
 <b>Entergy</b> <b>IPEC SITE MANAGEMENT MANUAL</b>	<b>QUALITY RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE</b>	<b>IP-SMM-AD-103</b> <b>Revision 0</b>
	<b>INFORMATIONAL USE</b>	<b>Page    13    of    21</b>

<b>ATTACHMENT 10.1</b>	<b>SMM CONTROLLED DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM</b>
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**SITE MANAGEMENT MANUAL CONTROLLED DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM - PROCEDURES**

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 <b>Entergy</b>		<b>CONTROLLED DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM - PROCEDURES</b>	
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<b>DOC #</b>	<b>REV #</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>INSTRUCTIONS</b>
<p><b>Page 5 of 5 on the List of Effective Sections was inadvertently left out of the distribution of the BASES update 19-11/04/05....Please insert into your files.</b></p> <p align="center"><b>*****PLEASE NOTE EFFECTIVE DATE*****</b></p> <p>RECEIPT OF THE ABOVE LISTED DOCUMENT(S) IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED. I CERTIFY THAT ALL SUPERSEDED, VOID, OR INACTIVE COPIES OF THE ABOVE LISTED DOCUMENT(S) IN MY POSSESSION HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM USE AND ALL UPDATES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EFFECTIVE DATE(S) (IF APPLICABLE) AS SHOWN ON THE DOCUMENT(S).</p>			
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## DISTRIBUTION CONTROL LIST

Document Name: ITS/BASES/TRM

CC_NAME	NAME	DEPT	LOCATION
1	OPS PROCEDURE GROUP SUPV.	OPS PROCEDURE GROUP	IP2
3	PLANT MANAGER'S OFFICE	UNIT 3 (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	IP2
5	CONTROL ROOM (FL)	OPS (3PT-D001/6 (IP3/IPEC)	IP3
11	RES DEPARTMENT MANAGER	RES (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	45-4-A
19	STEWART ANN	LICENSING	GSB-2D
20	CHEMISTRY SUPERVISOR	CHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT	45-4-A
21	TSC (IP3)	EEC BUILDING	IP2
22	SHIFT MGR. (LUB-001-GEN)	OPS (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	IP3
23	LIS	LICENSING & INFO SERV	OFFSITE
25	SIMULATOR	TRAIN (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	48-2-A
28	RESIDENT INSPECTOR	US 'NRC 88' ELEVATION	IP2
32	EOF	E-PLAN (ALL EP'S)	EOF
47	CHAPMAN N	BECHTEL	OFFSITE
50	TADEMY L. SHARON	WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC	OFFSITE
55	GSB TECHNICAL LIBRARY	A MCCALLION/IPEC & IP3	GSB-3B
61	SIMULATOR	TRAIN (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	48-2-A
69	CONROY PAT	LICENSING/ROOM 205	GSB-2D
99	BARANSKI J (ALL)	ST. EMERG. MGMT. OFFICE	OFFSITE
106	SIMULATOR INSTRUCT AREA	TRG/3PT-D001-D006 ONLY)	#48
164	CONTROL ROOM (FL)	OPS (3PT-D001/6 (IP3/IPEC)	IP3
207	TROY M	PROCUREMENT ENG.	GSB-4B
273	FAISON CHARLENE	NUCLEAR LICENSING	WPO-12
319	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
354	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS/TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
357	L.GRANT (ITS/INFO ONLY)	TRAINING - ILO CLASSES	48-2-A
424	GRANT LEAH (9 COPIES)	(UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
474	OUELLETTE P	ENG., PLAN & MGMT INC	OFFSITE
483	SCHMITT RICHIE	MAINTENANCE ENG/SUPV	45-1-A
489	CLOUGHNESSY PAT	PLANT SUPPORT TEAM	GSB-3B
492	FSS UNIT 3	OPERATIONS	K-IP-I210
493	OPERATIONS FIN TEAM	33 TURBIN DECK	45-1-A
494	AEOF/A.GROSJEAN (ALL EP'S)	E-PLAN (EOP'S ONLY)	WPO-12D
496	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS/TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
497	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS/TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
500	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
501	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
512	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
513	L.GRANT (LRQ-OPS TRAIN)	LRQ (UNIT 3/IPEC ONLY)	#48
518	DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK	NRC (ALL EP'S)	OFFSITE
529	FIELDS DEBBIE	OUTAGE PLANNING	IP3/OSB

**INDIAN POINT 3  
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES**

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR UPDATE: 19-11/04/05**

Pages are to be inserted into your controlled copy of the IP3 Technical Specifications Bases following the instructions listed below. The **TAB** notation indicates which section the pages are located.

