


Chapter 5 Over- pressure protection & Chapter 6 LOCA Analysis



ESBWR Response to Over pressure protection

Conservatively assumes direct scram on MSIV position fails

Assumes 1 of 4 IC fails

FW trip assumed simultaneous with isolation (no credit for FW scram/condensation)

Result – Maximum pressure is approximately the SRV set pressure, little dynamic overshoot

Table 5.2-2. Safety/-Relief Valve and Depressurization Valve Settings and/or Capacities

Valve Type SRV /DPV	Number of Valves⁽¹⁾	Spring Setpoint Maximum Safety Analytical Limit MPa gauge (psig)	ASME Rated Capacity at 103% of Safety Analytical Limit Spring Setpoint Pressure (kg/s each)
ADS SRV	10 _[ACE1]	8.618 (1250) _[ACE2]	124 _[ACE3]
Non-ADS SRV	8 _[ACE4]	8.756 (1270) _[ACE5]	126 _[ACE6]

Table 5.2-3. Systems That May Initiate or Trip During Overpressure Event

Systems	Initiating/Trip Signal
Reactor Protection	Reactor shutdown on high flux ^[ACE1]
IC	Initiated on high reactor pressure or reactor isolation or low reactor water level when mode switch is in “run” ^[ACE2]
CRD	ON when reactor water level is at L2
RWCU/SDC	OFF when reactor water level is at L2 ^[ACE3]

Figure 5.2-4a. MSIV Closure – Flux Scram

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



Figure 5.2-4d. MSIV Closure – Flux Scram

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TRACG Applied to all Thermal Hydraulic evaluations of ESBWR

Follows process described in ESBWR Licensing topical reports:

NEDE-33083 (LOCA and AOO's)

NEDE-33083 Supplement 1 (Stability)

TRACG model of ESBWR reactor vessel

2D Reactor vessel for
LOCA

3D Reactor vessel for AOO,
ATWS and Stability




Figure 6.2-6. TRACG Nodalization of the ESBWR RPV




Figure 6.2-7. TRACG Nodalization of the ESBWR Containment





Figure 6.2-8. TRACG Nodalization of the ESBWR Main Steam Lines



Containment Pressure and Temperature Analysis

ESBWR design provides more than the 15% margin required at the PSAR stage

Table 6.2-5. Summary of Calculated Results for A FW Line Break with Failure of One DPV

	Peak DW Pressure (a)	Peak DW Pressure (g)	Margin to Design Pressure of 45 psig (%)
Nominal Case	322 kPa (46.7 psia)	221 kPa (gauge) (32.0 psig)	29
Bounding Case	342 kPa (49.6 psia)	241 kPa (gauge) (34.9 psig)	22

	Short-term DW Temperature (C)	Long-term DW Temperature (C)	Long-term WW Temperature (C)
Nominal Case	168	141	90
Bounding Case	170	144	87

Table 6.2-6. Plant Initial Conditions Considered in the Containment DBA Cases

No.	Plant Parameter	Nominal Value	Bounding Value
1	RPV Power	100%	102%
2	WW relative humidity	100%	100%
3	PCC pool level	4.8 m	4.8 m
4	PCC pool temperature	110°F (316.5°K)	110°F (316.5°K)
5	DW Pressure	14.7 psia (101.3 kPa)	16.0 psia (110.3 kPa)
6	DW Temperature	115°F (319.3°K)	115°F (319.3°K)
7	WW Pressure	14.7 psia (101.3 kPa)	16.0 psia (110.3kPa)
8	WW Temperature	110°F (316.5°K)	110°F (316.5°K)
9	Suppression pool Temp.	110°F (316.5°K)	110°F (316.5°K)
10	GDCS pool temperature	115°F (319.3°K)	115°F (319.3°K)
11	Suppression pool level	5.45 m	5.50 m
12	GDCS pool level	6.60 m	6.60 m
13	DW relative humidity	20%	20%
14	RPV pressure	1040 psia (7.17 MPa)	1055 psia (7.274 MPa)
15	RPV Water Level	NWL	NWL+0.3m

Table 6.2-7. Operational Sequence of ECCS For A Feedwater Line Break with Failure of One DPV (Nominal Case)

