

ENCLOSURE 2

MFN 05-117

**Revised DCD Section 1.C,
“Industry Operating Experience”**

Conditional Release – pending closure of design verifications

APPENDIX 1C INDUSTRY OPERATING EXPERIENCE

1C.1 EVALUATION

Industry operating experience information is routinely made available to and/or distributed by GE design and modifications personnel. The more important industry-wide issues are routinely addressed in NRC Generic Letters and Bulletins.

All of the Generic Letters and Bulletins covering January 1, 1980 through February 24, 2005 were reviewed. Of those, the Generic Letters and Bulletins that are potentially applicable to the ESBWR design or operations are addressed in Table 1C.1-1. For each of those Generic Letters and Bulletins, Table 1C.1-1 provides (a) the Tier 2 location(s) where the Generic Letter's or Bulletin's topic is addressed, (b) a summary conclusion of its effect on the ESBWR, or (c) notes that it is applicable to the COL applicant/holder. (See Subsection 1.9.4 for COL information.). Generic Letter and Bulletin topics deemed not applicable to the ESBWR design or operations (topics pertaining to other reactor types or BWR design features, e.g., a Reactor Recirculation Pump issue) are not included in Table 1C.1-1. Also, Generic Letter and Bulletin topics related to identified regulatory or industry developed resolutions are not included in Table 1C.1-1, to avoid repetition within Tier 2.

Table 1C.1-1
Operating Experience Review Results Summary

No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
Type: Generic Letters			
80-06	4/25/80	Clarification of NRC Requirement for Emergency Response Facilities at Each Site	
80-30	12/15/80	Periodic Updating of Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs)	COL Holder
80-34	4/25/80	Clarification of NRC Requirements for Emergency Response Facilities at Each Site	Subsection 18._.-
80-113	12/22/80	Control of Heavy Loads	Subsection 9.1.5 with COL Holder to supplement
81-03	2/26/81	Implementation of NUREG-0313m, Rev. 1	Subsection 5.2.3
81-04	2/25/81	Emergency Procedures and Training for Station Blackout Events	COL Holder
81-07	2/3/81	Control of Heavy Loads	Subsection 9.1.5 with COL Holder to supplement
81-10	2/18/81	Post-TMI Requirements for the Emergency Operations Facility	Appendix 1A and Subsection 18._.-
81-11	2/22/81	Comments on NUREG-0619	
81-20	4/1/81	Safety Concerns Associated with Pipe Breaks in the BWR Scram System	
81-37	12/29/81	ODYN Code Reanalysis Requirements	Not applicable, ESBWR does not use the ODYN Code
81-38	11/10/81	Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes at Power Reactor Sites	COL Applicant
82-09	4/20/82	Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment	Section 3.11
82-21	10/6/82	Technical Specifications for Fire Protection Audits	Not applicable. No longer controlled by Technical Specifications.

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
82-23	10/30/82	Inconsistency Between Requirements of 10CFR73.40(d) and Standard Technical Specifications for Performing Audits of Safeguard Contingency Plans	Not applicable. No longer controlled by Technical Specifications.
82-27	11/15/82	Transmittal of NUREG-0763, "Guidelines for Confirmatory In-Plant Tests of Safety-Relief Valve Discharges for BWR Plants," and NUREG-0783, "Suppression Pool Temperature Limits for BWR Containments."	The suppression pool is provided with sufficient temperature instrumentation to monitor the temperature rise during testing that adds heat to the pool. The Tech Spec limits on pool temperature are established in accordance with the applicable design limits.
82-33	12/17/82	Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737	Appendix 1A
82-39	12/22/82	Problems with the Submittals of 10 CFR 73.21 Safeguards Information Licensing Review	COL Applicant
83-05	2/8/83	Safety Evaluation of "Emergency Procedure Guidelines," Revision 2, NEDO-24934, June 1982	Superseded, see Appendix 18A
83-07	2/16/83	The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982	COL Applicant
83-13	3/2/83	Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Absorber Units in Standard Technical Specifications on ESF Cleanup Systems	<i>Issue is being reviewed and if it is determined to be applicable the DCD will be revised to address this item.</i>
83-28	7/8/83	Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events	Superseded by 10 CFR 50.62, see Section 15.5 for the ATWS event evaluation
83-33	10/19/83	NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50	Subsection 9.5.1 and Appendices 9A & 9B
84-15	7/2/84	Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability	Not applicable, the ESBWR does not have/need an emergency diesel generator
84-23	10/26/84	Reactor Vessel/Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs	Subsection 7.7.1
85-01	1/9/85	Fire Protection Policy Steering Committee Report	Subsection 9.5.1 and Appendices 9A & 9B