<b>Remove Page</b>	<b>Insert Page</b>
<b>TAB - List Of Effective Sections</b>	
List of Effective Sections, Rev. 18 (5 pages)	List of Effective Sections, Rev. 19 (5 pages)
<b>TAB 3.8 – Electrical Power Systems</b>	
B 3.8.1, Rev. 2 (30 pages)	B 3.8.1, Rev. 3 (30 pages)

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS**

BASES SECTION	REV	NUMBER OF PAGES	EFFECTIVE DATE
Tbl of Cnt	2	4	8/10/2005
<b>B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS</b>			
B 2.1.1	1	4	06/03/2005
B 2.1.2	1	4	06/03/2005
<b>B 3.0 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY</b>			
B 3.0	2	16	08/10/2005
<b>B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL</b>			
B 3.1.1	1	6	06/03/2005
B 3.1.2	0	7	03/19/2001
B 3.1.3	1	7	10/27/2004
B 3.1.4	0	13	03/19/2001
B 3.1.5	0	5	03/19/2001
B 3.1.6	0	6	03/19/2001
B 3.1.7	0	8	03/19/2001
B 3.1.8	0	7	03/19/2001
<b>B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS</b>			
B 3.2.1	0	7	03/19/2001
B 3.2.2	1	7	06/03/2005
B 3.2.3	0	9	03/19/2001
B 3.2.4	0	7	03/19/2001
<b>B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION</b>			
B 3.3.1	2	58	06/03/2005
B 3.3.2	4	45	04/08/2005
B 3.3.3	3	18	08/10/2005
B 3.3.4	1	6	08/10/2005
B 3.3.5	1	6	10/27/2004
B 3.3.6	1	8	04/08/2005
B 3.3.7	1	6	04/08/2005
B 3.3.8	2	4	06/03/2005
<b>B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM</b>			
B 3.4.1	1	6	06/03/2005
B 3.4.2	0	3	03/19/2001
B 3.4.3	2	9	06/03/2005
B 3.4.4	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.4.5	0	6	03/19/2001
B 3.4.6	1	6	06/03/2005
B 3.4.7	0	7	03/19/2001
B 3.4.8	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.4.9	3	5	06/03/2005
B 3.4.10	0	5	03/19/2001
B 3.4.11	1	7	08/10/2005
B 3.4.12	2	19	08/10/2005
B 3.4.13	3	6	06/03/2005
B 3.4.14	0	10	03/19/2001
B 3.4.15	3	7	08/10/2005
B 3.4.16	2	6	08/10/2005
<b>B 3.5 ECCS</b>			
B 3.5.1	1	10	10/27/2004
B 3.5.2	2	13	09/16/2005
B 3.5.3	1	4	08/10/2005
B 3.5.4	0	9	03/19/2001

BASES SECTION	REV	NUMBER OF PAGES	EFFECTIVE DATE
<b>B 3.6 CONTAINMENT</b>			
B 3.6.1	0	5	03/19/2001
B 3.6.2	1	9	06/03/2005
B 3.6.3	0	17	03/19/2001
B 3.6.4	0	3	03/19/2001
B 3.6.5	1	5	06/20/2003
B 3.6.6	2	13	06/03/2005
B 3.6.7	1	6	06/03/2005
B 3.6.8	1	1	08/10/2005
B 3.6.9	1	8	06/03/2005
B 3.6.10	2	12	09/16/2005
<b>B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS</b>			
B 3.7.1	2	6	06/03/2005
B 3.7.2	1	10	06/03/2005
B 3.7.3	1	7	05/18/2001
B 3.7.4	1	4	08/10/2005
B 3.7.5	3	9	08/10/2005
B 3.7.6	2	4	06/03/2005
B 3.7.7	1	4	12/17/2004
B 3.7.8	1	7	06/03/2005
B 3.7.9	2	9	06/03/2005
B 3.7.10	1	3	06/03/2005
B 3.7.11	5	7	08/10/2005
B 3.7.12	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.7.13	3	7	06/03/2005
B 3.7.14	1	3	04/08/2005
B 3.7.15	0	5	03/19/2001
B 3.7.16	0	6	03/19/2001
B 3.7.17	1	4	06/03/2005
<b>B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER</b>			
B 3.8.1	3	30	11/04/2005
B 3.8.2	0	7	03/19/2001
B 3.8.3	0	13	03/19/2001
B 3.8.4	1	11	01/22/2002
B 3.8.5	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.8.6	0	8	03/19/2001
B 3.8.7	1	8	06/20/2003
B 3.8.8	1	4	06/20/2003
B 3.8.9	2	14	06/20/2003
B 3.8.10	0	4	03/19/2001
<b>B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS</b>			
B 3.9.1	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.9.2	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.9.3	2	7	06/03/2005
B 3.9.4	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.9.5	0	4	03/19/2001
B 3.9.6	2	3	04/08/2005