Time (sec)	Events
~0	Guillotine break of feedwater line inside containment; normal auxiliary power assumed to be lost; feedwater is lost; Scram signal initiated.
~1	High drywell pressure setpoint for ADS is reached.
~2	Loss of normal auxiliary power confirmed; reactor scram initiated; IC initiated.
~5	Level 3 is reached; Reactor receives second signal to scram.
~6	Maximum (first peak) DW pressure of 322 kPa (46.7 psia) is reached.
~9	Level 2 is reached; Reactor isolation timer initiated.
~14	Level 1.5 is reached; Reactor isolation initiated; ADS/GDCS timer initiated.
~17	IC drain valve begins to open.
~24	Level 1.5 signal confirmed; ADS-SRV actuation begins.
~33	IC drain valve fully open.
~74	DPV actuation begins; SLC system signaled to start.
~100	Minimum chimney water level is reached.
~164	GDCS timer timed out. GDCS injection valves open.
~250	Vessel pressure decreases below maximum injection pressure of GDCS. GDCS flow into the vessel begins. Chimney and downcomer water levels start to rise.
from ~250 to 259000 (72 hrs)	RPV water level remains higher than Level 0.5. Therefore equalizing line valves are not expected to open for this event.
~ 140000 (39 hrs)	PCC pool level drops below the elevation of 29.6 m; top ¼ portion of the PCC tube length becomes uncover; Connection valves open to allow the water from the Dryer/Separator storage pool to flow into the PCC pools.
~ 250000 (70 hrs)	Long-term DW pressure (2nd peak) of 290 kPa (42 psia) is reached.

Table 6.2-8. Model Parameters for Containment Bounding Calculation

No.	Model Parameter	Base value	Distribution	Uncertainty (1 sigma)	Bounding case	Bounding value used
1	Crit Flow (PIRT84)	1.0	Normal	9.5%	- 2 sigma	0.81
2	Decay Heat Mult.	1.0	Normal	~0.05	+ 2 sigma	D.H. + 2 sigma
3	Surf. HT (PIRT07)	100	Uniform	1 to 200	Lower bound	1
4	PCC inlet Loss (k/A ²)	1065m ⁻⁴	Normal	260.0m ⁻⁴	+ 2 sigma	1585m ⁻⁴
5	PCC HT (PIRT78)	1.0	Normal	7.9% (bias – 6.0%)	- 2 sigma	0.902
6	VB Loss (k/A ²)	169.0m ⁻⁴	Normal	21.18m ⁻⁴	+ 2 sigma	211.4m ⁻⁴

Figure 6.2-9. Feedwater Line Break (Nominal Case) — Containment Pressures

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


Figure 6.2-10. Feedwater Line Break (Nominal Case) — Containment Temperatures

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


Figure 6.2-11. Feedwater Line Break (Nominal Case) — PCCS Heat Removal versus Decay Heat

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


Figure 6.2-12. Feedwater Line Break (Bounding Case) — Containment Pressures

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


Figure 6.2-13. Feedwater Line Break (Bounding Case) — Containment Temperatures

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



Figure 6.2-14. Feedwater Line Break (Bounding Case) — PCCS Heat Removal versus Decay Heat

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10CFR50.46 LOCA Analysis

- PCT < 2200 deg. F (no core uncover or fuel heatup)
- Local Oxidation < 17%
- Core wide oxidation < 1%
- Coolable Geometry maintained
- Long term cooling provided for 72 hrs via passive systems

Table 6.3-1. Significant Input Variables to the ECCS-LOCA Performance Analysis

A. Plant Parameters		
Variable	Units	Value
Core thermal Power	MWt	4500
Vessel Steam Output	kg/hr [lbm/hr]	8.76×10^6 19.31×10^6
Vessel Steam Dome Pressure	MPa (absolute) [psia]	7.17 1040
B. Emergency Core Cooling System Parameters		
B.1 ECCS Initiation Signals		
Variable	Units	Value
Initiating Signals: Level 1.5 plus High Drywell Pressure <u>or</u> Level 1.5 plus Delay Timer Timed Out <u>or</u> Level 1	meters (above TAF) [ft] (above TAF) kPa (absolute) [psia] meters (above TAF) [ft] (above TAF) min meters (above TAF) [ft] (above TAF)	5.547 [18.20] 34.457 [5] 5.547 [18.20] 15 3.547 [11.64]
Maximum Allowable Time Delay to Confirm ECCS-LOCA Signal	sec	10

Table 6.3-1. Significant Input Variables to the ECCS-LOCA Performance Analysis (Cont.)

