason of their saying that living in the area is safe. As said by a

neighbor of C.E. it is the fear of the unknown that frightens people. C.E. has strived to be a good neighbor to the community. In closing the future of the Hematite plant is also the future of the fifty-five union and sixty company employees. The company is also in the process of hiring a number of new employees. This is an economical plus to the county in addition the safety factors of the new equipment being installed at the time. Thank you.

MR. NORELIUS: Next we have Gary Surdyke.

MR. SURDYKE: That's better than some people have done. My name is Gary Surdyke. I'm from Hematite, Missouri. Live with my wife and our family of ten have lived there for about twenty years, close to it. I come here representing nobody but myself, my family and my kids. I have been asked and have agreed to both sign and to present to this body a petition of approximately eighty plus signatures of people who and let me read what it says. We the undersigned petitioners do hereby give notice to all concerned that as local neighbors of Combustion Engineering, Incorporated we support their efforts to modernize and expand operations at the Hematite, Missouri plant. I would like to present this. Also there is a letter in there from one of the residents, one of our Hematite characters. Okay. I share Senator Nixon, Martha Dodson, Mrs. Sisk's concern about Jefferson County. I think that it is something that we

need to be concerned about. The county does have some problems. Dr. Pernoud brought up something that's quite interesting that sometimes with our focus on nuclear because nuclear has become such a hot word that we lose sight of the real problem and it could be that the real problem is flouride, it's not radioactivity. It may well be. Sounds like it is something that's been looked at and considered. I believe that the objective of the coalition for the environment is to stop nuclear in its tracks and to eventually eliminate it completely. Why else would they come after an operation as inoccuous as the Hematite plant and not take time to compare nuclear to petroleum, coal and wood as sources of energy as far as the potential damage to the environment. We all are much aware of some of those problems. I believe that the coalition for the environment is part of the problem rather than part of the solution as it applies to energy production and use. I believe that the, their time, the coalition for the environment's time would be better spent concerning themselves with sewage, trash and litter dumped in our beautiful county and maybe flouride. If they did I imagine that everybody in this room would join them in their endeavor. Nuclear has the potential that would eliminate the environmental damage done to our planet by the use of oil and coal. I predict that sometime in the future whether it be not too distant future

or centuries and centuries it may depend upon how successful the coalition for environment is, that sometime in the future our personal transportation vehicles, our cars our motorcycles, I am in that business, will run for years on the electricity generated by very small amounts of nuclear energy. Now, my goodness are we going to do away with something that has such great potential. There is no compromise with the antinuclear people. There is great lengths, there is a tremendous body and tremendous effort of concerned people and a part of our government a tremendous amount of its budget is spent to insure to protect us from the potential hazards of nuclear. But I have confidence that that's being done at Hematite and in the industry as a whole because the industry as a whole has a very good safety record. If the coalition for the environment is successful we will be much more dependent on oil and coal and what will that bring us. I recall in the late '40's and early '50's going into St. Louis with my father and a dark pale hung over the city in the winter time and it was because of coal. Most everything was coal fired. Now I just wonder what department of the government was or citizens committee that eliminated that. Well, gee I think it was the market place because we come up with oil and we come up with natural gas and we come up with fuel oil and electricity. Where would the coalition for the environment have us be? Where would

they back the clock up to? That's all I would like to know. I have more hope in mother nature in the future lead by people who are concerned than I do about the doom sayers and the chickens littles of the world. Thank you.

MR. NORELIUS: Next we have Phillip Crow.

MR. ~~CROW~~ Sgrer: My name is Phillip ~~Crow~~ Sgrer. I live in Hillsboro. I really wanted to come to this hearing tonight, this meeting tonight. I did not have any prepared questions. I wanted to come and listen with openess and were genuine respect for all of the parties that are involved. And I'm somewhat saddened at the question of the integrity of one of the bodies that was brought into body by the last speaker. But what I would like to share with you is that I'm here for a couple of reasons. One of them is that at night when I look at the awesome beauty of the stars and during the daytime and during the daytime when I look at the beauty of nature I'm still with a sense of wonder and of an increasing awe for the God that could create this. And the other reason that I came here tonight was that I have a real concern about the safety of people who work in the plant and about the citizens of our community. For a long, long time now certain kinds of issue have needed to be discussed. Missouri began to talk about participation in the low level radioactive nuclear waste. In fact, I was a member of the board of directors of the coalition of the