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
REVISION HISTORY**

**REVISION HISTORY FOR BASES**

AFFECTED SECTIONS	REV	EFFECTIVE DATE	DESCRIPTION
ALL	0	03/19/01	Initial issue of Bases derived from NUREG-1431, in conjunction with Technical Specification Amendment 205 for conversion of 'Current Technical Specifications' to 'Improved Technical Specifications'.
<b>BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 01-031901</b>			
B 3.4.13 B 3.4.15	1	03/19/01	Changes regarding containment sump flow monitor per NSE 01-3-018 LWD Rev 0. Change issued concurrent with Rev 0.
<b>BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 02-051801</b>			
Table of Contents	1	05/18/01	Title of Section B 3.7.3 revised per Tech Spec Amend 207
B 3.7.3	1	05/18/01	Implementation of Tech Spec Amend 207
<b>BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 03-111901</b>			
B 3.3.2	1	11/19/01	Correction to statement regarding applicability of Function 5, to be consistent with the Technical Specification.
B 3.3.3	1	11/19/01	Changes to reflect reclassification of certain SG narrow range level instruments as QA Category M per NSE 97-3-439, Rev 1.
B 3.4.13 B 3.4.15	2	11/19/01	Changes to reflect installation of a new control room alarm for 'VC Sump Pump Running'. Changes per NSE 01-3-018, Rev 1 and DCP 01-3-023 LWD.
B 3.7.11	1	11/19/01	Clarification of allowable flowrate for CRVS in 'incident mode with outside air makeup.'
<b>BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 04-012202</b>			
B 3.3.2	2	01/22/02	Clarify starting logic of 32 ABFP per EVL-01-3-078 MULTI, Rev 0.
B 3.8.1	1	01/22/02	Provide additional guidance for SR 3.8.1.1 and Condition Statements A.1 and B.1 per EVL-01-3-078 MULTI, Rev 0.
B 3.8.4	1	01/22/02	Revision of battery design description per plant modification and to reflect Tech Spec Amendment 209.
B 3.8.9	1	01/22/02	Provide additional information regarding MCC in Table B 3.8.9-1 per EVL-01-3-078 MULTI, Rev 0.
<b>BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 05-093002</b>			
B 3.0	1	09/30/02	Changes to reflect Tech Spec Amendment 212 regarding delay period for a missed surveillance. Changes adopt TSTF 358, Rev 6.
B 3.3.1	1	09/30/02	Changes regarding description of turbine runback feature per EVAL-99-3-063 NIS.
B 3.3.3	2	09/30/02	Changes to reflect Tech Spec Amendment 211 regarding CETs and other PAM instruments.
B 3.7.9	1	09/30/02	Changes regarding SWN -35-1 and -2 valves per EVAL-00-3-095 SWS, Rev 0.

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
REVISION HISTORY**

AFFECTED SECTIONS	REV	EFFECTIVE DATE	DESCRIPTION
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 06-120402			
B 3.3.2 B 3.6.6 B 3.7.1 B 3.7.6	3 1 1 1	12/04/02	Changes to reflect Tech Spec Amendment 213 regarding 1.4% power uprate.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 07-031703			
B 3.3.8 B 3.7.13 B 3.9.3	1 1 1	03/17/2003	Changes to reflect Tech Spec Amendment 215 regarding implementation of Alternate Source Term analysis methodology to the Fuel Handling Accident.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 08-032803			
B 3.4.9	1	03/28/2003	Changes to reflect Tech Spec Amendment 216 regarding relaxation of pressurizer level limits in MODE 3.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 09-062003			
B 3.4.9	2	06/20/2003	Changes to reflect commitment for a dedicated operator per Tech Spec Amendment 216.
B 3.6.5	1	06/20/2003	Implements Corrective Action 11 from CR-IP3-2002-02095; 4 FCUs should be in operation to assure representative measurement of containment air temperature.
B 3.7.11	2	06/20/2003	Correction to Background description regarding system response to Firestat detector actuation per ACT 02-62887.
B 3.7.13	2	06/20/2003	Revision to Background description of FSB air tempering units to reflect design change per DCP 95-3-142.
B 3.8.7 B 3.8.8 B 3.8.9	1 1 2	06/20/2003 06/20/2003 06/20/2003	Changes to reflect replacement of Inverter 34 per DCP-01-022.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 10-102704			
B 3.1.3	1	10/27/2004	Clarification of the surveillance requirements for TS 3.1.3 per 50.59 screen.
B 3.3.5	1	10/27/2004	Clarify the requirements for performing a Trip Actuating Device Operational Test (TADOT) on the 480V degraded grid and undervoltage relays per 50.59 screen.
B 3.4.3 B 3.4.12 B 3.5.1	1 1 1	10/27/2004  10/27/2004	Extension of the RCS pressure/temperature limits and corresponding OPS limits from 16.17 to 20 EFY (TS Amendment 220). Changes to reflect Tech Spec Amendment 222 regarding extension of completion time for Accumulators.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 11-121004			
B 3.7.7	1	12/17/2004	Addition of valves CT-1300 and CT-1302 to Surveillance SR 3.7.7.2 to verify that all city water header supply isolation valves are open. Reflects Tech Spec Amendment 218.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 12-012405			
B 3.7.11	3	01/24/2005	Temporary allowance for use of KI/SCBA for unfiltered inleakage above limit.

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
REVISION HISTORY**

AFFECTED SECTIONS	REV	EFFECTIVE DATE	DESCRIPTION
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 13-022505			
B 3.7.5	1	02/25/2005	Clarification on Surveillance Requirement 3.7.5.3 as it relates to plant condition/frequency of performance of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump full flow testing.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 14-030705			
B 3.9.6	1	03/07/2005	Changes to reflect that the decay time prior to fuel movement is a minimum of 84 hours per Tech Spec Amendment 215.
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 15-040805			
B 3.3.2	4	04/07/2005	Changes to reflect AST as per Tech Spec Amendment 224.  NOTE: In addition to the AST changes to B. 3.7.11, the temporary allowance for use of KI/SCBA for unfiltered inleakage above limit is being removed. Tracer Gas testing is complete.
B 3.3.6	1		
B. 3.3.7	1		
B 3.7.11	4		
B 3.7.14	1		
B 3.9.6	2		
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 16-060305			
B 2.1.1	1	06/03/2005	Changes to reflect SPU as per Tech Spec Amendment 225.
B 2.1.2	1		
B 3.1.1	1		
B 3.2.2	1		
B 3.3.1	2		
B 3.3.8	2		
B 3.4.1	1		
B 3.4.3	2		
B 3.4.6	1		
B 3.4.9	3		
B 3.4.13	3		
B 3.4.16	1		
B 3.5.2	1		
B 3.6.2	1		
B 3.6.6	2		
B 3.6.7	1		
B 3.6.9	1		
B 3.6.10	1		
B 3.7.1	2		
B 3.7.2	1		
B 3.7.5	2		
B 3.7.6	2		
B 3.7.8	1		
B 3.7.9	2		
B 3.7.10	1		
B 3.7.13	3		
B 3.7.17	1		
B 3.9.3	2		