B.2 Gravity-Driven Core Cooling System		
Variable	Units	Value
Initiating Signal	—	ECCS-LOCA confirmed initiating signal (See B.1)
GDCS Injection valve timer delay	sec	150
Minimum drainable inventory per GDCS pool		See Table 6.3-2
Minimum elevation of GDCS pool surfaces above the RPV nozzles		See Table 6.3-2
GDCS drain line loss coefficient (k/A ²)	1/m ⁴ [1/ft ⁴]	12.587*10 ³ [1.458*10 ⁶]
B.3 Isolation Condenser System		
Variable	Units	Value
Initiating Signal	—	Loss of feedwater
Maximum Sensor Response Time	sec	2
Heat Removal Capacity per Unit	MW	33.75
Minimum Drainable Liquid Volume per System	m ³ [ft ³]	4.98
B.4 Standby Liquid Control System		
Variable	Units	Value
Initiating Signal	—	DPV actuation (See B.5)
Liquid Volume per Tank	m ³ [ft ³]	7.8

Table 6.3-1. Significant Input Variables to the ECCS-LOCA Performance Analysis (Cont.)

B.5 Automatic Depressurization Subsystem		
Variable	Units	Value
Initiating Signal	—	ECCS-LOCA confirmed initiating signal (See B.1)
Valve Actuation Sequence:		
5 ADS	sec	0
5 ADS	sec	10
3 DPVs	sec	50
2 DPVs	sec	100
2 DPVs	sec	150
1 DPVs	sec	200
Total Number of Safety/Relief Valves With ADS Function	—	10
Total Min. ADS Flow Capacity at Vessel Pressure	kg/hr MPa (gauge) [lbm/hr] [psig]	4.356×10^6 8.618 [9.61 x10 ⁶] [1250]
Total Number of Depressurization Valves	—	8
Total min. DPV flow capacity at vessel pressure	kg/hr MPa (gauge) [lbm/hr] [psig]	6.89×10^6 7.481 [15.2 x10 ⁶] [1085]
Total max. DPV flow capacity at vessel pressure	kg/hr MPa (gage) [lbm/hr] [psig]	8.47×10^6 7.481 [18.7 x10 ⁶] [1085]

Table 6.3-1. Significant Input Variables to the ECCS-LOCA Performance Analysis (Cont.)

C. Fuel Parameters *		
Variable	Units	Value
Fuel type	—	See Chapter 4
Peak Linear Heat Generation Rate (Bounding)	kW/m [kW/ft]	44 13.4
Initial Minimum Critical Power Ratio (Bounding)	—	1.12

Table 6.3-2. GDCS Design Basis Parameters

Parameter	Value
Number of separate/independent GDCS divisions	4
Per division, number of (short-term core cooling injection) lines from its GDCS pool	1
Per division, number of injection line RPV nozzles	2
Per division, number of equalizing line RPV nozzles	1
Minimum total drainable inventory (for 3 GDCS pools)	1760 m ³ (62,150 ft ³)
Minimum elevation of GDCS pool surfaces above the RPV nozzles	13.3 m (43.6 ft)
Minimum long-term core cooling flow delivered by the GDCS equalizing lines for a ΔP of 9.12 kPa (1.32 psid) across the equalizing lines	22.7 m ³ /s (100 gpm)
Minimum flow through the deluge lines required to flood the lower drywell region	70 kg/sec (154l m/sec)*
Minimum available suppression pool water inventory 1 meter above TAF	334m ³ (11,800 ft ³)
Minimum GDCS equalizing line driving head	1.0 m (3.3 ft)

Table 6.3-7. Operational Sequence of ECCS For A Feedwater Line Break with Failure of One GDCS Injection Valve (nominal calculation)

Time (sec)	Events
~0	Guillotine break of feedwater line inside containment; normal auxiliary power assumed to be lost; Feedwater is lost; Scram signal initiated.
~1	High drywell pressure setpoint for ADS is reached.
~2	Loss of normal auxiliary power confirmed; reactor scram initiated; IC initiated.
~5	Level 3 is reached; Reactor receives second signal to scram.
~9	Level 2 is reached; Reactor isolation timer initiated.
~14	Level 1.5 is reached; Reactor isolation initiated; ADS/GDCS timer initiated.
~17	IC drain valve begins to open.
~24	Level 1.5 signal confirmed; ADS-SRV actuation begins.
~33	IC drain valve fully open.
~74	DPV actuation begins; SLC system signaled to start.
~101	Minimum chimney water level is reached.
~174	GDCS timer expired. GDCS injection valves open.
~250	Vessel pressure decreases below maximum injection pressure of GDCS. GDCS flow into the vessel begins. Chimney and downcomer water levels start to rise.
from ~250 to 2000	RPV water level remains higher than Level 0.5. Therefore equalizing line valves are not expected to open for this event.