environment at the time and introduced the motion to have the coalition oppose Missouri's participation in should impact the relevance of that. As we were told tonight that there is the possibility if the Barneswell facility cannot take the waste then in fact Missouri may in time participate in the compact and until then the waste will be left on site and after that it will be part of the compact. The difficulty that I and others have with the compact was three fold in its nature. One, the issues related to the safety of the storage, two, issues related to the safety of transportation and third, the ethical issue. And very briefly the ethical issue is I don't think my God allows me to say if I don't want waste here that I have a right to get you to take it by taking an economically depressed community and telling it if it desperately needs jobs it has to surrender the potential safety of its workers and residents in order to be able to have increased income. I don't like that kind of ethical trade off. What happened though is that we have talked about low level radioactive waste and as I began to do things like, for example, debate the assistant director of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources I have the same kind of ambiquity that I have when we use words without definition. Like say the reason that I am bringing that up is when I would ask them would you please define for me low level waste. Most frequently the response

I got was low level waste is that waste which is ~~higher~~ lower than high level waste. Is that the kind of definition that we want safety based on. Yes, there are technical responses that can come but I don't like to see the safety of people in my community nor the safety of people in plants based on the kind of language that has that ambiguity that can be used very deliberately but in turn impact upon the health of people. That's one of the concerns that I had. Was that we hear some definition of what low level waste means in terms of this future of facility. Because the amount of it at the facility on site seems large at least in terms of volume. I'm not questioning the integrity of any of you. I respect your integrity and I deeply respect your expertise. I do have a concern about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its vigilance in protecting us based on its past record. For example, the studies that told us that the kind of accident that occurred at the Three Mile Island could not occur, right. The same experts that the N.R.C. relied on for that safety figure for that was then hired for a dam and he gave the same figures for the safety of the dam. The dam also broke and people died in the flood. My point is simply that the N.R.C. has not always been our guardian but at times has been the guardian of the industry. So I think we have a right to say to the N.R.C. we appreciate your openess tonight. We respect your integrity and expertise but we

know that your track record is that sometimes you have a little more vigilant defending the industry rather than defending us. In closing I would like to say that I moved to this area recently to become a teacher. I'm an educational therapist. I teach children with behavior disorders and learning disabilities and what I hope for those children is that we can one offer them the environment that's more conducive to their health than growing up in the county with the twenty-eight highest degree of toxic waste in America. I think we owe that to them. I think we owe a more responsible worship to our God for our environment and what I ask you to do is please, if you could, join with us in being part of the process in protecting our community to define more to us with less ambiguity word like low level waste. Because my friends low level waste can and does kill people and that's my point is that low level waste has the capacity to kill human beings and that's why I'm concerned about it. I'm not saying that the waste there does. I'm just saying that when we use words as ambiguously as we did tonight we need to have a little bit greater clarity because you have some very, very powerful substances that are low level waste that even N.R.C. says that are dangerous to health. That's why I came here tonight. I notice some were in opposition. I think the coalition cares deeply. You may or may not agree with its position but it's been my

experience that the people who give their time to the coalition aren't there because of personal gain. The names aren't known in the community and they don't make money because they participate on the board. It's simply that they, you and I are concerned about the environment. The major conflict resolution along time ago so people could learn how to resolve conflicts in ~~waste~~ ways that all parties won. I don't think anybody wins when we begin to question the integrity of each other. Thank you.

MR. NORELIUS: I think in the interest of having everybody be able to make a statement we will move on. We have three other who have signed up. Bill Schifler.