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
REVISION HISTORY**

AFFECTED SECTIONS	REV	EFFECTIVE DATE	DESCRIPTION
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 17-081005			
TOC	2	08/10/2005	B 3.3.3, B 3.6.8 – Removal of Hydrogen Recombiners from the bases as per Technical Specification Amendment 228. B 3.3.3 is also affected by Amendment 226.  B 3.7.11 - Add reference that if the primary coolant source of containment is in question, refer to ITS 5.5.2.  All other bases changes for this revision are associated with Technical Specification Amendment 226 regarding increase flexibility in Mode Restraints.
B 3.0	2		
B 3.3.3	3		
B 3.3.4	1		
B 3.4.11	1		
B 3.4.12	2		
B 3.4.15	3		
B 3.4.16	2		
B 3.5.3	1		
B 3.6.8	1		
B 3.7.4	1		
B 3.7.5	3		
B 3.7.11	5		
B 3.8.1	2		
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 18-091605			
B 3.5.2	2	09/16/2005	Reflect implementation of ER-04-2-029 as part of Stretch Power Uprate (SPU) – HHSI Modification.  Update LCO and Condition B to clarify required actions consistent with FSAR.
B 3.6.10	2		
BASES UPDATE PACKAGE 19-110405			
B 3.8.1	3	11/04/2005	Include operability criteria for 138 kV and 13.8 kV offsite circuits.



## B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### B 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The unit Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the following: two offsite circuits (the normal or 138 kV circuit and the alternate or 13.8 kV circuit), each of which has a preferred and backup feeder; and, the onsite standby power circuit consisting of three diesel generators. As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The onsite plant distribution system is configured around 6.9 kV buses Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. All offsite power to safeguards buses enter the plant via 6.9 kV buses Nos. 5 and 6 which are connected to the 138 kV (normal) offsite circuit and have the ability to be connected to the 13.8 kV (alternate) offsite circuit. 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4, which supply power to the 4 reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), typically receive power from the main generator via the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) when the plant is at power. However, when the main generator or UAT is not capable of supporting this arrangement, 6.9 kV buses 1 and 2 receive offsite power via 6.9 kV bus 5 and 6.9 kV buses 3 and 4 receive offsite power via 6.9 kV bus 6. Following a unit trip, 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 will auto transfer (fast transfer) to 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6 in order to receive offsite power. The 6.9 kV buses supply power to the 480 V buses using 6.9 kV/480 V station service transformers (SSTs) as follows: 6.9 kV bus 5 supplies 480 V bus 5A via SST 5; 6.9 kV bus 6 supplies 480 V bus 6A via SST 6; 6.9 kV bus 2 supplies 480 V bus 2A via SST 2; and, 6.9 kV bus 3 supplies 480 V bus 3A via SST 3.

The onsite AC Power Distribution System begins with 480 V buses 5A, 6A, 2A and 3A and is divided into 3 safeguards power trains (trains) consisting of the 480 volt safeguards bus(es) and associated AC electrical power distribution subsystems, 125 volt DC bus subsystems, and 120 volt vital AC instrument bus subsystems. The three trains are designed such that any two trains are capable of meeting minimum requirements for accident mitigation and/or safe shutdown. The three safeguards power trains are train 5A (480 volt bus 5A and associated DG 33), train 6A (480 volt bus 6A and associated DG 32), and train 2A/3A (480 volt buses 2A and 3A and associated DG 31).

(continued)

BASES

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BACKGROUND  
(continued)

Offsite power is supplied to the plant from the transmission network by two electrically and physically separated circuits, the 138 kV or normal circuit and the 13.8 kV or alternate circuit. Each of the offsite circuits from the Buchanan substation into the plant is required to be supported by a physically independent circuit from the offsite network into the Buchanan substation. All offsite power enters the plant via 6.9 kV buses Nos.5 and 6 which are connected to the 138 kV (normal) offsite circuit and have the ability to be connected to the 13.8 kV (alternate) offsite circuit. This arrangement satisfies the requirement that at least one of the two required circuits can within a few seconds, provide power to safety-related equipment following a loss-of-coolant accident. Operator action is required to supply offsite power to the plant using the 13.8 kV (alternate) offsite source.

The 138 kV circuit and the 13.8 kV circuit each have a preferred and a backup feeder that connects the circuit to the Buchanan substation. For both the 138 kV and 13.8 kV circuits, the preferred IP3 feeder is the backup IP2 feeder and the backup IP3 feeder is the preferred IP2 feeder.

For the 138 kV (i.e., normal) offsite circuit, IP2 and IP3 each have a dedicated Station Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) that can be supplied by either a preferred or backup feeder. The normal or 138 kV offsite circuit, including the SAT used exclusively for IP3, is designed to supply all IP3 loads, including 4 operating RCPs and ESF loads, when using either the preferred (95331) or backup (95332) feeder. There are no special restrictions when IP2 and IP3 are both using the same 138 kV feeder concurrently.