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
86-10	4/24/86	Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements	Subsection 9.5.1 and Appendices 9A & 9B
87-06	3/13/87	Periodic Verification of Leak Tight Integrity of Pressure Isolation Valves	Not applicable, as defined Section B3.4.6 of NUREG-1434, the ESBWR does not need nor have pressure isolation valves.
87-09	6/4-87	Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) on the Applicability of Limiting Conditions for Operations and Surveillance Requirements	DCD Chapter 16 TS Section 3.0, consistent with current Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1434, Rev. 3.0).
88-01	1/25/88	NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping	Subsection 5.2.3.4
88-02	1/20/88	Integrated Safety Assessment Program II (ISAP II)	
88-14	8/8/88	Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment Past Related Correspondence: IE Notice 87-28, Supp. 1 NUREG-1275, Volume 2	
88-15	9/12/88	Electric Power Systems— Inadequate Control Over Design Process Past Related Correspondence: IE Notice 88-45	The ESBWR design process fully complies with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (see Chapter 17), COL Applicant to supplement, as needed
88-16	10/4/88	Removal of Cycle-Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications	DCD Chapter 16 TS Section 5.6.3, consistent with current Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1434, Rev. 3.0).
88-18	10/20/88	Plant Record Storage on Optical Disks Past Related Correspondence: NUREG-0800 Reg. Guide 1.28, Rev. 3	Subsection 17.1.17, COL Applicant and Holder to supplement
88-20	11/23/88	Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-10CFR Para. 50.54(f)	Section 19._

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
88-20s1	8/29/89	Initiation of the Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-10CFR Para. 50.54(f)	Section 19._
88-20s2	4/4/90	Accident Management Strategies for Consideration in the Individual Plant Examination Process	Section 19._
88-20s3	7/6/90	Completion of Containment Performance Improvement Program and Forwarding of Insights for Use in the Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities	Section 19._
88-20s4	6/28/91	Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10 CFR 50.54(f)	Section 19._
88-20s5	9/8/95	Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities	Section 19._
89-01	1/31/89	Implementation of programmatic Controls for Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications and the Relocation of Procedural Details of RETS to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual or to the Process Control Program	DCD Chapter 16 TS Section 5.5.1 and 5.5.3, consistent with current Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1434, Rev. 3.0). COL Applicant/Holder
89-02	3/21/89	Actions to Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently Marketed Products Past Related Correspondence: EPRI-NP-5652, "Guideline for the Utilization of Commercial-Grade Items in Nuclear Safety-Related Applications". Bulletins 87-02 and Supplements 1 and 2, 88-05 and Supplements 1 and 2, 88-10 IE Notices 87-66, 88-19, 88-35, 88-46 and Supplements 1 and 2, 88-48 and Supplement 1, 88-97	COL Holder
89-04	4/3/89	Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Program	Addressed throughout Tier 2 (e.g., Subsections 3.9.6, 5.2.4 & 6.3.3.9 and Section 6.6), COL Holder to supplement