MR. ~~SCHIFLER~~ SCHEIFLER: Yes, sounds like everyone can hear me. My name is Bill ~~Schifler~~ Scheifler. I live in Hillsboro, Missouri. I'm speaking only for myself as a private citizen. And I have three points or questions to make. This particular piece of property has passed through several owners and each owner has passed its liability onto I would suppose the current owner Combustion Engineering. Part of that liability are the waste pits. Now, I take some issue with using the federal funding to clean up these waste pits. This appears to be a liability that Combustion Engineering has purchased along with the property. And I think it is morally correct for Combustion Engineering to set a schedule and set aside escrow money for the cleaning up of these

pits. I think we can plainly say that this is nothing more than a waste dump. And I get the impression it might have been a high level waste dump to leave these pits in our water shed to contaminate our deep wells where most of the private citizens are using deep wells I think is I mean morally disgraceful. I'm a little disturbed that the regulatory commission is issuing expansion plans without having some plans for the removal and cleaning up of these waste pits. I am also somewhat surprised that the regulatory commission without hearing is issuing expansion plans and reissuing their licensing without providing escrow funds for the emissions and clean up of this plant at the end of its life cycle. Now these are normal liabilities of any company that is in this industry. And to ignore these liabilities is improper and it appears that the regulatory commission is ignoring them as well as the company. These waste pits should be removed and taken to a proper site. Because a mistake was made back in the '50's in burying it it does not make it correct today. Part of the clean up of the plant site should be the clean up of the waste pits and definitely an escrow account should be made for the emissions and cleaning up of this plant at the end of its life cycle. Those are two of my points. The third question I have, we have drugs prevelant in the area. I think it is a normal question to ask does the plant have a drug policy

within its plant? Thank you.

MR. ROUSE: I'm going to try the first two and then I'm going to let Jim talk about the last point, Mr.Schifler. I have no quarrel at all with your two points about the burial pits. First of all, the burial pits are the responsibility of C.E. notwithstanding that C.E. as a corporate entity was not the one that put that uranium contaminated material in those pits. They are now the licensee. They over took the responsibility for that site. These ~~§23.304~~ 10 CFR 20.304 burials, and I use the term that was in the regulation that permitted ~~this~~ the burials, is no longer in affect. As you might have heard it really went out of use for any fuel cycle facility in about 1970. Nevertheless we have a few of these around the country and they are a ~~bother~~ concern to the regulatory agency. And in very recent testimony ~~at~~ To the congress, our new Chairman, Chairman Carr committed to Congressman ~~Zifer~~ Synar of Oklahoma that before any of the plants were decommissioned and the license terminated that something would have to be done with these 20.304 burials. They would have to be assessed, determined what would be done with them, Whether there would have to be some restrictions on the land or whether that waste would have to be removed by the licensee. Number two, on the decommissioning again you're absolutely right and as a matter of fact about a year ago the N.R.C., maybe a little belatedly, but now has a rule that we will

require a decommissioning funding plan from ~~first~~ firms like Combustion Engineering Hematite which will have to estimate the cost of the ~~emissions~~ decommissioning and then provide assurance under specified mechanisms that that funding will be available at the time that the plant ceases its life. ~~And~~ It will be a few years before that comes into play, but there is no indication that C.E. Hematite is going to go out of business, ~~but~~ and I assure you that ~~that~~ the rule covers full funding of whatever it takes to meet the decommissioning requirements of the N.R.C. at the time and then ~~it~~ the plan has to be updated about every four or five years.

MR. ~~SCHIFLEY~~ SCHEIFLER: May I rebuttle there a moment? Why was this expansion plant approved without some provisions for those pits to be cleaned up along with the plant site that's being constructed on? Why wasn't that held up until committments were made on those pits? We know there were there. We know they exist. Granted they were under license in '53 but I can't visualize you issuing expansion plans and not including total clean up of that plant site before they were issued.

MR. ROUSE: I can't say anything other than the plant is an active plant. Some of these decisions with respect to these burial grounds have only been recently considered. And number two, as long as the licensee is there and operating ~~those~~ the plant~~s~~, ~~those burial grounds and~~

our studies and their studies have shown the burial grounds have had no impact off site.

MR. RODE: With respect to drug testing C.E. Hematite does have a policy of testing new employees for drugs. We also have a general policy dealing with fitness for duties. This policy dictates our answers when we detect that someone at the plant is unfit for work in the plant and this may not seem that it has any association with drugs but I assure that it does. It is not possible to unilaterally implement a drug testing program. This may come to pass in the future.