For the 13.8 kV (i.e., alternate) offsite circuit, there is a 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformer associated with feeder 13W92 and a 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformer associated with feeder 13W93.

Feeder 13W93 and its associated auto-transformer is the preferred feeder for the IP3 alternate (13.8 kV) circuit and the backup feeder for the IP2 alternate (13.8 kV) circuit. Feeder 13W92 and its associated auto-transformer is the backup feeder for the IP3 alternate (13.8 kV) circuit and the preferred feeder for the IP2 alternate (13.8 kV) circuit.

(continued)

## BASES

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### BACKGROUND (continued)

An offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite 480 V ESF bus(es).

The onsite standby power source consists of 3 480 V diesel generators (DGs) with a separate DG dedicated to each of the safeguards power trains. Safeguards power train 5A (480 V bus 5A) is supported by DG 33; safeguards power train 6A (480 V bus 6A) is supported by DG 32; and, safeguards power train 2A/3A (480 V buses 2A and 3A) is supported by DG 31. A DG starts automatically on a safety injection (SI) signal or on an ESF bus undervoltage signal (refer to LCO 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation"). After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage, independent of or coincident with an SI signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus on an SI signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, an undervoltage signal strips nonpermanent loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by individual load timers. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.

In the event of a loss of 138 kV or normal offsite source, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Within 1 minute after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

Ratings for DGs 31, 32 and 33 are consistent with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The 3 DGs each consist of an Alco model 16-251-E engine coupled to a Westinghouse 2188 kVA, 0.8 power factor, 900 rpm, 3 phase, 60 cycle, 480 volt generator. The ESF loads that are powered from the 480 V ESF buses are listed in Reference 2.

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(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND  
(continued)

The EDGs have four capacity ratings as defined below that can be used to assess EDG operability.

- Continuous: Electrical power output capability that can be maintained 24 hours /day, with no time constraint.
- 2000-hour: Electrical power output capability that can be maintained in one continuous run of 2000 hours or in multiple shorter duration runs totaling 2000 hours.
- 2-hour: Electrical power output capability that can be maintained for up to 2 hours in any 24-hour period.
- 1/2 - hour: Electrical power output capability that can be maintained for up to 30 minutes in any 24-hour period.

The electrical output capabilities (EDG load) applicable to these four ratings are as follows:

<u>RATING</u>	<u>EDG LOAD</u>	<u>TIME CONSTRAINT</u>
Continuous	≤ 1750 kW	None
2000-hour	≤ 1950 kW	≤ 2000 hours / calendar year
2-hour	≤ 1950 kW	≤ 2 hours in a 24-hour period;
	≤ 1750 kW	AND for the remaining 22 hours. [See NOTE A]
1/2-hour	≤ 2000 kW	≤ 30 minutes in a 24-hour period;
	≤ 1750 kW	AND for the remaining 23.5 hours. [See NOTE A]

(continued)

## BASES

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### BACKGROUND (continued)

NOTE A: The loading cycle permitted for the '2-hour' and the '1/2-hour' rating is operation at the overload condition (e.g. > 1750 kW) for the specified time followed by operation at the 'continuous' (e.g.  $\leq 1750$  kW) rating for the remaining time in the 24-hour period. This loading cycle may be repeated each day, as long as back-to-back operation in the overload condition does not occur. The 2000-hour cumulative time constraint also applies to repetitive operation at the overload conditions allowed by the 2-hour and the 1/2-hour ratings.

Operation in excess of 2000 kW, regardless of the duration, is an unanalyzed condition. In such cases, the EDG is assumed to be inoperable and the vendor should be consulted to determine if accelerated or supplemental inspection and/or maintenance is necessary. The EDG can be returned to an operable status following completion of vendor-required inspection and/or maintenance.

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power.

Distribution Limits; 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the Accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least 2 of the 3 safeguards power trains energized from either onsite or offsite AC sources during Accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36.

(continued)

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BASES

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LCO

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Electrical Power System and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or a postulated DBA.

There are two qualified circuits (normal and alternate) from the transmission network at the Buchanan Station to the onsite electric distribution system. The normal circuit is 138 kV and the alternate circuit is 13.8 kV. If the alternate circuit is in use, the normal circuit is inoperable because the autotransfer functions mentioned in the following circuit descriptions are disabled. Both of these circuits must be supported by a circuit from the offsite network into the Buchanan substation that is physically independent from the other circuit to the extent practical. The circuits into the Buchanan substation that satisfy these requirements are 96951, 96952 and 95891.

The 138 kV (i.e., normal) offsite circuit consists of one of the following: 138 kV feeder 95331 (preferred); or, 138 kV feeder 95332 (backup). Additionally, the 138 kV/6.9 kV station auxiliary transformer, circuit breakers ST5 and ST6 which supply 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6, and the following components which are common to the normal and alternate offsite circuits:

- a. The 480 V bus 5A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 5, station service transformer 5, and circuit breakers SS5 and 52/5A;
- b. The 480 V bus 2A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 5, circuit breaker UT2-ST5 (including autotransfer function), 6.9 kV bus 2, station service transformer 2, and circuit breakers SS2 and 52/2A;
- c. The 480 V bus 6A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 6, station service transformer 6, and circuit breakers SS6 and 52/6A; and,
- d. The 480 V bus 3A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 6, circuit breaker UT3-ST6 (including autotransfer function), 6.9 kV bus 3, station service transformer 3, and circuit breakers SS3 and 52/3A.