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
89-04s1	4/4/95	Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs	Subsection 5.2.4 and Section 6.6
89-06	4/12/89	Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 – Safety Parameter Display System CFR 50.54(f)	Appendix 1A
89-07	4/28/89	Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs	COL Applicant
89-07 Supp I	4/21/89	Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs	COL Applicant
89-08	5/2/89	Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning	
89-10	6/28/89	Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance	COL Applicant/Holder
89-10s1	6/13/90	Results of Public Workshop	COL Applicant
89-10s3	10/25/90	Consideration of the Results of NRC Sponsored Tests of Motor-Operated Valves	COL Applicant
89-10s4	2/12/92	Consideration of Valve Mispositioning in Boiling Water Reactors	COL Applicant
89-10s5	6/28/93	Inaccuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment	COL Applicant
89-10s6	3/8/94	Information on Schedule and Grouping, and Staff Responses to Additional Public Questions	COL Applicant
89-13	7/18/89	Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment	Not applicable, ESBWR has no safety-related service water
89-13s1	4/4/90	Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment	Not applicable, ESBWR has no safety-related service water

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
89-14	8/21/89	Line Item Improvements in Technical Specifications Removal of the 3.25 Limit on Extending Surveillance Intervals	DCD Chapter 16 TS Section 3.0, consistent with current Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1434, Rev. 3.0)
89-15	8/21/89	Emergency Response Data System	COL Applicant
89-16	9/1/89	Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent	The ESBWR does not need a dedicated Hardened Wetwell Vent, as discussed in Subsection 6.2.5.4
89-18	9/6/89	Resolution of USI A-17, Systems Interactions	
89-19	9/20/89	Request for Action Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47, "Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants", Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)	
89-22	10/19/89	Potential for Increased Roof Loads and Plant Area Flood Runoff Depth at Licensed Nuclear Power Plants Due to Recent Change in Probable Maximum Precipitation Criteria Developed By The National Weather Service	Section 2.3
90-09	12/11/90	Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions	COL Holder
91-03	03/06/91	Reporting of Safeguards Events	COL Applicant/Holder
91-04	04/02/91	Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle	DCD Chapter 16 TS Sections 3.1-3.9, COL Holder scope
91-05	04/04/91	Licensee Commercial Grade Procurement and Dedication Programs	COL Holder
91-06	04/29/91	Resolution of Generic Issue A-30, "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies", Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)	Subsection 8.3.2

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
91-10	07/08/91	Explosive Searches at Protected Area Portals	COL Holder
91-11	07/19/91	Resolution of Generic Issue 48, "LCOs for Class 1E Tie Breakers", Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)	COL Holder
91-14	09/23/91	Emergency Telecommunications	COL Applicant
91-15	09/23/91	Operating Experience Feedback, Solenoid-Operated Valve Problems at U.S. Reactors	COL Holder
91-16	10/03/91	Licensed Operators' and Other Nuclear Facility Personnel Fitness for Duty	COL Applicant
91-17	10/17/91	Generic Safety Issue 29, "Bolting Degradation or Failure in Nuclear Power Plants"	COL Holder
92-01r1		Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity	See Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3
92-04	8/19/92	Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)	The ESBWR includes a continuous purge of water to the reference leg to prevent the buildup of non-condensable gases. The CRD Hydraulics provides this flow. See Sections 4.6.1.2.4 and 7.7.1.2
92-08	12/17/92	Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers	Not Applicable. The ESBWR provides strict physical separation between the redundant safety-related divisions. There is no need to use Thermo-Lag 330. See Section 9.5.1
93-05	9/27/93	Line-Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operation	Not Applicable. Is an administrative communication. Lessons from the Tech Spec Improvement programs have been factored into the proposed ESBWR Tech Specs in DCD Chapter 16.

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
93-06	10/25/93	Research Results on Generic Safety Issue 106, "Piping and the Use of Highly Combustible Gases in Vital Areas"	The ESBWR only uses highly combustible gases in any safety-related area for reference gas in the H2/O2 monitors. This calibration gas is only used periodically and normally valved out of service. The H2 bottles are located in a non-safety structure. The lines to the H2 monitors are very small and would limit the flow in the event of a break.
93-08	12/29/93	Relocation of Technical Specification Tables Of Instrument Response Time Limits	Not Applicable. Is an administrative communication.
94-01	5/31/94	Removal of Accelerated Testing and Special Reporting Requirements for Emergency Diesel Generators	The ESBWR does not have safety-related emergency diesel generators. There are no surveillance requirements for the non-safety diesel generators.
94-02	7/11/94	Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in BWRs	The ESBWR addresses the concerns of Thermal-Hydraulic Instability. See Section 4.4 and Appendix 4D
94-03	7/25/94	Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in Boiling Water Reactors	Controls on material properties and welding parameters are placed on all stainless material used in the RPV including the shroud. See Subsection 5.2.3.4.1.
95-07	8/17/95	Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves	The number of safety-related valves in the ESBWR is much smaller than previous designs. The safety-related valves that need to open to perform their function are even smaller. Many of the safety-related valves that need to open are squib actuated and not subject to this phenomenon. Globe valves are generally used in the other applications. In any case, GL 89-10 Supplement 6 now cover this issue and the ESBWR complies with the guidance of this document. See Section 3.9.6

