



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

November 14, 2005

Mr. Russell B. Starkey
Vice President - Operations
United States Enrichment Corporation
Two Democracy Center
6903 Rockledge Drive
Bethesda, MD 20817

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-7002/2005-003

Dear Mr. Starkey:

This refers to the inspection conducted on October 17 - 20, 2005, at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether emergency preparedness activities authorized by the certificate were conducted in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.

The inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise.

Within the scope of the inspection, violations or deviations were not identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jay L. Henson, Chief
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 2
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-7002
Certificate No. GDP-2

Enclosure: (See page 2)

R. B. Starkey

2

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report

cc w/encl:

P. D. Musser, Portsmouth General Manager

J. Anzelmo, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

S. Penrod, Paducah General Manager

S. A. Toelle, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, USEC

R. M. Devault, Regulatory Oversight Manager, DOE

R. J. Vranicar, Portsmouth Contracting Officer's Representative, DOE

C. O'Claire, State Liaison Officer

Distribution w/encl:

D. Martin, NMSS

B. Nelson, NMSS

D. Ayres, RII

J. Henson, RII

D. Hartland, RII

B. Bartlett, RII

PUBLIC

X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

☐ NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

☐ SENSITIVE

X NON-SENSITIVE

ADAMS: X Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: _____

OFFICE	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI	RII:DRS	RII:DFFI			
SIGNATURE	DH 11/14	DH 11/14	DH 11/14	DH 11/14			
NAME	DHartland	AGooden	OSmith	SCaudill			
DATE	11/ /2005	11/ /2005	11/ /2005	11/ /2005	11/ /2005	11/ /2005	11/ /2005
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML053180367.wpd

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 70-7002

Certificate No.: GDP-2

Report No.: 70-7002/2005-003

Certificatee: United States Enrichment Corporation

Facility: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Location: Piketon, OH

Dates: October 17 - 20, 2003

Inspectors: D. Hartland, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector, DFFI
A. Gooden, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector, DFFI
S. Caudill, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector, DFFI
O. Smith, Physical Security Inspector, DRS
I. Hall, Inspector-in-Training, DRS

Approved By: J. Henson, Chief
Fuel Facilities Inspection Branch 2
Division of Fuel Facilities Inspection

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70-7002/2005-003

The inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the certificatee's performance during the biennial emergency response exercise. The inspection included an observation of activities, a review of selected procedures, records, and interviews with plant personnel.

- The inspectors noted that the scenario developed for this exercise was challenging and provided a unique learning opportunity that adequately tested elements of the emergency response program.
- Overall, command and control by the Incident Commander (IC) was good. Protective actions recommendations were made in a timely manner. However, the IC did not initiate a plant-wide accountability until 90 minutes into the exercise. In addition, an exercise control problem due to the incorrect placement of role players resulted in a delay in rescuing victims and mitigating the event.
- Command and control by the Crisis Manager (CM) in the Emergency Operations Center was good. Overall, technical issues were properly identified and resolved in a timely manner. However, some problems were noted with identifying the status of injured personnel as well as the untimely preparation of a press release. In addition, the CM did not simulate consulting with the NRC prior to terminating the event classification.
- The exercise critique was a candid assessment of the response, and numerous items were identified by the licensee for program improvement and entered into the problem reporting system for tracking the completion of corrective actions.
- The certificatee's performance in responding to the postulated accident was considered a successful demonstration of an emergency response program maintained in a state of operational readiness with personnel who were trained and familiar with procedures for implementing the Emergency Plan.

Attachment:

Persons Contacted

Inspection Procedures

List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed

List of Acronyms

REPORT DETAILS

1. Summary of Plant Status

During the period, normal plant operations and maintenance activities were conducted.

2. Emergency Preparedness (88050) (F3)

a. Drills and Exercises (F3.05)

(1) Scope and Observations

Section 7.3.1 of the Emergency Plan required that a biennial emergency exercise be conducted. The exercise scenario and objectives were reviewed for adequacy in testing the onsite response capability. The licensee's performance in responding to the simulated emergency and the critique to self identify areas of improvement were examined.