(continued)

**BASES**

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LCO

(continued)

The 13.8 kV (i.e., alternate) offsite circuit consists of one of the following: 13.8 kV feeder 13W93 and its associated 13.8/6.9 kV autotransformer (preferred); or, 13.8 kV feeder 13W92 and its associated 13.8/6.9 kV autotransformer (backup). Circuit breakers GT35 and GT36, which supply 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6, and the following components are common to the normal and alternate offsite circuits:

- a. The 480 V bus 5A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 5, station service transformer 5, and circuit breakers SS5 and 52/5A;
- b. The 480 V bus 2A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 5, circuit breaker UT2-ST5 (not including autotransfer function), 6.9 kV bus 2, station service transformer 2, and circuit breakers SS2 and 52/2A;
- c. The 480 V bus 6A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 6, station service transformer 6, and circuit breakers SS6 and 52/6A; and,
- d. The 480 V bus 3A supply consisting of 6.9 kV bus 6, circuit breaker UT3-ST6 (not including autotransfer function), 6.9 kV bus 3, station service transformer 3, and circuit breakers SS3 and 52/3A.

If the alternate (13.8 kV) offsite circuit is being used to supply power to the plant and the Unit Auxiliary Transformer is supplying 6.9 kV bus 1, 2, 3 or 4, the size of the 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformers requires that the automatic transfer of 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 to 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6 (i.e., the offsite circuit) be disabled because neither 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformer is capable of supplying 4 operating RCPs. This requirement is not intended to preclude supplying 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 using the alternate offsite circuit via the 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformers once sufficient loads have been stripped from 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 to assure that the 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformer will not be overloaded by these manual actions.

If IP3 and IP2 are both using a single 13.8 kV feeder (13W92 or 13W93), administrative controls are used to ensure that the 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformer load restrictions will not be exceeded.

Operability of the offsite power sources requires the ability to provide the required capacity during design basis conditions. The minimum offsite voltage necessary to provide the required capacity

(continued)

BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

was determined, using system load flow studies with conservative assumptions (Reference 10), to be greater than or equal to 136 kV and 13.4 kV for the 138 kV and 13.8 kV circuits, respectively. Upon notification by Con Ed that these alarm limits are not met, the LCO is considered not met at the time of the initial alarm. When the grid monitoring system is operating the minimum acceptable 138 kV voltage varies with grid conditions and Con Ed will provide notification.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.

Three DGs must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within 10 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

The AC sources in each safeguards power train must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete.

For the offsite AC sources, separation and independence are to the extent practical. A circuit may be connected to more than one ESF bus, and not violate separation criteria. A circuit that is not connected to an ESF bus is required to have OPERABLE automatic or manual transfer capability to the ESF buses to support OPERABILITY of that circuit.

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APPLICABILITY

The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

(continued)



BASES

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APPLICABILITY  
(continued)

The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources – Shutdown."

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ACTIONS

A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable DG or the 138 kV offsite circuit. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG. This also applies to the 138 kV offsite circuit, which is the only immediate access offsite circuit. Therefore, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a

MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

A.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. For activities that will require entry into the associated Condition, performance of SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuit(s) could be completed up to 8 hours prior to entry into the Condition. Performance of this SR before entry into the Condition can be credited to establish the accelerated Frequency and therefore is equivalent to performing the SR within 1 hour after entry into the Condition. The LCO Bases describes the components and features which comprise the offsite circuits. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met.

However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

A.2

Required Action A.2, applies only if the 13.8 kV offsite power circuit is being used to feed 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6 and the UAT is supplying 6.9 kV bus 1, 2, 3 or 4. This action prevents the automatic transfer of 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 from the UAT to offsite power after a unit trip. Transfer of buses 1, 2, 3, and 4

(continued)

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

A.2

from the UAT to offsite power could result in overloading the 13.8 kV/6.9 kV autotransformer. This requirement is not intended to preclude supplying 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 using the alternate offsite circuit via the 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformers once sufficient loads have been stripped from 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 to assure that the 13.8 kV/6.9 kV auto-transformer will not be overloaded by these manual actions. Automatic transfer of buses 1, 2, 3, and 4 can be disabled by placing 6.9 kV bus tie breaker control switches 1-5, 2-5, 3-6, and 4-6 in the "pull-out" position.

Although the auto-transfer feature is normally disabled prior to placing the 13.8 kV offsite power circuit in service, a Completion Time of 1 hour ensures that the 13.8 kV circuit meets requirements for Operability promptly when the alternate offsite circuit is configured to support the response of ESF functions.

A.3

Required Action A.3, which only applies if the train will not be powered automatically from an offsite source when the main turbine generator trips, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of redundant required features. Required safety features are designed with a redundant safety feature that is powered from a different safeguards power train.

Therefore, if a required safety feature is supported by an inoperable offsite circuit, then the failure of the DG associated with that required safety feature will not result in the loss of a safety function because the safety function will be accomplished by the redundant safety feature that is powered from a different safeguards power train. However, if a required safety feature is supported by an inoperable offsite circuit and the redundant safety feature that is powered from a different safeguards power train is also inoperable, then the failure of the DG associated with that required safety feature will result in the loss of a safety function. Required Action A.3 ensures that appropriate compensatory measures are taken for a Condition where the loss of a DG could result in the loss of a safety function when an offsite circuit is not OPERABLE.