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
96-01	1/10/96	Testing of Safety-Related Circuits	The passive systems utilize safety-related electrical busses that are designed as un-interruptible power sources. There is no load shedding and sequencing in the safety-related electrical systems.
96-03	1/31/96	NRC Generic Letter 96-03: Relocation of The Pressure Temperature Limit Curves And Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Limits	DCD Chapter 16 TS Section 5.6.4, consistent with current Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1434, Rev. 3.0), COL Holder scope.
96-04	6/26/96	Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks	The equipment specification for the racks at the time of the order will be consistent with the latest regulatory guidance. See Subsection 9.1.2
96-05	9/18/96	Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Power-Operated Valves	See Subsection 3.9.6 with COL Holder to supplement
96-06	9/30/96	Assurance of Equipment Operability And Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions	See Subsection 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.4
96-06s1	11/13/97	NRC Generic Letter 96-06, Supplement 1: Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions	See Subsection 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.4
97-04	10/7/97	NRC Generic Letter 97-04: Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps	Not applicable, the ESBWR does not have ECCS nor safety-related containment cooling pumps
98-01	5/11/98	NRC Generic Letter No. 98-01: Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants	Outdated concern
98-01s1	1/14/99	NRC Generic Letter No. 98-01 Supplement 1: Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants	Outdated concern

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
98-04	7/14/98	Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling System and the Containment Spray System After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident Because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment	Not applicable to the ESBWR GDCS. The GDCS pools do not have the debris transport mechanisms that the Suppression Pool is subject to. The PCCS pools are not subject to LOCA debris. There is no safety-related containment spray.
99-02	6/3/99	NRC Generic Letter 99-02: Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal	<i>Issue is being reviewed and if it is determined to be applicable the DCD will be revised to address this item.</i>
03-01	6/12/03	Control Room Habitability	The verification requirements are in accordance with the applicable regulatory guidance and standards. See Subsection 6.4
Type: Bulletins			
79-02r2	3/8/79	Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts	
79-08	4/14/79	Events Relevant to BWR Identified During TMI Incident	See DCD Appendix 1A
80-01	1/11/80	ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply	The design of the pneumatic supply to the ADS valves addresses the concerns with the potential loss of loss of pneumatic pressure. In addition the ESBWR has diverse means of depressurizing the RPV using the DPVs.
80-03	2/6/80	Loss of Charcoal from Absorber Cells	
80-05	3/10/80	Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks	COL Applicant
80-06	3/13/80	ESF Reset Controls	Section 7.3
80-08	4/7/80	Containment Lines Penetration Welds	COL Applicant
80-10	5/6/80	Non-Radioactive System – Potential for Unmonitored Release	COL Applicant

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
80-12	5/9/80	Decay Heat Removal System Operability	COL Applicant
80-13	5/12/80	Cracking in Core Spray Spargers	Not Applicable. The ESBWR does not have a core spray sparger.
80-15	6/18/80	Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System with Loss of Offsite Power	COL Applicant
80-20	7/31/80	Westinghouse Type W-2 Switch Failures	COL Applicant/Holder
80-21	11/6/80	Valve Yokes Supplied by Mole	COL Applicant
80-22	9/11/80	Automatic Industries, Model 200-500-008 Sealed Source Containers	COL Applicant
80-24	11/21/80	Prevention of Damage due to H2O Leakage Inside Containment	Not applicable, the ESBWR Containment is cooled using the Chilled Water System (HCW) which is closed loop system.
80-25	12/19/80	Operating Problems with Target Rock SRVs at BWRs	Not applicable to the ESBWR design. Different valve type to be used.
81-01	1/27/81	Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers	COL Holder
81-02	4/9/81	Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close	COL Holder
81-02, Supp 1	8/19/81	Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure	COL Holder
81-03	4/10/81	Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System	COL Holder
82-04	12/3/82	Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies	COL Holder

