

Allegation Follow-up
Hope Creek - In-Progress Work on "A" Control Room Chiller (AK400)
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Purpose

Investigate work control concerns related to in-progress work on the "A" control room chiller (AK400).

Background

The work management/control process is described in PSEG's procedure NC.WM-AP.ZZ-0001 ("Work Management Process"). The work management process is as followed:

T-16	Scoping Package Development
T-14	Scoping Package Review
T-12	Work Scoping
T-7	Tier 1 Scope Review
T-5	Workweek Scope Freeze
T-4	Initial Schedule Review
T-3	Final Schedule Review
T-2	Schedule Freeze
T-1	Complete Readiness Reviews
T-0	Workweek Implementation
T+1	Workweek Review

Work that is either added or deleted after the scope freeze (T-5), a "Form 2 Online Schedule Change Request" must be completed. This form ensures that a proper risk analysis is performed to accommodate changes to the work schedule and communication of potential impact to probabilistic safety assessment.

During the T-4 week, maintenance receives the work packages to verify that it is adequate to perform the required work. This usually involves field walkdowns, verifying proper procedures are identified, ensuring correct parts are available and on-site, etc... Prior to work being (i.e., day before or day of) performed a job brief is conducted with the crew performing the work and the job supervisor.

Description

On February 11, the A control room area chiller was taken out of service for scheduled maintenance; and a 7 day limiting condition of operation was entered for one control room emergency filtration (CREF) subsystem being inoperable.

The work package development for this job went as described below:

The original scope of work involved performing required preventative maintenance calibrations on system instrumentation. In mid January (T-4), the system engineer requested that additional work be added to the work scope and it was added in accordance with the work management procedure using Form 2. The system engineer requested the following additional work on the chiller: (1) outer bearing replacement, (2) oil filter housing replacement, and (3) inspection and/or replacement if necessary of the labyrinth seal. The work (order 60042095) was not added to the work schedule (T-1) till

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it was confirmed by the maintenance department (superintendent) that the parts were available and on-site after being ordered.

Maintenance personnel responsible for performing the work were not aware that the additional work activities were added to the work scope till Monday January 9, one day prior to the start of work and after they conducted their necessary reviews.

Conclusion

Additional work was added to the work schedule and not communicated to maintenance personnel after they performed their final work scope reviews. The work was added in accordance with PSEG procedures however was not fully communicated among the maintenance department.

Individuals Contacted

Rich Keenan, Maintenance Supervisor
Jim Kepley, Operations Work Week Coordinator
Edward Deppe, Maintenance Tech

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Reactor Safety Arena

Salem and Hope Creek continued to receive a significant amount of NRC review in response to concerns regarding the work environment at the station. The January 28, 2004 letter to their CEO on work environment had a significant impact on that site. In a February 27, 2004, letter, PSEG described a multifaceted approach for assessing and improving the work environment. The approach included: an evaluation of the results of a contracted survey in December 2003 of the work environment at all three units; a peer review from Utility Services Alliance that included planned evaluations and targeted interviews of various on-site groups; and a review by an Independent Assessment Team (IAT) that used preliminary results from the first two efforts in guiding further activities needed to identify potential causes of the work environment concerns. The IAT, which was staffed as an independent organization led by an outside executive, also planned a large number of interviews of plant staff and management, including senior corporate management. A lengthy March 18 management meeting was held with the utility to discuss their initial assessment of the work environment. The public was given an opportunity to ask questions at the completion of the meeting. A follow-up public meeting is scheduled for June.

The region elevated to senior agency management several policy issues related to the June 2004 IP3 emergency exercise. Preparations for this exercise, which will include a terrorist scenario, have continued to require significant regional resources. Coordination meetings were held with FEMA, the State, associated New York counties, and the utility. NRC project and communication teams have been formed to facilitate internal communications and decision-making. Other significant resource expenditures for Indian Point included regional preparations for a site-wide strike (averted by a settlement on the final day), a public allegation regarding cable separation, and the finalization of a deviation memo for continued heightened oversight. The special inspection on cable separation is continuing.

The region held end-of-cycle assessment meetings for all plants. Indian Point 2, Beaver Valley 1&2, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2, Millstone 2 and Salem 1 were in the Regulatory Response column of the Action Matrix. All other plants were in the Licensee Response column. Seven (?) substantive cross-cutting findings were identified, or remained open - all in problem identification and resolution. The region prepared Q&A on significant topics to prepare managers for the public annual assessment meetings. Vermont Yankee's meeting, which was conducted along with a meeting on the plant's proposed extended power uprate, had over 500 people present.

Numerous plants had spring outages. Significant issues resulting from these outages included: a loss of shutdown cooling at Seabrook, steam dryer cracks at Vermont Yankee, a partial loss of shutdown cooling at Calvert Cliffs, damage to a residual heat removal line at Hope Creek, and the recent identification of missing fuel segments at Vermont Yankee. The region performed an in-depth review of the loss of shutdown cooling events, and is sharing risk insights on these shutdown events with the program office.

Finally, several plants have experienced significant management changes this quarter. Peach Bottom, Nine Mile Point 1&2, and the Salem/Hope Creek sites have seen a higher than normal turnover. These sites have also been challenged by numerous events over the last half-year.-