

Release All

Enclosure 1

The NRC has received information regarding the performance of certain activities at Salem that may be not meet acceptable station standards, procedures and practices in the maintenance area. The concerns are listed below.

Statement of Concern(s):

1. Certain first line supervisors in maintenance department have been pressured to inappropriately close work orders for as-found testing of both safety and non-safety related relief valves without all specified work being completed prior to closing out the work order.
2. In one instance, a union chief was told not to write notifications regarding broken equipment; specifically, he identified that certain service water gates and valves were not installed correctly nor did they operate as designed and was told not to write a notification on the problem.
3. In March 2003, during a forced outage, rub marks were observed on an auxiliary (aux) impeller for the "B" reactor recirculation pump that could have been due to clearance problems between the aux impeller and stuffing box which would have necessitated that an internal pump inspection. Management disagreed with the need for an internal inspection and considered it a business decision. However, the notification written on this issue was never updated with management's rationale on why it was acceptable to postpone corrective action.
4. There is a critical problem in the stocking and maintaining of spare parts. Many safety related repair and maintenance activities can not be adequately completed without significant refurbishment and/or machining of old parts or similar parts because the needed parts are not available in the warehouse. This includes even minimal cost items such as gaskets, nuts, and bolts. Groups of people in the warehouse, others in the procurement group, and union planners have all stated that repair parts and other critical spares that maintenance needs to do safety-related work are routinely sent back to the wholesaler or manufacturer to limit in-house inventory to minimize PSEG's taxes.
5. A Level 1 notification was written because of abuses in the work control process in the planning and implementation of work orders and it never has been adequately addressed.
6. Station personnel are afraid to identify tagging errors that involved human errors because they fear that someone will get in trouble and that nothing will get fixed.

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