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
83-06	7/22/83	Non-Conforming Materials Supplied by Tube-Line Corp.	COL Applicant
84-01	2/3/84	Cracks in Boiling Water Reactor Mark 1 Containment Vent Headers	Not applicable to the ESBWR containment design
84-03	8/24/84	Refueling Cavity Water Seal	The ESBWR will utilize permanently installed flexible bellows between the RPV and the refueling cavity.
85-03	11/15/85	Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings	COL Applicant
85-03, Supp 1	4/27/88	Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failure During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings Past Related Correspondence: IE Bulletin 85-03, IE Notice 86-29, and IE Notice 87-01	COL Applicant
86-01	5/23/86	Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps	Not Applicable. The ESBWR does not have safety-related RHR pumps
86-03	10/8/86	Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line	Not Applicable. The ESBWR does not have ECCS pumps
87-01	7/9/87	Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants	COL Applicant
87-02	11/6/87	Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications	COL Applicant
87-02, Supp 1	4/22/88	Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications Past Related Correspondence: IE Notice 88-17	COL Applicant
87-02, Supp 2	6/10/88	Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications	COL Applicant

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No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
88-04	5/5/88	Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss	Not applicable, the ESBWR does not have safety-related pumps
88-07	6/15/88	Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) Past Related Correspondence: IE Notice 88-39	Sections 4.4 and 4B.7
88-07, Supp 1	12/30/88	Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs)	Sections 4.4 and 4B.7
90-01	03/09/90	Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount	Not applicable, the vendor has corrected the problem and new transmitters have been changed to correct the problem.
90-02	03/20/90	Loss of Thermal Margin Caused by Channel Box Bow	
91-01	10/18/91	Reporting Loss of Criticality Safety Controls	COL Holder
91-01s1	7/27/93	Reporting Loss of Criticality Safety Controls	COL Holder
92-01	6/24/92	Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free from Fire Damage	Not Applicable. The ESBWR provides strict physical separation between the redundant safety-related divisions. There is no need to use Thermo-Lag 330.
92-01s1	8/28/92	Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Perform its Specified Fire Endurance Function	Not Applicable. See above.
93-02	5/11/93	Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers	Not applicable to the ESBWR GDACS. The GDACS pools do not have the debris transport mechanisms that the Suppression Pool is subject to.
93-02s1	2/18/94	Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers	Not applicable to the ESBWR GDACS. See above.

Table 1C.1-1
Operating Experience Review Results Summary

No.	Issue Date	Title	Evaluation Result or Topic's Tier 2 Location(s)
93-03	5/28/93	Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs	The ESBWR includes a continuous purge of water to the reference leg to prevent the buildup of non-condensable gases. The CRD Hydraulics provides this flow. See DCD 4.6.1.2.4 and 7.7.1.2
94-01	4/14/94	Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit 1	COL Holder. The FAPCS is designed to prevent the possibility of draining water from the Spent Fuel Storage Pool.
95-02	10/17/95	Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat Removal Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode	Not Applicable. The ESBWR does not have a safety-related suppression pool cooling system.
96-02	4/11/96	Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment	See DCD 9.1.5 COL Holder to supplement
96-03	5/6/96	Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in Boiling-Water Reactors	Not applicable to the ESBWR GDCS. See response to BL 93-02
96-04	7/5/96	Chemical, Galvanic, or Other Reactions in Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks	Related to dry cask storage, which is not part of the ESBWR design. COL Holder will address if applicable.
2005-02	7/18/05	Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events	COL Holder will provide response.