Figure 6.3-7. MCPR, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Figure 6.3-8. Chimney Water Level, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Figure 6.3-9. Downcomer Water Level, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Figure 6.3-10. System Pressures, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Figure 6.3-11. Steam Line and Break Flow, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Figure 6.3-12. ADS Flow, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Figure 6.3-13. Flows Into Vessel, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Figure 6.3-14. PCT, Feedwater Line Break, 1 GDCS Valve Failure

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


Table 6.3-6. Single Failure Evaluation

Assumed Failure*	Systems Remaining**
One Depressurization Valve	10 SRVs, 7 DPVs, 4 Ics***, 2 SLC system and 4 GDCS with 8 Injection Lines
One Safety/Relief Valve	9 SRVs, 8 DPVs 4 Ics***, 2 SLC system and 4 GDCS with 8 Injection Lines
One GDCS Injection Valve	10 SRVs, 8 DPVs 4 Ics***, 2 SLC system and 4 GDCS with 7 Injection Lines


Table 6.3-11. Plant Variables with Nominal and Bounding Calculation Values

Plant Variable	Nominal Value	Bounding Calculation Value*
1. Vessel Steam Dome Pressure	7.17 MPa (1040 psia)	7.274 MPa (1055 psia)
2. Decay Heat	1979 ANS (Figure 6.3-39)	+ 2 σ
3. Core Power	Rated	+ 2%
4. PLHGR	44.0 kW/m (13.4 kW/ft)	44.8 kW/m (13.7 kW/ft)
5. Initial MCPR	1.12	1.10
6. Initial Downcomer Level	NWL	NWL – 0.3m
7. Significant TRACG Modeling Parameters**	Nominal	Bounding

Table 6.3-5. Summary of ECCS-LOCA Performance Analyses

Break Location	Break Size m ² (ft ²)	Minimum Chimney Static Head* Level Above Vessel Zero Per Active Single Failure m (ft)			PCT **	Maximum Local and Core Wide Oxidations (%) ***	Minimum Downcomer Collapsed Water Level Above Vessel Zero Per Active Single Failure m (ft)			Change in MCPR From Start of Event	Change in RPV Press. From Start of Event
		1 SRV	1 GDCS	1 DPV			1 SRV	1 GDCS	1 DPV		
Based on standard TRACG evaluation model:											
Feedwater Line	0.08387 (0.9028)	8.86 (29.07)	8.89 (29.17)	8.84 (29.00)	No heatup	<1.0	6.45 (21.16)	6.39 (20.96)	6.19 (20.31)	Increases	Decreases
Steam Line Inside Containment	0.09832 (1.058)	9.04 (29.66)	9.10 (29.86)	9.10 (29.86)	No heatup	<1.0	7.48 (24.54)	7.28 (23.88)	7.37 (24.18)	Increases	Decreases
Bottom Head Drain Line	0.004052 (0.04361)	8.94 (29.33)	8.91 (29.23)	9.04 (29.66)	No heatup	<1.0	6.88 (22.57)	6.61 (21.69)	6.71 (22.01)	Increases	Decreases
GDCS Injection Line	0.004561 (0.04910)	9.08 (29.79)	9.03 (29.63)	8.98 (29.46)	No heatup	<1.0	6.98 (22.90)	6.9 (22.64)	6.85 (22.47)	Increases	Decreases
Based on bounding values:											
Feedwater Line	0.08387 (0.9028)	—	8.17 (26.80)	8.23 (27.00)	No heatup	<1.0	—	5.22 (17.13)	5.19 (17.03)	Increases	Decreases
Bottom Head Drain Line	0.004052 (0.04361)	—	8.42 (27.62)	—	No heatup	<1.0	—	5.57 (18.27)	—	Increases	Decreases

Figure 6.3-6. Minimum Chimney Water Level vs. Break Area



Long term RPV rises to break elevation, or Spillover elevation, whichever is higher