(continued)

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS**  
(continued)

**A.3**

The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump is not required to be considered a redundant required feature, and, therefore, not required to be determined OPERABLE by this Required Action, because the design is such that the remaining OPERABLE motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump(s) is capable (without any reliance on the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump powered by the emergency bus associated with the inoperable diesel generator) of providing 100% of the auxiliary feedwater flow assumed in the safety analysis.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.3 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. The train will not have offsite power automatically supplying its loads following a trip of the main turbine generator; and
- b. A required feature powered from another safeguards power train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition A (one offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering that offsite power is not automatically available to one train of the on-site Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the other train that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the two remaining safeguards power trains of the on-site Distribution System. The 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

A.4

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Distribution System.

The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable DG, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. For activities that will require entry into the associated Condition, performance of SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuit(s) could be completed up to 8 hours prior to entry into the Condition. Performance of this SR before entry into the Condition can be credited to establish the accelerated Frequency and therefore is equivalent to performing the SR within 1 hour after entry into the Condition. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

B.2

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of redundant required features. Required safety features are designed with a redundant safety feature that is powered from a different safeguards power train. Therefore, if a required safety feature is supported by an inoperable DG, then the failure of the offsite circuit will not result in the loss of a safety function because the safety function will be accomplished by the redundant safety feature that is powered from a different

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.2

safeguards power train (and DG). However, if a required safety feature is supported by an inoperable DG and the redundant safety feature that is powered from a different safeguards power train is also inoperable, then a loss of offsite power will result in the loss of a safety function. Required Action B.2 ensures that appropriate compensatory measures are taken for a Condition where the loss of offsite power could result in the loss of a safety function when a DG is not OPERABLE.

The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump is not required to be considered a redundant required feature, and, therefore, not required to be determined OPERABLE by this Required Action, because the design is such that the remaining OPERABLE motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps is capable (without any reliance on the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump powered by the emergency bus associated with the inoperable diesel generator) of providing 100% of the auxiliary feedwater flow assumed in the safety analysis.

The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. An inoperable DG exists; and
- b. A required feature powered from another safeguards power train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one DG inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.

Discovering one required DG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with either OPERABLE DG, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. A COMPLETION TIME of four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.2

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.3.1 and B.3.2

Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DG(s). If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DGs, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists, and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG.

In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the plant corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition B.

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DGs are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

B.4

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 72 hours.

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BASES

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ACTIONS

B.4 (continued)

In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

C.1 and C.2

Required Action C.1, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. Two offsite circuits are inoperable when both the immediate access circuit and the delayed offsite circuit are not available to one or more safeguards power trains. The most probable cause is a failure in a portion of the circuit that is common to both offsite circuits. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.3). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that three complete safeguards power trains are OPERABLE. When a redundant required feature is not OPERABLE, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train features, such as turbine driven auxiliary pumps, are included as discussed in the Bases for Required Action A.3. The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required feature is inoperable.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

If at any time during the existence of Condition C (two offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours.

This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient.

In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources, two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours.

(continued)



BASES

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ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestricted operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

D.1 and D.2

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization. When the UAT is being used to supply 6.9 kV buses 1, 2, 3 or 4 and the 13.8 kV offsite circuit is being used to supply 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6, the autotransfer function is disabled. Therefore, 480 V safeguards buses 2A and 3A (safeguards train 2A/3A) will not be automatically re-energized with offsite power following a plant trip until connected to the offsite circuit by operator action. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no offsite or DG AC power source automatically available to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems – Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one DG, without regard to whether a train would be de-energized during an event. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a train that would be de-energized.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 12 hours.

In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the on-site AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure.

The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

E.1

With two or more DGs inoperable, the remaining standby AC sources are not adequate to satisfy analysis assumptions. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Reference 6, with two or more DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours.

F.1 and F.2

If the inoperable AC electric power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1 and H.1

Conditions G and H correspond to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost or a loss of safety function has already occurred. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

(continued)

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 1). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 8).

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 422 V is the value determined to be acceptable in the analysis of the degraded grid condition. This value allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 480 V motors. It also allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate rating.

The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 500 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 480 V circuit breakers. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to " 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

**SR 3.8.1.1**

This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The verification includes a sufficient number of breakers in their correct position together with proper bus voltage to ensure that distribution buses and loads are appropriately connected to either their preferred or backup power source for each of the offsite circuits (Normal and Alternate), and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. Portions of this SR may require telephone communication with the District Operator or IP2 Control Room personnel capable of confirming the status of the offsite circuits or some breaker positions. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because 6.9 kV bus status and 13.8 kV circuit status are displayed in the control room.

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.2

These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs are modified by a Note to indicate that all DG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period.

For the purposes of SR 3.8.1.2, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.2 requires that, at a 31 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. The 10 second start requirement supports the assumptions of the design basis LOCA analysis in the FSAR, Chapter 14 (Ref. 5).

The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). This Frequency provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing. DGs have redundant air start motors and both air start motors are actuated by both channels of the start logic. The DG is OPERABLE when either air start motor is OPERABLE; however, this SR will not demonstrate that both of the air start motors are independently capable of starting the DG. If an air start motor is not capable of performing its intended function, a DG is inoperable until a timed start is conducted using the remaining air start motor. Alternately, this SR may be performed using one air start motor (i.e., redundant air start motor isolated) on a staggered basis to ensure that the DG will start with either air start motor.