MR. NORELIUS: Okay. Next we have Pete Pappin.

MR. PAPPIN: My name IS Pete Pappin. I was called by a member of Senator Nixon'S staff to make sure that I would be here tonight. I responded in the local paper the Courier Journal that Mr. Surdyke wrote a couple of weeks ago and I have two things to say. The first one is as I look around tonight I see some red and white caps that say quality is our future. They are all brand new. How long has this been your motto. I would like to read my response to Mr. Surdyke and it's also a response to Combustion Engineering. It is ludicrist for Gary Surdyke to compare the coal industry to uranium processing facilities. That is like comparing apple to oranges. It seems as though Mr. Surdyke has little or no regard for the safety of the

residents of Jefferson County. Our county has been a dumping ground for far too long. It's time to slow down and consider just exactly what needs to be done so that the Combustion Engineering plant is a safe and welcome neighbor. Which he tried to slip an expansion of their plant past the residents of Jefferson County that would double the amount of processing done at the Hematite location. No environmental impact study was to be done until Senator Nixon required one to be completed before further construction. To my knowledge C.E. has no evacuation plan, no way to notify the surrounding communities of a nuclear accident. They don't even have a fence around their perimeter. They have four unlined waste pits that no one knows the exact location of. This is not what I call stringent regulation. I suppose the Exxon Oil spill sounds okay with Mr. Surdyke. With the oil industry is highly regulated with friends like Exxon, Dow Chemical and Combustion Engineering who need enemies. The human race is rapidly condeming itself through irresponsible polutting of the land, air and water and this is something no one has said tonight. Our children, our grand children will inherit the earth from us. Let's make sure that there is something worth while to inherit. I'm sure that the polluters of the world wish that there were more people like Mr. Surdyke and the people that signed that petition, people who do not care

about the environment. People who disregard the warning signals that our mother earth is sending to the human race. We won't get many more second chances.

MR. NORELIUS: Pam Midget.

MS. MIDGETT. My name is Pam Midgett. My husband, Dennis, works for Combustion Engineering. We also are residents of Jefferson County. We live in DeSoto. I speak only as a mother. We have three children and I wonder, also I wondered when Dennis took this job of parents does it was an unknown job. Whenever he mentioned radioactivity I kind of freeked at first. I mean who wouldn't and whenever I did meet Mr. Rode and I see alot of the people that work with Dennis we are all real people. You can walk up and shake our hands. I mean we have children. We are raising our kids here. We're not running off hiding. I worry about Dennis when something happens. The worse thing I are think he did was sprain his back at work, which they took care of that. They sent him straight to the doctor. He was paid for it. We have two children that we're born with disabilities before Dennis even worked here and, you know, I mean I don't think it's fair that we could blame Combustion Engineering. I know for a fact that the guys and the ladies and gentlemen wear patches on their clothes that monitors radioactivity. I get the letter in the mail telling me that Dennis is way blow and he is right

with it along with everyone else that works there or right with it. And I understand the community being scared but I also understand that the guys and the ladies that work with this stuff would be more contaminated than the rest of us and I'm not saying that every place is perfect but I do know what I know is that Combustion Engineering is safe. As safe as any place like this could be. And I also have a question for the lady. The plant did not hide its expansion. I mean anybody that travels that road could see it for over a year and if they did not expand would this have ever happened and that's my question?

MR. NORELIUS: Okay. That completes the list of people who asked to make a statement. It's getting near ten o'clock. Our purpose in coming tonight was to try to provide information to those of you who have an interest and from the size of the group that is assembled it's obvious that many of you do have an interest. I think that's a healthy sign. I appreciate the sincerety of each person who made a statement but one thing that strikes one in listening to it is that there are many people who sincerely come to this problem from quite different approaches. And I think what that means is that this like alot of questions are not easily answered. There are difficult problems they require judgement and they require study and they require alot of thought in order to make the

proper decisions. We have a responsibility as I said at the beginning of assuring public health and safety and we take the input that we receive and try to evaluate that and come to conclusions with regards to the standards that have been set. So I do appreciate your participation tonight and your attendance and again I will just say that I hope it has been helpful for each of you. Thank you very much.