Gravity Driven Cooling System (GDCS) - Small Pipe Break, Vessel Bottom




Table 6.3-8. Operational Sequence of ECCS For a Bottom Drain Line Break

Time (sec)	Events
~0	Guillotine break of feedwater line inside containment; normal auxiliary power assumed to be lost; Feedwater tripped; Scram signal initiated.
~2	Loss of normal auxiliary power confirmed; reactor scram initiated; IC initiated.
~5	High drywell pressure setpoint for ADS is reached.
~7	Level 3 is reached; Reactor receives second signal to scram.
~11	Level 2 is reached; Reactor isolation timer initiated.
~16	Reactor isolation initiated.
~17	IC drain valve begins to open.
~19	Level 1.5 is reached; ADS/GDCS timer initiated.
~29	Level 1.5 signal confirmed; SRV actuation begins.
~33	IC drain valve fully open.
~79	DPV actuation begins; SLC system signaled to start.
~169	GDCS timer timed out. GDCS injection valves open.
~338	Vessel pressure decreases below maximum injection pressure of GDCS. GDCS flow into the vessel begins.
~987	Minimum chimney water level is reached.
	Level 0.5 is not reached and equalizing line valves are not open.

ESBWR 10CFR50.46 LOCA/ECCS Summary

- Margin provided to core uncover in the bounding case, considering modeling uncertainties.
- No fuel heatup, no significant clad oxidation, or H₂ generation, fuel retains geometry
- Long term cooling provided
- Criteria met with only passive systems, no operator action for 72 hours.

Resolution of NRC TRACG SER commitments

Focus in submitting DCD was to incorporate items related to the execution of the calculations

DCD did not specifically identify which items were address

GE transmitted letter last week, identifying items addressed in DCD analysis, and plan for addressing other items

No items	Resolution
12	Addressed in DCD analysis
4	Will be addressed in Rev 3 of TRACG model description, by end of Nov 05
3	Provide long term PIRTs, and design changes and TRACG applicability, by 3-October. At the same time GE will provide the LOCA inputs and 12 hr. cases showing long term water level.
1	Provide separate qualification paper 1 separate effect test, and 1 integral containment test by 1-April-06.
1	NRC Staff action

Table 6.3-9. Operational Sequence of ECCS For a GDCS Line Break

Time (sec)	Events
~0	Guillotine break of feedwater line inside containment; normal auxiliary power assumed to be lost; Feedwater tripped; Scram signal initiated.
~2	Loss of normal auxiliary power confirmed; reactor scram initiated; IC initiated.
~4	High drywell pressure setpoint for ADS is reached.
~7	Level 3 is reached; Reactor receives second signal to scram.
~11	Level 2 is reached; Reactor isolation timer initiated.
~16	Reactor isolation initiated.
~17	IC drain valve begins to open.
~19	Level 1.5 is reached; ADS/GDCS timer initiated.
~29	Level 1.5 signal confirmed; SRV actuation begins.
~33	IC drain valve fully open.
~79	DPV actuation begins; SLC system signaled to start.
~169	GDCS timer timed out. GDCS injection valves open.
~332	Vessel pressure decreases below maximum injection pressure of GDCS. GDCS flow into the vessel begins.
~1281	Minimum chimney water level is reached.
	Level 0.5 is not reached and equalizing line valves are not open.

Table 6.3-10. Operational Sequence of ECCS For a Main Steam Line Break

Time (sec)	Events
~0	Guillotine break of feedwater line inside containment; normal auxiliary power assumed to be lost; Feedwater tripped; Scram signal initiated.
~1	High drywell pressure setpoint for ADS is reached.
~2	Loss of normal auxiliary power confirmed; reactor scram initiated; IC initiated.
~7	Level 3 is reached; Reactor receives second signal to scram.
~11	Level 2 is reached; Reactor isolation timer initiated.
~16	Reactor isolation initiated.
~17	IC drain valve begins to open.
~33	IC drain valve fully open.
~190	Level 1.5 is reached; ADS/GDCS timer initiated.
~200	Level 1.5 signal confirmed; SRV actuation begins.
~250	DPV actuation begins; SLC system signaled to start.
~340	GDCS timer timed out. GDCS injection valves open.
~430	Vessel pressure decreases below maximum injection pressure of GDCS. GDCS flow into the vessel begins.
~478	Minimum chimney water level is reached.
	Level 0.5 is not reached and equalizing line valves are not open.