(continued)

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

**SR 3.8.1.3**

This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads approximating the maximum expected accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while the 1.0 is an operational limitation to ensure circulating currents are minimized. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

This SR is modified by four Notes. Note 1 indicates that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 2 states that momentary transients, because of changing bus loads, do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

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(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.4

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for approximately 1 hour of DG operation at full load.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.5

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 8). This SR is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during the performance of this Surveillance.

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(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.6

This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. This is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE.

The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps operate automatically or must be started manually in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following DG testing. Therefore, a 31 day Frequency is appropriate. Since proper operation of fuel transfer systems is an inherent part of DG OPERABILITY, the Frequency of this SR is consistent with the 31 day Frequency for verification of DG operability.

SR 3.8.1.7

Transfer of the offsite power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and unit safety systems.

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(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.8

Verification that 6.9 kV buses 2 and 3 will auto transfer (fast transfer) from the Unit Auxiliary transformer to 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6 (i.e. station auxiliary transformer) following a loss of voltage on 6.9 kV buses 2 and 3 is needed to confirm the Operability of a function assumed to operate to provide offsite power to safeguards power train 2A/3A following a trip of the main generator.

An actual demonstration of this feature requires the tripping of the main generator while the reactor is at power with the main generator supplying 6.9 kV buses 2 and 3. This will cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge unit safety systems during a plant shutdown. Therefore, in lieu of actually initiating a circuit transfer, testing that adequately shows the capability of the transfer is acceptable. This transfer testing may include any sequence of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire transfer sequence is verified. The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgement taking into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle length.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge unit safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. As stated in Note 2, this SR is only required to be met when the 138 kV offsite circuit is supplying 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6 because, if the 13.8 kV circuit is supplying 6.9 kV buses 5 and 6, then the feature tested by this SR is required to be disabled.

(continued)



**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

**SR 3.8.1.9**

This Surveillance demonstrates that DG noncritical protective functions are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ESF actuation test signal, and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, low lube oil pressure, and engine overcrank) trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DG from service.

**SR 3.8.1.10**

IEEE-387-1995 (Ref. 9) requires demonstration once per 24 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 8 hours, 105 minutes of which is at a load equivalent to 110% of the continuous duty rating and the remainder of the time at a load equivalent to the continuous duty rating of the DG. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

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(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor of # 0.9. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Ref. 9, and takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the power factor limit will not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and unit safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.11

Under accident conditions with concurrent loss of offsite power, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by individual load timers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The design load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)

The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration operating experience that has shown that these components usually pass the SR. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that specifies that load timers associated with equipment that has automatic initiation capability disabled are not required to be OPERABLE. This note is needed because these time delay relays affect the OPERABILITY of both the AC sources (offsite power and DG) and the specific load that the relay starts. If a timer fails to start a required load or starts the load later than assumed in the analysis, then the required load is not OPERABLE. If a timer starts the load outside the design interval (early or late), then the DG and offsite source are not OPERABLE because overlap of equipment starts may cause an offsite source to exceed limits for voltage or current or a DG to exceed limits for voltage, current or frequency. Therefore, when an individual load sequence timer is not OPERABLE, because the timing sequence is outside the design interval, Condition D must be entered. However, if the automatic initiation capability of the affected load is disabled, Condition D may be exited, and the Actions for the inoperable load are taken. It is conservative to disable the automatic initiation capability of a component rather than continue with the associated DG inoperable because of the following: the potential for adverse impact on the DG by simultaneous start of ESF equipment is eliminated; all other loads powered from the safeguards power train are available to respond to the event; and, the load with the inoperable timer remains available for a manual start after the one minute completion of the normal starting sequence.

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.12

In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. This SR verifies all actions encountered from an ESF signal concurrent with the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG autostart time of 10 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability is achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated, or residual heat removal (RHR) systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation.

In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

(continued)

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

**SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)**

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 24 months.

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil and temperature maintained and lube oil continuously circulated consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs.

The reason for Note 2 is that the performance of the Surveillance would remove required offsite circuits from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

The reason for Note 3 is to allow the SR to be conducted with only one safeguards train at a time or with two or three safeguards trains concurrently. Allowing the LOOP/LOCA test to be conducted using one safeguards power train and one DG at a time is acceptable because the safeguards power trains are designed to respond to this event independently. Therefore, an individual test for each safeguards power train will provide an adequate verification of plant response to this event.

Simultaneous testing of all three safeguards power trains is acceptable as long as the following plant conditions are established:

- All three DGs are available,
- diverse and redundant decay heat removal is available,
- no offsite power circuits are inoperable, and
- no simultaneous activities are performed that are precursors to events requiring AC power for mitigation (e.g., fuel handling accident or inadvertent RCS draindown)

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is to allow SR 3.8.1.12 to satisfy the requirements of this SR if SR 3.8.1.12 is performed with more than one safeguards power train concurrently.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
  2. FSAR, Chapter 8.
  3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, July 1993.
  4. FSAR, Chapter 6.
  5. FSAR, Chapter 14.
  6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974.
  7. Generic Letter 84-15, Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability.
  8. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 0, 1978.
  9. IEEE Standard 387-1995, IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
  10. Calculation SGX-00073-01, Dated February 6, 2004
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