The exercise scenario simulated conditions for testing various aspects of the certificatee's onsite response capability and assistance by offsite support groups. The inspectors determined that the licensee adequately addressed a weakness in its scenario development program that was identified during the previous exercise. The inspectors had identified that there were only minor differences (such as cylinder size and the location of the fire) between the scenarios postulated during the last two biennial exercises. The inspectors noted that the scenario developed for this exercise was challenging and provided a unique learning opportunity that adequately tested elements of the response program. The exercise control team provided good control over the exercise to maintain the exercise time-line.

The inspectors observed the overall performance of the on-scene responders, including offsite participation by fire, rescue, and medical personnel. Overall, command and control by the Incident Commander (IC) was good. The IC correctly classified the event as a Site Area Emergency in a timely manner. Notifications to government agencies were within the required time frame, with the exception of the initial call to the National Response Center.

Protective actions recommendations to shelter members of the public residing within the potential plume area were also made to local officials in a timely manner. However, the IC did not initiate a plant-wide accountability until 90 minutes into the exercise. In addition, there was an exercise control problem due to the incorrect placement of role players, in that three of the five simulated victims were staged in the wrong building. This resulted in a delay in rescuing the victims and mitigating the accident. However, the IC and on-scene support staff adequately recovered after the on-scene controller realized the error and provided an inject.

The inspectors also observed some problems with telephone, radio, and pager communications. In addition, at times the IC's on-scene direct reports were not readily accessible which required the IC to walk around to find them to receive status updates or give instructions. Also, the IC did not routinely provide the on-scene responders with periodic status updates.

Once the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was fully staffed and operationally, the turnover of responsibility for managing the overall event response from the IC to the Crisis Manager (CM) in the EOC was well coordinated. Command and control by the CM in the EOC was good. Overall, technical issues were properly identified and resolved in a timely manner. Emergency facilities and equipment were adequate and operational. However, some problems were noted with identifying the status of injured personnel as well as the untimely preparation of a press release.

The CM ensured that the criteria were met prior to termination of the event classification. However, the inspectors noted that the CM did not simulate consulting with the NRC prior to making that determination. The inspectors noted that the checklist used as guidance in Procedure XP2-EP-EP1041, "Recovery," did not include the NRC notification prior to termination. The certificatee intended to revise the checklist to include the notification.

The certificatee conducted a critique following the exercise which afforded players, controllers, evaluators, and observers an opportunity to provide comments. The exercise critique was a candid assessment of the response and numerous items were identified by the certificatee for program improvement, including those noted by the inspectors, and entered into the problem reporting system for tracking the completion of corrective actions. Consequently, the inspector indicated that select items entered into the problem reporting system would be examined during the next emergency preparedness inspection.

(2) Conclusions

The certificatee's performance in responding to the postulated accident was considered a successful demonstration of an emergency response program maintained in a state of operational readiness with personnel who were trained and familiar with procedures for implementing the Emergency Plan.

3. Exit Interview

The biennial exercise results were discussed on October 20, 2005, with those persons indicated in the Attachment. Although proprietary documents and processes were occasionally reviewed during this inspection, the proprietary nature of these documents or processes has been deleted from this report. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

ATTACHMENT

1. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

*J. Anzelmo, Manager, Plant Services
*R. Bouts, Manager, Plant Training
*T. Brooks, Plant Manager
*M. Conkel, Maintenance Manager
*L. Cutlip, Project Director
D. Fosson, Operations Manager
*R. Lawton, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Quality
P. Musser, General Manager
*G. Workman, Production Support Manager

*Denotes those personnel attending the exit meeting on October 20, 2005.

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, production staff, security, and office personnel.

2. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 88050 Emergency Preparedness

3. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None

4. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CM	Crisis Manager
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
IC	Incident Commander
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission